House Of Commons
Monday, 30th March, 1874.
MINUTES.]—SUPPLY— considered in Committee—ARMY ESTIMATES; NAVY ESTIMATES.
PUBLIC BILLS— Ordered— First Heading—Building Societies * [55]; Prison Ministers Act (1S63) Amendment * [58]; Archbishops und Bishops (Appointment and Consecration) * [56]; Poor Belief (Ireland) * [57]; Fines, Fees and Penalties * [59]; Conveyancing and Land Transfer (Scotland) * [60]; Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Act (1870) Amendment (No. 2)* [61]; Local Government Provisional Orders'* [62].
Second Reading—Public Works Loan Commissioners (Loans to School Boards)* [46]: Cattle Disease (Ireland)* [52].
Considered as amended—Middlesex Sessions* [29].
Metropolitan Board Of Works Bill (By Order)
Second Reading
Order for Second Reading read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time,"—( Colonel Hogg.)
, who had given Notice of an Amendment "that the Bill be read the second time that day six months," said, that he did not intend to press that Motion, as he had boon able to come to an arrangement with the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board with reference to the Bill, which dealt with multifarious matters, He left that part of it which related to Finsbury Park to the hon. Members for Finsbury. The provisions in it to which he objected threw upon the metropolitan rates the cost of certain structures which were erected in Hyde Park and on the Holborn Viaduct by the Metropolitan Board of Works on the occasion of the National Thanksgiving in 1872. Objection to these erections at the public cost had been taken at the time by the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho), and himself (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice.) Notwithstanding that, the expenditure took place, and upon the objection of several ratepayers it was disallowed by the Auditor; but owing to a flaw in the Metropolis Local Management Act it was not easy to recover the amount so disallowed. Recourse was then had to the Court of Chancery and at this moment a suit was pending on the subject. Hence his chief ground of objection to the Bill, for it seemed to him that for that House to step in when a suit was pending in the Court of Chancery, and by an off-hand use of its jurisdiction practically to prevent the Master of the Polls giving his decision, was a most unheard-of proceeding. It was the 20th clause of the Bill which proposed that the sum disallowed by the Auditor should be paid out of the rates. The 21st clause, so far as he could understand, proposed that the Metropolitan Board of Works should have power to impose similar charges in future, for it relieved the Members of the Board of Works from all personal liability for any act whatever done by the direction of the Board, and the 22nd clause, which consisted of six sub-sections, gave an appeal to the Board from the decision of the Auditor to the Court of Queen's Bench; and by the fifth clause an alternative appeal to the Secretary of State. He (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) had gone into this matter with the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board (Colonel Hogg), who had met him, he must say, in the most frank, fair and straightforward manner, and had immediately agreed that this alternative appeal to the Secretary of State should be given up in toto, and that the power of appeal given by the 22nd clause should be extended to every ratepayer in the Metropolis, so as to give the same rights to ratepayers against the Board, as it now gave to the Board against the ratepayers. The Chairman of the Board had also agreed to give up the 21st Clause entirely, and to insert words at the end of Clause 20 providing—
Each party to the suit would bear its own costs. The Board saw that they had made a mistake, and he now thanked the Chairman for the honourable way in which he had met him in the matter. The suitors had agreed to the compromise, believing it to be a fair one, and were prepared to withdraw from the suit in Chancery. Under these circumstances he trusted that the House would allow him to withdraw the Amendment of which he had given Notice. At the same time, he wished to point out the practical inconvenience of which this Bill was a fresh instance, of mixing up heterogeneous matters in an "omnibus" Bill, and of incorporating important public legislation in what was only a Private Bill."That nothing in this Bill contained shall give any powers to the Metropolitan Board of Works, Vestries, or District Boards to incur expenses and charge thorn to the rates beyond those contained in any existing Acts."
also bore testimony to the very fair manner in which the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works had agreed to strike out all that was most objectionable in that part of the Bill to which the noble Lord had referred, and especially that portion of it which appeared to give power to impose on the rates in future expenditure similar to that which the Auditor had disallowed. It had also been agreed that Clause 22 should be modified, so as to give a fair and equal right of appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench both to the ratepayers and to the Board against the decision of the Auditor. He was, on the whole, satisfied with the agreement that had been come to, and therefore thought the noble Lord had exercised wise discretion in not moving his Amendment.
said, he objected to that part of the Bill which related to Finsbury Park, and had no other course but to oppose the Bill altogether. He objected to that part of the Bill, because, as described in the "title," it contained powers nominally to make a road "near" Finsbury Park, when, in fact, it proposed to make an encroachment on the limited area of 126 acres set apart for the public. He had no other means of protecting his constituents but to move that the Bill be read a second time that day six months. The word "near" meant outside, not inside, and in this respect the Bill was delusive. If the House overlooked measures with deceptive and misleading titles like the present, he should like to be informed where they would come to in a short time. This was by no means a new question. It had been fought before both in the last and the preceding Parliament. It would be a gross and a glaring injustice if the Bill wore allowed to pass in its present form. The road which the Board of Works sought powers to make was through a portion of the Park, and not, as the Bill would lead people to believe, near its boundary. He hoped the House would support his Amendment and negative the second reading.
seconded the Amendment.
Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."—( Mr. W. M. Torrens.)
asked the House not to refuse to give a second reading to the Bill. With regard to the word "near" used in the title of the Bill, and objected to by the hon. Member for Finsbury as deceptive and misleading, he would beg to point out that a Bill was not construed only by its title, and he would assure the House that in framing that title the Metropolitan Board of Works had no intention to deceive or mislead Parliament or the public. He trusted that the Bill would be permitted to go before a Select Committee and be tried in duo form. Being an "omnibus" Bill this was all the more essential, inasmuch as apart altogether from the question of the Finsbury Park Road, the measure was designed to deal with other important matters, such as the inclusion of the South Hornsey district in the metropolitan system of sewage, and the improvement at Newington Butts, where a church was to be removed and the thoroughfare widened. The Metropolitan Board had no wish to take away from Finsbury Park any portion of the ground of which it was originally proposed that it should consist. By the Act of 1857, 116 acres were set apart for the Park, out of which 20 were allotted for building ground; but, instead of building on those 20 acres, the Board decided on having them thrown into the Park He might add that the Bill of 1857 was opposed in the strongest manner by certain landowners, to whom concessions had to be made. The Board gave them rights of way through the Park; but the landowners who had pasture-lands to the west and north insisted on the Park being kept open by night as well as by day. Now, in the daytime it was found very inconvenient by the women and children who frequented the Park that cattle should be driven through it at all sorts of hours; while during the night cases of immorality were frequent—he could give an idea of the extent of this evil by the statement that there had been about 40 cases of prosecution within the last 12 months. The road now proposed skirting the Park on the northern and western sides, would not only be a great convenience to the neighbourhood, but would help, by providing a more direct and better lighted access, and by enabling the gates to be closed at night, to diminish those cases of immorality which had been so much complained of. That was an evil which the Board deemed it to be their duty to use their best exertions to remove, and the whole ground which would be taken away from the enjoyment of the public in order to secure that object would not be more than four and a-half acres. As to the question of the construction of seats in Hyde Park and the Holborn Viaduct on the occasion of Thanksgiving Day, and the disallowance of the expenses by the Auditor, he could assure the House that the Metropolitan Board of Works had never proposed to themselves to erect any structures upon ground outside their own jurisdiction. He would state exactly what the facts were. Previous to the Thanksgiving Day it was notified to the Board that Her Majesty intended to return along the Embankment, and they, as the local authority, had to consider what it became them to do on such an occasion. After due deliberation the Board decided to erect seats, not for themselves as had been stated, for they had places in St. Paul's, but for the accommodation of members of vestries, and district boards. Contracts were entered into, the timber was on the ground, and the work actually begun when it was notified that, the route had been changed. Under these circumstances great disappointment would have been caused, and a considerable sum of money wasted, had not Mr. Ayrton, the First Commissioner of Works, kindly offered a site in Hyde Park which was gladly accepted, and the stands were transferred to Hyde Parle from the Embankment. He thought the Metropolitan Board of Works had ample precedents for what they had done. He held a list of 10 in his hand, but would only mention three. In 1863, when the Princess of Wales, then the Princess Alexandra, made her triumphant entry into London, seats of a similar character to those which had been disallowed were erected. The expenditure on that occasion was allowed by the Auditor, and no one made any objection. Again, in 1865, on the opening of the Sewage Works, in the presence of the Prince of Wales and Members of both Houses of the Legislature, and in 1870, when the Victoria Embankment was opened by His Royal Highness, seats were erected, and the Auditor then also allowed the expenses. No doubt the Auditor had disallowed the expenditure incurred on the occasion of Thanksgiving Day, and a few ratepayers thought it their duty to put the Metropolitan Board of Works in Chancery for the purpose of compelling them to pay the amount out of their own pockets. But, in the face of the House of Commons, he said it was not fair to so mulct a body of gentlemen who had devoted their time and talent gratuitously to the public concerns, and with what success those who looked at what had been done throughout London for the last 16 years would be able to judge. Perhaps, misled by the precedents, the Metropolitan Board had erred in this expenditure: perhaps, on the other hand, the Auditor—a most honourable man-had erred in disallowing it, and what the Bill proposed was that for the future where the Auditor disallowed any amount there should be an appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench. If the Bill went before a Committee, the Board of Works would be prepared to go fairly into the discussion of that question; but they determined boldly to come before the House of Commons, in the confident hope that, if they had erred in following precedent in this matter they should not appeal in vain to it, not to permit the error of the body to be turned into an injustice to the members.
pointed out that, with regard to the proposed new road at Pins-bury Park, there was a serious discrepancy between the clause in the Bill and the details of the plan. Instead of skirting the Park, it appeared from the plan that the road would go straight through it, and would consequently take away a great portion of the laud which otherwise would belong to the Park. An inaccuracy of this description ought, at all events, to be removed before the Bill was allowed to pass the second reading. There had already been a good deal of land taken away from the Park. First it had contained 250 acres, then it had dropped down to 116, and afterwards 20 more had been taken away. Taking this melancholy position of the Park into consideration, he thought the House should, as far as possible, protect the public from the course which the Metropolitan Board of Works was now taking.
said, the proposed road was described in the Bill as "near" and as "skirting Finsbury Park on the northern and western sides;" whereas, when he came to look at the plans, he found that it encroached very considerably on the Park, destroying two cricket grounds which to the great advantage of the neighbourhood at present existed. A very strong feeling prevailed in Finsbury against this encroachment. It was mite unnecessary to make a new road; for if the present one were properly fenced and lighted a great deal would be done to check the immorality unfortunately existing in the Park, and thus one of the chief objects in view would be met. For his own part, he should give the Bill every opposition in his power.
said, he hoped that, after the expression of opinion which had been elicited from both sides of the House, the objection to the second reading of the Bill would not be pressed. It was necessary that some forbearance should be shown by hon. Members who objected to particular parts of the Bill, in order that the passing of others to which no objection was made might not be jeopardized. Surely, the most convenient course would be to have the Bill considered by a Committee, which could have the various plans before it to which reference had been made, and without which the House could hardly arrive at a satisfactory solution of the different questions involved. He saw no reason to fear that the Metropolitan Board of Works Mould not act in a considerate spirit with regard to parts of the Bill that might be found to be objectionable. The House should, at the same time, bear in mind that while the Metropolitan Board had engaged to withdraw some of the provisions to which objection had been raised, there was nothing to bind the Committee from striking out any of the remaining clauses if they should think proper. As to the new road to which reference had been made, he thought there was a great deal to be said in its favour, It would be the means of withdrawing from the Park the general traffic which rendered it necessary to keep the present road open during the night, and if this result were obtained it would be possible to take steps that would promote decency and propriety in the Park. Perhaps the correct description of the proposed road was not that it skirted the Park, or ran through it, but that it passed through the skirts of the Park. This matter, like others, could be satisfactorily investigated in Committee after the second reading. He trusted the hon. Member for Finsbury (Mr. Torrens) would not press his Amendment.
Question, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question," put, and agreed to.
Main Question put, and agreed to.
Bill read a second time, and committed.
Local Rating—Rating Of Government Property—Question
asked the First Lord of the Treasury, If it is the intention of the Government to introduce a Bill this Session to make property used for Government purposes assessable to Local Rates?
, in reply, said, the subject was under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, and that after Easter they would be able to give a more definite reply on the subject.
Building Act Of 1844—Legislation
Question
asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether, in view of the unrepealed sections of the Building Act of 1844 coming into operation in August next, the Government proposes to legislate on the subject according to the recommendations contained in the Report of the Select Committee made last year?
It is the intention of the Government to legislate upon the subject in the present Session, and, I may add—but speaking generally only—in the spirit of the Report of the Committee.
Post Office—Ireland—Money Order Offices—Question
asked the Postmaster General. If it is intended to extend Telegraphic Communication to those Money Order Offices throughout Ireland not already provided with such accommodation; and, if so, how soon it will be completed?
, in reply, said, that some of the Money Order Offices were not of sufficient importance to have telegraphic communication. Others were; but he could not say when the communication would be complete in their cases. Five-sixths of the Money Order Offices in Ireland had telegraphic communication now, which was above the proportion of England and Scotland.
Metropolis—The Green Park
Question
asked the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works, If his attention has been drawn during the past week to the noxious condition of the Main Sewer running under Piccadilly into the Green Park; and whether, in view of the approaching summer, it is the intention of his Board to take steps to remedy an annoyance so prejudicial to the public health?
, in reply, said, the nuisance of which the noble Lord complained did not arise from any sewer under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Board of Works. It arose from a small parochial sewer. He had called the attention of the Vestry of St. George, Hanover Square, to the matter, with a view to the abatement of the nuisance.
India—The Kirwee Prize Money
Question
asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether the final accounts of the Kirwee Booty, which have been so long under preparation, will be ready to be presented to the House be Core Whitsuntide?
, in reply, said, a letter had been addressed to the Indian Government asking them to expedite the consideration of the final accounts of the Kirwee booty. He could not say exactly when the accounts would be received; but they would be laid on the Table as early as possible.
Charges On The Consolidated Fund—Question
asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he has any objection to lay upon the Table, together with Estimates of the Supply Services at the commencement of the financial year, a statement of the probable charges on the Consolidated Fund, so as to give a complete view of the probable expenditure of the current year?
, in reply, said, he thought such a statement would be very useful, and he had given directions that one should be prepared. He should be prepared to lay it upon the Table of the House before the Budget.
Medical Officers Of Health
Question
asked the Secretary to the Local Government Board, If he can state when a Return relating to Medical Officers of Health and Inspectors of Nuisances, moved for on the 1st of July last, and ordered to be printed, will be laid upon the Table?
, in reply, said, he was sorry that the hon. Gentleman had had to wait so long for the Return; but it would be in the hands of Members in a short time.
Scotland—The Sasine Office, Eainburgh—Question
asked the Lord Advocate, Whether, under the circumstances of the expenses of the Sasine Office in Edinburgh during the last year being only £15,870, while the fees drawn were £32,526 16s. 11d., he will take the claims of owners of lands and heritages in Scotland thus burdened into favourable consideration, and deal with them in the promised legislation connected with Scotland?
When I introduced, in 1868, the Bill for concentrating in Edinburgh all the Registers of Sasines in Scotland, it was with the hope, among other things, that the cost of registration would be materially reduced, especially in regard to properties of small value. I have now the satisfaction to say that that hope has been realized, and that the consideration to the owners of lands and heritages in Scotland which my hon. Friend desires has already been shown, in so far as the reduction of fees of registration is con-corned. By a new table of fees, com- mencing as from the 1st of April, 1873, and now in operation—being No. 147 of the Papers of last Session—no less a sum than about £15,000 was taken off the foes of registration, still leaving the establishment self-supporting after paying salaries, and with a surplus of between £1,000 and £2,000 to meet contingencies. The reductions have been chiefly on the expense of registration of small properties valued under £5,000, as the fees for large properties were not considered excessive.
Scotland—Sheriff Principals—Glasgow And Lanarkshire
Question
asked the Lord Advocate, Whether his attention has been directed to the serious loss and inconvenience recently suffered in Glasgow and Lanarkshire generally in consequence of the absence of any provision for the appointment of an interim Sheriff Principal in cases where the holder of that office is prevented by illness from discharging his duties; and, whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government this Session to introduce any measure which will admit of such interim appointments being made?
My attention has boon directed to the circumstances referred to in the Question of the hon. Member. I am not prepared to state that there exists no power in the Court of Session to appoint an interim sheriff principal in the case of any such sheriff being prevented from discharging his duties by temporary illness, especially in the event of the Minister of the Crown giving his sanction to leave of absence to the sheriff. The Court of Session have, indeed, frequently exercised the right of making a temporary appointment of a sheriff when there was a death vacancy, and the public advantage required the office not to remain long vacant. But, as opinions to a different effect have been expressed by authorities entitled to consideration, I think it will be expedient that all difficulty should be removed in the way of preventing the loss and inconvenience caused by the temporary inability by a sheriff to discharge his duties, by vesting the power of interim appointment in Her Majesty's Government or in the Court for a limited time; and I hope this may be effected by a clause inserted in a Bill for regulating the Sheriff Courts in Scotland, or by a Bill solely having in view the remedy suggested by the hon. Member.
Criminal Law—Remission Of Sentence—Question
asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If it be true that the lad who was convicted on the 14th instant at Worship Street of cruelly killing a neighbour's oat, and who was sentenced to fourteen days' imprisonment with hard labour, has had half of the sentence remitted; and, if so, whether he will state the grounds upon which the remission was granted?
Yes, Sir; it is true that the lad who was convicted of killing a cat and sentenced to 14 days' imprisonment had half his sentence remitted. The doubt is as to the word "cruelly." On careful inquiry by the police it appears that the cat was after the boy's pigeons the boy went to drive it away and it jumped upon a wall, where the boy hit it once or twice with an iron rod and unfortunately killed it: but, apparently, he did not mean to do so, and did all he could to restore it, and beyond the blows there was no wanton act of cruelty. The Superintendent of Police further reported that the Secretary of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals said he would be happy to further the object of the memorial praying for the remission of the sentence, and on that I acted.
Hms "London"—Question
asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, When the "London," for which the Vote was taken on Saturday last, would be put into commission to proceed to Zanzibar?
, in reply, said, the "London" would be ready on the 15th of April to be put into commission, though it had not yet been decided when she should be actually put into commission.
Spain—The Sloop "Lark"
Question
asked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether he is able to give him any information respecting the claims arising out of the seizure of the "Lark," and the imprisonment of the owner, crew, and passengers by the Spanish authorities in Cuba?
, in reply, said, the questions arising out of the case were referred in June last by Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid to the Spanish Government. No further information had been since received, except that the claims had been referred by the Government of Spain to the Captain General of Cuba, with a view to obtaining his remarks upon them.
Ireland—Peace Preservation Act
Question
asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, If he intends to direct any relaxation in the application of those clauses of the Peace Preservation Act which restrict Irish farmers in the possession of fowling-pieces?
, in reply, said, the hon. and gallant Member appeared to desire that fowling-pieces should be exceptionally treated, and that persons who might not be considered fit subjects for licences to carry arms generally might possess fowling-pieces and use them without licences. As far as he was at present advised, he thought such a course would not be a wise one to adopt, even if it were possible. It would not be easy to distinguish between what was called a fowling-piece and what was not. A fowling-piece might be used to carry bullets as well as shot, and he was afraid the history of the many outrages in Ireland would show that it was with these weapons that many of those outrages had been committed. Every reasonable facility ought to be given to Irish farmers to obtain licences for the carrying of arms of the description mentioned in the Question. Much had been done already in this direction, and he should be glad if anything further could be done for giving these facilities.
Criminal Law—The Fentan Prisoners—Question
asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If he has any objection to lay upon the Table of the House a Return of the names of the twenty prisoners mentioned in his statement as still suffering punishment for offences connected with Fenianism, specifying as to each prisoner the date of the sentence, the offence for which he was tried, the court before which the trial took place, the nature of the sentence, and the place of his present confinement?
, in reply, said, that from time to time various Returns had been made respecting the persons who wore in custody for offences such as the hon. Member had alluded to. He had no objection to order similar Returns, though not in the terms suggested in the Question. Before the hon. Member moved for the Returns he should be happy to confer with him on the subject.
Ashantee War
Vote Of Thanks To The Forces
Mr. Speaker—The state of affairs on the Gold Coast at the commencement of last October was gloomy in the extreme. The Protectorate was entirely overrun by the enemy, who pressed in force even to the immediate neighbourhood of our own Settlements. There was great dissatisfaction among all the Native tribes, and the friendly Chiefs were in a state of utter despondency and inaction. The situation of affairs was not only unsatisfactory, it might have been described as disastrous had it not been for the efforts of a handful of blue-jackets and Marines, whose valiant energy saved in fact the whole of our subjects and those who depended upon us from being swept, I may say, from the Coast. Fortunately these men wore commanded in each Service by a man equal to the occasion. Colonel Festing, who commanded the Marines, and Captain Fremantle, who commanded the Sailors, showed that they possessed the same mettle which animated those who afterwards marched to Coomassie. But, Sir, it must be obvious that, with only a few hundred men, in the face of a foe that might be counted, not by thousands, but by tens of thousands, the result of their efforts must necessarily be limited. Yet they succeeded in checking and controlling the enemy, and during the eight months which thus elapsed between the commencement of the year and the beginning of October, with these limited resources, they had achieved and accomplished several considerable consequences. They had, in the first place, regained Elmina; in the second place, they had removed the pressure of invasion from Capo Coast Castle; and, thirdly, they had succeeded in establishing two fortified out-posts, which ultimately proved of singular value and service to Sir Garnet Wolseley when he prepared and consummated his triumphant march. At the commencement of the month of October Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived. He was sent out by the Government with full powers, military and civil. He was not only commander of the Army, but also the chief Administrator of the Settlements. He went without troops, because it was then the plan of the Government that the war should be carried on by Native levies. But he wont accompanied by a numerous, a well-selected, and a most efficient staff, every member of which subsequently greatly distinguished himself. Of course, Sir Garnet Wolseley's first object was to assemble the Native Chiefs, and to make his arrangements for raising those Native levies with which the war was to be conducted. The subsidies and terms which he offered appear to me to have been tempting. They wore liberal; they were adapted to the customs and the wishes of the population to whom they were addressed; and at the first glance it might have been hoped that they would have been successful. That they were entirely a failure I will not now say; because in the subsequent proceedings—as hon. Members, who have doubtless followed these events with the deepest interest, must have seen—there were bodies of Native troops officered by Englishmen who really did good service to the State. Hon. Members are now familiar with the name of Rait's Artillery, Russell's Regiment, and Wood's Regiment—regiments officered by Englishmen and commanded by Englishmen, but consisting entirely, as to rank and file, of Native troops. Yet Sir Garnet Wolseley, a man possessing great knowledge of human nature as well as of military science, soon perceived that there were not in the population of the Gold Coast materials that would enable him to accomplish the purpose of the Government. This conviction must have been rapidly arrived at by that distinguished man, because he found himself, for the first time, on the Gold Coast, on the 2nd of October, and it was in the middle of that month—as early, I think, as the 14th—that he wrote to the Government, and informed them that the business could not be done without British troops. That appeal of Sir Garnet Wolseley was answered by Her Majesty's Government with laudable promptitude. Not a moment was lost in giving orders that some of the flower of the English Army should be despatched to that part of the world. A battalion of the Rifle Brigade, a battalion of the Welsh Fusiliers, and one of the most distinguished of the Highland regiments were among the troops sent out. But it required a space of two months before these troops—although not an hour had been lost in ordering them to repair to the Gold Coast—could make their appearance where they were needed. What had occurred during that space of time, from the middle of October to the beginning of December? In the first place, Sir Garnet Wolseley, at the head of a force of Marines, and a Naval Brigade, commanded by Captain Fremantle, successfully attacked and destroyed settlements and villages on the coast from which the chief army of the Ashantees—who were encamped probably about 14 miles in the interior—received their principal supplies. This was a successful expedition, and had, ultimately, considerable consequences. In the second place, great progress was made in the military road which was constructing from Cape Coast Castle to the kingdom of Ashantee; and, in touching upon that point, I would ask the House for a moment to form some conception of the labour of constructing such a road. These settlements on the Gold Coast are towns built upon a surf-beaten shore, guarded generally by a citadel or castle. Touching the immediate precincts of these towns, what is called "the Bush" commences. The bush was originally an African forest. An African forest consists of trees of a colossal size. These trees, for purposes of domestic or other use, had been cut down; but the undergrowth remains, and on the average it is from 10 feet to 16 feet high, and quite impenetrable. There were paths through this bush which led into the interior, but there were no roads. This bush extends over a portion of territory which stretches in- wards on the average to about 30 miles, when, it ceases, and the primeval forest re-commences. Then you find yourself in a dense forest, consisting of those wonderful productions of tropical vegetation and those enormous trees to which I have adverted; and in the middle of this forest there flows a river—the River Prah—which is the limit and boundary, not only by custom, but by Treaty—which we entered into in 1831—between the Protectorate and the Kingdom of Ashantee. Sir Garnet Wolseley had stopped the chief supplies of the Ashantee Army, and he had already made great progress with the construction of the military road, which was of course, an achievement indispensable to his ultimate success. About this time the chief of the Ashantee Army, which was in great force and was once supposed to be as numerous as 30,000 warriors, probably inconvenienced by losing some of his resources—perhaps his main resources—and probably also encouraged by the inaction of his opponents, suddenly determined to attack one of our chief outposts. It was garrisoned by Native forces known as Russell's regiment, and by about 50 sailors, who were strongly intrenched there. For a whole day this little garrison bore themselves up manfully against the attacks of the enemy, and on the second day Sir Garnet Wolseley, having received information of the state of affairs, arrived at the head of such force as he could get together—chiefly Marines and Sailors—and a considerable engagement took place, lasting two days, and ending in the complete defeat of the Ashantee Army. From that moment the retreat of the enemy commenced. It was not for some time believed; it was, for a considerable period, thought to be only a feint; but authentic information at last convinced those who were at head-quarters that the army of the King of Ashantee was in full and regular retreat from the Protectorate. Then it was that some attempt was made to harass their roar; and to take advantage of so inviting a circumstance in war as a retreat, by means of such Native levies as we possessed. But this was not a very encouraging or successful move. Commanded as they were by English officers, the most unfortunate consequence was that the officers were generally the victims. Many were wounded, and it was in these continual skirmishes, occasioned by the retreat of the Ashantees, that, after an exhibition of valour which must excite the admiration of all, there fell, I am sorry to say, the gallant son of a respected Member of this House (Lieutenant Eardley Wilmot.) The Ashantee Army must have arrived on the banks of the Prah about the end of November—I think it was on the 27th—and two or three days were occupied by them in passing the river. So that, before the troops could arrive from England which Sir Garnet Wolseley had called upon Her Majesty's Government to send him, the invasion of the Protectorate had ended and realty ceased, and the army of the King of Ashantee was in the Kingdom of Ashantee. When these troops had arrived, it was impossible for Sir Garnet Wolseley to avail himself immediately of the forces which he then possessed. The road was not yet finished, and immense difficulty was experienced in obtaining carriers for ammunition and the commissariat—carriers necessary in a country where there are no beasts of burden. Complaints have been made of the neglect shown in not finishing the road before the British troops arrived. But if the matter is examined there will be be found no ground for this charge, which I have often seen in the newspapers, quoted against the Government and against others the fact is, that as long as the Protectorate was occupied by the army of the King of Ashantee, it was impossible to work upon the road except under great difficulty, or to afford sufficient protection to the Engineers, with the limited force we then had. The instant, however, that the Ashantee Army had crossed the Prah, and retired from the Protectorate, the whole country became clear for the operations of our Engineers, and the work was prosecuted with the utmost energy. But the road was not completed at the time the troops arrived, and, what with the want of the road and what with the want of carriers, those who were responsible for the conduct of affairs were placed in a most difficult position, because to land the troops in that country entailed great risks—which indeed were under any circumstances inevitable—and troops had to embark and re-embark, and again find themselves upon the water, even after they had reached the Coast. Nevertheless, affairs went on. Sir Garnet Wolseley and his head-quarters were at the limit of the Protectorate—at Prahsu, on the banks of the Prah—arriving there on the 15th; and from these head-quarters he addressed to the then Secretary of State his plan of campaign, which was as follows:—He proposed to invade the Kingdom of Ashantee by four columns. The chief force he himself commanded. Upon his extreme right Captain Glover—who had been appointed Commissioner by the Colonial Office to aid in this war—was to lead a column of Native troops, and find himself on the Prah, if possible, by January 15. Between Captain Glover, who was about 40 miles from Sir Garnet Wolseley, who was upon the main road, and the Commander-in-Chief, Captain Butler, was to lead another column of Native troops; and on the left of Sir Garnet Wolseley, Captain Dalrymple was also to lead a column of Native troops. It so happened that the Native levies upon which Captain Butler and Captain Dalrymple depended wore, in a warlike point of view, of little value to us. The men assembled, but on the first sign of combat they vanished; and nothing but the great ability and energy of the two English officers prevented, perhaps, disasters. But we should err greatly if we believed that no good effects resulted from this plan of the campaign, and from these too quickly vanishing columns of Captain Butler and Captain Dalrymple. They acted admirably in their respective positions as diversions, diminishing the pressure which would otherwise have been brought to bear upon Sir Garnet Wolseley and the main body. And that is shown by the fact that of the six great tributary Chiefs of whom the Ashantee Kingdom was composed, two, whose districts were invaded by these columns, of which they had received notice, retired each with his force to his own country in consequence. Captain Glover, who was 40 miles distant from Sir Garnet Wolseley, was more fortunate than either Captain Butler or Captain Dalrymple. He kept his men together, on the whole, pretty well. At one time he anticipated that he would be at the head of thousands, for he seems to have a marvellous power of influencing these tribes. Many of them deserted and disappeared; but still he was not wanting at the critical moment, to which, before I sit down, I may perhaps for an instant allude. On the 15th of January Sir Garnet Wolseley had communicated his plan of campaign to Her Majesty's Government. On the 20th he passed the Prah. For the first ton days matters remained in an ambiguous and, on the whole, somewhat unsatisfactory state. On passing this river, the House must understand that our forces were still in a forest. Those battles to which I shall now have occasion to allude were battles in a forest—they were battles with a powerful and almost invisible foe. The King of Ashantee appears to have thought, on the withdrawal of his troops and giving up the invasion of the Protectorate, that the war had ceased. It never occurred to him that there would be another invasion, and that, the invasion of his own territories. When, therefore, he heard we had crossed the Prah, it became necessary for him to re-assemble his troops, and, considering they had been out for two campaigns and were naturally weary and exhausted, that was no easy task. It was most essential, therefore, for the King to gain time, and while we advanced, messengers were perpetually coming, commencing negotiations and offering terms. But throughout these proceedings the Commander of the British Forces was served with excellent intelligence. It is difficult to conceive how in such a country the Commander-in-Chief could have been so well served. De soon convinced himself of the falsity of the King's overtures, and became satisfied from the mode in which these men carry on war that a trying moment was at hand. At last that trying moment arrived, and he found himself, I can scarcely say in the face of the Ashantee Army in their first line, because he was still in a forest and the enemy were invisible, but the whole of the British forces seemed to be surrounded by foes and were assailed and fired upon all around. It required the instinct of military genius to be able to conceive where the enemy were placed, and how to dispose his forces under such circumstances. The battle which ensued lasted 12 hours. It was conducted with the utmost fury and determination on the part of the enemy; but at last their fire slackened, our troops advanced, and they bivouacked upon the very spot—I think on the night of the 31st of January or the 1st of February—where the enemy had been strongly intrenched and so advantageously posted. This battle has been, as the House is aware, called the battle of Amoaful. On the night following the battle, the position of Sir Garnet Wolseley must have been one of extreme anxiety. He felt he was dealing with a foe who were desperate, and who would make any sacrifices to arrest his course. The lives of 100 Ashantees would willingly have been given for the life of one white man, and he might apprehend, if this obstinate resistance were persisted in, not that he might not ultimately reach Coomassie, but that he might reach it at a most dangerous period of the year, with his forces so much diminished that he would be in extreme peril. Besides his losses in battle he had to establish as he advanced a considerable number of armed posts, each of which reduced the forces immediately available. It was then for him to determine what line he would pursue. To retreat would have been disastrous. Our Native levies would certainly have then disappeared; the carriers would have run away An English soldier is invincible, except;, perhaps, under one condition, and that is retreat: and if an enemy had been pressing him in all directions, and feeling their own lives to be as nothing compared with the object of destroying their foe, such a state of things might have led to the utmost disaster. Sir Garnet Wolseley decided, therefore, on the boldest course, to continue his march to Coomassie, as the least of two dangers. The enemy fought for two days after this, contesting every mile of ground. For two days Sir Garnet Wolseley advanced, having rested on the field of the great engagement for 24 hours, and on the 3rd day he arrived at the River Orda, where the Ashantee Army was in force, commanded by the King himself, and another pitched battle was fought. It did not last as long as the battle of Amoaful; but it was maintained for more than six hours, and the enemy fought with great obstinacy. At length the King fled. From that moment the Ashantees gave up all hope, and Sir Garnet Wolseley, at the head of his forces, entered the capital of the Ashantee Kingdom. The House is well aware of the important event which then occurred. I believe it was a wise and necessary step. Time had been so calculated that there were not 24 hours to be wasted. The campaign, indeed, had no longer to be calculated by days, but really by hours. That great change in the climate and in the appearance of nature common to those tropical countries at particular seasons had already commenced. The Prah is a river which in ordinary times is, perhaps, only three or four feet deep and fordable by troops. After the first tornado it is often 10 feet deep. Sir Garnet Wolseley, therefore, took those steps which he believed would best insure the result that he desired under the circumstances, which was to make a great impression upon the population of the country, to aim as decisive a blow as possible at the prestige of the Ashantee monarch; and, having done this, he made up his mind to retire. He retired unmolested. The nature of the climate rendered it necessary that he should send on the English troops without a moment's loss of time, and he himself followed more leisurely with the Native levies alone. Pleased he must have been with the admirable conduct of those whom he led; pleased we all must be; but, perhaps, some were disappointed that he had not succeeded in obtaining that Treaty for which he had been so frequently in negotiation with the ruler of Ashantee. It was at this time, having proceeded in his march from Coomassie some 20 or 30 miles, that he was surprised by receiving messengers from the King accepting all his terms, and offering to enter into a Treaty, which, so far as Treaties can, would secure all Sir Garnet Wolseley's objects. How was this brought about? By the successful movement of Captain Glover, who at the head of his Native levies, 40 miles distant originally from Sir Garnet Wolseley, now threatened the panic-stricken monarch of Ashantee in his rear. When the King found himself thus menaced by another force, he offered to yield to all the conditions. The House is well aware that we have no authentic accounts that this formal Treaty has been concluded, nor do we know exactly the state of affairs at Cape Coast; but I must express my belief that though we have not yet heard that this Treaty has been entered into, it is by no means hopeless. I cannot help thinking that such operations as have been carried on could not have been accomplished without bringing about considerable consequences and working beneficial changes in the relations between this country and African Sovereigns. I have endeavoured to place before the House, in however slight a manner, yet I hope not inaccurately, and without wearying hon. Members with too many details, a general view of the remarkable operations which have been performed in Africa during the course of this campaign. I am mistaken if these are not feats of arms which will not be easily forgotten in this country. I know it has always been a vulgar error to associate military glory only with armies of great magnitude. But that is not a just view to take. Some of the greatest military feats have been performed by very small armies. In modern history, nothing, perhaps, is more illustrative of this truth than the conquest of Mexico by Cortes. So great a result effected by such slight means is not easily matched in the history of man. Even in our own times—in that great continental war which occupied a great-part and the early portion of this century—when hosts counted, not only by hundreds of thousands, but by millions, were arrayed against each other—it was a small army, admirably disciplined, which, to use the word of their illustrious commander, would go anywhere—it was a small army like that, under our matchless Wellington, which really decided the fate of Europe. I am not wishing to exaggerate the gallant deeds, of which we are naturally proud, of Sir Garnet Wolseley and his brave companions. I do not mean to say that the engagements in which they took part are to be counted among the decisive battles of the world; but I think we may say of them truly that they are those deeds which thrill the hearts of households, and which, by the examples they offer of energy and endurance, sustain and strengthen the tone of a nation. Sir, I beg to move the Resolutions which are on the Notice Paper.
said: With your permission, Sir, I am very desirous to second the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman. It is quite unnecessary for me, after the ample description which the right hon. Gentleman has given of the operations on the Gold Coast, to detain the House for more than a very few moments. Everyone whom I address is sensible that we are deeply indebted to the small British force, in all its arms, which has defended the honour as well as the interests of this country in the late war. Her Majesty's Government having thought fit, upon their responsibility, to propose this Vote of Thanks to the House, I am very anxious to avail myself of the opportunity of testifying the cordiality with which, for my own part and on that of my late Colleagues, we acknowledge the magnitude of that debt, and to show the readiness with which we are prepared, and shall be prepared, to concur in every becoming form of owning and of acquitting ourselves of the obligation. An expression fell from the right hon. Gentleman in the course of his narrative with respect to which I should wish to offer a remark, applicable to the form rather than the substance of what the right hon. Gentleman said. I think he stated that, at a time when Sir Garnet Wolseley left this country, the plan of Her Majesty's Government was to prosecute hostilities by means of Native levies. In that statement the right hon. Gentleman has, perhaps, gone a little beyond, and at the same time has fallen a little short of, an actual description of the views of the Government at the time. It would be strictly accurate to say that at that moment we scarcely had what could be called a plan. The truth is that from day to day, at least with each successive arrival of intelligence, a varying state of circumstances and expectations was reported. I am bound to admit that, until Sir Garnet Wolseley was despatched, and until he had reached the Gold Coast, the amount of information which we possessed, and which, of course, must have been the basis of any determination we arrived at, was scanty; so much so, that I might even call it deplorably scanty. There were, as the House is aware, a certain limited number of British forces on the Gold Coast, and it was not until the summer was far advanced we abandoned the hope that by this force alone, acting in concurrence with that portion of the Natives who were opposed to the Ashantees, a settlement of the matter might be brought about. It was, however, thought wise in the first place to authorize the expedition of Captain Glover; and that expedition was one which, as the right hon. Gentleman has accurately stated, was to be conducted by Native forces. But, when we considered the state of things as it stood in the month of last August, it was manifest that more was required; and at that time it would have been, I think, impossible—certainly unwise and rash—to endeavour to determine either how much more, or what precise measures, were the right measures to adopt. That which appeared clear, and that upon which we decided, was that we must send to the Gold Coast the very best man we could find. The choice was made in the first instance by my noble Friend the then Secretary of State for War (Mr. Cardwell), and the then Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Kimberley), and a measure was adopted which the circumstances required, and which was the most effectual for the attainment of our end. We placed in Sir Garnet Wolseley that full and absolute confidence which has been fully and absolutely justified by the result. At the very moment when he left the shores of this country, although we were not in a condition to determine it would be right or safe to prosecute the war by means of European troops, a measure was taken which subsequently enabled us to act upon his report, and, as the right hon. Gentleman has stated, without the delay of a moment. Those battalions which have since earned such honour and distinction on the Gold Coast were at that time, and not subsequently, told off to prepare for the expedition, and the transports in which they were ultimately to sail, and in which they ultimately did sail, were likewise prepared; so that, depending as we did upon the judgment of this able officer, we might be in a condition to adopt his recommendations, to second him in his endeavours, and so with the utmost-thrift and the utmost despatch, to limit the time for the conduct of those operations. I do not wish to enter further upon that subject, because it was no part of the object of the right hon. Gentleman to describe the attitude of the late Government, and the accuracy or otherwise of their views at this or that particular moment; but he will excuse me being anxious that we should not be misunderstood as regards the measures which we adopted. I am very glad that the right hon. Gentleman, in the course of his speech, has called attention to the share which has been taken by Her Majesty's Naval Forces, and especially that he has not confined himself to noticing that portion of the Naval Force which co-operated in the final and successful movement; but that he has likewise reminded us of the gallant efforts of those who, in the worst season of the year, upon that pestilential coast, amid circumstances of the utmost discouragement, and when burdened rather than aided by a set of allies of whose character or military conduct I am afraid we can scarcely say too little, nevertheless, by their own unassisted resolution, de fended and maintained their position against the most fearful odds. With regard to the proceedings after the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley, it is in my own opinion needful to say very little. I will venture to observe that those form a very inadequate estimate of the nature of this undertaking and the difficulties that had to be encountered who regard it merely as an enterprise conducted among savage people, and who do not take into view the remarkable combination of courage, craft, and ferocity which that savage people has exhibited, the advantages which they derived from the peculiar nature of the country, and the still greater advantages they possessed from the inexorable limitations as to the time under which Sir Garnet Wolseley alone was compelled to conduct his operations. Without at all presuming to compare these military operations with other gigantic events which have occurred in our own time and in other countries, this I will venture to say, in the first place—I concur in the remark of the right hon. Gentleman opposite that nothing was more striking than the promptitude with which, from the moment of Sir Garnet Wolseley's arrival, he appeared to have mastered the secret of gathering the most searching and trustworthy information, where all before had boon darkness and uncertainty. Further, I will venture to say there are very few examples in military history of cases in which the plan of a difficult operation has been so completely conceived beforehand and, after being so completely conceived, has been executed so exactly in the manner in which it was conceived. A happy instinct, as well as a wide experience, a cultivated and intelligent as well as a gallant and manly mind, enabled the Commander of that expedition at once to take the measure of his own position; and, when he had taken it, to proceed to the execution of his plan with the most unfaltering determination, never at any moment hesitating, never at any moment finding reason to question the wisdom of the steps he had already adopted, or to doubt the result of perseverance for the full accomplishment of his measures. I am sure there has been no occasion when the House of Commons has more unanimously felt the great obligation under which it lies than to the gallant men who have been engaged in this expedition, and never has it been my fortune to make a proposal in this House with greater satisfaction than that which I now do—namely, to second the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman opposite.
said, that the speech which had been delivered by the Primo Minister had conveyed in the most appropriate manner the thanks of that Assembly to Sir Carnet Wolseley and the soldiers who had shared with him in the perils, the difficulties, and the successes of the operations on the West Coast of Africa. If that which they wore now doing were a mere complimentary business, private Members might be content to leave to the Leader of the House the task of expressing in well-chosen words the satisfaction which England had experienced in watching the conduct of her little Army during the recent campaign. But that was not a mere formal business, and private Members might be excused for a little effusion of feeling on an event which could not occur very often. Among all professions, it might be said that those who belonged to the military and naval forces of this country wore the most sensitive to the praise and blame of those in whose good opinion they desired to stand well. The frequent thought in a soldier's mind when he was engaged, thousands of miles away from home, was—"What will they say in England of the way in which we are doing this duty?" How could the House of Commons do better than encourage that noble feeling, which gave a sure guarantee that wherever English troops were engaged, and under whatever circumstances they might be placed, they would act up to the highest standard to which their strength and their endurance might enable them to attain? The war in which we had been engaged was no test of the power and military strength of the English nation, neither did it afford any sign of the patience or the endurance which English people would display in sustaining the burdens of a prolonged and arduous campaign. Our Continental friends must remember, when they expressed some surprise at the great laudations which had been common in the writing of the Press and in the speeches of our public men, that those did not indicate that we were unduly proud of having successfully matched the strength of England against that of a savage nation on the coast of Africa, but rather that we were proud—and had reason to be proud—of the handful of soldiers and sailors who had executed the difficult task assigned to them, and of the neatness and completeness with which they had performed the work the original plan of that campaign appeared to have been that it should be accomplished by sending out English officers to train and discipline the cowardly and savage tribes who hitherto had been running like sheep before their victorious and domineering neighbours. With that object in view volunteers were called for, and those who loved the Service and delighted in anything which showed its spirit and its courage, saw with pleasure the number of officers who came forward on that occasion, so that for any vacancy which offered there were 20 competitors ready to avail themselves of the opportunity. Among them there was one personally known to some in that House, probably known to all by name, for that name was a distinguished one—an officer possessing all the advantages of high position, ample wealth, and good looks, and with qualities which rendered him certain to be able to derive the full enjoyment of those blessings to the utmost of life (Lieutenant Alfred Charteris). But he preferred the rough lines of a soldier's career to remaining at home the favourite of the society of that great town. He volunteered for most arduous duty—to go on the Staff of a General about to organize an expedition such as that destined for the Gold Coast. He who approached ubiquity came nearest to what a Staff officer should be on service the Regulations allowed him three horses for his use; but on that occasion horses could not be had, and that officer had to perform all his duties on foot, which must have added greatly to his labour. Feverish nights brought no repose after weary days, and so he perished in the service of his country. Sonic consolation to his parents and his many friends was to be found in the fact that he did not die in vain. High and low had stood in the trials of that campaign, and perhaps they might be drawn closer together in consequence. The plan of operations was to discipline the savage tribes, and with them to perform the campaign. Amid many onerous and anxious labours devolving on the Leader of that House, such a task as he had performed that night must have been one of the most pleasing. The right hon. Gentleman had had the privilege of congratulating Sir Garnet Wolseley, and of thanking him and his brave comrades for having done so well and so gallantly their duty to their Queen and country, In conclusion, as a private Member, he had desired humbly to add his voice in confirmation of the vote proposed by the Prime Minister.
said, he did not rise to prolong the debate; but he must express his regret that the body of officers whose duty it had been to take care of the health of the troops engaged in that Expedition, and whose services wore unusually important on that occasion, had been in no way mentioned either in that Vote of Thanks or in the speech of the Prime Minister. It appeared to him that the medical officers in that Expedition had a special claim to consideration; and although it might have been contrary to etiquette to mention them specially, yet he ventured to think that was not an adequate reason for omitting to notice them. It was well known that on the medical policy adopted in an enterprise on that coast, the power of the troops to withstand the dangers of the climate, and thus to go successfully through their work, vitally depended.
might, perhaps, be allowed to say that it would have been out of place to mention the medical officers in the Vote of Thanks, inasmuch as other officers of the same rank were not named in it. But the hon. Member who had just sat down would observe that the thanks of the House were given to all "the other Officers of the Navy, Army, and Royal Marines who have taken part in the Operations on the Gold Coast"—terms which would embrace both the combatant and the medical officers. The rule was not to mention an officer by name unless he had held a command in the field, and it would be remarked that all who were named had been in command. He certainly did not wish to depreciate the services of the medical officers, which were most important; but some of the most distinguished officers who had taken part in the Expedition were left out by the rule on which it was usual to act in those cases. No one had read with greater pride and pleasure than he had done some of the reports of the medical officers, which reflected the greatest possible honour on them and on the Service to which they belonged.
said, he had to acknowledge his gratitude to the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government for the handsome terms in which he had spoken of the services of his gallant son (Lieutenant Eardley Wilmot). He expressed his most cordial concurrence in everything which had fallen from that right hon. Gentleman, and also from the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Gladstone), respecting the noble and heroic conduct of every officer and soldier who had taken part in the Ashantee Expedition. There was one officer, with whom he had had some personal communication, whose name he should have liked to have seen associated with the distinguished names which had been mentioned in the Resolutions before the House; but, from what had just been said by the Secretary of State for War, he felt that its omission was unavoidable. He meant Captain Rait, of the Artillery—a most zealous and deserving officer. It was well known to those who had followed the operations of the campaign on the Gold Coast, that the services of Captain Rait had contributed in no small degree to their success. Even during that hard fight which had been so well described by the First Lord of the Treasury—the action of Amoaful—they knew, from the accounts given by the newspapers and also by those who were present at the battle, that Captain Rait's rockets were extremely useful in enabling the gallant 42nd Regiment to drive the enemy through the bush and gain the victory which they won. With respect to the war itself, while he knew that every soldier who went to war must go with the full expectation of risking or losing his life, he confessed that he felt the loss he had sustained to be rather bitter when he regarded the necessity which bad induced the late Government to send out a handful of officers to the Gold Coast totally unsupported by troops. As early as January, 1873, they knew that the Ashantee Army had invaded the Protectorate, and from the tenor of the despatches sent home by Governor Henessey and by Colonel Harley in the middle of that year, the unreliable character of the Fantees ought to have been known to the then Government. There were gentlemen who well knew every portion of that country, who could have told Her Majesty's Ministers that it was worse than useless to send out gallant officers to head the Fantees. If the House would kindly permit him, he would briefly mention the circumstances under which his gallant, and might he be permitted to say, his noble son met his death. He was detached on the 3rd of November, with a party of those men, to make a re-connoissance of the enemy's camp near Dunquah, and having arrived at the appointed place at 7 o'clock in the morning, soon after received his first wound, his shoulder having been completely shattered. There was not a single white man present to assist him in working his gun, which he actually worked himself from 7 to half-past 9 o'clock, when he fell mortally wounded. Only five minutes before his death he wrote upon a slip of paper to his colonel—Colonel Festing—asking him to send him a few men of the West India Regiment, for that the men he had with him had gone; and he could not help expressing his gratitude and admiration at the heroic conduct of that gallant officer, who rushed to the spot amid a shower of slugs, caught his son in his arms—himself receiving a severe wound—and saved his body from mutilation and from being borne away by the Ashantees; and he trusted that when the distinguished honours which wore so much prized by our gallant soldiers and sailors came to be distributed, and especially that reward for bravery which bore Her Majesty's name, his right hon. Friend at the bead of the Government would not forget the heroic and noble conduct of Colonel Festing, to whom he should ever feel grateful for securing for his son a peaceful grave at Capo Coast Castle, instead of leaving his body in the hands of our barbarous enemies. He begged, in conclusion, to express his thanks to the right hon. Gentleman for his reference to his loss, as well as to the House for the manner in which they had received the mention of his son's name.
said, he was sure every hon. Member of the House would wish, on that occasion, when all were desirous to do honour to the soldiers who had been engaged in this arduous undertaking, that there should be no kind of controversy introduced, nor anything said that would tend to mar the unanimity that prevailed with regard to the object the House had in view. He only rose, with reference to what had fallen from the hon. and gallant Gentleman who had just addressed the House, to say that his right hon. Friend (Mr. Gladstone) had omitted to state that the white troops could not be sent earlier to the Gold Coast than they were, on account of the sanitary condition of the country. [Sir EARDLEY WILMOT: The officers were sent.] The officers were sent with Sir Garnet Wolseley, at his request, to take preliminary measures, to get information, and organize matters; and it would be apparent to the House that it was possible to take sanitary precautions with reference to a handful of officers which it would be impossible to take with regard to entire regiments. He wished it to be understood that when Sir Garnet Wolseley was despatched, the white troops were not sent with him—not because it was intended to carry on the war with Native allies only—but because from the nature of the climate it was unsafe to send white troops until December. As soon as the season admitted of it the European troops arrived at the Gold Coast.
rose to suggest that the £5,000 which was brought back with the greatest difficulty by his gallant friend, Sir Garnet Wolseley, from Coomassie should be considered as part of the prize, and should be distributed among the troops. The House was aware that anything in the shape of pillage was put down with the utmost severity in our Army, and the things which had been taken during the war and sold at Cape Coast had, he believed, realized but a very trifling sum. He hoped the Government would, under the circumstances, see the expediency of acting upon the suggestion which he had thrown out, following the precedent which had been set in the Abyssinian Campaign, in connection with which he had been so fortunate as to obtain the distribution of a sum of£2,000 among our soldiers and sailors. It should be borne in mind that in regard to the Ashantee Expedition, it was no more nor less than a forlorn hope on a large scale. He could not but express his regret that the usages of the House prevented the appearance of the name of any medical officer in the Vote of Thanks, because he believed that from the beginning to the end of the war nothing could equal the attention and personal gallantly displayed by every medical officer present. Dr. Home, the chief of the Medical Department, had for former services received the Victoria Cross, and was a Knight of the 15th, and he extremely regretted that the custom of the House prevented that distinguished officer's name being mentioned on this occasion.
Resolutions put, and agreed to.
Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That the Thanks of this House he given, to Major General Sir Gurnet J. Wolseley, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, for the exemplary skill with which he planned, and the distinguished courage, energy, and perseverance with which he conducted, the recent Expedition into Ashantee, resulting in the expulsion of the enemy's Army from the British Protectorate, the defeat, by Her Majesty's Forces, of the Army of the King of Ashantee, and the capture and destruction of Coomassie.
Resolved, Nemine Contradiceate, That the Thanks of this House he given to—
- Commodore John E. Commerell, Royal Navy, Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Victoria Cross;
- Commodore William N. W. Hewett, Royal Navy, Victoria Cross:
- Captain the Honourable Edmund R. Fremantle, Royal Navy, who was in temporary Command of the Squadron; and
- Colonel Francis W. Fasting, Royal Marine Artillery, who was in temporary Command of the Troops on the Gold Coast:
for the distinguished gallantry, indefatigable zeal, and great ability which they displayed in conducting the operations on the Gold Coast, and to all the above Officers for the cordial co-operation which they afforded to Her Majesty's Land Forces.
Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That the Thanks of this House be given to Brigadier General Sir Archibald Alison, Baronet, Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, and to all the other Officers of the Navy, Army, and Royal Marines who have taken part in the Operations on the Gold Coast and the. Expedition to Ashantee, for the energy, gallantry, and ability with which they have executed the various services which they have been called on to perform in a most unhealthy climate.
Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That this House doth highly acknowledge and approve the discipline, gallantry, and endurance displayed by the Petty Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Men of the Navy, Army, and Marines, whether employed in the front, on the line of communications, in reserve on land, or off the Coast; and that the same be signified to them by their respective Commanding Officers.
Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That the Thanks of this House be given to Commander John Hawley Glover, Royal Navy, for the energy, courage, and ability with which, as Her Majesty's Special Commissioner to the Eastern Tribes of the Gold Coast, and with the aid of Other gallant Officers of the Army and Navy, he led a considerable Native force from the River Volta to Coomassie, thereby largely conducing to the success of the main operations under the Major General commanding.
Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That this House acknowledges with admiration the distinguished valour and conduct of those who have perished during the operations against the Ashantees, in the service of their Country, and desires to express its deep sympathy with their relatives and friends.
Ordered, That Mr. Speaker do communicate the said Resolutions to Major General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley, and that he be requested by Mr. Speaker to signify the same to Commodore John E. Commerell, Commodore William N. W. Hewitt, Captain the Honourable Edmund R. Fremantle, Colonel Francis W. Festing, Brigadier General Sir Archibald Alison, and Commander John Hawley Glover, and to the several Officers of the Navy, Army, and Royal Marines who served in the said Expedition.—( Mr. Disraeli.)
Supply—Army Estimates
SUPPLY— considered in Committee.
(In the Committee.)
, in moving that the number of Land Forces for the Service of the United Kingdom be 128,994, said: After the interesting discussion to which we have just listened on the subject of the recent war in Ashantee, I am afraid that the somewhat detailed statement which I shall have to offer to the House will be rather distasteful; but, at the same time, those who are interested in the success of our Army such as has been achieved in that country, must be anxious that our Army at home should be maintained in such a condition that whenever expeditions like that to the Gold Coast have to be sent out, our men will be found in a condition to fulfil their duties. With regard to the present condition of our Army I shall have to call the attention of the House to various circumstances affecting it which have occurred during the last few years. During the time the noble Lord my predecessor (Viscount Cardwell) occupied the office I have now the honour to fill—that is to say, during the last four or five years—various great changes were made in the constitution of our Army. Thus in 1870 short service was brought into practice and bounties were abolished, and in 1871 purchase was abolished. I may here state, although it is not a matter connected with the Estimates, that the sum which is required for satisfying the claims of officers on retiring for this year will be £657,000. That sum may appear larger than was expected; but the state of the case is this—formerly a deduction was made on account of the amount repaid by India, but now the Indian repayment will go into the Exchequer; so that the amount will appear in the document which will be next year laid upon the Table. In 1872 the localization of the Army was set on foot, and brigade depôts were formed, with the view of combining the two Armies of Reserve with the Regular Forces. With regard to the abolition of purchase that matter appears as far as fact is concerned to be finally settled; and we must take the question as one that cannot be re-opened; but, nevertheless, there are many subsidiary questions connected with the abolition of purchase which still remain to be determined, and I only wish that those who abolished the system of purchase had been able, while they were in office, to provide for all the different and difficult circumstances which have arisen in consequence, and which I am afraid it will be my painful duty to make arrangements to meet. I do not intend to enter on the present occasion into the matters connected with this question, which are now under the consideration of the Royal Commission, because until the Report of that Commission is before the House, it would be presumptuous and indecorous for me to express an opinion with regard to them. I shall have an opportunity of forming a judgment upon the decision to which the Commission may come on the different points, when they present their Report, and should it then become necessary, in accordance with the judgment I may form, to bring any points connected with the question again before the House, I shall not shrink from doing so, nor from asking its decision upon them. I am satisfied that in dealing with the Estimates I am now about to submit for its approval, the Committee will do me the justice of remembering how short a time they have been before me—it being scarcely a month since I assumed the office I now fill, and there being many other matters besides the preparation of the Estimates which have largely occupied my attention. I am quite sure the Committee will not expect me to give an opinion on the subject so soon after my assumption of office, and I feel that until upon full consideration I determine upon a different policy it is my duty to carry out the proposals of my predecessor (Viscount Cardwell), but which he has been unable to carry into effect, and therefore in substance, and with the exception of a few matters of detail, the Estimates I am about to lay before it are those of that noble Lord, which I believe he had prepared, although he had not actually submitted them to the Cabinet, before he left office. Under these circumstances, without offering either praise or blame, and while fully aware that there are some matters which will require further consideration, I shall submit the Estimates to the Committee as well as I ant able at this time, without pledging myself as to the future limit of expense to the country, in order that it may acquire a knowledge of the present condition of things in connection with the service, reserving for future consideration all great questions which may arise with regard to Retirement, Promotion, the steps necessary to secure greater efficiency in the Reserves, Recruiting, and the Brigade Depôts. I may, however, tell the Committee that it may be requisite for the country to incur some considerable expense for necessary works and buildings, works which from time to time have been put off on the ground of the country having had to incur a large expenditure in con- nection with the Fortifications Loan and with the loan for building the brigade depôts, which seemed to render it expedient to defer all works which were not of pressing urgency. The time has now arrived, however, when the construction of these works and buildings can be no longer delayed, for although many married soldiers' quarters have been built, yet many more are required, and I am certain that the Committee will not grudge the money required for such buildings as married soldiers' quarters, which are calculated to confer such a great benefit upon the Army. With a view to more efficient administration, Lord Cardwell, in bringing forward the Army Estimates in 1870, spoke of the necessity there was for bringing the Horse Guards and the War Office under one roof, and contemplated a building adequate properly to contain them; nothing, however, has been done to bring about that result. For that, I am sorry, although it does not concern myself, and, as it is not likely that new buildings will be raised during my tenure of office, I hope something may soon be done, for I doubt whether there is any other office in which file clerks are more inconveniently and more unhealthily housed. In that year, 1870, Lord Cardwell stated that the then First Commissioner of Works was engaged in preparing a plan for a new building which would accommodate all branches of the War Department; but the plan for such a building was only presented with much timidity last year, was withdrawn at the first sign of opposition, and things remain just as they were in 1870, except that the union of the two offices has taken place under these unfavourable conditions. The sanitary condition of the present building is such that some of the inmates are absolutely unfit for work after they have been engaged in it for a few hours, the atmosphere occasioning severe headache. Of my own apartments I cannot complain, as they are well ventilated and have abundance of room, but I have experienced considerable delay in conducting the business of the office, in consequence of the different branches being so widely separated. Turning to the question of recruiting, I have to state that the number of recruits who joined the Army during 1873 was 17,194, of which 7,340 were long-service men and 9,854 en- gaged for short service. The Report of the Inspector General for Recruiting will shortly be laid upon the Table of the House, but as it has not been submitted, I may shortly state what the present condition of our recruiting is. I have made very careful inquiries into this subject that. I may not be misled, and with the view of removing any misunderstanding with reference to it which may exist, and it appears that the recruiting is what is called adequate for the present numbers of the Army in the present year—that is to say, that the ranks of the Army, with the exception of the Artillery, have been filled by the recruits. Then it will be asked—are the recruits of a character to fit them to become efficient soldiers? I have made inquiries into the subject, and I am assured from all the reports, both from medical and from commanding officers, that the character of the recruits is satisfactory. No doubt, men are recruited younger than was the case formerly; but the fact is that the state of the labour market prevents us from obtaining adult recruits, wages being so high; but, although our present recruits are supposed by some not to possess adequate stamina, by means of steady work and good feeding they become very healthy, and acquire a physique which fits them for the duties they have to perform. In confirmation, I may say that although I was not present at the last Autumn Manœuvres, I am informed that the men engaged there proved themselves to possess ample physical power to enable them to do what was required from them. Now, in the Cavalry and the Infantry there has been a slight increase; the only deficiency is in the gunners of the Artillery, and that is now being supplied. I believe I am right in saying that this period of the year is one of the least favourable to recruiting—that the Array practically stands now at its lowest ebb, that the drafts are going out to India, and that the ranks will soon begin gradually to fill up. On the general state of the recruiting I can, if the Committee wish, show how it has gone on during every month of the year; but that I do not regard as necessary, and perhaps, it will be sufficient for me to say the general results are favourable. While admitting that there is a sufficient number for the present force, the Inspector General looks forward with considerable doubt and apprehension to the period, which is gradually approaching, when greater numbers of the men will he drafted into the Reserve than at present. In the year 1876 this increased drafting will begin. In that year it will not be necessary to provide for such a great number of short-service men as has been generally imagined; but in subsequent years, it will become a question of thousands instead of hundreds, and therefore you will have to provide for recruiting under that new condition of affairs. That is one of the questions which will have to be solved. I do not intend to express any opinion upon it, but. I will repeat what is said by the Inspector General—that the question of pension has always been held as the ultimate resort, in addition to the inducements which are offered at present. You have instituted an absolutely new system of recruiting. You are recruiting at your brigade depôts under the lieutenant colonel commanding, who takes the command of the whole district, and F do not think it would be fair or just to judge by a single year of what can be done under that brigade system. There are certain parts where it is admitted to have failed—in the thinly-populated rural parts of the country and in the sea-coast towns, where the inhabitants rather give their sons to the naval service—but the failure in these parts has been compensated by keeping up our old recruiting establishments in London and Dublin. But for the present, at all events, the House will see that I leave open the question as to what it will be necessary to do hereafter in order to encourage recruiting, and turning from the subject, I come to the question which is very much connected with it—namely, the question of desertion. Now, there can be no doubt that desertion has gone on upon a scale which is extremely unsatisfactory, and I hope that some new conditions which are about to be instituted with respect to recruiting may tend to the diminution of desertions. If not already issued, there will be new terms offered in a Circular which is about to be issued, by which the short-service system of the Infantry will be extended to a certain extent to the Cavalry and Artillery. In Infantry the time is six years with the colours and six with the Reserve. In the Cavalry, it is proposed that it shall be eight years with the colours and four years with the Reserve. These periods were practically settled before I came into office, but they have been fixed after consultation with the military authorities, and there are many reasons which Gentlemen more conversant with the Army than I am can explain, why a longer period of service should be required from a Cavalry than from an Infantry soldier. One reason is that a Cavalry soldier takes a longer time to make, and that, therefore, you ought to have longer use of him than of an Infantry soldier. With respect to the Artillery, it is also proposed to have eight years with the colours and four with the Reserve. In the Engineers and the Army Service Corps, it is proposed that there should be six years with the colours and six with the Reserve. There are also other powers with respect to our soldiers which have not yet been put in force. At the end of three years a man may, with his own consent, and the consent of his commanding officer, be transferred to the Reserve. In that way you may get rid of desertion to some extent, by allowing those who are wearied of the Army to retire. On the other hand, there is a provision that, at the end of three years' service, a man who desires to continue a soldier may enlist for the remaining nine years, and may make his service a long service, In that way you may remove those whom it is least desirable to keep, and you may retain those who are really in earnest, who have volunteered to serve for the nine years, and who are the men whom you would try to attract to the service. [Mr. HOLMS: Does that measure apply to the whole service generally?] I see that the Circular is general in its terms. In future, recruits will be enlisted in the sub-districts cither for the brigade of the sub-district in which they are engaged, or for a brigade belonging to any other sub-district, or for any special corps. We shall thus have recruits for special service and for general service, and it seems to me calculated both to attract and retain recruits that they should be able to join with the bodies of men with whom they desire to serve. With respect to desertion, I find that in the year which has just passed—1873—our net loss by desertion was 3,917 men. That gives a percentage on the recruiting for the whole Army of 33 per cent. but that desertion varied much in different branches of the service. In the Household Cavalry it was 20 per rent; in the Cavalry of the Line, 39 per cent; in the Royal Artillery, 39 per cent; in the Royal Engineers, 24 per cent; in the Foot Guards, 51 per cent; in the, Infantry of the Line, 30 per cent.; in the Army Service Corps—in which, however, the recruits were 26 and the deserters 37–146 per cent (a laugh); and in the Army Hospital Corps, 3 per cent. It has been said that this is scarcely a fair way of estimating the desertions, but it was the only satisfactory way in which you could show what the balance was from the desertion on the one hand, and the recruiting on the other. The gross number of soldiers, with under one year's service, who deserted in the past year was 2,101; with between two and three years' service, 889; and with over two years' service, 2,332. In connection with this part of the subject, I think that what is wanted is some plan which will put a stop to desertion, or which will, at least, make the condition of the Army such that desertion will be reduced as much as is possible, so as to have a body of men on whose services we can rely. I come now to the question of the Militia, and I find that there is not much difference in the recruiting of the Militia between last year and preceding years. Between the trainings of 1872 and 1873, the number of recruits for the Militia amounted to 27,253, and during the same period the quota it gave to the Army was 4,312; but the recruiting for the Militia does not keep that body to its full establishment. In respect to the Militia recruiting there have been great changes. In the first place, the labour market affects the Militia in the same way as it does the Army. Then there is the prospect of objectionable quarters, and I am told that the probability of having to servo under canvas has had a deterrent effect. Then, again, there is the bounty, which, instead of lasting five years as formerly, is now spread over six years. Upon this point I will not dwell, as I do not like to express any opinion upon it; but I doubt whether it is just or fair that the Militia, who expected their bounty to be spread over five years, should now find it spread over six. With regard to the strength of our Army, we have within a few men the same number as we had last year. We have 128,99 men, with the same deduction as before as to the 3,964 men who will be with the brigade depôts. Hon. Members will observe, if they look at the Estimates, and compare them with the Estimates of last year, that we have different regimental arrangements this year. There are two regiments who will go to India from the Colonies, and there will therefore be two fewer regiments in England at a strength of 820, because two regiments of that strength will be found for India elsewhere. There will be thus nine regiments instead of seven, at 820 men, and there will be two instead of four at homo. We have 55 regiments at a minimum of 520, and 15 preparing to go out at a strength of 600 men, and leaving at the same time, 100 men at the depôts. I have seen remarks made upon the peculiarities of the Estimates as they are presented, because there appears to be a great apparent decrease in the pay of men, and a largo increase in the cost of their supplies. It arises, as those who are conversant with military matters know, from the change consequent upon the abolition of stoppage for rations, which was effected by my predecessor. The decrease is mainly in regimental pay; beer money, which amounting to £123,000 is done away with; and the transference of payments to Army accountants, which is a new item. The paymasters were to a great extent included, who used to be included in the first Vote. the Paymasters' department is now called the "Department of Army Accountants," and there is a Vote of £95,639 in the Estimates for the present year which used to appear in Vote No. 1. Whether the Army should be paid by Army accountants or by the ordinary paymasters is a question which requires very grave consideration. The post of paymaster used to be coveted by men who desired to retire from active service. The work is now done by a body of Army accountants, who are to a large extent composed of paymasters. There are, however, about 20 vacancies for paymasters, in addition to about 40 other posts which are not yet filled up. It is intended that the Army accountants should pay for the whole kingdom, and that they should have the control of all the accounts. This may be a prudent and wise economy; but I have not yet had time to give the subject the careful study which it demands, therefore I trust that the Committee will excuse my reserving my opinion upon it. This is perhaps, a good opportunity of explaining what is the real condition of the Estimates throughout. The increased prices of food and supplies add £ 124,000 to the provision and forage item. There is also an increase arising from the additional pay of the men, who used to receive 10½d. a day but now receive 1s. a day net. That causes an increase of £110,000 in the pay of the men. There is then an increase of £19,000 in other regimental pay and allowances. One of those is for "good conduct pay," which I am sure no hon. Member of this House will grudge. It will, however, be a diminishing item as the short-service comes into operation. There is also an increase of £15,700 in the Staff and other charges in Vote 1, and an increase under the head of Divine Service of £1,300, not for chaplains, but under the head of officiating clergymen. There is an increase £9,100 under the head of Education, Miscellaneous Services, and Administration of the Army; of £3,600 under the head of Control Establishments. With other items, the summary for the whole increase of charge on the Army Estimates for 1874–5 is £282,700. There is on the other hand, a reduction under the head of Stores. We find that the supply of stores is so full and efficient that we can dispense with the payment of £ 100,000 under this head. There is also a diminution of £16,700 under the head of Works. There was an item under this head which I must take upon myself the responsibility of having struck out. It was proposed to build barracks for Infantry at Sandhurst in order that the young men might see them manœuvred. It appeared to me, however, that Sandhurst was sufficiently near to Aldershot to bring over not only Cavalry and Artillery, but Infantry when they were required, and to place them under canvas. I therefore struck out the item of £8,000 for building these barracks. There is a diminution of £16,000 in the charge for the Auxiliary Forces, and a decrease of £40,000 for the Autumn Manœuvres, which I will explain at the proper place. There is also a diminution of £4,900 under the items Military Law and Medical Establishments and Services, and a reduction of £35,900 for the Non-effective Services. Those diminutions will reduce the Estimates by £213,500, and they make the net increase £69,200. Practically, the Committee may consider that there is no increase at all, but rather a decrease, if the increase of £124,000 rendered necessary by the higher prices of food is considered. I should like to say a few words here as to the sanitary condition of the Army, and if the Committee will allow me, I will read the Report of the Director General of the Army Medical Department. He says:—
Except in one instance, therefore, it will appear that the condition of the Army is satisfactory the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) has given Notice of an Amendment to reduce this small Army by 10,000 men. I call it a small Army, because it has to supply not only England, but India and the Colonies, and it would be idle to talk of an Army of Reserve if you have not an army sufficiently large through which your Reserve are to pass. It is quite true that we are at peace with all the world; but we never know when wars may break out—whether in Europe, India, or in the Colonies, besides which, the question is, whether this Army of 125,000 men can be considered excessive for a great country like England, so that you can reduce it by 10,000 men? The hon. Member wants to reduce the Vote in the lump, and to leave us to find out how and where to take the number from, and yet keep up the Army in proper condition. Now, this House has gone on improving the education and the scientific branches of the Army, and this is not so much a question of reducing the Infantry as reducing your Scientific Corps and Cavalry. The Committee also know what essential service science is now rendering to our Army, and they are not, I hope, prepared to diminish cither the number or efficiency of the scientific branches of the service, The hon. Member seems to be afraid that we are going to compete with the great Continental armies. He takes the reduction en bloc; but when he speaks of the armies of Continental Europe as ready for action, and prepared for movement in any other country, he should remember that our Army is not one that threatens any human being either on the Continent or any where else; and if we were involved in a war in which it became necessary to send our Army abroad—and I hope no such accident will occur—it must then be regarded merely as the nucleus of the Army which it would be necessary to raise if it had to compete with those on the Continent. I remember that in an amusing speech delivered not long ago in this House, the hon. Member objected to our Army as withdrawing men from peaceful industry at home. As a nation of shopkeepers we have generally been addicted to peaceful industries, and if one is to judge by the vast number of trading associations that are swarming in every direction, and the prospectuses of which leave us no peace in our own homes, I think we need have no fear of disturbing the peaceful industry of the people who are, perhaps, rushing into a great many industries from which they had better abstain. I trust, however, that the Committee will have the good souse to maintain an Army which a Government claiming to be economical—and I do not dispute their title—regarded as not too great for the occasion and for the demands made upon it. I will now say a few words with regard to the education of the officers. I have been asked a Question relating to Sandhurst—not the Staff College, but the Military School there, and I will now say with regard to it, that the position of Sandhurst gives the impression that the Army was made for it and not it for the Army. It was thought proper to do away with the Military School for young men preparing to enter the Army. Some use had to be made of the empty buildings, and it was extraordinary that the plan should have been adopted that young officers should first join their regiments, and afterwards go to school. I speak with the more confidence of the want of knowledge of human nature which this scheme showed, because this system having been instituted by my predecessor, was also given up by him. I have merely completed what was in course of preparation. I will now state frankly to the Committee that what I propose to do with Sandhurst, I do experimentally. We propose that for the future, after the first examination—the successful candidates will go straight to Sandhurst. If they had to join Colonial or Indian regiments, sublieutenants heretofore have not gone to Sandhurst, but to their regiments, and their future studies were there completed under garrison instruction; but if you continue to send young men who have passed their Civil Service examination, and are therefore in a condition to enter the Army, it must be a question whether they should all of them, both English and Indian, go to Sandhurst; but inasmuch as we have had as yet no negotiations with the Indian Government upon that point, I assume that both those for the Colonies and India will, for the present, join their depôts at once. Those who go to Sandhurst, will be placed on an unattached list, and will not be posted to their regiments till after they have been a year at the Military College. But there are some for whom no commissions may be ready. They will go as students to Sandhurst, and probably will have to pay some small sum while they remain uncommissioned. With respect to those now completing the term of their year's service as sublieutenants in the Army, none of them will be sent to Sandhurst. They will be provided with education under the Director General of Military Education, and stops will be taken, as they do not go to Sandhurst, that they have the fullest opportunity of obtaining a satisfactory military education. With regard to Woolwich, a change is about to be made here also. It has been found that in the examination, Latin has been too much exalted, that it has diminished the knowledge of mathematics, which is essential to the education of an engineer. Additional force has, therefore, been given to mathematics, and I trust that a better state of things will be the result. There have been instances where the best mathematicians have been unable to pass successfully in Latin or modern languages, but they have been found of the very first ability as mathematicians, and have risen rapidly to the highest place there. Without a thorough knowledge of mathematics, a man cannot be either a good Engineer or Artillery officer. I pass on from the subject of education to the mode in which the Army will be armed. With reference to the time at which the Army will be supplied with the Martini Henry rifle, which some people have said will be very long, I have got some information which I think will be satisfactory to the Committee. At present, practically, the whole of the Force have the Snider breech-loaders. In a few weeks the whole of the Infantry will, I hope, have the Martini-Henry rifle. By to-morrow there will be 140,000 Martini-Henry rifles in store, and during this year there will be a further number of 10,000 provided. In stock there are 60,000,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition ready for issue. With respect to the question of the sword-bayonet, no absolute decision has been come to, but the old bayonet has been adapted to the Martini-Henry rifle at very small cost—about 2s. each With respect to Horse and Field Artillery, foreigners themselves being judges, our muzzle-loading!) and 16-pounders are said to be equal to any arm in Europe, and the Force will be efficiently armed with them. With respect to gunpowder, we have a very large stock also of pebble powder, and it has been found that common powder can be converted into pebble powder at a very small cost. With respect to these stores, I may say, from the information I have received, and making the statement on the authority of persons perfectly conversant with the subject, they are of a very efficient character, and the Reserves are quite sufficient. With respect to the Autumn Manœuvres, I will state shortly what is proposed to be done. Those who have read the Report of the last Autumn Manœuvres will be aware that His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief has proposed that there should not always be Autumn Manœuvres, but changes in the disposition of troops and training—and there will this year be two separate trainings of from 10,000 to 12,000 men at Aldershot—one in June and another in July. These, of course, will be of a less expensive character than last year, because they will be made with our present transport, and thus save the £40,000 which was spent last year on horses and transport. I come now to the question of the Militia, and let me say that the Reports of Sir Charles Staveley and other officers at the Autumn Manœuvres were very satisfactory with regard to the Militia Force. On the whole, the Inspectors were satisfied with them; and the kind of training the officers received with the Regular Army promised to make them most efficient. The numbers enrolled on the 1st of February, 1874, were 101,464; there is, therefore, a deficiency on the establishment of 27,462 men. I ought to mention that there are 294 officers attending the School of Instruction, and of those who have passed the School of Instruction, who may add P.S. to their names, there are 753 in the Army List. There is a Militia. Reserve of 29,903, with an Army Reserve of 7,619, making a total of 37,522 men available for foreign service if occasion should arise. Last year there were 127 commissions offered to the Militia; of those there were not so many taken up as we had hoped. Thirty-five have been granted, and as there is to be another examination in April next, there will probably be a greater number disposed of. With respect to the examination of officers passing from the Militia into the Army, it was stated by Lord Cardwell to be such as any gentleman of education might undergo; but, unfortunately, some of those gentlemen of education had not passed, and they complained that only two chances were given to the Militia, so that if they failed twice they could not go up again to be examined. In April next, however, as I before observed, by a relaxation of the rule made in the time of my predecessor, there will be a third examination, when we may hope a larger number will be successful. With respect to the Militia, there are now confidential Reports, which tend to make the authorities better acquainted with the character, skill, and conduct of officers than they have been heretofore. These confidential Reports are to be extended, not only to the Militia, but to the other Auxiliary Forces. With respect to what is to be done in the Militia, it is proposed that there shall be two battalions at brigade depots, just as the Line has two battalions forming one regiment; the recruiting being regimental, and the promotion of officers being also regimental. That has not been to a great extent carried into effect; the recruiting in many places has not been sufficient, and it will be necessary to consider some changes in reference to this point. In the present year it is proposed that there should be a reduction in the permanent Staff, which is steadily going on, but it must go on gradually as vacancies occur. It is proposed that there should be only one Adjutant for both battalions, but in the event of the men being called out for training at the same time, another adjutant would be supplied. There will be, of course, in every new battalion a new field officer, and that officer will be taken from the Army, and, if possible, be a resident of the county. Of the same description will be a half of the captains, while the other half will consist of promoted subalterns. There have also been many changes made with regard to quarter-masters, and others are in progress. The question of grouping the regiments has been mentioned, and it must have occurred to those who have looked into the matter that both in Wales and in other parts of the country the bodies of Militia for the different counties are very small—too small, indeed, for real efficiency. But when you come to consider how the grouping of the forces of different counties may be carried out, it is found that a good deal of prejudice and local feeling naturally intervene and cannot fairly be disregarded. It is desirable, if possible, that we should proceed in this matter by gentle, and not by violent means. In Scotland, I believe, the grouping has been carried into effect with very great advantage, and without the jealousy which I am told prevails in some parts of England and Wales, and I am not without hope that by means of further explanations we may be enabled to overcome some of the difficulties which at present stand in the way. With regard to Ireland there is a special objection raised—namely, that there are a great many regiments not only small, but some practically unformed, and, consequently, some steps will have to be taken with regard to them. There will—to allude to another point—be 17 regiments of Militia reduced by two or more companies, because they are unable to maintain their proper strength; but this I hope, like the grouping of regiments, will be done gradually. A word next as to the Army Reserve. This is but a very small body, consisting of somewhere above 7,000 men, part of whom, forming Class A, have entered it for five years, and have no other connection with the Regular Army, except having once been in it; while there are others, composing Class C, who have been transferred from the Regular Army to the Reserve, in order to complete their period of service. This Army Reserve is paid by the country—perhaps not very highly, but still it is a paid body; and this being so, we ought not to have it only coming up to receive its pay, but ought to be able to put our hand upon it when it is required. At present it is quite obvious that there is a great want of means of acting upon this Army Reserve. Suppose they refused to conic forward when called upon in time of war, we might proceed against them as deserters; but suppose that in time of peace the men belonging to Class A neglect their duty, as some of them did, for instance, when they ought to have been going to the Autumn Manœuvres, you really have no means of punishing them, for removal from the Reserve may be no punishment. Then as to these men in Class C, you cannot transfer them back to their regiments, and if you dismiss them from the Reserve, it is only giving them a release which otherwise they would have to pay for by a sum of £20. These are things which call for some further legislation, because it is evident that if this want of control is to be tolerated, the Army Reserve must become a mere fictitious thing. A system by which every man should be compelled to present himself when called upon seems to me to be necessary. In short, the question affecting the Army Reserve is simply one of discipline. With respect to the Yeomanry, there is no increase in the Vote this year, but there is a slight change to be introduced, for in some of the more important cases, instead of a sergeant-major acting as adjutant, there will be a Cavalry captain appointed to the post, and of course the latter must be treated on a somewhat different footing from the former. The figures before me show that the Yeomanry—a body consisting of 15,129 men—has been working pretty efficiently, and now that it is inspected by selected Army Cavalry officers, on a regular system, there is reason to hope that in the future it will be still more efficient. Mounted drill with the Westley-Richards breech-loader, and dismounted drill are being carried on in such a way as to render the Force really effective for the kind of work it would be called upon, in the event of an invasion, to discharge, and although an invasion of this country is an eventuality not so much talked of in these days as it used to be, yet there are Continental critics "ho maintain that it is quite within the bounds of possibility. With respect to the Volunteers, who form the remainder of the Auxiliary forces, there is no doubt, they have been, as to numbers, in a state of backwardness and decadence for several years past. Originally the number of enrolled men—far, however, from efficient men—was 199,000; this year there are only 153,000, but these are efficient, and in paying for them, you are paying for something which is far more worth having than what formerly existed. Although I should be glad to see the numbers of the Volunteers keep up, it is still more important that they should be in a state of efficiency, and I learn from the Reports of the Inspector General that they are more efficient now than they have been for a number of years past, and this is a result with which the Committee has reason to be satisfied, although in numbers there has been a very great and continual falling off. We find also a slight increase in the number of the officers. Last year there were 2,233 officers wanting, while this year there are only 2,164. The Volunteers, however, have a larger proportion of officers than the Regular Army, and, in the country districts especially, it is unavoidably difficult to find men qualified for the duties. In connection with this Force, permit me to say that it is proposed to modify some of the rules with regard to efficiency. It is proposed under the new scheme, which will shortly be out, that whereas for two or three years past, all Volunteers have had to fire five rounds in squads of not less than five files, in future the requirement will be that recruits only should lire five rounds, and this in squads of not less than two files. Secondly, instead of requiring that, exclusive of the permanent Staff, there should be not less than a hundred men present at a battalion drill, not less than 16 of these to be officers and sergeants, the minimum number will in future be 80, of whom not less than 16 must be officers and sergeants. Then, instead of 20 being the minimum number required at a company drill, it will in future be only 16, while the number of officers and sergeants will be reduced from three to two. It has been thought, not only at head-quarters but by the commanding officers and the Inspectors of Volunteers, and by the commanding officers in the brigade districts, that these new provisions will be sufficient to secure efficiency. They will at the same time give great relief to the Volunteer officers and men. There have been some complaints, and it has been under consideration whether some examination cannot be provided for Volunteer officers at the brigade depôts. As no plan has yet been matured, I need not detain the Committee by referring further to the point. Not less than 1,712 officers have passed through the existing Schools of Instruction, and obtained certificates of efficiency, and this, I think, is very satisfactory. Including all the different Forces to which I have referred, the total number of men is about 430,000. With regard to the brigade depôts, I shall say but little, as they are in course of formation rather than formed; and it would be unjust before they have got into working order to express au opinion on the merits of the system. There are to be 70 altogether. The number actually established is 31, of which, however, seven are provisional as to place. Fourteen others will be ready this year, or, at the latest, in 1875. With respect to a tactical station in the North of England, that question was mentioned by my Predecessor and it still remains in abeyance. Negotiations are going on for the purchase of land suitable for the purpose, and I trust they will be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. With respect to expenditure, the Treasury has already sanctioned the laying out of £1,093,000, including a sum of £259,119 on contracts for which we are now absolutely liable. I said that the Works had been diminished for some years, or kept as low as possible, on account of the fortifications, and probably the Committee will be glad to know the condition in which the Fortification Loan is. The Fortification Loan was originally £7,460,000, and that was to be raised by instalments. That was in 1860. As everyone knows, great progress has been made since that year, both in defences and in guns, and that involved the necessity of our proceeding with great caution. At this moment upwards of £6,000,000 of the sum voted has been expended upon fortifications, and a balance remains of £759,775. From the Report of the Fortification Commissioners, which will no doubt be published, it appears that the fortifications are of a most efficient character, and that, with the exception of those at Portsmouth and Plymouth, they will be finished within a year. Those at Portsmouth and Plymouth will be finished within two years. At that time, I believe, so carefully has the money been expended, considering the rise of prices, there will be found a small balance of £50,000 or £60,000. That, however, may probably be got rid of by some contingency that may arise. But the Fortification Loan has been expended so far within the limits assigned to it by Parliament. With respect to these fortifications, I may say generally, that so far as the loan is concerned, the sea defences have all been armed as nearly as possible. They have been armed very efficiently, as I believe, with very heavy ordnance, of a character suited to the defence of the fortifications which require them. With respect to the land batteries, practically nothing has been done; but there are in store a largo number of guns which can be converted into rifled guns, and thus be made very well suited for these batteries. With respect to the fortifications mentioned in the Estimates, there are a great number of them as to which I need not go into details, which are given in the Vote; but I may observe that by to-morrow 800 guns of all calibres will have been supplied to those batteries. That, however, would hardly give you an accurate estimate of the condition of things, because 305 more are required to be provided of enormous weight. The 800 guns that have been supplied weigh 11,600 tons, whereas the 305 still to be supplied will weigh 7,300 tons, so that they will be much heavier ordnance than those that have gone before. With respect to the Navy, for which we are manufacturers, the Committee will observe there is a Vote in the Estimates of the expenditure on that account. Of course, there has been considerable outlay in connection with the torpedo, and I am happy to think that there are a great number of torpedoes in store, which will be very admirable defences for seaports and for rivers. By some of these torpedoes we may save the country great expenditure, which might otherwise be necessary; for I believe the torpedo will greatly increase in value, and will probably be the means of preventing a hostile invasion of places which would otherwise be open to attack, and this applies to commercial ports as well as naval arsenals. Now, in order to utilize all these men and all these materials we require a great deal of information. I could not but be struck in the course of the discussion that has occurred to-night with what was said by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) as to dearth of information. Is it not a remarkable thing that though we had been in possession of territories upon the Gold Coast for such a great number of years, there was so little information with respect to the interior of that Coast that in sending out the Ashantee Expedition all sorts of useless things were provided, and all sorts of useful things were omitted? [Mr. CAMPBELL-BAXNERMAN dissented.] I am only repeating what has been said practically to-night—that when Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent out the Government was absolutely without information. In this country we were so absolutely without information as to the interior of the Coast that we could not decide, till we had received instructions from Sir Garnet Wolseley, after his arrival there, what was really required. That is a most unsatisfactory state of things, and I hope that the Intelligence department now connected with the War Office will, in the future, give us instruction that will be satisfactory. Hitherto, we have been supplied with admirable information collected from foreign sources, and have been content with being ignorant of our own country and our own colonies; but I hope that this Intelligence department, by corresponding with officers in every part of this country, by calling their attention to all the strategical points in their district, by obtaining information with regard to roads, canals, railways, and everything connected with their district, and by obtaining similar information with regard to our Colonies and the means of defence at their disposal, will remedy this state of things. It is important that information on these subjects should be accurate and complete, and although it is a small and cheap portion of the War Office at present, I do not doubt that this Committee, or any Committee of this House, will always be ready to supply sufficient means to improve, if necessary, the work of this Intelligence department. I thank the House very much for giving me its attention. I know how deficient a statement I must have made, and that I may have shown a great deal of ignorance, which I own and bewail, upon many details connected with the Army. I trust, however, if it be my fortune to address you upon the subject of the Army another year, that I shall be better prepared to do so. In the meantime, let me ask the Committee to remember that they are dealing with an Army and Auxiliary Forces, all of whom are Volunteers. Let us remember that in dealing with those men that they are not like chessmen that we can place here or there just as we please, but that their feelings, affections, and it may be their prejudices should be carefully respected; that whether they be officers or men they should have confidence in the Government of this country, and feel that they will ever receive from us that just attention which they are entitled to claim at our hands; and without prejudicing any question which may arise hereafter, I say that in dealing with our countrymen who volunteer for this arduous service, justice should be combined with kindness. Above all, it is important that we do not content ourselves with an army upon paper, but be sure when the War Minister brings forward the Estimates, that behind the shadow shown to this House, there is real substance' upon which we can rely, from which we can make drafts on every occasion that may arise, composed of men who will confer honour upon themselves, and do as much credit to the country to which they belong as that body of men and that body of officers to whom the House has just paid a due tribute of thanks. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving a Vote for 128,994 men."The result as to the health of the troops in the United Kingdom during the year has been satisfactory. The ratio of admissions to hospital per 1,000 of the strength was 20 below that for 1372, and although the ratio of deaths was rather higher than during that year, it was 33 below the average of the previous 10 years. It will be observed that the results for the three Indian Presidencies, those of Bengal and Bombay in particular, are more than usually favourable. At Mauritius the ratios of sickness and mortality were high, from the continued prevalence of the malarious fever by which that island has been so severely visited during the last few years."
(1.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 128,994, be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and for Depôts for the training of Recruits for Service at Home and Abroad, including Her Majesty's Indian Possession?, from the 1st day of April 1871 to the 31st day of March 1875, inclusive."—(Mr. Secretary Hardy.)
, in moving, as an Amendment, the reduction of the Vote by 10,000 men said, he was sure the Committee was very much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for the able and eloquent way in which he had moved the vote. He (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) had ventured to put an Amendment on the Paper, and was glad to have had the benefit of the assertion of the Primo Minister that ovening that the efficiency of an Army did not depend upon its size. This was the most important Vote which came before the House of Commons in the course of the year. It was a Vote involving policy and not confined to details, because when once the number of men was voted, the spirit was out of the whole thing; you must feed, house, and clothe the men. When General Peel was Secretary for War—and an abler never sat in this House—ho used to reckon the expense of every man roughly at £100, so that if the Committee knocked off 10,000 men, as he now proposed, they would save something like a million of money. Perhaps a million was not thought much of in these days of large surpluses; but it would be a great thing for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, especially when he was harassed twice a week by interests clamouring for remissions of taxes. Of far greater importance, however, than the money saving was the policy now at issue. The present Prime Minister had once declared that "expenditure depends on policy." He was right; but would he kindly inform the Committee what was the policy which required us to keep on foot at this time in the United Kingdom, a larger Army than we had ever had since 1810, when we were threatened by a French invasion? Her Majesty had announced that her relations with all foreign Powers continued most friendly, yet we were now asked for 2G more men for the Regular Army than were deemed necessary last year. Certainly, 26 was not a large number; but still it was an increase; and if these, as they had once been told, wore "transition Estimates," the transition was from bad to worse, for an increased expenditure of £09,200 was now proposed over the Estimate of 1870–4. He thought when, as Lord Cardwell had promised, the Army had been "blended into one harmonious whole," the cost of maintaining it would be reduced; but that did not seem to be the case. Would the right hon. Gentleman take the House into his confidence, then, and tell it against whom we wore arming in this extraordinary way? Lord Cardwell had referred to "enormous military Monarchies" abroad, and had appealed to the House whether the Army he proposed for this country was disproportionate in numbers. The right hon. Gentleman the present War Secretary had talked in much the same strain, but would he "condescend to particulars?" Against which of the Continental Monarchies was it necessary to maintain it? Not against Russia, because we had given up by treat all we had previously fought for. He was glad that hon. Gentlemen opposite agreed with him how foolish it had been to fight with Russia. ["No!"] At all events, having relinquished by treaty what we had gained in war, we were not likely to fight with Russia again. Besides, had not an additional bond of union been formed with that country by the Royal Marriage, at which they all rejoiced? As to France, little need be said. Some 12 or 15 years ago, we used to be is constant fear from that quarter; but poor France was now crushed to the earth, and no alarm was felt by anyone as to invasion from her. She had enough to do, he was sorry to say, in preparing against Prussia. With some people in this country Prussia had taken the place of France. There was always some bugbear; but Prussia was as busy in watching France as France was in watching her. The right hon. Gentleman had said something about our liability to little wars, but surely there was no intention of entering into more wars like that against Ashantee? We had just recognized, and very properly recognized, the gallantry shown by our soldiers during that war, but the House did not, by such a Vote, endorse the policy of the war itself. What had we got by it? We had brought back nothing from that country except an old umbrella and a treaty. [Laughter, and "No treaty."] Well, he did not regret that there was no treaty, for he thought a treaty would have been as worthless as the umbrella. We had given up interference in European quarrels, and he felt sure that the new Ministry, with Lord Derby at the Foreign Office, would keep us free from such complications as the late Government had led us into, and that they would not approve such, schemes as had just been propounded in the press by a gallant officer—an army of mounted infantry who could cut their way through Europe. We did not want to cut our way through Europe. Happily, during the late war between France and Prussia we took no part, and did not seek to increase the bloodshed; we only invaded France with assistance and provisions. Moreover, we had lately adopted a system of arbitration in international disputes. No doubt many people thought the arbitration at Geneva resulted rather unsatisfactorily, and in his opinion we had paid more money than we ought to have paid. But he had ten times rather pay many millions than sacrifice the lives of his fellow-countrymen; and, having submitted to arbitration in one case, an able Government like that before him might also bring disputes with other countries under arbitration, if we had any such disputes. That being so, why keep up the present machinery of destruction? The usual answer was—"because we may get into quarrels from which we cannot escape, honourably, without going to war." Of course such a result was possible, but might not the remedy be worse than the disease? Was it not better to run some slight risk than to keep up all this machinery? He should, perhaps, be told that it was un-statesmanlike to adopt such a course. But Sir Robert Peel in 1850 said, in time of peace we must by retrenchment consent to incur some risk. The question was, whether by husbanding our resources we were not ultimately stronger than we were after incurring this perpetual outlay? the present Prime Minister, in 1859, said—
Hon. Gentlemen opposite seemed to forget that we had a Navy. His hon. Friend the Member for Hastings (Mr. T. Brassey) stated two or three years ago—and he still retained the opinion—that our Navy was superior to the united Navies of the world. We really insulted the British Navy by these large levies of forces. Besides, there were the Auxiliary Forces for the defence of this country, and if they were of no use and did not enable us to reduce the strength of the Regular Army, they were nothing better than shams. The Minister for War had asked him why he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) had fixed on 10,000 men? Well, he confessed he could assign no reason for fixing on that particular number. All he wished to do by his Motion was to protest against our large Army, and on looking back at the Division lists on this subject for several years, he found it did not much matter whether he proposed a reduction of 10,000 or 20,000 men, for his Motion was always rejected by a large majority. It was evident that this was no party attack. He did not expect, however, to get any recruits from among his Friends on the opposite benches. Indeed, the only Friend he could rely upon on that side of the House was the hon. Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Mr. Mellor). The Leaders of both the great political parties objected to the maintenance of our "bloated armaments," as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) once termed them, and they would be most happy to carry out their views were they not prevented from doing so by party considerations, by the strong military influence in that House, and by the popular apathy, for he did not mean for a moment to say that this was a popular Motion. Those who sat on his side of the House had always professed the principle of retrenchment, though he was sorry to say they had not always acted upon that principle when in office. The party had recently suffered a great disaster, for they had been shipwrecked; but there were a few survivors of the crew who had saved their lives, and he trusted, their principles also. He hoped they would now oppose this vast expenditure, which, if not proved to be absolutely necessary, must be opposed to the true interests of the nation. In conclusion, the hon. Member moved to reduce the number of men by 10,000."Let us terminate this disastrous system of rival expenditure, and mutually agree, with no hypocrisy, but in a manner and under circumstances which can admit of no doubt—by a reduction of armaments—that peace is really our policy. Then, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer may look forward with no apprehension to his next Budget, and England may then actually witness the termination of the income tax."—[3 Hansard, civ. 179.]
Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 118,994, be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire-laud, and for Depôts for the training of Recruits for Service at Home and Abroad, including Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, from the 1st, day of April 1874 to the 31sl day of March 1875, inclusive."—(Sir Wilfrid Lawson.)
remarked that his hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) who had just brought forward his annual Motion for the reduction of the Army with his usual good temper, proposed at a City banquet some time ago the health of the hon. Member for Merthyr (Mr. Richard). While giving both those hon. Gentlemen credit for good intentions, he could not think their Motions were well-founded, either with regard to the opinions of this country or of foreign nations. His hon. Friend thought the time had come when the lion might lie down with the lamb; but had forgotten that in every nation of Europe, instead of any diminution being made in armaments, statesmen were endeavouring to place in the field a greater number of well-equipped men than had ever been known before in the history of the world. Yet his hon. Friend was now asking us to reduce our small Army by 10,000 men. His hon. Friend admitted that the Crimean War was a great mistake, and he also admitted that, after we had fought to attain a certain object, we had men who could throw that advantage to the winds, and who thought that what we had fought for was not worth maintaining. If his hon. Friend was in earnest in his proposal to reduce the Army, in what branch of the service would the hon. Gentleman make his proposed reduction—in the Cavalry, or the Artillery? He thought the hon. Gentleman would not be disposed to touch either of those branches; and in point of fact he had not shown where he would begin his reduction; it certainly could not be in our attenuated Infantry battalions. The hon. Gentleman had confessed that the country did not want a reduction of the Army, or the petty retrenchments which had been effected by the late Government. The hon. Gentleman also spoke of the great reverse of his party, and that retrenchment might have had something to do with it. He, (Colonel Barttelot) for one, was not opposed to economy; but seeing that the country was in a state of unexampled prosperity, surely they were not paying too high an insurance in keeping up an efficient body of men in the Army to sustain and uphold that prosperity. With regard to Lord Card-well, he had something to say in reference to his conduct respecting the Army, and he should have been glad if he were still a Member of that House, so that he might hear what he (Colonel Barttelot) had to say on that subject. He candidly admitted that Lord Cardwell had done much for the Army. He had done much for the Artillery, an arm of the Service which had stood greatly in need of improvement, and which was now brought into a more creditable position than it had over stood in before. He admitted also that Lord Card well had done much for the Militia, and much to promote the efficiency of the Volunteers. He had done much for the Militia in proposing to abolish the billeting system, an improvement which was now in the course of being carried out; and he would have done everything required had he not in a measure spoilt all by passing an Order that men should serve six years for the same bounty for which they were formerly to serve only five. He ventured to say, also that the regulations made by Lord Cardwell with regard to the Volunteers tended very much to the better discipline and efficiency of that force. And now coming to the Army itself, he should be unwise and untruthful if he were to state that its management was all that could be wished. He would be untruthful if he were to say that the name of Card well was revered in the Army. On the contrary, it was a name from which men turned away. And why? No doubt many things had been done by Lord Cardwell in the best interests of the Army, but in many respects he had signally failed, and for this reason—Lord Cardwell had endeavoured to destroy more or less completely the regimental system, and that esprit de corps which was the very main-stay of our army, and which above all things had carried it through so many successful campaigns. In doing that, Lord Card well had trodden on the prejudices of the Army, and he had done many things in which it was to be hoped the present Secretary for War would not follow him. It was all very well for people to say, why should not a man do as well in one regiment as in another; why should he not be promoted from one regiment to another; why should he not fight as well in one regiment as another? No doubt he would fight as well; but they had only to look to the last campaign to see what esprit de corps had animated everybody from the colonel to the drummer, as if he thought his own regiment the best, and they might, depend on it, anything that injuriously affected that sentiment would injure the efficiency of the Army. His right hon. Friend (the Secretary of State for War) had made an admirable statement that evening, for while he pledged himself to look into everything, he had absolutely committed himself to nothing, except to those things which he believed could be done with advantage. There were some grievances with regard to the abolition of purchase which ought to be remedied. He was not going to re-open that question, for purchase was abolished, and no power could alter that. But in abolishing purchase that House, with a liberality which it meant to be carried to its just and legitimate conclusion, left in the hands of those in authority power quite sufficient to do many things which had not been done. He only hoped the Commission which had been appointed would appreciate the work they had to perform; and while thinking that it would be a great mistake for any right hon. Gentleman to depart at once from all those main lines which had been laid down by Lord Cardwell, without giving them a fair trial, yet he thought that anyone looking into what was intended, without departing from the lines of that policy, might be able to make it work more in harmony with the feelings of the Army and of the country. His right hon. Friend had said, with regard to commissions from the Militia into the Line, that but few officers had been able to pass the requisite examination; that he hoped they would be more successful in future; and that he intended to give them another trial in May, so that they would have three trials. That was perfectly fair. There was, however, a matter to which he (Colonel Barttelot) wished to call attention. Two young men went up for competitive examination, one of whom passed, and passed well, and the other was plucked. The one who passed well in due course got a sub-lieutenancy in a regiment, and the other who had failed passed into the same regiment as a lieutenant from the Militia. Was it fair that a man who could not pass should go in over the head of the other through the Militia? The way to prevent such a grievance arising was, in his judgment, to give officers of the Militia sub-lieutenancies, the same as were given to those who were appointed in the first instance to the Line, and in that way much odium would be avoided. Then as to depôt centres, the great object of those centres was "to unite in one harmonious whole" all the branches of the Service. Moreover, the regiment belonging to the county was at times to be at its depôt centre, so that both officers and men should be well known, and that recruits should take pride and pleasure in joining their county regiments. But up to the present this intention had not been carried out, and where recruits had been got for county regiments, and those regiments for the moment happened to be full, instead of keeping the recruits as supernumeraries they were drafted off into Scotch regiments, and sent to places where they were wanted to fill up vacancies. [Mr. CAMPBELL-BAKKERMAN: Against their will?]. Whether against their will or not he would not say; but at all events, it was against the principle that had been laid down. His right hon. Friend had stated that the recruits coming in were of a fair kind and quite qualified to do their work. But he was informed by commanding officers that most of the recruits were very little over 16 years of age, though no doubt they enlisted as 18. Was it possible that young men of that age could be made fit to go anywhere, and do what a British soldier ought to do? Some time ago 20 years of age was fixed as the minimum at which a soldier should be sent to India, but if men enlisted at 16 stating they were 18, no doubt they were sent to India long before they were 20. With respect to regiments in India, he thought it would be much better to send them in full lighting force, complete in all ranks, for five or six years, and then bring them home again, than our present system of sending them out for 12 years, and filling up the losses caused by death, disease, and other causes, with young and raw recruits. The cost of passage was now so cheap that such a change would add little to our expenditure, while it would keep the Indian Army up to a much higher standard of strength and efficiency. But his right hon. Friend had told them that during the last year 17,000 recruits had entered the Army. Supposing they were all stout, able-bodied men—not lads of 16 years of age—there was an offset to the statement. During the same period the Government had got rid of, or the men themselves had rid the Government of, 20,400 men. Of these 6,000 had deserted, 1,800 had been removed to the Reserve, 3,500 had been granted their discharge to which they were entitled, 2,000, after 21 years' service, had been pensioned off, 1,000 (12 years' service) also discharged, 3,000 had purchased their discharge, 200 had been dismissed with ignominy, 2,000 more had received what was known as free indulgence, and 000 had left the Army under other heads. If the number of the Army was increased at the rate of 17,000 a-year, and diminished at the rate of 20,400, what would its state be in a few years with our present system of short service? But it was said that the men, after serving the short period, passed into the Reserve, of which it was also said that in 1882 we should have 80,000, at a cost of £569,250. He was afraid that that would be, to a large extent, a paper Army, and that when the right hon. Gentleman the then Secretary for War wanted to lay his hands upon them, they would not be found. The only way to secure them was to insist upon their mustering at least eight days in every year for drill and exercise, insisting upon their registering their residence in the district to which they went to live, and further upon a new register if they removed to another. It might be said that this was done already; but he had reason to believe that it was not done effectively, or to any great extent. He would also urge upon his right hon. Friend the importance of dealing liberally with that important body of men, the non-commissioned officers. There could be no truer economy than to pay well the men upon whom the efficiency of the Army so largely depended. He also thought the surgeons in the Army had a grievance. They now had Staff appointments and not regimental ones, which was considered a hardship, as they were liable to be removed at any time from their regiment. He also wished to ask, whether it was true, as was reported, that instead of regimental hospitals it was intended to have one large hospital in each military district, which would be much worse for the men, as neither them- selves nor their constitutions would be known to the surgeons there. With respect to deserters, he did not—as he had been misrepresented to have done last year—wish the system of "marking" to be brought back; but it was certain that since it had been abolished desertion had greatly increased: and, further, that deserters frequently enlisted into other regiments only for the sake of the bounty, in order to desert again. Some means ought to be taken to prevent this, and he thought placing them under the surveillance of the police might be useful. He believed his right hon. Friend was sincerely desirous of increasing the strength and raising the character of our Army, and that he would be willing to listen to any suggestions for that purpose of a practical nature, and therefore he had pointed out where he thought improvements might be made.
said, the Estimates of the year had been presented to the House under very peculiar circumstances. In the first place, they were presented by the right hon. Gentleman who could not be said to be responsible for them, and they must all admire the spirit and the ability with which he had performed the duty; secondly, they were presented to a House of Commons composed largely of new Members; and, thirdly, they were presented while the Army itself was still in a state of transition. Happily, therefore, they could discuss the question free from all party bias. For himself, he had always felt that there ought to be no party spirit in dealing with the constitution and maintenance of the Army, and with regard to the present occasion he would remark that, having expressed his opinions fearlessly when his political Friends were in office, he should do the same now they were in Opposition. He was afraid that the right hon. Gentleman had given the House a rather rose-coloured version of the state of the Army. The expenditure was about £69,000 more than last year, yet the total strength of the British Establishment, Militia, Yeomanry, and Reserve, was smaller—namely, 291,000, instead of 306,000. Returns for which he had moved, in order to ascertain the actual numbers at an average period of the year, showed that the non-commissioned officers and men of the British Establishment on the 30th November last numbered 112,187, being 5,415 less than the number in the last Estimates. The Militia was only 101,087, instead of 125,224 men the Yeomanry were 3,356 men short; the First Class Reserves, 2,473; and the Second Class Reserves were 1,338 men short, giving a total deficiency of 36,700 men; so that, while 291,000 men were voted, the actual number was only 255,000. As to the quality of the men, only those between 20 and 30 years of age would be accepted by all Europe as efficient soldiers; yet, out of the 90,500 on home service, 32,000 were over that age, and during the year there were 68,000 admissions into hospital, 3,360 men being constantly sick. For his part, he believed that if they acted upon the common-sense principle which was adopted in the Prussian Army—namely, of not keeping any young men in the Army after 22 or 23 years of age—they would get rid of much of that immorality which the present system encouraged so much, and which required the enforcement of the Contagious Diseases Act. ["Oh!" and a laugh.] Hon. Gentlemen seemed to laugh, but had they considered the condition in that respect of the Prussian Army? In the year 1867, a very eminent medical man gave evidence to the effect, that out of a camp of 20,000 only four were withdrawn on account of the disease we encouraged by keeping our soldiers in an enforced state of celibacy. With respect to desertions, he found that up to the 1st of January last they amounted to 7,500. 500 of these were recruits. Of the remaining 7,000, 1,200 had returned to the Army, 1,700 and odd were apprehended, and about 4,000 escaped. These facts showed clearly the amount of discontent which existed in the Army. In the year 1873, 1,914 men were constantly in prison, 2,025 men were discharged from the Army as bad characters, after having been about five years in the service, and 309 were discharged on conviction for felony—that being another and a new road out of the Army. Altogether, no fewer than 12,605 men were from one cause or other taken out of the Army in that year; and there also retired on pensions 4,069, and by purchase 2,981, making a total of 19,655 withdrawn last year. How were they to replace these men? The noble Lord the late Secretary for War (Viscount Card-well) stated in the year 1870 that in order to carry out his plan and maintain the Reserve at the amount necessary they should have 23,000 recruits a-year. Well, in that year 23,000 recruits were obtained, and in the following year that number was exceeded. But in 1872 the number fell off to 17,317, and last year it reached only to 17,194. They were, therefore, recruiting about 6,000 fewer than were required to keep up the proper strength of our Army. He would now turn to that other Army, the Militia, which was most antagonistic to the Regular Army, as regarded recruiting, and which was far more efficient as far as age was concerned, for of its total number only 16,000 were over 30 years old. For that Force, which numbered 101,000, 25,864 recruits were obtained last year, and that number was scarcely sufficient to maintain the Militia as it ought to be kept up. Now, the Regular Army was composed of two-thirds of agricultural recruits and one-third townsmen, and there was this peculiarity as regarded desertion, that the agriculturists furnished only one-third of the deserters, while the townsmen furnished two-thirds. It followed that, beyond all doubt, the agricultural recruits were the best and safest for the Regular Army. With regard to the Reserve Force, the great difficulty was, that they had no hold upon thorn. In 1871, only 600 men were out to drill, and last year very few of the Reserve Force attended the Autumn Manœuvres, and these volunteered to do so. As he had stated, they were recruiting at the rate of 25,000 for the Militia, while for the Army they were obtaining 6,000 men below the required number. Now, in the recent debate on the Army Bill at Berlin, Count von Moltke stated that, though the German Army was smaller than the French, it had the advantage of not including the Militia element. War, he said, carried on by Regular troops was the cheapest, because the shortest. Even Washington, as he pointed out, found the uselessness of Militia, and again and again insisted on the necessity of maintaining a Standing Army. The Militia Force was not regarded as one which would be of value to us in real warfare, and was there not a danger to the country in the fact that there were 10,000 deserters from the Militia and 4,000 from the Regular Army; in all 14,000 partially trained and discontented men escaping in one year into private life? He ventured to suggest that, for a time at least, they ought to stop recruiting for the Militia, so that the Army might have the advantage, temporarily, of all the available and eligible recruits in the Kingdom. They ought also to pass into the Militia from the Army those older soldiers of whom we had so many. The effect, he believed, would be to improve the Militia by the presence of 10,000 old soldiers, and to encourage Militiamen to pass into the Army more quickly than they now did. Above all things, they should pay the men a higher rate on passing into the Militia than into the Reserve. If they paid them £20 a-year instead of 4d. a day as at present, they would in a few years have a Militia mainly composed of men who had passed from the Army, and the saving to the country would be very great. He rejoiced to hear from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War, that it was the intention of the Government to allow men of all arms to pass, if they so desired, into the Reserve after three years' service. [Mr. GATHORNE HARDY: With the assent of the commanding officer.] He so understood, and believed the system would be attended with good results. This he would urge upon Her Majesty's Government—that if they wore to prepare for the year 1876, it was essentially necessary that they should cease to recruit for the Militia, otherwise, it would be hopeless for them to think of obtaining anything like the number of men they would require to fill up the gaps in the year 1876 and the following year. It had always been held up as a bugbear in the way, that if they had their Indian and Colonial Armies in connection with their Homo Army, it was impossible to have short enlistment for the Home Army. He demurred to that view. They might still have separate enlistment for the Indian and Colonial Armies, and it would have this advantage—that they could give to those who were—as many were—desirous of going abroad, the option of proceeding to India or the Colonies, and to those who wished to stay at home the opportunity of passing into the Home Army, and thus a great many would be induced to join who did not care to go abroad, and many would join also who did not wish to stay at home. The country was desirous of securing not only economy but efficiency, and he did not think they could have thorough efficiency until the Army was divided into Army Corps. When he first made that suggestion some years ago a Member of the then Government told him that it would be impossible in this country to carry out such a system: but what, he asked the Committee to consider, would have been the result if they had had an Army Corps system in the ease of the late Ashantee War"? Had Sir Garnet Wolsoley been at the head of an Army Corps, he might have selected from it such men of each arm as he thought proper, and the War Department would only have had to provide the requisite transport for the troops. He was satisfied that until our military force was divided into Army Corps, it would never be realty efficient. He had no doubt that the object of his hon. Friend in moving the Amendment was economy; but under present circumstances, he could not vote for it, and trusted that it would not be pressed to a division. The true road to economy with efficiency would be to pass the men through the Regular Army, and till they did that they would not have a reliable Army. He did not understand how they could continue to pay £30,000 for the Reserve Force of the Militia, and he trusted that the right hon. Gentleman would endeavour to do what he could, so that they should not appear in the Estimates at all.
said, he should not abuse the patience of the Committee, if they would listen to him for a short time. Different people had different views as to the number of men of which our Land Forces should consist, but he was afraid that, owing to the great difficulty of recruiting under our present system, we were in danger of not obtaining the number of men the Committee were asked to vote, and consequently, of having what the Secretary for War had so properly deprecated in the course of his speech—a paper Army. He agreed with the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms) that our agricultural labourers made the best soldiers; but how were they to be persuaded to enter our Army V If recruiting failed to bring into the Force the requisite number of men, there must be something wrong with the system. The regiment in which he had held a commission for the past quarter of a century was in a very bad condition as regarded its numbers—it being 70 below its proper strength. Although it had 62 recruiting agencies at work about the country, it had only obtained one recruit during the past fortnight, and he was in hospital with the view of his being discharged as being unfit for the Service. But that did not represent the full extent of the evil, for there were at present 67 men in the regiment who were urgently applying for their discharge, and although discharge by purchase was sanctioned by the regulations, yet the commanding officer was compelled, much to his regret, to refuse to these men the privilege to which they were morally entitled, because he was unable to obtain recruits to fill their places. It must be remembered also that whereas the effective strength of a battalion of the Guards was 820 on the 1st of April, 1873, it was now only 750, which for the whole regiment was a reduction in force of 210 men. Nothing was more fatal to recruiting, than the report getting about that men were detained in the Army against their will. He did not see how the rates of pay could be increased, and, indeed, when unskilled labourers could command their 4s. a day in the country, he did not see how the Government could compete successfully in the labour market against ordinary employers. In his opinion it was pension and not pay the men required. It was said that under the present short-service system pensions could not be granted. But our short-service system was copied from the Prussians, and he warned the country against following too servilely the Prussian system. We must adopt cither the system of pensions, or that of conscription, and the country was not as yet prepared to adopt the latter system. If we could not have short service combined with pensions, we were better without the short service. He should recommend that in addition to the fines imposed for drunkenness being distributed among the meritorious soldiers on their quitting the Force, the fines imposed for absence without leave should be applied for a similar purpose. He would like for a moment to refer to a plan, the idea of which he believed originated with Colonel Anderson, of the brigade depôt at Chester. That plan, which he believed to be well worthy the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, was this—to increase the soldier's daily pay by 2d., and to place the amount to his credit in the regimental savings bank, to accumulate at compound interest until his discharge at the end of 21 years' service, the soldier, moreover, to have the privilege of disposing by will, in the event of his death before the completion of his engagement, of the amount standing to his credit at the time of his decease. Again, the system under which medals were distributed for long service and good conduct was not extremely satisfactory. The number of men who fulfilled the conditions entitling them to this reward was almost always largely in excess of the medals available for distribution, and consequently, the task of selection was an extremely invidious one; and as the medals were very properly distributed at a full-dress parade, it was easy to imagine the disappointment occasioned to non-recipients almost, if not equally worthy. That was a point which was well worthy the attention of the Secretary of State for War. There was another way, too, by which we might greatly augment the comfort and welfare of our troops, and at the same time proportionately diminish the attractions of the public-house. He believed it to be absolutely necessary that every soldier should receive 1lb. of good cooked meat daily, supplemented by well-cooked vegetables, for which he now had to pay. While thanking the Committee for the attention they had paid to his observations, he trusted that nothing he had said was inconsistent with the character of a soldier, and that he had in no way disregarded any of the restraints which were very rightly and necessarily imposed by his profession upon its members.
said, he had had occasion more than once during the debate to regret the absence of those who were his Colleagues in the War Department of the late Government, and was sorry that the duty of representing Lord Cardwell's policy had not fallen into more effective hands. He especially regretted the absence of the late Secretary for War when the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Colonel Barttelot) was addressing to the House his fervid denunciations of that policy. His hon. and gallant Friend had that evening again accused his noble Friend of trampling on the prejudices of the Army, of doing away with all esprit de corps, and of ruining the system under which the British Army had gained its successes in past years. Now, it was not for him (Mr. Campbell-Baunerman) to sing the praises of Lord Cardwell; but if there were two points for which he was more distinguished than any other they were an impartial and judicial mind, and a laborious attention to the details of every subject with which he had to deal, and we may, therefore, be sure that he had fully considered the value of those prejudices before adopting the policy which he had followed. There was no doubt that there were many officers in the Army who disapproved of the course taken by his noble Friend, but it was equally certain that there were many distinguished officers who thought that what his noble Friend had done had contributed immensely to the increased efficiency of our Forces. His hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), in moving that the number of men be reduced, alluded to what he called the great military establishments now existing in this country, and the warlike policy pursued by the late as well as the present Government. But surely his hon. Friend must call to his mind the vast armies existing on the Continent of Europe; and considering that, besides India, England had possessions in every quarter of the globe, he did not think the Committee would consent to make any reduction at the present moment. It would certainly be impossible to remove 10,000 men from the Infantry—and he supposed his hon. Friend did not suggest they should be taken from any other branch of the service—without serious detriment to the Army. The process of enlisting for brigades instead of battalions had only just been commenced. When that plan had been in operation for some years, and they had a more elastic force, there would be an opportunity for reduction, if the country desired it; but at present such a course, if adopted would prove fatal to the experiment that was being tried. His horn Friend the Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms) had denounced the Militia, and would abolish that branch of the service as unworthy of their confidence; but he thought his hon. Friend must have badly read the feeling of the House of Commons if he thought that any War Minister could come down to Parliament and propose the abolition of the Militia. His hon. Friend had expressed the opinion that the Ashantee Expedition might have been more easily accomplished if the system of Army Corps had been in existence; but what his hon. Friend had suggested as proper for such an expedition was precisely what had been done under the present organization. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, in his very clear statement, had rather taken his noble Friend the late Secretary for War (Lord Card-well) to task for not building a better War Office. There was no doubt that such a building was necessary for the public service, for of all the public departments requiring to be better accommodated, the War Office and the Admiralty were the first that should have received attention; but when, last year, the late Government brought in a Bill to sanction the erection of a new War Office and Admiralty on a suitable site in Spring Gardens, it was received with so little favour that it was withdrawn almost as soon as introduced, the general feeling of the House appearing to be that the Home and Colonial Offices should be finished before the new War Office was taken in hand. The right hon. Gentleman having also referred to the item of £8,000 for building a barrack at Sandhurst, which he had struck out from the Vote, he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) wished to say that that item had been inserted most reluctantly by the late Government. It was said to be unwise to send young officers to join their regiments for a year, and then to send them to Sandhurst. ["Hear, hear!"] That was, however, the Prussian system, and it was found advantageous to send young men to their regiments to learn the elements of drill, in order that when they went to Sandhurst the time of their highly accomplished instructors should not be taken up in teaching those rudimentary branches. There was, no doubt, a strong feeling against it, but he believed that the unpleasant occurrences at Sandhurst which had attracted attention were the work of a very few young men, who considered that they had a special grievance. It was I said they were too old to go to school; but they were not so old as many young men who went to the University, and who there submitted to discipline quite as strict. The late Government, however, agreed to give way on this point, but they were told by the Educational authorities at the War Office that it was absolutely necessary to have troops at Sandhurst all the year round, not that the young men should see them manœuvre, but in order that they might engage in daily drill with them the present Secretary for War had induced those authorities to agree that it was sufficient to have troops six months under canvas at Sandhurst, instead of all the year round, and he congratulated him on his powers of persuasion. He trusted that the right hon. Gentleman would adopt the arrangements contemplated by the late Government in regard to the new Paymasters Department. The pay-masterships of regiments had, indeed, been regarded as a means of satisfying the claims of ex-combatant officers; but he believed the right hon. Gentleman would find that they were not the class of the community from which the best trained accountants could be drawn. With regard to the Auxiliary Forces, it was true that recruiting for the Militia had not been very flourishing during the year; but that could be accounted for by the fact that the labour market was in an excited state, and an open winter like the last, which allowed agricultural operations to go on without a check, always interfered with Militia recruiting. There had also, unfortunately, been a misapprehension about the bounty. The right hon. Gentleman said it was hard to change the term of service, and to spread the bounty over six years that was intended for five. The Militia recruit, however, got the benefit of the new ration arrangement, which was greater than the trifling loss under the bounty. [Colonel GILPLN dissented.] He could assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that it was so, for he had gone carefully into the figures, and the balance, though small, was in favour of the recruit; while as to the existing Militiamen, they did not bear the loss of bounty, and yet they would reap the gain of rations, and they, at least, had nothing to complain of. With regard to the Army Reserve, difficulty existed, not as to finding the men, but as to their discipline when called out, and the late Judge Advocate General had drafted clauses on the subject to be introduced into the Army Discipline Bill, of which he was to have given Notice at the beginning of this Session. With reference to the statement as to recruiting brought forward by the hon. and gallant Member for South Ayrshire (Colonel Alexander); he must remind the Committee that the recruiting for the Guards was managed by the Guards themselves, who were, both as to recruiting and as to their hospital system, on a peculiar footing. Whilst he was at the War Office he had made ineffectual efforts to get to the bottom of this subject; and he trusted that his hon. Successor, who he knew had sympathy with the Guards, and at the same time would have due regard to the interest of the public, would take up the question and see if it was not possible to do away with the anomalous system which at present existed. It had been said that the great object of the present Government would be not to have a paper Army. No one had kept this object in view more steadily than his noble Friend Lord Cardwell, whose Localization Bill was the greatest measure in this direction which had been passed for many years. That noble Lord had to stand the brunt of attacks for reducing the number of the Militia and Volunteers, because he took a course which got rid of paper men and men of straw, and at the same time greatly increased the quality of the remainder. He trusted the hon. Baronet would not divide, but would accept the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman, and be content with having raised a discussion on the subject.
said, he presumed this Amendment was made in solemn earnest, for nothing but what was very sober ever proceeded from the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Law-son); but he must confess that his doubts had not been resolved by the speech with which the hon. Baronet had introduced his Amendment. The hon. Baronet said he could not understand the reason for the extraordinary armaments of this country; and he (Mr. Butler-Johnstone) in that must agree with him, for when he looked at the armaments abroad, he must confess the armaments of this country were extraordinary—from the smallness of their extent, and not from the largeness of their scale. The hon. Baronet said he had the authority of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, that night, for saying that a small Army was as efficient as a great one. But the right hon. Gentleman said nothing of the kind. What he said was that deeds of heroism might be performed by a small Army as well as by a great Army; that heroism was not to be measured by the scale of an Army, but no one could for a moment imagine that what was really meant was that the same deeds could be performed by a small Army as by a great one. Then the hon. Baronet said, instead of raising gigantic Armies, we should husband our resources and be prepared to meet our foes; but to talk of a great country like England, with Colonies all over the world, and wealth accumulated such as had never been accumulated before, husbanding her resources with a view to her protection when the emergency arose, would be as sensible as for a banker to put out the money to interest which he should spend in bolts and bars to secure his coffers. What were the armaments abroad? In France the Army Bill gave a Reserve, not of 30,000 or 40,000 men, but in a few years something like 2,000,000 of soldiers. Prussia was also providing for an increase of its military strength, while Austria and Russia were following the example. The hon. Baronet asked, what nation was likely to attack England? Apparently none; but if war broke out on the Continent, was it impossible for us to be involved in the vortex? Even in the last war, it was not without difficulty and some loss of dignity on our part that we had managed to maintain our neutrality. Our present relations with Russia were of a most friendly character, but we could not help remembering as matter of fact that the progress of Russia in Central Asia had already reached a limit beyond which a single step in advance would bring her in collision with tribes bordering on countries it was essential for us to protect from conquest or aggression, and no English Minister would dare neglect that duty; and whether that step forward was over taken depended not on us but on Russia. The hon. Baronet, moreover, in the face of universal conscription in Europe, proposed a reduction of 10,000 men. Such a reduction in case of the French or Prussian Army would be a small matter, but in the case of the Army of England it would be a reduction of something like one-fourth of the Force at home. Besides, the hon. Baronet's proposition was unaccompanied by any suggestion by which the void could be filled up. The people of this country were proud of their Army, small but brave, and instead of such an imprudent proposal, it was matter of great importance to endeavour to devise the means by which our military Force could be brought up to a level with the interests and responsibilities of this great country. He believed the country would be ready, if called on by the Ministry, to sacrifice some portion of the personal liberty of the subject, and it would not be impossible to introduce the Ballot for the Militia. With the Militia Ballot for one year's service, without exemption, he should not mind such a proposal as that of the hon. Baronet; but so long as the only force on which the honour and interests of the country de-pended for security was our gallant Army, he must vote against any such Motion; and he would join in the wish expressed by the hon. Gentleman who had last spoken, that it would not be pressed to a division.
said, he was strongly in favour of reductions in the Army, and of economy in every Department; but he thought it unfair to push the new Government to extremities, especially when it was considered that these Estimates had been prepared by their predecessors. The necessity for increased economy in the Army expenditure was shown by the fact that if there had not been a saving in stores the expenditure of the year would have shown an increase of £250,000. But there was this great objection to the redaction of 10,000 men, proposed by the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle, that on the existing organization of the Infantry of the Line, on which the reduction would mainly fall, it could not be carried out without rendering the regiments and battalions at home quite inefficient. The number of privates of Infantry being 94,000 in round numbers, and 50,000 being in India and the Colonies, and 7,000 in depôts, there were only 34,000, with 70 battalions, in the United Kingdom, distributed amongst 70 battalions of 560 companies, so that by reducing 10,000, there would remain only 24,000 privates, giving 43 per company and 343 per battalion. But as the hour was late, and the House was anxious to proceed to other business, the hon. and gallant Member stated that he would close his remarks.
said, he did not rise to criticize the Estimates, which had been expounded by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War with great ability and in the most lucid manner. With regard to the six years' recruiting for the Militia, instead of five, he might state that he had been appointed on the War Office Committee by the late Government who reported in favour of six years—it being thought, on mature consideration, a good thing for the Service, and not injurious to the Militia. In his own county he had no difficulty in getting the men for the six years, although there was some difficulty in getting them to re-enlist. With regard to the depôt system, he was convinced that it would turn out the most expensive absurdity which the country had over adopted the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hackney (Mr. J. Holms), to whom he had often listened with attention, had broached a maxim with reference to the Militia which no Government could adopt, which the Duke of Wellington and Sir John Burgoyne set their countenances against, and which he (Colonel Gilpin) hoped the Committee would not approve of the Militia, though they might not be perfect soldiers, were trained men, and much better than the young recruits of 18 enlisted for the Regular Army. With regard to the abolition of purchase in the Army, although the House had acted with much liberality, yet the money devoted to that purpose had been disposed of in a way which was not satisfactory to the Service. He himself had held that, as soon as the purchase system was abolished, the officers should have received the regulation price of their commissions. He should be glad to hear that they were likely soon to have placed on the Table the Report of the Royal Commission now sitting on that subject.
said, he thought that £13,000,000 per annum was an enormous sum to spend on the Army, with only about 160,000 men on the war footing, and that we might maintain that amount of force and yet relieve the finances of the country to the extent of £2,000,000 or £3,000,000. He wished to point out that what was wanted was not to increase our peace footing, but to increase the Reserves, a plan carried out by foreign nations, and which should be adopted in this. If every soldier, after three years' service, had the option of passing into the first Reserve, they might have a very large Reserve. He, however, considered it most undesirable, looking at the immense armies of Russia, Germany, Austria, and France, to reduce our small Army, and he could not vote for the Amendment.
, as a commanding officer of Yeomanry of long standing, thought that force should be armed with the best available weapon as well as the other branches of the service; whereas the fact was, they were still armed with a rifle which did not contain the ignition in its own cartridge. He also hoped that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would take measures for the establishment of a school for the instruction of Yeomanry officers in order to make them thoroughly efficient.
Question put.
The Committee divided:—Ayes 45; Noes 256: Majority 211.
Original Question put, and agreed to.
(2.) £2,434,500, Pay and Allowances, &c. of Land Forces.
Navy Estimates
(3.) 60,000 Men and Boys, Sea and Coast Guard Services, including 14,000 Royal Marines.
, in moving a Vote for 60,000 Men and Boys, said, as before intimated, that he proposed to lay the Navy Estimates before the Committee on the 20th of April. As, however, it was necessary in the meantime to take steps for the renewal of the Mutiny Act, he desired the Committee to show him some indulgence by passing at the present sitting, and without debate, the Vote for the number of men required. The number mentioned in the Vote was 60,000 men and boys, including 14,000 Royal Marines; and that was just what his right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Goschen) would have proposed had he remained in office.
said, he understood that the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman would not preclude hon. Members from discussing Vote 1 on a future occasion; and, under the circumstances that had boon referred to, he thought the Committee would not object to the course suggested.
Vote agreed to.
House resumed.
Resolutions to be reported To-morrow; Committee to sit again upon Monday 13th April.
Archbishops And Bishops (Appointmext And Consecration) Bill
Leave First Reading
MR. MONK moved for leave to bring-in a Bill to provide for the Appointment and Consecration of Archbishops and Bishops in England and Wales.
said, he did not rise to object to the introduction of the Bill; but as it, touched a question of very great importance, which, if handled at all, must be handled with great delicacy, he hoped the hon. Gentleman the Member for Gloucester (Mr. Monk) would not press the second reading for a considerable time, in order that it might, be thoroughly discussed in the country before the House was asked to give an opinion on it.
Motion agreed to.
Bill to provide for the Appointment and Consecration of Archbishops and Bishops in England and Wales, ordered to be brought in by Mr. MONK and Mr. DICKINSON.
Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 56.]
Conveyancing And Land Transfer (Scotland) Bill
Leave First Reading
, in moving for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the Law relating to Land Rights and Conveyancing, and to facilitate the Transfer of Land in Scotland, said, that Bills on this subject had been brought forward in 1871, 1872, and 1873, and he hoped this year they would be able to pass a measure which would give satisfaction to Scotland. He would move the second reading of the Bill on an early day.
Motion agreed to.
On Motion of The LORD ADVOCATE, Bill to amend the Law relating to Land Rights and Conveyancing, and to facilitate the Transfer of Land, in Scotland, ordered to be brought in by the Loan ADVOCATE, Mr. Secretary CROSS, and Mr. CAMERON.
Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 60.]
Building Societies Bill
On Motion of Mr. TORRENS, Bill to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to Building Societies, ordered to be brought in by Mr. TORRENS, Mr. WALPOLE, Mr. GOURLEY, Mr. GOLDNEY, Mr. DODDS, and Sir CHARLES RUSSELL.
Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 55.]
Prison Ministers Act (1863) Amendment Bill
On Motion of Mr. MELDON, Bill to amend "The Prison Ministers Act, 1863," ordered to be brought in by Mr. MELDON, Lord FRANCIS CONYNGHAM, Mr. BRADY, Mr. DIGBY, Mr. MARTIN, and Mr. OWEN LEWIS.
Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 58.]
Poor Relief (Ireland) Bill
On Motion of Mr. O'SHAUGHNESSY, Bill to assimilate the Law for the Relief of the Poor in Ireland to that of England by substituting union rating for the present system of rating by electoral divisions, ordered to be brought in by Mr. O'SHAUGIINESSY, MR. BUTT, Mr. DOWNTNG, Mr. REDMOND, and Mr. BROWNE.
Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 57.]
Fines, Fees, And Penalties Bill
On Motion of Mr. Serjeant SIMON, Bill to amend the Law relating to the disposition of Pines, Pees, and Penalties in certain corporate Boroughs and other places, ordered to be brought in by Mr. Serjeant SIMON, Mr. MELLY, Mr. CHARLEY, Mr. RATHBONE, Mr. MELLOR, and Mr. GOURLEY.
Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 59.]
Landlord And Tenant (Ireland) Act (1870) Amendment (No 2) Bill
On Motion of Sir JOHN GRAY, Bill to amend "The Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Act (1870)," with a view to facilitate the acquisition of property in land, in fee and in fee farm, by-tenants in Ireland, ordered to be brought in by Sir JOHN GRAY, Mr. PATRICK MARTIN, Mr. MELDON, and Mr. O'SULLIVAN.
Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 61]
Local Government Provisional Orders Bill
On Motion of Mr. CLARE READ, Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Local Government Board relating to the districts of Aberystwith, Carnarvon, Hurst, Nottingham, Penzance, and Tetbury, ordered to be brought in by Mr. CLARE READ and Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH.
Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 62.]
House adjourned at a quarter before Twelve o'clock.