asked the Secretary of State for War, if he will give in detail the number of troops, exclusive of the National Reserve, who would be left in the country after the departure of the Expeditionary Force?

I am afraid that to give the detailed information for which the hon. Gentleman asks would be contrary to precedent and would not be in the interests of the public service.

asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what evidence is in the possession of the Government to prove that the persons who pay Income Tax at the rate of 1s. 2d. in the £ only number 150,000; and whether all those persons who receive small dividends from which 1s. 2d. in the £ has been deducted are included among the 150,000 persons?

The total number of Income Tax payers is estimated to be about 1,100,000. Of this number, at least 950,000 are entitled to relief in respect of small or earned incomes, leaving 150,000 who pay at the full rate. The figure 950,000 does not of course include persons who claim relief solely in respect of life insurance premiums. If these were added, the number of those who pay at the full rate in respect of their whole income, would be very small indeed. Recipients of small dividends from which tax is deducted at the source are for the most part of the class whose total incomes fall within the limits of exemption or abatement, which in such cases are conferred by way of repayment. Any recipients who are not entitled to relief are included in the estimate of 150,000.

Is there no certain means of ascertaining how many Income Tax payers there are paying this 1s. 2d. in the £? I should suggest that it would be double this 150,000

I do not know why the hon. Gentleman says that it is double. I agree that we cannot ascertain exactly the precise figure, but we are able to arrive at something like a pretty fair estimate.

I desire to ask the Foreign Secretary a question, of which I have given him private notice, namely: If he can state whether His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt was consulted before the arrest of Alexandre Adamovitz in Alexandria; what was the specific charge on which he was arrested; whether the prisoner has been deported, and, if so, to what place; whether any correspondence on the matter has passed between the Russian Consul and the British Representative since the arrest; and, if so, will he communicate the gist of it to the House?

I regret that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has been so engaged this morning that I have not been able to get an answer to the question approved. No doubt my hon. Friend requires the information for to-morrow's Debate, and if he will repeat his question to-morrow at Question Time, I have no doubt an answer will be given.

Can the hon. Gentleman say whether Alexandre Adamovitz has been deported?

That is one of the points on which I have no information.

Is the Chancellor of the Exchequer in a position to make any statement as to the business next week, as promised yesterday?

I hope to be in a position to-morrow to make a more definite statement about next week's business. Perhaps I may say in the meantime that we shall ask the House to adjourn early on Tuesday, in connection with the King's Birthday celebrations, probably about seven o'clock.

Will any of the Scottish Estimates be taken next week?

Perhaps my hon. Friend will put a question down tomorrow.

I beg to move, as an Amendment, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words, "upon this day three months."

Last night I stated that I disagreed with the statements made by the Attorney-General in introducing the Bill. This is the third time the measure has come before us. In connection with the two previous Bills the statement was made that they were for the purpose of meeting the claim of the Dominions, made at the Imperial Conference, and that statement is repeated in a modified form in the Memorandum to the present Bill. If the proceedings of the Imperial Conference are referred to it will be found that none of the Dominions ever asked for this, and there was no arrangement of the kind whatever. The question is whether there is a shortage of judicial strength in the House of Lords and in the Judicial Committee. Again, if I were satisfied that that was so, I would be prepared to support the appointment of additional judges, or such number of additional judges as might be required for the purpose of giving adequate strength to those two very important Courts, being the highest Court of Appeal for the Courts of this country, and also for the Courts in the Colonies throughout the Empire. Dealing first with the Attorney-General's suggestion that this was a pledge made at the Imperial Conference, I notice that the Memorandum states that the increase in the number of Law Lords from four to six, proposed by this Bill, is the first step necessary to give effect to the resolution passed at the Imperial Conference in 1911. That is a very plain, definite statement, but there is no truth in it whatever. I do not wish to suggest that the Government are deliberately trying to mislead the House—far from it—but I do say that no resolution bearing on this question involving the appointment by this Government of two additional judges was passed at the Imperial Conference. I think, if I can establish that point, that I take away the whole strength of the appeal made by the Government to the House. We are on this side—and I think I am able to include the Front Bench—economists. We profess to be. Charges are made by the other side that in face of being declared economists we have largely increased the expenditure. That has nothing to do with it. An economic Government may largely increase expenditure if that expenditure is for the good of the people. Economy means that the expenditure which the Government disburses which is not for the benefit of the country should be done away with. Everyone will admit I think that £ 12,000 per year is a very large sum of money, and capitalised it means that because it is to go for ever, since you may depend on it that if we agree to this Bill appointing two judges we will never get rid of those two judges, in our lifetime at any rate. Therefore I hope that if I can convince the Government they have made a great mistake—and I am sure they have—in suggesting such a Resolution was passed; and also, in addition, that the Attorney-General is mistaken in supposing that there is not at present on the rota judges available for the House of Lords and Privy Council sufficient for all purposes, that then the Government, being a Government pledged to the hilt in favour of economy, will no longer press this proposition on the House. The record of this matter is a very brief one. It commenced in this way. Mr. Fisher, Prime Minister of Australia, proposed a short resolution that there should be an Imperial Court constituting a Court of Appeal for the Courts in Great Britain and also constituting a final Court of Appeal for the Colonies. That is a proposition I have supported in this House before, and which was very considerably supported by Liberal speakers. Mr. Fisher's point was that the present constitution of the House of Lords and the Privy Council is not a good one. His resolution was:—

"That it is desirable that the judicial functions in regard to the Dominions now exercised by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council should be vested in an Imperial Appeal Court, which should also be the final Court of Appeal for Great Britain and Ireland."

In other words that the House of Lords as a judicial body should be abolished and that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as a judicial body should be abolished, and that a new Grand Court of Appeal should be established for all those purposes. I think there are many reasons why that proposal should be adopted. We know that the Gladstone Government carried through the great judicial reforms and did away with many of the abuses to which I referred yesterday, and which were portrayed by Charles Dickens in "Bleak House," and by many other writers, abuses in the Court of Chancery which have been largely done away with in 1873 when Lord Selborne, then Lord Chancellor, carried through the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, which to a large extent removed the distinction between Common Law and Chancery so far as procedure was concerned. The Courts were then consolidated into one Court to a considerable extent, and we know that one of the great reforms adopted by that Act was the change in the composition of the final Court of Appeal. The judicial functions were taken away from the House of Lords, but, unfortunately for the country, in the following year, 1874, the Liberals went out of power, and the Conservatives came into office. They had not been in power for more than a year or two before they reversed that very great change, and we have the very unsatisfactory arrangement at present of the House of Lords, which is composed of a large number of laymen, and a very small number of lawyers, having those judicial powers. Every Member of the House of Lords has the right, the strict right, to appear and vote on every appeal which comes before the House of Lords. They do not, as a matter of fact, do it, but it leaves the matter in a very unsatisfactory condition. Another matter which has created a great deal of confusion in the Colonies has been that there are different decisions given by the Judicial Committee and the House of Lords. There are several subjects on which those two High Courts have come to different conclusions which makes it almost impossible to determine what the law is. If you are in a Colony and your appeal goes to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, then you get the law as it has been laid down there. If the same circumstances arise in this country on appeal to the House of Lords, the precedents are all the other way. That is all wrong, and no doubt those were some of the reasons which induced Mr. Fisher to suggest this Motion. The Prime Minister of New Zealand had another Motion:—

"That it has now become evident, considering the growth of population, the diversity of laws enacted, and the differing public policies affecting legal interpretation in His Majesty's Overseas Dominions, that no Imperial Court of Appeal can be satisfactory which does not include judicial representatives of those Overseas Dominions."

That is a resolution which personally I would not agree with, because I think the great advantage of the Judicial Committee to the Colonies is that it is composed of judges who are not Colonial and are not concerned with the political affairs of the different Dominions and Colonies from which the appeals come. That has always been amongst us Canadians one of the strong reasons why we have always been glad that we have had an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. When questions affecting the Constitution under the British North America Act, 1867, have come up in the Canadian Courts, they have nearly always been matters of bitter controversy between the two political parties, and it very rarely happens in the Colonial Courts, as also here to a large extent, that the judges have not been in their time politicians on one side or the other. Hence the people of Canada have never been really satisfied with the interpretation placed by the Canadian Courts upon debated constitutional questions arising out of the British North America Act, and every question of importance has sooner or later found its way to the Judicial Committee, whose decisions in these matters have been very acceptable to the general body of people in Canada. Sometimes those decisions have gone against one party, sometimes against the other, but it has been recognised that the questions have been approached here entirely from the legal point of view, unembarrassed by any political prepossessions on the part of the judges. Therefore, I should oppose the proposal of New Zealand. It is far more advantageous to the Colonies that they should get the benefit of the distinguished judges who sit in the Judicial Committee in connection with all cases, but particularly in connection with constitutional cases. That, too, was the view taken by the Imperial Conference. While there was no objection to Mr. Fisher's resolution, the New Zealand resolution did not meet with the approval of any other Dominion. After discussion both resolutions were withdrawn, and the only other resolution passed was one moved by Mr. Fisher in these terms:—

"That having heard the views of the Lord Chancellor and Lord Haldane, the Conference recommends that the proposals of the Government of the United Kingdom be embodied in a communication to be sent to the Dominions as early as possible."

In the face of that how can the Government make the statement that this proposed increase in the number of Law Lords is the first step necessary to give effect to the resolution passed by the Imperial Conference in 1911? There is no connection between the two things at all. I may say that in pursuance of that resolution the Government here some time afterwards put forward their proposals, one of which was an increase of two judges in the Judicial Committee, but those proposals were not discussed at the Conference. The Dominions do not care how many judges there are, so long as there are enough, and whether or not there are enough is entirely a matter for this Government to determine. I will deal with that question later on; at present I want to dispose of the idea that this increase has been asked for in any sense whatever by the Dominions. It would be invidious for the representatives of the Dominions at an Imperial Conference to dictate to the Government here, who pay the judges and are responsible for them, what they should do in the matter. What the Dominions did say in the discussion was that they were not satisfied with the quorum which now sits in the Judicial Committee. The Attorney-General referred to that last night, and I quite accept his statement. The Dominions wanted a quorum of five instead of three. How the larger quorum should be obtained was a matter entirely for this Government to determine. The Dominions did not suggest that it should be obtained by the appointment of two additional judges. I think I shall be able to show conclusively that a quorum of five can be obtained very easily from the number of judges at present available. The hon. Member for the Mansfield Division (Sir A. Markham) last night completely disposed of the suggestion of the Attorney-General that the appointment of these two new judges would enable the Court to do any more business than at present. It is not proposed to provide for two Courts; you would have only one Court to dispose of Colonial appeals; and if you appoint two new judges in order to increase the quorum, you certainly will not be able to do more business. In further proof of my statement that there is nothing in the proceedings to show that the Dominions want two more judges appointed, I propose to read the remarks made by the different representatives at the Conference. I will quote from the précis. There is a longer report, but really everything that was said is contained in the shorter statement taken at the time:—

"Mr. Fisher, in moving the Commonwealth Resolution, said that they wished to advance the view that it was advisable to have one Imperial Court to which all cases could be submitted for final decision. The constitution of that Court need not be gone into at the moment.

Mr. Batchelor pointed out that there were two Courts of Final Appeal in the Empire: one, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, for the Crown Colonies, India, and the Overseas Dominions; and the other the House of Lords, for the United Kingdom. That was an anomalous position, and unless there were serious practical difficulties in the way it ought not to be continued in the Empire as now developed. When an appeal was made to a Court of Final Jurisdiction there ought to be no possibility of uncertainty or of conflict of opinion in different parts of the Empire as to what the law really was. As the two bodies were composed largely of the same judges there seemed to be no great reason against having one Court. The judgments of the Privy Council were findings of a Board rather than decisions of a Court. It was the one Court in the Empire which did not give individual judgments."

That is another grievance raised by the Dominions. The first was that the Court should have at least five judges sitting. In Canada the Supreme Court consists of six judges, of whom five make a quorum. It has always been felt to be not quite satisfactory that in appeals coming over here from Courts consisting of five or six members the judgments should be reversed by a smaller Court of three or four members. The representatives of the Dominions spoke very strongly upon that. The other question was that referred to by Mr. Batchelor. There has been a feeling that it would be more satisfactory to the Dominions that in the case of their appeals, as in the case of House of Lords appeals, the different judges should give their individual judgments, instead of there being one single judgment, which is not necessarily the judgment of the whole Court, but simply the judgment of a majority. The reason that point was taken was in connection with constitutional cases. It does not make so much difference in ordinary private cases whether or not you get all the opinions of the judges. What you want is the final decision. But in a constitutional case it is sometimes of the greatest importance to know whether or not the decision of the final Court is a unanimous decision, or whether there was a difference of opinion, because very often these constitutional questions result sooner or later in new legislation. It is therefore very important indeed, in suggesting new legislation, to know whether the final Court of Appeal was unanimous upon the question or whether there was a decided difference of opinion, and what that difference of opinion was. So that Mr. Batchelor and the other representatives took the ground that they would like to have individual judgments in the case of their appeals.

"Mr. Asquith said that some people thought that that was a drawback, others that it was an advantage. One never knew whether a judgment of the Privy Council was unanimous or not, or to what extent it was dissented from.

Mr. Batchelor said that was one of the arguments sometimes used against it. The practice of giving one judgment only could not tend to the same close study of a case by each individual member of the Court as the giving of an individual judgment would require. Moreover, the institution of one Final Court would be another step in the direction of Imperial unity.

Lord Loreburn, in explaining the nature of the jurisdiction already existing, said that the House of Lords heard all the appeals from the United Kingdom. In theory every Peer was entitled to sit in the House of Lords as a Court of Appeal."

A most absurd proposition, if you take into consideration that the House of Lords is appointed, not by election, but comes into existence by birth; for a man may be an idiot and yet be entitled, as a Law Lord, to sit and hear these appeals. [An HON. MEMBER: "They never do."]

"For a long time"—

Lord Loreburn goes on—

"the attendance had been restricted to the judicial members, namely, the Lord Chancellor, four Lords of Appeal, with any previous Chancellor, and any Peer who had held high judicial office; three members formed a quorum, but the Court seldom sat with less than four. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had jurisdiction, broadly speaking, in regard to India, the Dominion and Colonial Courts, and certain other Courts. From this it followed that the cases dealt with might involve old French Law, Roman Dutch Law, English Common Law, considerably modified by statutes in different Dominions, and also the Indian Codes. It was, therefore, necessary to adjust the composition of the Tribunal to the nature of the laws with which it had to deal. The judges entitled to sit on the Judicial Committee were the Lord Chancellor, the four Lords of Appeal, all Privy Councillors who had held high judicial office, two judges with special knowledge of Indian law, and also judges, not exceeding five in number, from the Dominions or Colonies."

I am rather sorry that the Attorney-General is not present, because he referred last night in one of the Clauses of this Bill to the raising of the five Colonial judges to seven. I understood him to say that these Colonial judges were now entitled to sit in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, but did not sit in cases except those from their own Dominions. I would have liked to ask him about that. I think that is a mistake. I think I have seen sitting in the Privy Council and hearing appeals from Canada Lord de Villiers, who, of course, comes from South Africa. It does seem to me that the suggestion of the Attorney-General, if it be correct, is the proper one. That is to say, that this Court should not, for reasons I gave a short time ago, be composed of representatives from the different Colonies deciding one another's cases, but that the deciding judges in any particular case should be English judges if it so happens to be convenient to have representation from the particular Dominions from which the case comes. I have no objection whatever to having the number increased from five to seven. But I would like to have the point cleared up. Lord Loreburn goes on to say:—

"In practice the members were the same as those who sat in the House of Lords, with the addition of Sir Arthur Wilson, who was unquestionably a judge of the very highest ability, but of whose services they would shortly be deprived"—

That has happened since, but there are still two judges like Sir A. Wilson who sit in Indian appeals.

"If both the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee were sitting at the same time, a distribution of the available members was made, and the utmost care was taken to equalise as far as possible the strength in the two Courts. In substance the personnel of the two Courts was identical, and he had never known a case in which there had been conflict between their decisions."

I do not agree with that, for I have known a case where there was a conflict between the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Councl. That, I think, is a most unfortunate incident.

"Dr. Findlay said that the conflict, when any, had been in connection with dicta of different members.

Lord Loreburn said that that constantly occurred in England and between different dicta in the House of Lords itself, where it was the custom for each judge to deliver his own judgment. Sometimes the judges differed in opinion and sometimes they agreed, but for different reasons. His own view was that if in every Court there was only one judgment there would be more coherence and consistency. That, however, was a point in regard to which the Home Government would not be disposed to make any difficulty. Each constituent part of the Empire ought to judge for itself as to the kind of tribunal it wished, and the composition of that tribunal. Whatever Court of Final Appeal in England was desired by any of the Colonies the Home Government would wish to give effect to the desire as far as possible, and if they would agree on the same kind of Court and the same kind of judges so much the better."

All this is from Lord Loreburn: I hope the House will bear that in mind. What I am reading are not suggestions from any of the Colonial delegates, but from Lord Loreburn, and, of course, that what he may say in an Imperial Conference is binding upon the Government here. It cannot be said that it was a request from the delegates from the Colonies, as suggested in the Memorandum of the Government!

"With regard to the Privy Council, was it desired to have British judges only? Was it desired that the Indian judges should take part in the appeals from the Dominions? Was it desired that there should be a permanent judge from each Dominion, and that those judges should deal with all the appeals to the Privy Council, or that the individual judges should with the British judges deal only with the appeals from their respective Dominions? If desired, it could be arranged that all the cases from a particular Dominion should be heard consecutively, and a time fixed for their hearing convenient to the Dominion concerned, so that a judge from that Dominion might be present. Having regard to the complex nature of the jurisdiction, the best course would probably be to have always a wide membership of the Judicial Committee, and that a selection should be made according to the nature of the case to be tried. That was done at present so far as there was the necessary judicial strength. Another point for consideration was the different rules which prevailed in different Dominions as to special leave being required as to the limit of the amount involved, as to the nature of the security to be given, and so forth. With regard to the United Kingdom, the Government were not prepared to recommend that the personnel of the judicial body in the House of Lords should be changed. It was already possible to add any distinguished judge from the Dominions. If each Dominion would say what kind of Court they preferred and the class of judges they wished to see, the Home Government would do its very best to meet their views. His own idea was that they should add to the highest Court of Appeal both in the United Kingdom and for the Dominions and Colonies by selecting two English judges of the finest quality, that the quorum should be fixed at, say, five, and that the Court should sit successively in the House of Lords for United Kingdom appeals, and in the Privy Council for appeals from the Dominions and Colonies. In that way they would have substantially the same Court in its full strength for both classes of appeals."

There is a direct suggestion that two additional judges should be appointed. I ask the House to remember that this suggestion was made by Lord Loreburn, and did not in any way come from the Dominions:—

"Sir Joseph Ward pointed out that in order for a New Zealand judge to deal only with New Zealand cases it would be necessary for him to leave New Zealand for six months, and then perhaps have only one case to deal with. He and his colleagues would have no objection to Canadian or South African judges sitting in New Zealand cases, but it would hardly be practicable for New Zealand judges to come over to deal only with New Zealand cases.

Lord Haldane remarked that in connection with a Maori land case, which occupied nearly ten days before the Privy Council, it would have been useful if they could have had a New Zealand judge present as an assessor, to make sure that no points of importance on a long series of special Statutes were missed.

Sir Joseph Ward said that the majority of cases from New Zealand would have reference to native land, in regard to which there was much difference of legal opinion, and it was of the greatest importance that there should be present a judge who knew the customs of the natives, which had to be considered in such cases.

Mr. Asquith pointed out that if the Court sat in full strength it would meet the complaint sometimes made with regard to the Judicial Committee being a scratch Court and too few in numbers. He had often argued cases in the Judicial Committee before three judges, which he thought was hardly fitting, seeing that they might be appeals from the Supreme Courts of various Dominions."

And Mr. Asquith did seem to think that there should be a greater number. I quite admit that they asked for that:—

"Sir Joseph Ward asked if the Lord Chancellor had any objection to there being only one Court by merging the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council with the House of Lords, instead of one for the United Kingdom and another for the Overseas Dominions, and make the one a final Court of Appeal.

Lord Loreburn said it was practically the same thing, and the system which he had suggested might develop into the one Court. Personally, he would be very well pleased if it did. Our own system was somewhat complicated, but he did not think that the legal profession or the people at large at home had any quarrel with the existing final Court of Appeal."

I cannot agree with that. I have heard Member after Member in this House get up and object very strongly to the continuance of the judicial powers of the House of Lords. There is no advantage in it, and it involves a great many inconsistencies. Why, if the Government are so much concerned, as I think they ought to be, to fall in with the views of the Dominions as suggested in this Imperial Conference, do not they meet the Dominions upon this point? Why not, as was suggested here every time this Bill has come up, have one great Imperial Court—not a House of Lords Appeal Court, nor a Judicial Committee—but one real Court? We have that, in a way, at present. Why not have it really, instead of nominally? If we are to have appeals heard, why not substitute a Court? Australia asked for it, and Canada would like to have it, and I am sure there would be no objection as far as the people of this country are concerned that there should be a Court of that kind.

"Lord Haldane said that the Lord Chancellor's proposition was really to make one Court, but to keep the old forms.

Mr. Malan said that in South Africa there was no right of appeal from their Appeal Court to any Court outside the Union. But every subject had the right to petition the King, and any such petition would, as a matter of practice, go to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. If the Committee gave leave to appeal the case would be considered on its merits. It was not anticipated that there would be more than one such case in five or ten years. Therefore, as far as South Africa was concerned, they were generally satisfied with the present practice. It was, however, felt that the Judicial Committee was in some respects no ordinary Court of Law at all, and it would be an advantage to have its procedure in conformity with that of the other Courts of Law."

I could not put my view on this matter before the House anything like as well as they are expressed in this document, especially as the Government are trying to make out, as I think most improperly, that they are meeting the views of the Dominions in the proposition to increase the number of judges. Mr. Malan went on to say:—

"The appeal to the King was one of the connecting links of the Empire, and on purely sentimental grounds it would be a right thing to have one final Court of Appeal for the whole Empire. A great deal sometimes depended on a name, and if they had one Imperial Court of Appeal, perhaps in two divisions, one dealing with appeals from the United Kingdom, and the other with appeals from the Dominions and India, leaving the Lord Chancellor certain discretion in constituting the bench of the respective divisions, the difficulty might be solved.

Mr. Brodeur said that in Canada they had been very well satisfied with the existing system of appeals before the Privy Council. In view of the dispositions of the British North America Act and of the different procedures and practices of the various provinces, it would be somewhat difficult to make a change. Everyone who had practised before the Judicial Committee must have been impressed with the great breadth of mind which prevailed amongst its members. Not only might a change be objected to by some of the provinces, but it would be a reflection on the present Court, which had given satisfaction.

Sir Joseph Ward said that there was not the slightest idea of reflecting on the Privy Council or its members. If such a line of argument were followed no change at all would ever be made. New Zealand were in the peculiar position that out of their limited area some 7,000,000 acres of land were owned by natives. When litigation in connection with this land arose, native customs had to be taken into account, and it was felt that when important cases of this kind came before the Privy Council, it would be a great advantage if they had a representative judge from New Zealand present. In view of the statement of the Lord Chancellor, he would not urge that the Judicial Committee should be merged in the House of Lords. He suggested, however, that in addition to the present members of the Judicial Committee, there should be a permanent judge from each of the important Oversea Dominions. The difficulty with regard to a judge coming over specially was that in all probability he would have to deal with cases which had already come before him in New Zealand. If permanent judges were appointed as he suggested, possibly for five or seven years, after which they would resume their work as Supreme Court judges, it would not only get over various difficulties which stood in the way of other proposals, but would greatly assist towards securing that uniformity and co-ordination of the law in different parts of the Empire which was so eminently desirable. In view of the importance of the interests involved, the question of expense, so far as each Dominion was concerned, was a secondary matter. New Zealand would hail with supreme satisfaction the presence of judges from the other Dominions in cases in which New Zealand was concerned, and he could hardly think that there would be any objection on their part on practical grounds to a New Zealand judge taking part in cases from the other Dominions.

Dr. Findlay said that the creation of one final Court of Appeal for the Emplre would satisfy a great Imperial sentiment."

I am sure that appeals to hon. Members on the other side of the House, and I am surprised when there is an opportunity like this of talking real Imperialism, and of trying to meet the demands of our Dominions we hear so little from hon. Members opposite. Their Imperialism is more connected with Toryism than with Empire. If there is any Tory capital to be made out of talk about Empire and waving the flag they are always prepared to do it, but when we are trying to induce the Government to meet the suggestions of the Dominions which are most reasonable for a great Imperial Court, not only for Great Britain and Ireland, but also for the Colonies and Dominions, including India, they are silent. That would be true Imperialism compared with what we hear suggested upon the other side of the House. Dr. Findlay went on to say:—

"and although the personnel would differ very little from that of the present Court, it would constitute a step towards closer union. The presence of a resident Colonial judge would obviate the necessity for sending over at great expense counsel from, for instance, New Zealand to see that the Privy Council were instructed on the peculiar features of New Zealand law. In any fair conception of the burdens of Empire, there should be no objection to the Dominions sharing the cost of the Imperial Court of Appeal by paying the salary of one of their own judges."

Sir Edward Morris said that very few appeals came from Newfoundland, and they were generally satisfied with the present arrangements. At the same time, if there was a desire for change on the part of Dominions who were more largely concerned in the work of the Judicial Committee, he would not consider himself justified in voting against the resolution. The proposed change was largely one of name, the Imperial Court of Appeal instead of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. There could be no objection to each Dominion having a representative on the permanent Court of Appeal. The principle was in harmony with the general sentiment of unification now prevailing.

Mr. Asquith asked whether the other Dominions would approve of Sir Joseph Ward's suggestion that each Dominion should appoint a resident judge who should sit, not only in cases affecting his own Dominions, but in appeals from all the Dominions.

Mr. Fisher said that in Australia they desired to have an Australian final Court of Appeal, failing that, they desired to have one Court of Appeal in England. He was not at present prepared to accept Sir J. Ward's suggestion.

Sir E. Morris said that Newfoundland would not be prepared to appoint a man and pay his salary and expenses in view of the small number of cases from that country."

That is as I stated. They were unanimously opposed to Sir Joseph Ward's suggestion that Colonial judges should act on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. They also unanimously supported the resolution proposed by Mr. Fisher that there should be one Court of Appeal instead of two Courts. The report proceeds:—

"Mr. Asquith said that he would much prefer the suggestion that the cases from a particular Dominion should be fixed to be heard at a time to suit the convenience of a judge from that Dominion. He thought that this would substantially meet Sir J. Ward's view that when cases from a particular Dominion came on, it would be an advantage to have a local judge present, and the Government would be glad to meet that view as far as possible.

Lord Loreburn agreed that if there were only one or two cases, the sending over of a judge would be a large order for a comparatively small result."

That is Lord Loreburn's statement, and it is not a statement made by any of the Colonials, and it contains the suggestion that there should be two additional judges appointed. I wish to draw the attention of the House to the fact that Lord Lore-burn made that statement because the Imperial Government have the responsibility of providing the Court, and that was his statement. It was not made by any of the Colonial representatives, and they did not ask for it. Lord Loreburn goes on to say:

"As he understood the discussion there was general agreement to the following effect: That there should be for the whole British Empire one final Court of Appeal in two divisions, one for the United Kingdom consisting of the same persons who were now entitled to sit in the House of Lords, and the other for the Overseas Dominions, consisting of the persons now entitled to sit on the Judicial Committee, with such further additions as might be agreed upon, and that it should be strengthened by the addition of two English judges."

If the Government think that that justifies them in saying that a resolution to this effect was passed by the Imperial Conference, very well.

Does the hon. Member quote Lord Loreburn as saying that that is the general summing up. Was there any dissent from Lord Loreburn's statement?

No. He said there should be two additional judges appointed. There would have been no dissent from the Dominions in regard to that proposition, and they were not called upon to pay any part of the expense. The suggestion of having two judges came entirely from Lord Loreburn. No doubt they have a reason for it. I do not know what it is exactly, but I have my suspicions. My point is that it was their proposition, and it was not asked for by the Dominions. I shall endeavour, in my subsequent remarks, to show that there was no necessity whatever to have two additional judges. In other words, a quorum of five can be obtained both by the Judicial Committee and the House of Lords from the present judges who are receiving salaries now without appointing these two additional judges.

"Sir Joseph Ward thought that that represented the only modus vivendi.

Mr. Fisher said that he would withdraw his resolution and substitute the following:—"

I have already read the resolution.

"Mr. Batchelor said that they looked forward to one final Court of Appeal for the Empire. The two divisions seemed to be a practicable arrangement for the time being, but it ought to be understood that the proposal was merely for the time being.

The original resolutions were then withdrawn, and the substituted resolution was unanimously agreed to."

I am sorry I have had to detain the House reading quotations from this Report, but when I make the charge that the statement set forth in the Memorandum has no truth whatever in it. I feel that it is necessary to prove it, and I submit that I have now proved it up to the hilt. I think I have shown that the suggestion to increase the number of judges from four to six as the first step necessary to give effect to the resolution passed at the Imperial Conference in 1911 is an absolute misstatement of what occurred on that occasion. Quite apart from what took place at the Imperial Conference, the Attorney-General suggested that there were not enough judges available to do the work. The real difficulty in connection with these two Courts arises from a matter that can be fixed without any legislation whatever, and it is that the two Courts should sit at the same time. There is no reason why the judicial Courts should not be divided into two parts, one sitting as the Judicial Committee and the other sitting in the House of Lords. When that was suggested it was stated that they could not keep up with the work. I do not know myself how many days a judge ought to work. In discussing this question in regard to the King's Bench Division, we found out that the judges work about 200 days in the year, or perhaps a little less. They work 170 days, and there are thirty-five Saturdays. Some of them do not work on Saturday at all, and some of them only half a day. There are thirty-five Saturdays in the judicial year, and Lord Loreburn, before the Joint Committee, made a suggestion that it would be fair to consider those thirty-five Saturdays as about seventeen working days. On this subject I have had a reply from the Attorney-General to a question I put which throws a great deal of light upon the point of these two Courts not being able to keep up with the work. I asked how many days the House of Lords sat as a judicial body and as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, respectively, actually hearing cases during the years 1910, 1911, and 1912. I also asked how many days in each of the said years the said Courts sat on the same day. Mr. Gulland, for the Attorney General, said that the House of Lords sat judicially 87 days in 1910, 100 days in 1911, and 86 days in 1912. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council sat 76 days in 1910, 101 days in 1911, and 101 days in 1912. Taking the year 1910, you get 163 as the total number of working days of these two Courts. Is it to be suggested that judges who sit altogether 163 days in the year cannot possibly take on any more work? It is a very serious thing for the Attorney-General to ask us to agree to an annual expenditure of £12,000 involving pensions for these judges, and to represent to us that they are required for the transaction of business when the Courts only needed to sit 160 days in 1910, 201 in 1911, and 197 in 1912 to clear up the business of both of them. The Attorney-General took the ground that the only judges available to constitute these two Courts were the four Law Lords. He objected to including the Lord Chancellor because he said he was a Member of the Government and had to attend Cabinet meetings, and was not always available. I think it will be found that the last three Lord Chancellors have always been on hand to sit in these Courts. We must remember that the Lord Chancellor receives the salary of £10,000 per annum, which is double the amount received by the Prime Minister, and he receives that seemingly large salary because he has to do this judicial work in addition to his responsible duties as a Member of the Government. The Attorney-General rather suggested that it was a matter of free will on the part of the Lord Chancellor whether he sat in these Courts. I object to that view. I say that if this country pays him a salary of £10,000 to fulfil certain duties it is not within the competence of that Noble Lord to say, "I will," or, "I will not attend in these Courts, as I see fit." I am not making any reflection upon these Noble Lords because they have always taken that view themselves. They do not shirk their work. They appear in these Courts, and preside over them, and there is no question that the Lord Chancellor is absolutely at the disposal of the country for the purpose of filling the office of one of the judges of the House of Lords. That makes five judges.

We always have in the House of Lords a number of ex-Lord Chancellors. At present we have two. A short time ago we had three, but unfortunately Lord Ashbourne died a few days ago. The Attorney-General said that none of these ex-Lord Chancellors were available except when they saw fit to sit in these Courts. I join issue with him there. He stated that these gentlemen had pensions in respect of the services which they had performed for the State. That is true with regard to an ordinary judge. He has to sit for fifteen years before he is entitled to a pension of £3,500 a year. Of course, it has so happened that in recent years Governments have remained in office a reasonably long time, though hon. Members opposite think that this Government is staying in a most unreasonably long time, and they are trying, with very poor success so far, to put them out; but it might happen that there might be a succession of Governments with very short terms of office. Lord Herschell was only in office for nine months, and that might occur again. We might at the next General Election have a very close result. This Government might be turned out, and their successors might only be able to remain in for a few months. Lord Halsbury is an old man now, and possibly he would not care to take up the appointment of Lord Chancellor again. We might, therefore, easily have a Lord Chancellor in office for only a few days. Is it reasonable to suggest that if a Government were in power for, say, a month, and a Lord Chancellor were appointed, that he would be entitled to a pension of £5,000 a year for the services he had performed for the country during that period of one month? To state the proposition is to furnish its contradiction. I suggest, therefore, that when the country agreed to give the ex-Lord Chancellor a pension of £5,000 a year the intention was that he should be available as one of the judges of these Courts. If I am right, then we are entitled absolutely to the services of the Earl of Halsbury and Lord Loreburn in addition to the other five judges. That makes seven judges.

The Attorney-General said that Lord Halsbury was very good, and that he came in of his own free will and gave his services on the Judicial Committee and in the House of Lords. I say it is not of his own free will. I say that as long as he takes that money from the country he is bound to give his services in these Courts. The large pension of £5,000 a year, equal to the salary of the Prime Minister, is given to these ex-Lord Chancellors in order that they may be available as members of the Court of the House of Lords and on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. We therefore have the four ordinary Law Lords, the Lord Chancellor, and two ex-Lord Chancellors. We may at any time have more. If hon. Gentlemen opposite and this Government comes to an end in three months or so, then we shall have another ex-Lord Chancellor, the present Lord Haldane. We, at any rate, have two, which makes seven judges to constitute a Court in which the quorum is five. That, however, is not all. We have, in addition, Lord Dunedin and Lord Kinnear, Scotch judges, who can be got at any time, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, and the Chief Justice of Ireland. We had Baron Palles over here the other day. He was called in by the Lord Chancellor to sit on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to hear an important case from Canada affecting the marriage laws. We have also the Master of the Rolls, the President of the Probate Division, and five Lords Justice. We have fifteen or twenty judges who can be called upon if necessary. We have seven judges of whom we are absolutely sure, and, if by any chance any of them happen to be sick, we have this reserve force to fall back upon. There are always the two Indian judges, Sir John Edge and Syed Ameer Ali, so that all that is needed for the Indian cases, which constitute a considerable portion of the work of the Judicial Committee, are three other judges. Under these circumstances, there is no necessity whatever for the expenditure of this large sum of money.

I am very glad that this time the Government have put the salary of the new judges at £6,000. That may not meet with the approval of some of my hon. Friends, but I think it would be very invidious to appoint two new judges and give them £5,000 when there are four others, who have no additional duties to perform, getting £6,000 a year. It is suggested that the proper course would be to cut the salaries of the others down to £5,000, but I disagree with that. The salary of an ordinary judge in England is £5,000 per annum, and I do not think it is one penny too much. I oppose the appointment of these judges, but I would not oppose paying them the whole salary if they were appointed; and, if the salary of an ordinary judge is £5,000 a year, it does seem to me only proper that the judges who sit in appeal from these judges and who are naturally selected men, men who are considered to be most capable of filling the judicial office, should receive £1,000 additional, so that so far as that point is concerned I quite support the change in the Bill. Last night the Attorney-General raised the question as to the calls on the new judges, and antici- pated there would be no objection to it. Certainly, I have no objection to it, but I would like some information on the point. I understood the right hon. and learned Gentleman to say that the judges would only sit on cases from their particular Dominions. I have seen Lord de Villiers from South Africa sitting in cases of appeal from Canada. Do I understand there is to be a change in the law in that regard? If so, I agree with it. I do not think it would be acceptable to Canada or Australia to have their cases decided by judges from other Dominions or Colonies. What we really want, as Colonials, is to have the Court constituted of English judges, not acquainted with the politics or particular circumstances of the particular countries, so that they can look at the cases that come before them purely from a constitutional and legal standpoint, as they have done in the past.

The Attorney-General, I think unfairly, attempted to prejudice this discussion by pointing out that there were sixty-three cases standing for trial which ought to be disposed of before the 31st July next. Thirty-four of these cases are in the House of Lords, and it therefore comes to this, that there are about forty cases to be disposed of in ten weeks. That is no argument for increasing the number of judges. As a matter of fact, I suppose, there is not in the world, and certainly not in this country or in Canada, or in the United States, any Court which is in a better position to do its work than these Courts are, so far as the business before them is concerned. I believe I am correct in saying that there are really no arrears whatever either in the House of Lords or in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and that the only cases in which judgment has not been delivered are a few cases very recently argued, as must always be the case before any final Court of Appeal. If there are forty cases to be tried in ten weeks, it means disposing of four cases weekly. If the Courts were in arrear, as are those in the King's Bench Division, I would suggest that the Privy Council might well sit oftener than it does. It sits regularly, I believe, on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays. It sits sometimes on Friday, but never on Monday or Saturday. There is no objection to that, of course, so long as it keeps pace with the work. The Attorney-General tried to prejudice the issue before this House by suggesting that there are forty cases to be decided between now and the 31st July, and adding that the Lord Chancellor tells him that if we do not give him these additional judges the work cannot be accomplished. I do not think it is fair. I do not think it is true even. On the 31st July, every single case from the Colonies, including fifteen from Canada, will have been disposed of by the present judges in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and if for any reason whatever it may prove difficult to dispose of them, the Judicial Committee will only have to sit on Mondays and Fridays, and occasionally on a Saturday, in order to accommodate the Colonies and dispose of the cases. Colonial counsel are under great obligations to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for the careful way in which they consider the circumstances of counsel coming over, and go out of their way to oblige them by expediting the hearing. I object to the Attorney-General taking this course.

Recently a long article appeared in the "Times." Evidently it was inspired by the Government. I always suspect, when I see anything on politics in the "Times," that it is more or less inspired by the Government, although it is a Tory paper. The Attorney-General has stated that there is a terrible rush in the Judicial Committee, and that, unless the House of Commons comes to the rescue, and authorises the appointment of these additional judges, there will be a great block. There is nothing whatever in that. The writer in the "Times" went so far as to point out that there were two cases which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had ordered to be reargued, and suggested that probably that order would not have been made had these additional judges been in existence. That shows how little the writer of the article knows about the law. What difference could it make whether there were five or twenty judges if the argument had been ineffective? The truth is that one case was argued ex parte. The Court probably saw that some point had not been dealt with, because there was no representative of the other side, and, consequently, provided for a reargument of the case. But that has absolutely nothing to do with the number of judges. When we find an argument such as this put forward by the Attorney-General, we are driven to the conclusion that the Government have a very weak case indeed for their demand for two more judges. What really was promised at the Imperial Conference was that there should be individual judgment given by the judges of the Judicial Committee. We are told by the Attorney-General that the Colonies have agreed to the abandonment of that. It would be satisfactory to this House to have published the correspondence upon that point. We had the representatives of the Colonies at the Conference taking a strong ground in favour of separate judgments, and I, for one, should like to see the correspondence which, according to the Government, has released them from the undertaking they certainly gave on this point. The other matter was that the Courts should sit separately. I do not think there would be any difficulty whatever in regard to that so far as the question of time is concerned. It would only mean, at the utmost, the Court sitting 200 days in the year, and surely that is a not unreasonable period of time. So much for the Government's position!

I should like to point out this one thing. While Canada has been very glad to avail herself of the services of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—it costs her nothing, and is furnished by the taxpayers of this country for the benefit of the Dominion—I would like to point out that in all probability the number of appeals from Canada hereafter is not likely to be so great as in the past. There have been a number of cases decided by the Judicial Committee during the past year the decisions in which have proved very unsatisfactory indeed to the people of Canada. I am not going to discuss these cases. I am not suggesting that they were wrongly decided; I am merely mentioning the fact that there is a great deal of discussion in Canada at the present time with regard to the advisability of sending appeals over here, and that discussion has arisen from the fact that there have been a number of cases between big financial corporations and municipal bodies in which the municipal corporations have got very much the worst of the decision. I am not saying it is not right. I have great respect for this Court; I have not examined these cases; in all probability the Court is right on matters of law. We may assume that to be so, considering the high character of the Court in question. What. I am doing is putting before the Government the fact that there is a great deal of dissatisfaction in Canada, and it has grown stronger within the last few months in connection with a case decided from the Province of Alberta. There has been a great deal of trouble in that province with regard to the construction of a certain railway, and various Acts in regard to it have been passed by the Legislature. These Statutes came up for revision by the Judicial Committee, and, a few months ago, a most remarkable decision was pronounced. Again I do not propose to discuss it. I do not say it was wrong. But it almost paralyses the Legislatures of the different provinces in Canada, and it seems probable that, if the decision is allowed to stand, those Legislatures will not be able in the future effectually to legislate on a subject which has always been understood to be exclusively within their jurisdiction. So strongly has this feeling grown, and so much has it been discussed in the newspapers and periodicals in Canada, that recently a long discussion took place in the Senate on the point, and strong views were expressed by lawyers and others in the Senate that the time had arrived when Canada should cease sending appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. I think that bears materially on this question whether we should precipitately appoint two additional judges to this Court, seeing that one of the reasons put forward for the appointment of the new judges is that the business before the Judicial Committee is likely to increase.

If this Bill passes its Second Reading—I hope it will not—there should be some legislation by this House in another direction. If there is a strong feeling in the Colonies in favour of having the power of appeal to the Judicial Committee, that is not a feeling which this House should for a moment undertake to force in any way. If any Colony, if Australia or Canada, should desire to have its own final Court of Appeal, I think it would be, from an Imperial standpoint, the greatest mistake in the world for this House to attempt to force upon any Colony which desired a change, the duty of sending its appeals to this country. The Dominion of Canada many years ago inserted in its Criminal Code a clause to the effect that there should be no appeal to the Privy Council in connection with criminal matters. I do not know whether that was constitutional or not, but, in spite of the clause being in the Criminal Code, the Privy Council has continued to hear criminal appeals from Canada. It seems to me Parliament should make it clear that if a Dominion passes legislation in favour of taking away the right of appeal with regard to particular classes of cases, to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, we ought to make that constitutional, and it would be a great mistake to force the hands of the Colonies in this matter. The fact that that Clause was put into the Criminal Code of Canada does not in any way suggest that Canada is dissatisfied with the Judicial Committee as a Court of Appeal. The reason it was put in was to prevent delay in criminal matters. Canada has a great reputation for its exceedingly fine criminal law, which is so well administered. A very important thing in connection with the administration of the criminal law is speed, and we who are acquainted with what occurs in the United States fully understand the position. In the United States it is possible, on account of the numerous appeals, for a person convicted of murder to keep his case going in the Courts for seven or eight years.

This is totally irrelevant to the matter now being discussed. I must call the attention of the House to the continued irrelevance of the hon. Member, and warn him against it. The delays the hon. Member was dealing with were delays in the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. That has nothing whatever to do with this Bill. I must ask the hon. Member to approach more closely the subject-matter of this Bill.

We have a Bill here affecting the constitution of a Court of Appeal—the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It will be proposed to insert in that Bill a Clause making it clear that any Colony or Dominion can, if it likes, legislate constitutionally so as to prevent appeals coming from its Court to the Judicial Committee. The reason I referred to the United States was to show why it was that Canada legislated in that direction. It was because we appreciated so much the undesirability of having long delays caused by appeals to the different Courts in connection with criminal matters. That is all, Mr. Speaker. I think it is important.

I must point out to the hon. Member that he has already occupied an hour and twenty minutes, and that a great deal of what he has said has been tedious repetition. I give him a warning—that is all I wish to do at present—and I invite him to approach more closely to the subject-matter of the Bill now before us.

I look upon this as a very important matter indeed. I did not know that I repeated myself. I am very sorry that I should have done so, and I will endeavour to avoid that defect. I have just about finished the points with which I wish to deal. In conclusion, let me say with regard to both the reasons put forward by the Attorney-General last night—the first that this Bill has been asked for by the Dominions at the last Imperial Conference, and, secondly, that the Court requires additional strength—I submit that I have shown conclusively that there is absolutely nothing in either of those points. I have read every word of the précis of the Report of the Conference upon this particular matter, and I defy any Member of this House to point out in any way that any single representative of any Dominion at that Conference asked for an increase in the number of judges. With regard to the other matter, I have shown that we have at our disposal seven judges who are paid salaries for the purpose of sitting in these Courts, and who are bound, I submit, to sit in those Courts already. The quorum attempted to be established is five instead of three. There is no trouble at all in having a quorum of five when you have seven judges available, and in addition to those seven judges there are eight or ten more who can always be had on short notice in case any of the seven should be ill at any particular time. I may have repeated myself, but I was not aware of it. I devoted a large part of my speech to reading these extracts. That may have been wearisome and tiresome, and I should not have done it if the Government had not made certain statements. When I challenge the correctness of the statements of the Government I am bound to show that my challenge is a correct one. For these reasons I hope the House will refuse to give the Government power to put upon the taxpayers of this country for all time a further charge of £12,000 a year.

I beg to second the Amendment. I desire, in the first place, to protest against the methods adopted by the Government in putting down for discussion three Bills which are opposed by a number of their own party.

That is not relevant to this discussion now.

Perhaps it may, to some ex-tent, account for our action in strenuously opposing this measure that the Govern- ment have tried to punish their own supporters by bringing them back earlier than the regular Opposition. Seeing that you Sir, have ruled that out of order, I shall address myself to the question under discussion. My hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Martin), in his brief observations to the House, made one error. He said that this was the third occasion upon which this Bill had conic before the House. In fact, this is the fourth occasion. In 1911 a Bill was discussed in this House, the. Second Reading was passed after a protest, and nothing more was heard of it. In 1912 it was put upon the Paper, and the Motions for its rejection were many in number. This year it has been twice before the House. It has been twice through the House of Lords, and has twice come down here. The first occasion was on the 1st April—a very suitable day—when it was found that an error was made by the Upper Chamber in putting in the pensions and salaries of the judges, and a new edition had to be sent down to us. On the first of the two occasions, when the Bill was practically rejected by this House, we had the support of the Labour party in opposing the measure. They actively opposed the measure in 1911 by speeches and by votes, and in 1912, by their own Motions on the Paper, they indicated that they as a party intended to oppose the measure. It is an extraordinary thing that the Labour party are to-day conspicuous by their absence. Not a single representative of that party is in the House at the present moment. Yesterday, when an Address for a new judge was passed, only one Member of the Labour party voted with the thirteen who opposed it. I hope that the country will be made aware of the fact that yesterday the Labour party voted for an additional judge at a salary of £5,000 a year, and that now, when two new judges are being appointed, or the Bill appointing them at £6,000 a year—which is equal to a capitalised sum of something like £350,000—is being discussed, not a single representative of the Labour party is in the House. My belief is that the Labour party in the House are a stupendous fraud. The point which should make them most strenuous in opposing this measure is the fact that in the later editions of the Bill, as was indicated by the Attorney-General, the salaries to be paid to the judges are to be increased. Six thousand pounds a year is to be paid to each of these new judges, whereas in 1911 and 1912 the salaries were only £5,000 a year.

What is the idea at the back of this Bill? What is the Government supposed to be aiming at? What is the demand of the Colonies which they are constantly trotting out as an argument in its favour? In a nutshell, the demand of the Colonies is that when they bring their cases forward to this country on appeal they should have six judges to sit on those cases. They object to the fact that while in the Dominions, or in some of them, six judges sit on their cases, when they are brought over here on appeal the number of judges sitting on the appeals is four. That is the problem that has to be solved. The Dominions suggested a solution of the problem, which has been referred to by my hon. and learned Friend. The suggestion they made was that the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council should be amalgamated, or made into one Court, and should be an Imperial Court for the Empire. The Government did not see their way to adopt that suggestion. I can see quite readily that there were many difficulties. There is the question of the reform of the House of Lords, which is to come in the immediate future, I suppose, and no doubt that will be dealt with when we do come to reform the House of Lords. The Government rejected that solution, but is there no other solution, apart from the one adopted in this measure, to the appointment of two additional judges? As my hon. and learned Friend pointed out, by an arrangement of the sittings of the two Courts it could easily be provided that six judges should always sit on the cases that come from the Dominions. What is the supply of Lords to constitute these two Courts? There are fourteen Lords who sit in the House of Peers who are qualified to sit in the House of Lords Appeal Court; there are fifteen Lords qualified to sit with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and there are twenty-one judges who hold or have held high judicial positions which qualify them to sit with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. There are fifty men available from the Lord Chancellor to constitute the two Courts which only require six men to constitute them. Fifty available, and only six wanted! The Lord Chancellor has it quite within his power so to arrange the sittings that he will always have these six men available for the constitution of these Courts. The Bill of 1911 set about settling this demand from the Dominions in a different way from the Bill of 1913. The Bill of 1911 laid down that the sittings of these two judicial bodies should never be upon the same day. The Clause read:—

The sittings of the House of Lords for the hearing and determination of appeals and the sittings of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council shall, so far as practicable, be arranged in such a manner as not to take place simultaneously, but nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring those sittings to be held at any time other than those prescribed for the sittings of the Court of Appeal in England under the provisions of the Judicature Act.

The last portion of the Clause was a saving of the holidays to the judicial bodies, but the first part indicated that they should not sit simultaneously. Since that measure was practically rejected by this House it has been found possible by the administration of the Lord Chancellor and by arrangement to provide that they shall not sit simultaneously. In the years 1911–12, in many instances the two Courts did not sit on the same day. My hon. and learned Friend referred to the fact that the Courts sat, in 1910, 163 times between them; in 1911, 201, and in 1912, 187. But the principle which I am advocating, of not sitting at all on the same days, was departed from in these years on several occasions. In the year 1910 they sat on the same day and at the same time on thirty-four occasions, in 1911 fifty times, and in 1912 thirty-nine times. My suggestion is that all that has to be done by administration on the part of the Lord Chancellor is that these thirty-four times, fifty times, and thirty-nine times should be done away with, that the principle which in the main is carried out, that they do not sit on the same day, should be carried out in its entirety, and I think with the fact that there are fifty men available, and that there are only, roughly, about 180 sittings, it might be very easily arranged. Then the question of the number of cases which come before these bodies is worthy of consideration. In 1910, which is the latest year for which we have statistics, the House of Lords dealt with 100 cases, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council dealt with seventy-eight cases, so that between the two judicial bodies in that year only 178 cases were dealt with—fifty men to deal with 178 cases. I think it could be easily arranged if it were desired.

Then with regard to the number of days on which the men available have sat I asked a question of the Attorney-General on 10th November, 1911, and the reply was:—

"The number of days on which each Lord qualified to sit for the hearing of appeals in either the House of Lords or the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council during the last legal year is as follows:—Lord Chancellor 87, Earl of Halsbury 60, Viscount Haldane 7, Lord Ashbourne 27, Lord Macnaghten 121, Lord Atkinson 101, the late Lord James of Hereford 1, Lord Shaw 112, Lord Robson 119."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th November, 1911, col. 2046, Vol. XXX.]

Then come fewer numbers, Lord Gorell twenty-four times, Lord Mersey sixty-eight, Lord Dunedin nine, Lord Kinnear twelve, Lord Alverstone nine. These numbers indicate to me that the distinguished gentlemen who are available for the constitution of these Courts can readily be called on to take part in the work of the Court in a greater number of cases than they have done in the past. Then there is the financial aspect of this Motion, namely, the fact that£12,000 per annum and pensions are being passed by practically an empty House. That point becomes important when one realises the figures which are already paid to the distinguished gentlemen in connection with the work of these Courts. On 22nd November I asked the Chancellor what money was paid, either as salary or pension, to the fourteen Members of the House of Lords qualified to sit for the hearing of appeals in the House of Lords or in the Judicial Committee. The reply was that the fourteen Lords who were qualified received £75,000. Then I asked on 9th December what the twenty-one judges who were qualified to sit on the Judicial Committee were paid, and the reply was that only sixteen of these twenty-one received payment from British funds, and that these payments amounted to £63,712. Then I asked on 10th December what was the money paid either as salary or as pension to the fifteen Lords of Appeal qualified to sit on the Judicial Committee. The reply was:—

"The annual amount paid for this purpose is £70,792 6s."

So that with these three figures together we have the sum of £217,547 10s. 8d. for the administration of justice in these two Courts, that £217,000 now being raised to £229,000, and the Labour party will probably vote in its favour.

The hon. Member makes a very extraordinary statement when he says these moneys are paid for the administration of justice in these particular Courts. He must know, if he looks at the answer, that in a great number of instances they are pensions to judges who have retired.

I know that £56,000 is paid in salaries to the judges of the King's Bench Division and £17,000 in pensions, and I am quite willing to accept the proportion of seventeen to fifty-six.

It must be remembered that this measure is based upon certain decisions which were arrived at by the Imperial Conference, and we must look at those decisions and also look at what preceded their coming to those particular conclusions. I think it has been quite correctly stated by the hon. Member (Mr. Martin) that, in the first instance, the suggestion of Australia was for the creation of what will be practically an Imperial Court of Appeal, by the merger of the present House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Prime Minister of New Zealand had in view the representation of his particular Dominion in the Judicial Committee, and his suggestion was that all the great Overseas Dominions should be represented in an Imperial Court of Appeal. These were the two main points pressed, though there were some subsidiary points of importance with regard to the small number of judges who sit in the Judicial Committee and the manner of recording dissent, if there was dissent, in arriving at the conclusions. It was pointed out by the Prime Minister, who presided, that it was a matter of opinion whether a dissenting judgment should be recorded or not, and he also indicated that in the great tribunal of the Supreme Court of the United States usually one reasoned opinion was delivered on behalf of the majority who gave judgment, and all the dissenting judgments were embodied in one dissenting opinion from one of the other judges. After a great deal of discussion a considerable number of difficulties in connection with the matter vanished. For instance, it became apparent to New Zealand that as they only had one or two appeals a year, and sometimes not that, it would not be worth while for a judge to come over and remain in England all the year round to wait for the hearing of one or two appeals at the outside. Ultimately the ex-Lord Chancellor suggested in a most reasonable way that the sole desire of the Government of this country was to arrive at some conclusion which would best facilitate the objects the different Dominions Overseas had in view, and he ultimately made the suggestion that we should add to the highest Court of Appeal, both in the United Kingdom and in the Dominions and Colonies, by selecting "two English judges of the finest quality."

The Dominion of Canada has no ground for complaint whatever. The Minister representing it said they were satisfied with the decisions which were given by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and that they would view a change with some apprehension. The Prime Minister of Newfoundland said that his Government was satisfied, but that if it was the general desire that there should be a change he would fall in with it. Australia did not appear to be particularly interested except in respect of the establishment of an Imperial Court of Appeal. The whole basis of the discussion in the Imperial Conference very rapidly disappeared, leaving nothing behind it except the fact of some little inconvenience with regard to the presentation of cases, the small number of judges who heard them, and certain other minor matters. The Prime Minister of New Zealand pointed out something which is extremely important, and which has not formed the subject of sufficient consideration. He said—

"I would urge that in addition to the present members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council there should be a permanent judge from each of the important Overseas Dominions, one for Canada, one for Australia, one for South Africa, and one for India."

That was the general proposition. I believe if an Imperial Court is ever to be established on an enduring basis that idea must be given effect to. At present we have the Chief Justices of five of the Dominions taking part intermittently in the proceedings of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, perhaps one once a year, and then for many years not appearing again. I am convinced, as a practitioner before the Judicial Committee for many years, that that system is bound to fail. It is already a failure. You cannot prepare a judge for the important work of an Appellate Court like the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council by merely allowing him to look in occasionally, and have there what is practically a very minor status compared with the regular judges of the Court. If you wish to establish a truly Imperial Court you must select the best men, not merely from the United Kingdom, but throughout the Empire, and place them in the Court for a term of years—let them get their training that comes from the experience of hearing cases, and from association with the great men who are in the Court. They must inhale the atmosphere of the Court. If it is not worth while paying for that, it is not worth while making a change at all. What is proposed in the introductory Memorandum of this Bill? We are asked to sanction the appointment of two additional judges who are to be "English judges of the finest quality." I recognise these were the words used by the Lord Chancellor in his first alternative proposal, but they are not the words of his later formal proposal. I have not seen the reference to the quality of English judges put so emphatically before. I have always understood that it was difficult to discriminate as to the quality of the justice administered by English judges. But let that pass. Why "English judges?" What about my brother Scots and the Irish fighting brigade? Are these English judges to be restricted to the judges of Courts in England? Are we not to have included as eligible for appointment judges and lawyers practising in Ireland and in Scotland? But, even if you were to include these, then there is complete exclusion in this Bill of the possible appointment of judges and lawyers trained in the systems which prevail in our great Dominions. In that respect there is differentiation against members of the profession to which I belong, and of judges who come from that profession, and to that differentiation I cannot give my adhesion. I repeat that if you wish to have a great Imperial Court you must have representation in it not merely from England, not merely from the United Kingdom, but, if it is to be worth having at all, you must see that it represents the greatest men in the profession, whether they are judges or lawyers, from all these parts of our great Dominions which can supply such men. This Bill professes to be based upon the resolution of the Imperial Conference. After a long discussion at the Conference on 12th June, 1911, the late Lord Chancellor (Lord Loreburn) summarised what he believed to be the conclusion arrived at. He said:—

"Is this the substance of what is proposed—I think it has been spoken to by all the Prime Ministers—that there should be one Final Court of Appeal for the whole British Empire in two divisions, the first division for the United Kingdom, consisting of the same persons as are now entitled to sit in the House of Lords, and the second division for the Oversea Dominions, consisting of those now entitled to sit on the Judicial Committee, with such further additions as may be needed. Does that represent the view?

"Sir Joseph Ward: I should accept that.

"Mr. Fisher: Practically it is that."

That was what the Imperial Conference accepted. Then the President said:—

"You agree that what the Lord Chancellor read fairly represents the opinion of the Conference, and that will appear on the Minutes.

Viscount Haldane: It is understood that this final Court of Appeal for the whole Empire is not merely to be of the strength of the existing one. We hare agreed to strengthen it, and propose to add to it as the Lord Chancellor said, two highly-picked lawyers."

That is the conclusion they came to. There I discern that the present Lord Chancellor saw at once the absurdity of the previous description of the men who are to constitute this Court. He had in his recollection, no doubt, that two of the greatest men we ever had in the Judicial Committee were Lord Watson and Lord Macnaghten, both of whom came directly from the Bar and not from the Bench. He had in view that the best men should be "picked," no matter where they came from. It is clear that what the Conference decided was that the change should be in the direction of establishing an Imperial Court, one Division to deal with matters that now come before the House of Lords, and composed of the men who administer justice in the House of Lords, and the second Division to be for the hearing of appeals from the Dominions Overseas, and that to the second Division there should be added two highly picked men. Their decision, therefore, was that, if you appoint an imperial Court, the work, so far as the House of Lords is concerned, should be carried on on existing lines, that you should not abolish the judicial body of the House of Lords, which has done most important service—service which was acknowledged when this Bill was brought in in the Upper Chamber, but that simply the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council should have an addition of two members. The point was put directly to Lord Loreburn as to how far the existing decisions of the House of Lords were satisfactory, and in clear terms he stated that their decisions were satisfactory, so far as Chambers of Commerce, the profession, and so far as the public generally were concerned. That being so, no amendment or improvement is required in that respect in the House of Lords. If we restrict the discussion to-clay to the question of the amendment or improvement of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, I would say that the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment have made out a very strong case that the Judicial Committee at the present time is sufficiently manned, so long as you are not creating in two Divisions an Imperial Court of Appeal for the whole Empire. If such Court is created, and if it has two Divisions, then of necessity a certain number will be restricted to the hearing of United Kingdom Appeals, and a certain number will be restricted to the hearing of appeals brought before the Judicial Committee. In that case, you require two strong Divisions, and it is in these circumstances that provision is required, so far as the Judicial Committee is concerned, that it should be strengthened by additional judges. If you proceed on the lines laid down by the Imperial Conference and create an Imperial Court in two Divisions, then you are justified in adding strength to the Judicial Committee. But if you do not proceed on these lines you must demonstrate that the House of Lords is not now efficiently discharging its duty as a judicial body, which you cannot do, because the Lord Chancellor has said that it is not so; and you must also demonstrate that the Dominions Overseas are dissatisfied with the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which you cannot do, for they have not said so. I think my hon. Friend has made out a strong case on that point. Many of the retired judges who are in receipt of pensions would be only too happy to appear and assist in the administration of justice, upon receiving the summons of their Sovereign to aid him in Council. In these respects, it seems to me, in view of the limited lines projected by the Bill, as distinguished from those forecasted by the Imperial Conference, this Bill is unnecessary. If you do create an Imperial Court of Appeal, I agree that the Judicial Committee should be strengthened. I do not say that it should be strengthened by the addition merely of English judges. It should be strengthened by the selection of the best men wherever they are to be found in the Empire.

I certainly do not intend in the very short reply I propose to make to travel over the ground which was travelled yesterday. In the speech I made yesterday I endeavoured to answer by anticipation all the arguments which have been addressed to the House today. I put forward the case for the Bill then in order that it might be unnecessary to go at any length into the matter again when I replied. There are only one or two points to which I propose to refer. My hon. Friends who moved and seconded the Amendment have, as I gathered from their speeches, some grievance—or, at all events, they think that they have some grievance. It would be out of order for me to travel into that. What we have to deal with is the merits of the Bill to which we are asking the House to give Second Reading. The hon. Member for the College Division of Glasgow (Mr. Watt) made, I confess, a speech containing statements which startled me, because they were based on answers to questions given by myself or the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and I really think that the use he made of them was quite unwarrantable. He put together all the pensions which were paid to judges who had served their time and had retired, or who had retired in consequence of ill-health, and he stated that payments were made to some of these judges who were agreeable to sit in the Privy Council. His point was that the payments so made to them for that purpose ought not to be paid. Well, obviously it is quite inaccurate, and I think the hon and learned Gentleman appreciated that when it was pointed out—

Pensions were included.

One must be careful when a statement is made and a lot of figures are given to see quite clearly what the figures represent. Then he enumerated the number of judges who have work to perform in Courts which are themselves in arrears He referred to the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, and others. Anyone who has the faintest knowledge of what is going on at present must know that nothing could be more unfair than to say that these payments are made for services on the Judicial Committee. To put that forward as an argument against the proposition of this Bill is, I think, very surprising indeed, and the only explanation that I can give is that my hon. and learned Friend cannot have quite grasped the meaning of the answers that were given to the question. I can scarcely credit him with intending to present to the House that a large proportion of the payments made were for judges whose services could properly be given to the Judicial Committee. He must have known perfectly well that none of those judges could be spared from the Courts in which they sit. Every one of them has his work to do there, and it would be impossible to come away without disarranging the whole of the work of the Courts.

Sixteen judges were qualified to sit on the Judicial Committee.

When the hon. and learned Gentleman represents that there are sixteen judges available, then I say that that is not a correct statement, because he knows, or should know, perfectly well that the majority of those judges are actually engaged in their own Courts, just the same as the President of the Court in Scotland has his work in Scotland to perform, and he can no more be spared from there to attend regularly here at a Judicial Committee than the President of the Probate and Divorce Division can be spared from the Courts in which he exercises jurisdiction.

There are no arrears.

It is not a question of arrears. In order to keep down arrears a judge must preside over his own Court. Take the Master of the Rolls. The Master of the Rolls presided over the Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal is itself in arrears with its work, and does anyone seriously suggest that the Master of the Rolls should be asked to sit on the Judicial Committee? The Lord Chief Justice of England, when he is well enough to resume work, might be asked to sit at the expense of the King's Bench Division. When you come to examine the number of judges who are really available, they amount to very few. I gave that Memorandum yesterday, and showed that they do willingly give their services whenever it is possible. Reference has been made to Lord Halsbury who has been receiving a pension for a considerable number of years, but no one will suggest that he has not given valuable services for that pension, although he is not bound to do it. Lord Loreburn retired on account of ill health, but he does sit whenever he can; but that is not the same thing as having judges who are paid their salaries and are under obligation to sit in those Courts. One word with reference to what took place at the Imperial Conference. The result of the whole discussion there was that a conclusion was arrived at which was formulated in the proposition quoted to some extent by the hon. and learned Member for Chertsey. It came to this, after considering the various proposals that were put forward with reference to the Judicial Committee and the Imperial Final Court of Appeal, that there should be three new Law Lords appointed. That was the conclusion arrived at by the Conference. It is in order to carry out that conclusion that we introduce this Bill. It is summed up in those words which were read advocating the strengthening of the Court and proposing to add, as the Lord Chancellor said, two judges. Mr. Fisher said, "Two or more, just as you please." It is the minimum of that request that I ask the House to adopt, and I do submit that this is a proper thing to do in order that we may make our Imperial Court of Appeal one which will give satisfaction to all the Dominions and enable it to do the work of the United Kingdom, and in which appeals will be heard by a sufficient number of judges, and I will only conclude by calling attention to the extraordinary spectacle here in this country of the Dominions having recourse to our final Court of Appeal in this country as one of the great connecting links between them and this country, and pointing out that if they desire, that we should add two more to our judges in order that we may give them More satisfaction—and that is the result of the discussion which they had with us at the Imperial Conference—then I really do fail to understand on what ground it can be suggested that we should not give assent to their wish and should not pass this Bill.

At the Imperial Conference the Prime Minister of Australia particularly asked that the judges appointed should be English judges, because he said that the Australians prefer that their appeals should be heard by the House of Lords rather than by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The hon. and learned Member for Chertsey was rather opposed to the Bill on the ground that the words "English judges" were put in. I think it is a fact that the Scotch and the Irish have already in this country a very undue proportion of judicial appointments. A very large number of our present judges, from whom those two judges will be selected, are Scotsmen and Irishmen, and if they were to be selected also from the benches in Scotland and Ireland as well, in all probability that proportion, which is already undue, would be very much increased. I got up, principally to draw attention to the fact that the greater part of the speech of the hon. Member for East St. Pancras was directed to attacking the Memorandum upon the Bill. He endeavoured to prove that what is stated there was not the result of the Imperial Conference at all. I have taken the trouble to go to the Library and get the Official Report, and I see that on page 236, Command Paper 5746, contains a résumé of the proposal to His Majesty's Government agreed to by the Imperial Conference, and I think that if the hon. Member for East St. Pancras had read those words—which evidently he has not, as apparently he has only read the précis, which seems to have misled him—he would have found that the Memorandum endorsed on the Appellate Jurisdiction Bill is as correct a précis of what was agreed on at that Conference as it is possible for a précis to be.

If the hon. Member had read the proceedings at the Conference through he would have found that it was said time after time that it was impossible that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the House of Lords could sit together at the same time because there were not sufficient judges available; that it was extremely important for the proper conduct of the business of the United Kingdom that the House of Lords should be able to sit for appeals at the same time as the Privy Council; and inasmuch as the number of paid judges who could alone be applied for was limited, it was impossible that the business of the United Kingdom could be carried on in the case of appeals where the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was sitting. For that it would be necessary that you should at least have ten paid judges available. The point insisted on at the Conference was that the quorum should be increased from three to five, and that it was not fair to the Colonies that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council should only consist of three judges when the appeals were from a larger number of judges in the Courts. It was also advisable that the House of Lords as the Court of Appeal for the United Kingdom should have its quorum increased to five judges. Now there are not ten judges available. That being the case the essence of the Bill is that there should be two new Lords of Appeal appointed who would bring the numbers up so that there can be two sittings, one for the United Kingdom and one for Appeals from the Colonies, each consisting of a minimum of five judges. That is the scope of the Bill. The origin of it was this. While it was impossible at present for this country to agree to have one Imperial Court of Appeal both for appeals from the United Kingdom and His Majesty's Dominions, yet they could take the first step towards it by strengthening the existing Courts of the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in such a way that the same judges would sit upon both Divisions. The Government were very anxious to meet the wish that as far as possible the appeals that came from the Colonies should be heard, not by the House of Lords sitting as the House of Lords, but by the Law Lords of the House of Lords sitting as a Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. With that view two more Law Lords were to be added to the House of Lords, and they would be available to sit on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

The other provision of the Bill with regard to increasing from five to seven the number of Colonial judges who may become members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council when they are here for the purpose of sitting and hearing appeals is really a subsidiary matter, but it is one that has been thought to be important for this reason, that the Government have found that the five Colonial judges who have been appointed to positions which allow them to become members of the Privy Council and sit to hear appeals have not been able to attend more than very occasionally, and practically they are of little or no assistance, and it is hoped that if you have seven there will be more chance of more of them attending. The Bill also contains a very important provision to amend the Act of 1908 by which those judges were required to be drawn from men holding actual judicial offices in the Colonies. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 allows them to be drawn from

rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a second time."

The scope and purpose of this Bill is the same as that of the Bill to which the House gave a Second Reading last year. Hon. Members will remember that on that occasion, after a Debate covering the whole ground, only nineteen Gentlemen voted against the Second Reading.

The Debate was closured.

I am not discussing the question of Closure. The number of Gentlemen who voted against the Second Reading was only nineteen. I am encouraged by that experience to believe that the general principle of this measure has been accepted by the House, and will be accepted again. But although the scope and purpose of the Bill is the same, in many material respects the machinery has been altered. In introducing the subject now I would only remind the House that this question was dealt with by a Royal Commission, which took evidence over no less than four years, and in its Report came unanimously to certain recommendations, upon which this Bill is founded. It was observed that there is a class of persons in this country who, by reason of mental defect, are not able to take proper care of themselves. Under the existing law they are not provided for under the Lunacy Acts or under the Idiots Act, except in a certain measure. The Idiots Act applies to a certain number of them, but it does not deal appropriately with the class of persons whom it is intended to provide for under this Bill. Therefore it is proposed to repeal the Idiots Act, and to re-enact and incorporate it in this measure. Not only have we a unanimous Report of a Royal Commission in favour of some legislative measure, but I am not exaggerating when I say that local authorities have been overwhelming in their petitions in favour of this Bill. I go further and say that persons now engaged in every kind of social work, who are brought in contact with the feeble-minded, have without exception recognised the need for some legislation of this kind. At this moment there are, I regret that I must say, scores of thousands of people who, owing to mental defect, are unable to take proper care of themselves, and who might, as I believe, if this Bill were passed, live happy and, within the limits of their powers, even useful lives. At present they are left, uncared for and unprotected, to live miserable existences, and, quite apart from their own habits, become a source of degradation, misery, and poverty to others.

Last year considerable criticism was directed against the proposed machinery. In the Bill then put forward it was proposed to set up a new Commission, quite separate from the existing Lunacy Commission, to have the special control of all feeble-minded persons. I remember that the hon. and learned Member for one of the Divisions of Liverpool (Mr. Leslie Scott) took very strong objection to the Bill on that ground, and in that view he was supported by the hon. Member for the Stowmarket Division (Mr. Goldsmith), the hon. and learned Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Pollock), and the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. Charles Roberts). Their arguments, which I admit impressed me very strongly at the time, were further pressed in Committee upstairs, and in consequence the whole scheme of the Bill, so far as that part is concerned, was altered. The whole charge for mentally defective persons, whether lunatics, idiots, imbeciles, or feebleminded, was proposed to be placed under a single Board of Control. That is the proposal contained in the present Bill. The Board of Control will consist primarily of the existing eight paid Lunacy Commissioners. It is proposed that there should be altogether twelve paid and three unpaid Commissioners. Of the twelve paid Commissioners one at least must be a woman, and of the three unpaid Commissioners also one at least must be a woman. The Board of Control will deal with all forms of mental deficiency. After the discussion which we had upstairs, I think I am justified in recommending to the House this second proposal as being far superior to that contained in last year's Bill. It would only be right for me to say here how much I am indebted to hon. Gentlemen opposite for the interest they have taken in this measure and for the great knowledge they showed in debating it upstairs. My hon. Friends on this side will agree with me that, interested and keen as they are in the subject, the hon. and learned Member for Liverpool, the hon. and learned Member for East Birmingham the hon. and learned Member for Warwick and Leamington and others, were not less interested in securing for this unfortunate class of persons such care and protection as this Bill would give them.

The next important change in the Bill is one which in justice I am bound to attribute in large measure to the strong criticism made to the proposal of last year by my hon. Friends the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Booth) and the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Wedgwood). Those Members took a very strong line in support of the principle of individual liberty, and it is only justice to them to say that, although they opposed me very strongly in the course of the Bill, their arguments were singularly effective in pointing out the particulars in which the Bill might be considered to transgress the due line of the care and preservation of individual rights. We have in the Bill as now presented to the House, so far as is possible consistent with the existence of the principle of compulsion at all, done everything to meet the objections put forward by my hon. Friends. Let me point out the very important changes which have been made. Last year the persons to be dealt with included persons who might be classed as coming under the definition of the Bill by a subsequent Order of the Secretary of State. That portion of the Bill is omitted now. The Bill, so far as the definition goes, is limited to what is contained in the actual words of the Bill. No power was given either to the existing holder of the Home Office or any future holder of the office to extend the operations of the Bill except by introducing a new Act of Parliament. We have also omitted any reference to what might be regarded as the Eugenic idea, which my hon. Friend behind me believes underlies the whole promotion of this Bill. I can assure him that, as the measure now stands, it exists for the protection of individual sufferers.

By locking them up?

Well, let me put this case to my hon. Friend: I suppose he will agree that the Lunacy Acts were designed by Parliament for the protection of the sufferers, the lunatic patients? Yet they are locked up for their own protection. Persons suffering from mental defect who come under this Bill are only locked up in those cases where it is shown by past experience that they ought to be locked up. Let me explain very briefly the classes of persons whom we now propose to include in this Bill. We, first of all, define the mentally deficient. These are persons suffering from mental deficiency. They are idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, and moral imbeciles. We make a clear distinction between the different categories of feeble-minded persons who come under this Bill. Idiots and imbeciles, who may already be certified under the Lunacy and Idiots Acts, continue to be certifiable under the Lunacy Acts, or under this Bill, without importing any new condition; but when we come to the classes of feebleminded persons who are not now certified, either idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, or moral imbeciles, such persons cannot be dealt with compulsorily under this Bill unless certain conditions co-exist together with such feeble-mindedness. They must either be proved to be neglected, abandoned, or cruelly treated. That is to say, they must obviously require the protection of the State; or they must have been found guilty of a criminal offence, they must be proved to be habitual drunkards, they must be children notified by the local education authority as being too low mentally or morally to benefit by the special schools provided, or they must be children who, on leaving the special schools, have been notified by the local authorities as requiring further protection. The only other class is that of women who give birth to illegitimate children whilst in receipt of Poor Law relief.

Or who are pregnant.

The difference between the two is obviously only a question of time. I hope my hon. Friend will be satisfied that we are only endeavouring to deal with those cases of feeble-minded persons where we have tangible proof that they are of a kind which calls for some degree of care from the State. My last few words are upon a point of the Bill about which I think there has been a good deal of misunderstanding. I refer to the financial side. It is proposed that the local authority shall have certain duties imposed upon them, and that certain powers shall be placed in their hands. So far as a duty is imposed upon a local authority under this Bill, it is limited to the extent to which the cost of carrying out the duty is borne by the State as to one half of the amount. The local authority will have no duty imposed on it except that in which the State bears one half the cost.

Would that amount to half the total cost of maintenance, including interest on capital, sinking fund, and cost of administration?