Business Of The House
May I ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what business will be taken on the day that we reassemble? If he can tell us what business will be taken on the succeeding days in the week it will be for the general convenience?
On the Tuesday it will be Supply—Pensions Vote—and the two subsequent days will be devoted to the Education Bill.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say when the Irish Home Rule Bill will be introduced, and when the Order in Council dealing with Conscription in Ireland will be issued?
I have already answered a question on that subject to-day, saying that I can give no information.
I understand the Pensions Vote is to be taken on the Tuesday. Am I to take it that will be a Supply day purely, and that the Resolution down in the name of the hon. Member for Salford (Sir M. Barlow)— [
]— will not be taken?"That, in the interests alike of the State and of the wounded and discharged sailors and soldiers and their dependants, and of the widows and orphans of those who have fallen, it is essential that all questions relating to Pensions and Allowances should be kept free from party politics and the influence of party organisations"
Yes, that is the understanding.
Will that Vote be taken if the Minister of Pensions at that time is not a Member of this House, in view of his announced resignation?
He will think better of it and drop it.
Referring to the Irish Home Rule Bill, may we know whether it is the intention really to introduce it, especially in view of the Prime Minister's statement, now about a month ago, that it would be introduced immediately?
If the hon. Member will devote his mind to the subject he will realise that a Bill of this kind is not so easily prepared as one would think. I do-not think that there has been any undue delay.
May I have a reply to my question?
It is hypothetical.
Ordered, "That the Proceedings on-Consideration of the Lords Amendment to the Defence of the Realm (Food Profits) Bill and on the Motion for the Adjournment of the House (Whitsuntide) have precedence this day of the Business of Supply."—[Mr. Bonar Law.]
Defence Of The Realm (Food Profits) Bill
Order read for consideration of Lords. Amendment.
Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That the Lords Amendment be now considered."
I wish to suggest reasons why this business should not be taken to-day, and I hope my right hon. Friend-will give them consideration. These Amendments are of a very far-reaching character. Of course, I cannot, on this Motion, go into the nature of the Amendments, but I would point out that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Food Controller is no there to-day, and I feel the Bill ought not to be taken in his absence. There is no special pressure in regard to it. My second objection is much more far-reaching. If any hon. Member will look at the Lords Amendments—[An HON. MEMBER: "Speak up; we cannot hear a word!"]—he will see that they refer to Bill No. 25. That Bill has not been printed. I asked for a copy of it only five minutes ago, and could not obtain it. I repeat, the Amendments proposed to be introduced are of a far-reaching character, and I think it is inevitable that they will lead to considerable discussion. In view of the fact that the right hon. Gentleman has already made an appeal to us to-day, in the interests of the general convenience of Members, not to unduly prolong the proceedings, and in view of the fact also that the other day he spoke of his very great reluctance to interpose business on days allotted to Supply, also, in view further of the fact that no notice was given of the intention to consider these Amendments—
They are only of a drafting character.
They are not at all of a drafting character; they alter the whole character of the Bill. There are two very long Amendments, but in view of the reasons I have already indicated, and bearing in mind the fact that this is not urgent business, I do ask that the consideration of these Amendments be postponed until after the holidays.
In the absence of the representative of the Ministry of Food, I will take the responsibility of saying a word or two as to the Amendments on the Paper, one of which, of course, refers to Scotland. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that if he will look at the Amendments he will find that they are of a purely drafting character. The right hon. Gentleman will see that an account is to be taken in connection with breaches of Food Orders, but the provisions are not sufficiently clear, and, accordingly, an Amendment has been introduced, and we ask this House to insert it for the purpose of making it perfectly clear that if there is a breach of the Order the person who has broken the Order may be compelled to exhibit his books, so that it may be ascertained whether, on any previous occasion he has broken an Order, and if it be found that he has, then certain consequences will ensue.
That is not a drafting Amendment.
I suggest it is purely a drafting Amendment. The House will observe that the Bill itself provides that if the Court is satisfied there has been a breach of the Order it may direct that an account be taken, and this Amendment, so far as England is concerned, provides in terms for the taking of that account. The Scottish part of the Amendment is a mere translation of the other. I do appeal to my right hon. Friend to let this Bill go through. It is very desirable it should operate at the earliest possible moment. I think I have explained it fully, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not persist in his opposition.
Question put, and agreed to.
Lords Amendment considered accordingly.
CLAUSE 1.—( Forfeiture of Excess Profits from Overcharging for Food.)
Where a person has, after the passing of this Act, sold any goods at a price in excess of that allowed by or under any Order made by the Food Controller in pursuance of the powers conferred on him by the Defence of the Realm Regulations, that person in addition to any other penalty to which he may be liable, shall forfeit to His Majesty a sum equal to double the amount of such excess, and in any proceedings taken to recover such amount the Court, if satisfied that there has been a breach of the Order, may order an account to be taken in like manner as if the sum recoverable under this provision had been money had and received for the account of His Majesty.
Lords Amendment:
Leave out all words after the word, "and" ["the amount of such excess and"], and insert instead thereof the words,
"that sum shall be recoverable as a debt due to the Crown.
"(2) In any proceedings in England or Ireland under this Act against any person in respect of any such sale as aforesaid, the Court, if satisfied that there has been a breach by him of any Order so made by the Food Controller, may order an account to be taken with respect to that sale and with respect to any other sales by that person of any goods to which any such Order applies, and may upon such account being taken direct the payment of double the amount of the excess thereby appearing to have been realised on the sales.
"(3) In any proceedings in Scotland under this Act against any person in respect of any such sale as aforesaid, the Court, if satisfied that there has been a breach by him of any Order so made by the Food Controller may proceed in like manner as if such proceedings were an action of count reckoning and payment concluding for production of an account of the aforesaid sale, and of any other sales by that person of any goods to which any such Order applies, and for payment of double the amount of the excess thereby appearing to have been realised on the sales"
Lords Amendment read a second time.
I am sure there is one Amendment which is required here. The whole thing of a very far-reaching character. I do not like to make a statement on a legal point in contradiction of that of the Secretary for Scotland, but in the House of Commons we inserted in the Bill the words "after the passing of this Act," and I suggest that similar words ought to be put into these new Sections. When, the Bill was under discussion here the question was asked whether it was intended to be retrospective, and we were assured that it was not, but without the inclusion of the words I suggest it might possibly be made retrospective, and I would therefore like to move in paragraph (2), after the word "person" ["other sales by that person"], to insert the words "after the passing of this Act" That would bring the whole thing into harmony with the circumstances tinder which the measure was passed through this House.
The Amendment is unnecessary. The Act will only apply to the cases of persons who have, after its passing, sold goods, and therefore no offence can arise unless a man, after the passing of the Act, has sold goods. Then the appropriate punishment will apply.
It did occur to me that these words were very material, and that the Bill if amended, as now proposed, might be made applicable to other sales, but if the Secretary for Scotland assures me that the words already introduced govern the whole procedure, I am willing not to press my opposition.
I am very much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for withdrawing his opposition. I can give him the assurance he asks for that the words "after the passing of this Act" govern all sales, including those provided for in the Lords Amendment.
Motion made, and Question, "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment," put, and agreed to.
Whitsuntide Recess (Adjournment)
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House, at its rising this day, do adjourn till Tuesday, the 28th May."— [Mr. Bonar Law.]
Emperor Of Austria's Letter
In the course of the last two weeks a number of questions have been put to the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Blockade about the publication in France and in this country of extracts from the remarkable letter written by the Emperor Charles to Prince Sixte of Bourbonne, and the events, discussions, and proceedings which appear to have sprung there from. The Foreign Secretary has quite properly, if I may say so, declined to discuss this at Question Time, and I agree with him that matters so delicate cannot be dealt with then, but I understood him to say just now that, although he could not answer the ques- tion put to him then, he would participate in the discussion that was likely to take place on the Motion for the Adjournment. It is in the hope, therefore, that he will be able to give this House and the country some information on these events that I shall put to him, if he will permit me, a number of questions, without, I need hardly say, desiring to cause him or the Government any difficulty—for I realise how difficult the position has been, still is, and may continue to be —but in order that we may have some information on which we can rely in respect to the communication from the Emperor Charles, and the part that has been taken in them by the Prime Ministers and others who dealt with the matter last summer.
The calendar of these events is some what interesting. The Revolution in Russia broke out about the beginning of March, 1917, and the letter was written by the Emperor Charles on 31st March. It appears to be an inference justified by events that what happened in Russia was not without its influence on the Emperor's mind. It was a letter of a most confidential nature, written to Prince Sixte, who is connected with the Emperor Charles. It appears, if the newspaper accounts may be believed, to have been shown by Prince Sixte to President Poincaré It is said that President Poincaré showed it to the Prime Minister of France, M. Ribot, and that the purport of the letter was at that time communicated to our own Prime Minister. I am bound to use the phrase "it is said," because we have in this country no official information on the subject, and the right hon. Gentleman quite rightly has declined to discuss it at Question Time, but that the facts more or less follow these lines appears to be clear, not only from what has passed in the French Press but also from circumstantial accounts which have been given in one of our own important newspapers, the "Manchester Guardian" If, therefore, anything that I say with regard to what is generally known is incorrect, I must plead that I can only rely on what has been published in the Press, and if there have been inaccuracies no doubt the right hon. Gentleman will clear them up. It was on 31st March that the Emperor Charles wrote his famous letter. Oddly enough, on 3rd April Count Czernin gave an interview to the "Fremdenblatt," suggesting that there was now a possibility of negotiation without an armistice. I would infer from that, therefore, that the Emperor Charles was not acting altogether without the knowledge of his Chancellor. Some time in April the Emperor of Austria and the Emperor of Germany met at their general headquarters, and it may be—we do not know—that they discussed the possibility of negotiation. If there was any collusion between them, then, no doubt would be the opportunity for the suggestion of collusion, for the organising of such communications and the publication of such interviews as might lend themselves to the purposes of the two Emperors. But shortly afterwards, as far as we can ascertain, the Emperor wrote a second letter in which it is said he added that Bulgaria agreed to the action which had been taken by him and proposals made by him in the first, and I think he added, if one may believe current reports, that Roumania had also been communicated with, in what way we are not able to ascertain. He suggested that if the territorial claims of the Allies were restricted to Alsace-Lorraine there was a possibility of carrying the negotiations further. We immediately find ourselves in the middle of territorial discussions of the most delicate character, which at that time appeared to be the rock on which any negotiations would break and so far as future transactions are concerned have always been matters of the greatest delicacy. M. Briand shortly afterwards, and not in any way connected with the transactions which surrounded the letters, seems to have met Von Laken in Switerland, and from information which he has given to his Government and to the Committee of the French Chamber since his return, the proposals made to him there were that Trieste and the Trentino could be assured to Italy. I draw no inference from these transactions except that it would appear that there was collusion between the two Emperors, that Austria was prepared to suggest to France a settlement of their grave differences by securing to France Alsace-Lorraine, and that, getting wind of this, Germany was prepared to suggest to anyone who would communicate to Italy that we might settle our differences by their giving away the Trentino and Trieste—a characteristic transaction, each being prepared to give that which did not belong to him. Belgium and Roumania for the first time were communicated with in the course of these transactions by the Allies, and the first question I would like to put to the right hon. Gentleman is this: When the Emperor Charles's letter was first communicated to the French Government, and by the heads of their Government communicated to our Prime Minister, were any of the other Allies except Baron Sonnino consulted? Was there, for instance, any communication with the other European Allies, and in particular was there at that time any communication made by our Prime Minister or the French Government to the American Government? They were as deeply concerned in the attainment of peace as we were. Their influence in the Alliance at that time was not as great as it has since become, but it was growing rapidly, and that these great transactions—for they might have been great in their result if they had been started in good faith and had been carried through by the belligerent countries—should have gone on without the knowledge of President Wilson is almost inconceivable. As far as one can ascertain, at the beginning of the correspondence Russia was not informed of what had taken place. It is difficult to tell how far any Government in Russia at that time would or would not have been able to take part in important pourparlers, but from such information as has come through to us from Paris it appears to be clear that M. Kerensky was not then given any information about what had taken place, and I presume he was entirely in the dark as to proposals having reached the French Government from the Emperor Charles. And it was at the very moment when M. Kerensky was appealing to the Allies to take some steps towards a negotiated peace! Mixed up in this curious tangle of events there is the proposed Conference at Stockholm. It is impossible to disentangle the Conference at Stockholm from these transactions, and it has a direct bearing upon the attitude of M. Kerensky at that time and upon the attitude of other important persons since then. M. Kerensky was in favour of the Stockholm Conference, and so, we are given to understand, was M. Albert Thomas, who had been in Russia and had just returned. So, we are informed, was M. Ribot, at first. Indeed, he is said by the Socialists in France to have promised to issue passports. We are also informed by one of the important organs of the Press, which represents the Prime Minister's views, that our Prime Minister was in favour of the issue of passports at first. During this very period, when communications. were passing somewhat freely, owing to movements in France, M. Ribot withheld his consent to the issue of passports. The same attitude was taken up by this country. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Barnard Castle (Mr. Henderson) has already stated that he counted on the co-operation of the leaders of Socialist opinion in France when he wished to take part in that Conference, and he has, more than once, publicly stated that, in his view, with such knowledge as he had at that time, and which has accumulated since, the virtual prohibition of that Conference by the French and British Governments has been a misfortune. I can express no opinion on that one way or the other, but I hope that any attempt to bring together the organised Labour of belligerent countries in future will not find any obstacles placed in its way. There is no doubt that the negotiations which were passing in this somewhat irregular way were mixed up with the prohibition of the Stockholm Conference. There appears to have been an entire change in the views of the Alliance in regard to the proposals which came through from Austria and Germany, and if the right hon. Gentleman can give us any information on that subject to-day I think it would do a good deal to calm public opinion here in many quarters. Not in pacifist quarters only, but in many other quarters there is disquiet, due to the disclosures which hare been made in France. The questions I have to put forward are these: Why at the time of the receipt of that letter did our Government not communicate with the American Government; why was the American Government not informed of what was passing? My second question is of a different nature, and refers more to the responsibility which our own Government Departments and our Government as a whole have over matters of peace and war, and it is this: Did our Prime Minister inform the Foreign Office at the time of the communication of the fact of the communication having been made and having been shown to him? I know that he was unable at the moment to consult the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Balfour), because, if my memory serves me rightly, he was in America; but it would not have been impossible to have communicated the facts to the right hon. Gentleman and to the President of the American Republic at one and the same time, and the presence of the right hon. Gentleman in Washington would have been a convenient moment for consultation between President Wilson and the Foreign Secretary. The last question I would ask is this: Why were negotiations dropped; was it on purely territorial grounds, or was it because the demand was made by France not only for Alsace-Lorraine, but for the 1814 line? It is said in some quarters that the demand is even for the 1790 line. That seems to me inconceivable, but it is so generally stated that the right hon. Gentleman will be doing a real service to public opinion in this country if he can clear it up at once. If the 1814 line is in any way incorporated in our war aims, I need hardly say that would cause great surprise to public opinion in this country. So far as I have been able to ascertain, that has never at any time been contemplated by the Foreign Office or in any statements which have been made by the present or the previous Prime Minister, although I ought to add that some members of the War Cabinet have at times made speeches which lent themselves to the view that the 1814 line was part of the war aims which they contemplated, and that when speeches were made about the banks of the Rhine it was with the knowledge in their minds that the 1814 line was freely canvassed by those who spoke on behalf of the French Government. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be able to clear up these points. On the general necessity of making a statement now, I would like to point out that far more has been communicated to the Foreign Affairs Committee in France than has been vouchsafed to the House of Commons. That Committee exists for special purposes, and it is supposed to be secret in its rules and procedure, whereas here we have nothing to correspond to it. I understand that the Government deems all Select Committees as objectionable organisation, and that none of them can be trusted with confidential information. I ask for nothing confidential. I merely ask for such information as the Foreign Secretary feels that he can communicate to the House, fortifying my request with the knowledge that unless we get some information that rumour must continue, that opinion instead of being healthy will be diseased, and that it is in the interests of the Allies that we should be told as much in England as can be communicated to the public in France.Balfour! Balfour!
I thought the proper thing was to reply on the Debate.
It will always be possible to pass to another topic after the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, if the House so desire.
The right hon. Gentlemen who has just sat down has not been pouring in a series of questions for the last fortnight like the hon. Gentlemen I see congregated below the Gangway, and who have indicated in the ordinary Parliamentary fashion that they mean to take amore or less important part in this Debate. I conceived, therefore, that I should be only acting in accordance with the convenience of the House if I waited until I had heard their case before attempting to reply, which of course, by the Rules of the House, cannot be repeated. I understand that they have entrusted their case to the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Runciman).
indicated dissent.
I do not suggest that there has been any collusion between them, but I thought that the case presented by the right hon. Gentleman was their case.
Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that the Noble Lord (Lord R. Cecil) has returned, and that we have been informed that he also will take part in this discussion this afternoon?
The hon. Gentleman is mistaken on that point. There is no suggestion that my Noble Friend should deal with the particular topic raised by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, and on which so many questions have been asked me in the course of the last fortnight or three weeks. The right hon. Gentleman has put two or three questions to me on this subject. The subject is very naturally exciting a great deal of interest both in this country and abroad. I must, however, remind the House that there is a very natural tendency to treat this subject as if it were one in which the British Government alone were con- cerned, and that the Opposition or the critics of the Government of the day had a right, therefore, in the public interest and in their own, to extract the last drop of information which it is in the power of the Government to give. That is a very natural mood for the House of Commons to be in. It is one to which we are accustomed on ordinary subjects of domestic controversy, and it is a mood of which we cannot be expected easily to divest ourselves when we come to deal with these delicate questions of international policy. Although this point was very fully present to the mind of my right hon. Friend, and I am not at all sure that it was present to the minds of many ton. Members of this assembly. This is not a question which can be discussed as if it were a domestic question. The people whose conduct is impugned or against whom suggestions are made are not merely or chiefly British Ministers. The question is an international question which touches not only our domestic controversies, but even more acutely the domestic controversies of many of our neighbours and our Allies. It goes far deeper than that, and it is perfectly impossible, and it would foe grossly improper for anybody holding my office to attempt to deal with this subject in a form which would not only be desirable, but necessary, if I were merely defending the action of His Majesty's Ministers on a domestic subject. This is a matter deeply affecting the conduct of our foreign relations. That general observation is true, and would be true of all discussions of these most delicate subjects, and the approaches towards peace discussions.
It is a curious thing in regard to the gentlemen who are proud of the name of pacifists, whom I see opposite to me, that there is a little inconsistency between their conduct in this House and their professions. The hon. Gentlemen must know quite well that now the condition of international affairs has got to its present position in Europe, it is not a good thing necessarily to discourage informal attempts at conversations.— [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"]—Hon. Gentlemen who are always trying to make Parliamentary capital, directly the suggestion is made, try to turn it to some controversial purpose. As far as I am concerned, let me say that we have never, at any time, initiated conversations. We have never, at any time, laid it down that we would not listen to conversations if other people wished it. If any representative of any belligerent country desires seriously to lay before us any proposals, we are prepared to listen to them. Of course, we are not going to deal with them without our Allies, but in the full confidence of our Allies. Certainly the last thing I should lay down would be that the door must be shut to any kind of informal approach which had any elements of authenticity, and which had adequate credentials. The very fact that such conversations are of an informal kind at the time necessarily makes them very improper subjects for discussion in this House, and that which is true as a general proposition is emphatically and specially true of the international episode which is the subject of our discussion today. The letter which is attracting public attention was a private letter written by the Emperor of Austria to a relative, conveyed by the relative to the French President and the French Prime Minister, under the seal of the strictest secrecy, and without permission to convey it to anybody except the Prime Minister and the Sovereign of this country; without permission even to communicate it to the Cabinet colleagues of the Prime Minister of this country.As a matter of fact, it -was not conveyed only to the President?
It was conveyed to the Prime Minister.
He knew it.
I understand in the first instance (it was conveyed to the President, and it was communicated to the French Prime Minister and the British Prime Minister under those pledges. A more inconvenient method of dealing with great transactions could hardly be conceived. The inconvenience was not due to any wish on the part of the French Prime Minister to carry out public business in this most inconvenient fashion.
When you go outside the ordinary channels of public business and the ordinary methods of conducting great international affairs, you land yourself in very great difficulty. Records are not kept. Discussion is hampered or is impossible. The whole machinery of Government works with extreme difficulty. As my right hon. Friend has reminded the House, I was away at the time, and I never heard of these transactions until I returned, when practically the subject had become a matter of history in all its main aspects; and I confess that, as I have very little time for dealing with history, I did not go as intimately as I might have done into these details, because the transaction was over. My right hon. Friend has asked me a specific question—whether the President of the United States was informed of this? As Foreign Minister—not acting Foreign Minister, but still as titular Foreign Minister of Great Britain—I was in Washington at the time. I was not informed, and could not be informed in the conditions that I described, of the transaction. I need hardly say, therefore, that, as I was away acting in quite a different matter in Washington, the Government was better acquainted with these facts than I was myself; but if anybody supposes on that account that we ever showed any want of confidence in the Government or the President of the United States, he is under a complete delusion. I have no secrets from President Wilson. Every thought that I have in the way of diplomacy connected with the War is absolutely open to President Wilson. I do not believe that it is possible for Great Britain and the United States of America to carry on the great work in which they are engaged, and to deal with the complex problems which we have from day to day, without complete confidence, and, as far as I am concerned, complete confidence has always been given. So much for that, which is the first of the questions raised by the right hon. Gentleman. The second question he put to me related to the Stockholm Conference. I am not going into the whole question of the Stockholm Conference. Personally I think that it is a matter of which it is very difficult to speak with any confidence, a matter on which there is much to be said, and reasonably said, on both sides. But I myself was no believer in the Stockholm Conference. I did not think then, and I do not think now, that it would really have conduced in any important way to a settlement of this great War. But however that may be, putting that subject aside—it is not the subject on which I think the right hon. Gentleman wanted me to speak—I may re-assure him on this point. The course taken by the British Government with regard to Stockholm had no relation, near or remote, with the Emperor Karl's private letter to Prince Sixte, or with the negotiations or conversations that thereupon took place. They were wholly separate transactions decided on quite, different principles, and absolutely unconnected one with the other. There was only one other question which the right hon. Gentleman put to me. He asked me whether one of the reasons why the negotiations broke down—why these incipient conversations did not lead to any fruitful result, was that France, not content with asking for the return of the Alsace-Lorraine of 1870, asked in addition to that for those further territories which were attached to Alsace-Lorraine in 1790 or in 1814. He was referring, of course, to all that passed, or was alleged to have passed, between M. Doumergue and the late Tsar, I think in the early days of 1917. There was no question of this bigger Alsace being a war aim of the Allies. M. Doumergue's mission to Russia, his conversations with the Tsar, were not known to us until very much later. They had no international bearing. Certainly this Government never gave the least encouragement to any such notion. It was altogether outside our whole modes of thought on this subject. It was not a subject which we should ever have seriously contemplated, nor do I think it ever was a very fixed or solid part of the foreign policy for any length of time of any French Government.The reference is not, as the right hon. Gentleman supposes, to this Treaty, but to the statement in the Press that President Poincareé met the Emperor Karl's suggestion by a demand for these further extensions of territory.
Pourparlers were not interfered with by any such demands as the hon. Gentleman suggests. That was not the point at all. I know that some Members of this House think that I have been too reticent in my refusals to answer questions put to me across the Floor of the House; and even those who thought, perhaps, that I was well advised in not answering such questions may think I ought to deal more fully than I propose to do with the subject in debate. But a little consideration will, I think, show the House that I am absolutely well advised on this point. We do not know—and perhaps. until the secrets of the archives of Europe are opened to the historian of the future we shall not know, or perhaps we never shall know—exactly what motives influenced Count Czernin, the Emperor Karl, and the Emperor of Germany in these various transactions. I am inclined to think that it was all part of what now is sometimes called a "peace offensive" An hon. Gentleman whom I think I see opposite seemed to interpret the phrase "peace offensive" as carrying with it by inference the suggestion that people who talked about peace offensives were people who intended to reject any propositions for peace, whatever those propositions might be. That is not what peace offensive means. As I think I indicated in an answer to the hon. Gentleman, I am quite unable to follow the logic by which he arrives at that conclusion.
May I ask whether the word "offensive" does not necessarily imply rejection or resistance?
Hon. Members should allow the right hon. Gentleman to continue his speech, seeing that they did not avail themselves of the opportunity of speaking previously.
The hon. Gentleman is quite mistaken. The meaning of the expression "peace offensive "is this, that propositions are made by one party who does not desire peace himself, but who does desire to divide his enemies by making proposals of peace. That is the policy which undoubtedly lay at the root, I will not say of all these transactions because I am not sure, but undoubtedly of a great many of the transactions which have been brought before the House recently, and to which the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has referred. Take for example the publication by M. Clemenceau of the fact of these offers from the Emperor Karl. How did it arise? Why was it done? It was done because Count Czernin, in pursuing a peace offensive, tried to suggest to the world, and especially to the Italian world, that they were being made to go on with the fighting in order that France might obtain Alsace-Lorraine. That was the suggestion made by Count Czernin. The Letter of the Emperor of Austria was directed equally to a peace offensive, but a peace offensive aimed at another member of the Allies. There the suggestion was that France should have Alsace-Lorraine, but no suggestion was made that Italy should have anything. That is the other side of the "peace offensive." That is the whole essence; and no wonder M. Clemenceau, who is a great man but not a patient man, seeing this cynical attempt to divide the Allies—by suggesting that the whole War was being continued in order that France might obtain Alsace-Lorraine—turned round, and said to the people who made that insinuation, "You yourselves offered Alsace-Lorraine to France about a year ago" If you are dealing with people as cynical in their methods as the Central Powers, some kind of counter-attack is rendered almost obligatory. The actual mode of counterattack which was adopted by M. Clemenceau appears to me to have been thoroughly effective in the sense that it has exposed, and exposed in the clearest manner, the methods by which Central European diplomacy is animated. There is much that is obscure in the letter. There is much that, I think, will always remain obscure, and I believe that every other effort at conversation made by the Central Powers has never been made in the interests of a fair and an honourable peace, but has always been made in the interests of dividing the Allies against whom the Central Powers are contending. That is the only thread which draws together these disconnected efforts. That is the only common principle which lies at the root of all of them. That they desire peace on their own terms is, of course, absolutely true. Everybody does. The whole world is passionately desirous of peace, if it can be obtained on terms which to the various combatants seem tolerable. There is no symptom whatever at the present time that German public opinion, in so far as German public opinion exists — certainly not the opinion of the soldier, and the civilians dominated by the soldier, who now bears sway in the German governing circles—
Thanks to you!
that they either now, or at any time, have contemplated the possibility of what we should regard as a reasonable peace—a peace which is going to secure the future of the world, and the freedom of those who are in danger of falling under German domination. They vary with almost cynical readiness the principles which they profess and the policy which they have adopted. Never under any circumstances does a close examination suggest that they wanted to have the kind of peace with which alone I believe even hon. Gentlemen sitting below the Gangway would feel themselves content. The very letter which is the. occasion of this Debate is surely a proof of that.
2.0 P.M. The right hon. Gentleman suggested, and he may very well be right—I certainly have no evidence to the contrary —that the two Emperors met together, and contrived this little coup. It is possible. I do not know whether it is true. But there is this curious and significant fact, that the essence of the offer made by the Austrian Emperor to the President of the French Republic, under the narrow limitations which I have endeavoured to describe to the House, consisted of an offer by the Austrians of something that belonged to the Germans. That is a very significant and very singular fact. The Austrians are hardly in a position now, and hardly were in a position then, to offer the territory of their infinitely more powerful ally to anybody, without that ally's consent. It is almost incredible that Austria, which notoriously has fallen more and more into the grip of Germany, should have quietly suggested that she would be very glad to make peace at Germany's expense. What the explanation of that may be I do not know, except it be the one which I have indicated to the House and which I think was suggested by my right hon. Friend himself. Anyhow a suggestion of that character is not one which anybody would look on very confidently as in itself containing an arrangement that is likely to mature. This question has been examined, no doubt, with a knowledge of the facts, more minute than I can have or give to the House, by a Committee of the French Chamber. My right hon. Friend who just sat down appeared almost to suggest that we should have a Select Committee to inquire into these transactions. I think that would be a most deplorable precedent.I did not suggest that. What I did was to incidentally remark, in no offensive spirit, that the Government had a horror of Select Committees.
I see! It was a delicate reference to another controversy. At all events, however that may be, it is quite clear that we have not the machinery now for the sort of investigation which the Committee of the French Chamber has carried on, and that a Select Committee will not provide that machinery. I am not going to discuss whether we ought or ought not so to modify our institutions as to copy our neighbours in this respect. My own opinion is that it would be inad- visable. We may say this: The French Chamber have the machinery; they have used it freely with regard to this particular controversy, and the conclusion which they came to was that the letter of the Emperor Charles did not provide adequate or satisfactory bases for an honourable peace. You may say that the Committee of the French Chamber were prejudiced. You may say that other motives than a judicial consideration of these historical facts animated their verdict. But observe, if they had prejudices at all, it would surely have been in favour of a peace which gave them Alsace-Lorraine without further fighting! That is the point. The suggestion is that the Emperor of Austria made a proposal, which he could have imposed afterwards upon Germany, by which the War should come to an end, and France would obtain Alsace-Lorraine. Had there been any possibility that that proposal really carried within it the seeds of an honourable peace, is it not patent that a Committee of the French Chamber would have expressed its regret that the opportunity had been thrown away by the French Ministers or the French Prime Minister? They came to precisely the opposite conclusion.
By only one-third majority.
Of course, it was not unanimous. I did not suggest that it was unanimous. I said that the Committee, by the ordinary procedure of those Committees, had given its verdict in that way, and with that verdict I think the House might well be content.
The French Chamber were not content.
We, at all events, cannot be accused of any selfish considerations in this matter. There is nobody who can be more desirous than the British Government of bringing this War to an honourable termination, and if any method by which that can be accomplished is shown to us, of course it will be accepted. But, Sir, we are fighting, as one among Allies, against the Central Powers, who, so far as I can make out, have never had at any time, and now less than ever, the least intention of meeting our wishes. I am not talking of our legitimate wishes; I mean the wishes in which I believe the whole House, the whole country, and even many hon. Gentlemen sitting below the Gangway opposite, entirely agree. Those great aims of ours can only be attained by absolute loyalty between the various Allies. It is not so simple and so easy a matter as some hon. Gentlemen appear to suppose to run an alliance, even if the Alliance has been founded on the most unselfish principles. As long as human nature is what it is, there must be causes of difficulty—there must be causes of friction. It is inevitable that one nation does not look at the problems before it from precisely and exactly the same angle as another nation. Differences of temperament—these small differences of outlook which I have described—even pettier subjects of difference, may arise, and must arise, from time to time. Even if you confine yourself only, as you have no right to do, to the four or five great belligerents—even confining yourselves to them, where you have five Foreign Offices, five War Departments, five Cabinets, of course there are points of difficulty which necessarily arise, and everybody knows that that must happen.
The one thing which makes it possible to sweep all these things on one side, and to get them in the right proportion, is, in the first place, that we should keep our eyes fixed upon the great common object of the War; and, secondly, that we should have in each other absolute and unbreakable confidence in our mutual loyalty. The main thing which makes me regret such Debates as we are having now, or which makes me see in them some germs of difficulty and danger, is that the sort of controversy to which we are accustomed within, as it were, the limits of our own family affairs should be applied to international affairs. In our own family affairs no harm is done. We are all accustomed to it; we are all familiar with it; it is our daily bread and our daily life. [An HON. MEMBER: "Not very nourishing!"] But it is a very difficult thing when you apply those methods —which are not out of place, or not much out of place, within these walls—to international controversies, to the action of foreign statesmen, to the motives of foreign Parliaments, and to the deeds of foreign armies. Believe me, that kind of freedom of discussion would be absolutely fatal to any Alliance. I think there is no greater duty—sometimes it is a duty difficult to perform and rather ungrateful —more incumbent upon the holder, whoever he may be, of the office which is for the moment entrusted to me, than to take care that, in so far as in him lies, nothing shall be said which makes it more difficult to carry out that task, which can be accomplished if all the great Allies remain unanimous, but which will be lost irretrievably if any breach were allowed to creep in between them.As the right hon. Gentleman has very truly said, we are treading here on the most delicate ground—ground which ought not to be entered upon except with the utmost circumspection and reserve, and with the fullest sense of responsibility, not only on the part of the Minister, but on the part of the Members of this House. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Runciman), as was acknowledged by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, approached the subject in that spirit.
Hear, hear!
To the appeal which the right hon. Gentleman has just made, and which, I believe, will find a ready and cordial response in every quarter of the House—that we should not at this or any stage of the War import into the discussion of matters, whether they be of strategy or diplomacy, the controversial spirit in which we are accustomed to indulge with regard to our domestic affairs—as far as I can I shall venture, not only by precept, but by practice to respond. I rise not for the purpose of probing further into these matters of fact, but simply, if I may, of summarising and recording with satisfaction, in two or three sentences, the substance and effect of what, I venture to think, was a most instructive and opportune statement on the part of the Government Bench. In the first place, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said—there was nobody who would have doubted it if he had not said it, and it is satisfactory not only to us but to the world at large to know it—that the British Government has closed no door to overtures and approaches in the direction of an honourable peace, and that they are not confined to what I may call the formal, the normal, and the conventional methods of full dress diplomacy. From whatever quarter, be it with adequate authority and with real good faith, if an appeal be made which is not merely rhetorical, but which is based upon substantial considerations — from whatever quarter such an appeal is directed to them, they would not, I am certain, turn to it a deaf ear. Let that be clear.
The next point is equally important, and my right hon. Friend was well advised to lay the stress upon it that he did. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Runciman) asked whether any communication was made of this correspondence and the pourparlers, such as they were, which ensued upon it, to the President of the United States. I gather it was not, for what I am quite prepared to suppose were perfectly adequate reasons. The thing did not last long, and it disappeared and became, as the right hon. Gentleman said, a matter of history rather than of actual, practical diplomacy. I welcome, as I am sure the whole House will welcome, his assurance that not only in matters of this, kind will he and the Government at large have no secrets from the President of the United States. What is equally important is that, difficult as the task is, delicate as it is, sometimes almost heartbreaking, to have a complete accord, certainly of knowledge and information, and based upon a full interchange of knowledge and information, of policy and practice between all the Allies fighting in the same cause—difficult and delicate as that task is, it is one which must never be lost sight of, and which must be strenuously pursued, in spite of difficulties, even if in the pursuit of it you are obliged from time to time to reject what may seem to be for the moment promising prospects, or at any rate to delay their being carried into effect I am sure you cannot carry on a struggle of this kind—we feel it increasingly the larger the area of the Alliance—you cannot effectually carry on a struggle of this kind, unless it be on the basis of complete mutual confidence between the Allies. The third and last point of which I should like to take note is what my right hon. Friend has said in regard to the claim said to be put forward in France, as one of the conditions of an honourable peace —that is, what is vaguely and conveniently called the "line of 1814" As a matter of fact, I gather from my right hon. Friend's statement—he will correct me if I am wrong—he tells us that, as far as his information goes, after the letter was delivered to President Poincaré —the allegation which we have seen in many quarters that he then put forward this demand for the 1814 line is, as far as my right hon. Friend knows, totally without foundation. I am very glad to hear that, and I may say I am not in the least surprised to hear it. But I want to go a step further, and take note, with still more satisfaction, of my right hon. Friend's declaration that it never has been among the war aims of the British Government, and that, so far as he knows—of course, no one can speak with the same absolute assurance—so far as he knows, it has not been, and is not now, to be accounted as a part of the settled policy of the French Government. Am I right in that?Yes; I think so.
I am extremely glad to hear it, though I never had any doubt of it, and I think the country and the world will be glad to hear what the right hon. Gentleman said to-day, for, let me state once more—and it is the last word I will say—while, in my judgment, there has not been, and there should not be, any contraction, so equally, in my judgment, there should not be any expansion of the declared aims and purposes for which we entered the War, for which we have prosecuted the War, for the sake of which we desire to see the War brought to a successful issue, and the attainment of which will be, in our opinion, the only foundation of a durable peace.
The one word I want to say on this question is to ask the Foreign Office whether they are not prepared to endeavour to obtain a larger measure of co-operation between ourselves and our Allies in a really constructive policy dealing with the great problems which must arise immediately after the War. We have heard a great deal from the right hon. Gentleman, who represents the Foreign Office, and from the Prime Minister, and from statesmen of Allied countries about a League of Nations. I do say that when there are now eighteen States banded together to defend the civilisation of the world, now is the time that they should amongst themselves be prepared to put into operation the principles and objects for which the League of Nations stands. President Wilson has defined the meaning of a League of Nations, and the whole question now is as to whether we, the Allies, shall make our position perfectly plain, not only to our own people and to neutrals, but also to the people of enemy countries. I was glad to note the other day that the Foreign Office has, I believe, a Committee which is engaged on this question, and I hope it will also be considered by the Governments of our Allies. But the point, I think, is that some measure of agreement ought to be arrived at with the least possible delay, and that we should not allow ourselves to drift into the position that this country and our Allies have no constructive policy before them, which they are prepared to put fully into operation the moment the War comes to an end. Now, I think this reconstruction must be based on the recognition of free democracies. That is to say, I do not think anyone can contemplate the domination of a League of this kind by any great military Power, and therefore the crux of the whole thing seems to me to be that any League of Nations of this kind must be based on the principle of general disarmament. That is the crux of the whole problem, and we ought to make it quite clear that that is the positive aim which this country has before it in this War. In the case of nine out of every ten men fighting our battles in France and in the other theatres of war, that is the supreme war aim for which they are fighting at the present moment, and this object is one which appeals to every man and woman in this country. Therefore I say again that we must look to the Foreign Office for a constructive and objective policy, and that we ought not to be satisfied until they have put that great problem in the forefront and made it one of our chief war aims.
General Maurice
There is another question to which I desire to draw attention, and it is with regard 'to the matter which came up before the House last week. I refer to the Debate on General Maurice's letter. I voted for the Government on that occasion because, as I understood it, it was a matter which concerned the discipline of the Army. Now I put two questions to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for War as to whether the procedure which has been adopted in the case of General Maurice was the one which was usually adopted in similar cases, and he gave me what I considered to be a very unsatisfactory reply. He told us that under some Royal Warrant cases of this kind did come before the Army Council. The first question I want to ask him now is whether he could give us any precedent, any other case which has been dealt with in precisely the same way, and
the second point is whether the Army Council is a judicial body. I have yet to learn that the Army Council in any way exercises any judicial functions. Another question I asked was whether any other similar offences have been committed during this War, and, if so, what were the punishments meted out in those cases to officers, non-commissioned officers or men who have written to the Press and have conveyed important information or secret information to the Press. The answer I got to that question was that my hon. Friend (Mr. Macpherson) had no information. I suggest to him that if he asks the Judge Advocate-General's Department he ought to be able to furnish us with some facts in order to show that the treatment which General Maurice received was on a par with the treatment which any officer, non-commissioned officer or man would have received in any case of a similar offence. That is all that we ask. We want to be assured by the War Office, because, I understand—and I believe it is true—that a great deal of misapprehension, or at any rate a great deal of feeling exists in certain quarters that generals are not accorded the same treatment as is accorded to other ranks in the Service; and in the interests of the discipline and moral of the Army the War Office must make it perfectly clear to the House and the country that that feeling is ill-founded, and that there is no real cause for its existence. I understand that General Maurice has had a very long and distinguished career in the Army, and I do feel the Government may have shown some rigidity in this matter and in dealing with this particular case. They have also dealt in a very rigid manner with the statements which have been made in the Press. I understand now that General Maurice has been appointed the military correspondent of the "Daily Chronicle" That is really a most extraordinary finale to this whole proceeding, that a distinguished officer, who has been in the innermost circles of the War Office and of the War Cabinet during the last four years, should now become the military correspondent of a certain newspaper. It would appear now as though instead of having one military correspondent thundering against the Government in the "Morning Post," we shall now have two, one thundering in the "Morning Post" and the other thundering in the "Daily Chronicle" We shall have General Maurice giving the result
of his experience and knowledge through the medium of the "Daily Chronicle," administered in small doses for the benefit of the War Office and the War Cabinet.
There is another matter on which I wish to endeavour to elicit some information from my hon. Friend, and that is in regard to certain facts and figures which have from time to time appeared in certain organs of the Press, giving away what I consider to be most valuable information to the enemy. I really cannot understand why certain officers—or people who call themselves officers—have not been prosecuted for having given away this information. We should also like to know what are the sources from which they received that information.
The "Morning Post" we are told, published the number of casualties which took place in the year]917, and we have been told of the deficit in the number of the establishment of the Army in France at the end of last year. I submit that these figures, if they were true, were of great assistance to the enemy. I did not wish to bring up these facts and figures because I felt that it would unnecessarily have drawn attention on the part of the enemy to them. But I think the House and the War Office should make it understood that they will not allow these things to be published in newspapers, and that they will not allow these articles, however highly placed may be the organs in which they appear, to be published, thus giving information broadcast, that damage the Government. There are two things to which we must look. The first is the discipline and moral of our troops, and the second is unity of command, but I maintain that if this sort of thing is to go on it will tend greatly to injure that moral and that discipline, while greatly prejudicing the unity of command. These articles have not helped this country in the progress of the War, and I hold that the Government are chiefly to blame. They have been weak. The Prime Minister has not carried out the policy which he declared he believed in, and which he was convinced was the policy which the Allies ought to pursue. We remember perfectly well, after the Italian debacle, that the Prime Minister made his Paris speech, in which he said that all our disasters, all our upsets, arose from the fact that there was no unity of Allied command.
The Prime Minister told us that he was going to set up an executive body in Versailles who would regard the Allied
line from the North Sea to the Adriatic as one line; the policy of the single front was to be adopted. He reinforced all that in this House, but a military section then commenced to kick against unified command, and immediately the Versailles Council was rendered down to an advisory body. Various steps were taken, and we were told that a great Army of manœuvre was going to be established, and that at last this Conference was to be given executive authority. Then the great attack came, and I submit that the Government has been the real cause of our misfortunes to-day. I hope that, in spite of the fact that a certain section of this House have taken up the attitude of backing up the military against the civilian elements, the Government will go on with the unified command and stick to it, and not put up with clamour and attacks. If the House is going to be worthy of its responsibility to the country and the Army, it must insist on putting an end to all these proceedings. I protest in the strongest possible way against the way in which the matter has been handled by the War Office. I could have understood it if Lord Derby had been at the head of the War Office, but now we have a new Minister, a great administrator, at the head of the War Office, and we may hope that reasonable reforms will be carried out, and that we shall see a strong hand and firm leading. In the interests of the Army, in the interests of discipline, in the interests of the moral of the Army, in the interests of moral at home, the Government must take a strong line and they must tell us—I hope they will tell us—why this procedure in the case of General Maurice was adopted, so that the House and the country may be assured that the same justice will be meted out by the War Office to other officers and men.
I will reply to my hon. and gallant Friend who has just sat down (Major Davies) in so far as what he has said relates to the Department for whose administration I am responsible to this House. The hon. and gallant Gentleman divided his observations into two parts, and I will deal with the smaller one first—namely, that which relates to the publication of facts and figures in the public Press. I am not aware to what particular facts and figures my hon. and gallant Friend refers.
I particularly drew attention to only one sample of many others, where the figures relating to the-casualties in France, in 1917, and other theatres of war, were published; and secondly, I drew attention to the facts and figures relating to the deficit in the establishment of British troops in France at the beginning of this year, and which were given in an article in the "Morning Post" of 24th January.
I am obliged to-my hon. and gallant Friend for drawing my attention to the particular facts and figures. I can only say that the publication of any of these facts and figures, which have not been given to the House of Commons, is most reprehensible, and I, for one, cannot find out how these leakages take place, though I have made inquiries. But, so far as lies in our power, we have consistently refused at the War Office to give figures of this nature to be made public by any journal.
May I ask whether the hon. Gentleman will take steps to prosecute?
The publication of the facts and figures to which my gallant Friend has drawn attention seems to have taken place some months ago, apparently towards the end of January. I am afraid I cannot promise that the authorities would take action in the case, but I can assure my hon. Friend and the House that we regard any publication of this sort as being against the best interests of the country and as being in every way very reprehensible. I can only repeat that neither do they nor do I know how these facts have leaked out, but I can state that no authority for the publication of these facts and figures has been given by any person who is in charge of that kind of information at the War Office. In regard to the second point raised by my hon. and gallant Friend, he seems to think that we treated that able and distinguished officer, General Maurice, whose case was before the House last week, rather too gently. I take the view that we treated him not by any means gently, but that we punished him—there is no other word for it—for the action he took, both quickly and effectively, and in accordance with our powers. I pointed out to my hon. and gallant Friend in answer to a question, that there are two ways in which an officer in circumstances of this sort can be punished. One is a longer way, and the other is a shorter, and the latter, in my judgment, is the more effective way. The longer way is by court-martial. As the House will appreciate, that is a very difficult form of inquiry in the case of a general of the standing of Sir Frederick Maurice in the Army.
But the Army Council has power under a Royal Warrant to take immediate action as a judicial body, and this action was taken in the case of General Maurice. The House has always looked upon it as desirable in these cases to come to a quick judgment and to inflict quick punishment, and I think we have been quick in both judgment and punishment. The punishment which General Maurice has received is that he should be retired from the Army, and I do not know whether my hon. and gallant Friend realises what that punishment means. General Maurice is placed on the retired list, but not with the retired pay of his rank, and at the present moment I do not think that General Maurice will be receiving annually more than £225 a year. When one reflects that his brilliant future has been spoiled and that his very brilliant prospects in the Army have ceased, I think it will be seen that the punishment under Royal Warrant was a swift and severe punishment, and that it will do much to reassure regimental officers and men in the British Army that there is no inclination on the part of the Army Council to favour anyone however exalted the rank. I am quite sure that if you put this case to any general of the British Army at the present time he will say "This is a much more effective way and a much quicker way of dealing with a general than is trial by court-martial" My hon. and gallant Friend asked me whether I have any precedent for this course of action. I tell him quite frankly that I do not know personally of any case where an officer has been punished for sending communications of this sort to the Press. But undoubtedly there may have been occasions when an officer or a soldier had to be tried for this offence, but there are no means by which the War Office can find out definitely information as to the exact number of punishments which have been inflicted under that particular Section of the Army Act or under the Royal Warrant. I can, however, go so far as to say that even distinguished and gallant Members of this House who are or may have been on the Territorial Force Reserve came on one or two occasions pretty near it. I need not mention the cases; my hon. and gallant Friend may know of one of them. I can. assure my hon. Friend that I think the-action which had to be taken in the case of General Maurice will have a very great effect, and that it will make generals in. distinguished positions hesitate long before they take the action which General Maurice took. I do not think my hon. and gallant Friend raised any other question, but, if so, I shall be only too glad to let him have an answer. Before I sit down. I should like once more, to make it perfectly clear that in the action that we have-taken in regard to General Maurice there-was no attempt on our part to show any favouritism of any sort or kind simply because he happened to be a distinguished general and rendered distinguished service-to the State. I think it would be a calamity if the idea got abroad that because a man occupied a very high rank he received from the Army Council or any other military authority any preferential treatment.It is the other-way about in some people's minds.
That may be so And if that is true I think it points to the-facts that in General Maurice's case we-have effected a just punishment, because if the people in the country are divided as to what the effect of that punishment has been it goes a long way to show that a just medium has been reached and that, in the interests of all concerned, particularly in the interests of the discipline of the Army, we have taken a most proper and effective course.
Allied Diplomacy
I think it would be a. misfortune if we left the Debate on foreign affairs, which we began this morning without drawing from it the conclusions that will arise in many minds as regards its practical value for the present and the future. There are two considerations I should like to put before His Majesty's Government, and if the Noble Lord is able to give us any assurance on them I am sure it will give widespread public satisfaction. The two considerations that clearly arise from the events of last year are these. First, there are-obvious uses of the diplomatic offensive From that it is natural that we should ask: Are we using the weapon of the diplomatic offensive with its full effect? The second question that arises even more insurgently is: Have we attained the utmost unity of diplomatic machinery of which the Alliance is capable, or can we advance along lines of greater unity, and so very really increase our diplomatic forces? The Noble Lord quite recently in an interview referred to the dangers of what was described as a peace offensive. I regret the phrase, because it contains some indication that peace is a disease and something to be avoided at all costs, though I know it is quite unintentional. The phrase I shall myself use is diplomatic offensive, which means the same thing and does not give rise to any misconception. The one thing clear in the interview was the importance the Noble Lord attached to the diplomatic offensive. What was his argument? That by the skilful use of neutral agents, by specious offers spread abroad among the people, you can do something to weaken the popular will to victory. The pacifist is visualised as a person fed on a meagre ration of home-grown food who, on receiving a substantial dump of foreign supplies, waxes fat with offensive zeal. I agree there is a great deal of truth in that. The question arises, Are we endeavouring to perform the same operation amongst the Central Powers and their allies? Of course, in the nature of things it is not a subject on which the Noble Lord can give us intimate details, and I do not complain that he has to answer in very general terms. But there is this difference between the diplomatic offensive conducted by the Central Powers and the one conducted by ourselves, that we are not in the least ashamed. As I understand it, we are all united in the prosecution of the peace aims declared by our Prime Minister and the President of the United States of America, and we are not ashamed to spread them abroad in any quarter of the world. We have no need to adopt that secrecy and those tortuous methods which are necessary to statesmen who are following devious paths.
I am bound to say the one public fact we have learned as to the Government's activity in this direction is not wholly reassuring. I refer to the appointment of Lord Northcliffe as Director of Propaganda in enemy countries. I hate introducing personalities, because there are far too many of them nowadays, and it poisons a great deal the atmosphere which we would like to keep free from such matters. I am the last person to desire to depreciate the valuable work Lord Northcliffe has done in many directions throughout this War. What I want to argue is that just in so far as his work has been valuable in other directions, it makes him an unsuitable instrument for this particular form of activity. Lord Northcliffe stands in the public mind as the leader of the "bitter end," extreme militant point of view, and that is surely the very type of person whom you should not select for conducting propaganda in enemy countries. Lord Northcliffe is to the German what Count Reventlow is to us, and if we were told that Reventlow was undertaking the task of German propaganda in this country obviously the work of German propaganda would be at once absolutely stultified. It would give rise to an atmosphere of extreme hostility in all quarters in this House. The type of mind you want to conduct propaganda in enemy countries is surely the President Wilson type of mind, the man who is prepared to say he has no quarrel with the German people as such, but will wage unending war with the Junker, Prussian, element. A man who can appeal to the democratic spirit in enemy countries and strengthen the democratic influence, rather than turn them into a line of immediate and emphatic hostility When you see the Government employing Lord Northcliffe as an instrument of the diplomatic offensive, it obviously gives room for doubt whether they are making the best use of that weapon and whether they themselves really recognise the powers that can be wielded by means of it, though they are free to recognise the dangers of it when it is used within this country. So I ask the Noble Lord if he will set at rest the widespread doubts and say that, as far as they can, they are doing their utmost towards a peace offensive in enemy lands, and that they are making diplomacy bear its fair share in furthering our aims and not neglecting the full use of one political weapon and thereby throwing undue burdens on the other political weapon, namely, the armed forces of the Crown. My doubts are in some measures confirmed by the Government's failure to unify the Allies' diplomatic forces as they have unified so many of our other forces. It is surely remarkable that while they have brought to a very high pitch of unification the military and economic 3.0 P.M. powers of the Allies, they appear to have done exceedingly little to unify the diplomatic forces. I need not enlarge on the increase of diplomatic power which the Allies would derive from possessing a single diplomatic power or a united diplomatic machine. No expression of opinion on this point could have been stronger than that of the Foreign Secretary in the early part of this Debate. But is it not possible that some such machine could be set up; and now surely, if ever, is the time for it! There is of necessity, while the events on the Western Front are still hanging in the balance, a slackening of diplomatic effort. That must be so, and that is the time when you can set up fresh machinery. The Noble Lord knows well enough that if and when we have succeeded in beating back the German offensive there will come a time of diplomatic strain when it will be impossible to start new machinery, and we shall feel the evil effects of five different Foreign Offices and five different Cabinets working without any sufficient co-ordination. The secret treaties have revealed, even more than the affairs we have discussed earlier in the Debate to-day, the confusion caused by the incompatible aim sand ambitions that have surged up from time to time in the councils of the Allies. How great is the weakness of that effect it is most difficult to estimate. The Central Powers have clearly had great encouragement in assuring their people that in 1917 they were fighting in self-defence for the preservation of their country. The Central Powers have been encouraged by the absence of any kind of Allied diplomacy to spread peace offers, which is always a danger to Alliances, more particularly in time of victory. While the American conditions were at least a basis for probably successful negotiations, the attitude of the Allies was a barrier. For this confusion and consequent danger I ask the Government to substitute a central diplomatic council at Versailles, a council speaking with a single voice and examining, with the necessary materials, if any, put before it, every proposal or hint which emanates from the Central Powers, and conducting a vigorous and unceasing diplomatic offensive. Only so can the full united forces of the Allies attain their greatest strength. There are subsidiary, although important, advantages which would arise out of such a council. It would be a body that might well form the foundation upon which an institution might be developed appropriate to a League of Nations, and, perhaps of even more importance, would be the knowledge and intimate understanding of foreign affairs which would be gained by the younger generation of statesmen of all Allied countries, including the States. This is a subtle and indirect advantage it is difficult to exaggerate. The rubbing together of different points of view, personal friendships, the daily study of foreign problems, would provide an education in international problems such as has rarely been available to any State, and of the permanent value of which in its influence on peace it is difficult to speak too highly. Those are the two points I wish to bring to the attention of the Government. I regard myself as one of its humblest supporters, and I am sure the Noble Lord will realise that these suggestions are made in no spirit of criticism. I believe the Government to be the best exponent of a policy which seems somehow rare in this House, though common enough outside. I represent those who look for a Government that shall be Prussian in its vigour in the conduct of the War, and American in its single-mindedness in the pursuit of peace; and it is because I should like assurance that it is showing in the latter part of the policy the vigour and energy I recognise it puts into the first part that I have made these suggestions to the Noble Lord to-day.I should like to take the opportunity of the presence of the Noble Lord the Minister of Blockade to say a few further words upon the subject which has been touched upon by the last speaker, and that is the question of what he styled the diplomatic offensive. I want very seriously to suggest to the Minister of Blockade that there is real need of the adoption of new methods on the part of the diplomatists among the Allied countries. It is not fair that our soldiers should be making the enormous sacrifices which they are making without at the same time receiving every kind of support on the part of the diplomatic forces of the Allied Powers, and I cannot help feeling, for reasons which I will briefly explain, that our soldiers are not at present receiving the full support to which they are entitled. We talk a. good deal about bombing German towns, and bombing German trades, but I should like to see a real diplomatic offensive started for the purpose of bombing the con- sciences of the German people. The way not to do it is, of course, illustrated by the facts which have been brought out in the Debate this afternoon, and that is by our diplomatists in public continually making statements on war aims of proposals or counter proposals which are based upon questions of territory. It is an entire mistake, I venture to submit, for the Allied Governments ever to state their war aims in terms of territory, because, after all, questions of territory are merely incidental questions, and they are questions a true and fair solution of which can never be determined until we have first settled the main substantial issue, and that is by what reorganisation of the constitution of international relations, or in what other way are we going to give the countries now unhappily at war security for the future.
I take as an example the question which has been raised this afternoon about what is called the 1814 boundary of Alsace-Lorraine. It is suggested that it would be a very improper thing indeed for France to be making even a suggestion that under any circumstances those ancient frontiers of France might be restored. I noticed the other day the most distinguished Belgian, M. Maeterlinck, was saying that, so far as Belgium is concerned, the Belgians regard the creation of a buffer state from the Saar Valley up to the left bank of the Rhine as essential to the future security of Belgium; and if the Allied Statesmen cannot give Belgium any better security for her future than she possessed at the outbreak of this War, who is there in this House would dare to say that it was an improper or a shameful thing that somebody should propose, as a matter of discussion and negotiation, that, for the protection of Belgium, a buffer State should be created between the frontier of Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine against future German aggression? Therefore, when you come on to these questions of territory, you must first know whether the nations are going to have any security, other than military and naval preparations, in the future, or whether they are not. If in the future, as in the past, the security of a nation is to depend entirely upon its power to defend itself, in case of need, against a wanton violation of public right by force of arms, then it has every right to demand the rectification of frontiers, if necessary, or to demand the creation of buffer States, and it is only upon the assumption which we hope will happily prove to be true, that by the formation of that League of Nations, of which President Wilson has spoken, or in some other way, there is to be a real security given to small countries like Belgium for their future, when this War is over—that one can then say, under those circumstances, that any questions of altering frontiers are unnecessary and provocative, and are matters which ought not to be brought up. There is another reason why our war aims should not be placed upon a territorial basis. Let us sum up in a sentence or two the letter of the Emperor Karl. What happened I There were, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dewsbury said, certain circumstances which pointed strongly to a certain amount of collusion between the two Emperors of the Central Powers as to their movements in March or April of last year, and we find the Emperor Karl, as representing Austria, saying to France in effect, "It is not necessary for the French to continue the War,, because we will give you Alsace-Lorraine. The War is only being continued because those unreasonable Italians want to takeaway territory belonging to Austria. You make a separate peace, and you will have all you want. Never mind about Italy; what is Italy to you? "Then, on the other hand, Germany goes to Italy and says," What are you fighting for? We can get you Trieste and the Trentino from Austria; you need not go on fighting—why-should you?—in order that France may have Alsace-Lorraine! "So they play off one against the other, and with that diabolical cunning which marks the diplomacy of the Central Powers from start to finish, you will observe each Power promises that which it is not in its power to perform. So that once the dupe is brought into the trap, the partner and the Ally can say," Oh, Austria promised you. Alsace-Lorraine, did she? It was very kind of her, but she had no power to give it "Austria can say," Oh, Germany has-been offering the Trentino and Trieste, has she? Well, she did not consult us about it beforehand. Now, like the Bolshevik armies, having laid down your arms and gone home—having got peace negotiations on the brain—we shall reconsider the terms of the Emperor Karl's letter, or any other proposal of that description. Now we will let you know what a German peace means" They need not tell us; we know already ! We do not want to discuss our aims in terms of territory. It is unscientific; it is un statesman like to attempt to do so. You cannot reasonably state what should be the frontiers of Europe until you have first settled the question of whether it is to be a Europe, in the centre of which is to be a militant autocracy, caring for nothing but its own selfish interests, prepared at any moment to resume its business of carrying on its own aggrandisement by war of conquest, or whether, on the other hand, it is a Europe which will come under the rule of law and order. It is quite idle to talk about the rectification of frontiers, just as it is quite idle to talk about the question of the return of the German colonies in Africa, until we know whether the natives are to be handed over to the same people who have butchered, outraged, and massacred them in the past, or whether they are to be handed back to a democratised, reformed, repentant Germany! No, that is not the way in which the war aims of the Allies should be stated, if we are to assist our soldiers in the field. Let us not reiterate a multiplicity of territorial issues, which inevitably divide. Why cannot our Government for once state in a plain and unmistakable way to the world at large the simple and essential issue which is not only so much greater and more important than these minor issues, but is different in kind as well as importance? What is the great issue? We are fighting for security. We are fighting to make it impossible for this War to recur. The difference, I say, is in kind as well as in magnitude, because, while other issues arc issues which inevitably divide the combatants, this is an issue which unites, and which unites not merely the Allied Powers, but unites our enemies as well. If we are now fighting, as we are, to make a recurrence of this War impossible, we are fighting for something which is just as dear to the hearts of the German people as it is to our own. If we are fighting to save our children from the horrors of another war we are indeed fighting, too, to save the children of the German people from the horrors of another war—and it is just as well that the German people should be occasionally reminded of that fact. That is why I do press this matter. It is not the first time I have raised this question, and, if the opportunity be given me, it will not be the last. I do press upon the Government the necessity of reconsidering their whole method of presenting the war aims of this country to our Allies and to the world at large. Reference has been made to Lord Northcliffe as a propagandist. I should like to say this: One of the first acts of Lord Northcliffe, on his appointment as a propagandist, was to devote more than a whole page of the "Times" to a verbatim reprint of the memorandum of war aims drawn up by the Inter-Allied Conference in London representing the Socialism and Labour of all the Allied countries. This was a document of the utmost possible importance. The printing of it in such a verbatim form in the "Times" was obviously not calculated to increase the sale or the circulation of the "Times" in this country. It was, however, an act of very great propagandist value, as ensuring that a verbatim report of an important document would go wherever the "Times" would carry it over the continent of Europe. That was a step in the right direction. It is open to this criticism, the document was one of 3,000 words. It is not a document; it is an encyclopædia, and an encyclopædia which ought to be read and digested on the instalment plan. Volumes could be written on war aims and diplomacy upon all the paragraphs of that voluminous and statesmanlike document. It was followed by a speech from the Prime Minister when he addressed a meeting of the Congress of Trade Unions. That speech was one of 3,000 words. In it the right hon. Gentleman covered the same ground as did the document. It was a most able speech. It was a speech in entire harmony with the views of Labour and Socialism, as expressed in. the document, and of President Wilson; but it was much too long. It went far too much into these territorial questions, which do not carry conviction in the minds of simple-minded men on either side of the North Sea. Therefore I do venture to press upon the Government sometimes to drop this discussion of territorial questions, to leave such discussion over till a more convenient season, and say a few plain, homely words about what we mean when we say that we are fighting for security. I make this practical suggestion, that if you really want to explain your war aims to the people of this country, or to the Allies and to the world at large, the simplest explanation would be to do some- thing—something concrete and tangible which they could see. You say you want to abolish war: why not start by agreeing not to make war on one another? You say, "We are trying to make it impossible for any war to recur" Why not, at any rate, start by agreeing never to make war on the United States of America? They would be quite willing.We have such an agreement already.
I beg your pardon: that is an example of the imperfect information that one finds in the most unexpected quarters. I should have thought that my hon. Friend would have known the Bryan Treaties from A to Z. They are not treaties abolishing war, but legitimising it, recognising its propriety by defining conditions precedent upon which you can go into a war of aggression with a clean heart and a good conscience. All you have to do is to agree to arbitrate first and then to wait twelve months. That arrangement is only binding between ourselves and America for five years.
You would never have war under those conditions—that is, if you have to wait a year—never!
A treaty of that kind may satisfy, and rightly satisfy, my hon. Friend, because of his great diplomatic experience and his statesmanlike and constructive mind. He is able to read out of that somewhat jejune document the beneficial results which no doubt may flow from it. Let me say that it is no good for propaganda purposes. We want an agreement much more simple than that and much more comprehensive, and there is no reason why this country and the United States of America and the great Republic of France should not commence tomorrow by saying in the face of the world that we are fighting to make war impossible again, and that, so far as we are concerned, we are never going to make war again, and we put our hands to a solemn Treaty to that effect. That would do more to make clear our essential war aims than many speeches. I support the suggestion put forward by the hon. Member for Carlisle, (Mr. Denman), that the first real constructive need of war aim propaganda is to start and build, in the eyes of all mankind, at least the foundation of that League of Nations, and of that recon- struction of the international machine which President Wilson, and all Allied Statesmen, say is the means on which they will rely to make war impossible in the future, but which is very difficult for the uninstructed man in this country, or Allied countries, to fully understand until he can see in plain form the structure being built, and in that way realise our sincerity of purpose. If that were done, it would be a diplomatic offensive in the right direction, calculated to do-no possible harm to the cause of the Allies, but would, as a matter of fact, weaken and divide the enemy, and strengthen the resolution of our own people and of our own soldiers who are fighting at the front.
The speakers on this subject this afternoon have, I think, accepted the hint thrown out by the Foreign Secretary that it is impossible to conduct a discussion on this subject on the same lines as obtain in our discussions on domestic politics. Every Debate on foreign politics during the last three or four years has been conducted, in the main, in that spirit, and, therefore, the Foreign Secretary ought to be well satisfied with the form of this Debate, and the spirit which has animated every speaker. I hope the right hon. Gentleman's mind is receptive enough to take stock of the very useful hint which has just been made in the characteristic and interesting speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. McCurdy). In that speech, as well as in the speech made by the hon. Member for Carlisle, there found expression a feeling which is widespread throughout the country, and in quarters in which pacifist doctrines have never found a place that, along with the portentous and gigantic reorganisation of this country for military purposes of this War, there never has been a sufficient orientation of the mind of the Government towards the political issue. The Foreign Secretary told us, when we are discussing the political issues of the War, we must remember that they are not as domestic issues are, and that in them not only the British Government is concerned, but other Governments, over whom the British Government has no more than the influence of a friend, and sometimes not that, and that therefore anything said in relation to the political attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the diplomatic side of the War should always take into account the difficulty of conducting war in an Alliance.
That is perfectly true. Take, for instance, the specific issue out of which this Debate arose to-day. I do not believe that there would have been a Debate to-day on this subject if it had not been that practically every report which came to us from France offered different accounts of the negotiations launched by the Emperor Charles' letter to Prince Sixte, of Bourbon-Parma. But, though these accounts differ in many important respects, they all coincide in attributing to the British Prime Minister a special and peculiar part in those negotiations, and they all insist that the Prime Minister used his influence with the Prime Ministers of the Republic of France and. the Kingdom of Italy, to show that if a proposal of this sort was made it ought to be probed to the bottom, even though it turned out not to be based on good faith. That is very sound doctrine provided you know who you are dealing with, and the Government and the country knows quite well how to distinguish a purely diplomatic offensive of the kind described by the Foreign Secretary as a peace offensive from a bonâ fide offer of peace terms. I do not think the Foreign Secretary can complain that this Debate has been raised to-day because it has given him the opportunity of making several very important announcements. First, that the British Government has never been responsible for the initiation of any of these secret negotiations; secondly, that the Government has always insisted that, whenever proposals were made, and from whatever quarter they came, they should be treated on their merits, although the latest speech of the Minister of Blockade did not seem to indicate that that treatment had been meted out to every proposal that was made; and, thirdly, that whatever wild aims may have been attributed to other members of the Alliance the British Government has never countenanced them. I will never believe that the Alliance as a whole would countenance any extravagant aim. I have always understood that in relation to one or two agreements which were certainly open to criticism, there were at the time the agreements were made cogent reasons why they should be made, although sometimes the makers of them were unable to see their most distant and perhaps more disastrous results. Therefore, I do not wish for a moment to cavil at the Government for the course they took, and I think the House will agree with the decision arrived at by a small majority of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the French Chamber, that the offer conveyed through the Emperor Charles' letter to Prince Sixte was not one upon which a bonâ fide peace could have been founded. I think my hon. Friends were justified in concluding that there is not a sufficiently cohesive arid coherent method of dealing with these things when they arise. I have never been an advocate of open diplomacy in its cruder form, and, I believe, all negotiations must be initiated by private conversations, and there will be little suspicion of those private conversations if the public were assured that the main principles upon which the Government were operating had their full consent, and they would be still more confident of the final result if the diplomatic intentions and movements of the whole Alliance were guided by something like the same unity of control as exists in regard to the military. We have had declarations of the political side of the War from bodies which were really set up to deal with military affairs. I think that we are entitled to ask for something in the nature of a political council at Versailles. There is one substantial difficulty in the way, and it is germane to one of the questions which was asked by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Runciman). What position would the United States occupy in that respect? The United States is in the position of an Ally which has not yet signed the compact of London. It is, therefore, in a position in some way the most powerful of the belligerents, and is not bound exactly by the same compacts which govern the others. Until the United States comes into that compact it might be difficult to form a political council at Versailles, but I am quite sure, if a council of that sort could be formed, and if the Government were assured that its deliberations were governed by those principles which have been laid down over and over again by the principal leaders of the Alliance, both here and abroad, public opinion, as a whole, would be a great deal steadier than it sometimes shows signs of being, and would be able to support the Allied Governments in resisting every diplomatic offensive which was not based upon an honest purpose. I should like to say one word, not about the latest diplomatic offensive, but about the diplomatic offensive which has been conducted in one form or another ever since the Sixte letter was handed to M. Ribot. That letter has been discussed this afternoon, mainly as a means of dividing the Allies, and the offer made to M. Briand in Switzerland some months later was also discussed in that sense. I agree, but behind that motive there was surely a much greater one, and that was not to divide one Ally from the other, but to separate the problems of Eastern Europe from those of the West, and to try and persuade the democracies of the West that the result of the War will be that those ideals of public right and justice and freedom for nationalities, and so on, which have figured so often and so eloquently in the proclamations of our war aims, can obtain, if we will, west of the Rhine, but that east of the Rhine to Mesopotamia there shall obtain not the rule of right, but the rule of force as interpreted by German power. That seems to me to be the great lesson to be learned from all these offensives. I do not believe in the long run, things being as they are, that it will be possible for any diplomatic design of the Central Powers to separate one of our Allies from the rest, but I do believe, unless the Government take care to keep before the country the even greater issues which I have just mentioned, that when we do come to make peace, serious temptations will be offered to us to make peace on a basis upon which it will be absolutely impossible to establish the rule of right or law throughout Europe. You cannot hope for anything in the nature of that new international order which has just been so eloquently described, or even to lay the first stones of the foundation of that order, unless the peace which emerges from this War is a peace which establishes public law not only in Western Europe but also, and still more firmly, in Eastern Europe. The principles which we proclaimed at the beginning of the War of re-establishing the idea of public right are just as cogent, and infinitely more needed, in Eastern Europe than they are in Western Europe. I believe it is long since any man who has really studied the question closely doubted whether we should be able to release Belgium and restore her complete independence, both politically and economically, but it has taken all the four years' education of the War—and the education is not yet complete—to explain to people in this country that exactly the same issue for which we went to war in the Belgian case is at stake in every other crucial case in Eastern Europe. That argument can be addressed with the same success and the same confidence to practically every school of political thought in this country. I do not care whether you are a pure Imperialist, of, say, the "Morning Post" school, or whether you are a pure pacifist of the school of the Union of Democratic Control. A peace founded upon Macht Politik in Eastern Europe is equally disastrous to both. I should have thought by this time that we should be able to see in every diplomatic design of the Central Powers that master thread running through them all—namely, of establishing and garnering the fruits of all their victories in Eastern Europe at the comparatively small expense of yielding territory to which they have no right in Western Europe; and I express the hope with all the cogency at my command to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Blockade that the Government will take care whenever they discuss the diplomatic and political side of the War to accept the hints which have been offered by my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. McCurdy), and in particular to point out to the British people and all the democratic peoples of Western Europe, especially after the peace of Brest-Litovsk and the disastrous peace that the. Central Powers have imposed upon Roumania, that their outlook towards peace in the future is just as much at stake in Eastern Europe as in their own more comfortable and peaceful part in the West.It was with great pleasure that I listened to the speech of my hon. Friend, and I want to use additional arguments to force home his point. I have had no consultation with him whatever. I came here to-day convinced that a new point of view should be stated in this House. I was discussing the other day with an important diplomat the vitally important "question of what the war aims were to be, and I said to him" This War is becoming a struggle between President Wilson and the Round Table, "and he said" Yes; and it is the Round Table that will win" I want to put this to my hon. Friends of pacifist persuasion, because they without knowing it are so far as I can see in league with the Round Table scheme. Lord Milner and the others of that group, are, I think, anxious to secure a peace of adjustment, a peace which shall attain our aims in the West and leave the East out of account, which shall slice up tropical Africa and the German colonies without any regard to the native rights and any regard to anything but real politik, a peace which will preserve the dynasties, but deny the rights of democracies throughout the world. That peace will not be a real one. It will involve the burden of militarism upon all the peoples of the world till the next war comes. It is a negation of the idea of a League of Nations, because no League of Nations can be based upon an unjust peace which denies the rights of nationalities. You cannot have a League of Nations with an international police to prevent intervention and the altering of existing boundaries, if those boundaries are fundamentally and notoriously unjust. Therefore, this peace which may be offered to us any day now, a peace whereby the Western Powers will attain their aims, and a peace which will absolutely disregard any reopening of the Eastern question would be a disaster to the whole civilised world. It would be a peace which will not obtain the sanction and the guarantee of the American Republic.
The important thing—indeed, the vital thing—for us as Englishmen is to remember that any peace which is obtained must be a peace guaranteed by America. One thing that this War has done has been to unite the Anglo-Saxon race throughout the world. There is one way in which we can split that unity and revert to the prewar preparation, jealousy and rivalry between ourselves and America—that is, by accepting a peace which denies all that President Wilson has proposed or that he has advocated throughout these years of war; indeed, not merely since the outbreak of war, but before. If we are going to make the world safe for democracy, we have to back up President Wilson and his war aims rather than an adjusted peace, which will be a militaristic peace and which will saddle upon us Conscription, armaments, secret diplomacy, and all the curses of the Old World of which we are striving to get rid. The unfortunate thing is that in this country we speak with a divided voice. One knows that the bulk of the people of this country are in favour of President Wilson's terms. The Labour party have backed it up. I believe the Liberal party backs it right through, not only Liberal militarists like myself, but even pacifists like the hon. Member for Hanley (Mr. Outhwaite). The people of this country would sooner have President Wilson's war aims than the policy stated by either Front Bench in this House. The bulk of the population of this country, and, so far as I can see, the bulk of the population in France also, support President Wilson's war aims. We are in serious danger of being rushed by a secret diplomacy—not merely the diplomacy of our Foreign Office, but the diplomacy run in the "Garden" in Downing Street—into a peace which will perpetuate war, which will perpetuate kings, kingdoms, and aristocracies, and deny rights through all time to democracy throughout the world. We are up against that sort of diplomacy, with the weird combination of Lord Lansdowne, Mr. E. D. Morel, and Lord Milner. No one has a keener admiration for Lord Milner than I have, but I dislike his policy. If that weird combination were to settle a premature peace in this War, it would be a disaster to the whole of the forces of democracy in the world. We do not want to have an unsatisfactory peace. We have made sacrifices, we are prepared to make even more sacrifices if the peace is worth fighting for, but we are not going to be forced by the fear of revolution or by the fear of an Income Tax of 10s. in the £ to compound with our consciences and accept that which sells the rest of the democracy of Europe. I know that strong pressure will be brought when Germany enters the lists for peace to accept the status quo in the East, to accept the subjugation of the subject races in Austria, the subjection of Courland, Lithuania, Livonia, and of Poland, in order that we may get slices of territory in Africa. We do not want slices of territory in Africa. We want justice. Our men are lighting for that and not for militaristic aims. It is not the British Empire, but democracy which is the backbone of this War. I welcome the opportunity of stating here that the democracy of England, Liberal and Labour, is behind President Wilson and not behind the "Garden" in Downing Street. [An HON. MEMBER. "What about the Tories?"] The Tories are divided, but many of them are standing for democracy too, although many of them accept the nationalistic ideas of the Old World; they have stepped out of the reign of George III., and think that they can conduct the world in the twentieth century on those lines. We know that so far as our Allies are concerned the policy of America must prevail. It is no use blinking the fact. Why, then, should we go out of our way to advocate policies which America has turned down? In the East, particularly in connection with the Russian difficulty, America has throughout taken an absolutely democratic line, which results have shown to be in the interests of the whole Allied policy in this War. Would it not have been better if our Government had taken their cue more from America and less from other of our Allies? It is a difficult subject for me to touch upon, but I will say this, that the more the President of the United States comes out into the open and advocates and forces upon the rest of the Allies this policy, the more he will be supported by the democracy of Europe and the better it will be for our Government if they find out his views beforehand and back them up rather than accept dictation from other directions. We do not want to have any sort of controversy with America. They came into this War, just as we entered it, for purely altruistic reasons. We knew when we started in this War that we were not afraid of invasion by Germany. We went in to protect France and Belgium. America came in for the same reason, not because she was the least afraid about herself. She came in because she believed she was fighting for the cause of democracy and justice. [An HON. MEMBER:" How long did it take her to find it out?"] Perhaps longer than it took us. Distance from the scene of conflict makes a great deal of difference. America has come in on exactly the same lines as ourselves. She is not in this War to get anything for herself. I hope that we in this country are out to get nothing for ourselves, but all for democracy.The two last eloquent speeches have drawn the attention of the House to the position in the East of Europe. I propose, in accordance with the notice I have given, to call attention to the position in the Eastern States of Europe and to ask the Government to make a statement of their policy and aims. Those who are following anxiously but hopefully affairs in Russia and those countries which were previously part of Russia may have observed in the "Times" this morning an account of a speech delivered yesterday by Sir George Buchanan, our recent Ambassador in Petrograd, which gives some ground for hope, especially as Sir George Buchanan, in the course of his remarks, stated that he brought to the meeting he was addressing a message from the Foreign Secretary. There cannot, then, be any doubt that he was speaking not merely from the position of one who had held high office in Petrograd under our Foreign Office, but that he also was in immediate touch with the Foreign Secretary on this matter. In the course of his remarks he said:
Sometimes I am almost afraid to think the fact has not penetrated into the minds of British Statesmen at the Foreign Office, because recently we have had no public sign—I hope something has been going on behind the scenes—that we are offering any material help, encouragement or hope to the Russian people, and it is because I want to face facts and to suggest methods by which we could do this that I am speaking to-day. First of all, are we facing the true facts, not as they are represented by the "Times" Newspaper or Reuter's correspondent, but as we may gather them from the organs of neutral opinion and from the best informed persons who have recently returned from Russia and elsewhere in the East? The-facts are, of course, first of all, that the strength of the present Bolshevik Government is greater than ever. When it was established early in November, 1917, it was the opinion of the newspapers, again and again repeated, and apparently even the opinion of official circles here, that the Bolsheviks would fall, as the five previous Governments of Russia had done, in the course of a week or two. That Government has lasted for six months, and now even the "Times" newspaper is reporting that Lenin, Trotsky, and the Bolsheviks are stronger than ever. Some of us, especially if we have Russian bonds, may not like that prospect, but let us face the facts, and if the Bolsheviks have esta- blished a strength which no other Government since the Tsar had, if the prospect of being turned out is as remote as ever— more remote than it has been before—the obvious conclusion is that we must in some form or other, sooner or later, recognisen the Bolshevik Government as the de facto Government of the country. I believe we can afford to do so if we move on dignified and cautious lines, for one thing is evident. The Bolsheviks are at present modifying and moderating their policy in certain most important respects. They are so modifying their policy as almost to invite us to step in and help them. A little time ago there was nothing but the State bank and the Cooperative bank, but now actually private banks are being enabled to open their doors. That is a great advance, and though no doubt it is under great restrictions it suggests the possibility of the opening of foreign trade and the use of capital apart from strict Socialist control, which we have not had before. That is a remarkable sign. Another is the development of a regular army. The Bolshevik Force, the Red Guards, let us suppose, have been a tatterdemalion crew. Let us suppose they have been lacking in the usual order and discipline of an army. But now there is growing up a definitely organised, better equipped, better officered army than there has been certainly since the early days of the Revolution. Probably the Russian armies which are being formed, and are growing up now, will have the prospect of being stronger in another few weeks for even offensive operations against the Germans than before. That is a matter which is difficult to decide on the evidence that we have, but we still retain our military mission in Russia. I suggest to our authorities that close inquiries as to the progressing organisation of the Russian Army at present might be made by our military authorities. Another point which is very remarkable in connection with recent Bolshevik policy is that the Bolsheviks are now taking into their Soviets others than men who have been manual labourers. At first there was almost a tendency to reject anyone who was not engaged in actual labour. Now intellectuals are coming in in much greater numbers, especially teachers and professors, and the result is that the Bolshevik Government is getting an intellectual force of men of university training in a measure which it never had before, and its prospect of organising the country and developing its resources, and getting a real moral and intellectual force behind the Government, is much greater at present than it was. That being so, can we not make some approach to the Bolshevik Government? I believe if our Foreign Office had ever really thought the Bolsheviks would have been in their present position six months ago they would not have cut themselves off from relations with them so hopelessly as they did. They did not expect their life to be so prolonged. They did not expect that the Germans, brutal as that military power is, would behave with such callous disregard of their own word and with such public brutality as that with which they treated the Russians. We have all been deceived in these respects, but are there not grounds now why we should come very near to having good relations with the Bolshevik Government? It will mean some amount of restraint and possibly some amount of humiliation for us who have imprisoned Chicherin, the present Foreign Minister, and other great and eminent Bolsheviks within the last few months. It is very difficult, but let us accept our humiliation and do it manfully. After all, if we have committed a fault, do not let us tell lies to make people believe we have never done so. Let us face the fact that we must admit our errors. 4.0. P.M. I will now make some practical suggestions. Having discussed these matters with persons of much greater experience and weight than myself, I make them personally. Act in the closest accord with President Wilson. His remarkable message to the Russians at the time the Brest-Litovsk negotiations had to be accepted and their conclusions faced did an immense amount of good in giving hope to the Russians from America. Let us act in that same spirit here and as closely as possible in the same accord. The second thing I want to suggest is that whether we recognise the Bolshevik Government or not, we should immediately send some sympathtic person to represent us in. Russia. The French have a Minister there who is not very sympathetic. The Americans have a Minister, but he is not fully accredited—Mr. Francis. We might send someone with higher authority and position than Mr. Lockhart. We have a representative in Petrograd now, Mr. Lockhart, who is simply entrusted with the care of the interests of British subjects, but he has no diplomatic position. The personal qualifications of Mr. Lockhart are very high, but I would like to suggest that we sent someone who has a. very close sympathy with Labour and internationalism. It was a good move months ago to send the right hon. Member for Barnard Castle to Russia, but the treatment that his suggestions and policy received when he came back almost did away, and probably more than did away, with the wisdom in sending him. Whoever we send, let us send someone who will be personally sympathetic towards the Russian people. If possible, I would suggest, without any disrespect, that we should not send one of the old diplomatic servants. Discourage, as far as possible, offences against the Russians here. Let us recognise that the Russians have different ideals, different mentalities, and a different angle, as the Foreign Secretary himself has said, from ourselves. Do discourage attacks—wild, wicked, and malicious attacks—on Russians here. The way in which the Russians have been spoken of in some of the great organs of the Press as if they were all traitors to the Allied cause, and as if they were all ready to accept so much money from the Germans or anybody else for any purpose, is offensive and does absolutely no good. One or two expressions have been used by Ministers—I will not recall them, but I have them most distinctly in mind—which can be nothing but most offensive to the Russian people as a whole. A very well-known Oxford professor (M. Paul Vino-gradoff) only a few weeks ago expressed in quite strong language the shame he felt that Russia was being, as he said, blackguarded by large sections of the English people. I have made practical suggestions, and I hope I have made nothing but what can be called a hopeful speech. I recognise that we have all made mistakes in this War, and all of our Governments, if they could only go back, how differently they would have managed affairs! Of all the mistakes that are obvious, there is none so great as our mistaken policy in the last few months towards Russia; but there is no mistake that we have made which I believe at the present moment we can so easily and honourably go back upon and, if not retrace our steps, at any rate strike out on a new line. I do urge upon the Government that every means should be taken, if not by an immediate recognition of the Soviet Government, yet by stages in close accord with our Allies, and especially with President Wilson, to gain that end which we all have constantly in view."Russia had now been split up into a number of republics. He hoped that in the end she would be stronger than ever. We must not disinterest ourselves in Russia because of what had happened recently, for if we did so it would allow her to fall completely under German domination. If Germany was allowed to control Russia's enormous Empire and her vast natural resources of unexploited wealth, she would become the mistress of the East, and whatever conditions were imposed in the West, then Germany would have won the War. He was afraid this fact had not penetrated into the minds of the British public.'
I do not rise for the purpose of dealing with the point which has been so well put by my hon. friend, but I do express the very earnest hope that when the Under-Secretary replies he will be able to give a favourable response to the appeal made by my hon. Friend. I think it is to be regretted that no opportunity was given to any Member sitting on these benches, who were described more than once by the Foreign Secretary as the pacifist group, to reply on the question which was introduced by the right hon. Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Runciman). I think the results of that part of our Debate are likely to be very good. We had a number of admissions from the Foreign Secretary which even those who sit on these benches must regard as satisfactory, and I hope the policy of the Government in future will be in harmony with the declarations and promises that the Foreign Secretary made. The right hon. Gentleman stated that it was most important that there should be complete confidence between the whole of the members of the alliance. On the Foreign Secretary's own admissions this afternoon in regard to the Emperor of Austria's letter, that policy was not carried out It is perfectly clear from the admissions of the right hon. Gentleman that there was a want of confidence on the part of certain of the Allies towards other members of the Alliance. It was admitted by the right hon. Gentleman that one of the most imporant members of the Alliance was not informed of these negotiations. There was one very remarkable omission from the statement made by the Foreign Secretary about these Austrian negotiations. The right hon. Member for Dewsbury put a number of questions, and most of these were answered categorically by the Foreign Secretary, but one, perhaps the most important of all. was either accidentally or wilfully ignored by the Foreign Secretary. The right hon. Member for Dewsbury asked why these negotiations broke down, and whether it was because it was impossible to satisfy the territorial demands of certain of the Allies. In the Foreign Secretary's speech the name of Baron Sonnino was not once introduced. If any reliance is to be placed upon statements which have appeared in the British newspapers it was because of the dissatisfaction of Italy as well as the extreme demands of France that these at one time very promising negotiations broke down.
I want to put this further question. The late Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) concluded his speech by saying that he hoped there would be no expansion of the original war aims of this country. What were the original war aims of this country? They were stated very often by the right hon. Gentleman himself in the early days of the War. The original war aims of this country were the restitution and the independence of Belgium and the restitution not only of Belgium politically but economically and also the restitution of Serbia and Montenegro. I do not think there is even amongst those who are called pacifists anyone who would not regard these aims as being aims which this country must have in view in a peace settlement. The late Prime Minister was of opinion that these original war aims should still remain the only aims for which this country continued in the Alliance and in the War. Therefore, I put this question. Are these the only war aims to which this country is committed at the present time? I think it is perfectly clear from what we do know, and from what we have reason to believe, that those negotiations which were initiated by the Emperor Karl a little more than twelve months ago broke down because demands were made by certain of our Allies which went far beyond the original war aims of this country. We were specially glad to hear the Foreign Secretary this afternoon disassociate himself from the demand which it is said has been made by the French President for what it is called the old 1814 or 1790 boundary between France and Germany. I do not know how the disclaimer of the Foreign Secretary will be received by Monsieur Clemenceau, but the declarations which have been made by the French Premier and by his predecessor in regard to the Allies' aims are much more extensive than those which have received the authority of any member of the British Government, not excluding even, I believe, the Prime Minister himself. So far as our information goes the grounds on which these negotiations broke down were, first, the demand of France that the old boundaries of more than a century ago should be restored, and, second, the demands of Italy. If our information is correct the larger measure of blame, notwithstanding the unreasonable and impossible demands put forward by the French President, appears to attach to Italy. The Foreign Secretary deprecated the discussion of matters in this House in which our Allies were equally interested. But we are equally interested in these matters, and perhaps we are more interested than any one of our Allies, because we have a heavier financial responsibility for this War, and we are paying just as great a toll, if not a greater toll, of human life, than any one of our Allies is paying at the present time. Therefore, we have a. right to discuss this question, and the people of this country who are finding this treasure and making these appalling sacrifices of human life—according to the War Office returns yesterday we had 7,500 casualties—have a right to be informed on these questions and to know for what purpose these lives are being sacrificed, and to know—to use the expression of the late Prime Minister—whether they are fighting for the original war aims of this country or for war aims which have been considerably and unreasonably expanded. It is stated that the Prime Minister was at one time quite favourable to the, perhaps I ought not to say acceptance, but, at any rate, the full consideration of the Austrian proposals. Why did he afterwards change his mind? It said that Prince Sixte came to this country and saw the Prime Minister, and the Prime-Minister appears to have been favourably impressed by his statement. Then he went to France and changed his views. Now I protest altogether against the influence that Italy appears to be exercising on the counsels of the Allies. Italy came into this War for no high moral purpose. Italy was bribed to come into this War. [An HON. MEMBER: "Nonsense!"] We have it in black and white. The terms that were offered to Italy to join the Allies were most unreasonable and most outrageous. It appears that this War is to continue and that lives are to be sacrificed in order that Italy may obtain these unreasonable demands. I want to know if, when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife said he hoped there would be no expansion of the original war aims of this country, he meant that the secret treaties ought to be repudiated, because the promises made in these secret treaties far transcend the original war aims of this country, and go far beyond anything which the people of this country were led to believe was the object for which they were called upon to give their treasure and sacrifice their lives. This War should not be continued for a single day to satisfy the selfish Imperialistic ambitions of Italy. I was glad to hear the Foreign Secretary's repudiation of the extreme and unreasonable demands of France. I hope that we may have, if not this afternoon, at any rate before long, an equally emphatic repudiation of the Imperialistic war aims of Italy. I was delighted to hear the Foreign Secretary say that it would be very unwise to reject any offer of peace negotiation without inquiring into its character and the possibility of its soundness and honesty, but it seems to me not at all consistent with an act which the Undersecretary perpetrated two or three weeks ago. It seems to be a favourite medium of the Under-Secretary, for the announcement of his views and the enunciation of his policy, to call in a newspaper reporter. The representative of Reuter's agency appears to be specially favoured as a medium for the communication of the right hon. Gentleman's views as to foreign questions and policy. He gave an interview to the representative of Reuter about a fortnight ago. That interview must have been arranged beforehand. It is quite certain that the representative of Reuter did not happen to be walking past the Foreign Office and decide that he would go in to see the Under-Secretary and ascertain if there was anything which he would like to communicate. It goes without saying that that interview was an arranged interview, and it was given with a very definite object. There had been rumours for some time of a likely peace offensive by Germany, if I may use the right hon. Gentleman's words to describe a peace offer. It had been understood that the, I will not say representative of a neutral country, but a man from a neutral country, was in this country at the time, and that there were informal negotiations, and it was in an atmosphere like that that the right hon Gentleman gave his interview. It might be very difficult to point to a line in the report of that interview on which the right hon. Gentleman said that any offer which came from Germany would be rejected because it would not be genuine, but that is the only possible interpretation of the interview as a whole. I think I can point to actual words in the interview which convey the impression that if the offer came it would be a dishonest offer, not made in the interests of a genuine peace but merely a move in order to deceive the Germans themselves, and to restore the drooping spirits of the German people. There was in a Sunday newspaper the day after the report of the interview which the right hon. Gentleman gave to Reuters' representative what appeared to be an inspired article dealing with this question. It dotted the i's and crossed the t's of the interview, and it really put into plain language what I think any unprejudiced reader of the interview would have regarded as its proper construction. This article said there had been a conflict between the militarist clique and the politicians in Germany in which the militarists had come out on top, and this reported peace offer was an attempt on the part of Von Kuhlmann to pacify the other side. Surely if that were the object any offer of peace which came from Germany ought to be heartily welcome. But the effect of the interview which the right hon. Gentleman gave could only be to cement together all these different cliques in Germany and to prevent the divorcing of the civilian from the military element in that empire. That, indeed, has been the disastrous effect of the whole diplomatic policy of this country during these three and a-half years of appalling warfare. Apart from the fact that I do not think it is a proper thing for an Under-Secretary to make pronouncements of this character through newspaper interviews—the right hon. Gentleman gives newspaper interviewers information that he disdainfully refuses to the House of Commons—I say that the nature of this interview and the character of the statements of the right hon. Gentlemen were altogether deplorable in their effect in Germany, as was shown by the German reply a few days later. I regret very much that the interview was given, and I hope we may take the statement made by the Foreign Secretary this afternoon that any offers that may come will be carefully and dispassionately considered—I hope we may regard that statement as an implied censure on the right hon. Gentleman for what he said at that interview.The hon. Gentleman who has just addressed the House never speaks without sounding a certain recriminatory note, but I shall endeavour to avoid as far as may be imitating his very bad example. It is a little difficult sometimes. With regard to the question of the interview which he has raised, I am glad to have an opportunity of explaining very shortly the actual facts in connection with it, as the interview has been, apparently, very much misunderstood. I have already stated in this House that I was asked to give a weekly interview to American journalists. That was begun before America came into the War, and it was represented that it would be a useful thing to enable American correspondents to put questions to me on blockade and other matters, and if I thought it possible to give information I should do so. I have persisted in that practice ever since. I quite recognise that there are certain objections possible to that course. But it was begun and has been continued with the full approval and sanction of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and of other members of the present Government who are specially concerned in such matters. For my part, I have always thought it desirable—and I understood it was the view of hon. Members who sit on that bench—that diplomacy should be carried on as far as possible in public, and that the greatest possible information should be given to the public regarding diplomatic matters as can safely be conveyed. I should have thought that this humble attempt on my part would have met with their approval, but it seems to be otherwise. Certainly the object of the interviews is not to lay down policy, but to give information.
What happened in this particular case was this. The moment it began I asked, "What subject is it you desire to discuss to-day?" Immediately one of the gentlemen present replied, "The peace offensive," and it was in consequence of that observation that I thereupon explained the view I held, rightly or wrongly, as to the situation, which seemed to render it very likely that the Germans would conduct a so-called peace offensive. What is meant by a "peace offensive"? I am amazed there should be any misapprehension on the subject. It is treated as if it were some kind of peace offer. It is entirely different. The object of a peace offensive—the nature of a peace offensive—is diplomatic or semi-diplomatic action, not with the view of producing peace, but with a view of promoting war. It is intended to be of indirect diplomatic assistance to the German army in the field. That is what I thought likely to happen. I am not going to repeat the interview to the House; I merely stated what I thought was very likely to occur in that connection. There seemed to me to be certain signs of that being likely to happen, and I explained what I thought they were and what I thought likely to happen in that connection. As to the suggestion of the hon. Member that I intended or conveyed to anybody, except the hon. Member and those who think as he does of myself and of members of the Government, that any offer from Germany would necessarily be rejected, there is not a word I uttered that could be so construed by any fair-minded man; and I do not think it was so construed. I adhere most fully to what was said by my right hon. Friend this afternoon, that if any offer is made coming from a quarter which may be regarded as reasonably trustworthy it deserves examination and consideration from the present Government, because we, at any rate, are as desirous of peace even as the hon. Member for Blackburn. There is only one other observation I desire to make on this interview, and it is this: It was said to have some relation to the presence of a neutral in this country. I want to explain quite clearly that it had no connection at all with the presence of that gentleman in this country. I did not know at the time that he was here, and I only heard of it afterwards. It had no reference at all to his presence of any sort or kind. I regret very much, because it may seem somewhat discourteous to him, that anything I said should be construed as having any reference to his presence. With the rest of the hon. Gentleman's speech I do not propose to deal. My right hon. Friend spoke on the subject of the Emperor Karl's letter, and I do not think it would be useful or desirable for me to add anything to what he has said. He was fortunate enough to secure the approval of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife (Mr. Asquith), and I can face with some equanimity the fact that he did not win an equal approval from the hon. Member for Blackburn. But the Member for Blackburn did make one observation which I must repudiate with all the strength I can muster. He chose to make a perfectly undeserved and baseless attack on one of our Allies. For what purpose he did it, except to assist and comfort the enemy, I cannot imagine. I am very reluctant to believe that was his reason, but he perpetually does it. It is not an accidental lapse from the proper responsibility of a Member of Parliament. He perpetually does it when he intervenes in these Debates, and to attack one of our Allies at this period of the War in the way that attack was made is an action which does not appear to me capable of any defence whatever. For my part I desire to say, though it is scarcely necessary to say it, that we utterly repudiate and disagree with it, and believe that the aims of Italy-are as high and as pure as those of any other belligerent in the War. We value her assistance to the highest possible degree, and are as determined to maintain our alliance with her as with any other of the Allies. I pass very shortly to some other observations made in the course of the Debate. The hon. Member for Carlisle (Mr. Denman) and several other hon. Members were anxious that we should make use of what he described as a diplomatic offensive, by which I understood him to mean that we should carry on propaganda in enemy countries describing the reasonableness of our war aims, and matters of that kind. As the hon. Member said he did not expect me to deal in any detail with that question, I hope he will be satisfied with my assurance that that side of our activities is not lost sight of, and we are doing all we can in that direction. As to the other suggestion that we should have at Versailles a diplomatic council, I confess I have more doubts. The object he has in view has my entire sympathy. I quite agree that nothing is more important than the complete unity of the Allies, and I adhere most readily to what was said by several speakers that it is of the utmost possible importance that we should keep in the closest touch and agreement with President Wilson. I am not sure that the establishment of permanent representatives at some centre would really do more than we can do by our existing machinery. After all, my hon. Friend must not forget that on the diplomatic side we have elaborate machinery for being represented at the various Courts of all the Powers, and wherever the centre of interest happens to be they can put the aims of the Allies. On the whole, I believe that system will be more likely to produce unification than the attempt to set up a kind of International Foreign Office, which is, I believe, what the hon. Member has in view. After all, he must not forget that when it comes to great questions of policy, the determining of what course any particular country should pursue, that country will always insist on that decision being taken at the seat of government of the country. They will never delegate to any representative, however important, in some foreign centre questions on which may hang the future prosperity, or even the future existence, of the country in question. At the same time, I can assure the hon. Member that if there is anyway in which we can promote a closer co-operation of the Allies, I shall be very glad indeed to see that proposal carried out. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Lees-Smith), my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Colonel Wedgwood), and the hon. Member for North. Somerset (Mr. King), were all very anxious that we should hold out a hand to Russia, as it were, and should recollect that we have as great an obligation to secure justice in the East of Europe as we have in the West. That was, I think, the point of my hon. Friend the Member for Perth (Mr. Whyte). I quite agree with him. We have no quarrel with Russia at all. On the contrary, with the Russian people we have always desired to be on the closest terms of friendship. We have suffered, and we cannot deny it, great disappointment and great loss from the course which Russian politics has pusued. No one can get over that fact. But we are anxious to do all we can to assist and support the Russian people in their difficulty, and to preserve Russia as a great country, not only now, but for the period after this War. I think the hon. Member opposite (Mr. King) has a kind of idea that we have, as it were, some personal or political quarrel with the Bolsheviks, arising, not,. I think, from the direction of their foreign policy, but from some disapproval we may have of their domestic policy. I assure the hon. Member he is entirely mistaken. In our view the domestic policy of Russia is a matter for Russia and Russia alone. Whatever Government the Russians desire to have, the Russians ought to have, and it is not for us to interfere in any way in that matter.Will the Noble Lord make it quite clear that he includes action with regard to foreign loans as part of their domestic policy or as part of their foreign policy?
I do not want to go into any unnecessary details.
But is not that vital?
What I desire to emphasise, with deference to the hon. Member, is that we have no quarrel with the Bolsheviks, but we wish to see Russia preserved as an Allied country, or, if that be impossible, as a non-German one. That is the great foundation stone of our policy. We have no other wish at all; we only desire to see Russia a great and powerful non-German nation. These are the observations I desire to make on that point. Many other things have been said in the course of the Debate, and I do not know that I have very much to reply to. Two of my hon. Friend's spoke with great anxiety about the League of Nations, and I can add nothing to what has been said frequently in this House as to the desirability of establishing that league. I do not agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, that we can disregard all territorial questions. After all, territorial questions are at the base of most wars that have taken place. Though I am a convinced and passionate adherent of the idea of a League of Nations, I am also convinced that it will have no chance of success, no chance of useful work in Europe, unless it is established on the basis of justice, and not on the basis of a territorial arrangement, which is not likely to endure. Merely to establish such a league as that, with the inflammable material there is now in Europe as there has been in the past, to establish a League of Nations on existing occupations in Europe, would be to place it on a basis which I am afraid would not do anything to preserve the permanent peace of Europe, which would be the merest deception and delusion, and which would lead not to peace, but to further struggle, and probably cause an increase rather than a diminution of the danger of wars in the future.
Members in all parts of the House will agree that we have had to-day a Debate which will serve a most useful purpose. The speeches of the Foreign Secretary and of the Noble Lord, who has just sat down, have done a great deal to clear the air. I think misapprehensions were rather more rife than the Noble Lord thinks with respect to his interview on what has been called the "peace offensive." That phrase is an unhappy phrase, and it is a good thing to- day that the Noble Lord and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, who preceded him, have made it abundantly clear that the mind of the British Government is always open to approaches from belligerent Powers that are likely to be of an acceptable character. Of course, we must be continuously on our guard against propositions which are calculated to divide one Ally from another. Just as Hindenburg and Ludendorff are endeavouring to thrust a military wedge between the French and British Armies, so may we expect that it will be sought to thrust a diplomatic wedge between the British and the French Councils. It is an absolute truism that the more Allies you have, the easier it is to make war, and the more difficult it is to make peace. They necessarily have to some extent divergent views, which it is a task of extreme difficulty and delicacy to reconcile. They can only be reconciled if we proceed on one-great clear principle, plainly expressed, unswervingly followed, and that can only be that we are fighting, not on mere questions of territory, but for the establishment of a new world-order.
That, I venture to say, has been the keynote, at any rate, of the speeches in the later part of the Debate. One after another Members, and chief of all the noble Lord who has just sat down, have emphasised that aspect of the present world struggle. The hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr. Snowden), asked whether my right hon. Friend (Mr. Asquith) was content to limit himself, in his declaration of our war aims, to a specific list of territorial changes which the hon. Member enumerated. Let me remind him that my right hon. Friend the Member for East Fife has laid down, as the chief of our war aims, the attainment of security. Security cannot be attained without the establishment of a new world-order. That world-order must be based upon justice, and how are you to define international justice? It can only be defined in this way: Wherever you have a people which possesses national characteristics, which is capable of forming and declaring its national will, that people must be conceded the right to be governed according to its own ideas, and not according to an outside authority, imposed upon it by force. That is the principle which must be adopted in regard to Eastern, as much as to Western, Europe. It must be in Poland as well as. Alsace-Lorraine and the Trentino, and, if I may improve the hour, I would suggest that it must be applied in Ireland -as much as in Bohemia. This world of -order, if it is to be secure, must be guaranteed by the League of Nations of which, like the noble Lord, I declare myself to be an adherent. Our enemy must know that in no circumstances will we accept a peace based on anything else than that. Our Allies already know that neither for ourselves nor for them, are we willing to fight for any more than that. I venture to suggest to my hon. Friends below the Gangway that they are really the truest friends of peace who are determined not to lay down their arms until that object has at last been attained. Otherwise, the old conditions will continue and increase, and war following upon war, until, it may be, that the world will at last fall back into the chaos of the Dark Ages. This great struggle must be settled now, and once and for all. We have repeated these declarations again and again in order that there may be a clear and perfect understanding.Home Situation
There are some observations which I wish to make on the present political situation in this country, and in this House, and in its bearing to the war position. It is contended that the criticisms which have been directed against certain authorities in the Government indicates a weakening of the determination of those who are responsible for those criticisms to carry the War to a successful issue. It has been suggested in many quarters that the controversy of last Thursday was really an issue for or against the vigorous prosecution of the War. One would be inclined to ignore assertion of that kind, if they did not come from authoritative quarters, and have recently apparently received, at all events, to some extent, the endorsement of so distinguished a statesman as Lord Curzon. There have been criticisms of the Government. They have been mainly on three lines. In the first place, it has been said there have been several defects in their administration of domestic affairs; that the problem of man-power was, in effect, neglected all through the critical year 1917; that there has been a comparative failure, which still continues, in the shipbuilding programme—a most vital matter; that there is frequently conflict and com- petition between the various Departments of the State; that our expenditure has increased from £2,000,000,000 to £3,000,000,000 per year within a period of eighteen months; that there are prolonged delays in dealing with many of the problems relating to food control, and other matters.
Those of us who have made these criticisms have gone on to point out what we regard as their cause, and the possible remedy for these defects. We consider that the War Cabinet has assumed a burden of work that is beyond the capacity of any so small a group of men to carry, not through any lack of capacity or application on the part of those Members, but because they have undertaken a burden which is in itself too heavy to bear. Engaged as they are in supervising the whole operations of the War by sea and land, our relations with our Allies and our Dominions, with India, with neutrals, attending, as many of them have to do frequently, international conferences, busy with the immense volume of work that attaches to these large matters that come before them, they have, nevertheless, undertaken to deal with all domestic problems as well —labour problems, Ireland, food, manpower, domestic legislation of every kind. Is it to be wondered at that there is a continual and extreme congestion of business? Only last week we were told, in answer to a question in this House, that there had been submitted to this body the question of whether or not a limited amount of flour should be released for the purpose of making dog biscuits, and, on the same day, we were told that the War Cabinet had not yet given its decision on the matter of whether or not horse-racing should be discontinued. Of course they have not. How could they be expected to divert their attention from these large matters of vital importance to read the papers and come to their conclusions on horse racing or dog biscuits? We have urged that the machinery of government is working badly because it is not complete, that in addition to the War Cabinet you ought to have something in the nature of a Home Cabinet to deal with these comparatively minor matters. Having come to that conclusion, whether right or wrong, I submit it is our duty to state those views to the House, because good administration at home, frugal finance, an effective manage- ment of such problems as shipbuilding and man-power, are essential to the effective prosecution of the War.
The second line of criticism which has developed in recent weeks has relation to Conscription an Ireland. I do not propose to argue that subject now. I have dealt with it before, and I dare say I may have an opportunity of speaking on it again when it comes in concrete and immediate form before the House. We believe the Government, in dealing with this matter, are on wrong lines, that the course they have taken is not likely to add to the number of our Armies available for service at the front, but is calculated, so far as one can at present foresee, to reduce the numbers available. We hold, more important than that, that it injures profoundly our moral position in the face of the world, and that if the Government adopt in Ireland Austrian methods they will find our moral international position tends to be reduced to something approaching the Austrian level. Above all. the action which they seem likely to take in Ireland does run directly counter to the supreme principle on behalf of which we are waging this War, the necessity that people should be governed according to their own desires. Again we may be right, again we may be wrong; but I submit to hon. Members of all shades of political opinion that if we hold sincerely this view we should be doing less than our duty if we did not take such opportunities as are offered to impress it on this House. The third line of criticism relates to the relations of the Government to their military and naval advisers. There have been a series of controversies, misunderstandings, explanations, resignations, dismissals, which have given rise to a widespread uneasiness in very many quarters, and not least among military men. On each of these occasions it may well be that the action of the Government was fully justified, and I should be very far indeed from saying that any distinguished general or admiral has a freehold of his office. Of course changes may often be necessary, and may frequently be very salutary. The fact remains that the way in which these questions have been handled one by one has done something to sap confidence. The matter came prominently before this House a week ago, in consequence of the letter written to the Press by General Maurice. I cannot conceal my own
opinion that that letter ought never to have been written, but, having been written, the House of Commons was, I think, bound to take cognisance of it. It is exceedingly unfair and unjust to suggest that in bringing the matter before this House those who did so were actuated by any irresolution with regard to the conduct of the War or any desire to weaken its prosecution. The "Times,"' which will not be suspected of tendencies of that kind, speaking of this matter, said:
"That is a challenge, coming from such a quarter, which no Government can afford to ignore or merely to rebut. Unless and until it is impartially investigated and disproved it will profoundly shake the public confidence in every statement made from the Treasury Bench. What is more, it will revive for that period all those mischievous controversies of last winter, which, whatever their merits, were themselves the greatest stumbling-block in our preparations for the German offensive."
The same article further down went on:
"Least of all can they be settled finally by any ex-parte statement, however apparently convincing, from the Prime Minister himself. Mr. Lloyd George should be under no illusions whatever on that point. He has, we believe, an unanswerable case in his instinctive zeal and pressure for what we have called the Allied point of view. For all we know, he may have an equally unanswerable case against General Maurice's specific charges. But the inevitable restrictions of a speech on military dispositions, the growing public distrust of all official statements (whether by generals or by Ministers) "
I will omit some words which are perhaps unduly critical of the Prime Minister—
"all this makes it hopeless that there should be any end of this controversy except through an entirely disinterested inquiry."
What occurred? On Tuesday the Government came to the House and declared that an inquiry was desirable. On Thursday they held that any question of an inquiry was something in the nature of treason to the vigorous prosecution of the War. On Tuesday my right hon. Friend told us all that the matter could only be decided by a reference to documents so secret that they could not be disclosed even to a Select Committee of this House. Two days later the House as a whole was asked to judge the matter without any documents before them at all. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] We had no opportunity of seeing documents. We were told that there could not be found in this House five righteous men—worse even than the City of Sodom—and yet the whole House was asked to judge the issue in open Debate on a Motion which was declared, although its movers did not intend it, to be a vote of censure, the Government Whips telling in the Lobby.
And the Opposition Whips.
5.0 p.m
The Opposition Whips told also, but we should have been very glad to have taken them off if you had done the same and left it open to the House. Not only that, but one very large section of the House met in. conference on the day previous to the Debate, and decided to support the Government, not only without probing the charges that had been made, but without even waiting to hear what the Government answer might be, and the newspapers on the morning of the Debate declared, quite truly, that the Government majority was assured before any answer had been offered. I have never known a case in which a matter of this gravity and importance has been more unsatisfactorily handled. Those are the three main lines of criticism which have been addressed against the Government in recent weeks. It has been suggested that the Division on Thursday was intended to secure, or might have the effect of securing, the installation in power of a Government less resolute than the present Government in the prosecution of the War, who would hasten to make peace on such terms as the Germans and Austrians might now be likely to offer us. If that had been the outcome of that Debate or Division, or if that had been likely to become the outcome of that Debate or Division, I can assure the House that not one of us would have made one step towards the Lobby in order to secure such a result. If the outcome of it should be that we should make peace with our present enemies on such lines that they who have been guilty of this great aggression against the peace of the world, which has resulted in deluging Europe with blood and bringing agonies of sorrow to millions of homes—if the outcome of it should be that those powers should not be penalised for this aggression, but should be aggrandised and regarded—if the outcome should be that militarism could claim to be justified by its proofs, then, I say, those who were responsible for such as that would be guilty of the greatest crime. For my own part, I am profoundly convinced that no Government of that kind could be formed in this country at the present time, and, if it could be formed, this House would eject it from office in a week, and, if this House neglected to perform that clear duty, an indignant public opinion would sweep it aside. Is it a service to the country to represent that my right hon. Friend the Member for East Fife and his colleagues and the great central body of Liberalism are careless in these matters, and are willing to make a peace of that character? The Germans are carefully watching what we say and do, and I think it is a grave disservice to our State to give their propaganda material of that character and quite falsely to represent that the only unity which has prevailed and, I say, still prevails, in the country on all the essential purposes is now in danger of disappearing.
Royal Assent
Message to attend the Lords Commissioners.
The House went, and, having returned, Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:
Workmen's Compensation (Illegal Employment) Act, 1918.
Post Office Act, 1918.
Defence of the Realm (Food Profits) Act, 1918.
Local Government Board Provisional Order Confirmation (No. 1) Act, 1918.
Land Drainage (Lotting Fen) Provisional Order Confirmation Act, 1918.
Nitrate Railways Company, Limited, Act, 1918.
Whitsuntide Recess (Adjournment)
Question again proposed, "That this House, at its rising this day, do adjourn till Tuesday, the 28th May."
( resuming)
When the House was interrupted I was drawing my remarks to a close. I have a few more sentences which I should like to address, if I may, to the House. I was suggesting that they are doing no real service to this country who exaggerate the points of difference between us, and do not rather emphasise the essential unity which still exists. We may be quite sure that the Germans are very carefully watching the movements of public opinion in the country, and of politics in this House, and that their propaganda will eagerly seize -upon any statements which tend to show that there is a weakening in our purposes, and that our endurance is approaching its limit. I venture to suggest that the articles which have appeared in some of the ultra-patriotic papers of this country have been likely to furnish German propagandist agencies with the best material they have had for some time past. It would be better in the interests of the country to emphasise—as recently did my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham—the fact that in all essentials we all stand together at this time as we did at the beginning of the War, rather than falsely to assert that such criticisms as there have been indicate a weakening of our purposes.
I am led to make these observations because of the anxiety that must to some extent, be caused by this situation on the Army. If the Army is led to feel that some turn of the political wheel may result in a Government being installed in office which would surrender the main purposes for which we are fighting—nothing, I conceive, would be more likely to take the heart out of them than that. We are so accustomed to regard the valour of our soldiers as a matter of course: we are so accustomed to read the story of their heroism, that we have almost come to assume that their steadfastness can be taken for granted. I have no doubt that that steadfastness will remain unimpaired in all circumstances. But our Armies may be subjected in the very near future—next week, this week—to the severest of all tests, and it is not a light thing for men remaining in their trenches under, first a deluge of shells, then drenched with poisonous invisible gas, and, at last, having to stand up against great bodies of Germans skilfully led and armed with bombs, flame-throwers, and all the rest of it, with machine guns sweeping every bit of the open ground—it is not, I say, a light thing, as we all know, for them to face that readily. How can they do it: how can we expect them to do it, if they are led to think that the people at home may in some eventuality let them down; that the people at home may give away everything, or much, of that for which they are fighting, and for which they are undergoing these extreme sacrifices? It is the duty of this House, and of all persons of responsibility in it, to enable our Armies, so far as they can, to feel that this country and this House will never let them down.
I listened to the first part of the speech of my right hon. Friend with pleasure and with complete agreement. In what he said about the aims with which we are carrying on this War I entirely agree. He expressed them in the way in which I have always thought they can be most simply expressed, by saying that, as far as this country is concerned, what we are fighting for is peace now and security for peace in the time to come. That is our main object. I agree also with what he said about a League of Nations. I agree, at all events, to this extent, that if, as the result of this horrible War, we do not arrive at some means which by a universal concensus of sensible people throughout the world will prevent a repetition of it, then indeed this War will have been waged in vain. So far I am in agreement with my right hon. Friend. But as regards the rest of his speech I am at a loss to account for its delivery, and I can only explain it on the principle of the French proverb with which he is not doubt familiar, "Quis'excuse, s'accuse "—who excuses himself accuses himself.
Have you read Lord Curzon's speech?
Oh, yes. I can see no other object in it. He has dealt with the criticism of the way in which this Government is working. I am not going to deal now with that in detail. The restrictions which the necessities of the case have imposed upon our food supply have made it necessary at home to see the same dish over and over again in different forms. If my right hon. Friend thinks it necessary to give constantly réchauffês of his speech, I hope he will not expect me to give réchauffês of my replies. Look for a moment at the matter. If my right hon. Friend were comparing the existing state of things with some ideal state, I can understand his criticism, but he has had experience, and what I would like him to compare is the way in which things are being done now with the way in which they were done in the Government of which he and I were members. That comparison I would never be afraid to face.
He gave, as an illustration of the absurdity of our system, that the Cabinet has to deal with dog biscuits and horse-racing. My right hon. Friend has had some experience, and he knows perfectly well that the question whether dogs are to be destroyed or kept alive, and whether or not there is to be horse-racing are questions which influence the House of Commons, and is it possible that they should be decided without those who are responsible in this House—first of all the Prime Minister, and secondly, under present circumstances, myself—is it possible that they can be discussed without our having some voice in the decision? What happens? When these questions, and other similar questions, have been remitted to a Committee of the Departments concerned, they report to the War Cabinet, and make recommendations. We consider them and give our decision; and I know no better means than that by which questions of that kind can be settled. Now I come to the main point of my right hon. Friend's speech. What happened last Thursday? His speech is rather interesting. He tells us, in the first place, that at a meeting upstairs—I presume he refers to the meeting of the Unionist War Committee— they passed a resolution to support the Government before they knew what was the Government case. I was not present, but I received a report of it, and unless my right hon. Friend has means of obtaining information different from mine, his report is quite inaccurate. It is perfectly true, and I should be sorry to think it were otherwise, that members of that party start with the desire to support the Government, but, as I was told, the meeting ended leaving every member free to take whatever course he thought proper. As regards last Thursday, my right hon. Friend referred again to the five just men who cannot be found in the House of Commons. I am sorry my right hon. Friend the Member for East Fife (Mr. Asquith) is not present, for I should like to make a claim upon his gratitude which I am sure he would have been the first to recognise. In an interruption, I gave him an opportunity for the display of that particular kind of forensic eloquence in which he does not often indulge, but of which, when he pleases, he is a past master, but for which in his heart nobody in the House has a greater contempt than my right hon. Friend. I do not pretend that my interruption was intended to help him, but in the circumstances, in the very trying circumstances, for right hon. Gentlemen who sit on that bench, I did not grudge him the advantage my interruption gave him. As regards this question, what happened was that the letter to which my right hon. Friend referred appeared in the papers. We had the same day to take a decision as to what we were to do about it. I was personally rather interested in it, and this applies to everyone engaged in politics. I am not thin-skinned about criticism, and I do not object to being accused constantly of incompetence and of weakness, and I have got used to being told that I am staying in office against my convictions for the sake of office. But it was a new experience for me to be told that I was a liar, and I did not like it, neither did the Prime Minister. We therefore proposed that the subject should be left to be decided by what we thought was an impartial Court, and we made that proposal, and we are asked why we altered the decision in twenty-four hours. The Member for East Fife altered it. We made the proposal, and now my right hon. Friend tells us that they never intended a Vote of Censure. If that were so, then not only I, but the Whole House, was under a misapprehension at the time. My right hon. Friend the Member for East Fife has had more Parliamentary experience than anybody, except perhaps, the Foreign Secretary, but I have had a great deal too, and when I was in Opposition, over and over again I asked that time should be given for the discussion of something I wished to discuss. It was always refused unless it was accepted as a Vote of Censure. It was in that sense and that sense only that I agreed to the discussion, and it was in that sense that every Member of the House understood it. What happened? It is quite true, if it worth arguing, that we preferred another tribunal to a Select Committee of this House. I am quite unrepentant as to what I said as to the suitableness of that tribunal for this purpose. During the time that I have been Leader of the House I have carried out my functions in my own way. I have acted on the assumption that what I thought reasonable was reasonable, and that if I said to the House what I thought, they would think it reasonable also. I have got into trouble that way often, but I am certain I would have got into greater difficulties if I had tried any other method. Does anyone pretend that, as a tribunal to try the conduct of Ministers, a Select Committee of the House is an impartial body. The thing is utterly absurd. We have had experience. Election petitions used to be decided by Committees. of this class. These Committees were supposed to act as judges. It was found that they acted from party motives, and the system was abolished. We had an experience more recently, and I am sure the Prime Minister would not in the least object to my referring to it. A Select Committee was set up to try the conduct of Ministers absolutely impartially. Yet by the strangest of coincidences, on every Division of any importance every Conservative voted in one way, and every Liberal voted in another. That is what happens. What we offered was a tribunal which we thought would look at the facts fairly, and at nothing else; and when my right hon. Friend refused to accept that offer and, instead, took the course of asking, as I thought, for a Vote of Censure, the position was changed, and we asked the House of Commons to decide themselves. They did decide, and we are quite pleased with the decision. My right hon. Friend made some remarks which are very much to the point about criticisms at a time like this. Nobody, I think, is a better judge of the difficulties of that than I am. For ten months I was Leader of an Opposition during the War, and it was a very poor position under those circumstances. I had a good many advantages over my right hon. Friend the Member for East Fife (Mr. Asquith), and my right hon. Friend will not object to my saying it. None of my colleagues were quite so critical, and were willing to give me greater freedom than he is prepared to give in the matter of criticism. It is very difficult, and we do not in the least contend that there ought not to be criticism. What I have said before I say now. In each particular case the man who makes the criticism, and the House itself, must judge as to what is the nature of that criticism. If the criticism is of such a kind as to imply that it is a Government which ought not to have the confidence of the House of Commons, and that it is not fit to carry on its functions, then instead of thinking the position is made better because speeches of that kind are made and are not followed by a Division, I say at once that it would be infinitely better that we should have a Division, and know where we are, and realise that we have a real opposition and are prepared to face it. In such circumstances the House knows where it is. Under conditions such as have existed since the War there is a great deal of latitude in the minds of Members. At ordinary tunes, when there is a party Government, the leaders of that party have one advantage which is of the greatest value They can always count on the support of their followers when they most need it, and that is when they are partly wrong or altogether wrong. In the present circumstances, they cannot do that. There is an amount of freedom which does not exist at ordinary times. Therefore I say, from the point of view of the Government, there is a real advantage sometimes in having parties clearly defined, and knowing exactly where we are. But I do not wish it. It would be a very great misfortune if there should be any appearance of any weakening in the main motive which I am sure actuates my right hon. Friend as much as it actuates me, and I welcome his assurance, not that he is as earnest in the War as we are—I do not doubt that—but I welcome his speech to-day if it means that he does not intend, and that his party do not intend, to lend themselves to criticism which is not helpful and which is mainly intended to discredit and weaken a Government which has as great a responsibility as any Government has ever had in this country. Very few things can be more foolish than for a member of a Government to say anything in praise, or approaching praise, of the head of that Government. At a time like this, anyone in a responsible position who was influenced in his support of opposition to a, Government by feelings of friendship would be guilty of something like a crime towards his country. We have got to try to have the Government which is best calculated to secure the result that we want—an honourable peace in this conflict. I say to the House as a whole, and I can say it when one of his own supporters could not, that as long as this House believes that the present Prime Minister is the man best fitted for his post, it is the duty of everyone to give him support, and not to go about seeking grounds for finding fault.I rise merely for the purpose of corroborating the right hon. Gentleman's statement as to what occurred at the War Unionist Committee. It was absolutely correct in every particular. No resolution of any kind was-passed to back up the present Government right or wrong, black or white, but every Member was left to vote perfectly freely according to his own conscience after hearing the Prime Minister's statement.
I cannot help entering an emphatic protest against what I consider to be the very unfair treatment to which General Maurice has been subjected by the Censor I do not propose to enter into the general controversy, because that would be out of place at the present moment. Neither do I propose to refer, except in passing, to the action of the military authorities in punishing General Maurice for a breach of discipline. It is quite within their rights, upon evidence, to inflict upon a general whatever punishment they consider right and proper for violations of military discipline. They can degrade him from his rank, they can reduce his pay, they can ruin his career, and they are entitled to do it if they think fit; but I venture to say that neither the military authority, nor any other Department of the Government, is ) entitled to rob General Maurice of his personal honour or to refuse him the opportunity of establishing his bona fides and his credibility in the statements that he has made in the letters that he has written. This letter that appeared in the "Daily Chronicle" yesterday was submitted to the Censor and, in answer to a question, the Home Secretary stated portions of it were deleted. In answer to a supplementary question, he stated that it was because of some reference to secret documents which might create a false impression. That letter was a very moderate and modest and patriotic letter. It did not renew the controversy in any shape or form. It simply attempted to answer what the General thought were unfair reflections upon himself and statements that undermined his reliability, his credibility, and the bona fides of his previous letter. On one point only, the most important point, the Censor deleted material statements that General Maurice made. I do not want to take any advantage of the privileges of this House by quoting the words that were deleted by the Censor—that would be improper and in bad taste—but on one particular point the Prime Minister laid great stress and certainly implied that General Maurice had not the information that would entitle him to express opinions; that, in fact, he was not present on occasions when he alleged that he was present, and that, therefore, he could have nothing but indirect or second hand knowledge of the statements that he made—indeed, that the phrasing of his original letter was deceptive and intended to convey an impression that he was present at a certain place when, in fact, he was not present. The words that were deleted from General Maurice's letter made it perfectly plain that he was in direct access to all the information which enabled him to express a true and correct opinion upon what took place. Those words were deleted. It is grotesquely unfair to deprive a man of an opportunity of justifying the statements he has made.
As to the answer made by the Home Secretary, although I have very great respect for the Home Secretary, I am more afraid of him than I am of any other man who sits on the Front Bench, because his fine Parliamentary manner, his amiability and affability usually succeed in completely out-manœuvring and putting an extinguisher on his opponent. His reply, which suggested that in some way these secret documents, if referred to, would make a false impression on the public mind, was a polite Parliamentary evasion of the real point at issue. It would have been perfectly simple, even if there were any words in the part deleted, if the Censor had desired to treat General Maurice fairly, to have made a slight alteration in the words that would not have given away any secrets, and which would have established the bona fides, credibility, and reliability of General Maurice's statement. I venture to protest against the action of the Censor in this respect. I protest not only because I think that General Maurice has been treated unfairly. I have not the honour of General Maurice's personal acquaintance, and I know nothing about the controversy except what I have read in the papers. But I feel he has been treated badly, and that it is a profound mistake, to put it no higher, to create in the minds of our great and distinguished generals the idea that they are likely to be treated unfairly, that they are not to have treatment which is honourable and fair and which gives them a chance to establish any case they think it is reasonable and proper and in accordance with Army discipline to make. The action of the Censor goes beyond the question of General Maurice. It means that we are. in danger of a great Government Department exercising its mere discretion, not on points of public interest, but its mere discretion from its own standpoint, in regard to public statements that may be made or written by distinguished people who may happen to differ from themselves. It is quite right that the Censor should delete from a statement anything which might give information to the enemy, and if any opinions any of us choose to express are opinions that would hearten or encourage the enemy and diminish the confidence of our own people in the prosecution of the War, it is quite right that they should be deleted. The Censor goes beyond that. The time may come when anybody who ventures to disagree with the opinions of the Leader of the House—there may be misguided, foolish mortals who may sometimes disagree with him—will not be allowed to express those opinions in a newspaper. That position is an intolerable one, and we ought not to be so limited, circumscribed, and tyrannised over by Government Departments. This unfortunate general was tried last week in his absence. A brilliant counsel held the brief for the prosecution; no one was retained for the defence, and he was condemned unheard. I do not want to reopen that controversy again, but surely, having condemned him unheard, having ruined his career, having driven him from the Army, you might at least allow him to make a plain, patriotic, honest statement to rehabilitate himself and to re-establish his credibility in the mind of the public at large. It is kicking a man when he is down, and I dislike that. Let us at least practice fair play, even with those who are opposed to us. Even a British general is entitled to be treated with some consideration and respect. I desire to enter my emphatic protest against this proceeding, and I hope the Government will restrain the enthusiastic loyalty of their Censorship Department, and will try to play the game with generals and with their political opponents.Question put, and agreed to.
Resolved, "That this House, at its rising this day, do adjourn till Tuesday, the 28th May."—[ Mr. Bonar Law.]
The remaining Orders were road, and postponed.
Whereupon Mr. SPEAKER, pursuant to the Order of the House of the 13th February, proposed the Question, "That this House do now adjourn."
Question put, and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at Thirteen minutes before Six o'clock till Tuesday, the 28th May, pursuant to the Resolution of the House this day.