House Of Commons
Tuesday, 21st March. 1922.
The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.
Private Business
Private Bills (Standing Orders not previously inquired into complied with),—Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the following Bill, referred on the Second Reading thereof, the Standing Orders not previously inquired into, which are applicable thereto, have been complied with, namely:—
Stock Conversion and Investment Trust (North Western Trust) Bill.
Bill committed.
Private Bills [ Lords] (Standing Orders not previously inquired into complied with),—Mr. SPEAKER laid upon the Table Report from one of the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, That, in the case of the following Bill, originating in the Lords, and referred on the First Reading thereof, the Standing Orders not previously inquired into, which are applicable thereto, have been complied with, namely:—
Legal and General Assurance Society Bill [ Lords].
Milford Docks Bill [ Lords].
Bills to be read a Second time.
Railways (West Scottish Group) Bill,
To be read a Second time upon Thursday, 30th March.
Oral Answers To Questions
India
Fiscal Commission
1.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for India what is the estimated cost of the Fiscal Commission under the chairmanship of Sir Ibrahim Rahimtulla; and when it is expected to report?
(Earl Winterton, rising amid general cheers on Ministerial appointment): The Commission is expected to report about the end of May. The Government of India estimated that the Commission would cost 2 lakhs of rupees in the financial year ending 31st March, 1922. No estimate of the expenditure in the next financial year has been received, but it will probably not exceed half a lakh.
Is the Noble Lord aware that this Commission has been wasting time and money in examining Mrs. Besant, who is an agitator and not a fiscal reformer; and also in listening to the absurd statements that the thumbs of Indian weavers had been deliberately chopped off to prevent them competing against English weavers, and all that sort of nonsense; and what possible advantage does the Noble Lord hope to get as the result of the deliberations of such a Commission?
I am not aware that the Commission is wasting time. I am aware that it has been carrying on a most important and a most essential work.
Can the Noble Lord give us the present value of a lakh of rupees?
The hon. Member had better put that question down.
Law And Order
2.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been called to the resolutions passed by the European Association of India calling upon the Government of India to support all loyal citizens, to punish declared rebels without fear or favour, and by definite and immediate action to carry out its elementary duty of maintaining law and order, and of protecting its servants from murder and violence; and can he state what action has been taken in the matter?
I have seen a newspaper report of the resolutions. The Government of India and the Provincial Governments are adopting the measures they consider necessary, in the varying circumstances of different Provinces, for the purposes indicated.
To what is this failure on the part of the Government of India due, and why should an influential association like this have to pass such a resolution calling upon the Government to do their duty?
I can only repeat that the Government are endeavouring to do their duty by the action they have taken.
Cotton Goods (Excise And Customs Duties)
4.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for India what
Excise duty for 11 months ending 31st January, 1922 | … | … | Rs. 2,18,21,000 |
Excise duty for 12months ending 28th February, 1914 | … | … | Rs. 56,68,000 |
Customs duty for 12 months ending 28th February, 1922 | … | … | Rs. 4,91,15,000 |
Customs duty for 12 months ending 28th February, 1914 | … | … | Rs. 2,11,93,000 |
Quantity of cotton goods produced:— | |
(a) In 11 months ending 31st January, 1922. | (b) In 12 months ending 28th February, 1914. |
Piecegoods, 367,903,000 lbs. | 268,130,000 lbs. |
Other woven goods, 4,615,000 lbs. | 2,797,000 lbs. |
Value of woven cotton goods produced:— | |
(a) In 11 months ending 31st January, 1922. | (b) In 12 months ending 28th February, 1914. |
Rs. 56,11,90,000. | Not recorded. |
Quantity of cotton goods imported:— | |
(a) In 12 months ending 28th February, 1922. | (b) In 12 months ending 28th February, 1914. |
Piecegoods, 1,122,753,000 yds. | 3,181,092,000 yds. |
Handkerchiefs, 2,806,000. | 39,032,000. |
Value of cotton goods imported:— | |
(a) In 12 months ending 28th February, 1922. | (b) In 12 months ending 28th February, 1914. |
Piecegoods, Bs. 44,90,79,000. | Rs. 57,95,69,000. |
Handkerchiefs, 10,61,000. | Rs. 89,00,000. |
Other dutiable goods, RS. 1,49,33,000. | Rs. 2,71,12,000. |
Prisoners (Treatment)
5.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether there has yet been made in India any difference in the feeding or treatment in gaol given to political and to ordinary prisoners; if so, in what provinces has such distinction been made; and why is it not done in Lahore gaol?
On the 16th January the Home Member made a statement in the Legislative Assembly in reply to a question on this subject. He said:
"The Government of India recently suggested to Local Governments that persons recently sentenced to rigorous imprisonment under Act XIV of 1908 or under the Seditious Meetings Act should receive differential treatment in jail in the matter of diet,
were the receipts from the Excise Duty and Customs Duty on cotton goods, respectively, for the 12 months ending 28th February; and what were the corresponding figures for the 12 months ending 28th February, 1914, and the quantity and value of cotton goods in each case?
The statistics required, as far as they are available, are being circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
The following are the statistics mentioned:
The statistics of Excise Duty and production of cotton goods for February, 1922, are not yet available. I am, therefore, giving the figures for the 11 months ending 31st January, 1922, in respect of Excise Duty and production. The figures are:
clothing, labour, etc. They understand that Orders to this effect are already in force in most Provinces."
I believe that the Punjab is one of the provinces referred to, and have no information that Lahore gaol is an exception.
Will the Noble Lord—whom I am very glad to see on that Front Bench—himself wire to Lahore and find out definitely whether these instructions have been carried out there; my latest information is that they have not yet?
I offer my sincere congratulations to the Noble Lord on his presence on that Front Bench. May I ask why should there be any distinction made between political and other prisoners—
You will find out soon—
Should it not rather be in the direction of greater hardship?
In regard to the question of the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite, if he will inform me of cases that he knows where that has not been done already, I shall be glad to ask the Secretary of State to telegraph for information. My information is to the effect that it is being carried out in Lahore gaol and elsewhere.
It was not being done in Lahore when the last mail left.
Perhaps my hon. and gallant Friend will see me afterwards, and I will inquire.
Do we understand that there are now more generous and lenient Regulations for political prisoners in India than formerly obtained?
I must have notice of these questions, but there has been an alteration in policy during the, last few years.
Navy, Army And Air Force Institutes
6.
asked the Secretary of State for War if he will ascertain from the War Office representative on the Navy, Army, and Air Force Institutes Board, and inform the House, as to the reason why no trading accounts or balance sheets have been published by the said Board for over four years; and when it is intended that a statement of accounts and balance sheet will be published?
I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which I gave on the 13th February to my hon. Friends the Members for Carmarthen and the Drake Division of Plymouth.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the last accounts published in 1918 by these institutes showed a turnover of over £40,000,000, and having regard to the fact that they are rent, rates and taxes free and carry on their business in Government property, does he not think it very desirable that some account of their working should be published?
I cannot admit the statements of fact that my hon. Friend has imported into his supplementary question. I will send him a copy of the answers to which I referred.
British Army
War Medals
7.
asked the Secretary of State for War how many War Service Medals have been issued; how many are still to issue; and what men should have received them by now, so that direct application may be made to records by those entitled to medals who have not yet received them?
The numbers of medals issued to Record Offices and other distributing agents, including those issued direct to officers, but excluding issues made to India and the Dominions, are as follow:
British War Medals | … | 3,651,490 |
Victory Medals | … | 3,641,354 |
1914 Stars | … | 350,475 |
1914–15 Stars | … | 1,336,975 |
British War Medals | … | 749,588 |
Victory Medals | … | 676,780 |
1914 Stars | … | None. |
1914–15 Stars | … | 12,000 |
When shall I get my medal?
10.
asked the Secretary of State for War whether any decorations or medals were granted to officers, non-commissioned officers, or men who never served overseas in the War; and, if so, how many were granted for home service only?
War medals are granted only to those who served overseas during the Great War, with the exception of the British war medals granted to personnel of land batteries who were engaged with hostile vessels of war. I am not in a position to state the numbers of this personnel, but it will be quite small.
Does the right hon. Gentleman say that no military decorations whatsoever were awarded for home service?
No; I was referring to the British war medals to which my hon. Friend himself alluded in his question.
Officers (Disbanded Irish Regiments)
8.
asked the Secretary of State for War what provision is being made for the future of officers at present serving with the Royal Munster Fusiliers and other Irish regiments now being disbanded under the terms of the Treaty made with the Irish Free State?
As I explained on the 15th instant, in my statement on Army Estimates, it is proposed that the whole Army shall bear equally the reduction in officers consequent on the disbandment of units; that is to say, it will not follow from the disbandment of any unit that every officer in it will be retired. Officers whose retention is recommended will be allowed to transfer to other regiments. Officers will be allowed a choice of regiments, and their wishes will be met as far as is possible in the interest of the Service. Those who are called upon to retire will be offered compensation as to the terms of which I hope to make a statement at an early date.
Suppose an officer of one of these regiments take service with the Irish Republican Army, will he get pay from this Government? [An HON MEMBER: "Why not?"]
So long as he is transferred to one of the British forces, my answer applies; if he goes to some force the British Government does not recognise, of course, he will not be paid by the British Government.
Time-Expired Bounty
9.
asked the Secretary of State for War why the time-expired bounty is withheld in the case of ex-Lance-Corporal Armitage, 2/5th battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers; and is he aware that on 12th September, 1917, a memorandum was sent to this man stating that his service has now been established as from 15th November, 1912, therefore admitting that he had qualified for the bounty?
I am not aware of the contents of the memorandum which is stated to have been sent to this man on 12th September, 1917, but the bounty referred to is issuable in the case of men re-enlisted or recalled to the colours, only to those who had previously been discharged, on termination of engagement, since the outbreak of War. Lance-Corporal Armitage does not fulfil this necessary condition, having been discharged medically unfit on 6th August, 1914, before the termination of his engagement. He is, therefore, ineligible for a bounty in respect of his subsequent re-enlistment.
Is my right hon. Friend aware that this man's receipt of his demobilisation pay of £5 was his first indication that he had left the Army; that he was ill at the time, and for two months afterwards?
It must be obvious that I cannot carry in my mind the facts of each case. If my hon. Friend will send me any further information, I shall be glad.
I will send the memorandum.
Territorial Army (Divisional Commands)
11.
asked the Secretary of State for War whether, in drawing up the fresh edition of Regulations for the Territorial Army, he will amend paragraph 57 of the 1912 Regulations so as to enable Territorial officers to be eligible to command divisions, in view of the fact that several Territorial officers were recommended to command divisions in the field during the War, and that the then Secretary of State for War gave a promise to this effect in 1920?
I am not able to identify the promise to which my hon. and gallant Friend refers. The question raised shall be considered.
Officers (Retired Pay)
12.
asked the Secretary of State for War the number of officers of all ranks not now actively connected with the Army who are in receipt of pensions, pay, or allowances; the annual amount paid in respect of each category; and the total annual expenditure in this connection?
The hon. Member will find the number of Army officers on retired pay and the annual amount of such retired pay in Army Estimates, 1921–22, Head VII A., and in the Estimates of the Ministry of Pensions. Officers drawing pay and allowances chargeable to Army Votes are all actively connected with the Army.
Ireland
Troop Casualties, Belfast
14.
asked the Secretary of State for War how many soldiers have been killed or wounded during the weeks of rioting in Belfast; what steps the War Department are taking for the protection of these troops; and whether they have called upon the Ulster Government for aid in such measures?
The casualties since the 1st January have been 2 killed and 12 wounded. The military authorities, acting in co-operation with the civil power, have re-inforced the garrison, and are employing all measures which experience shows to be desirable to secure the best possible results. There have been some arrests, but I am not in possession of the particulars.
Is it not a fact that, in spite of the precautions to which this right hon. Gentleman has alluded, the number of murders and incendiary fires have not increased almost weekly in a large degree?
Is it not a fact that Lieutenant Bruce, one of the two soldiers killed, was off duty when he was murdered, and was passing through the streets of a strictly Catholic area?
I really have not the facts to which my hon. Friend refers. The other question put to me is so general that I find a difficulty in replying specifically to it. If the hon. Member will give me any further details, I will do my best to reply.
Rate Collectors
20.
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies the result of the discussions with the Provisional Government as to the position of rate collectors in Ireland whose collection books were seized by the Irish Republican Army some two years ago, and who were thereby deprived of their fees and earnings; and what arrangements have been made for assessing their pensions or compensation on a fair and equitable basis?
The Provisional Government have undertaken that the officers referred to will be provided for either by the payment of suitable compensation or by suitable re-employment, and they are making inquiry into such cases with a view to early settlement.
Will the right hon. Gentleman confer with the Provisional Government in order to see that compensation is paid to them direct?
Certainly.
Republican Army
21.
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies why the forces at the disposal of the Provisional Government for the preservation of law and order in Southern Ireland are still described as the Irish Republican Army; and whether he will suggest to the Provisional Government that this description of the forces employed by them for keeping order should be discontinued at the earliest possible moment?
I must refer the hon. and learned Member to my replies to previous questions on this subject, more particularly to my reply to a supplementary question addressed to me by him on the 14th February. The force known as the Irish Republican Army and the force which is being organised by the Provisional Government for the preservation of law and order are, as I have previously explained, not identical; but the Provisional Government, as I understand, from time to time use the so-called Irish Republican Army, in areas where this force acknowledges their authority, to assist them. The latter part of the question does not arise.
Does my right hon. Friend not think that it is extremely undesirable that a Government that is not a Republican Government should utilise forces which describe themselves as Republican?
No, Sir; I think that in all the difficult circumstances prevailing in Ireland the Provisional Government are doing their best.
Boundary Commission
24.
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the Government of Ulster and of the Irish Free State will be consulted as to the terms of reference to, and the constitution of, the Boundary Commission to be set up in pursuance of the terms of the provisional Treaty with Southern Ireland; whether the findings of the Commission will be legally binding, even if they involve the transfer to the Free State of substantial areas of Ulster as delimited under the Irish Government Act of 1920; and when it is proposed to set up the Commission?
In reply to the first part of the question, the provisions of Article 12 of the Schedule to the Irish Free State (Agreement) Bill lay down the terms of reference and the constitution of the Commission, and as regards its constitution I would further refer the hon. and gallant Member to the Debate of the 3rd instant, on an Amendment to the Bill moved by the Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University. In reply to the second part, I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the same provisions, which appear to me to be free from ambiguity on this subject. The third part does not arise, unless and until an address is presented to His Majesty as provided in Article 12.
Can the right hon. Gentleman say plainly whether a Commission is going to be set up or not? The right hon. Gentleman has only referred to something that does not give a reply to my question.
I do not understand.
Raids
(by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he can make any statement as to the position to-day on the boundaries of Northern Ireland and if he can give the House particulars of the raids by detachments of the Irish Republican Army into Northern Ireland on last Sunday night which resulted in the death of a special constable near Tobermore and Robert Mulligan near Blackwater-town, and the wounding of other persons, and what steps have been taken to prevent further outrages?
I have been in communication with the Provisional Government, the Government of Northern Ireland and with General Macready. I have not yet received details of what has actually taken place in connection with these regrettable occurrences, but the Provisional Government inform me that they have ascertained that no forces from the 26 counties took part in either of the raids referred to. General Macready's Report confirms this. These raids, so far as I am at present informed were organised locally by members of the so-called Irish Republican Army who are resident in the six counties area. I have given the House the best information I have up to the present. Both the authorities I have consulted on this matter, the Provisional Government and General Macready, concur in the news which I have just given. The Provisional Government add that firing across the border is reported to them as having occurred from the Northern side. Following the destruction of bridges by Ulster special constables, apparently, a number of roads have been cratered, and a certain number of bridges have been blown up by the Northern forces with a view, no doubt, to preventing motor-car incursions. The Provisional Government say that they are seeking further information and will report later. The general position on the boundary is undoubtedly one of serious tension. The liaison Commissions are not functioning as they should on either side. Every effort is being made by the officers of those Commissions, but General Macready considered that the newspaper accounts greatly exaggerate the situation. Very highly coloured accounts are current in the papers. The situation is a very disagreeable one, but it really does not justify the alarmist versions which occupied such a large portion of our public prints yesterday. I have not received any answer as yet to my inquiries from the Northern Government.
Has the attention of the right hon. Gentleman been called to a statement, which has been made by one of the Ministers of Northern Ireland, that a state of war exists between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republican Army, and has that view been brought to the attention of the Government?
My attention was called to that statement, but I do not know whether my hon. Friend will wish me to offer any comment on it.
Is it not the view of His Majesty's Government that they should put down outrages of this kind, whether they be committed by local bodies, by republican forces, or by any armed bodies of men?
These outrages occurred within the jurisdiction of the Government of Northern Ireland. The Government of Northern Ireland have had placed at their disposal 13 battalions of infantry up to the present time. They are there for the purpose of assisting them in maintaining the law. In addition to this they have 3,000 constabulary. They have nearly 5,000 armed A specials. They have 20,000 B specials all armed with rifles and they have a further force of C specials behind them. The C specials are not in all cases armed. I have no reason to believe that they will not be able to maintain order in their territory.
Are not these perilous incidents on the frontier largely due to the pogrom against the lives and property of Catholics in Belfast—[HON. MEMBERS: "No!"]—which has now gone on for several weeks without apparently any interference on the part of the Government?
Have His Majesty's Government given instructions to General Macready to help the Ulster people?
Yes, certainly. General Cameron, who is in command of the troops in North East Ireland, is aware that any demand for troops that he can make will be complied with and we are doing everything in our power to assist. Overwhelming force is at the disposal of the Northern Government for the proper purpose of their own defence and maintaining the order in their districts. So far as the question of the hon. Member for the Scotland Division of Liverpool (Mr. O'Connor) is concerned I am bound to say that the conditions which have prevailed during the last few months in Belfast are lamentable in the extreme. Considerably more Catholics have been killed and wounded than Protestants, but I know that Sir James Craig and his Ministers are determined to do everything in their power to try to bring about a peaceful and orderly state of affairs in what you may call the underworld of Belfast.
May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will now afford an opportunity for a discussion on this matter which would give an opportunity of showing the falseness of the suggestions made by the hon. Member for the Scotland Division?
rose—
Since responsible Government was given to Northern Ireland I have deprecated questions or arguments affecting the responsibility of that Government.
Is it not a fact that with a frontier of something like two hundred miles it is not possible to speak about overwhelming forces being at the disposal of the Northern Government? Is it not a fact that the only way of stopping this would be by bringing the Free State Government to book for not seeing that these invasions do not take place?
I have answered already that no invasion has taken place. In my opinion, the Free State Government have taken every step that they can to abolish the present state of affairs?
Abolish the frontier. Then it would be done.
Is it a fact that large forces have been massing on the Southern side?
I am informed that a certain number of men have been collected. There is a difference between collecting and massing. The numbers are not very large. I have telegraphed to the Southern Government pointing out that they are in no danger whatever of a raid into their territory from Northern Ireland. I am confident that in those circumstances a raid would not be tolerated by the Northern Government. I am endeavouring to reassure them in every way.
If the Southern Government deny that these raiders have anything to do with them, where do they get their ammunition?
United Services Fund
15.
asked the Secretary of State for War if the amount of £3,713,000, as stated in the Report of 31st January of the United Services Fund Committee, is the total amount paid to that fund up to the present time?
The Report of the Committee presided over by my hon. Friend the Member for the Ecclesall Division of Sheffield indicates the value of the cash and securities transferred as £3,849,000. The discrepancy between this figure and that quoted in the question appears to be due mainly to differences in the method of valuation of the securities which have been transferred. No further payment has been made up to the present date.
Is it not a fact that £4,049,000 has been given as the amount paid to that fund; and is the right hon. Gentleman aware that three different figures have been given?
I do not remember any such figures.
Can the right hon. Gentleman make any statement as to when the money will be paid over?
I have answered that question in previous Debates, and I ask my hon. and gallant Friend to look at those answers.
Treatment Of Children, Hong Kong
16.
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will make an investigation as to whether, under the mui tsai system of Hong Kong, the mui tsai girls of any household do, upon the death of the owner, become the property of concubines in the household, and are disposed of by them for cash, with other elements in the estate of the deceased owner?
19.
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the records of the Colonial Office show that mui tsai of Hong Kong, of quite tender years, are frequently compelled to labour over 12 hours a day, and that cases have been established in the open court where these children have been forced to work up to as long as 18 and 20 hours in one day?
The House will recollect that I asked hon. Members to postpone their questions on this subject in order that I might communicate with the Governor of Hong Kong. The recent occurrences in the Colony have unfortunately prevented either the Governor or myself from dealing with this matter as expeditiously as I had hoped, but I have now received a telegram from the Governor stating that his Government in consultation with the societies for the protection and for the abolition of mui tsai will draw up a scheme for the abolition of the system as soon as possible. Both the Government and the societies point out that this process must take some little time. I have directed the issue without delay of a proclamation making it clear to employers and employed that the status of mui tsai as understood in China will not in future be recognised in Hong Kong and in particular that no compulsion of any kind to prevent girls over the age of 12 leaving their adopted parents at any time will be allowed. It has been pointed out to me by the Government and the societies that the issue of this proclamation will involve some risk of exposing a number of girls to the wiles of unscrupulous persons, and that before the girls are encouraged to leave their employers it would be very desirable to have some scheme to provide for their future. It is indeed obvious in view of the numbers involved that it will be beyond the power either of charitable institutions or of the Government to deal adequately with the situation should any large proportion desire to leave their present homes immediately. I have, therefore, instructed the Governor that mui tsai should be warned in the proclamation that until accommodation can be provided for them elsewhere they should not leave the shelter of their present homes except in case of ill treatment and after reference to the Chinese Secretariat, and I have also said that they should be specially warned against the other danger referred to by the Governor. Although it is obvious that an old established custom cannot be altered at a moment's notice, I desire to make it clear that both the Governor and I are determined to effect the abolition of the system at the earliest practicable date, and I have indicated to the Governor that I expect the change to be carried out within a year.
Is it not a fact that in the notification to the mui tsai they are told that if they are entreated they can come out, although there be no accommodation?
What will happen if, during the next 12 months, steps are taken to shift these girls off to Canton? Will attempts be made to retain these girls in Hong Kong until accommodation is provided for them?
Palestine
Jews (Settlement)
17.
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether any subventions have been granted by His Majesty's Government or the Government of Palestine for the purpose of settling Jews on the land in Palestine; if so, the amount of such subventions; and, if not, whether the cost of such settling of Jews has been subscribed from Jewish sources?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative, and to the last part in the affirmative.
Present Situation
22.
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether his attention has been drawn to the suggestion which recently appeared in the Press that a special Commission should be sent to Palestine to investigate the whole situation there; and whether, in view of the fact that an inquiry of this nature would be welcomed by all parties concerned in the present dispute, he will agree to appoint such a Commission?
I would refer the hon. Member to the answer given to the hon. Member for Lincoln on the 1st March last. I am not in a position to add anything to that reply.
Betting Debts (Payment By Cheque)
25.
asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if, failing any proposal by the Government itself, the Ministry is prepared to offer facilities for, or at least not to oppose, an agreed on Bill for the removal of the present conditions under which people are recovering the amount of betting debts paid by cheque?
I certainly should offer no opposition on behalf of the Government to such a Bill. Any question as to facilities for the Bill should be addressed to the Leader of the House.
Aliens
Immigration
26.
asked the Home Secretary the number of aliens who have entered this country in the last year; whether, in view of the existing unemployment, he is still restricting their numbers; and whether he has any information showing the competition of their low rates of wages with British-born subjects, more especially in industrial centres?
The number of aliens who landed in the United Kingdom in 1921 was 294,569, and the number who embarked was 305,866. These figures do not include aliens who passed through the country as transmigrants. The vast majority of those who landed were visitors on business or on holiday, or residents returning after a sojourn abroad. I am satisfied that the provisions of the Aliens Order are being strictly enforced, and that aliens are not being allowed to land for the purpose of seeking employment. No information has reached me showing that aliens in industrial centres are competing with British-born subjects by accepting lower rates of wages.
Was not an alien allowed to land the other day whose papers had to be confiscated as seditious?
There is another question on this subject.
Naturalisation
29.
asked the Home Secretary if the memorial of Henry Isadora Kerner for letters of naturalisation was presented to the Home Office so far back as the 15th August, 1914; and whether he will take some steps to secure the improved administration of his Department and, in particular, the framing of regulations recording the principles upon which memorials for naturalisation at the instance of men and women, not former alien enemies or stateless, should receive adequate attention with reasonable promptitude?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second and third parts, I can add nothing to my reply to a similar inquiry by the hon. and gallant Member on the 9th instant.
38 and 39.
asked the Home Secretary (1) whether applications for grants of naturalisation are dealt with strictly in order of application, or whether specially early consideration is given to applications for persons of superior wealth, influence, or pertinacity; whether he is prepared to refund the fees paid By persons whose applications have been more than five years awaiting consideration;
(2) whether any and, if so, how many applications for naturalisation granted during the year 1921 were in respect of applications lodged since the Armistice; and whether he will direct that prior attention shall be given to applications which have been pending since the early months of the War?It is not possible without prolonged inquiry to say how many of the applications for naturalisation granted during 1921 were lodged since the Armistice. Naturalisation Regulation 14 provides that the fee payable on the submission of an application shall in no circumstances be returned. Applications are not dealt with strictly in order of application, for, as I informed the hon. Member for Caerphilly on the 13th February, if an applicant submits any special reasons why his application should be expedited they are always considered, but no special priority is given to the classes of persons referred to in the first question.
Washington Labour Conference (Sweated Labour)
27.
asked whether, either as a result of the Washington Labour Conference or otherwise, the Government has made, or is making, any representations to Foreign administrations against the prevalence of sweated labour in industries, which are directly competitive with our own; and whether his Department has any evidence to show the effect of such sweated labour, within the last two years, on any industries in the East End of London?
In view of the possible unsatisfactory or sweated conditions of less organised labour in many countries which have not the machinery for regulating conditions or wages which the trade boards provide in this country, the International Labour Office has been asked to collect information on the subject. With regard to the last part of the question, we have received no representations from the interests affected; but if my hon. Friend has any information in the matter, we should be glad to receive it.
Electoral Registers
28.
asked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that on 15th November, 1920, the then Leader of the House, speaking of the proposal to have only one electoral register instead of two, stated he would be glad to see it adopted; and can he say when a final decision on this question may be expected?
I am aware of the reply given on the date referred to by the then Leader of the House; but the hon. and gallant Member will bear in mind that it was made expressly subject to the proposal commending itself generally to the House, and according to my information there is no such general approval as to satisfy this condition. I hope, however, that the question will soon be disposed of.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a memorial was signed by over 300 Members of this House in favour of this alteration; is he further aware that a saving of a quarter of a million sterling would be effected thereby, and is he also aware that this House was told on 20th December that the matter was under the consideration of the Prime Minister?
I am aware of those facts, but at the same time there have been very strong representations the other way. I hope that the matter will be decided before the Second Reading of the Representation of the People Bill is reached.
Who is going to decide it?
The Government.
Will the Government take the matter up at once?
36.
asked the Home Secretary whether, in view of the fact that a county council, district council, and parish council elector must have resided in the parish or some parish in an immediately adjacent county on 15th December, 1920, in order to receive the right to vote at the elections in March and April, 1922, he has now decided to save £250,000 by providing for a yearly instead of a half-yearly register?
I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I have just given to the hon. and gallant Member for East Lewisham on the subject of the annual register proposal. The statement in the first part of the question is substantially correct, but I could hardly agree that the facts mentioned afford material support to the proposal.
If the facts stated in the first part of the question are substantially correct, what is the reason for not saving the money?
Liquor Traffic (State Management)
30.
asked the Home Secretary whether, after the expression of opinion by the Committee on National Expenditure that, in view of the results of State management, formerly the Liquor Control Board, so far obtained, and of the risk of loss in future years, its continuance as a State undertaking would not appear likely to afford any special financial advantage to the taxpayer, he proposes to take any and what steps for terminating the system of State management; and whether, in pursuance of the statement of the Committee that in the present financial circumstances no further expenditure for compensation and adaptation in connection with premises already acquired or for acquisition of further premises should be incurred, he has given any instructions to the Advisory Committee to suspend operations in these respects?
It is not proposed to take any steps for terminating the system of State management. I do not understand that the Committee on National Expenditure recommended no further expenditure on adaptation of premises already acquired, but in accordance with their recommendation there will be no further expenditure on the acquisition of further premises.
Marriages, Oxhey
31.
asked the Home Secretary whether any, and what, official was responsible for the nonexistence or non-production of licences in the cases of marriages at Oxhey recently confirmed by Provisional Order; and whether he has taken or can take any steps to guard against this kind of informality occurring in other cases?
According to the information supplied to me, the vicar of the parish was responsible. A clergyman who knowingly and wilfully solemnises a marriage without publication of banns or production of a licence is of course committing an offence against the Marriage Act and is liable to be proceeded against under that Act but I was advised that in this case there was not sufficient evidence on which proceedings could have been taken. I have been in communication with the Bishop of the Diocese who informs me that, in the absence of sufficient evidence, there is no action which he can usefully take. I am afraid there is nothing more that I can do in the matter.
If further evidence be supplied to the right hon. Gentleman's Department, will he bring it to the knowledge of the Public Prosecutor?
If my hon. Friend will give me any further evidence, I will put it before the Law Officers of the Crown, as I have done already.
Explosion, Tipton
34.
asked the Home Secretary whether, having regard to the recent unfortunate explosion at Tipton, he can, in conjunction with the Disposal Board, arrange that, in all future disposals of explosives, delivery shall be withheld until the proper licence, as required by Statute, has been granted?
96.
asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether, having regard to the explosion at Tipton, he will arrange for the disposal in future of explosives to only persons who are licensed to handle same?
As stated in my reply on the 14th instant to the hon. Member for West Bromwich, the Disposal and Liquidation Commission make careful inquiries in every case, with a view to ensuring that purchases of ammunition comply with the law as regards licensing. The responsibility of doing so must, of course, remain with the contractor, but the Commission are considering whether further restrictions of the character indicated by the hon. Members cannot be imposed. In the case in question, it is understood that the ammunition was transferred from the purchasing contractor to another firm without the knowledge of the Departments concerned.
Omnibuses And Trams (Overcrowding)
35.
asked the Home Secretary whether it is proposed to enforce the straphanging Regulations in omnibuses and tramcars on and from 1st April next; and, if so, whether, in view of the obvious inadequacy of the public means of transport during such hours, on special occasions, and under certain weather conditions, he can ensure that the police will, at least, be given discretionary powers in enforcing the Regulation referred to when the foregoing conditions prevail?
As I stated in my reply of the 13th instant, the whole question is under consideration, and I cannot at present make any statement on the subject Viscount CURZON: Has any decision yet been come to?
No decision has been come to.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the late Minister of Transport promised to make a personal experiment in strap-hanging?
Police Mutual Assurance Association
37.
asked the Home Secretary what is the position of the Police Mutual Assurance Association; why it refuses to receive the payments due monthly by the old members; and what is the position of old sergeants and inspectors who have paid into this fund for 40 or 50 years past, and who are now informed that the association (old scale) is dead?
The Association in question is a voluntary organisation. It is not and never has been under Government control or supervision and no Government Department had any responsibility for its management. I understand that a recent examination of its finances has shown that funds are not available to meet the payments which would become due under the existing rules, and the committee have decided that entire re-organisation is necessary. A new society has been formed and members of the old association have been invited to transfer to the new society, of which the rules will provide for modified benefits subject to some immediate payments and increased contributions being forthcoming.
Have these old sergeants who have been contributing for so long to this old society been informed there is some hope they may get some benefit?
Of course I have no personal knowledge, but I am told that they have.
In the event of these old men not being sufficiently well off to continue their contributions or to pay a higher subscription, will some provision be made for them?
I do not know what it could be made from. There is nothing official about the fund.
Is there anything in the fund?
I do not know.
Communist Literature (Seizure At Southampton)
43.
asked the Home Secretary whether he is aware that a second-class passenger recently arrived at Southampton with a large quantity of Communist literature, together with literature of a still worse type; whether, after all this had been confiscated, he was allowed to continue his journey to London; and, if so, whether he can explain why this man was not instantly deported?
I presume that the question refers to the case of a first-class passenger who landed at Southampton on the 27th February from the United States of America, and was required to give up certain literature in his possession; and I would refer the Noble Lord to the answer which I gave to questions addressed to me in the case by the hon. Members for East Leyton and Govan on the 7th instant. The answer to the second part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the last part, the passenger is a British subject and I have therefore no power to deport him from the United Kingdom.
Can any literature be worse than Communist literature?
I have not seen any myself.
Scotland
Greenock Unemployed Committee (Convictions)
44.
asked the Secretary for Scotland if his attention has been drawn to the sentence of three months' imprisonment with hard labour passed on 2nd March on four members of the Greenock unemployed committee by the Sheriff's Court at Greenock; and whether, in view of the severity of the sentence, having regard to the evidence adduced against the accused, he is prepared to consider the modification of the sentence?
As the hon. and gallant Member is aware, I am inquiring into this case. My decision will be announced without avoidable delay.
Rates (Arrears)
78.
asked the Secretary for Scotland whether he is aware that, owing to the widespread unemployment in Scotland during the last year, there are very heavy arrears of rates to town and parish councils which cannot meantime be met; and whether he intends to take any action to assist those authorities in bearing this very heavy burden?
I believe it is the case that, owing to the widespread unemploy- ment, the arrears of rates at the close of the current local financial year will be abnormally heavy. If parish councils are unable to meet claims upon them for relief owing to the existence of such arrears or for other reasons the Government are prepared to consider the propriety of making loans from the funds voted by Parliament last Session for relief of unemployment. Apart from this measure of assistance and from contributions towards the cost of approved relief schemes the Government cannot, I am afraid, take any special action in regard to arrears of rates.
79.
asked the Secretary for Scotland whether he is aware that, during the time between July and November of last year, when unemployment benefit was suspended, the parish and town councils incurred extraordinary expenditure, the rates for which fall to be collected this year; and whether he intends to give some measure of relief to those councils?
The reply to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. In the case of parish councils the Act passed last Session enables the councils, with the sanction of the Scottish Board of Heatlh, to borrow money for the purpose of meeting the exceptional expenditure and to spread repayment over a period of years. If parish councils are unable to borrow the money required for relief in the ordinary way, they may apply through the Scottish Board of Health for a loan from the funds voted by Parliament last Session. In the case of town councils, expenditure has been incurred mainly on works instituted for the relief of unemployment, and the Government are assisting town councils by contributing a proportion of the cost.
Temperance (Scotland) Act
80.
asked the Secretary for Scotland if voting areas under the Temperance (Scotland) Act remain as defined for the purpose of the 1920 poll, notwithstanding any change in population which might bring burghs above or below the 25,000 line which separates burghs voting in ward areas from burghs voting as one area?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Nurses (Registration)
81.
asked the Secretary for Scotland whether he is aware that the new Rule (9a) passed by the General Nursing Council for England and Wales, approved by the Minister of Health and now laid upon the Table of the House, permits the names of nurses to be placed on the State Register of Nurses without direct documentary evidence of their credentials and character, as provided for under the existing rule; whether, as is required by the Nurses Registration Act for England and Wales, Section 6 (3), the General Nursing Council for Scotland has been consulted as to this rule; whether it approves of the compilation of the State Register of Nurses upon indirect information supplied by the secretaries of organised bodies of nurses instead of upon documentary evidence supplied direct to the Council; and whether the General Nursing Council for Scotland will be prepared to admit to its register, under the reciprocity agreement, between the two countries, nurses who have obtained admission to the register for England and Wales without furnishing such evidence?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second and third parts of the question, I understand that the General Nursing Council for Scotland has not been consulted in regard to the proposed rule, and does not approve of it. In answer to the fourth part of the question, my information is that, pending the adjustment of this matter, the General Nursing Council for Scotland has not passed any rule providing for the re-registration on the Council's register of nurses already on the register of the General Nursing Council for England and Wales.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the General Nursing Council for Scotland has asked for this rule to be withdrawn?
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there are other institutions in this country which desire it to be retained?
Representations in both senses have reached me.
Is not the whole object of this Rule (9a) to speed up registration, and is not that exactly what nurses throughout the whole country want?
I did not hear my hon. Friend. I should like notice of any further questions.
Peace Treaties
Shipbuilding, Germany
45.
asked the Prime Minister whether the Government are prepared to make representations to our late Allies that they should follow our example to waive their respective claims to the 1,000,000 tons gross of new merchant shipping which, under the reparation Clauses of the Versailles Treaty, Germany has to build during the next five years, and thus prevent the shipyards of our Allies and ourselves being prejudiced in supplying the world's needs for new ships by this reparation tonnage being forced on the market?
Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany undertook to lay down 200,000 gross tons a year for five years commencing from the 10th April, 1920. No such tonnage has, however, as yet been laid down, and in view of the fact that Great Britain and Japan have waived their claims, the maximum that can be required from Germany after 10th April, 1922, is only 40,000 gross tons a year for three years. I believe certain of our Allies intend to have a few vessels laid down in Germany for their account, but I do not think it necessary to make such representations as are suggested by the hon. Member.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, if such tonnage is built, it will prejudicially affect the amount of labour required in shipyards in this country? Does not that interest the Government?
I have just said that it is not being built.
In the future?
United States Army Of Occupation
47.
asked the Prime Minister whether any further communication has been received from the United States Government on the subject of the payment for the United States Army of Occupation; whether this claim will affect the proposed allocation or distribution of the indemnity payments made and to be made by Germany; if so, in what way; and what is being done with the periodical payments made by Germany during the last two months?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. In reply to the second and third parts of the question, I am unable to add anything to the answer given to a question on the same subject by the hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood), and the correspondence then circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT. In reply to the fourth part of the question, these payments are at present being dealt with by the Reparations Commission in accordance with the Inter-Allied Agreements.
Do we understand, as regards the fourth part of the answer, that these payments are being distributed just as before, in spite of the altered conditions created by the United States Note?
There are no altered conditions created by the United States Note. The Reparations Commission is dealing with the whole matter.
Was not the distribution of this money arranged without any reference to the cost of the United States of America's Army of Occupation, and have not the conditions been altered?
I think my hon. and gallant Friend would do better to read the particular terms of the communication from the United States before asking a question in that form.
Do the Reparation Commission recognise the right of the United States to any part of the money in their hands?
That is a question to put to the Reparation Commission. I would only remind my hon. and gallant Friend that the Reparation Commission is dealing with the matter under the Treaty of Versailles, and that the United States are not a party to that Treaty.
77.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Note recently delivered by Mr. R. W. Boyden, asking on behalf of the United States of America for payment of £50,000,000 in respect of the costs incurred by that country in occupying Germany, is the first indication that America intended to make a claim of this kind; what is the present strength of the American forces in Germany; what has been the total expenditure up to the 31st December last in respect of the British forces on the Rhine; whether any part of this expenditure has been repaid by Germany; and whether he will make a statement as to the Government's policy in this matter?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. I understand that the present strength of the American forces in Germany is 2,700. In reply to the third and fourth parts of the question, I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the reply given to a question on this subject asked by the right hon. Member for the South Molton Division on the 23rd ultimo. In reply to the last part of the question, I am unable at present to add anything to the statement made on the 15th instant, in reply to a question by the right hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme.
Reparation Commission (British Delegation)
53.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is the size of the British Delegation to the Reparation Commission; what are the terms of appointment; what are the salaries paid in the aggregate and to each individual; are these sums charged to the accruing sums paid or to be paid by Germany; have any of these expenses on salary account been advanced by the Treasury; does any portion of the salary of Sir John Bradbury or of Mr. Salter continue to be borne by the Treasury as a recurrent annual arrangement; what proportion of the total sum collected on reparation account has gone in expenses of the Reparation Commission at Paris and elsewhere; and have any officials of the British Delegation been promised compensation for loss of office in the event of the Reparation Commission being wound up?
The answer is a long one, and I shall ask leave to circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
The following is the answer:
I am informed that the British Delegation to the Reparation Commission consists of three persons—the Delegate, Assistant Delegate and National General Secretary. The Delegate and Assistant Delegate hold office at His Majesty's pleasure, the National Secretary under the Reparation Commission at one month's notice. The Delegate receives a salary of 100,000 gold marks per annum; the Assistant Delegate receives a sterling salary of £4,000 per annum (inclusive of allowance); the National Secretary 48,000 gold marks per annum. The Delegate and National Secretary also receive an allowance equal to 20 per cent. of salary for additional expenses of foreign residence and an allowance of the same amount for official expenses. The staff of the British Delegation consists of 30 persons at various rates of salary from 7,200 francs to 36,000 gold marks per annum, with allowances for additional expenses of foreign residence of 20 per cent in the case of the more highly paid, and at slightly higher percentage rates in the case of those on lower salaries. The total cost of the salaries and allowances of the staff is 118,800 gold marks, £5,053 sterling, and 294,973 francs per annum. Apart from the British Delegation, there are 229 persons (including the administrative and clerical staff, male and female) of British nationality in the general service of the Reparation Commission and bodies under its control, including Mr. J. A. Salter, C.B., the Secretary-General of the Commission. Mr. Salter receives a salary of 60,000 gold marks per annum and allowances similar to those of the British Delegate and National General Secretary. The salaries and expenses of the Reparation Commission (including those of the British Delegation) are, under Article 240, Part VIII, of the Treaty of Versailles, paid by Germany. They are not charged against Reparation receipts, but are separately remitted by the German Government.
The salaries appropriate to the posts held by them in the Civil Service before their appointment to the Reparation Commission continue in the cases of Sir John Bradbury and 19 other members and officers of the Reparation Commission technically to be borne on the votes of their respective Departments, but no actual payment is made to them. These officers are in consequence permitted to reckon their service with the Reparation Commission for Civil Service pension in consideration of payment to the Exchequer of a contribution representing the value of the privilege as assessed by the Government Actuary. In the case of Mr. Salter, who does not count his service for pension, there is no charge whatever against moneys provided by Parliament. A statement published by the Reparation Commission gives the present annual expenses of the Reparation Commission as 13 million gold marks and the aggregate sums received from and credited to Germany by the Commission in respect of her Peace Treaty obligations as approximately 6½ milliard gold marks. In the case of those civil servants whose service with the Reparation Commission and League of Nations is treated as seconded service the privilege is allowed of returning to their Civil Service appointment on the termination of their engagement with those bodies. In the case of Sir John Bradbury, whose previous Civil Service appointment as Joint Secretary to the Treasury no longer exists, it would be open to the Treasury, in the event of his present appointment being terminated by abolition or re-organisation securing greater economy and efficiency in the working of the Commission, to award a compensation allowance not exceeding the amount of the compensation allowance which would have been awarded to him if he had continued to hold his previous Civil Service appointment and his service therein had been similarly terminated.
57.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if the salary of the chief British representative on the Reparation Commission is a charge on the British Exchequer, and what that salary amounts to?
I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to-day to the Hon. Member for the Eastern Division of Leyton.
German Reparation
70.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, as a result of his recent meeting with the representatives of the Allied Powers in Paris, he is in a position to say what is the total sum which this country can expect in the way of reparation or other payment from the German republic during the next financial year?
Sir R. HORNE: The Reparation Commission is at present considering what sum should be paid by Germany next year, and until their decision is given, I am sorry to be unable to answer the question.Genoa Conference
Vote Of Confidence
Me Chamberlain's Announcement
48.
asked the Prime Minister whether there is any alteration in the date of the Genoa Conference, or in the arrangements for its assembly; whether the agenda has yet been drawn up; if so, whether it can be laid upon the Table; and whether he can yet state the names of the British representatives to attend the Genoa Conference?
No, Sir, the Conference will take place, at Genoa on the 10th April as arranged. As regards the second and third parts of the question, I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the reply which I gave to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Dulwich (Sir F. Hall) on 6th March, to which up to date there is nothing to add. As regards the last part of the question, the representatives of Great Britain will be the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
I should like to take this opportunity of stating to the House that the Prime Minister, after the rest which, under medical advice, he has been compelled to take, will be back in his place in this House upon the 3rd April, and will at once take the opinion of the House on the policy of the Government in regard to the Conference at Genoa.Pending the fuller announcement to be made by the Prime Minister, might I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman can give any information as to whether the agenda for Genoa has been in any way limited in deference to French opinion, and whether any state- ment can be made on the representation at the Genoa Conference of Russia and Germany?
I have nothing to add to what is already known as regards the representation of Russia and Germany, and nothing to add to what I have already said in regard to the preparation of the agenda. The sketch agenda arranged at Cannes was made public at the time. Further examination of the proposals to be laid before the Conference when it is proceeding is now being made by experts of certain of the Powers in London, and their labours are not yet concluded.
May I ask, further, whether the statement to be made by the Prime Minister will be made in relation to any Motion to be placed on the Order Paper?
Yes, Sir, certainly. We intend to put on the Paper a Motion which will clearly raise the question whether the Government in this matter possees the confidence of the House or not. The whole House will recognise that it would be impossible for us to ask the Prime Minister to go to Genoa if there were any doubt about the authority which he possessed.
Has the Leader of the House communicated to the Prime Minister the result of the recent meeting of his own followers?
Sir Basil Zaharoff
49.
asked the Prime Minister whether Sir Basil Zaharoff, G.C.B., G.B.E., has been financially rewarded for his help and advice on the Eastern question?
I do not understand this question. If my hon. Friend has any charge to formulate, I beg that he will state it in plain language.
May I ask your ruling, Mr. Speaker? My great difficulty is that, according to the Rules of Procedure in this House, it is quite impossible to put down the kind of question which I wish to put down. I have been driven to put down the question in this form because that is the only way in which I can draw attention to the sinister influence of this great multi-millionaire.
That is just the point. An hon. Member is not allowed to make insinuations in the form of a question. There is no Rule of the House that is more clear than that. If the hon. Member has a charge to make, he can make it in the form of a Motion, but not in the form of a question.
Is not such a question, attributing sinister motives to a man who notoriously gave most valuable and disinterested service to the Allies during the War, an abuse of the Rules of the House?
There was a question tendered to me, but I struck out from it all the insinuations.
Is it not a fact that some time ago the Government gave a definite pledge that when these high decorations were given, the reason for giving them would be stated?
I had better see the further question.
Milk Prices
46.
asked the Prime Minister if he is aware that many dairy farmers and smallholders are threatened with bankruptcy by reason of the low prices now offered for their milk by the milk companies, in many cases those prices being no more than one-third of the pre-War price, while taxes and wages, and all costs of production are greatly increased; that there is no corresponding reduction in price to the consumers; and-whether he will appoint a small Committee, representing consumers, producers, and middlemen, to sift out the causes of this state of things with a view to its amelioration?
93.
asked the Minister of Agriculture whether his attention has been called to the fact that, while on 1st April the price of milk to the London public will be 2s. a gallon, the farmers in certain districts will receive only 6d. of this amount, the railway companies 2d., and the distributors 1s. 4d.; and if he proposes to take any steps in this matter?
I have been asked to reply. I am aware that prices now being offered by wholesale milk dealers are much lower than those paid under contract a year ago, but I do not think that in any case a figure less than one-third of the pre-War price—which in 1913 averaged 9d. a gallon delivered in London—or anything approaching this has been offered. In any case it does not follow that the producers will accept the prices offered. The price of milk is a matter which must be settled by bargaining between the producers and buyers. The best way in which farmers can bargain on equal terms is by cooperation among themselves, and individual farmers would be well advised to consult their representative associations before entering into contracts. In any case I do not see how the Government could intervene, since such intervention would mean the re-introduction of food control.
Is it not the case that it is not a question of a desire that control should be re-established, but rather that all sections of the public should have before them the whole of the facts, instead of the confused statements now put out by various Departments?
I sympathise with the desire of my hon. Friend, but I do not see what a Committee such as he proposes could inquire into. As a matter of fact, the prices have not yet been settled in most cases. In a very few cases only they have been settled. Next Thursday, I understand, there is to be a meeting between the representatives of the principal distributing companies and the chief farmers' organisations, to discuss the whole question, and I think a satisfactory solution is far more likely to come in that way than by any form of Government intervention.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the margin between the wholesaler and the retailer very often is 6d. and 8d. per gallon, where it was only 2d. and 2½d. when it was under control, and also that, where the farmer in a good many cases to-day receives 1s. 2d. and 1s. 4d. per gallon, the milk is sold retail to the consumer at 2s. 6d. and 2s. 8d. per gallon?
Is it not the fact that at all events the London wholesalers have fixed their price? I have had a list given to me this morning in which the price for May, June and July is fixed at 7d. per gallon, from which carriage to London has to be deducted.
I understand that that is a figure which has been offered, but I have studied this matter very carefully, and I can assure my hon. Friend that in very few cases have these offers been accepted up to the present. With regard to the question put by the hon. Member for Heywood (Mr. Halls) the only answer to him would be the re-introduction of milk control. These controls, however, were abolished by general agreement, and I think that no body of men objected to the controls more than the farmers themselves.
Estimates (Memoranda)
50.
asked the Lord Privy Seal whether he can arrange for the other Departments presenting Estimates for 1922–23 to follow the example of the Secretary of State for War and issue a memorandum summarising the recommendations of the Geddes Committee and the proposed action to be taken by the Department concerned?
The Navy and Air Estimates are, as usual, accompanied by explanatory statements, and my hon. and gallant Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury will, as usual, issue a memorandum on the Civil Service Estimates.
Friendly Societies Returns (Fees)
61.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it is proposed to adopt the Geddes Committee's recommendation with regard to taxation of 10s. per annum and 10s. every five years for complying with the requirements of the Friendly Society Acts and Registry Office; and is he aware of the fact that the adoption of such a suggestion would mean that a centralised society would only incur a total tax of £3 over a period of five years whereas an affiliated order having, say, 4,000 small branches would be charged £12,000 in the same period?
I would refer the hon. Member to the reply to a question put by the hon. and gallant Member for Hulme on the 13th instant.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many of these friendly societies carry out work not of an industrial character, but simply giving relief to members when sick, and will he prevent that good work being done by taxation?
Hon. Members are inclined to treat this matter as if it had been decided. No decision has yet been come to at all.
Budget
51.
asked the Lord Privy Seal if the Budget will be introduced before or after Easter?
56.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer when it is proposed to introduce the Budget?
74.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can now state, approximately, the date of the introduction of the Budget?
I am not yet in a position to name a date.
That hardly replies to my question. Is it before Easter, or after?
Food Prices
52.
asked the Lord Privy Seal whether, having regard to the maintenance of high retail prices for essential foodstuffs, including bread, meat, and milk, and also for coal, notwithstanding the great reduction in the costs of production, the Government will appoint a committee to inquire into the matter and to advise as to the steps which could best be taken to put a stop to this profiteering by retail traders?
I have been asked to reply. My hon. and gallant Friend will find on reference to the reports of Committees appointed under the Profiteering Act that in such of the cases referred to as were investigated the Committees find no evidence of an inflation of prices consequent upon combinations of distributors. That Act has now determined; but the Government see no reason to change the view then expressed that normal competition between distributors affords the best security to the consumer against inflation of price.
Income Tax
Officers' Children (Allowances)
55.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether his attention has been called to a communication from the Income Taxpayers' Society which was addressed to the Inland Revenue on the 14th February last, calling attention to the many cases of hardship suffered by children of deceased officers by reason of the fact that the allowances granted to them by Royal Warrants in 1914, 1917, and 1920 have been included with the income of their mothers, thereby rendering the said allowances subject to Income Tax; and whether he is now in a position to state whether relief from Income Tax can be granted in these cases?
The matter referred to in the communication to which my hon. Friend refers has been brought to my notice on more than one occasion. I would refer in particular to the reply given by me on the 20th October last to the hon. and gallant Member for Moss Side. I am sending my hon. Friend a copy.
Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that the question to which he has referred me had special reference to the pensions paid to officers' widows, and is it not a fact that the point raised by the Income Taxpayers' Society is that the pension is not a pension to the widow but to the children, and that the Royal Warrant of 1914 definitely so provides; and that it was only for the administrative convenience of the Government that in warrants subsequent to 1914 these pensions were paid to the children through their widowed mothers?
Employés (Assessment)
58.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether his attention has been called to the differentiation made under the Income Tax Acts between the employé of a public company and the employé of a firm, whereby the former is assessed for his remuneration on the basis of the income of the current year while the income of the latter is assessed on the basis of the three preceding years; and whether he will take steps to remove this anomaly, which is the cause of much dissatisfaction and hardship at the present time, by providing for the assessment of individuals on a uniform basis?
I am aware of the differentiation to which my hon. Friend refers, and the matter is receiving careful consideration. I am not, however, in a position to make any statement at the moment.
European States (British Loans)
60.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how much money has been loaned or guaranteed since the Armistice to various countries in Europe, including Allies, neutrals, late enemy States, and the new States created since the War; and what proportion of these loans have been repaid?
I would refer the hon. Member to the figures published in the Annual Finance Accounts of the United Kingdom.
Anglo-Persianoilcompany
62.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, under the agreement entered into in May, 1914, between the Government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the Government are entitled at any time to sell their holding of 5,000,000 shares in the company; and whether the nomination of ex-officio directors with a right of veto would lapse in case His Majesty's Government were to sell the whole or any part of their holding?
The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The answer to the second part is in the negative, except in the event of an alteration of tihe Articles of Association of the company.
Has the Government considered realising the very large profit which this investment now shows?
In answer to the question and to many observations which have been made on the matter, there is no approach to any question of decision on such a matter at the present time.
Dollar Standard (Austria)
63.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if the Austrian Government and the Austro-Hungarian Bank have adopted the dollar as the standard for the general basis of calculation?
I have no information as to this matter, and do not know what my hon. Friend has in mind.
British Debt (United States)
64.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer when the instalments are due of the interest on the loan in the United States of America; and if any instalments have been paid?
I presume the hon. Member refers to the debt due to the United States Government. On this matter I have nothing to add to the answer I gave to the hon. Member on the 27th October last.
66.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether any demand has been received from the Government of the United States of America for payment of interest on the British debt during the coming financial year; and, if so, whether a similar demand has been presented to the other European Governments which are debtors of the United States?
The answer to both parts of the question is in the negative, but the understanding arrived at with the American Government in 1919 was that interest should be postponed for a period of three years, and as that term elapses this year, we are making provision in the Budget of 1922–23 to pay the half-year's interest falling due in the autumn.
in the absence of any formal demand from the United States Government, will this payment be made?
If the right hon. Gentleman reads the American Press and follows the action of Congress and the Senate in America, he will realise that there is no anticipation of letting off this country from any payment which is due, and I am certainly not one to ask that it should be let off.
In what month is that interest due?
The first interest will become due in October or November.
In view of the fact that payment can only be made mainly by the export of goods from this country to America, will the right hon. Gentleman represent to the American Government that the most convenient way of making that payment is to reduce the import duties on our goods coming into America?
I do not propose to make any conditions to the United States Government for the payment of our due obligations.
Entertainments Duty
65.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he can state the amount of revenue derived from the Entertainments Duty for the 11 months ended the 28th of February last, and also for the corresponding period of the previous year; and whether he can say what proportion of the total is derived from cinema theatres?
The amounts of Entertainments Duty paid in the periods of 11 months ended 28th February, 1921, and 28th February, 1922, were £10,678,000 and £9,327,800, respectively. Owing to the fact that a considerable part of the duty is collected by means of the sale of Government tickets and stamps, it is not possible to state the yield of the duty in respect of any particular class of entertainment.
Old Age Pension Officers
71.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it is proposed or has been decided to alter the remuneration and other conditions of ser- vice of old age pension officers appointed or employed by the Treasury for duty in London and elsewhere; if so, will he furnish full particulars of that proposal or decision and of the previous arrangements as to remuneration and other conditions of service of pension officers; and will he state how the existing pension officers are affected as regards remuneration and other conditions of service?
I assume that the right hon. Member is referring to women pension officers employed in the Customs and Excise Department in London and certain provincial towns. At present these officers are employed in a temporary capacity, but it has been decided to form an established class of women pension officers, and consideration is being given to the claims of the temporary officers for appointment to the new class. I am sending to the right hon. Member a statement showing the pay and conditions of service in the new class and the pay of the existing temporary officers.
The following is a copy of the statement promised:
Statement showing (1) the rates of pay of temporary women pension officers employed in the Customs and Excise Department and (2) the rates of pay and conditions of service in the new permanent Departmental class of women pension officers.
(1) Rates of pay of temporary women pension officers:
- £3 4s. a week on appointment.
- £3 14s. a week on completion of three months' approved service.
- £3 19s. a week on completion of six months' approved service.
(2) Rates of pay and conditions of service in the established Departmental class of women pension officers:
Normal age limits for recruits.—25–35.
Salary scale.—£100—£10—£160, thence by £15 to £250, plus cost of living bonus.
Annual leave.—30 days for the first five years, and 36days thereafter.
Hours.—Eight a day on the average based on a 44-hour week. Saturday is ordinarily a half day.
Recruitment.—The method of recruitment under normal conditions has been reserved for further consideration. For the present recruitment is by selection from the existing temporary women pension officers and other suitable women who have served in Government employment for a period of at least two years since August, 1914.
Customs Clearances, Grimsby
73.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that, complaint having been made to the Treasury with regard to a parcel which arrived at Grimsby for Stewart McDonald, Glasgow, on 5th November, and had not reached the consignee before the middle of February, a letter was written from the Department to the complainants stating that the parcel had arrived on the 5th November, and that the usual notice of arrival was sent to the addressee on 12th November, but that the documents and remittance necessary for the clearance of the parcels not having reached Grimsby in response to that notice, a duplicate was sent on the 1st February; whether he is aware that the addressees allege that they did not receive the notice which is stated to have been posted on 12th November; and whether, in view of the congestion of such parcels, which has been admitted to exist at the arrival depots, he will see that arrangements are made for sending a second notice within reasonable time to the addressees and avoiding inconvenience in such eases?
I understand that the facts are as stated in the first and second parts of the question. As regards the third part, under existing arrangements a reminder is sent to addresses of post parcels when no reply is received to the first notice within a reasonable period, but the hon. Member will realise that the issue of such reminders must be subordinate to the need for sending out the first notices with the least possible delay.
Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that nearly two months elapsed before the supplementary notice was sent, and would it not be convenient to send them to the town of their destina- tion to be dealt with there? Would not that facilitate matters?
No reply was sent to the first notice, but the fault does not lie with the Custom House.
With whom does it lie?
War Pensions And Profits
75.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he has considered the possibility of raising by loan part of the sum payable for war pensions, with a view to the reduction of taxation?
Yes, Sir. This is one among a very large number of proposals which have been considered.
76.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Government have now definitely abandoned the idea of placing a special tax on profits made during and by reason of the War?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Ex-Service Men(Land Settlement, Scotland)
82.
asked the Secretary for Scotland how many ex-service men have been trained at Crailstone, Aberdeen; how many of these have been settled on the land; whether schemes for the settlement of ex-service men at the farms of Whitemyres and Danestone, within four miles of Aberdeen, have been prepared and approved; if so, on what dates these were submitted to and approved by the Board of Agriculture; whether the above-named farms are being secured for the settlement of ex-service men; and, if not, for what reason?
The number of ex-service men trained at Craibstone is 176. Of these, five have been settled on the land. The Board have had under consideration schemes for the settlement of ex-service men on the farms referred to by my hon. and gallant Friend. A definite decision has not been reached in respect of Whitemyres farm, but the proposals affecting Danestone have been abandoned on account of the cost involved.
Can the right hon. Gentleman answer my question which asks how long the Board has had this scheme under consideration?
I cannot give the precise period. Certainly for some time.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is a feeling abroad in Scotland that the Board of Agriculture is taking far too long to consider these schemes, thereby holding up land settlement?
I do not think that arises out of the question, but I shall be prepared to meet my hon. Friend afterwards.
Postal Facilities, Galloway
83.
asked the Postmaster-General whether he is aware that a resident tenant farmer, living 4¾ miles from Bargrennan post office, in Galloway, and paying a yearly rent of £1,084, Income Tax £430, local (occupier's) rates £76, together with his shepherds and workpeople, can only get a delivery of letters on three days a week; and will he take steps to restore the pre-War postal facilities to Palgown?
This case has been fully considered. I regret that, in view of the expense which would be involved, and of the very small amount of correspondence which would benefit, I am unable to meet my hon. and gallant Friend's wishes.
Is my right hon. Friend aware that inadequate postal facilities in rural districts create a sense of isolation, which tends to encourage migration to the towns; and will he decline to sanction further postal facilities in urban areas until people carrying on their business in the country, within reasonable distance of a post office, can have a daily delivery of letters?
As the hon. Member knows, the Postmaster-General has gone very carefully into this question on more than one occasion, but it is not a paying proposition. That is why it has not been adopted.
Is not this a crying grievance in many isolated parts of Scotland?
It is, naturally, a grievance, but we have to look at the matter from the whole point of view.
What have you done with the £10,000,000?
Paper Workers'union
(by Private Notice) asked the Minister of Labour whether he is aware that there is a dispute between the Paper Workers' Union and Messrs. Simpkin Marshall, Hamilton and Kent. Limited, with the result that the customers of the said firm, numbering about 600, are precluded from obtaining their supplies, that many of these are ex-service men, dependent for their livelihood on their supply of newspapers, and whether the book trade of the country is being seriously affected, and whether the Minister proposes taking any action in the matter?
I regret that I only received this notice a few minutes ago. No doubt my hon. Friend left it in my room earlier. May I make further inquiry, and communicate with my hon. Friend?
Parliamentary Franchise
I beg to move,
This Bill was introduced in a slightly different form two years ago, but it did not meet with the approval of the House on First Reading, mainly on account of the fact that there was in it a provision that, in the event of persons refusing to obey the law, they should be subjected, if necessary, to imprisonment for one month. That has been altered in the Bill which I now propose to bring in, and I hope, therefore, that the House will allow me to have the First Reading without the necessity of a Division. The result at the General Election of the increase in the electorate in 1918 from 8,500,000 to 21,000,000 people was that only something like 58 per cent. recorded their votes. The total number registered was 21,390,000. If you take away the uncontested seats, in which there were 3,000,000 voters, 18,390,000 were entitled to vote, but only some 10,000,000 odd actually voted. At a time when we are asked by a Bill now before the House even to increase this number of 21,000,000 by several million more, some attention really ought to be paid to the question of getting people to express their opinions at Parliamentary elections. Surely, it is not an undemocratic thing to ask the House to pass a law to compel people to exercise the franchise at Parliamentary elections. After all, a General Election only comes once about every four years, and it is not too much to ask the citizens of this country to do their duty and say whom they wish to represent them. With an increasing electorate it becomes more important than ever. This matter has engaged the attention of other countries. It has been raised in the United States. It is the law in Holland. It is the law in Czecho-Slo-vakia. Perhaps some hon. Members do not know where Czecho-Slovakia is, but I do, and it is a very important State. In Australia, as well, it is the law that people have to register. They are not compelled to vote, but they are compelled to register. This Bill simply says that people must go to the poll. They need not vote for either candidate; they can put a blank paper into the ballot box if they like. There are wide exceptions for illness, distance from the poll, and any reasonable excuse If they can show no reasonable excuse for not having voted, they are made liable for a first offence to a fine not exceeding 10s., and for a second offence to a fine not exceeding £1, or alternatively, seven days in the second division. Perhaps that sounds severe, but, as a matter of fact, in every Act of Parliament passed in recent years there is a penal Clause which says that if people do not obey the law they may be liable to a fine, or even to more severe penalties than seven days in the second division, which we are told by some people is merely a rest cure. I remember very well that on the last occasion on which I introduced this Bill there was a great deal of opposition to it, on account of the fact that there was in it a penalty of one month's imprisonment, but the very next morning I received a yellow paper which, no doubt, many other hon. Members received from the Ministry of Agriculture, asking what was the exact area of carrots, parsnips, and so on grown in one's garden, and at the end it said that if you did not fill in the form correctly you might be liable to three months' imprisonment. I am not quite sure that there was not hard labour attached to it as well. In Holland something on these lines is working very well indeed. Not long ago, I had in this House, as guests, two Dutch legislators, and they said that the law worked very well. "It induces people to take more interest than before in national politics. It is no trouble to people to go and vote. It simply gets hold of people who are too lazy to vote, and makes them do so, and we get a very much better result." I suggest to the Labour party that they would probably get a very much better poll. I am told that in the constituency which I have the honour to represent, Finsbury, 95 per cent. of which is working-class, less than 40 per cent. voted at the last election, and the result is that I am here. The Bill is not at all too drastic, and it will induce people to take more interest in politics."That leave be given to bring in a Bill to promote the wider exercise of the Parliamentary Franchise."
rose—
Does the hon. and gallant Member oppose the Bill?
Yes. It seems to me that the penalty is too drastic and too severe, although it may act very well in Holland and Europe. If my hon. and gallant Friend is really serious, would it not be better, instead of imposing a penalty of seven days, possibly with hard labour, to disfranchise the offender? Surely in this year of grace nobody is going to be forced actually to go to the poll. I do not want to take up the time of the House, but I make that suggestion.
Question, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to promote the wider exercise of the Parliamentary Franchise," put, and agreed to.On a point of Order. I think that you, Sir, have collected the voices.
No one challenged a Division when I put the Question, and it is too late now for hon. Members to take objection. Who is prepared to bring in the Bill?
I was informed that it was not necessary for me to have a supporter.
The Motion must have at least one supporter.
I beg to support the Bill.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Lieut.-Colonel Archer-Shee and Lieut.-Colonel Croft.
Exercise Of The Parliamentary Franchise Bill
"to promote the wider exercise of the Parliamentary Franchise," presented
Division No. 52.]
| AYES.
| [4.11 p.m.
|
Adair, Rear-Admiral Thomas B. S. | Dawson, Sir Philip | Jephcott, A. R. |
Agg-Gardner, Sir James Tynte | Dean, Commander P. T. | Jesson, C. |
Ainsworth, Captain Charles | Denison-Pender, John C. | Jodrell, Neville Paul |
Amery, Leopold C. M. S. | Dockrell, Sir Maurice | Johnstone, Joseph |
Astbury, Lieut.-Com. Frederick W. | Doyle, N. Grattan | Jones, Sir Edgar R. (Merthyr Tydvil) |
Astor, Viscountess | Edge, Captain Sir William | Jones, Sir Evan (Pembroke) |
Atkey, A. R. | Ednam, Viscount | Jones, J. T. (Carmarthen, Llanelly) |
Bagley, Captain E. Ashton | Edwards, Major J. (Aberavon) | Joynson-Hicks, Sir William |
Baird, Sir John Lawrence | Elliot, Capt. Walter E. (Lanark) | King, Captain Henry Douglas |
Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley | Erskine, James Malcolm Monteith | Kinloch-Cooke, Sir Clement |
Balfour, George (Hampstead) | Eyres-Monsell, Com. Bolton M. | Lambert, Rt. Hon. George |
Barlow, Sir Montague | Falle, Major Sir Bertram Godfray | Larmor, Sir Joseph |
Barnes, Rt. Hon. G. (Glas., Gorbals) | Fell, Sir Arthur | Law, Alfred J. (Rochdale) |
Barnett, Major Richard W. | Fisher, Rt. Hon. Herbert A. L. | Lewis, T. A. (Glam., Pontypridd) |
Barnston, Major Harry | FitzRoy, Captain Hon. Edward A. | Lindsay, William Arthur |
Bartley-Denniss, Sir Edmund Robert | Ford, Patrick Johnston | Lloyd, George Butler |
Beauchamp, Sir Edward | Forestier-Walker, L. | Lloyd-Greame, Sir P. |
Beck, Sir Arthur Cecil | Forrest, Walter | Locker-Lampson, G. (Wood Green) |
Beckett, Hon. Gervase | Fraser, Major Sir Keith | Locker-Lampson, Com. O. (H'tingd'n) |
Bell, Lieut.-Col. W. C. H. (Devizes) | Fremantle, Lieut.-Colonel Francis E. | Lorden, John William |
Bellairs, Commander Carlyon W. | Gange, E. Stanley | Lowe, Sir Francis William |
Benn, Sir A. S. (Plymouth, Drake) | Gardiner, James | Lowther, Major C. (Cumberland, N.) |
Benn, Capt. Sir 1. H., Bart. (Gr'nw'h) | Gee, Captain Robert | Lowther, Col. Claude (Lancaster) |
Bentinck, Lord Henry Cavendish- | Gibbs, Colonel George Abraham | Lowther, Maj.-Gen. Sir C. (Penrith) |
Bethell, Sir John Henry | Gilmour, Lieut.-Colonel Sir John | Loyd, Arthur Thomas (Abingdon) |
Betterton, Henry B. | Glyn, Major Ralph | Lyle, C. E. Leonard |
Bird, Sir R. B. (Wolverhampton, W.) | Goulding, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward A. | Lyle-Samuel, Alexander |
Borwick, Major G. O. | Green, Joseph F. (Leicester, W.) | M'Connell, Thomas Edward |
Boscawen, Rt. Hon. Sir A. Griffith- | Greenwood, Rt. Hon. Sir Hamar | Macdonald, Rt. Hon. John Murray |
Bowles, Colonel H. F. | Greig, Colonel Sir James William | Macdonald, Sir M. (Inverness) |
Bowyer, Captain G. W. E. | Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon. Frederick E. | M'Lean, Lieut.-Col. Charles W. W. |
Breese, Major Charles E. | Guinness, Lieut.-Col. Hon. W. E. | McMicking, Major Gilbert |
Brown, Major D. C. | Hacking, Captain Douglas H. | Macnamara, Rt. Hon. Dr. T. J. |
Buchanan, Lieut.-Colonel A. L. H. | Hall, Lieut.-Col. Sir F. (Dulwich) | Macpherson, Rt. Hon. James I. |
Buckley, Lieut.-Colonel A. | Hancock, John George | Macquisten, F. A. |
Bull, Rt. Hon. Sir William James | Harmsworth, C. B. (Bedford, Luton) | Malialieu, Frederick William |
Burdon, Colonel Rowland | Harmsworth, Hon. E. C. (Kent) | Marks, Sir George Croydon |
Burn, Col. C. R. (Devon, Torquay) | Harris, Sir Henry Percy | Marriott, John Arthur Ransome |
Butcher, Sir John George | Haslam, Lewis | Middlebrook, Sir William |
Campion, Lieut.-Colonel W. R. | Hennessy, Major J. R. G. | Mildmay, Colonel Rt. Hon. F. B. |
Carew, Charles Robert S. | Herbert, Col. Hon. A. (Yeovil) | Molson, Major John Elsdale |
Casey, T. W. | Herbert, Dennis (Hertford, Watford) | Mond, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred Moritz |
Cecil, Rt. Hon. Evelyn (Birm., Aston) | Hilder, Lieut.-Colonel Frank | Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C. |
Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord H. (Ox. Univ.) | Hills, Major John Waller | Morrison, Hugh |
Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. J. A. (Birm., W.) | Hinds, John | Morrison-Bell, Major A. C. |
Cheyne, Sir William Watson | Hoare, Lieut.-Colonel Sir S. J. G. | Munro, Rt. Hon. Robert |
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S. | Holbrook, Sir Arthur Richard | Murray, John (Leeds, West) |
Cobb, Sir Cyril | Hope, Lt.-Col. Sir J. A. (Midlothian) | Nail, Major Joseph |
Colfox, Major Wm. Phillips | Hope, J. D (Berwick & Haddington) | Neal, Arthur |
Calvin, Brig.-General Richard Beale | Hopkins, John W. W. | Newman, Colonel J. R. P. (Finchley) |
Coote, Colin Reith (Isle of Ely) | Hopkinson, A. (Lancaster, Mossley) | Newman, Sir R. H. S. D. L. (Exeter) |
Courthope, Lieut.-Col. George L. | Home, Sir R. S. (Glasgow, Hilthead) | Newton, Sir Douglas |
Cowan, D. M. (Scottish Universities) | Howard, Major S. G. | Nicholl, Commander Sir Edward |
Cowan, Sir H. (Aberdeen and Kinc.) | Hunter, General Sir A. (Lancaster) | Nicholson, Brig.-Gen. J. (Westminster). |
Craik, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry | Hunter-Weston, Lt.-Gen. Sir Aylmer | Nicholson, Reginald (Doncaster) |
Croft, Lieut.-Colonel Henry Page | Hurd, Percy A. | Nicholson, William G. (Petersfield) |
Davies, Alfred Thomas (Lincoln) | Hurst, Lieut.-Colonel Gerald B. | Norman, Major Rt. Hon. Sir Henry |
Davies, Sir David Sanders (Denbigh) | Jackson, Lieut.-Colonel Hon. F. S. | Palmer, Major Godfrey Mark |
Davies, Sir William H. (Bristol, S.) | Jameson, John Gordon | Parker, James |
accordingly, and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Tuesday next, and to be printed. [Bill 57.]
Business Of The House
Motion made, and Question put,
"That the Proceedings of the Committee1 of Supply and on the Reports of the Committee of Supply of the 17th and 9th March he exempted at this day's Sitting from the provisions of the Standing Order (Sittings of the House)."—[Mr. Chamberlain.]
The House divided: Ayes, 251; Noes, 76.
Pease, Rt. Hon. Herbert pike | Scott. Sir Samuel (St. Marylebone) | Warner, Sir T. Courtenay T. |
Pennefather, De Fonblanque | Seely, Major-General Rt. Hon. John | Watson, Captain John Bartrand |
Percy, Lord Eustace (Hastings) | Shortt, Rt. Hon. E. (N'castle-en-T.) | Wheler, Col. Granville C. H. |
Perkins, Walter Frank | Smith, Sir Allan M. (Croydon, South) | Williams, C. (Tavistock) |
Pickering, Colonel Emil W. | Smith, Sir Malcolm (Orkney) | Williams, Lt.-Col. Sir R. (Banbury) |
Pownall, Lieut.-Colonel Assheton | Sprot, Colonel Sir Alexander | Williamson, Rt. Hon. Sir Archibald |
Pratt, John William | Stanley, Major Hon. G. (Preston) | Willoughby, Lieut.-Col. Hon. Claud |
Pretyman, Rt. Hon. Ernest G. | Starkey, Captain John Ralph | Wills, Lt.-Col. Sir Gilbert Alan H. |
Rae, H. Norman | Stephenson, Lieut.-Colonel H. K. | Wilson, Capt. A. S. (Holderness) |
Rankin, Captain James Stuart | Stevens, Marshall | Wilson, Field-Marshal Sir Henrv |
Raper, A. Baldwin | Stewart, Gershom | Wilson, Col. M. J. (Richmond) |
Ratcliffe, Henry Butler | Strauss, Edward Anthony | Windsor, Viscount |
Raw, Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. N. | Sueter, Rear-Admiral Murray Fraser | Winterton, Earl |
Rawlinson, John Frederick Peel | Sugden, W. H. | Wise, Frederick |
Reid, D. D. | Sutherland, Sir William | Wolmer, Viscount |
Remnant, Sir James | Sykes, Colonel Sir A. J. (Knutsford) | Wood, Hon. Edward F. L. (Ripon) |
Roberts, Rt. Hon. G. H. (Norwich) | Taylor, J. | Wood, Sir H. K. (Woolwich, West) |
Roberts, Samuel (Hereford, Hereford) | Thomson, F. C. (Aberdeen, South) | Worthington-Evans, Rt. Hon. Sir L. |
Roberts, Sir S. (Sheffield, Ecclesall) | Thomson, Sir W. Mitchell- (Maryhill) | Yate, Colonel Sir Charles Edward |
Robinson, S. (Brecon and Radnor) | Townley, Maximilian G. | Young, E. H. (Norwich) |
Rodger, A. K. | Townshend, Sir Charles Vere Ferrers | Young, W. (Perth & Kinross, Perth) |
Roundell, Colonel R. F. | Vickers, Douglas | Younger, Sir George |
Royds, Lieut. Colonel Edward | Waddington, R. | |
Samuel, A. M. (Surrey, Farnham) | Walters, Rt. Hon. Sir John Tudor | TELLERS FOR THE AYES.— |
Sanders, Colonel Sir Robert Arthur | Ward, Col. J. (Stoke-upon-Trent) | Colonel Leslie Wilson and Mr. |
Scott, Leslie (Liverpool, Exchange) | Waring, Major Walter | McCurdy. |
NOES.
| ||
Archer-Shee, Lieut.-Colonel Martin | Grundy, T. W. | Parkinson, John Allen (Wigan) |
Asquith, Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry | Guest, J. (York, W. R., Hemsworth) | Richardson, R. (Houghton-le-Spring) |
Banbury, Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick G. | Gwynne, Rupert S. | Royce, William Stapleton |
Barker, G. (Monmouth, Abertillery) | Hall, F. (York, W.R., Normanton) | Shaw, Thomas (Preston) |
Barton, Sir William (Oldham) | Hallas, Eldred | Short, Alfred (Wednesbury) |
Bell, James (Lancaster, Ormskirk) | Halls, Walter | Smith, W. R. (Wellingborough) |
Benn, Captain Wedgwood (Leith) | Hartshorn, Vernon | Spencer, George A. |
Blair, Sir Reginald | Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (Widnes) | Sutton, John Edward |
Bowerman, Rt. Hon. Charles W. | Hirst, G. H. | Swan, J. E. |
Bramsdon, Sir Thomas | Hodge, Rt. Hon. John | Thomas, Rt. Hon. James H. (Derby) |
Brown, James (Ayr and Bute) | Irving, Dan | Thomas, Brig.-Gen. Sir O. (Anglesey) |
Cairns, John | Jones, J. J. (West Ham, Silvertown) | Thomson, T. (Middlesbrough, West} |
Carter, W. (Nottingham, Mansfield) | Kenyon, Barnet | Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton, E.) |
Cecil, Rt. Hon. Lord R. (Hitchin) | Kiley, James Daniel | Thorne, W. (West Ham, Plalstow) |
Clynes, Rt. Hon. John R. | Lawson, John James | Tillett, Benjamin |
Craig, Captain C. C. (Antrim, South) | Lunn, William | Walsh, Stephen (Lancaster, Ince) |
Davies, Evan (Ebbw Vale) | Maclean, Rt. Hn. Sir D. (Midlothian) | Waterson, A. E. |
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton) | Malone, C. L. (Leyton, E.) | Watts-Morgan, Lieut.-Col. D. |
Edwards, C. (Monmouth, Bedwellty) | Mills, John Edmund | Wedgwood, Colonel Josiah C. |
Edwards, G. (Norfolk, South) | Mosley, Oswald | White, Charles F. (Derby, Western) |
Finney, Samuel | Murray, Hon. A. C. (Aberdeen) | Wignall, James |
Foot, Isaac | Murray, Dr. D. (Inverness & Ross) | Wintringham, Margaret |
Galbraith, Samuel | Myers, Thomas | Wood, Major M. M. (Aberdeen, C.) |
Gillis, William | Naylor, Thomas Ellis | Young, Robert (Lancaster, Newton) |
Graham, R. (Nelson and Colne) | O'Connor, Thomas P. | TELLERS FOR THE NOES.— |
Graham, W. (Edinburgh, Central) | Oman, Sir Charles William C. | Mr. Hogge and Mr. T. Griffiths. |
Board Op Education Scheme (Dewsbury Endowed Schools Foundation) Confirmation Bill
Order [16th March] that the Bill be committed to a Standing Committee read, and discharged.
Bill committed to a Committee of the Whole House for To-morrow.—[ Colonel Leslie Wilson.]
Port Of London And Midland Railway Bill
Reported, with Amendments; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
Blackburn Corporation Bill
Reported, with Amendments [Title amended]; Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
Married Women (Presumption Of Coercion Removal) Bill
"to amend the Law with regard to the presumption of coercion in the case of offences committed by married women," presented by Viscountess ASTOR; to be read a Second time To-morrow, and to be printed. [Bill 56.]
New Member Sworn
Sir MURDOCH MACDONALD, K. C. M. G., C. B., for County of Inverness, Ross and Cromarty (Inverness Division).
Standing Committees (Chairmen's Panel)
Sir SAMUEL ROBERTS reported from the Chairmen's Panel: That they had appointed Mr. James Henry Thomas to act as Chairman of Standing Committee A (in respect of the Child Murder (Trial) Bill).
Report to lie upon the Table.
Selection (Standing Committees)
Standing Committee A
Sir SAMUEL ROBERTS reported from the Committee of Selection; That they had added the following Ten Members to Standing Committee A (in respect of the Child Murder (Trial) Bill): Mr. C. D. Murray, Viscountess Astor, Sir John Baird, Sir James Greig, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Munro, Mr. Shortt, Mr. Leslie Scott, Colonel Wedgwood, and Mr. Aneurin Williams.
Report to lie upon the Table.
Ecclesiastical Tithe Rent-Charges (Rates) Bill
Reported, with Amendments, from Standing Committee A.
Report to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.
Minutes of the Proceedings of the Standing Committee to be printed.
Bill, as amended (in the Standing Committee), to be taken into consideration upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 58.]
Notices Of Motion
Old Age Pensions
On this day two weeks, to call attention to the question of old age pensions, and to move a Resolution.—[ Mr. Myers.]
Finance (Parliamentary Control)
On this day two weeks, to call attention to the question of Parliamentary control of finance, and to move a Resolution.—[ Captain W. Benn.]
Agriculture
On this day two weeks, to call attention to the heavy burdens on British agriculture, and to move a Resolution.—[ Lieut.-Colonel Guinness.]
Royal Irish Constabulary
On this day two weeks, to call attention to the desperate plight of members of the Royal Irish Constabulary in Ireland.—[ Major McLean.]
Orders Of The Day
Supply
Air Estimates, 1922–23
Captain Guest's Statement
Order for Committeee read.
I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
I will as shortly as possible review the operations, activities and prospects of the Department over which I preside. The House will remember that last year, on the Motion that Mr. Speaker do leave the Chair, a general statement was made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies. At that time he was unable to remain for the Estimates and committed them to my charge. My right hon. Friend went on a mission to Egypt, where he presided over the Middle Eastern Committee, the results of which we are beginning to see to day. On 1st April, shortly after the introduction of the Estimates, the Air Ministry was for the second time given a separate Secretary of State, and to-day it is the first time that the Estimates are being presented by a Secretary of State who is responsible for that Department. My first observation in presenting these Estimates is to give expression to the satisfaction which has been felt, not only by those in charge of the Department, both Ministers and senior officers, but by the whole of the Royal Air Force, with the announcement made last week by the Leader of the House in connection with the separate and autonomous existence of the Ministry. At the risk of wearying the House I will mention two of the foundations upon which in future we shall rest. The Air Force must be autonomous in matters of administration and education, and in the case of defence against air raids the Army and Navy must play a secondary role. In this connection I think the House would be interested if I elaborated by a very little only the remarks made by the Leader of the House last week on the question whether it is peculiar that we alone of all the nations of the world have decided to establish or have approved of the existence of a separate Ministry. There are two great countries where this subject is causing a great deal of anxiety and, I might say, almost of consternation, due entirely to the unsatisfactory state of affairs which exists in those countries. In America I understand that the highest opinions are divided, and that some of the most influential are very much impressed by the separate organisation that we have in this country. In France, where aviation has been given a great impetus by the Government, I notice that a Commission which has been reporting to the Chamber Committee on military affairs has found it within its province to recommend that in its opinion aviation will never have its proper influence and take its proper place until it is given complete autonomy and independence. Therefore it is quite clear that what we have done is being very closely watched, and I for one shall not be surprised if our example is not very shortly followed. I turn now to a short résume of our activities during the past year, and I think it would be most useful if I began by giving an outline of the allocation of the forces under our control. Previous to the economies effected under the Geddes Committee, the Air Force consisted of 32½ fighting units. Some of the units are sections of squadrons, and therefore I can give the facts only in somewhat broad figures. The reduction in the service strength which we have effected under the Geddes Committee recommendations are the equivalent of two squadrons, and the reduction in our training schools may also be considered by those who understand the service to be equivalent to two more service units. So we are in fact the equivalent of four service units weaker than we were before the Government went into the question of economies under the recommendations of the Geddes Committee.Two full squadrons?
The equivalent. We have still at our disposal 31½, and of these 19½ are abroad. I am very anxious that the House should appreciate what that means. They are allocated as follows: India, 6; Iraq, 8; Egypt, 3; Palestine, 1; and in the Mediterranean doing naval co-operation work, l½. At home we have 12, but the 12 have a variety of functions to perform and may be best divided as follows: One is doing miscellaneous work, and is a communication squadron at Kenley; one is definitely allocated, practically permanently, to Army co-operation; three are in reserve; and three, under the new scheme which I shall outline later, will be our first modest preparation for home defence. A criticism may be raised some time this evening, and it would perhaps be simpler if I replied to it now in anticipation. As far as the cost of the Air Force is concerned it may be objected that the squadrons in India are paid for by the Indian Government, and those in Iraq by the Colonial Office. That is true, but in order to provide these units it is necessary to have additional training establishments and increased stores and depots at home.
The House would be interested were I to quote a few examples of what the Air Force is doing in different parts of the Empire. These examples will also serve to illustrate the fact that Air Force action is less temporary than Army action, and the object of my quoting a few of these stories is to prove two things. One is that under certain conditions, such as the patrolling and policing of semi-civilised portions of our Empire, the Air Force is not only quicker in its action, but that in its cost it is far less, and I think also that in its action it is more humane. Secondly, the effects are certainly not less lasting than those obtained by military expeditions. Everyone knows enough of the history of the Indian frontier to know that military action there has never achieved finality. Similarly, in the new Dependencies in the Middle East, we have already had evidence that even strong military action does not bring about final settlement. I do not suggest that we have yet proved that the results of air action are more lasting than the result of army action, but, if properly carried out, they are certainly no less so, and, in addition, where suitable opportunity is afforded for air force action, the evidence would seem to indicate that air action is as effective. The incident of Somaliland in 1920, will still be in the recollection of the House. On that occasion a considerable military expedition had been undertaken and a great deal of money had been spent in the attempt to quell the Mad Mullah. At last, somewhat late in the proceedings, an independent air force was invited to assist, and they were able within a very few weeks to completely destroy the rebellious rising and to bring not only the penalty, in the form of fines, into the Government, but to entirely disperse the enemy forces. The money which was spent was a fraction compared with the cost of the military expedition. Curiously enough a further incident has arisen in the same country within the last few weeks which is to a certain extent an Air Force romance. Trouble arose somewhat similar to that to which I have referred, and the governor considered it necessary that troops should be dispatched. The flight commander at Aden was asked to send out the two only aeroplanes there to see whether peaceful conditions could be restored, and to assist, as far as he could, the military. There was some anxiety as to whether this was not a considerable undertaking for so small a unit, but they went, and I think I am right in saying that within two days the tribe had surrendered and had passed into the Government three thousand or four thousand head of cattle and the two aeroplanes were back at Aden within a week. The flight across the Red Sea was certainly not less than 80 miles. In Iraq, of course, there are more object lessons to support what I have set out to prove. There it is now a question as to whether the effect of Air Force control, is not at least as valuable, and permanent, as that which is obtained by military expeditions. In Iraq there have been a number of opportunities of proving the value of the Air Force as a means of policing large unsettled areas. In this' connection operations in the districts of Sularmaniyah and Halabja provide a striking example of the effectiveness of the Air Force in suppressing disorder. In May of 1919 a coup d'etât was attempted by Sheik Mahmud. It took an expedition of two brigades to suppress that outbreak, and it took them two and a-half months to do it. An almost exactly similar outbreak occurred in January this year, less than three years after the first. This second outbreak was dealt with by the Air Force and was suppressed in a week by eight aeroplanes. There are also great tracts of country in these particular areas, with which we are dealing, which are almost inacessible, except with great preparation and at great cost, to ground forces. The marshy lands lying between the two rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, the mountains, which in many places are devoid of roads, could only be dealt with by a military force after long and costly preparation. These areas can be, and are being, daily patrolled by the Air Force and its success in the suppression of disturbances where necessary has been frequent and effective. There is another point which I think the House will appreciate, and it is, that in these countries the only way in which military forces can keep tribes in subjection is by placing garrisons. In semi-civilised countries that is just asking for trouble. It offers the one opportunity that the natives are looking for, and that is, something to come and sit round and strike at, in the hope of eventually getting some rifles or some loot. We have, I regret to say, had several detachments cut off in this country, but we propose in the future, when the transfer takes place, to adopt the more modern method of patrolling the country from a distance, and of keeping our base well back among our friendly tribes and far out of reach of any marauding bands. In Iraq, also, an opportunity is afforded of carrying out one of our operational performances which may bring in its train an opportunity for civil aviation there, and that is the development of the desert route. During the year we have established a line by air, as a communication between Cairo and Bagdad. Both from the operational and the trading point of view, this is a great advance. By this means quantities of official and public mails are carried from Cairo to Bagdad, and it is used for reinforcements of aeroplanes. It will be of enormous advantage, as will be appreciated by those who have suffered in these hot countries. Besides that, it provides a considerable economy. It enables us to send to the eight squadrons of Bagdad all their spares, new machines, and impedimenta by this route in two or three days, instead of packing them all in crates and sending them round by the Persian Gulf and taking 24 days to do it. The whole of this route is covered in two flights, one from Cairo to Amman and the other from Amman to Bagdad. The total distance is about 900 miles and the record flying is seven and a half hours. There is a story of a forced landing in connection with this route which will interest those who have played some part in flying matters, and it shows that we are rapidly becoming the handy men which our sister Service has claimed to be for so long. It appears that some time ago an aeroplane fell from the formation owing to some kind of engine trouble. It came to the ground somewhere in the desert hundreds of miles from anywhere. The personnel were picked up by another aeroplane and the disabled craft was left in the deseit. In a few hours, by means of air transport, the necessary spare parts were brought to it by another machine. It was repaired in the middle of the desert and within three days from the time of the accident the aeroplane had flown away to its original destination. We have also to draw the attention of the House to the operations which are taking place in Trans-Jordania. Amman is the headquarters of that section and we keep two aeroplanes there for the purpose of the desert service and forwarding mails. There the prestige of the Air Force is very high as was proved on a recent occasion when the Emir Abdullah found it necessary to send a force to visit the district of Kerak where there was constant faction fighting and no taxes were being paid. The Emir asked the Air Force to help; the aeroplanes arrived just as the political officer with his gendarmerie was entering the town. The aeroplanes merely manœuvred over the town and fired a few Verey lights. So startled were the opposing factions that they fell into each others arms, took refuge in each others houses and, in face of the common danger, very soon settled their differences. From the few examples I have given, the House will gather how quick, effective, and cheap can be the use of this new arm. I pass from that, the romantic side of flying activity, to the more solid but equally necessary department of training. It must be remembered in this connection that the Air Force has been built up almost entirely in the last three years, and that the period through which we have gone has had to be devoted to consolidation and regulation. As hon. Members who have been in the Army or Navy will know, a new service requires immense quantities of books, regulations, manuals, and treatises of every size and description. Upon them any organised force must rest. From the point of view of the Air Force, the subject is, if I may say so, even more complicated and technical than those subjects with which the other services have to deal. Manuals, regulations, and books of instructions have had to be most carefully provided, although it is not sought to bind the service by too much red tape. That has been carried out actively during the last year. With these merely general introductory remarks I may proceed to give some details of several Very important training centres upon which we depend. We have first of all the college at Cranwell in Lincolnshire built luckily for us during the War by the Admiralty who were famed for the excellence of the bricks and mortar which they provided during that period. That is the home of our future chiefs of the Air Staff. It is in that college now that we are training from earliest youth, in the secrets and science of this complicated Service, the young men upon whom Britain in the next 20 years or for the next two generations will have to depend. The college turned out its first draft last year of 29 officers and we regard that as a milestone of some importance. There are still 91 pupils in the college and another 49 will pass out in the course of the year. The reports which I have received from there are extremely high, and to give an instance two of our officers whose names and whose service were not known to the judges, received the first and second prizes in an open competition for an aeronautical essay. The second school of importance is the training school for boy mechanics which is at Halton and at Cranwell. When Halton is completed, we shall have nearly all of them there but at present they are divided, there being rather more at Cranwell than at Halton, The work undertaken by these boys can be best outlined if I may draw the attention of the House to one or two notes on that subject. The school opened in 1920. For some time the entries were not very large, since parents wished to wait until the system had proved itself. It is gratifying to be able to announce that in the course of the last 12 months candidates of the very best class have been coming forward in large numbers, and there is already considerable competition for entry. The boys enter by examination, and the majority have to obtain nominations from their local education authorities. It is not surprising that competition for entry is keen, since the technical and general education given is of a very high standard. This training school was inspected during the summer by representatives of the Board of Education, who spent three days going closely into the details of the instruction given there. This report was very satisfactory. They considered that its operation would do much to remove the objections that are frequently urged against the effects of military training upon young boys. There is no doubt that this training is proving a benefit to these boys who at the impressionable age of from 15 to 18 are given a first-class education, intellectual, moral and physical. The number of boys now under training is 1,700, and the first draft will pass out this year. When they pass out they are normally classified as leading aircraftmen, but those who have done exceptionally well will pass out direct as corporals, and those of outstanding superiority may pass direct into commissioned ranks. Passing from those three fountains of our flying inspiration, there are besides some new schools that we have opened this year for intensive flying training for older officers. We have, for example, the courses at the flying training schools for short service officers. We have more than 160 officers and airmen now learning to fly in these schools. The course is 10 months. In connection with the economies which have been made, one of these schools has been abolished, and the training hitherto undertaken there will now be distributed between some of the service squadrons in England. We hope that to a certain extent we may make up for the loss we sustain in the abolition of the training school, by distributing pupils amongst other service units and trying to teach them as well as we can with the spare aeroplanes of those units. We have, how-over, opened a school for which the service has been waiting, and from which we hope and expect the greatest things, and that is the Staff College at Andover. The urgent need for the establishment of such a college has made itself felt for the last two years. The Staff College is quite a new departure, and it is the first of its kind in the world. We are the only country which will have the advantage of a highly-trained Air Staff, and I can assure the House that the Air Force can no more be run efficiently without a trained staff than can either the Army or the Navy. The problems are just as complicated, just as far-reaching, and quite different. A new school for which we have been waiting a long time we have at last found ourselves able to start at Eastchurch. It will be a school of armament and gunnery, and now for the first time since the War can we go ahead with the training of that great potential weapon, the aircraft bomb. This school will enable us to bring our efficiency in using and in aiming the aircraft bomb to a standard hitherto un-attained. One other movement I would like to mention, because it occurred in the Debate on the Supplementary Estimate last night, and that is what has 'happened at Biggin Hill. Two things have happened there. We have moved the instrument design school from there to Farnborough, which is our great factory, our great arsenal, or shop, upon which so much of our experimental work depends, and we came to the conclusion that it would be economical and practical to shift our instrument design school from Biggin Hill and to quarter it upon Farnborough and thus enable us to economise very considerably in many ways. But in the place of that instrument design school we have been able to make economical use of Biggin Hill for a service which has been entirely neglected since the War, and that is the art of night flying, without which the home defence squadrons would be absolutely useless. Therefore, for the purposes of night flying, the antiaircraft co-operation school, as we call it, at Biggin Hill has been opened. Passing from those operational schools, the House will be anxious to hear about what we are doing in the way of technical training. We have made tremendous efforts, in the face of the very proper and reasonable demands made by the Government upon us for economy, to preserve at all costs the research and scientific foundations upon which we rest, and great progress has been made with the technical education of officers. I would like to direct attention to the fact that the method of technical training adopted in the Air Force is on quite new lines, and that, instead of spending large sums of money in building technical colleges, we are making use of the great civilian Universities and Colleges. This system has been in force now for some little time and is proving very satisfactory. We have, with the help and valuable assistance of the authorities of the University, organised a course for engineering officers at Cambridge University. Special courses for higher training in aeronautical engineering are carried out at the Imperial College of Science and Technology at Kensington. The instruction given at these courses at Cambridge and London provides the best possible training for our engineer officers, and we are most grateful to Professor Inglis and the staff of the engineering laboratory, Cambridge, and to Sir Richard Glaze brook, of the Imperial College of Science and Technology at Kensington, for the trouble they have taken in the arrangement of these courses, and for the sympathetic and helpful way in which they have dealt with the special requirements of the Air Force. One word more on the subject of education, which is an innovation on our part as far as service training is concerned, and one upon which we place very high hopes. It is quite on different lines from that adopted by other services, and is framed to meet the special needs of the Air Force. The educational machinery depends mainly on the organisation of a nucleus of civilian teachers, and this system also tends to prevent us from getting too narrow or too professional in our views. We are not depending only on our own resources, but can draw on those of the whole educational world. Our education comes from outside, and not from inside. Moreover, the system is very economical. I pass to a short review of the developments in the realm of research during the last 12 months. The House, of course, will appreciate that we have been curtailed in our activities very considerably by the shortage of money, but still we have, I think, made considerable progress. Research has been directed very largely in the last 12 months to securing greater safety and comfort in travelling by aeroplane. A Committee, under the presidency of my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ilkeston (Major-General Seely), sat to study this matter in 1919–20, and made certain recommendations, very many of which have been carried out in the course of the last year, through the activities of research. Take, for example, air navigation. A number of most important instruments for the safer navigation of aircraft have been invented and brought into use, notably the gyro turn indicator, and also an improved aircraft compass and an improved aircraft sextant. In a similar way we can record great advances in fire precautions. Extensive tests have been carried out, resulting in the determination of the best method of preventing petrol tanks from bursting in the event of an accident, a very fertile cause of fire and sometimes of loss of life. Another trouble was unreliability of petrol circulation, due to perishing of the rubber joints, but now we have found a new substance, which will replace rubber for these purposes and which resists the rotting effect of petrol. We are also developing air-cooled engines, which have great advantages, from the point of view of safety, over water-cooled engines. It is clear that there is no water to freeze and none to boil, and there is no water to leak, and if we could develop the air-cooled engine to the pitch to which we wish to get it, we should have made a very great advance towards simplification and, therefore, towards safety. Advance also has been made in the direction of silencing engines, and we are now busy at work studying how we can silence the propeller. The new types of machines brought out this year are not many, but one is very important, and it is very hard to determine what place exactly—either the first place possibly, or what place exactly—the amphibian will play in aerial performances in the future. This was built on the direct recommendation of the Seely Committee, and there are also large multiple-engine aeroplanes and seaplanes of various types in process of trial. A point in which some of the hon. Members of the House will be interested is this, namely, the difference between scientific research and ad hoc research. Of course, our practical methods of dealing with these problems must be described more or less as ad hoc research, but behind that is going on a great deal of the highest form of scientific research, and I would like to say that it is receiving much attention, and I am trying to arrange that scientific research shall be carried on continuously, chiefly by scientific bodies outside the Air Ministry, with financial assistance from us, and that experiments as a result of research and the work on modifications, which are so necessary for the development of machines and engines, shall be carried out under Air Ministry supervision. That is a short review of where our units are, what they are doing, what we are trying to do in the way of producing personnel of the highest quality to fill those units, and what efforts we have been able to make in the direction of science and research during the last 12 months.What about meteorology?
I will deal with meteorology when I come to civil aviation. During the past 12 months the Air Ministry have been asked to undertake certain new responsibilities. The first one, although of immense importance to us, I will only devote a very few words to, because the subject has been so completely covered by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies in his speech on the Middle East Estimates. In October the command of the forces in Iraq will pass from the General Officer Commanding to the Air Officer Commanding, and we appreciate fully the immense responsibility and the opportunity which is thereby afforded to us. It is the first practical experiment in the economical substitution of one arm for another. We cannot guarantee success, as my right hon. Friend said, and I must, naturally, warn the House that we may get our set-backs, just as other arms of the Crown have had reverses in the past, but we think we can satisfy those who reside in that land that those set-backs will be only temporary, and that they need have no fear that, because of this substitution, their lives will be in more danger.
5.0 P.M. The second responsibility which has been placed upon us is of a more serious character, and one which will cause us all to think and to study. It is the decision of the Cabinet to hand over to the Air Ministry the responsibility for air defence against air attack. There are very good reasons for that decision, which, of course, the House will appreciate as soon as I mention them. It struck me at once that at night time it would be quite impossible to form a line of demarcation between the land and the sea, and that unless you unified the command you would have both the Army and the Navy each feeling it incumbent upon them to have their own system of defence against air raids, so, from the simplest point of view, it has been handed over to us. The second reason is a more technical one. It is that the only defence against air raids is by fighting in the air. It is no good imagining that surrounding your cities and coasts with batteries of antiaircraft guns is going really to serve the purpose that you require. It is the last line of defence, not the first line of defence. The first line of defence is carrying the fighting into the enemy's area. That, coupled with air fighting in its highest form, is the only method by which an invasion of that character can be overcome and repelled. It would not be unnatural of the House to require at some stage during the Debate some information as to these modest attempts we are making, and I thought it would be of interest to them to hear that we have taken a good deal of advice, and certainly followed the example of other countries. In one way they are following our example in studying the advisability of an independent Air Ministry, and, in this case, I think we are taking advantage of their experience in this matter. Other countries have made provision on a somewhat greater scale for home defence, but, of course, their conditions in each case vary considerably one from another. The American situation is really of little or no guide to us. Still, they have a very considerable force of squadrons within their own areas—roughly 27 squadrons—although their Service is in its infancy. Italy is beginning to rebuild her industry and her Air Force. Something like 400 machines is about what she has to-day. In Japan there is also considerable development. But the big development is in France. France, which has always had the danger of invasion in the last fifty years, is quite determined that it shall not occur again, if air power can stop it, and the French force suitable for home defence last year, and, in fact, now, ranges between 60 and 70 squadrons, apart from those which she has available for Army and Navy co-operation.Can my right hon. and gallant Friend tell us "whether the squadrons of America, France, Japan, and England are comparable?
Roughly speaking, they are. The American squadrons range about 18 each. In France there are 10 machines for a fighting squadron, and eight for a bombing squadron. Our strength is 12 machines, and, with some slight variations, the squadron is the comparable unit between all countries. Of course, then you get to higher formations, which we call groups, and which, in France, I think, they call regiments, and, above the formation of the regiment, they call air divisions, but, getting down to a term we all understand, I think it may be taken that the word "squadron" is comparable more or less in all countries. It is a unit, and a unit probably capable of expansion in case of war. Our squadron in time of war was 18 and we have contracted it to 12. The home defence preparations in France, as I say, seeing that she has a great frontier to her eastern side, are such that she has already 62 squadrons, apart from those co-operating with the Army and Navy. But, further than that, there are reports of a very largely increased programme. There is no doubt that the article in the "Times" to-day, by a distinguished late officer of the Flying Corps, will be read with great interest.
There is another point in connection with this force. I think it is going to help, and not hinder, the relationship between the other services. I think it will form a link between the other two. It cannot help itself being the apex of the triangle, because it looks down from a considerable height above the activities of those who move on land and sea. But it is the only one of the three services which can act independently. The Army and Navy are dependent for assistance in the air for all their future manoeuvres, but the Air Service can act perfectly well without either. If it can lift the veil which has hung like a curtain between the two services; if it can break down some of the barriers which have existed for so long; if it can provide a common meeting ground, I think it will be an advantage to both the older services, and I am sure to the nation as a whole. But its functions are very difficult to handle because they are dual, they are independent and they are co-operative. The-independent side of their work is easily understood, but the co-operative side is more difficult, and the Leader of the House, two nights ago, intimated that a conference would be held between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry to see whether it is possible to improve the cooperative side, and the co-operative assistance which we can render. I am convinced that we shall succeed in solving that problem, as good will between the services is from now henceforth most important. Friction is not very harmful so long as it does not get beyond healthy competition. I will now ask the House to consider a few figures. Without dealing with all the recommendations of the Geddes Report, I would like to explain to the House the three main recommendations which the Committee make with which the Government have disagreed. They are recommendations as to policy, and not as to detail. The first one was the total abolition of the eight and a-half squadrons at home which are used for Army and Navy co-operation. That must seem, at first sight, a very remarkable recommendation to have made. Incidentally, I would like to point out that the economy which the Committee thought would be effective was arrived at in the most rudimentary fashion, and by a series of most unsound arguments, as I think I can satisfy the House. The total Vote of the Air Force was divided by the number of squadrons, and a figure was thereby obtained which was supposed to represent the cost of one squadron, and it was suggested that if eight and a-half squadrons were knocked off, you would immediately effect an economy of £2,500,000. That entirely ignores a very fundamental argument. You have to take the illustration of the tree and the fruit. Your foreign commitments are your fruit, and they demand a certain sized trunk. The cutting away of the eight and a-half squadrons at home would mean cutting too deeply into the trunk of the tree, which at the moment is only just big enough to carry its foreign commitments, because the eight and a-half home squadrons are the only reservoir from which we can supply the reliefs, both of men and of officers, and keep up the training to a sufficient pitch of efficiency to make those squadrons which are overseas able effectively to perform their duties. But apart from that, the abolition of eight and a-half squadrons would mean the total destruction and loss of Army and Navy co-operation, and perhaps its irretrievable destruction. It seems to me that no such recommendation could have been put forward without there being some reason for it. I have sometimes thought the real reason was that, unless the recommendation was put in the form it was, in other words, that the co-operation squadrons should be taken from the Army and Navy, there would be no inducement for either of those Services to study substitution, which would involve a surrender of something which cost them money, and if it has the effect of causing people to study more deeply what substitution may lead to, the recommendation itself may do no harm, and possibly good. The second recommendation with which we find ourselves bound to differ was the abolition of the boys' training school at Halton. The foundation of the service rests on the training school, and the best answer to that recommendation is that we have tried the other method, and we cannot get the men. Engineers, fitters, carpenters, riggers are all men drawing high rates of wages in industrial life, and I believe it is true to say that, in spite of the trade depression from which we are suffering, there are very few of the highly skilled categories who are out of employment. But there are other reasons, apart from that. There is the variety of technical knowledge required. There are 54 trades which have to be learned by various members of the Air Force. Then there is the advantage of the discipline, and the advantage of the general education which we are able to give these boys between the ages of 15 and 18, and I would submit, also, there is a national advantage, because their service with us is not very long, and, before the age of 30, they are in' a position to go back to civil life, equipped with the highest form of technical knowledge on an infinite variety of subjects, and quite certain to obtain employment wherever they go. On the other hand, the expenditure already at Halton must not be forgotten. We are within completion of about 20 per cent. of all the buildings. About another fifth of the money has to be expended, and then the organisation which we have wanted ever since the end of the War will be complete. But we have done something to meet the financial side of the recommendation, and that is prolong the service by a couple of years. We hope it will not have the effect of interfering with our recruiting, but we think we can effect considerable economy by reducing the number we have to train by prolonging the service after they leave the school and join our force. The third recommendation, I think, must be based on a misunderstanding, but it is an important one. It was suggested that by "reconditioning" was meant making the machines pretty, and was largely a waste of money. I can assure the House reconditioning is nothing of the sort. Reconditioning is prolonging the life of war stocks, instead of giving new orders. There is great responsibility in reconditioning war stock. It was built at a time of emergency, and, perhaps, in a hurry, and before the technical officers responsible can prolong the life of a machine by reconditioning, they have to satisfy themselves, by taking the thing to bits piece by piece, to see if it has further life in it. The Chief of the Air Staff has taken the responsibility of increasing the length of the life of the aeroplanes from three years to four. The economy immediately appears so far as this year is concerned, but there are disadvantages attached to it, which the House will perceive. First of all, if there are no new orders, it means the collapse of the industry. Secondly, our stocks of aeroplanes will always be growing less and wasting, so that it will become necessary to place very large orders for replacement' to replenish our reserves in 1924–25. With these main differences of opinion with the Goddes Committee's recommendation we have carried out nearly all which they suggested to us. The House will be patient with me, for I should like now to deal in very general terms with the Votes themselves. Nearly all the Votes show reductions, which is a good thing. Vote I shows a reduction of £660,000. Vote 2, quartering, stores, and equipment, shows a saving of £1,110,000. Warlike stores show an economy just under £2,000,000. This is on the sketch estimates prepared some time ago. Works are cut down by nearly £1,000,000, and the Air Ministry by £225,000, which is rather more than 25 per cent. of what we had last year. Coming to the non-effective Votes, only one, I think, shows a very slight increase of about £50,000. Civil aviation shows a reduction of £516,000, and research of over £500,000. There are four Votes with which I would like to deal, as they bring in new policy. They are the first Vote, dealing with personnel; Vote IV, with works, buildings and land, which I know the House has taken a considerable interest in in the past; there is Vote V, the Air Ministry, which will enable me to outline to the House the scheme of re-organisation which we have in mind; and Vote VIII, Civil Aviation, which deals with a subject about which, I am sure, the House will be anxious to hear. It includes the cross-Channel services and subsidies. A few words are necessary on this and on the figures of the Estimates. I have noticed in listening to ether Debates, naval and military, that the House usually provides itself with a copy of the Geddes Report, and then compares with those figures of the Geddes Report the Estimates put forward by the particular Ministry for the coming year. I have, for the better understanding of the House, and as being more simple, prepared my statement in that form, and also put together what I thought the House would most like to know, and that is as to what is the net economy that has been effected through the acceptance or otherwise of the Geddes recommendations. I therefore have arranged figures that are comparable in every form so that the House may more easily see how they compare. From the total in the Geddes Report of £19,033,000 for 1921–2, the comparable figure in our Estimates is £15,666,000. From both these figures I deduct normal and Middle East Appropriations-in-Aid amounting to £1,753,400 in the first case, and I arrive, under the column in the Geddes figures, at the sum of £17,280,000. I make exactly the same calculation on the other side by deducting £4,771,500. I get £10,895,000, and therefore the exact economy effected under the recommendations of the Geddes Committee is £6,500,000. But we do not want to take advantage of, or credit for, anything we do not deserve, and I must inform the House that £500,000 of that is an economy consequent upon a reduction in war liability, and, therefore, we cannot claim more than £6,000,000, or 37 per cent., of our original estimated expenditure. I told the House that on the first new Vote there was an item of considerable interest. I want to take this opportunity of reaffirming to those outside the House this fact, that we are granting no more permanent commissions than we can guarantee careers for. Our second formation of special officers for the force is by short-service commissions, and I may mention, as I have been asked several questions on the subject, that is one way by which we can build up a reserve of trained flying officers.Are they coming in?
Oh, yes. A new point which I submit to the House is that we are about to make a fresh experiment by re-introducing the non-commissioned officer pilot. The new scheme is one which opens up the attractions and prospects of distinction attaching to the flying duties of the Royal Air Force to noncommissioned officers and airmen of the force. Roughly, the scheme is as follows: The men must be under the age of 25, and not above the rank of sergeant or below that of leading aircraftsman. Airmen are recommended, within certain limits as regards numbers, by area and other commanders. Final selections are made by a Committee of the Air Ministry. Those selected are sent to training schools, where they learn to fly and qualify for the privilege of wearing the wings which are the insignia of an Air Force pilot. On qualification they are at once promoted to the rank of pilot-sergeant, if not already of that rank. When they have finished their flying- service they return from flying duties to the trade they came from prior to qualification as pilots. They, however, retain the rank of sergeant which they obtained by virtue of their qualification as pilots. This is a scheme which the Ministry think advisable to reintroduce and to give another trial. I was not connected with the Air Ministry in any shape or form during the War, and I am not able to give an opinion as to how the scheme acted in that time. There is no doubt, however, conditions are very different to the conditions of war, and there are good reasons for making a further test now under our present conditions of service.
The Vote which is next in interest, judging from last year, is the Vote for the money tint is to be spent on works. I would again caution the House, if they thought that we spent too much money on bricks and mortar, to bear in mind that we practically have no permanent buildings at all, and never have had. There are buildings at Cranwell which were bequeathed to us by the Admiralty at the end of the War. There are at Halton buildings which are nearly finished. There is also in course of erection certain other buildings; otherwise you can go the length and breadth of the land, from one aerodrome and one squadron to another, and you will find the Air Force living in huts, and, abroad, under canvas. In this connection I would say that I have had to authorise and sanction in some stations houses made from packing cases which are being lived in at the present time. But the Air Force do not complain. They have been putting up with immense inconvenience for the sake of the Service, but the hut question will, sooner or later, like the reconditioning question, come upon us in the form of a very considerably increased charge under this head. I now come to Vote V—the Air Ministry. Here I may outline the scheme of organisation which has become due. The Geddes Committee criticised our expenditure on our overhead charges, but pointed out at the same time that our system is very different from that of the War Office or Admiralty. Owing to our being a very small force, it had been economical to centralise the majority of the senior officers in the Air Ministry instead of having commands with their great staffs dotted about all over the world. We have tried to reduce the number of commands with their staffs and senior officers to a minimum. The Service side of the Air Ministry has been represented on the Air Council by the Chief of the Air Staff, and an additional member was appointed in Admiral Lambert, who was lent by the Admiralty to assist on the personnel side of the Air Force, but did not sit on the Council as Director of Personnel. In addition there was the Director-General of Supply and Research, whose activities were confined to that work. It might, therefore, be said that in reality the Service side was represented by one member only. It is now considered advisable, in the interests of economy, still maintaining the principle of keeping as few big commands as possible, owing to the small size of the force, to alter the organisation somewhat. This is considered advisable for the following reasons: During the organisation of this force it was necessary for the Chief of the Air Staff to be able to control the great mass of detail that had to be gone through in the formation of a new force, and in view of the fact that during the first two years we had practically no great responsibilities in the defence of the Empire, it was possible for him to carry on this work, and it was in the best interest of the force also. Now, however, with the assumption by the Air Ministry of definite responsibilities in the defence of the Empire and in order to relieve the increased work that is thrown on the Chief of the Air Staff, I propose to place the Council more on a footing with the Board of the Admiralty and the Army Council, and to broaden the basis of responsibility. I propose that the Chief of the Air Staff shall continue to be the First Senior Member of the Council, and shall be responsible for advising me on all matters of policy. In addition, he will have actual control of operations, intelligence, and training, and also the Works Department, but he will be relieved of all duties connected with discipline, personnel, organisation, and also equipment and transportation. In other words, the Director-General of Supply and Research will assume the duties of the Director of Equipment and take charge of Votes II and III and be responsible to the Council and to me for these, in addition to Vote IX, and the Votes will be re-arranged for the following year to meet this altered organisation. The Director of Personnel will take over all duties connected with Vote I, and the Works and Buildings shall at present and for another year remain under the Chief of the Air Staff. This will relieve the Chief of the Air Staff from an almost intolerable burden of detail and give him more time to deal with that part of the work which is being left immediately under his control. This reorganisation of the Air Ministry involves the first important changes which have been made in the headquarters administration of the Force since the beginning of 1919. It was at that time considered that continuity of tenure in the higher staff appointments and commands was essential to the very difficult task of building up the post-War Air Force, which, unlike the two senior Services, had no pre-War organisation. We were, fortunately, able to maintain this continuity for a period of nearly three years, although it was broken last December by the retirement of Admiral Sir Cecil Lambert, who was up to that time Director of Personnel and a member of the Air Council. The Air Service owes a lasting debt to the shrewd judgment and wide knowledge of this distinguished officer and we are under an obligation to the Admiralty—which I am glad to acknowledge—for enabling us to benefit by his services. Air Vice-Marshal Sir Edward Ellington has relinquished his appointment as Director-General of Supply and Research, on taking over command of the Air Force in Egypt. Under his direction there has been built up an organisation for the advancement of research which is not, I think, equalled anywhere. The Air Ministry is also losing in the near future the Director of Training and Organisation, on whom, in a special degree, the task of devising the new organisation and methods of training has devolved, and the Director of Equipment, who has had a heavy burden of work, particularly in connection with the immense stocks of material of all kinds which had accumulated under war conditions. Both these officers have done the most valuable work, and have contributed in no small degree to the successful development of the post-War Air Force. There is one further piece of organisation in contemplation, caused by the contraction of the Civil Aviation Vote, which has been progressively reduced during the last three years from £1,000,000 to a little more than £350,000 to-day. The bulk of that expenditure is taken up by £200,000 for subsidies and £80,000 for meteorology. As it ydll take a considerable time to bring this Department into conformity with the reduced scale of the other Departments, I have invited Sir Frederick Sykes, the present C.G.C.A., whose appointment would have normally temminated on 1st April, to retain his present post for a further period of one year. My ultimate intention, however, is to reorganise the Department as a Directorate, the administrative and Parliamentary responsibilities for which will be borne by the Under-Secretary of State on my behalf. Here I would add in this connection that the contraction of Civil Aviation is in no way the fault of the Department over which Sir Frederick Sykes has presided. It is due to the difficult times in which we live, and to the fact that to a certain extent commercial aviation in England finds itself in opposition to highly developed forms of other mechanical transport. It may be that in time to come this side of our work will expand, and the decision as to the best time to do this is among the problems which I submit to the House. The amount of savings it is hoped to effect by these economies in the year with which we are dealing is reflected in the saving shown on Vote V. All the details have not yet been worked out, but they are now in course of careful examination, and it will take most of the year to bring it about. I feel that the House will be dissatisfied if I do not say a word or two as to how the airship business stands at the present time. The House will remember that in July last, at the Imperial Conference, the future possibilities of utilising the air fleet for Imperial communications was closely considered. At that time an order to dispose of the airships had been recommended by my predecessor, and I was in process of following that policy, but the order was withheld until the Dominion Premiers had had an opportunity of consulting their Parliaments in order to see what contributions could be obtained from them, and which, added to one by ourselves, would have been sufficient to set on foot an Imperial Air Service. Since then replies in the negative have been received from New Zealand, South Africa, and India. From Australia a more hopeful message came, but even if that individual contribution had materialised, the inability of the other Dominions to contribute has made the scheme impracticable. Neither has any proposal, during this period of many months, emanated from private individuals which did not involve heavy subsidies in one form or another, and in consequence could not be entertained by the Government. We have therefore reluctantly commenced negotiations for handing over the entire outfit to the Disposal Board. This postponement has extended over a period of nearly 12 months, and I think it is at any rate sufficient proof of the reluctance with which we have had to abandon a service which is not only attractive in itself, but with which so many expectations have been connected. With regard to civil aviation I will explain in a few words to the House what we have done since last year. During the year, we have held a very important conference on civil aviation at the Guildhall, when a series of valuable papers were read by experts on every aspect of the problem of commercial aviation. The papers and the discussions which followed them were most helpful, and the Air Ministry is very grateful to all those who took part in making the conference such an undoubted success. The further experience of the last 12 months in the British Isles has shown that they are perhaps the least suitable of any country for successful internal commercial aviation. I am, however, strongly in favour of the maintenance of the London and Continental air services. They act as a demonstration and an advertisement of what is now possible, but in appraising the success already achieved by these services it must not be forgotten that they are being run in competition with probably the most highly organised boat and train service in the world. I must confess that I regard these cross-channel services in some degree as the practising and initial stage in the future development of schemes of Imperial communication. As an Empire we are more vitally interested in the success of aviation than any other country. In the flying sense, we have almost continuous territory from Europe to Australia, with great distances unbridgeable except by air, for example, Cairo to Bagdad, or Basra-Karachi. These 2,000 miles have been flown in 18 hours. What we are doing now is that we are making this the practising field for future and further development of the experience we have obtained in regard to these links in our Imperial chain. It is, therefore, the definite policy of the Air Ministry to steadily develop this and further links in the Imperial chain, and as soon as the separate stages of the various routes are safely opened, to hand them over to civil aviation to be progressively developed along commercial lines. The House has been very patient in listening to my statement. I hope at a later stage of the Debate to have an opportunity of answering any questions in regard to points I have not already covered. But I feel, in conclusion, that it is my duty to look beyond the horizon, and to try to probe the future. When you consider the rapidity of the advance of aviation during the last 10 years, which is patent to all, it would be foolish of us not to indulge in some flights of imagination. Speed, radius, carrying capacity, and air-worthiness, including safety, have increased in spite of all financial restrictions, and 200 miles an hour is quite a usual speed, and 560 miles continuous flight is now an ordinary performance. Weather, with the exception of fog, is now a negligible consideration, except for comfort. There is no mechanical limit to the size and carrying capacity of aircraft. With these facts in mind one is forced to look into the future from the point of view of national defence. The defence of these islands against air invasion has already been entrusted to us, and we maintain that aircraft is already powerful enough, if sufficient in quantity, to defend our shores against either invasion or naval bombardment. The possibilities of controlling unmanned surface craft filled with explosives from the air; or pilotless aircraft from another aircraft, or from the ground, cannot be ignored when considering our claim. It is my belief that within the next few years powerful aircraft will progressively expand the areas in which enemy ships cannot move with impunity, and in which we can afford effective and economical protection to our own commerce. As these controlled sea areas increase in size and number, so the remaining ocean areas in which fleet action can take place become more and more restricted. This brings with it possibilities for further economy in ships of war. The possibilities of the bomb are only very partially explored. A few months ago I indicated that for the first time since the War we are starting a bombing school. It is already proved that one bomb can sink the most powerful battleship in a few minutes. A battleship may survive a direct surface hit, but you cannot protect it from the explosion of a bomb underneath its water-line. It is merely necessary to perfect the bomb sight, which is purely a matter of practice and experiment. To show the power and superiority of the bomb over the shell—the accuracy must be greater, as apart from the fact that the former is dropped from a height of, say, two miles, while a shell must traverse, say, 20 miles, the error inherent in the gun itself is completely eliminated. As regards range, there is no comparison. The range from a ship can hardly be more than 20 miles, while the flight of the bomb-dropping aeroplane is something like 200. In 10 years' time I believe that a combat between the forces of the air and the forces of the sea will have become a grotesque and pathetically one-sided affair. And, finally, in the field of transportation I can see the aeroplane conveying small forces of artillery and infantry for minor operations, dispensing with vulnerable and expensive communications. There is no mechanical limit to the size to which aircraft can be developed for such purposes when the finances of the nation justify the capital expenditure, a capital expenditure which will give ample return in the decrease in the amount of blood and treasure now poured out in the minor campaign wars in which the Empire is so constantly and so inevitably engaged. This is the story of the Air Force of Great Britain after less than three years of independent and concentrated development. I have watched it from the inside for a year. It is a wondrous creation—mechanically and psychologically. It has created a psychology peculiar to its aims. It has had a short but a rich and crowded life. It is a service of young and enthusiastic men, led and inspired by an incomparable chief. This is the service which will certainly have to meet the first clash of war should it ever come again. The air front—possibly 200 miles away—? may be joined before the army reservist has reached the nearest station, or the battleship has got up steam. It is with these details and this forecast that I confidently submit the Estimates to the House of Commons.I think the House would wish to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on his very lucid statement, which is the first statement he has made with all the authority of an independent Minister, and with the find- ings of the Committee of Imperial Defence behind him, and I think all this will ensure him the continuance of his high office. I think we may all congratulate him upon his very lucid statement which was of extraordinary interest in many parts. We do congratulate him and the Ministry and the Royal Air Force on the result of the careful inquiry made by the Committee of Imperial Defence, which has at last, and I should hope finally, disposed of the attack made upon it by-other services, and other ill-informed persons who do not realise that the maintenance of such a service is vital to our national safety and is a necessity of economy. What the Secretary of State for Air has told us to-day is proof positive of economy so far as we have gone.
The right hon. Gentleman drew a very pleasant and interesting picture of the way in which the Air Force controls the different areas which are now under our sway, especially in Iraq and Palestine, and whatever view may be taken as to the expediency of our stay there—I see the Field-Marshal present who takes the view that we ought to restrict our activities there, because we cannot afford to maintain the force necessary to control—it may be right or it may be wrong, but supposing we do stay there, I think the Secretary of State has made out an unanswerable case for administering those countries by air power rather than by other means. The astonishing result which we achieved in Somaliland the other day shows conclusively that the effect of air power properly used lasts longer than the effect of ordinary military operations. The Field-Marshal was absolute in this country when the Mad Mullah was finally disposed of. Whether he is alive or not we do not know, but there was a time when he was a great anxiety to the War Office and the Director of Military operations of that day. Other means had to be found of coping with this danger, and as regards the use of the Air Force I only need to mention that in this part of the world the other day the presence of two aeroplanes was sufficient to bring in a whole tribe with 3,000 cattle. There can be no doubt that the claim that has been persistently made as to the economical results following the use of air power in this way has been substantiated and made good. I would like to say a word or two as to the decision of the Committee of Imperial Defence that the Air Ministry shall be separate and autonomous like the other two services, and especially in the matter of administration and education it shall have all its own way in the education of its own people. My Noble Friend the Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil) presided over a Committee to consider the education of the officers of the Royal Air Force, and they gave us some very remarkable conclusions, a great many of which have been embodied in the recommendations now in force. I do rejoice that the Lord President of the Council, and the Committee of Imperial Defence over which he presided, decided in accordance with the view of the Noble Lord that the education of the airman is to be wholly distinct from the education of other people, and must proceed on wholly different lines and be devoted to wholly different things. I would plead with the Secretary of State that he should try to prevent that standardisation of thought which has been the curse of military and naval education manuals. He told us that the manuals were increasing in number. Let him keep his eye on them to see that they do not increase too fast. Everyone will know how the unfortunate officer is beset by manuals nearly always out of date and constantly laying them down things as eternal verities which are only the views of some Chief of Staff 10, 15, or 20 years ago. An officer of the Royal Air Force in this House had to study a manual quite towards the end of the War in which it was carefully laid down that it was better for him to use a carbine rather than a rifle in the pit of the areoplane, because, being somewhat shorter in the barrel, it was less likely to catch the propeller, and this advice was given at a period long after mechine-guns had been introduced for these operations. I could given many other instances of out-of-date manuals—of manuals which ought never to have been written. Let the right hon. Gentleman try to keep the education of the Royal Air Force what it should be: a thing constantly seeking new methods and new ideals, realising in this so rapidly moving science that it is hopeless to standardise anything, and least of all to standardise the thoughts of those who are learning. There is one thing the Committee of Imperial Defence did not lay down and which has not been done, and that is to put the Secretary of State for Air in exactly the same position as the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War with regard to the Cabinet. At the present moment the Secretary for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty are Members of the Cabinet, while the Secretary of State for Air is not. That must be wrong. It has in fact, I know, caused great inconvenience and probably considerable loss of effort and money during the past few months owing to the failure of the Air Ministry to know Cabinet decisions as soon as they were known by the other two Departments, thanks to the presence of their Chiefs in the Cabinet. I know I am voicing what everyone interested in the administration of the Royal Air Force is saying, namely, that it should be the rule that all should be in the Cabinet or that none should be in it. If you are to have a Minister of Defence to represent all three Services well and good, but if you have two heads of a Service in and one left out the latter will not have the same chance of making his views prevail as is possessed by the other two. That is particularly unfortunate in the case of the Royal Air Force, because the whole thing is so novel that unless there is such pressure old-fashioned views are apt to prevail to the great detriment of the Service. The Secretary of State told us he had carried out a great deal of the Geddes Report. I notice there are very few of those who claim a desire to see economy carried out present in the House at this minute. I presume it is because they think that the Air Ministry have economised as much as they ought to. It is probably true that they have done so. As I have endeavoured to show, we have probably gone quite as far as it is safe to go in this matter. Let us see what reductions have been made, and then let us consider what other countries are doing, and what is our real strategical position now as compared with what it was in days gone by. First, we have abolished all airships. I do not say that that affects our strategical position for the moment, because the airship has been found to be a very unreliable weapon in times of war over the land, and probably in connection with the Fleet as well. In this House we have a man who has given much of his life to the study of this science—the hon. and gallant Member for Hertford (Rear-Admiral Sueter), to whose services to aviation in general everyone would wish to pay a tribute. For effective action it was thought that airships would be of enormous value, but my information is that further developments in the way of anti-aircraft defence at sea have made the airship less formidable at sea than it was in the middle of the War. Still, there are developments of the airship which might come along and make it an extraordinarily valuable weapon, not only for War, but also for peace, and therefore I think it is a very serious thing to have given up all practical research into airships while other nations are carrying on such research. I cannot believe it is wise to completely abandon all experiments in this matter, and I urge the Secretary of State that he should not take such a course, and that in a science of this kind no man is justified in finally declaring that the airship is useless and should be scrapped. With all the experience of the past behind us, and with the opinions of eminent men of science before us, we ought not to come to such a definite conclusion. We have reduced our squadrons from, 33 to 31½. I understood from the Secretary of State that we have 19½ squadrons abroad and 12 at home. Of the 19½ abroad three are in Egypt, six in India, eight in Iraq, one in Palestine, and one-and-a-half in the Mediterranean. The right hon. Gentleman has also told us that he has taken over, by a decision of the Cabinet, the air defence of the Empire, and I presume he is going to do that with the squadrons he has at home, nearly all of which are required for purposes of training. I have been furnished with some very remarkable figures as to what the French are doing. They fear an attack from Germany. Their apprehensions may be justified. As to that I cannot say, but they have a real apprehension of a very formidable attack from Germany. The figures I have here differ very little from those given by the Secretary of State, and only in one particular from the extraordinarily interesting article in the "Times" this morning by Brigadier-General Groves. The French had at the end of last year 126 squadrons of eight or nine machines as compared with our 12 squadrons at home, and of these nearly four-nineteenths were abroad. If their present programme is carried out they are to have 220 squadrons, and th.3 proportion abroad will be about the same or slightly less. This will, therefore, mean that the French, for the purposes of their home defence, will have from 165 to 170 squadrons of aeroplanes of which a proportion, which has yet to be settled, will be abroad. These figures are in print in France, so that in quoting them one is not disclosing any confidential secret. The book containing them may be purchased at the bookstalls over here, and therefore they are not confidential in the least, although here we regard such information as confidential. I hope I may be allowed to point the -extraordinarily interesting position in which we now stand. We are told, and I believe it is true, that unless we economise we may go bankrupt. At the same time, we are all agreed that we will maintain the integrity of our country and of our Empire. The problem resolves itself into how far we can economise on our fighting forces consistently with maintaining the integrity of our country. The French, in order to maintain the integrity of their country, are proposing to have from 165 to 170 squadrons. At the end of last year they had 126, of which nearly 100 were at home. The Secretary of State for Air tells us that for this specific purpose he has practically three squadrons. I think on that fact we may say that whatever 'criticisms we are going to direct at the Secretary of State or at the Air Ministry, we had better not call them extravagant, because, if a man says he is provided with three squadrons to protect this country with a population of 45,000,000 and its material wealth, while they in France think it wise to have anything from 100 to 140 squadrons, it would be juggling with words to call it an extravagant proposal. 6.0 P.M. Be it observed that no one has ever seen what an air attack would be like. We were going to have air attacks in the campaign of 1919, and as I was partly responsible for preparing them I know of what I am speaking, and I can say that the figures given by Brigadier-General Groves in to-day's "Times" are perfectly accurate. Nobody ever attempted to bomb a place with more than 50 aeroplanes during the War. The biggest air raid on London was, as a matter of fact, conducted with 36 aeroplanes. It will be quite easy, and no doubt it will be done if ever we go to war again, for an enemy to bombard, not with 30 aeroplanes, but with 300, and those aeroplanes will not carry the little bombs which were carried by the 36—and they were quite small bombs which were used in that daylight raid upon London—but they will carry bombs at least ten times as weighty, and, as far as I have been able to ascertain, those bombs will have at least four or five times the effective power per weight. The real fact is that we stand here in the House of Commons to-day with our eyes opened to the fact that an entirely new era in warfare, and in the relations of States to States, has come about. It used to be said that the best form of defence was attack. In the new warfare which Marshal Foch and others foresee, the only form of defence is attack. It is hopeless to attempt to protect yourself against this raid of 300 aeroplanes. It took 32,000 men to protect London against the raids of the 36 machines. An hon. and gallant Member tells me that they did not succeed, but still they made it rather difficult for them, although they did not prevent them from flying over. It will be seen at once that to attempt to prevent an enemy from bombarding your town, by preparation in time of peace in the way of land defence, is, frankly, impossible. All that you can say is, "If you are going to destroy my town, I will destroy yours." From that I deduce two lessons. The first is that we must be sufficiently prepared to enable us to meet this kind of danger when it becomes imminent. We must have the most highly qualified staff and the most highly qualified men, and we must have the power of expansion. We have got the highly qualified staff, and we have got the highly qualified men. We have a very much greater proportion of qualified pilots than any other country in the world, and I believe our technical skill is as great as or greater than, that of any other nation, even the Germans, who, we are told, have made great advances. In our power of expansion, however, we are at the moment ludicrously short of other nations. At the end of 1921, the production of machines in France was 150 per month, that is to say, 1,800 per year. The Secretary of State, of course, will not be able to tell us that we can produce anything like that number. Therefore, I believe that one of the first things we ought to do is by some means or other so to encourage civil aviation—if that be the reserve on which the Secretary of State means to rely—as to ensure that our possible production of aircraft shall be very greatly increased. That is our real danger. The next thing, I think, that must occur to one is that the whole thing is becoming so complicated, so terrifying to civilisation, that it is high time, while preparing to avoid the consequences of an unprovoked attack, to try to get the peoples of the world to agree to make peace, for assuredly, from what we now know, if we do not make peace between ourselves, it is quite possible and, indeed, quite easy, for us to destroy each other altogether. In conclusion, I would congratulate the Secretary of State on his success in securing a separate Air Force and an autonomous Service. I beg him to keep his research up to concert pitch. I would assure him that he will not find in this House any criticism if he takes steps, even at some added expense, to ensure that the power of expansion is there, and I beg him to appeal to the Cabinet, as a Minister of the Cabinet—as we hope he soon will be, for whoever occupies his place ought to be in the Cabinet—to bring the nations together and say, "We are not afraid, but we see the truth before us; let us agree to make peace."I somewhat regret that the Secretary of State, in his opening statement, attacked the Geddes Committee, because, while the Geddes Committee were not particularly complimentary to any Department at all, they did happen to give the Air Ministry a good character. We have to approach these questions from the point of view of economy to-day, and it is interesting, in reading the Report of the Committee, to see that the expectation of the amateur economists has not been realised. The expectation of the amateur economists was, of course, the instant abolition of the Air Ministry and a return of the Air Force to the two older Services. Far from that being the case, one or two of the Committee's statements are particularly interesting. They say:
and also—"Economies to an increasing extent ought to result in the older Arms from the advent of the Air Force. … We have in mind not only the substitution of aircraft for certain other arms of the older Services, such as light cruisers or cavalry, but a revolution in the method of carrying out certain operations"—
If we are going to substitute aircraft for the older Services, it is essential that we maintain that independence of the Air Ministry in virtue of which it can look at these problems from a detached point of view, and not from the point of view of an arm of an older Service. We cannot deny that there have arisen lately very strong attacks against the Air Ministry and the Air Force, and I think that even you, Sir, have found difficulty in the overlapping which occurs in Debates in this House on the three Services. We have already had a Debate on the Army which was slightly diluted with Air. We have had a Debate on the Navy, also diluted with Air; and now we have a "neat" Debate upon the Air itself. But those advocates of a return to the old system of the Air being a service of both the older Services must remember that, if we ever made such a mistake as to recur to that, the overlapping would be just as bad, or even worse. The duties of the Air Force are threefold. Firstly, they have to look after the tactical side of the Army. Then they have to look after the tactical side of the Navy, and they have to provide an independent Air Force. That is an organisation which has the admiration of other countries, and it is, perhaps, significant to note that America is doing her best to adopt the same form of organisation. It is, however, extraordinary to me that the organisation is not really as well understood as it should be. Only the other day, when the hon. and gallant Member for the West Derby Division of Liverpool (Sir It. Hall) delivered a philippic against the Air Force, and pleaded for the Navy, he seemed to be entirely ignorant of the organisation whereby the Air Force fits into the Navy. It is, roughly, this: In the Air Force there are 2,000 officers, and, of those officers, 1,000 are what are called short-service officers. They come to the Air Force and serve a term of four years, after which they go back to private life. But of those pilots, 500 should be seconded from the Army and from the Navy—250 from each. In that way you get the Navy officer flying, with all his experience of the Navy, and when he goes back to the Navy he takes with him all his experience of flying. Consequently, when he becomes an Admiral, he is not ignorant of flying, but has gained an actual experience of and intimacy with that subject. But what happened when that proposal was put forward? Both the Army and the Navy refused to co-operate. That is the trouble in regard to the present position. The Navy and the Army refuse to co-operate. They have always at the back of their minds the idea that there is a possibility of getting back their own air services. I maintain that it is essential to have a compelling power, transcending those of the three Services, to compel one of them to fall into line with the others. Why have these attacks revived to such an extent during the last year? It is because the Air Ministry have put forward three claims towards economising from the point of view of national expenditure. The first claim they put forward is that they can provide partially against invasion by sea. The second is that they will take over the responsibility of invasion by air; and the third is that they are prepared, by part substitution, to garrison abroad. Probably the point in regard to invasion by air will be granted us, although the Army still keep anti aircraft guns. But on the question of the sea, and on the question of garrisons abroad, the Air Ministry run right across the older Services. If you call the Air Force the Cinderella Service, then certainly the other Services are now its stepsisters. There have been many attacks, some delivered by hon. Members in this House. It was Jacob's voice, but the hands were the hands of Esau. We could see through most of their attacks. Take the case of the Navy alone. Here the Air Force is up against one of the most autocratic bodies the world has ever seen. The Admiralty for 100 years has been the spoilt darling of this nation, but it was the spoilt darling of this nation for one reason, and one reason only, and that was because it could defend us. But a very vast change has come about. If the Channel had dried up, would the Navy still have taken on the defence of England? It would have passed to the Army. But a bigger miracle that that has happened. The air has been conquered, and consequently, from this moment, the Navy cannot be responsible for the defence of these islands. I heard the hon. and gallant Member for the West Derby Division say the other day that the Navy alone should be responsible for the commerce of this country upon the high seas. I cannot understand his contention. During the War the Navy showed that they practically could not look after our commerce on the seas without the assistance of air power. Is it logical to put a Service which cannot do a thing over a Service which can? That is the proposition which the hon. and gallant Member for the West Derby Division advanced. I know it does us immense harm to exaggerate the powers of the Air Force, but I do ask those hon. Members who are interested in the subject to read up what happened in America with regard to depth charges. It was not a question of hitting a ship, but only a question of dropping a depth charge near, or even within 200 yards of, a big vessel—not a very difficult thing to do, even from a height of 10,000 feet. The results were very convincing. We heard the other day, on the Navy Estimates, that we had deteriorated, and had become less than a one-Power nation on the sea. I heard no protest from anybody. Surely at last people are realising that such a change has happened in the world that the Navy to-day is obsolescent. France, a friendly Power, can put within 20 miles of our coast 240 squadrons. Do not let us enlarge on what 240 squadrons can do to this country. What could our first line of defence, the Navy, do against that? They would have to sit in the Channel and look on and smile. Having given the Navy what they deserve, let us turn to the Army. The Air Force clashes again with the War Office. The Mesopotamian scheme has been a bitter pill for the War Office. I am really surprised a little at some of the attacks which have been delivered by the Army, because I thought the co-operation between them and the Royal Flying Corps during the late War was very intimate and as good as the co-operation between the Royal Air Force and the Army. We always expect that opposition from very-old generals wearing the Crecy and Agin- court medals. That, of course, is to be expected. But when we get an attack from an ornamental and distinguished Member of this House, the gallant Field-Marshal behind me, that, I think, is going too far. May I read something which he said when he was not a Member of the House? When you are a Member of this House you can say anything. He said this when he was Chief of the Staff. Speaking at Amiens (according to Reuter), the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff said it was for those who governed the actions of the world to consider whether, if they wanted to limit the horrors of future wars, it would not be better to limit aeroplanes rather than submarines. The development of the aeroplane movement seemed to him to be on the whole a development of the movement for killing women and children. I resent that very much. First of all, it is a most disgraceful thing to say, and is not true. Secondly, as Chief of the Staff, I maintain that no officer has the right to go about stumping the country, saying how we are to spend our money, when he occupies an official position in one Department of State. I have tried to show the difficulties the poor Air Force find themselves in, attacked from every side. They know really that they are a power for economy, and that though you spend what you like and have the finest Army and the finest Navy, you cannot use either of them if you are defeated in the air first, and it is in the air that the next fight will take place first. I think I have shown the impossibility of getting the three services to co-operate on this question. We must have an overruling power. I do not care what it is. You can call it the Committee of Imperial Defence, you can call it your Ministry of Defence, or whatever you like. We have a certain amount of money to spend on defence, and we must use it to the best advantage. I should like to say a word with regard to the aircraft industry. You cannot expand, as we should have to expand the Air Force in case of trouble, very quickly without an industry, and the keeping of a designing and construction staff is not a question of economics so much as a military consideration. Can the Secretary of State show us that the very important military consideration of keeping alive in this country firms who can make aeroplanes is going to be kept in mind? We were promised on the Navy Votes a Com- mittee of Inquiry to co-ordinate the Navy and the Air Force. I hope that under the blessed word "co-ordination" the Navy will not use that Committee as a stepping stone to force their old claim of a separate air service to themselves. The Committee was promised on the definite understanding—that was, the co-operation of the Air Force and the Navy—and its terms of reference should not go beyond that. I was brought up on Power standards. It does not sound a good diet, and probably is not, but it meant that we knew where we were relative to a potential enemy. I have explained that, from the point of view of defence, the Air Service must take first place. What is the position with regard, to the Air Force to-day? A friendly State next door can put 240 squadrons at Calais, and we are going to defend ourselves with 12. One of our famous admirals said we could sleep quietly in our beds. Does the right hon. Gentleman maintain that we can do that to-day? Is he prepared to match 12 English squadrons against 240? Is he satisfied with that? It is an absolute, disgrace that we are spending to-day £130,000,000 on Army and Navy and only £10,000,000 on our first line of defence. That is the position to-day. It is, is it not, because the Government will not look upon this question from a big point of view. Every service here has pressed upon them the essential necessity of having some co-ordinating influence in the Committee of Imperial Defence, or Defence Ministry, and here we are to-day still thinking in three Services, dribbling away money in three separate ways instead of looking upon the thing as one problem—spend the money we have and can spend in the very best way. I have spoken very strongly. I shall have to apologise if I have given any offence to anyone, but I feel very strongly on this. I have seen all this grow up, and I should regret very much to see it all wasted. But the Air Force must not be looked upon by the country or by the House as an extra. It is not an extra. It is a substitution for other arms, and when you look upon it from that point of view it is our duty in this House to see that we spend the money on defence in the very best way."it can no longer he denied that by the intelligent application of air power it is possible to utilize machinery in substitution for, and not as a mere addition to, manpower."
The hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just sat down objected to the description of aero- planes as a means for killing women and children. I think it is right. The House and the country should realise that in the next war it will be a case of women and children unavoidably, and not only that. In the last war, when the Independent Air Force got to work down at the south-eastern corner of France bombing the towns of Germany, though ostensibly we were bombing the munition factories in those towns, it is perfectly certain that the effect created on the morale of the German soldiers in the trenches was the result of the bombing of women and children. Horrible as it may be, a very distinct effect was created in the German trenches by the ruin and destruction and the cruelty and barbarity, whatever you like to call it, which was inflicted on the women and children in Germany, and the hon. and gallant Field-Marshal was perfectly correct in his description of the effect of aeroplane war even in the last war. What will it0 be in the next war? You have, as has been admitted, vast fleets of aeroplanes coming over our towns or going over the towns of the enemy, not with little ten or a hundred pound bombs, but with bombs containing four or five thousand pounds of high explosives and poison gas. Do you think you are going to get rid of poison gas in the next year. Do you think any Hague Convention or any League of Nations in the world is going to stop poison gas? Do you think you are going to prevent, not merely poison gas, but cholera germs? You may say you would like war with limited liability. That takes you back to the time of the bow and arrow. The first man who invented something more effective in Warfare than a club was the lineal ancestor of the man who invented poison gas. So it will go on. You will find that the man who invented gunpowder was just as bad in his day as the man who invented poison gas. We refused to use it until we were forced, and when in the next war some enemy bombs our towns with two or three hundred machines containing bombs of four and five thousand pounds of either high explosive or poison gas, or still worse than that, do you mean to suggest that we are not going to use the same thing? The next war, whenever it comes, will be a war of nation against nation, and a war of the most cruel and destructive character, in which the women and children will be bound to suffer just as much as the men.
That brings me to the point whether, as that war will break out in a moment, probably without any possibility of knowing even 24 hours beforehand with any certainty, we are sufficiently prepared, as France is being prepared to-day. The right hon. Gentleman who made that very interesting speech from the Treasury Bench told us frankly that we only have half a dozen service squadrons. It is perfectly ridiculous that we should attempt, even now, after the Great War, to say we are prepared for the future with half a dozen service squadrons here. You may say there is going to be no war. France apparently does not think so. France is at least as wise a nation as ourselves and is no more vulnerable in the air than we are. There is very little difference between an enemy attempting to invade Paris and an enemy attempting to invade the south-eastern part of England, including London. We are just as vulnerable, and while France thinks it necessary to have 140, rising next year to 220 service squadrons for defence and, what is the real defence, for attack, we have, he told us, six squadrons. There are one or two other questions I should like to ask in regard to small details. The right hon. Gentleman mentioned one about Cairo being an essential position in all matters of air connection with ourselves and other parts of the Empire. Can the right hon. Gentleman who is responsible for the Middle East tell us what, if any, arrangements have been made with regard to the new Kingdom of Egypt for our hold upon Egypt so far as an air centre is concerned? Without an air centre in Egypt we are cut off from Africa, from Mesopotamia, from Palestine, and from the future of an air service to India or Australia. I have raised this point previously, and I have never had any satisfactory answer from any member of the Government. They always said nothing had yet been arranged. We now understand that an arrangement has been arrived at. There is a King over Egypt instead of a Sultan subordinate to us. I should like to ask the Secretary of State to the Colonies what are the arrangements with regard to the position of affairs in Egypt to-day so that our rights not merely for civil, but for military aviation may be maintained. Unfortunately, the Secretary of State for Air has left the House. I should have liked to ask him a few questions in regard to short-term officers and sergeant pilots. I remember years ago speaking in this House and advocating the appointment of non-commissioned officer pilots. At last, I am glad to hear that a real definite effort is being made in the Air Ministry to have sergeant pilots. I wish my right hon. Friend could have told us—there is no reason why we should not have the information—a little more as to the success of these two schemes. We know how many officers we have, and I should like to know how many short-term officers we have and how many sergeant pilots we have. My main point is as to the allocation of the £11,000,000. A sum of £11,000,000 is being spent on the Air. I gather that that is in addition to the Grants-in-Aid received in respect of Iraq and other parts of the world—on 30 squadrons. France has 140 squadrons, four times as many as this country, and France is spending four times as much money. Is France spending her money differently? We are spending our money, not on squadrons, not on fighting machines, but on Air Staff colleges, on officers' colleges, and on training schools for boys: all perfectly admirable, but do let us realise that the first thing an Air Force wants, if it is to be a fighting force—if it is not to be a fighting force, there is no reason in having an Air Force at all—is fighting squadrons. The first thing that the Navy wants is battleships, destroyers, and submarines. The first thing the Army wants is not colleges, not bricks and mortar, but a fighting, striking force. The result of the arrangements made by my right hon. Friend is the provision of colleges and schools and very little fighting force. I do not want to go into details on the Estimates, but we find in one of the Votes £86,000 provided for engines during the current year. Engines are the be-all and end-all of the aeroplane. The whole fight during the last 10 years, and I have made many speeches in regard to it, has been for higher and ever higher powered engines. We have frequently asked the Minister for Air during and since the War what he is doing in regard to the provision of high-powered engines. He has not told us a word about it. He has not told us about the 500 horse-power engines that exist or about the 1,000 horse-power Napier Lion Cub. There is no secret about it. Many Members of this House have, through the courtesy of the hon. Member for Acton (Sir H. Brittain), seen the trial of this 1,000 horsepower engine, which cost something like £5,000. A sum of £86,000 gives you a matter of 20 engines, if you are going to use engines of that calibre, and you are bound to do so. You cannot stop in this hideous competition between nation and nation. The Air has come, and it will go forward to more victories, and those victories can only be based upon higher powered and still higher powered and more efficient engines. Yet out of the sum of £11,000,000 which we are to spend on the Air, a beggarly sum of £86,000 is to be spent on engines, which will only provide about 20 of the higher powered engines. I am not saying this in any hostility to my right hon. Friend or his Ministry. I believe that, from many points of view, the Ministry is doing its best, but I am afraid that it has been got hold of by a section of the Air Force who are in favour of these wonderful schools and colleges. I want some, explanation in regard to the higher power engines. My hon. and gallant Friend, who preceded me, told the House something of the possibilities of the Air. The real difference between us in this House, between the Naval man, the Army man, and those who have devoted a great portion of their lives to the study and support of the Air Service is this: The Navy man and the Army man believes that the Air Service is a useful adjunct. The Navy regards the Air as a kind of useful destroyer and a good submarine catcher, and in the Army it is looked upon as very useful for scouting, for spotting for artillery, and various operations of that kind; but we, on the other hand, believe that the Air is destined in the future very largely to supersede the Navy and the Army. The question between these schools of thought have to be settled one way or the other, and I think it should be decided in the near future. It is very easy to prophesy in regard to the Air. Many of us have made prophesies in this House in the last 10 years, and everyone has come true, because the Air has advanced more marvellously than it was possible to believe in those 10 years. The Secretary of State for Air to-day has prophesied in regard to the Air of the future. I do not believe that his prophesy is one whit beyond the mark. You will have in a very few years aeroplanes that go 500 miles an hour. You will have fleets of aeroplanes carrying bombs of 5,000 lbs. A bomb of 5,000 lbs. is quite different from a shell of 5,000 lbs. A bomb of 5,000 lbs. contains at least four times as much high explosive as a shell of 5,000 lbs. When hon. Members interested in the Navy think that when a warship fires a shell of 5,000 lbs. that it is equivalent to an aeroplane bomb of the same weight, I say that it is nothing of the kind. They are only firing a shell which is one-fourth as effective as an aeroplane bomb of the same weight. [An HON. MEMBER: "How can an aeroplane carry two tons?"] It can and does. I speak with some little knowledge of the manufacture of aeroplanes, though I have no financial interest in it, and I say that the Air is prepared to carry a higher-powered bomb or shell than the Navy can fire, or that a submarine or torpedo destroyer can fire, as a torpedo. We shall make aeroplanes big enough, strong enough and powerful enough to carry any bomb or any shell which is used by either of the other Services. My right hon. Friend who represents the Air Service will admit that fact. That being so, knowing all that the Air Service did during the War, knowing what those of us who believe in the Air have prophesied, and knowing what the right hon. Gentleman has prophesied to-day, I want the House to approach this question from the point of view that the Air in the next few years is going to be the paramount Service, and is not going to be looked upon merely as an auxiliary. The question will be, how much money it is desirable to transfer from the Navy and the Army to the Service which will gradually take the place of these two great Services.The few remarks that I shall address to the House will be in order to try to make out a case so that the Committee which the Leader of the House announced last Thursday he was going to appoint may include the Army in the purview of its inquiries. If in the course of my remarks I may say something that seems to disparage an independent Air Force, I hope the House will believe me when I say that we soldiers and sailors are fully as alive as anybody in the Air Force to the coming power of the air. It is because we want to have all the force we possibly can from the air that we dislike an independent Air Force, and not because we disparage the air. On Thursday last the Leader of the House made a speech in which he said that the Cabinet had come to a certain decision. At the commencement of that speech he reviewed the coming of the Air Force from 1912 up to the day, last Thursday, on which he spoke. He showed beyond all question that in the years 1914–16, owing to what he called the force of inter-departmental competition, there was a great loss of power, a great loss of money and a great amount of overlapping.
In 1916, therefore, a co-ordinating authority was set up to try to co-ordinate the Air Service as between the Navy and the Army. In 1918, in the month of June, the air was given for the first time its independent status. It was a little contradictory to say that the air was independent, because twice in the same speech the Leader of the House said, quite correctly, that the Air Force was under the orders of Marshal Foch. The Air Force, therefore, was not independent in that sense. It was placed under the Army. The War was won with the air placed under the orders of the Army. That it is absolutely essential to co-ordinate the working, or rather the supply of air machines and even of personnel as between the Navy and the Army is certain, but that because you do that, you must go another step and have an independent Air Force, independent of both the Navy and the Army, I challenge. The Leader of the House then went on to say that other Powers might be thinking of changing in the direction of having an Independent Air Force, and that the Powers were anxiously examining the problem. The right hon. Gentleman's information may be later than mine, but I think that the other four countries that have navies and armies have distinctly decided not to have an Independent Air Force. Those countries are France, Italy, Japan, and the United States of America. We are, so far as I know, the only country that has or means to have an Independent Air Force. The Leader of the House went on to say that the decision reached by the Cabinet was based on the work of a Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and also on war experience. As regards the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, I have very little to say, because the workings of a Committee like that are, of course, secret. As regards war experience, I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman can quote the name of a single eminent sailor or eminent soldier, either in England or France, Italy, the United States, or Japan, who has taken part in war, and who is in favour of an Independent Air Force. If that is so, and I think that it is so, on whose advice are we acting when we have an Independent Air Force? The Leader of the House informs us that the Cabinet had reached given decisions. They were first that the Air Force were to be autonomous in administration and education. I do not think that I know what that means. I looked up the word autonomous, and I find that it means self-determination. What is happening, in fact, is this, that in order to become autonomous the Air Force is duplicated in every service practically by the Navy and by the Army, and that at a time when we are really very hard up. The Air Force has got its own Ministry, and a big Ministry. It has got its own Chief of Staff, its own Adjutant-General, Quarter-Master-General, and so on, its own Army Service Corps, its own ordnances. It is going to get its own bases, and now it is getting its own armoured cars. It will presently have its own infantry. In one theatre it has taken over the duty of the Navy. I would not have thought that this was the time to duplicate services which are already in full action either in the Navy or the Army. The second decision of the Cabinet is that in the case of defence against air raids the Army and the Navy are of secondary importance. I presume that means only the air raids in Great Britain. There might be air raids in a theatre of war, and I do not know that the Army would be of secondary importance there, but in the case of Great Britain in the defence against air raids the Army and Navy are to be of secondary importance. I wonder what that means. Does it mean that the head Air Marshal would take command of both the Army and the Navy? Does it mean that the Air Marshal in charge of the air over England can move the troops about, tell the Aldershot Command that they must go to the Chiltern Hills and hide, and tell the Salisbury Command that they can go to the hills in Wales? What does it mean? Does it mean that the Air Marshal is in command in England and that he is in command of the coastal defence and of the Navy and the ships supplying it? May the Air Marshal say that no ships of war may put into port? May he clear the harbour at Dover of supplies? What does it mean? The third decision is that in land operations and sea operations the general and the admiral will be in command. That is very sound ruling and I hope that it will be carried out. It is what was done in 1918 when Marshal Foch was given general command, but I was a little puzzled over that because while the Leader of the House tells us that in military and naval operations the general and the admiral shall command, I am confronted with this that in two theatres of operations at the present moment, one in Palestine and one in Iraq, the War Office is handing over operations to the Air Force. If operations on land are to be under a general, then why do we hand them over to an Air Marshal in Palestine and in Iraq? In that connection I would like to say that for every airman there are certainly from 15 to 20 or 25 groundsmen of sorts. For every airman you have to have 20 soldiers, army service, ordnance, lines of communication and so forth, and that is on the basis of the operations in the air. But if the rule is laid down by the Cabinet that on land operations are to be directed by a general, then why at the same time do we have to hand these two theatres over to the Air Force? The fourth decision again I find it difficult to follow. I think that it was this, that in the protection of commerce and in offensive operations against enemies' harbours and inland towns, the Air is not to be under the Army or the Navy, nor is the Navy to be under the Army or the Air, nor is the Army to be under anybody except itself, but they are to co-operate. The word co-operation translated into action is the way to lose war. The French and British armies co-operated from the beginning of August, 1914, until the 21st March, 1918, four years ago to-day when the Germans made their great attack. Five days later we passed from co-operation, which had been proved fatal to victorious war, to one command. Marshal Foch was given command. The difference between co-operation and command is the difference between the loss and the winning of war. Why then do we go back to co-operation when it has been proved fatal to victory in time of war? The fifth decision is another one which again I am afraid I do not understand. The Air takes over the anti-air defence at home. It seems to me that here again we are duplicating a complete service of its own. It is certain that in any theatre of operations, whether we fight in France, Germany, Palestine or Afghanistan, wherever we may fight, there would have to be anti-aircraft. Then it seems that the Air is given one set of anti-aircraft for home and the Army and Navy other sets for abroad, duplicating the whole thing over again, and I do not see how in practice it can be worked. To explain this, I would have to go into detail, and I will not weary the House with that. I have tried in these few remarks to make out a case why I would like the Leader of the House to include the Army in the terms of reference which he is going to put before the Committee which on Thursday last he said he was going to appoint. May I conclude by saying that there is one thing which is very much lost sight of We are spending a great deal of money, as the hon. Member for Brentford (Sir W. Joynson-Hicks) said, on bricks and mortar schools and colleges duplicating services, but one thing on which we are spending very little money is civil aviation. One thing certain is that if a big war comes we will require an enormous expansion. We cannot get that expansion from the small number of squadrons which we have to keep or which we can work in times of peace. Therefore I plead very strongly for a big sum of money to be devoted to civil aviation. I could not help smiling now when I heard the French figures when I remembered that the French can now send 120 squadrons in the field and will be able to send 240 squadrons a year hence and we can only put four or eight or 12, while in the meantime the French have not got the blessing of an independent Air Force.I feel a little presumptuous in endeavouring to controvert anything that has been said by the distinguished and respected Field-Marshal who has just addressed the House, but I am encouraged by the observations which I have been able to make during the War when I was for some time a very subordinate officer in the Air Ministry, and though I was subordinate owing to the circumstances that I was almost junior in rank, yet as I was second oldest officer in age next to Sir David Henderson in the Air Force, I was often admitted to the confidence of very distinguished officers, and I had some opportunity of observing how the various systems of operations worked. I observed very early that soldiers, no matter how very distinguished, or admirals, no matter how distinguished, never understood the ABC of air matters. They were always quite as ignorant as civilians, and a great deal more self-confident, and therefore their opinion was a great deal less valuable than that of an intelligent civilian who was content to ascertain the facts before expressing his judgment.
7.0 P.M. Encouraged by that reflection, I venture to oppose some arguments to those which my hon. and gallant Friend addressed to the House. He spoke of the evils of duplication, and he dwelt on the defects of co-operation as opposed to unity of command. In respect of duplication, there is no need to duplicate, because you have a separate Air Force, except in so far as you want knowledge. I am not sure myself that there is a particular branch of the Air Force Service which is absolutely comparable to the Navy and the Air Force or the Army and the Air Force. Such a branch might no doubt be treated administratively as comparable, but if you want knowledge in respect to any particular branch of the Air Force, even if you do not have an independent Air Force, you will have to duplicate and must have an air officer who understands it at the head of the service and subordinates, experts in air matters, who would have to be added to the staff of that Department, of the Army or Navy, or whatever it was. Duplication really does not arise out of the independence of the Air Force. It arises out of the fundamental condition of the problem, namely, that the Air Force and its problems are so different from those of the Army and Navy that if you want the intelligent authority and organisation you must have air officers in charge of the matter. You must have airmen to manage air matters. My hon. and gallant Friend spoke of co-operation and command. I suppose it is common ground that in respect of any particular operation of war it is desirable that somebody should be in chief and supreme command of all the forces of the Crown that are at work. That, I suppose, to be conceded by everyone, but I observed that my hon. and gallant Friend took up a position which appeared to be inconsistent in itself. He saw no difficulty about a distinguished soldier commanding the Air Force in certain operations, but at the same time he thought it so extravagant as to be treated almost with derision that a distinguished air officer should command soldiers. He asked whether you were going to tell them to go into the Chiltern hills or the Welsh mountains. I am not going to contest details of Army movements with him, but there is no greater absurdity in allowing an air officer to order about an army corps or division of men than there is in allowing a general to order about squadrons of aeroplanes in the air. If the air officer were much too ignorant and ill-informed to be a good judge as to what an army corps should do, so the Army officer would be equally ignorant and ill-informed in judging what it is wise to do with an aeroplane. With regard to co-operation, my hon. and gallant Friend said with truth that co-operation—by which he understood and I understand to be something less united than different bodies acting under one command—was a very dangerous thing. I have no doubt he is perfectly right, but that applies to the Army and the Navy to-day. Have we forgotten the famous distich:"Lord Chatham, with his sword undrawn,
Is waiting for Sir Richard Strachan,
Sir Richard, longing to be at 'em,
That was co-operation between the Navy and the Army. You have to put up with that sort of thing. You have to work them sometimes together, and the difficulties of co-operation have to be overcome. So it must be with the Air, and you must get over the difficulties just as you do with the Army and the Navy. I wonder whether my hon. and gallant Friend has ever considered whether there is any argument that his brain can devise against an independent Air Force which is not equally good against an independent Fleet. I know that what lies in the minds of so many distinguished generals is that a pilot in an aeroplane is merely a soldier in the air. Apparently, by the same process of reasoning, a captain on a man-of-war is a mere soldier on a ship. Nobody thinks that. Everyone says that you must have a distinct Navy and Army, and that they must be separately organised. If it were proposed that my hon. and gallant Friend should take command of the Channel Fleet, I am almost sure he would refuse. Lord John Russell said he felt quite able to command the Channel Fleet, but he was a civilian. I believe my hon. and gallant Friend would refuse; yet, why, on his principles? I suppose he would say he did not know about the material organisation of a battleship. Neither does he know anything about an aeroplane or the organisation that goes to build up the efficiency of air work He would say, I suppose, that he did not understand the temperaments of sailors, their discipline, or how you could command and manage them, and that therefore he would not trust himself in command of a battleship or of the Channel Fleet. That is even more true of aeroplanes than of the Navy. I have asked very distinguished officers who have served in the Navy, and who have afterwards become officers in the Air Force, and every one of them to whom I have spoken has agreed that the difference between the Air Force and the Army and the Navy is greater than the difference between the Navy and the Army. The point of view of the fighting officer in the Air Force is more difficult, and everybody knows how extremely difficult the question of discipline was during the War in respect of the Air Force. It was because of the intense individualism of the men of the Service. The officer in the Army has the importance of discipline driven home to him because of the conditions of his service. He sees that you cannot work an army without discipline. He sees that you have to command others and be commanded by others obviously for the efficiency of all that he does. It is not so in the Air Force. With the individual pilot in the air it is much more difficult to bring that home. There he is, relying on himself for everything—an exaggeration of self-reliance, an exaggeration of self-confidence, successful, very largely, in proportion as he becomes self-confident, and almost too self-confident, as he undertakes risks disregards dangers, relies on his own judgment without regard to any outside consideration. You cannot help flying officers looking down on people who do not fly. If my hon. and gallant Friend came down to inspect some air squadron, after he had inspected it, and when the young pilots met in the mess-room afterwards, he would be treated with contempt. They would say, "Who is this ignorant person of the lower classes who cannot fly and comes here to instruct us?" As I have said, I had the advantage of being in age very old, but in rank very junior, and therefore I used to associate with the aged of the Service and with the very young officers. I used to hear what they said, and that was their attitude of mind to the men who did not go into an aeroplane. If you did not go into an aeroplane and fly, and you were middle-aged, well and good, but if you were not middle-aged and did not fly you were degraded. The attitude of the soldier and the sailor would be absolutely different. I am satisfied that the management or discipline of the Air Force is impossible if you do not have it separately controlled, and I hope the Government will not fritter away their decision on that point in the name of co-operation, and that they will not concede any control of discipline, promotion, or training, or the administration that relates to discipline, promotion, or training to the Navy or the Army. If they do they will only destroy what is a most difficult thing to build up in the Air Force, esprit-de-corps and pride in the Force, and they will get very inefficient management of those wings that they hand over to the Navy and the Army. There is one thing I wanted to say about what fell from my hon. and gallant Friend regarding the organisation of the Cabinet in respect to national defence. I see very vividly the arguments that have been put forward for organising the three services in one Department. I am not able to offer any very precise criticism, but I would suggest that as far as it is possible to observe from outside—we sometimes get lurid gleams of the interior of the Cabinet, as by a flash of lightning from the lips of ex-Secretaries of State for India and others, these revelations of the unspeakable world beneath our feet—I think what really is wrong with the control of Cabinet organisation is that the Prime Minister—I do not mean particularly this Prime Minister but any Prime Minister—has too much to do, and that what you want is three or four deputy Prime Ministers, one of whom would have care of these branches of defence and perhaps some allied branches—that is a matter which might be considered—and break up the Cabinet, as I understand it is already largely broken up—not merely by disagreements and temperamental differences but by the organisation of Committees. You would have your deputy Prime Minister at the head of the Cabinet Committee who would act to a large extent for the common interests of the Departments as a separate Department. There was one thing in the speeches to which we have listened which must, I think, fill every intelligent person with grave alarm. The Secretary of State said that he was going to make a beginning of home defence, that he proposed to have the few squadrons necessary for training, and only, as I understand, three squadrons for actual defence. I believe there are only two possible policies—indeed that there is only one—in respect to home defence in the air. You must either compete with the Continental nations or you must make no attempt whatever. I do not believe there is any advantage in having these three squadrons. Personally, I should have none at all, except in so far as it is a part of training, and it is possible that these three squadrons might be necessary from the point of view of training in order to give officers practice in a particular class of machine. But I should not have home defence, so-called, at all. France is to have next year, we are told, 220 or 240 squadrons, and obviously three squadrons would be no use against those 240. Personally, the arguments used fill me with the conviction that the whole thing in impossible, and that an air struggle between two great European Powers could only result in the total destruction of both the Powers engaged, and, indeed, of all civilisation. We are told by those who advocate a large extension of the Air Force that you will have quantities of air machines able to carry bombs far heavier than any used in the last War, bombs containing high explosives which will destroy all the buildings, or poison gas which will kill all the people, met, women and children. Therefore, this great city of London could be totally destroyed, and by way of consolation we are recommended to have corresponding aeroplanes to destroy Paris or Berlin in their turn. Some people say that we should then sleep easier in our beds. I do not think I would be any the more comfortable, because of the consciousness that the French and Germans were going to burst out a day later, after my own demise, in circumstances of great suffering and terror. Surely the truth of the matter is that any great nation can destroy civilisation if it pleases, if it really gives its mind to it. There is not the least doubt that with the improvement of mechanical science you could send up such a quantity of aeroplanes and bombs and devices of deadly destruction that you could wipe out your enemy. The only chance would be to be the first to act, and since everyone who knows the British Government may be quite certain that we would not be the first to act, the prospect is not a very prepossessing one. I see no choice except that of retiring to New Zealand or Tristan da Cunha, or to become, as I am, a supporter of the League of Nations. Do not let me be understood to say that I am satisfied it could not happen. I think very likely it might happen. The only way to stop it is by convincing all the civilised nations that it is not in their own interests to bomb London into non-existence. If we bomb Paris and Berlin into non-existence we should have to ask ourselves whether we would be any better off after the operation than we were before. If you are not to pour forth destruction on this scale, you must fall back on one consideration, and that is that it is not the interest of any nation to destroy the whole of the civilised world. It is very easy to show in imagination that if one nation 'were destroyed in this way and in turn other nations were destroyed by the same method, there would soon be nothing left but a lower standard of civilisation and we should be back to a stage of barbarian development. It is to that we would be driven. It is so obviously true that I cannot believe that the nations of the world will persistently ignore the truth. They must fall back on some diplomatic, quasi-federal organisation like the League of Nations to solve the problem. Otherwise, what have they to look to but absolute ruin and destruction? Be that as it may, I do not think we should be wise—not looking to the remote future, but to the financial year with which we are concerned—in spending some of the money on small measures of home defence. It is true that if you cannot be formidable the next safest thing is to be insignificant, even on the militarist's theory. No one proposes to bomb Berne or Geneva, or even the Hague. Therefore we shall be better off. We might be less offensive to our neighbours if we had no squadrons for home defence. I would prefer to leave home defence to be considered in the future. Then we may have a time of less financial stringency, and we shall certainly have some means of estimating how far mechanical and scientific development have gone. We shall by then, perhaps, have attained to something like a static condition. Some day it will be with the aeroplane as it is now with the railway engine, which cannot be greatly improved. Your machinery will have been so far developed that no very great improvement would be possible. What you are doing now is certain to be obsolete in a few years. I support the Air Estimates in every respect except that I would leave out of them every sum that is actually spent on home defence, and I would confine the work of the Air Force to what it does more safely, as efficiently and much more cheaply, namely, the policing of the Empire against savage or uncivilised warfare, and by assigning to it that large sphere of usefulness you would both support and sustain the fabric of civilisation and practise a wise economy.Is waiting for the Earl of Chatham."
After listening to the Noble Lord it seems to me that this is a matter which interests the Labour party. I shall not pursue the mangling of the gallant Field Marshal with which he began his speech, but apart from that it seems to me that the Labour party are almost in entire agreement with his speech. I want to draw attention to the main value of this Debate. Service Members will not disagree with me when I say that the ordinary naval or military officer is essentially conservative, and that the whole of the direction of those Services is conservative in tendency. At the War Office and the Admiralty they prefer to go on the old lines, and it requires the shock of something like this Debate to put new ideas before them and the public in order that the nation may start afresh on thinking out these problems of defence. There is no doubt that at the present time if you went to 99 people out of 100 or 99 newspapers out of 100 and asked them what was Britain's first line of defence, they would say the Navy. After to-day's Debate there will be more people who realise that the Navy is not our first line of defence but that the Air Service is. Really the proportion in which we should assist these two Services ought to be precisely reversed if we are to get the maximum amount of defence.
What we have to realise is what would happen if there did come a fresh war, and with what the next war would begin. Undoubtedly, whenever that calamity does occur, it will begin by one power or the other securing the control of the air. Anybody who knows anything about aviation knows that the only possible way of defending yourself against air raids is by fighting aeroplanes, and that antiaircraft guns are valueless, and dangling wires hopeless. Therefore the first struggle in the new war will not be to secure control of the sea, but to secure control of the air. That Power which can overwhelm its rival in the air will not start by bombing London. If it did that it would very likely lose the advantage of the first onslaught. It would start by bombing aerodromes and factories, and by preventing us from making the aeroplanes that are necessary for defence. You must secure absolute control of the air. It is not only in its importance as compared with the Navy that the Air Service is so vital to us. In the case of the Army also, the Air Service is now revolutionising our views with regard to armed forces. We have had descriptions both from the Secretary of State for Air and from the Secretary of State for the Colonies of how the aeroplane is taking the place of ordinary pedestrian troops and of those cavalry regiments which some people are seeing disbanded with such great reluctance, and of how the aeroplane is taking the place even of the armoured cars and ordinary motor transport. The Air Service in the new portions of the Empire is replacing the Army just as in the defence of this country it is bound to replace the Navy. For those reasons I am very glad we have had this Debate, because that view has not been controverted. There is one point to be made clearer. The Air Service has been developed probably more in the United States than in France. There they are experimenting very largely in the carrying of heavy bombs, directed not so much to destroying buildings or aerodromes or factories as to wrecking ships. They are dropping bombs as an experiment on some of the captured German ships, and they have found that by dropping bombs, not necessarily on the ships but within 100 yards of them, the mere dropping of the bombs is sufficient to send a post-Jutland battleship to the bottom of the sea. That is making the capital ship completely out-of-date. The French did not start constructing capital ships. We, unfortunately, spent £10,000,000 or £11,000,000 last year on starting the construction of more capital ships. What we have to do now is to reckon with this entirely new force. We must instil into the minds of the Admiralty and War Office some conception of the power and capacity of the new arm. It is for that reason that this Debate is of importance. We have to look at the Debate from another point of view also. It is perfectly true that as we have three squadrons of aeroplanes, and the French 168 squadrons next year for home service, we are completely outmatched, and that we are absolutely at the mercy of a foreign Power at the present time. It is perfectly true, as has been said, that even if we had 168 squadrons of aeroplanes to match the French any struggle between the two nations would end in the destruction of civilisation. Whether we have three squadrons or 200 squadrons will not make very much difference, in the long run, if these two countries ever go to war. I have felt more to-day than ever before, the vital necessity for our Government really backing up the League of Nations. The only alternative to the horrible future which the development of these arms of assassination brings before our eyes is to back up the League of Nations. Nothing, not even the expenditure of hundreds of millions of money, can save civilisation in another war. We are brought to this impasse, that the conquest of the air means either the cessation of conquest altogether, or the destruction of civilisation. I wish I could see, not only in this but in other countries in Europe, a realisation of what this means and of the necessity for a real League of Nations, including not only the victors in the last War, but Germany and Russia as well. That seems to be the chief lesson in ultimate strategy to be deduced from this Debate. In the first place, the aeroplane has completely taken the place of the old first line of defence; in the second place, it has revolutionised and will gradually supplant the army as a policeman for the world, and in the third place, the development of the aeroplane makes war itself either suicidal or impossible. Let me turn from that to another point which has been made clear in this Debate and another motive which has arisen. It has been made quite clear that the French are overwhelmingly strong in air force. I can conceive it possible that in the next year or so, when the public realise the relative position of ourselves and the French in connection with aeroplanes we shall have started in this country an aerial league similar to the Navy League. We shall have started in the Press a gigantic agitation for a one-power standard in the air. We shall have pressure brought to bear, not only from interested parties, but from the ordinary public, nervous lest they should be blown to bits, for this country to join in competitive building with other countries. The old armament ring is getting a little feeble and flaccid owing to the slump in their particular engines of destruction. You will have a new armament ring springing up. Every body interested in aeroplane manufacture and motor manufacture and so forth will be behind this movement, and we shall have the usual expert engineers advising us, and before we know it we may find ourselves in exactly the same feverish competition with the French in building aeroplanes as we were in previously with the Germans relative to the building of battleships. We shall have changed one engine for another. We shall have changed one dangerous enemy for another. We shall have changed the object of our envy and suspicion, but the newspapers which back up the enterprise will be the same as they were previously. I do not see that we can stop that feeling, I do not see that it is possible to prevent the people of this country clamouring for an enormous increase of expenditure on the Air Service, unless we can develop the League of Nations on sound lines. It seems to me utterly useless to try to compete in building, and utterly degrading to go back to the old hideous frame of mind in which we were continually suspecting the man across the Channel, because he did not happen to speak the same language, of desiring to assassinate us. You have either got to change that completely and realise the international solidarity of the world, the international solidarity of civilisation, or else go back to the brute beast conditions of competition in arms, with the sure and certain knowledge that when, as inevitably happens, that competition liquidates in war, the war which will follow will be a disaster which will obliterate civilisation entirely, conqueror and conquered alike.Royal Air Foece (Control)
I beg to move to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof the words
I do not propose to follow up the controversy which has arisen in this Debate as between an independent or a combined Air Force, because I believe whichever solution is finally accepted it will be equally necessary to have proper coordination from above. There is a very interesting feature in this year's Air Estimates, namely, the Appropriations-in-Aid which appear in respect of Iraq, Palestine, and Trans-Jordania. These new responsibilities have not merely a strategic interest. The Geddes Report has stated that the use of the Air Force in the Middle East has caused the Estimates for that area this year to be cut down from £27,000,000 to £13,000,000. There-fore there is a great deal of money in the right use and co-ordination of resources in cases of this kind. One is bound to ask, from the point of view of national economy, if for no other reason, whether the most satisfactory method exists for exploiting the possibilities of the young Air Service, or whether it is merely being given this new opening because the Colonial Secretary happens during his varied career to have presided over all three of the fighting Departments. In this year's Debates on getting you, Mr. Speaker, out of the Chair, there has been one curious feature. The Members who have secured precedents for their notices of Motion have in no case used the opportunity for discussing matters of internal departmental interest. They invariably brought forward proposals on the wider issue of the relations between the fighting Services themselves. I do not think this feature in Debate was due merely to the recognition that Imperial defence must be considered as a single problem. Distinguished members of both the Army and Navy agree that the present system of organisation and coordination is very far from satisfactory The hon. and gallant Member for the West Derby Division of Liverpool (Rear-Admiral Sir R. Hall) wished to secure the co-operation of air and sea forces by killing the Air Force and dividing its corpse. The hon. and gallant Member for Bute (Sir Aylmer C. Hunter-Weston) did not commit himself in favour of such an amalgamation, but proposed a Commis- sion with a very wide reference to consider how to deal with defence organisation and the co-ordination of operations and administration on air, sea and land. The Under-Secretary of State for War answered, "Leave us alone; cannot we have a little rest?" I do not think the country can afford to give them a rest in this respect. The time for reform of war administration is after a war, as was the case with the Esher Commission after the South African War. It would be disastrous to allow haphazard improvisations to harden into a system. If reform is not tackled now, when experience is still fresh in the minds of the experts, it will never be achieved. Ten years hence the country will have forgotten Gallipoli and how that amphibious operation was undertaken without any joint consideration between the naval war staff and the general staff. It is common knowledge too, that proper co-ordination has not yet been achieved, and we must increase co-operation if we are to make the best of our resources. I am sure many examples will occur to the minds of hon. Members, and I need only mention one. It is well known that a great difficulty which confronts the Air Service is that it offers permanent careers to a far smaller number of officers than it is desirable to train in the Service. The conditions of air fighting are so exacting that only officers of, say, up to the age of 30 can bear the strain of actual air service. If you are to have reasonable promotion, if you are to get over the difficulty of having a pyramid with a huge base and very narrow apex, the obvious solution is to arrange for the attachment, for a few years, of officers from the Army and Navy. In addition to giving the necessary number of officers of flying age, you will produce flying men who, being soldiers and sailors first of all, will be able to co-operate efficiently, as we are told is most necessary on the part of both Services. Both Senior Services have practically blocked this proposal, and this deadlock can only be ended by some coordination being proposed by an authority superior to the executive Departments. The Government have refused the proposal of the hon. Member for Bute that an inquiry should take place. I trust that this means that they feel there have been enough inquiries on the subject, and that they can now make up their minds. What is the position? The Haldane Report on the machinery of government recommended that there should be a general supervision over the three Departments of Defence by the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Geddes Report advocated the setting up of a Ministry of Defence. The Government should surely now be capable of deciding between these two proposals, because they are only different in method. It is only a question of whether you will begin with a short step or a long one. There are obvious and overwhelming difficulties in the way of creating a Defence Ministry at one stroke. Until the General War College has had time to produce experts with far more balanced training than is possible in the staff colleges of the separate forces, the Minister responsible for co-ordinating these services must get his professional advice from the present specialists—experts who have been trained in the Army, Navy or Air Force, respectively. Eventually we must come to an Imperial combined general staff, as has been admitted in very definite terms by the Colonial Secretary himself. It is useless to set up this staff until the personnel with which you are to man it has been trained. Even if you could, by a miracle, improvise a great Department of this kind, the Minister who runs it would quite overbalance the system of Cabinet government as it is administered at present. Unless he is to be a Triton among minnows, it would be necessary to extend the principle recommended by Lord Haldane's Committee and have a super-Cabinet and super-Ministers, placed, like the proposed Ministry of Defence, over the pre-occupations of a Ministry of detail, and responsible only for the widest lines of policy and coordination. It may be that eventually the Ministry of Defence will be achieved, but if so, the Minister and his Department will most easily be evolved from the present machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Such evolution seems to me far more consistent with our institutions than the method of special creation of a full-fledged super-Minister presiding over a super-Department. The Under-Secretary of State for War stated the other day that the Committee of Imperial Defence already has power to carry out all the sugges- tions which were put forward in the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for Bute and Ayr, to which I have already referred. That is so, but the point is, that the constitution of the Committee of Imperial Defence is such that it is not enabled to make the best use of those powers which it possesses, and my Amendment seeks to strengthen and regularise its machinery. It urges that"in the opinion of this House, to enable the best use to be made of the Air Service, all defence forces should be represented on and their activities co-ordinated by the Committee of Imperial Defence, which should meet regularly and frequently; and that a Minister who is not departmentally responsible for any of the fighting Services should be appointed as permanent Vice-Chairman of the Committee, to take the Chair in the absence of the Prime Minister."
The trouble is that the Committee has no executive or administrative power whatsoever. Its control used to be exercised through the Cabinet by the channel of the Prime Minister, who presided over both those bodies. Before the War the Prime Minister was the only—and, indeed, I suppose he is now—permanent and regular member of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and other members were merely summoned by his choice. The late Prime Minister recognised the importance of this institution and gave very much time to it, but no Prime Minister is physically capable, in view of his other pre-occupations, of giving the necessary attention to such work if it is to be adequately conducted. If the Prime Minister is either inattentive or asleep during the discussions, it means that the advice of the Committee of Imperial Defence does not get through to the Cabinet, where alone policy can be finally settled. Since the War the position seems a little different. From an answer which I received from the Leader of the House yesterday, it appears that sub-committees have been very active, but they have no direct access to the Cabinet. The full Committee appears now to have ceased to meet. The Leader of the House told me yesterday that, as far as he knew, they had not met at all last year; anyhow, they had never met under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, and a Standing Defence Sub-Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Lord President, appears now largely to be taking over the functions formerly performed by the full Committee. It seems to me that this present position is unnecessarily haphazard and makeshift. We do not even know who s on this Standing Sub-Committee. I could not get the information when I asked for it, on the ground that there was no precedent for disclosing these details. Surely, for the important work of co-ordinating these Departments, we ought to have a body openly appointed and publicly responsible—probably the head politician and the head professional representatives of the three fighting Services at the present time—but we do not know, and why should the matter be veiled in secrecy? Is it not time to admit that the co-ordination of the direction, operation, and supply of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force should definitely be the duty of a body with a permanent organisation? It is, above all, important that this co-ordinating body should have this independent chairman, as to which the right hon. Member for Ilkeston (Major-General Seely) has put forward such strong arguments on two previous occasions. It has been suggested to me that the work of Chairman could efficiently be carried out by the senior of the three Departmental Chiefs. Under present circumstances, however, any such Minister presiding over these deliberations would almost certainly be biassed in favour of the claims of his own fighting Department, because he would necessarily know their case in much greater detail than the case of the other Departments. It would often be a question of substitution, of one Service being cut down to enable another Service to expand, and even if the Minister did not listen to his own professional advisers, he would always be suspected of doing so, and you would get endless friction and jealousy. Here again, therefore, our proposal would merely regularise the position which now exists, because I gather that the Lord President has already been presiding over this Standing Defence Sub-Committee, of whomsoever it may consist, and certainly there is no Minister more pre-eminently fitted by knowledge and long experience for such a responsibility. I am very glad to see that the Secretary of State for the Colonies is apparently going to deal with this question, because in addition to his unrivalled administrative experience of the fighting Departments, he has a hereditary tradition in this matter. There is a Memorandum of Lord Randolph Churchill in the Report of the Hartington Commission, in which he urges the creation of a Secretary of State and Treasurer of the land and sea Forces of the Crown, a Chancellor of the Exchequer for those very important Departments. He recommended this proposal, firstly, because it would ensure proper financial control by Parliament and the Government, and, secondly, because it would provide a much needed link between the two Services. Lord Randolph Churchill made this very prophetic recommendation in the limited liability, bow and arrow days of 32 years ago. Since then warfare has been absolutely transformed. It has become infinitely more complex, and its coordination has become a far more urgent and exacting problem. Warfare has now broken the old boundaries. It is no longer limited to the surface of the land and sea. Modern fighting lurks above the clouds and dives under the sea,' and it even poisons the very air, and in the emergency of large scale mobilisation all public Departments are brought in, because this process involves for a great war, not merely the entire manhood, but the whole economic and industrial resources of the nation."all defence forces should be represented on and their activities co-ordinated by the Committee of Imperial Defence, which should meet regularly and frequently; and that a Minister who is not departmentally responsible for any of the fighting Services should be appointed as permanent Vice-Chairman of the Committee, to take the Chair in the absence of the Prime Minister."
I beg to second the Amendment.
I do not propose to go into the quarrel, which has been waging to-day, between a separate and an independent Air Force, for the proposal which we have put on the Paper is, I believe, inevitable, whether your Air Force be independent or not. I only wish to make three points, of which the first is this: The Committee of Imperial Defence was indicated in the Geddes Report as the co-ordinating authority for defence, and, therefore, all the economies suggested in the Geddes Report can be obtained by passing our Amendment, and to get them we need not go as far as a Ministry of Defence. I think it is sometimes thought that you cannot get the full effect of the Geddes economies unless you take the very much bigger and rather questionable step of setting up at once a Ministry of Defence, but it is not so, because the Geddes Committee very carefully guarded themselves, and they themselves have pointed out the Committee of Imperial Defence as being the co-ordinating authority, and, as my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Lieut.-Colonel Guinness) said, the same suggestion was made by Lord Haldane's Committee on the Machinery of Government. My second point is, that our suggestion is much more modest than a Ministry of Imperial Defence, and is not open to the very serious objections which, on Thursday last, were stated by the Leader of the House against a Ministry of Defence. He said, for instance, that that scheme required more consideration. I quite agree that it does, but this suggestion which we bring forward gives the occasion for that consideration, for it enables all the three defence forces to be brought together round the same table, and the problems that are common to all to be worked out. It also gets over the difficulty that we do not now possess a trained, common Staff. Under our suggestion each branch of service would retain its Staff as at present, and then if, as time goes on, a General Staff is required, it could be built up gradually; and it does not suppress the individuality of the three Services, nor does it set up a super-Minister, and it does facilitate all the unification, to which the Leader of the House pointed, of transport, supply, intelligence and education. Therefore, all the advantages lie on the side of our suggestion. 8.0 P.M. My third point goes rather wider. I have listened to the whole of the Debate to-day with the interest that we always feel when a subject is being discussed by people who know much more about it than we do. I represent the ordinary man who does not know what the future of the Air Force is going to be, but I want to know, and until you get the heads of these three great fighting forces in the same room and round the same table you will not know what the future of the Air Force is going to be. The House has had two absolutely conflicting views put before it. The first was represented in its most extreme form by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Rochester (Lieut.-Colonel Moore-Brabazon), who envisaged a world where the Channel was as dry as the Red Sea once was, where the Fleet was obsolete, and where, I think he said, the Army was obsolete or obsolescent, and to his mind there was nothing at all, no force of any good, except the Air Force. No doubt he produced some strong arguments to enforce that view, but I cannot help recalling that when the last War started, and when trench warfare started, it was thought the rifle was obsolete and that the bomb and the grenade were going to be the only weapons, but when the War ended we came back to the man with the rifle, and he was more important even than he had been before. So, I think, often we exaggerate the last new invention, and the mind goes round it, sees all its points and puts too much weight on the last new thing. Upon the other hand was the view represented by the hon. and gallant Field-Marshal who wants an Air Service that is subsidiary and subservient to the Army and Navy. Anything that I can say cannot carry any weight against a military opinion so important as his. Still, my mind did go back to our fighting on the Somme in 1916. At that time it so happened that the British aeroplanes were much stronger than the German, and, so far as you can get command of a substance like the air, we had command of the air. But supposing we had again to attack and take those trenches, is it not quite conceivable that the man who plotted out that attack would have been an airman, and would not we have seen the air-trained general in charge of the air and also of the attacking infantry, and would not the controlling and deciding factor have been the preliminary air bombardment of those trenches? I think it is quite possible. I do not express any opinion, but, after all, the Navy fights on the water, and the Army on the land; but the wind blows over both sea and land, and where the wind blows the Air Force fights. I was tempted to favour the view of the more extreme air advocates, but, again, I was checked by this consideration. I think all those extreme advocates forget that you do not win a war by staying in the air, and that your objective is either a fleet, an army, a fortress or a factory. Those are either situated in the sea or on the land, and you have to come down to destroy or occupy them, and that is not done by aeroplanes. You do not win a war by shooting. You win a war by the occupation of the enemy's country, and I am not quite sure that my mind goes quite so far as to envisage aeroplanes leaving the whole of this country flat. I do not believe that. I think the defence against aeroplane attack will not stand still, and our depots and factories will be protected against their bombs. I know that when you get an aeroplane engine which is more powerful than our most powerful express locomotives, flying at the rate of 200 miles an hour, and that can carry a bomb of 2 tons, you have got a very formidable weapon, but, after all, it is a pretty big thing to destroy a country. It is a pretty big thing to beat a country, and in the end you will require the infantry and the ships. So that I do not at all subscribe to the extreme view of either party. But the main opinion left on my mind is one of ignorance. I do not know. I can imagine all sorts of things occurring, but I want somebody there who will collect together the best brains of Army, Navy and Air, and will preside over them, and will advise the country on what is an enormously important point. Nobody, whether he wants the Air Service as a subsidiary arm or as an independent Service, will in the least minimise the enormous importance of the air. Can you conceive a better body than the Committee of Imperial Defence? The Prime Minister is chairman of it, and, if he be not present himself, he appoints his deputy, who, I presume, would be a Cabinet Minister, and so you keep the Committee in touch with the Cabinet. Until you do that, and unless you do that, you will have these three great forces, the Army, Navy, and Air, all working out their own problems, working them out with great courage and great skill, but on their own lines, and you will not have anybody who will look to defence as a whole. The mere saving of money, the allocation of money, cannot be done unless you have somebody who can look to the whole of the defence of this country and the Empire. Therefore, from all points of view—from the point of view of immediate saving of duplication, from the point of view of the best way of spending the money that we can spend, and, lastly, from the point of view of making proper use of these three great factors of defence, I do hope the Government will accept the Amendment of my hon. and gallant Friend.I should like to congratulate the Air Minister on the way he has presented his Air Estimates, and on his very able speech, and then deal with the Amendment brought forward by the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite. For many, many years, we had a Subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence presided over by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ilkeston (Major-General Seely) and he had on it representatives of the Army and the Navy, officers who dealt with their particular Air Forces. We met two or three times a week very often, and the right hon. Gentleman presided over that Committee with very great success. We made great strides in the Air Service on both the military side and the naval side, and we have to thank that right hon. Gentleman for his great vision in turning over the small airships to the Admiralty, and so enabling us to train the pilots, who did such good work in the small airships during the War in hunting submarines. The great fault of this Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence was that it had no executive power. It could recommend anything to the Admiralty or to the War Office for their flying services to carry out, and those authorities adopted them or not, just as they liked.
I have listened to all the arguments this afternoon with great attention, and I consider that a most splendid case has been made out for a Ministry of Defence. The experiments in America and France show that the battleship now is quite obsolete, and I should like to see some of the money voted for the Navy turned over to the Air Service. The right hon. Gentleman has put forward very modest Estimates indeed, and I do not think anybody can complain on the ground of economy. He says he is going to get a 37 per cent. reduction, and I think that is very satisfactory. But all these arguments to-day show that we want to have an authority in power to tell the Navy, the Army or the Air Force exactly what to do. If you can only do that, you can make very great economies indeed. It is argued by the hon. Gentleman opposite that we have not got the staff to do it. I say, we have the staff existing now, and the Government could appoint a Ministry of Defence to-morrow. You could draw your staff from the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, from men who have had experience in the War, and I guarantee to get it going within 48 hours. I hope the Minister for Air will give us his opinion on this question of a Ministry of Defence. The Estimates are signed by six gentlemen, and none of them has any experience of the Navy. That, I am quite certain, is one of the reasons why there is so much criticism from the naval side on the Air Service. The Secretary of State for the Colonies is largely responsible, because he set up this Air Service on military lines, and I think the right hon. Gentleman has followed in his footsteps far too keenly. If you take the people who signed these Estimates, there is only one, and that is a secretary, who was at the Admiralty and had been secretary to a Sea Lord. That is the only connection any of them has had with the Navy at all, and I would ask the Air Minister whether he could not in the reorganisation of the Air Service put an admiral there, or somebody who has experience of Fleet work, aeroplane carrier work, and submarine work. You want to get those people on it—the younger men who have had that experience in the War—and then we would not have all this criticism from the naval side. If you will only do that, I feel quite certain that things will go far more satisfactorily, and people will not be able to criticise your Air Service and say it is being developed as a cavalry regiment.I should like much to follow the Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University (Lord H. Cecil) in the very amusing speech and the many fallacies to which he treated us; but I desire to pay attention strictly to the Resolution put before the House by the hon. and gallant Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Lieut.-Colonel Guinness). I would emphasise here to-night that I do not intend in what I have to say to make any reference to what I advocated to the Government in speaking on the Army Estimates. What I propose to say has nothing whatever to do with that. I think the Resolution which has been brought forward by my hon. and gallant Friend has this great advantage amongst others. First, that it urges on the Government the great importance of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the necessity of making what is a most excellent thing even more effective than it has been in the past. Secondly, a great point is that it proves to the Government the great interest that is taken in this matter by the House generally. In this matter it really is essential, and an essential portion of our organisation for defence.
The third point is that it will recall to the House the important functions that are being played by the Committee of Imperial Defence in our defence organisation, because I think it is certainly taken as accurate now that, unless the House of Commons itself takes an interest in any matter, unless it presses upon the Government the demand for action, the Government of these days, with the great strain and great stress in matters financial, domestic, and foreign, are apt to place anything that is not so brought to their notice in a secondary category that can be dealt with at a more convenient opportunity. I fully agree that the work that has been done by the Committee of Imperial Defence, about which the Resolution treats, has been of the very greatest importance to the country both in the past and in the present; that there has been an immense press of work for many years on every Cabinet and on every Secretariat to get through, and it has been very difficult therefore—we all realise it—for Members of the Government, who are the heads of the great Services, and for their technical assistants to give that attention to that Committee work which I know they would under other circumstances have desired to do. A discussion of this sort does give the House certain knowledge of what the Committee of Imperial Defence is, and, therefore, gives the House a greater knowledge and greater interest in it. It is essential for national security that we should have a knowledge of this Committee of Imperial Defence, and should press on the Government for its more effective action. It is important, as the Seconder of the Resolutions has said, because of the great effect the Committee of Imperial Defence doing its duty well would really have in the co-ordination of our administrative services, and therefore the finances of the country. That point, I think, was very clearly brought out by the Geddes Committee. Not only shall we recognise, therefore, that without the effective working of the Committee of Imperial Defence we cannot get the right eoconomy or efficiency, but also that we have, on the other side, the fact that unless the Committee of Imperial Defence acts, and acts regularly, we cannot get the best results out of the other side of the services, that is to say, the operating side—the general staff, the War staff, and the Air staff as they are respectively called in the three services. In order that the Committee of Imperial Defence may do the best work in the way that everybody desires it shall do, the factors that were brought forward by the Mover of this Resolution are, in the opinion not only of himself, but of all who have had to do with it, essential: that is to say, that the Committee of Imperial Defence shall meet regularly and frequently, and that it shall have a permanent Chairman or Vice-Chairman. We say Vice-Chairman because, according to the constitution of the Committee of Imperial Defence, the Chairman must necessarily, and rightly, be the Prime Minister. As has, however, been pointed out in these days when the Prime Minister has such an infinity of different things to see to, it is practically impossible now, and in any immediate future that we can see, for the Prime Minister himself to give that continuous attention to the Committee of Imperial Defence that is necessary if we are to get the result that we require. Therefore it is as the Mover of this Resolution and all those, both inside this House and outside of it, who think with him in this matter, feel it should be laid down as a principle that some definite Minister, who is not the head of one of the great Departments, shall be appointed as a permanent vice-chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence, should attend all its meetings—those regular and frequent meetings to which I have referred—and himself should take the Chair if the Prime Minister is not present. The Committee of Imperial Defence in its work and discussions must necessarily be technical, but a knowledge of the reasons for the existence of the Committee are quite simple and quite commonsense and ought not to be a mystery, as it seems to me. A general knowledge of the Committee of Imperial Defence itself and how it is constituted ought to be the common knowledge of all in this House. I do not for one moment say that the various matters which it goes into and which necessarily are very technical, and others which must necessarily be secret, should in detail be given to this House, but I say that this House should be made acquainted with what it is, how it works, how it is constituted in order that hon. Members may take that interest to which I have referred; and all this to my mind is a matter of considerable interest and, indeed, importance. The Committee of Imperial Defence before the War was found to be very valuable, because even when we had only two Services, the Army and the Navy, it was found that there was a great deal of overlapping, and not that proper co-ordination between the two fighting Services themselves, and the various Departments on land, which are quite necessary for the proper defence of this country. Now that the War is over the functions of this Committee are enormously increased. The decision of the Government that was given on Thursday last by the Leader of the House, that the Air Ministry was to remain a separate Ministry in the immediate future or so far as he, the Leader of the House, could foresee, and that there should be a separate Air Force; that is, or ought to have, as a necessary corollary that the Committee of Imperial Defence should be strengthened and made even more effective than before. For you now have, not two Services operating in separate elements, the sea and the land, but you have three Services operating in elements that are to a very great extent inextricably mingled, and unless you have a sufficient co-ordinating authority you will have a great deal of overlapping, a great deal of duplication, and a great deal of waste. Had there been an Air Ministry, of course, it would have been the duty of that Ministry to co-ordinate the efforts of the three Services, but I agree a Ministry of Defence is not at the present time within the sphere of practical politics. I agree with the Mover of the Resolution that the strengthening of the Committee of Imperial Defence is good, not only in itself, but as leading up to the possibility of such a Ministry of Defence ill the future, and that, at any rate, it is the only practical way that is to be got for co-ordinating the Services, and of directing them in common. The advantages of a separate Air Force were very rightly and clearly put forth in the Memorandum that was read by the Leader of the House. The disadvantages he naturally did not particularly deal with. They are known, and the disadvantages are mostly on the question of the danger of construction. I think that those disadvantages and dangers can only be got over by a strong central co-ordinating authority, such as the Committee of Imperial Defence, if it meets regularly and frequently, and not sporadically, and if it has a permanent Chairman who will attend all its meetings. Let us not be misunderstood in thinking that the Committee of Imperial Defence is not an important body and does not work hard. We know the immense work done by the Lord President of the Council, who has always been so keenly interested in the Committee of Imperial Defence. We know the work done in the absence of the President of the Council by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, but the sporadic interest first of one Minister and then of another is not sufficient. I agree that machinery is not everything. Criticism of our proposal has been made that we have too much machinery. I agree that is not everything. I agree that both good men and good machinery are necessary, but even if you have heaven-born men they cannot, in a great and complicated machine such as our defence organisation is, do their work without a good chief. It is of considerable importance that we should have an organisation which will have machinery for co-ordinating the whole. The essentials are regular meetings, a permanent vice-chairman and a good secretariat, which I know you have already. Beyond these, if we have the technical heads of the three Services, and the political heads meet once a week under a neutral chairman, we shall be able to create a feeling of corporate responsibility for defence. That is to my mind one of the most important things we can have. Taking the analogy of the Board of Admiralty or the Army Council, you see there that you have the big officers of State who are in charge of each Department of the Army or the Navy. They come to the Council each charged with the interest of their particular Department, and they look upon the problem, not from the point of view of their own particular Department, but as a whole, and they feel that they are part of the corporate whole and responsible as a corporate whole for the Army or the Navy, and they take a very much broader view of their duties and are really Ministers or Counsellors of the Service as a whole, and not merely advocates of their own Department. This would be the case if the Committee of Imperial Defence met as a rule once a week and did not hesitate to discuss all matters of defence and not as at present avoid discussion of matters belonging to another service. I know there is a feeling that the other service will say, "Keep off my ground," but if each Department will look at the work as a whole we shall have made a large step towards getting our defence forces on a more healthy foundation. I trust the House will accept the Amendment. The Government must have a far greater knowledge of these matters than we can have, but we rely upon them for effecting the organisation or coordination as soon as possible.The Mover and Seconder of this Amendment did not put their proposal forward in any antagonistic spirit towards the Air Service, but I do not belivee even if this Amendment be passed, and the right hon. Gentleman opposite put it into effect, that the Air Service is likely to benefit. The real difficulty about the Committee of Imperial Defence is this: On that Committee—and I saw a certain amount of its operations before the War—it is only the heads of the Departments concerned, and not even the heads of the small sub-Departments who come together on that Committee and talk about policy. The real thing is that that Committee has not got a staff. I fully appreciate the work of Sir Maurice Hankey and his assistants, but they do not really constitute a staff, and their work is only to co-ordinate the work of that Committee. Before the Committee of Imperial Defence or the sub-Committee outlined by this Amendment can really be an effective machine, not merely the heads of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Service will have to meet, but also the heads of those Departments and their staffs.
For example, the staff officers in the Planning Department of the Admiralty, and the corresponding officers who deal with the plans divisions of the Air Ministry and the War Office, must meet together and discuss their plans. The officers connected with the staffs of the Intelligence Sections of the Navy, Army, and the Air Ministry must also get together to think out and discuss the schemes which they have to put into operation. Until that is done, it will be a mere waste of time for the heads of Departments to come forward with prepared schemes arranged in the watertight boxes of the Admiralty or the War Office; it is no use coming with their schemes in black boxes to be discussed for half-an-hour at the offices of the Committee of Imperial Defence. If they do that they will come with prejudiced notions, either naval or military, and with schemes not prepared by experienced staff officers who can look at the needs of all the three Services together. Of course, the First Lord of the Admiralty will have a purely naval idea, and the Secretary of State for War will have a purely military idea, and the chances are that they will outvote the desire and ambition of the Secretary of State for Air. What must be done is to train up a Ministry of Defence Staff. Until you have trained officers to look upon all three Services from a centre point and in the right prospective, until you have a sufficient number of officers trained on those lines, both senior and junior, it will be futile to give executive control to anybody who will be in a position to coordinate the services of the Admiralty, War Office, or the Air Ministry. That leads me to speak about the relations between the Air Ministry and the Admiralty. The Mover and Seconder of this Amendment were not unsympathetic in their action and attitude towards the Air Service, but even they were sceptical as to the possibilities which lay in front of the development of the Air Service. One hon. Member said he thought the time would be far distant when the Air Service would be secondary to the other Services. That time may come before very much longer, when wars can be won, and will be won, in the air, and when the land and sea forces will be a purely secondary consideration. This has already taken place in the Navy, because wars are won at sea without either of the two armies having to come into operation. The time is not far distant when we may see a war entirely conducted in the air. A war may commence by a great flight of 3,000 or 4,000 bombing aeroplanes, with bombs weighing a ton apiece, and they might destroy London before the Army or the Navy could come into action. To guard against this danger depends upon the defence which the Air Ministry will provide. I think a more important statement was made on Thursday last by the Government. Those who have spoken in opposition to the retention of the Air Ministry as a separate Service never experienced the difficulties which we experienced during the War in building up the Air Service. People talk as if the Air Service were only a branch of the fighting Services, in the same way as they talk of the torpedo and gunnery branch of the Navy, or the artillery and Army Service Corps in the Army. The difference between the Air Service as a Service and as a branch is the difference between an adjective and a noun. The Air Service is working in a totally new element. We have Services working on land, and on the sea and under the sea. Now we have a third Service working in the air. Anyone who has had any practical experience of the working of the Air Service knows that it is impossible to draw a dividing line between the air over one part of the world and the air over another part. You must have uniformity of administration, of regulations, of recruiting, of education and of training, and all the paraphernalia which goes to make up the administration of a fighting Service—tactics, fighting in the air, meteorology, manoeuvring, arrangements for stores and training—these are all matters which require a highly trained staff to carefully think out and scheme and arrange Estimates for for years ahead. The designing staff must consist of highly technical experts. The whole organisation is much too big and too delicate to be divided into two Services operating over land and over sea. I would ask hon. Members who want to get the Air Service back to the Army and the Navy whether they would like to have separate navies for the Pacific and for the Atlantic, whether they would like to have one army for Scotland and another for England. We want to have one Air Service to build up its own customs and regulations, and, what is more important, its own esprit de corps, entirely untrammelled by any other service. The Air Service has only just been built up. We have at this moment to carefully succour and nurture this delicate plant and to prevent it being strangled by the two senior jealous Services. There is an argument from the commercial point of view which bears out the necessity for a separate Air Ministry. Apart from the points I have mentioned—fighting, tactics, stores and so on—the technical side is a very important side. Under the Admiralty and the War Office sufficient skilled brains were never put on to the aircraft side—the technical side, but they tried to shunt it off under the Director of Naval Construction—a very excellent and worthy Department, a Department organised to build up fighting ships to float on the water. Can it be wondered at that this Department failed utterly to grasp the possibilities of the future of the Air Service? That is one point which shows that the Air Ministry should be a separate Ministry. During the War we had a good deal of experience of the Admiralty's opposition to air work. Much more could have been done during the War if there had been an Air Minister with direct responsibility to the Cabinet, who could have launched out into schemes to the right or left, not trammelled by Admiralty conservatism. These schemes would have gone a long way towards hastening the victorious conclusion of the War. There were several areas in which the Admiralty declined to allow intensive air operations to be carried out. There was anti-submarine work in the Channel and in the Mediterranean. There were air offensives in France, in Sinai, in Asia Minor, the Balkans and other places. I remember seeing the minutes of discussions which took place on these matters. They were really childish. It would have been humorous had the matter not been so serious, to see the attitude taken up by the people at the head of affaire at the Admiralty and elsewhere during the War, when thousands of lives were being lost every week. There are other Members of this House who can bear me out with regard to the attitude of the Admiralty over the development of the Air Service. I would ask the Secretary for Air particularly to bear in mind how the Admiralty tried to strangle the Air Service in the past. Before the War there were two alternatives. First, the Admiralty might have taken over the whole of the Air Service, and run it both on naval and military lines. That would have been a possible alternative, but they failed to grasp the situation; they failed to realise that there was any possibility in the air at all. I will give one little incident which shows the mentality of the Lords of the Admiralty in this respect. It was about the time when I applied for a commission in the Royal Navy. I wrote to a distinguished officer at the Admiralty asking to have my name put down for the Air branch of the Navy, and he wrote back: "My dear boy, the Admiralty will never waste their time over these new-fangled toys." I give that as an example, and a very good one, too, of the mentality which the Admiralty showed towards the Air Service. At any rate, in 1913–14, the Admiralty refused to see a future for the Air Service, and to run it. The other alternative which is to be carried out now is that the Air Service should be completely separate. One must not cast aspersions on the Admiralty or their predecessors. I remember reading that even in the time o*f the reign of James II. the same sort of opposition was brought forward to the establishment of a new service. Before the time of James II. there was no Army and no Air Service. A suggestion was brought forward by the Radicals at that time, who wished to improve our fighting services, that instead of carrying soldiers on board ships, they should start a new service and call it a Navy. A hurricane arose from the Army officers of that time. They called the soldiers who went to sea in ships by various nicknames, and it was some time before James II. was enabled to establish a new service which he called the Navy. Later, the same kind of opposition was raised by the Admiralty when steamships were introduced in the early part of the nineteenth century. Whenever you get improvement, whenever you have to have new things, the people at the head of affairs, who have been brought up under an old school, do their best to hinder the growth of the new service. We found during the War that the Admiralty simply would not tackle the question of air administration, whether in regard to big questions of strategy or small details of tactics. Even in connection with the fitting out of seaplane ships, they used to put the photographic room next to the boilers, which shows the sort of technical ability that the old admirals displayed in dealing with the Air Service. All the large operations—the operations, for example, which led to the successful raid on Cuxhaven on Christmas Day, 1914, the operations at the Dardanelles, where the first torpedo-carrying attack was carried out, reconnaissance in Palestine and elsewhere—all these operations were carried out in spite of, rather than with the assistance and co-operation of, the Board of Admiralty. I should like to pay a tribute now, although I do not agree with him on many points, to the work of the present Colonial Secretary in forcing through some of these schemes and operations in face of the united opposition of the then Board of Admiralty. What happened when he left? When the present Colonial Secretary left the Admiralty, those who had worked with him were subject to the jealousy and spite of the civil servants at the Admiralty. What is all this about? Why it is that this old Service will not allow a new Service to grow up I The fact is that these people have got jobs which have been built up on old lines. They have got staffs of civil servants, who see that, when a new Service is quickly and audaciously growing up to be a real rival, those staffs of civil servants and so on will have to be cut down, and so anyone who tries to do anything in that way to improve the nation's fighting Services is bound to get up against the Admiralty and the staff of civil servants at the Admiralty. When the present Colonial Secretary left we found all this backdoor work being started by very distinguished civil servants at the Admiralty—and I am only saying this because they are still there, and are still, probably, working against the new Service. People who held high positions in the Secretariat of the Board of Admiralty went round canvassing senior officers to get the Air Department officers relieved, and so to get a hit back at the present Secretary of State for the Colonies. While we were trying to do our little bit in some obscure part of the globe, these civil servants at home were scheming and intriguing and plotting and wire-pulling, hitting us in the back at every opportunity they could find. The A'dmiralty's air administration is a blot on its record, and finally and irrevocably excludes any consideration of the question of allowing that Department again to throttle the development of the air resources of the nation. The Admiralty have had every chance, and I hope the Government will never allow them again to fiddle with the Air Service. I should like now to make one or two general observations about the Air Estimates. It seems to me, looking at the Estimates, that the personnel charges are far too great.I must ask the hon. Member to confine himself to the subject of the Amendment. General criticism of the Estimates will only be in order when the Amendment is disposed of.
The other and most important point in connection with the Amendment which is before the House is that, if you co-ordinate the work of the three Services, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, under this Committee, composed simply of the heads of the three Services without any staff, the civil side is bound to suffer. I look upon the work of the civil branch of the Air Ministry as quite the most important work which the right hon. and gallant Gentleman has to do. We are told by the Cabinet that there is not going to be a war for another ten years. The most important work in the meantime, from every point of view, is to see that the civil aviation side is given a great deal more encouragement. The speech which the right hon. and gallant Gentleman made at the Guildhall on 7th February was, if I may say so, a very depressing speech. It was only brightened by contrast with the speech of the Noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State on the same day. It seemed to me, reading those two speeches, that they were diametrically opposed to one another. It seemed to me that they were, written by two different people, and, if I might hazard a guess, I would say that the speech of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman was written in the Department of the Chief of the Air Staff, while Lord Gorell's speech was written by the Department of Civil Aviation. That is very regrettable, because it shows that these two Departments are not in entire accord with one another. It shows that there is some competition going on between the two Departments—the fighting Department and the civil Department—inside the Air Ministry. I hope the right hon. and gallant Gentleman will do his best to bring them into accord. Lord Gorell at the Guildhall said:
At the same time we are told that air ships are going to be abandoned. What is the meaning of it? One Air Minister says that airships are going to be the thing of the future, while the other says they are going to be abandoned. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman has said that, rather than waste money on airships, it is better to commence de novo. Has he had any experience—"In the future the main air lines of the British Empire will be primarily airship lines, with branch aeroplane lines running off from them."
I cannot see, on the face of it, how this argument is really connected with the question of the representation of the Air Force on the Committee of Imperial Defence.
The point I was making was that I do not think this civil side of aviation, which I am now elaborating, will be adequately represented on this Committee. I feel that civil aviation will be strangled if it is subject to being outvoted by the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War. If it is subject to the control of the Admiralty, you get back to the old days. I believe the disaster to the "R38" was largely due to the Admiralty. If only the facts were known, the responsibility for that regrettable incident, causing the loss of, I might almost say, dozens of lives of gallant pioneers—officers and men—of the Air Service, was a result of the negligent policy adopted by the Board of Admiralty in past years. All that must be kept clear from any chance of control, either directly by the Admiralty or indirectly through the Committee of Imperial Defence, in which the Admiralty will have a determining vote. I do not feel that even now, without the Committee proposed in this Amendment, as much as possible is being done in regard to civil aviation. Looking at the constitution of the Department of the Director-General of Civil Aviation, I cannot find any section of that Department which is really doing useful work. There are five sections of this Department, a Controller of Planning, a Controller of Information, a Controller of Communications, a Controller of Aerodromes and Licensing, and a Director of the Meteorological Office. These are all vital sections of the Air Service, but they are only adjuncts to the successful organisation of commercial aeronautics. What does this Department of the Controller-General of Aviation do? I have read through the Command report dealing with the last six months' flying and I cannot see that the Department is encouraging aviation as things stand at present. Does the Controller send for the firms and say, "What can you do to further civil aviation? What routes ought we to get authorised? What can I press the Government to do for you?" Is he constantly meeting the leading organisers of Air Transport? Even in regard to these essential details as much is not being done as could be clone.
I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Member. The first part of his speech was perfectly in order, but I cannot see that criticism of the internal organisation of the Air Ministry can be made relevant to the question whether the Air Ministry should be represented on the Council of Imperial Defence.
I was trying to show that even now, under the present administration of the Air Service, the civil side of aviation, which is the most important side, is badly organised. How much worse will it be when it is subordinated to the voting power of the Admiralty and the War Office? I think I shall be in order in pointing out one or two big defects in that Department as it exists at present. These defects are likely to be made much worse when the right hon. Gentleman opposite is subordinated to the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Minister for War. I was giving him one or two little details which his civil Department ought to do now. They ought to erect wireless stations at both ends of the London-Paris route.
This is clearly out of order. It would be in order on the Main Question or on Vote A, but on this Amendment the considerations the hon. Member is putting forward clearly cannot be in order.
I think I have covered most of the points relating to the question of co-ordination and I shall reserve these matters for a later Vote.
9.0 P.M.
I regret that I was not able to be in the House when the Mover and Seconder of the Amendment made their speeches, but I was present during the whole of the rest of the discussion, and also during the Debate the other day. One thing that has struck me is the attitude of all those Members of the House who speak with a recognised weight of authority from the Air Force side upon this question. There is one current which has run through all the speeches I have heard, and that is that there is some attack upon the Air Force of a malevolent description. I wish to tackle that question. I look upon this question from a naval point of view, and I can say from my own personal knowledge that those Members who speak for the Air Force make the greatest mistake, of their lives when they think the present administration of the Admiralty is in any way antagonistic to the Air Force. Absolutely the reverse is the fact. The position is to-day that the Navy recognises in the Air Force a magnificent weapon of which they desire to make the very greatest use, and they feel that they are unable to do so under the present system. With regard to the terms of the Amendment, it may be that some sort of central organisation may be necessary in order to co-ordinate the forces. I know the last thing the Admiralty desire at present is the abolition of the Air Ministry, and I say that without fear of contradiction. The position is that the aeroplane, so far as the Navy is concerned, is a most valuable adjunct, but it is looked upon from quite the wrong point of view by those who are chiefly interested in the Air Force. I have an extract from a newspaper which has a most skilled aeronautical correspondent. Hon. Members may have read it. It is called the "Times." The aeronautical correspondent says:
How is it possible under the present conditions, for the Admiralty to do that? The Navy is responsible to-day for aircraft carriers. They are ships of war. The Navy has no concern whatever with what is put in them. The Navy may go in for a scheme of aircraft-carrier building, but it has no sort of guarantee whatever that when the aircraft' carriers are completed there will be a single aeroplane put in them. The tonnage of aircraft carriers was limited at the Washington Conference, but there was no sort of standard for what you were going to put into them fixed at that Conference. The Admiralty provide the carriers, and they have no concern in "the machines or the personnel to go in them. That is a situation which is thoroughly bad. It cannot make for the good of the Air Force or for the good of the Navy. It cannot make for the best utilisation of the most valuable weapon which is placed in them. Such a situation arises as that to which I alluded the other day. The very few pilots in the Navy who are capable of flying off—and I believe in their number there was only one who was capable of flying on to an aircraft carrier—-were all suddenly withdrawn at a given moment and sent to Iraq."The secret of success in war lies in bringing the greatest possible force to bear at a decisive point."
I have been unable to trace that incident.
I regret that fact because I elicited it by a question. I shall be delighted to furnish the right hon. Gentleman with the particulars in order to prove what I say. What I want the Air Force members to get over is the attitude of hostility towards the Force. I cannot see any attitude of hostility on the part of the Navy or the Army towards the Air Force. I know it is not a fact and to take up that attitude now is to prevent the best possible utilisation of the weapon we have. The hon. and gallant Member for Hertford (Rear-Admiral Sueter) below me very likely does not take that view, but he has had nothing to do with the present Board of Admiralty or the present administration, but with a former administration.
I had so many years of the former administration, and I can say we had no assistance whatsoever from the Sea Lords.
Exactly, that is just my point. The lessons of the War have gone home. The Air Force is an admirable weapon and they are not advocating its abolition. What they want is some power of control over the Air Force. A naval war of the future will mean the employment of a number of aircraft carriers. Supposing this country had to wage war on the other side of the world. It would have to take floating aerodromes with it. If this country went to war with such a power as Japan it would need aircraft carriers, which would have to work as part of the Fleet, and it is essential that the senior naval officer should have these aircraft carriers under his control and under his command. If I understood the Leader of the House aright, I am correct in assuming that that will be so. I do not want the Air Force all the time to think that the Navy is up against them; it is not. The Secretary of State for Air, in introducing his Estimates this afternoon—and I allude to this in order to emphasise my point that the present system does not work properly—made only one reference to the Navy, and that was in the allocation of the aircraft squadrons. He said that one and a half squadrons were allocated for work with the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean. He made no reference whatever to the Fleets in home waters.
There are four squadrons in home waters. I think I read that out.
I took down what the right hon. Gentleman said, and he never made any reference whatever to the fleets in home waters. All he did say was that there was one squadron in the home station, or in the home area, for work with the Army, three in reserve, and three for home defence, and one miscellaneous squadron.
The remaining four will make up the 12 at home.
The right hon. Gentleman never said anything about the remaining four working with the Navy. That is the point I want to get at. It is one of those things that gives cause for anxiety to those who care for the welfare of the Navy and also for the welfare of the Air Force. Several hon. Members have assumed that the battleship is obsolete. I know the gallant Admiral the Member for Hertford (Rear-Admiral Sueter) will endorse that. I am quoting his words. He said that the battleship was quite obsolete. It is astounding that a distinguished and gallant officer such as he is should arrive at such a conclusion. I suppose he bases it upon the results of the "Oestfriesland" experiments in America. If that is so, it astonishes me, because he will recollect that the "Oestfriesland" was a German battleship of by no means recent construction. That ship was moored as a stationary target, and it did not incorporate any of the latest ideas for countering the very serious effect of charges of high explosives exploding in water close to the ship.
It had a stronger and thicker armour under water than any of our ships.
The under-water armour did extend further below the water line than is the case in most of our ships, but at the same time the ship was not of recent construction, and it did not embody the more recent lessons of naval architecture. Therefore, when it is claimed by the Air Force that they have been able to make the battleship obsolete by that experiment, they should be careful not to claim too much. First of all, they must remember that the Navy of to-day takes into consideration the possibility of counter aircraft action. Every battleship to-day and most of the light cruisers are equipped with a certain number of aircraft themselves, apart from those aircraft carried by the aircraft carriers. It is important from the point of view of the Navy and the Air Force that the Navy should be able to make the utmost possible use of these aircraft. Under the present system they do not get a chance. I have had the opportunity of talking with Air Force officers working with the Fleet, and I find that they very largely share that opinion. I know that the Admiralty are most anxious to make the greatest possible use of what they know to be a most formidable weapon. Therefore, I do think that if there is anything in the suggestion made by the Mover and Seconder of this Motion to set up some co-ordinating Ministry or some co-ordinating control of the three Services, I shall certainly support it for all I am worth. What do the Air Force do when it comes to a matter of co-ordination? The Military for years have had a staff college at Camberley. A short time ago the Navy was to establish a staff college, and they established it at Camberley.
The Air Force staff college is at Andover.
How can you get perfect co-operation between the three staffs if you have your Air Force staff college at Andover?
An aerodrome is very necessary in connection with an Air staff college.
Would it not have been possible to get your aerodrome nearer to Camberley? I want co-operation between the Services, and if we have that, I feel certain that we shall get the best possible value for the money we are asked to spend. I cordially support the Motion, and I hope the Government will see their way to take it up, and that they will be able to adopt the suggestion made by the gallant Field Marshal the Member for North Down (Sir H. Wilson) that the Army point of view should also be considered in conjunction with the Navy and the Air Force in the Committee which the Government are going to set up. It-is most important that the question should be considered as a whole, and not as one merely between the Navy and the Air Force.
The Noble Lord who has just spoken was very anxious to reassure those Members of the House who are interested in the Air Force that there is no ill-will on the part of the Admiralty, from the naval standpoint, towards the Air Force. As regards personal ill-will or friction in that sense there is naturally none, but the Noble Lord pointed out that the naval authorities and the naval side in this discussion are very anxious to make the best use of the Air Force, and then he went on to make a point about the position of the Staff College at Andover, overlooking entirely the fact that you cannot have a flying establishment without an aerodrome.
Surely the staff ought to be kept entirely from the material side. It is so in the Army and Navy.
That does not affect the point I am making, that those experts who are so anxious to make the best possible use of the Air Arm overlook an elementary fact of that kind. Nobody can make the best use of the Air Af1" except the people who have devoted their whole lives to the study of the Air Arm. Whenever I hear this point of view put, whether it is by an eminent soldier or by a gallant admiral or captain of the Navy, we never get a true realisation of the fact that the Air operates in an element of which the Navy and the Army must be by their whole training totally ignorant.
Is it not possible for the other Services to co-operate with the Air Service in any way? I can quite understand that you require aerodromes, but I cannot understand why you require an aerodrome right alongside your staff college.
Co-operation with the naval authorities always means the cooperation of the rabbit with the boa-constrictor. Co-operation on equal terms by all means. Some people think that the battleship is obsolete. No one has ever said that the aircraft is obsolete. We know that other Services are obsolescent, and we know that the Air Service is crescent. The hon. Gentleman spoke of concentrating forces at one point at a given moment. That applies to aircraft as well as to ships and soldiers. Suppose you do divide the Air Service and give part to the Army and another part to the Navy, how is the Air Chief of Staff ever to get his men together if he wishes to concentrate on one spot? The same principles which apply to the concentration of ships apply to the concentration of aircraft. On that point it is important that each branch of the fighting service should have the same principles. The Noble Lord went on to complain that the Admiralty had control of the seaplane carrier but had no control of what went into the seaplane. That seems to show that the Noble Lord regards the seaplane carrier as the most important part of the Air Service. What is most important, in my opinion, is what the seaplane carrier is carrying.
How can the Admiralty know anything of the quality of the men or the develop-men of the machines which are carried in the carrier? I served in a very subordinate capacity in the Air Service under the Admiralty, under the Army, and under the Air Force, and so I had an opportunity of seeing what the control of the two Senior Services was. It is said that the man in the seaplane carrier should be under the control of the captain or the admiral. The man has got to fly. What does the Admiralty know about the apparatus or about the conditions 10,000 or 15,000 feet up? It knows nothing at all about it. These things never came within the sphere of its experience and its instruction. Then as to code service, co-operation with the Navy is likely to be much easier than the Army, because the wireless service is much better in the Navy than the Army. But take photography, the eyes of the Air Service. What is there in the curriculum of the sailor, or any man who starts in a cadet class, and later becomes a distinguished officer in the Navy, to bring him into close touch with aircraft photography?The Admiralty have now established a definite photographic branch.
At one place in which I served, the Admiralty arranged that the place where the glass plates are developed is exactly under a battery That is a measure of the appreciation which these people show. Photography is not a naval subject at all.
Does the hon. and gallant Gentleman know that the Admiralty are now making a great use of photography and that they established two years ago a special branch to deal with it?
I am very glad to hear it. I hope that they will avail of the Air Service, which has got so much experience in this matter. We all know that photography has been developed to such a point that it has become a matter for experts, which must be left in the hands of people who have studied it thoroughly and know exactly how to interpret the plates, and whether something which is photographed is real or whether it is merely camouflage, and know all about many other points on which I suppose those who serve in the Air Service have often to get special information from those highly skilled in photography. Then take the case of maps. What is the good of one of the Noble Lord's maps to a man who is going to fly in the air? He does not want to know how deep the water is. He is not going to paddle. He is going to fly. Why, then, should you put under the Navy this Service, which is in a different element, operating altogether apart from the Navy, and which is in the hands of people who have developed the wonderful amount of knowledge of the element in which they work, certainly passes my comprehension.
On this question of the co-ordination of the Army and Navy it does seem to me that by having an independent Air Service and an independent Air Ministry you may introduce a very valuable link between the two. I do not know what the Noble Lord's experience is, but my experience was that it was not very easy to get close and direct co-operation between the Army and the Navy. I think that that very frequently does happen. Something is going to be done, and the ships do not turn up, or the soldiers are not there when the ships are. But suppose you had the Air Force divided part under the Army and part under the Navy you lose a certain fluidity which has been on many occasions extremely useful. In the War in the Eastern Mediterranean there were in one place a seaplane station and a flying corps squadron. Sometimes the seaplanes worked for the Army—in fact the best part of the work was done from seaplane carriers with the Army—and some of the work of the Navy took a squadron of the Flying Corps. How much more friction there would have been if, instead of taking a Service which was independent and using it as a link between the two, they required the Navy to take part of the Army work and the Army to take part of the Navy work I leave the House to imagine. The Noble Lord argued in favour of what he called co-ordination which really amounts to domination of the Air Service by the Navy. It has amounted to that in practice. The scheme of things which he likes, as was pointed out by the Leader of the House the other night, has been tried before. Everything which the Noble Lord and the Field-Marshal ask for has been tried before. The only chance they have of setting up their scheme again is a period of profound peace. When there was war we were driven to take the other course. It was created by the necessities of the War and it proved a success in war.Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that right up to the end of the War the Air Ministry never controlled the aeroplanes working for either the Navy at sea or anywhere else, or the Army in France; that all the aeroplanes working for the Army in France were controlled by the general officer commanding and those working for the Navy were controlled by the Commander-in-Chief on the North Sea, and further that the Independent Air Force was controlled by the Admiralty?
Yes, the answer is quite simple. It was not until the Air Force was released from the paralysing control of the Army and Navy that it achieved the position which put it in a position almost to end the War. Everybody knows that at the end of the War the power of the air had so increased that if the War had gone on a short time longer we could have delivered blows from the air far exceeding in power any blows previously delivered. That was entirely due to the fact that an independent Ministry and control was the child of necessity. It was brought into existence by the lessons of the War. It was not in 1919 that the Noble Lord and his friends proposed to sever it, nor in 1920 that they proposed to break it up, nor in 1921. They must wait for a period of profound peace before they try to impose on the public and Parliament views which the lessons of the War show to be utterly erroneous. I am glad to see that the Noble Lord and his friends have not developed in the House the arguments; which they, or at least some supporters of their views, develop outside, namely, that in some way the subordination—or as I think ultimately, the destruction—of the Air Ministry would be an economy That view, I am glad to see, has absolutley disappeared. How, creating from one Ministry four Departnicnts, a Naval Air Service, a Royal Flying Corps a Research and Supply Department, and yet another under the Board of Trade, a multiplication of Departments quadrupling what is now single, would produce economy, one cannot imagine.
The real economy, and the reason I think it is possible for one to be anti-militarist, economist, and yet a keen and ardent supporter of a unified and autonomous Air Service is because the Air Service does provide, as the Gcddes Report points out, the means of advancing in power and economising in cash by the substitution of scientific advance for man-power. It is the substitution. The gallant Admiral who spoke the other night (Rear-Admiral Sir R. Hall) and the Noble Lord to-night said they were anxious to use the Air Force, ana were delighted that this scientific experiment should be made, but that is not the point of view of those who see the future of the air. We say that in the Air Force there is a power which may ultimately supersede to a large extent the functions of the Navy and the Army. I think, and I believe many others do too, that it is by substitution that you will get economy as well as your greater power. How can you go to a ship's captain and suggest that he should dovise a plan for the substitution of the very instrument of which he is in command, or how can you go to a cavalry captain and suggest that he should supersede the work of his skirmishers by a small number of airmen? His tradition and his whole interest is in the Army, the Admiral's tradition and whole interest is in the Navy, and the only people who can develop the Air arm are those brought up in the Air tradition and who believe in it. Those who have seen the cramping and crippling effect of the tradition of another Service introduced into the Air Service will understand what I am saying. If a man is a sailor first and is lent to the Air Service, or if he is a soldier first and is lent to the Air Service, his eye is always on the older Service, He thinks, "If I do this, what will the General think?" or he thinks, "If I do this, what will the Admiral think?" What he should think is. "What will the Air-Marshal think?" His whole interest, his energy, his imagination and power, all that he can put into his work should be for the Service in which his whole life and promotion and the whole of his interest lies. For these reasons I express the view that co-ordination and co-operation between the three Services, certainly, but only upon terms of a perfect equality between the two.There is nothing whatever in this Amendment which conflicts with the desire of the Navy, which is solely that whatever Air Force is attached to them and is being utilised by them for maritime warfare should be administered and controlled absolutely by them. This Amendment that there should be a C.I.D. controlling the whole three forces is absolutely agreeable to the Admiralty and all those who, like my- self, none the less support the desire of the Navy to control such Air Force as is attached to them as an auxiliary. That is all they ask, and no more. The only reason adduced by the Lord Privy Seal the other day when speaking of the breaking up of the Air Force between the Army, Navy, and an independent force, was that during the War, owing to the great difficulty of supply, there was great, confusion and overlapping, and that one Service was kept in conflict with the other. That was in the days, the very early days, of aerial warfare. There were very few and small firms in this country supplying the necessary material, the aircraft themselves, and, more important, the air engines. But as the War went on all the great armament firms took this up and the supplies became ample to meet the requirements of each and every Service that wanted it. If there were any claims in the future of there being a difficulty of supply, I should agree at once that it was impossible to break up the Force at all, but I cannot foresee any such difficulty. The difficulty arose in the last War because the development of aerial fighting was sudden, unexpected, and wonderfully developed. So it was that the sources of supply could not possibly meet the requirements of the two Services. In future, however, given a proper allocation of these sources of supply, each Service getting its supply from the firm that can supply the most suitable material, I foresee no such difficulty, and therefore I cannot accept the argument of the difficulty of supply as being one opposed to the desire of the Navy to control their own Air Force. That was the only argument the Lord Privy Seal brought forward.
I am not a bigot about this at all, and the conclusions to which I come are arrived at after hearing the arguments on both sides, of Air Force officers, Naval officers, and debates in this House. I do put this to the House. Why was it that after two years of existence as the Royal Flying Corps the wing of it—the Naval wing—that supplied the Navy with its Air Force broke off from the Royal Flying Corps and was re-constituted as the Royal Naval Air Service, a thing entirely apart? It was the natural evolution of the Naval Air branch. If that has occurred once already, I say it will probably occur again, and rather than go off on these lines at all I am for starting on the right lines, which, as the Colonial Secretary is well aware, led to the separation of the Royal Naval Air Service from the original Flying Corps. I foresee that the same thing will occur again, and rather than that it should occur again in such a manner it would be much better that we should start off on the proper lines. I have been arguing this matter for about three years on every occasion I could in this House, and I am not going to repeat all the arguments I have used. They have been put forward by the hon. and gallant Member for the West Derby Division of Liverpool (Rear-Admiral Sir R. Hall) and by my Noble and gallant Friend above me (Viscount Curzon), but I do say that the Navy feel, as I do, that until they control absolutely such Air Force as is essential as an auxiliary to the Navy they will never have that efficiency in it which is absolutely essential. That, I think, is a fair statement of their contention. They want the control and administration of such Air Force as is the necessary auxiliary of the Navy, and no more than that. They do not want to interfere with the Air Ministry; not at all. Neither do they want to interfere with the independent Air Force, nor with the Air Force of the Army. They do not want to break it up. Their argument is that the essential branch of the Navy ought to be under their control. There is no reason whatever why there should not be a common flying school where every officer, whether of the Navy or Army, is educated in aeronautics, theoretical and practical, and there is no reason why there should not be a common Board for the supply and construction and development of air materials, a Board such as the Ordnance Board, which dealt with the whole of the ordnance of the Army and Navy. Let them work together and co-ordinate their work, and there need be no friction whatever in the matter. In what I am about to say I do not want anyone to suppose that I am belittling the Air Force in any way. No one appreciates more than I the splendid work they have done, and the splendid work they probably will do in future, and the great importance of it; but I would ask the House to bear in mind that we are now looking to the future maritime warfare and not dealing with close waters, as we were in the last war. We have to consider great oceans and thousands of miles of waterways, and I say that it will be many, many years, if ever, before aircraft will be able to control those waterways. At present the radius of action of aircraft is so limited that they have to be carried in ships to the scene of action. I am speaking of maritime war. Those ships are vulnerable to attack from other ships, and the other ships, again, are open to attack by bigger ships. So it goes on until we reach again the capital ship of the future, whatever it may be. We come to the capital ship simply because aircraft cannot, so far as we can see, for many years cover the enormous distances which we have to consider in maritime wars of the future—wars which may be in the Pacific or over waterways thousands and thousands of miles away. For that reason I am sure that, for the present at any rate, the aircraft used in maritime warfare can only be auxiliary to the Navy, and as such they ought to be part and parcel of it. In the speeches we have heard to-day that point has been badly overlooked. An hon. Member referred to their being 270 squadrons, possibly at Calais, ready to bombard this country. That is not the point we have to look at in connection with maritime warfare. We have to look at the Pacific, at far distant parts of the Atlantic possibly, at the Indian Ocean, and so on. The creed of the Air Ministry, which is supporting the idea that the Navy should not have this control of its Air Force, resembles closely that of St. Athanasius. They say there is an Air Force of the sea and an Air Force of the land, and an independent Air Force, and yet there are not three Air Forces, but one Air Force. That belief is all very well in the profession of which St. Athanasius was so shining a light, but it does not do when you come to so brutal a profession as that of the Navy and the Army. I hope the Admiralty will persist in the demand for having the control of such Air Force as is working with the Navy as an auxiliary to it. I feel sure that such control is bound to come.This has been a valuable, if somewhat discursive, Debate. It has ranged over a very wide field, at one moment descending to the most intricate technicalities of naval and aerial warfare, at another rising to those elevated tablelands occupied by the League of Nations and the future international peace of mankind. We had very interesting speeches by the Noble Lord the Member for Oxford University (Lord Hugh Cecil) and by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood), who led for the Labour party. They were both speeches which trespassed on the regions of philosophy, and, in my opinion, were far remote from the practical considerations with which the House is concerned to-night. The Noble Lord, in his amusing reply to the Secretary of State for Air, showed us how easy it was to baffle a military argument by the thorny dilemmas of the expert metaphysician. He also imparted to the Secretary of State for Air some confidential information as to the talk which goes on in the subalterns' mess after a visit of inspection, or the visitation of some distinguished officer in high command. The hon. and gallant Member who spoke for the Labour party could not resist the opportunity of showing how very hopeless the world would be unless we modelled ourselves immediately upon the principles of the Labour party—those great pacific principles of international brotherhood and goodwill for world-wide humanity which are so strikingly exemplified by the government of Messrs. Lenin and Trotsky.
I would remind the right hon. Gentleman that we are now on a specific Amendment.
Surely I shall be strictly within the limits of that if, in reply to the speech of the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite, which dealt with these very elevated principles, I point out, as a passing reference only, that some of those who are professing these elevated principles in the most extravagant degree have shown themselves the most marked defaulters. I do not press that, but I think it shows that if the solution of these difficulties is to be found, it is certainly not to be found in the promulgation of idealistic principles coupled with the basest laxity in practice.
Surely it cannot be found in the destruction of the whole of humanity.
No one has succeeded more in destroying a large portion of humanity than the gentlemen to whom Mr. Deputy-Speaker has said I should not be in order in referring. They have achieved the record up to date, but on very idealistic principles. The question which really lay at the root of our discussion to-day, a question of the first importance, was Ought there to be a separate Air Service or not I That question is settled, surely, for the time being, at any rate. It is a settled and established fact that there is a separate Air Service. It exists, and it exists not in virtue of some momentary fancy or caprice of an individual or an administration. It exists under an Act of Parliament; it is by law established. There is a Secretaryship of State for Air and a separate Air Force. How was it established? It was established in the War. It grew out of the War. It was born in the convulsions of that struggle. My hon. and gallant Friend is acquainted with every detail of what took place in those days, and he knows perfectly well that in a great clash of opinion, at a time when it was vital to choose rightly in these matters, the decision to create a separate Air Service, under a separate Air Ministry, was wrung from this country, from this House, and from the great military Services by land and sea, and a Bill was passed on which the Air Ministry to-day rests.
My hon. and gallant Friend asks on whose advice was this created. It was created by force of circumstances, in the most bitter school that men had ever lived through. That is the position. It is not a question of our asking, Shall we create a separate Air Service? The separate Air Service exists, and the question which we have to consider—indeed it is the question before us—is, ought we to repeal that Act, ought we to destroy the Force, and go back on the experiences which we went through in the War and on which, in the War, we acted. My hon. and gallant Friend says that the Air Force was under the Army in the War. That is not quite an accurate statement. It is perfectly true that the so-called independent Air Force which was established under Air Marshal Trenchard in France was, like all the units operating on French soil, under the command of Marshal Foch. That is quite true, but the independent Air Force ought not to be confused with the separate Air Service. They were quite different. The Air at the disposal of the military commander in one particular theatre of war was rightly under his complete control, but the Air Service of this country had an altogether separate existence. Had the War lasted a few more months, or possibly even a few more weeks, there would have been operations conducted from these coasts upon Berlin and in the heart of Germany, and those operations would have increased in magnitude and consequence had the campaign been prolonged all through the year 1919, but we reached peace at an earlier date. It is not true to say that in theory the Air Service was placed under the command of the supreme military commander in a single theatre of war, nor ought it to have been. The developments which we never reached in the War, owing to our having run short of Germans and enemies before the experiments were completed—the developments which were in progress but were never reached in this War must be looked to. Had it been continued for another year, or a year and a half, we should have undoubtedly seen an entirely new consideration being brought into the struggle that was proceeding. We must take for our start in the future, not the War that we know as it actually happened, but the position of military science as it was at the close of the struggle. That must be our starting point, because the year 1919 would have assumed an entirely different character from any previous year of the struggle, and it is that which invests the Air Ministry and the Royal Air Force with their extraordinary significance at the present time. We were only just beginning when, thank God, the torture of humanity was arrested, and this terrible evolution of the science of destruction came to a more or less abrupt conclusion. My hon. and gallant Friend asked for the name of a single military officer in any of the four great countries of Europe, which still maintain large forces, who is in favour of a separate Air Force. I am informed that General Castelnau, a distinguished military commander, who has the successful conduct of great battles to the credit of his reputation, has reported to the Chamber as head of the Army Commission. His Report has been presented by Colonel Fabry, Secretary to the Commission, and he states:That is an opinion which has come to hand within the last few days, and I am sure my hon. and gallant Friend agrees that it deserves respectful consideration. My first proposition to the House is that there is a separate Air Force by Act of Parliament, and what we have to consider is: Are we moving in accordance with the spirit of the future in retaining it, and in continuing its existence, or are we to break it up and resolve it into its constituent elements I Personally I have a very clear view upon that. I think extraordinarily strong arguments would have to be adduced by those who wish to make a change from what has now been established and is a result of our experiences in the War. Let us just consider what the future holds for us. We are no longer an island. When once the navigation of the air has been brought to a high degree of perfection, as it must undoubtedly be in the generation which lies in front of us, we have lost to a very considerable extent that distinctive insular position on which our safety and our greatness have hitherto depended. Clearly then events are in progress in the region of this new element which are of the very highest consequence to us, second not even to the Navy and the salt water, by which we have hitherto been secured. I am not in the least discouraged by being told we are the only Power which has established a separate air administration. It is perhaps some deep instinct which has taught us that this is of more consequence to us than to any other Power, and we must be sure that in these great developments which are taking place—which no doubt will not be of great consequence this year, or next year, or the year after that, or the year after that, but which will be of great consequence 15 and 20 years hence—we must make sure that we have leadership in the science of the air, that we have real leadership in the knowledge of all that is possible in the art of flying and in all forms of aerial defence, of aerial war from a defensive point of view. In an aerial war the greatest form of defence will undoubtedly be offence. Does the House think that the Air Service will get its chance if it is separated into two parts and one mutilated fragment handed over to the Navy and the other handed over to the Army? 10.0 P.M. As soon as there was an aeroplane in the Naval Service I became responsible for settling questions connected with it, and I am quite certain that the whole prejudice of the Army and the Navy, of the higher officers of the Army and the Navy, must lead them to diminish and depreciate the value and the possibilities of this entirely new and extremely subversive element. It is a question of scrapping all sorts of prepossessions at every step, of handing over functions dearly prized and highly valued, of dispersing subsidiary services which have become vested interests, of turning the back upon the conventions, the experiences of a whole life; and to give this new arm, this new auxiliary, entirely into the hands of generals and admirals would, I am certain, be to crush it in the period after the War just as those generals and admirals did their best to crush it in the period before the War. No one can doubt it. It is quite true that they say now, "We have learned by experience, and we see that it is a most important thing." Yes, but developments are proceeding all the time. Every day something new is coming along, and every year you will find the Air Service laying its hand on one cherished possession of the Army and Navy after the other. Are you going to make the military and naval chiefs the sole judges of the rate at which that process shall be accomplished? If you do, I am quite certain that you will be told on the highest professional, expert authority that this Is impossible, that that is impossible, that we have tried that and it does not answer, just in the same way as the tanks were choked and stifled and only made their appearance after years of obstruction. I therefore deduce that the future of the Air Service is of special importance to this island and that it will not be fully realised except upon an independent and a separate basis, and that during the long years of peace which we hope and expect lie before us it will be in the highest interests of this country to give free rein to it, having regard to the limitations of expense by which, of course, all the Services are bound. Let us see, then, what should be the relations between the Air Force and the Army. I will deal with ordinary relations in a moment, but I must say one word about an extraordinary instance of the present relations, and that is the Iraq-Palestine episode. My hon. and gallant Friend commented on this, and said the Air Force there have been starting armoured cars, infantry, and so forth. They are taking over the defence of a whole region. When the late Mr. Chamberlain secured those great provinces in Nigeria for the British Empire, he found that the ordinary, regular methods of the British Army were much too expensive for the country to support. It is the business of the War Office to create units which can stand up in the line against the best troops in Europe. When you have to deal with natives in a country like Nigeria, with the kind of revenue which is got under those conditions, in a region without railways, without wealth, without settled government, you have got to fall back on very much less expensive methods, and so the Colonial Office 20 years ago was equipped with a private army of its own in Nigeria, which endures to this day. Something of the sort has happened in Iraq and Palestine, and we should not be able to hold either of those places unless something of that kind had happened. We have had to fall back on methods which are very much less expensive than those kinds of methods which would be necessary to hold the centre of the front in France or Flanders. That is how the British Empire has been built up. You say to me, "Is there not some risk in it?" I say, "Of course, there is a great deal of risk in it." The British Empire has been built up by running risks. If we had never moved an inch beyond the range of our heavy artillery, our Empire would have been limited by probably that same scope. I explained the other day to the House how the Middle East, Iraq, and Palestine were being held and administered, particularly Iraq, mainly by the agency of politics agreeable to the people of the country, but with the control from the air. Was it not quite natural that when the Air was much the greater part of the Imperial Force in the country, much the most powerful part, the most expensive part, the most numerous part, as it will be—was it not natural that the odd details of other troops that were in the country should be placed under the command of the Air, and is that not in itself a measure of economy? Fancy having a great war establishment in command of armoured cars side by side with an Air Force establishment. The Air Force establishment requires workshops to keep the aeroplanes in good order—large, important, complicated workshops. Why should they not be the same workshops which keep the armoured cars in order, and keep the two or three gunboats on the river also in order? Why should we say, "You are usurping the function of the Army when you mend an armoured car," or "You are usurping the function of the Navy when you mend a gunboat on the river"? That is nonsense. We cannot afford to have the whole British Admiralty watching over the cradle of the infant kingdom at Bagdad. We cannot afford to have the stately and magnificent array of the Army Council brooding over every small decision that is taken to send an armoured car into this jungle or into that territory. These things have to be done, and they are being done, and I cannot refer to them without repeating that I give no guarantee whatever on the subject; but still I say, you would have crushed this experiment if you had stuck the whole weight of the Board of Admiralty and the Army Council on top. I am delighted to think that in Air-Marshal Trenchard and the Air Ministry we have found a vehicle which is enabling us, I think, to get through some of our serious difficulties there. Before I pass on from this question as a thing that does not concern this Debate on the relation of the three Services, and is a matter between the War Office and the Colonial Office, I ask the House, as we have the onus and burden of obtaining the money from the House of Commons, what is it to the War Office? We are paying, and we are entitled to hire the aeroplanes and the Indian soldiers we require. At the present moment we do not require the heavy foot of the British Grenadier. No one has a greater respect for it than I have, but, at the present moment, it is not quite the article we require. But apart from this, what is the quarrel over the relations between the Air Force and the Army? I cannot see that there is anything unsettled in the relations which prevail there so far as the present year is concerned. A certain number of squad- rons are required for training with the Army. These squadrons are formed by the Air Ministry. When they are placed at the disposal of the War Office for training with the Army, the War Office have the control. They are able to use them in combination with their troops just as much as if they were artillery."The Army Commission are of opinion that aviation will never have its proper influence and take its proper place until it is given complete autonomy and independence and a status of its own."
Who decides the number of squadrons to go to the Army—the Army or the Air Force?
In my view, that is a matter which the Army are perfectly entitled to raise. For instance, there would be no objection whatever to the Secretary of State for War coming forward, on the advice of his Council, and saying, "We desire to have another half-dozen squadrons for use with our experimental brigade, for use at Salisbury or Aldershot with our troops, and we are willing, if we can get them, to reduce so much expenditure on cavalry, on artillery, or on infantry.' I am perfectly certain if such proposals were put forward by the Army Council, my right hon. Friend would provide, with the utmost punctuality, the very best squadrons with the very best air science behind them. They would be entirely at the disposal of the War Office for the purposes of training troops, and in war they would be absolutely under the orders and control of the military commander who is conducting the operation, and who must insist upon having at all times the tactical integrity of his operation established. I do not believe there is any real difficulty over the Army. I quite agree that the Army should be entitled to say, "We wish to have more air squadrons, and fewer cavalry squadrons," or something like that. A Committee has already inquired into this subject. I do not say they agree. They disagree absolutely. You never could obtain the slightest possible agreement between my hon. and gallant Friend and the representative of the Air Ministry. They differ entirely, but the Lord President of the Council, whose experience is unequalled in dealing with these matters, after weighing them carefully, came to certain definite conclusions which have been read out to the House, and which I venture to think deserve the test of at least a year's experiment. They are very carefully considered, and it seems to me they solve our problem in this period.
Why only a year?
Because we shall be able to discuss that, this time next year.
You may not be there.
After all, we only live from year to year. At any rate, it does seem to me that these principles are well adapted to the period with which to-night we are specially concerned. Let me turn to the Air and the Navy. There, again, I feel that it is the business of the Air to cater for the Navy, just as they cater for the Colonial Office. My right hon. Friend the Air Minister caters for me, and I pay him—at least, the British nation pay, and I transmit to him such portions of their wealth as Parliament allots me. I think the Navy, in the same way, has a right to expect that the Air Service will cater for them, and I think one must not try to be too logical and symmetrical, and say that exactly as you do here for this service, so you have to do for that service. It seems to me the naval problem is the more difficult one to solve. After all, we know how easily the relations of the Army with the Air Force in France were adjusted in the course of the War. There really was no difficulty at all in the field under the Commander-in-Chief. But the Navy is more specialised in some ways, and it does seem to me that it would be a great mistake for the Air Ministry not to put the Admiralty at their ease in this matter. The vital part of the great sea battle must be fought by aeroplanes out of ships. The whole course of that action must be intimately regulated by the aeroplanes which rise from and alight upon ships. Then there is the proportion of the money devoted to naval expenditure which has to be assigned to the air forces operating in the battle, and it seems to me that is a matter which the Admiralty, which still retains prime responsibility for the safety of this country, must regard as most vital.
A Committee has been set up to examine and explore the question of the relations between the Admiralty and the Air Force, and we must not anticipate the results of that examination. I myself, however, hope that, although the Committee is conducting its inquiries, there will be an effort on the part of the Admiralty and the Air Ministry all tha time to continue to reach some agreement, if possible; an agreement between the Departments as to the points which have been raised When I see my Noble Friend the Member for Battersea (Viscount Curzon), now resting after the conflict in which he was engaged a few moments ago in deadly grapple with the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Leith (Captain W. Beam), I found myself thinking: "Here you see the same difficulties which arise when these two elements, the air and the sea, are at variance; there is no limit to the controversial position which can be developed on the one side or the other." But we must not allow them to come into the relations between the two. They ought to try to come to agreement, and I believe they will be able to do so. I will now deal with the co-ordination of the three Services, because, after all, as has been so frequently stated, they are only one. No satisfactory line of division can really be drawn between the Navy and the Air, between the Air and the Army, and between the Navy and the Army. Every attempt to draw such a line has failed. My hon. and gallant Friend put forward some hard cases. Take the question of the cost of our defences. To which of the three Services would you assign that cost? At the present time it is divided between the Army and the Navy, and the line of division is the low-water mark. Here you have guns which are fired by the Army from forts on the shore in which they have to recognise the different forms of naval craft which are coming in, to tell friend from foe, and so on. Here are lights which have to be directed by, and are largely also under the control of, the Army, and which have to be co-ordinated with the working of the guns. There are mine-fields laid by the Navy which are intimately interwoven with the arrangement of the lights and the guns. The whole of these are placed under a military officer, and if there was no such thing as co-operation and goodwill and everybody pushed every claim to its most extravagant limit, of course, you never could carry on. In this pro- posed defence scheme we have a third party, the Air Force, which is responsible for helping the military guns, which goes out and fires its own torpedoes at the enemy craft, or drops bombs upon the craft. It is perfectly clear that in the case of defence every one of the three Services has equal claims. Some may think that the Air Force, being neutral, is the one which should most properly have responsibility assigned to it, but the point is, not the division of the responsibility, as if it were booty to be shared between the three Services, but the harmonious association of the three Services in the discharge of a common duty. How are you to achieve this co-ordination in the year 1922–23 I have formed the opinion that there is no final solution of a harmonious kind to be found from those difficulties except in a Ministry of Defence and in inculcating a feeling in the three Services that, although they may specialise in the Air, the Navy, or the Army, yet, really, they are all concerned with one problem, and it is to that their loyalties are due. It will take a great deal of time. By the time the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force have really sacrificed their particular prejudices and have shaken down to the broad basis of a common Service of defence, probably the nation will have laid aside their respective points of view, and the ideals which have received such tributes from the benches opposite will have been achieved. At any rate, the essential solution of all these difficult problems lies in a common Service. You could not possibly achieve that at the present time. In the first place, if you are to move towards a unified Service, you must have officers, a body of officers trained to look at the problem of war as a whole and not merely from a land, or sea, or air point of view. That has not been undertaken at all. A Minister of Defence who had at his service no experts who could speak with a certain measure of professional authority on the air, land, and sea would be in most difficult position. Such a Minister of Defence would be such a dazzling super-Minister that he would dwarf all the rest of his colleagues, and he would have an extremely difficult task if he had to defend the Army, Navy, and the Air Services in his own person during the late crisis of the Geddes Committee. I should be glad that each Service should have its own spokesman, because the recommendations of that Committee would undoubtedly expose an individual Minister to a burden which no human being could have supported. The practical steps which are open to us are being taken. The creation of the brain of a-common Service is to be the subject of an inquiry by a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The establishment of a State college for a training that will unite officers of the middle rank in the three Services, who will go up in time to the higher positions, ought not to be delayed by a single year, and the Committee is being set up with a direction to formulate such a scheme, and not merely to debate the question. Then again there is the question of the duplication and the triplication of common services—three kinds of transport offices, three kinds of accountants and three kinds of contractors. There is no reason why considerable public economy should not be effected by co-ordinating these services. It is an extremely intricate problem, and a year is very little time for an expert Committee to hammer out a scheme. It has been decided to set up such an inquiry, and that will certainly occupy fruitfully the whole of the present year. Nothing more than that can be done at the present moment. When we are in possession of definite plans for pooling the administrative services and for creating the beginnings of a common brain for the three Services, then the question on which no decision has been taken at the present time, of establishing a Ministry of Defence, will have reached the threshold of practical politics.Can the right hon. Gentleman answer the question raised by more than one speaker tonight? Will the question of co-ordinating the Army together with the Navy and Air Force be added to the other questions to be considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence?
I am afraid I have not made the point quite clear. There is to be a Ministerial inquiry to adjust the relations between the Air Force and the Navy.
Will the Army be added to that?
No, that has nothing to do with what I am now speaking of. The relations of the Air Force and the Army are settled. The relations of the Air Force and the Navy are to be the subject of a special inquiry. But quite apart from that there will be set up an inquiry under the Committee of Imperial Defence to formulate a scheme for the creation of a common brain for the three Services and another inquiry to make proposals for pooling the administrative services on which they depend. These two inquiries are quite separate from the other. The one is a question of policy and the relations between the Air Ministry and the Admiralty. The others are questions of machinery which have to be hammered out by technical persons and a final scheme presented. I think that is really all that it is wise and practical for us to do this year, and that it is not only the best step we can take, but the only one, towards the realisation of that unification of the Services which every thinker on this subject must regard as the only satisfactory final solution. In the meantime, the coordination of the Services must be achieved through the agency of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Committee of Imperial Defence has, as my right hon. Friend well knows, nearly always discharged its important functions through the agency of special or standing sub-committees, and it is very rarely that there have been meetings of the whole Committee of Imperial Defence. I think that in the, year 1912 there were only six meetings, and yet during that year and the year following, the, meetings of the Invasion Committee were very frequent indeed, and the Sub-committees met almost continuously. A Standing Subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence was appointed early in the year before last by the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister intended himself, if possible, to take the chair frequently; but in practice, with the great pressure of these times, he has left this position to be taken by the Lord President of the Council, and, in the absence of the Lord President in the United States, the task has devolved upon me. This Sub-committee has held frequent meetings, and other Sub-committees of the Committee of Imperial Defence, as the Leader of the House described yesterday, have aggregated nearly 150 meetings in the course of last year. This Standing Sub-committee is really the only machinery which exists, at the present stage in our development, for the coordination of the action and policy of the three Services. All three Services are represented on it, not only by their political heads, but also by their professional chiefs and by other expert advisers. Then the Chancellor of the Exchequer usually attends, and one or two other Ministers who have been specially drawn into this class of work. Any question of policy between the three Services must in the interim period be threshed out by this body or some similar body.
To sum up, the Air Force is a fact, established by law, and the onus rests on those who wish to overturn this law and to destroy the Air Force. The relations of the Air Force with the Army have been adjusted by a Committee presided over by the Lord President of the Council, and there is no reason whatever why they should not proceed satisfactorily on that basis during the present year. The relations of the Air Force to the Navy require further consideration, having regard to the enormous and vital part which the Air Force is likely to play in a supreme trial of strength in the future. The co-ordination of the three Services can only effectively be attained through a process of unification, of realisation by all members of those Services that their business is to defend the country as a whole. Whether they serve in the air or at sea or on land ought not to be a cause of differentiation anymore than exists between the cavalry, artillery and infantry, who are all gathered under the War Office. No solution of a harmonious or symmetrical character will be achieved in the co-ordination of the Services except through the agency of a Ministry of Defence, but it is not possible to create such a body at the present time, nor will it be possible for a considerable time. In the interim the only steps which are open to us are to create machinery for pooling the administrative functions of the three arms, and to create a common staff brain, from whose exertions in the future the responsible advice given to the Cabinet of the day in regard to matters of defence must and can only effectively originate.
In view of the statement of the right hon. Gentleman as to the satisfactory efforts which are now being made to co-ordinate the three Services, I beg to ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Main Question again proposed.
rose—
I would appeal to my hon. Friend to allow Mr. Speaker now to leave the Chair. We have had a long discussion with you, Sir, in the Chair. Of course, the general discussion can be continued on the first Vote in Committee.
Do you propose to take the Committee stage to-night?
Yes, we must.
Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to
Considered in Committee.
[Sir E. CORNWALL in the Chair.]
Number Of Air Force
Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That a number of Air Forces, not exceeding 31,176, all ranks, be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland at Home and abroad, exclusive of those serving in India, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1923."
In view of the lateness of the hour, I shall confine myself to making a few remarks in regard to the actual figures of the Estimates. Taking first of all the abstract of the Air Estimates, effective services, we find an item of £2,193,000 for technical and warlike stores and an Appropriation-in-Aid of £898,000. The figures there are 50 per cent. less than for the previous year. This is a very serious point, because it is one to which the Secretary of State referred in a speech at the Guildhall some time ago when he said how important it was that we should have up-to-date machines and do away with the old material, whereas, as things are at present, we are simply using old machines and old engines. Another point is the question of the money we have down for works and buildings, £1,425,000. That is 10 times in excess of what the amount was last year, and I think we should have an explanation. I understand a large proportion of this amount is possibly going to Iraq and Egypt. At the same time it is an enormous item. We then have an item of £47,000 for civil aviation, and I observe a notice at the bottom of the page that this includes certain non-effective charges in respect of these services. I suggest that all the charges for civil aviation are really non-effective charges because it is quite a non-effective branch of the Air Service. On Vote A I see the number of cadets is reduced from 135 to 100. I should like to ask for an explanation of this reduction. Surely the cadets are the foundation of what we hope to be the men who will make up the Air Force in the future. They are very valuable indeed, and it is only through the cadet school that we can get the right men. On the following page, under Pay and Personal Allowances, I notice allowances to two air marshals. So far as I know, we only have one to-day and we should all be very interested to know that there is to be another appointed. I imagine that refers to the air marshal who is to be given command in Iraq.
I should like to know if that is so. The Colonial Secretary said he thought it possible to save a lot of money by the three Services co-ordinating the accountancy, stores and medical branches. On Vote I the staff of these branches, accountants, store-keepers and doctors, are called wing commanders, group captains, squadron leaders, and so on. These titles in the old days carried a very great amount of respect as far as they applied to flying, and it is not right to give such titles to doctors, dentists, and accountants. Some of the equipment people do go into the air. There are no fewer than 25 wing commanders in the stores, accountant, and medical branches, 79 squadron leaders, and three dental squadron leaders. What is a dental squadron leader? I can only imagine that he is a man who walks about in a wonderful uniform and leads a squadron of people for dental treatment. For the sake of the people who are flying men in the Air Force these descriptions of a purely flying character should be withdrawn from people who are merely doctors, accountants, and storekeepers. If you are going to give these people these very high-sounding titles, why not call the chaplains sky pilots, and call the nurses angels? Give them all flying titles. Under the head "Allowances" there is an item of £1,300 for language awards. In the Navy and Army, if you pass a certain examination and have certain qualifications, you receive an extra allowance of £50 or £100 a year. It is a very excellent system, but an allowance of £1,300 gives very little scope in that respect. There is an item of £300 for interpreter and schoolmaster allowances. That is a point which I raised on last year's Estimates. That sum does not seem to be very much. I am sorry, and everybody who has the welfare of the Air Force at heart will regret to notice the very dangerous reduction of the recruiting staff. The recruiting staff of the Air Force have done splendid work. The type of man you want for the mechanic or rigger is a very superior and very intelligent type of man, and it is very important that an efficient and sufficiently strong recruiting staff should be maintained. I hope that the very substantial reduction will be reconsidered. On Vote 3 there is an amount of £1,051,000 for aeroplanes, seaplanes, engines and spares. I put a question to the right hon. Gentleman a few weeks ago with regard to the machines and engines at present in use in the Air Force. He will remember that practically all the machines at present in use are pre-War machines. A large portion of this money goes in what is called re-conditioning. I will read an extract from the right hon. Gentleman's memorandum which is included in the Estimates. He says:It is an injustice to people who have to fly to ask them to continue to take the risk of using these old machines when if they go up into the air they may meet a pocket of air which they cannot see or a piece of wire may not be in the condition in which it ought to be. But, according to the Secretary of State for Air this afternoon, it may be possible to make these machines suitable for flying for four years, but then the time must come when all these machines will have to be replaced, and it is far more important that economies should be made in cutting down other expenditure and providing the Air Force with an up-to-date machine, not merely for the safety of life, but to enable us to compete with countries like France, which are so far ahead of us in having modern machines. On Vote 3, on which there is the item of £249,500 for armaments and ammunition, no explanation is given. I presume that it is for Iraq. Further down there is an item of £500,000 for war liabilities, rewards to inventors and miscellaneous claims. I did hope last year that we had had an end of all rewards to inventors, because I think that they received very adequate rewards. If this money were spent on new machines it would be better spent. Coming to the item, on the next page, of £86,800 for complete engines, I would like some further detail. The hon. Member for Twickenham (Sir W. Joynson-Hicks) said that the Napier Lion Cub engine, 1,000 horse power, costs £5,000. The cheapest type of modern engine is the Napier Lion, which costs £2,000. The Napier Cub, the Rolls Condor, and the Sidley Tiger all cost between £4,000 and £6,000, so that if we are only going to spend £86,000 on engines, we shall not be able to provide many up-to-date engines and we shall not be giving any encouragement to engine manufacturers to continue as they have done to try to bring out the best types which will be an advantage to the Air Force, and if the time should come again—I hope it will not—when you want a large supply of modern engines at very short notice, if you allow these engine manufacturing firms to go by the board now you may be in a very serious position in the future. The total for aeroplanes, seaplanes, engines and spares is £786,000. On a later page there is an item of £64,000, the cost of inspection of this £786,000 worth of material. I suggest that that is a most enormous charge, especially in view of the fact that, in my opinion, a very large proportion of this' £786,000 worth of material should have been put on the fire heap a very long time ago. On page18, again, you have, an item for machines spares, parachutes and miscellaneous, £186,000, and I should like to ask exactly what this item of parachutes means. How many parachutes do the Air Force own, is every machine forced to carry one, and what are the conditions which govern them? I am sure everybody connected with the Air Force would be very glad to hear that there was some parachute which could be used with security from an aeroplane which is crashing down. Personally, I doubt it very much, indeed, and for that reason I should like to have this item explained. Then on page 21 again we come to the question of the staff of the Works Services, and that again is a point upon which I feel very strongly. There is a total of £260,000 for staff for Works Services. If you look into the figures you will see 25 civil engineers at something less than £600 a year each. I suggest that, instead of having a large number of cheap people—because you cannot possibly get first-class civil engineers at the present time at something under £600 a year—if you want to effect real economy in the Department in which I think it is essential that economy should be effected, namely, the Works Department, you should engage, instead of a large number of inefficient, or if not inefficient, underpaid, people, a small number of highly efficient people to pull that Department together, which process would result in saving the Air Ministry a large amount of money. There is another item to show the way in which the Works Department draw up their information. On page 22 under "Inland. Andover. No. 5" there is "Provision of Cells in Guard Room and Improvements to Water Supply, £3,570."What on earth is the analogy between the provision of cells in the guard room and the improvement of water supply, unless it is intended to put a supply of water there to entertain the too-festive gentlemen who are given accommodation there? On the same page there is an item of £35,000 for the housing of Civilian Subordinates at Milton. That is a question which has been raised a good many times, and I have joined in the suggestion that you have at Milton a number of empty sheds I only use that term in a descriptive sense, in the same way as the right hon. and gallant Gentleman referred to packing-cases, because we all know that aero- plane packing-cases can be converted into very nice bungalows. There are a very large number of buildings at Milton, I contend, which could be converted into quite suitable living bungalows instead of spending £35,000 on housing civilian subordinates, I am sorry to bore the right hon and gallant Gentleman—"Here, however, a word of caution is necessary. The reconditioning of machines (see page 92 of the Geddes Report, Part 1) is not a process of improvement and embellishment, but one of making machines safe to fly. Economies in this direction must be governed by a sense of the most serious responsibility. Apart from this it should be realised that the patching up of temporary buildings and living on stocks is essentially a process of deferment of expenditure which must tend to force Air Votes up again in future years, and is justified only by extreme financial pressure."
I am only smiling at the idea of housing civilian subordinates in bungalows.
At any rate, I think it is up to some of us to try to understand some of these questions, and to deal with them. On page 24 there is an item for married quarters, and that again is a question which has been raised in the House frequently. I do not think sufficient money is being used for providing suitable married quarters for married officers in the Air Force. I think the right hon. and gallant Gentleman has had a good many complaints on that score, and I ventured to ask him last year, as I do again to-day, if he will give his personal attention to that matter. On page 38 there is a reference to works, buildings and lands, under the heading civil aviation.
That comes under Vote 8. The only Votes we have before us to-night are Votes A, 1, 2, 3 and 4.
The Speaker was moved out of the Chair very early on the understanding that we would have a very wide discussion on Vote A. Although the Leader of the House may have been out of order, we acted in good faith in the matter.
I have allowed the hon. and gallant Member to travel beyond Vote A and to deal with Votes 1, 2, 3 and 4. I could not allow discussion on a Vote which is not down for to-night and which cannot be put from the Chair to-night.
In the case of the Navy Vote A is purely a numerical Vote dealing with personnel, but we are allowed very wide discussion on it.
The practice is that on Vote A, which is concerned with the number of men, general discussion is allowed, but general dis- cussion only on the Votes which the Chair is to put at a particular sitting of the Committee. I am to put to-night only Votes A, 1, 2, 3, and 4.
I am very glad that I shall have an opportunity of dealing with the other Votes. I wish that I had appreciated the position before, as I could then have looked up some other details. Am I to understand that you propose to take other Votes to-night as well?
The Standing Orders have been suspended to enable the Committee to deal with the Votes I have mentioned, Votes A, 1, 2, 3, and 4, and those Votes I have allowed the hon. and gallant Gentleman to discuss. I am quite willing that such discussion should be continued, but, of course, in taking the general discussion on Vote A it would not be in order to repeat the same arguments when I put the question for Votes 1, 2, 3, and 4. I rose to interrupt the hon. and gallant Member only because he was proceeding to discuss Vote 8, which would not be in order tonight. Another occasion will arise to discuss Vote 8.
Those are the points that I desire to raise on Votes A, 1, 2, 3, and 4. The Secretary of State for Air knows, I am sure, how anxious we all are to help him in his task. We know quite well the difficulty with which he has to contend. In certain directions I would suggest manners in which amounts might be saved. For instance, on housing at Milton, and on lands and buildings a large amount could be saved, and the money could be better spent on new engines.
11.0 P.M.
I do not; pretend to be, in any way, an expert in regard to the Air service. The Debate has been in the hands of experts up to the present moment, and I, as a layman, am merely doing my best to understand the Estimates. I would like to point out that in the sketch Estimates presented to the Geddes Committee the Air Ministry gave an Estimate of 3,091 officers and 27,070 other ranks, a total of 30,161, but in the Estimate now before the Committee they are asking for 3,576 officers and 27,600 other ranks, a total of 31,176. If you compare the sketch Estimate with the Estimate now before the Committee, it will be seen that the Air Ministry are asking, three months after the Geddes Committee's Report, for 1,015 more personnel—485 more officers and 530 other ranks. I do not in the least understand why they are asking for 1,000 more personnel than estimated for in the sketch Estimates.
There is also a question in connection with education and training, to which I should like to have an answer. According to the Estimate presented to the Geddes Committee, the numbers engaged in connection with training are 532 officers and 5,669 men, or a total of 6,201. Those who are receiving training number 406 officers and 6,035 men, or a total of 6,501 people. That means that in order to train 6,501 persons you have engaged 6,201 persons, which seems to be an enormous proportion. Another serious point is this. There is indicated in the Estimate a reduction in personnel of between 9,000 and 10,000 compared with last year. In spite of that the item of pay and personal allowances to officers and men has increased by £153,000. There are two Air Marshals in these Estimates, as against none last year, although there are fewer men. Highly-paid officers in the general service branch have increased from 2,165 to 2,186. The stores branch wants 20 officers more than last year. The accountant branch wants 76 more officers, and, what is most extraordinary—I do not understand it, unless the Air Service has become more irreligious since last year—three more chaplains are required although the personnel has decreased. There are many other points which I could raise, but as it is late, I have no wish to detain the Committee further. Without elaboration, I have tried to put my argument before the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, that it is difficult to understand these increases in the number of officers when the personnel has been so largely reduced. I do not understand the added cost and the question of the enormous number of people required to train the men. I hope my right hon. Friend will do his utmost to cut down expenditure. He is cutting it down by £3,000,000 less than the proposals made by the Geddes Committee, and I hope that in the coming year he will do his utmost to see whether further cuts cannot be made.
I think the usual convention is that we do not raise Committee points on this Vote, but keep to the general discussion. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a speech which was lightened with mirth and laden with wisdom, if I may say so, found fault with the admirals of his day because they obstructed the development of the Air Service, but he forgets one thing, namely, that when he was at the Admiralty we had no proper War Staff. He never gave us a War Staff, and individual opinions of admirals and generals are of very little value unless they are informed by what is called a War Staff of the middle ranks. Now we have got a great War Staff, the Navy does appreciate the services which the Air Force can render, and it is quite a mistake for hon. Members who belong to the Air Force to think that there is any hostility whatever to that Service. The Navy desires the utmost possible cooperation with that great Service, but it does say this—and the Secretary of State for the Colonies practically granted the demand—that it must control that Air Service when it is operating with it at sea and must have its demands met. Otherwise, let us reflect on this point. It is said that the experience of the War has shown that it is necessary to have a separate Air Service, and no doubt that is so, but I am not sure that it was experience that showed it so much as lack of material and personnel for which the Navy and Army competed, but clearly all the other nations came to different conclusions. The Navy will note that the admiral of an enemy fleet who has always been associated with his part of the Air Service will have it under his control, and the British admiral does not under the present system. This the Committee of Imperial Defence are going to remedy, I am certain, by making sure that he will have the full control of all his own air forces. This is important, for in the near future we may have the admiral directing operations from the air. That is a thing of great likelihood.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies rightly said that what we have to bring about is co-ordination of the Services. There are a great many hon. Members who say they hate that word "co-ordination, "but it is a very old and very respectable word, much used by the Hartington Commission nearly 40 years ago. The Hartington Commission said that want of co-ordination between the Army and the Navy was a danger to the country, and the Secretary for the Colonies favours, as an ultimate solution, the same conclusion that the Geddes Committee came to, namely, a Minister of Defence in charge of all three Services. That is the conclusion which his very distinguished father came to on the Hartington Commission in 1886, and it is one which has my entire support. I have from time to time directed attention to the fact that we have three sets of servants, one for each Service, three sets of accountants, three sets of transport officers, and at one time I was directing attention to the fact that we had separate bakeries for the different Services, and we got that abolished. I hope we will get rid of this overlapping of the services when men are really performing the same duties. In discussion on the Navy, I directed attention to the fact that the life of an airman in the Air is very short. I want to know what prospect he has in the Air of rising to high command. There are 3,576 officers. In foreign countries, when they leave the Air Force, they still have the opportunity of taking naval or military commands. They can rise to Admirals or Generals, and they bring the knowledge they obtained in the Air to reinforce the Naval and Military side. At present I am very much concerned to know what is the future outlook of our young officers whose flying career soon comes to an end. Have they any great outlook in the future? It is a matter of some import. I do not think anybody has drawn attention to the fact that the Navy was promised, under a memorandum of Sir Hugh Trenchard, in 1919, control of any airmen lent, and of all its own requirements. That was a Memorandum which was published as a White Paper, but I have not got it by me.Notice taken that 40 Members were not present; Committee counted; and 40 Members being present—
We want to get the realisation of the idea that the three services constitute one fighting force. The Secretary of State for Air only referred to the Navy once, except when he mentioned the strength of the Squadrons, and that was at the conclusion of his speech, and it was rather derogatory to the Navy. I think that the argument shows that the Air Department does not really appreciate the Naval point of view at all. He truly said that one bomb could sink a battleship in a few minutes. It is perfectly true, if the aircraft succeeds in placing its bombs within reasonable distance of a battleship, that battleship as constructed formerly—I do not say as constructed to-day—will be sunk, as the American experiment is said to have proved. That would apply to a Dreadnought seven years ago, but I doubt whether it would apply to a modern one. Then the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Air said that he believed in 10 years' time "a combat between the forces of the air and the forces of the sea will have become a grotesque and pathetically one-sided affair, "It is not, however, a question of warships versus aircraft, but of warships and aircraft versus warships and aircraft. The same argument was used when torpedoes were introduced, that it meant the doom of the battleship. Similarly with the destroyer and the submarine. But they have not brought about the doom of the battleship. Where the mistake is made is in overlooking the fact that both sides will possess aircraft in addition to warships, and the aircraft of one side will counteract the efforts of the aircraft of the other. What we want is to get the Air intimately associated with the Navy and the Army, so as to get the best teamwork out of the whole three.
In the interests of economy, I want to ask one or two questions on the Air Estimates. The expenditure that comes under Vote IV. is very severely criticised by the Geddes Committee, which recommends a certain amount of working with the other two Services, the Army and the Navy. What has the Secretary of State done to carry out the recommendations of the Geddes Committee? On page 95 of the First Interim Report I read:
What is being done in this direction by the Air Force? In Vote II. (page 15) there is an item: "Cleaning allowances and washing charges. "What exactly does this mean? Take Vote IV. (page 22), there is an item "Sick Quarters."Why is it necessary to provide sick quarters at Lee-on-Solent, which is next door to Haslar where there is a naval hospital fully equipped? Why go in for a separate Air Force establishment at Lee-on-Solent? May I ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider this provision, for it appears to me to be quite unnecessary? There is also at the foot of the same page 22, "Sick quarters at Netheravon. "For years there has been an Air Force at Netheravon. Are these new sick quarters, or what? There is also an item that deals with married quarters. Why have we to provide these quarters for officers and a certain number of men—on home stations? The officers and men of the Navy do not get married quarters, and I can't understand why there should be any differentiation in this respect in the Estimates of the Services. Then I want to ask about Ascot? There is a large depot there, but I cannot find any allusion to it in the Estimates. There is at Ascot a large depot of the Royal Air Force. That establishment is in full commission, and there are a number of lorries and a certain amount of valuable material which appears to be suffering severely from the weather. There are also some railway trucks and engines and other material to which some attention must be given. I think there is clearly an error somewhere, because all this does not appear in the Estimates. With regard to pensions, the hon. Member for Maidstone (Commander Bellairs) said that an air officer had a very short life. Supposing that a flying officer cannot carry on after three or four years' work and he cannot be absorbed into the training establishment, is he pensioned, and if so, can the right hon. Gentleman tell us to what extent the number of pensions are likely to be increased in this way. Before the Navy Estimates are taken in the House of Commons would it be possible another year to ensure that the Air Force Estimates are in the hands of members before the Navy Estimates come to be considered? There is a very considerable overlapping between the Air Force and the Navy, and it would be of great assistance to hon. Members like myself who are desirous of discussing the Navy Estimates to have a copy of the Air Force Estimates to look at before we come to consider them. I ask whether another year the Air Estimates cannot be placed in the hands of members before the Navy Estimates are taken."If reductions are also made in the personnel of the Navy and the Army the possibility of using some of the accommodation which these Services have for training mechanics, or existing school buildings to be vacated, should also he explored."
I beg to move to reduce the Vote by 1,000 men.
I have listened very carefully to the greater part of the debate to-day. It seems to me that the House has become a sort of debating society, asking questions, such as whether the Army or the Air Force should control Iraq, and it is neglecting its proper functions as guardian of the public purse, although the financial situation of the country is perfectly desperate. Very few hon. Members have spoken in the interests of economy: most of those who have addressed the House, have ignored the fact that although the war to end war is now over, we are still spending over £11,000,000 on the Air Service.£9,850,000.
That is not the total as I read the figures contained in the estimate. I make the proposed expenditure over £10,000,000. I consider that the figure is too high. The Air Service is the one Service on which I would hesitate longest to propose a reduction. It is the coming Service. I do not like to propose a reduction. The Service has plenty of enemies in the Cabinet without the Opposition adding itself to the number. I am sorry that the Minister for Air is not a member of the Cabinet. But the fact remains that we have aircraft in Constantinople where we have no business to be; we are still holding great tracts of territory in Iraq by aircraft, and this at a time when? the Government are cutting down expenditure on vital services, when they are having to stop their housing plans, when they are stopping the grants of the Universities, and when they cannot make adequate allowances for the support of children of unemployed workmen. In view of all this I say there can be no defence of the policy of keeping aircraft in parts of the world where we have no business to be—where indeed we are not in our own territory. I see we are spending £200,000 odd on buildings in Iraq alone, yet within a couple of miles of this House can be seen the worst slums to be found in Europe. I do not intend to let this Vote go through without seeing who are on the side of economy and solvency in the present financial stringency, and who are on the side of wasteful expenditure and national bankruptcy. Therefore I move a reduction of 1,000 men in the personnel of the Air Service.
There is no doubt that if any real permanent economy is to be effected on this Vote it can only be done in the way suggested by my hon. and gallant Friend who has moved the reduction. These estimates have been introduced with a great flourish of trumpets as to the proposed economies. Looking at the Memorandum issued by the Minister for Air I find that in the first part attention is drawn to the fact that a reduction of some 20 per cent. on the Estimates for Air was effected before the publication of the Geddes Committee's Report, and that since then further reductions have been made. My recollection of the Geddes Report generally is that the Geddes Committee were somewhat sceptical as to the economies made by the Departments, and they pointed out that in the majority of cases these economies were reduction which would in any event have had to be made, and therefore they did not indicate any real attempt on the part of the Department to arrive at a real permanent economy. These Estimates as presented appear to me to afford a very striking illustration of the truth of the Committee's comment. It is pointed out to us that a reduction is being made on the Estimates this year, as compared with those of last year, of some £6,400,000. I have been looking through the general items, and should like to show the Committee how this reduction is really effected. In the first place, the War Liabilities last year amounted to £1,471,000, while this year they only amount to £859,500, so that this first reduction of rather over £500,000 has nothing to do with any economy at all on the part of the Department.
Perhaps the hon. and gallant Member did not hear the Debate, but I admitted that when I made my statement.
Then we are on common ground as to that. The next item is that of the Appropriations-in-Aid. Last year the Appropriations-in-Aid amounted to £1,370,590, and this year they amount to £4,769,500, so that here again the Department gets an advantage of £3,398,910 without the least effort in the direction of economy. It is a windfall—rare and refreshing fruit which falls into their hands. Nearly two-thirds, therefore, of their £6,400,000 is already reached without any real economy having been made. Then we come to very great reductions that have been made in respect of stores. There are two items, namely, Quartering Stores, and Technical and Warlike Stores. Upon the first, £3,253,700 was spent last year, and the Estimate is £2,214,000 this year, so that a saving has been made on Quartering Stores of £1,039,700. On the next item-Technical and Warlike Stores—a still larger reduction is shown. Last year this expenditure was £4,292,000, and this year it is £2,193,000, so that £2,099,000 is saved this year on Technical and Warlike Stores. The saving, amounting to rather over £3,000,000 on these two items, does seem to be a very substantial one, and one for which the Department might seem entitled to claim considerable credit, but there seems to be room for inquiry into this matter of saving en stores. If it is possible to save £3,000,000 this year, one wonders what it was that happened last year. Was the excessive expenditure last year due to equipping the Force? If that were so it does not seem to me that any credit attaches to the Department for saving this year, because they have not got to spend the money. If that be not the explanation, is it that last year they laid in stores such as they considered it proper to lay in for the use of a Force of this size, and are they this year diminishing those, stores beyond what is proper? Are they not maintaining their stores up to proper pitch, and shall we be faced next year with an expenditure very much larger than is normal, because the stores have been allowed to run down? In all big concerns which have to provide themselves with stores, this is generally done on a kind of programme, and I would ask the Minister what is the real explanation of the saving here. Up to this point we have a saving of £7,049,110 on these items, none of which appears to represent any real and permanent economy. There are two other items. On Civil Aviation £898,000 was spent last year, as against £411,000 this year—
Did you not say, Sir Edwin, that Vote 8 was beyond the scope of this discussion?
Yes, I did, but I am sorry to say that for the moment I was not listening to the hon. and gallant Member. I will listen more carefully for the future.
I can quite understand the House not wishing to pursue this.
That is not quite fair to the right hon. Gentleman. I had ruled that those Votes should come on another occasion. It would not be in order to give details.
I had not the slightest desire to be unfair, and if it was unfair I withdraw it unreservedly. I thought the ruling was that we were not allowed to go into detail on these other Votes, but one was in order in referring to the total amounts. I have shown that as against the £6,400,000 which is credited to this Vote in the way of economy there is a sum of £7,049,110 which appears to have been arrived at without in any way reducing the strength of the Force or dealing with it in such a way as to lead to a permanent and continued lessened expenditure. On works, buildings and land, that is to say, on things connected permanently with that Force which call for continuous expenditure there is an actual increase this year.
I should like, before I go into the Lobby, one way or the other to bring to a head one or two questions which have been raised by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy). Is the total cost to the nation going to be, in the following year, for all services necessary to provide us with an Air Force, £11,250,000 odd?
Where do you get that?
On page 1. Is it going to be that figure, which my right hon. Friend now sees for the first time? I remember a similar occasion with regard to War Estimates some years ago when Lord Haldane had not seen the total expenditure of the War Office, informa- tion which is recorded on page one of the War Estimates as this statement is on page one, or is it £9,000,000 odd, which is the figure mentioned when the right hon. Gentleman interrupted my hon. and gallant Friend? If the expense, as seems to be indicated, is £11,250,000, including all these items which fall upon us under other Votes, the Committee should take a division against so high a figure.
I rise to support the proposal for a reduction. One of the effects if a reduction is carried will be to bring about a very substantial reduction in the tremendous figure of Vote 4 on page 20. There is an enormous amount of £3,250,000 on building, and there is an item underneath, as Appropriation-in-Aid, which is a grant under the Middle East Vote. That does not amount, as I read it, to any reduction at all, but it provides for an expenditure of £3,000,000 on buildings. We have been told by another Department that one of the reasons why housing is so expensive is on account of the enormous demand for building materials, but if the Air Ministry is going to spend the enormous amount of £3,000,000 no wonder building material is costly. Therefore, if there is some reduction of personnel it will effect a very considerable saving in the expenditure, and it will also have a very useful effect in keeping down the cost of building material, which will enable us to get more houses built.
There is an item for National Health Insurance £30,000, and National Unemployment Insurance £22,000. If the Air Force had not a medical staff and were not taking money for hospitals I could understand the need for such a sum being voted for National Health Insurance, but why we should be voting money to provide free insurance service and benefits for the men while at the same time the Air Force provides medical staff and hospitals for them seems to require some explanation.The hon. Member for East Islington (Mr. Eaper), whose intervention I have always found helpful, asked me a long list of questions. With respect to the re-conditioning of machines, the Ministry would not have indulged in this process, with some attendant risks, had it not been for the very exceptional financial pressure brought to bear upon it. The point which arises and is of great importance in this connection is that if this re-conditioning was not accepted by our chief experts at the Ministry as being of no more danger to the pilots, than they undertook in times of war with these machines it would have been impossible for us to pursue that course. The next question asked by the hon. Member was about works in connection with the Middle East. I cannot remember whether the question takes exactly the same form as other questions on the same subject from other quarters. I shall not be far wrong if I say that the works programme has been cut down by £1,000,000 since the sketch Estimate was presented to the Geddes Committee, and in view of the conditions of housing under which the Air Force carry on, it is not excessive for keeping in order the number, of stations which we have. The hon. Member also asked me about the reduction of the number of cadets from 130 to 100. This is purely a small step amongst many that we have taken in the direction of economy. No one would be more ready than ourselves to have the full number when better times permit.
Will the right hon. Gentleman deal with the question of Air Marshals?
The reason why the extra items of pay and allowances are inserted for these two senior officers is that we may have the sanction of the House of Commons to make the appointment as increasing responsibilities devolve upon us. If we find it necessary owing to the responsibilities in Iraq in October that are to be placed upon the Air Ministry we shall then have the permission of the House to enable us to appoint an officer of that rank for that particular work.
The hon. Member's next point was as to the titles given to members of the accounting and medical branches. It is very difficult to abandon these titles. My own service for 20 years has been in the Army. You know how much the title of Captain, Major, Colonel or General is prized by members of the Medical Corps, and that ranks as high are prized by even the Veterinary Corps. To take away from a man the title which would go with the number of years' service is an injury to the service and would do harm instead of good. In reference to the language award that has been referred to I cannot answer offhand why it is so low, but I have made a note to ascertain the reason. Coming to the reduction in the expenses of recruiting, I may say that it was a reduction to which we felt ourselves forced to submit, but I hope that it will be one of the subjects which will come up for, consideration before the Committee on Auxiliary Services which was mentioned by the Secretary of State for the Colonies which we hope will be functioning soon. On that occasion we shall get a good opportunity of drawing attention to the quality of the recruits of whom we are in need in the Air Force and of trying to see that special steps are taken to assist us to obtain them. On Vote 3 my hon. Friend (the Member for East Islington) referred to the items for arms and ammunition. This year we are asking for £139,000, being £100,000 less than last year. I gather that it is to keep pace with the demands of the service abroad and at home on the reduced scale of enterprise and development which is in keeping with our general economy. I was then asked about war liabilities, rewards to inventors. In 1921 it was £700,000. This year it is £500,000. But this is a sum over which we have no control, it being decided entirely over our heads by the Royal Commission on awards for inventions. My hon. Friend regretted to see so limited a sum expended on engines. We regret it too. The reduction from last year is a sum of £345,000 to £86,000. The same answer covers this case also. For reasons of economy we have been forced to abandon many of the experiments that we should have liked to try. As regards parachutes, I understand that we have one for each practising aeroplane. The item of £3,500 which has been referred to, I am unable to explain without having an opportunity for further reference. The Staff for the Works Services has, I think, swollen this year by reason of the extra accommodation that we have had to get ready in the Middle East for the troops that have to settle down there and take over the country. At Milton the same point comes up that we have discussed on more than one occasion. It must be remembered that these are cottages built by the Ministry of Health, paid for by the Air Ministry and let to civilian workers at economic rents. I think it would be impossible, despite what the hon. Member for East Islington said, to consider for a moment housing civilians in anything like the packing-cases or crates that the young soldier in times of depression is more ready to put up with. Married Quarters and their insufficiency is, I admit, one of our great difficulties. We are very short, we are putting them up very slowly, and in this year's programme a very modest amount is asked for. The hon. Member for Wood Green (Mr. G. Locker-Lampson) asked why there are more officers and men taken on the strength this year.I asked why are there more officers and men on this estimate than were presented to the Geddes Committee on the sketch estimate.
The answer is that during the last three months the new arrangement that we have made with the Colonial Office to take over some of these very ancillary services we discussed earlier in the Debate—for instance, armoured cars—have had to be revised in order to take over the country in time. We thought at one time that we should be able to take over the armoured cars from the Army and use their personnel in the form of a loan. Since then, the Colonial Office having arrived at this decision on our behalf has called on us to find the personnel for these cars, so that in Iraq and Palestine we are responsible for finding the personnel.
The next question is as to why there is 9,000 less personnel shown in this year's Estimates, while pay and allowances have increased. The answer is that last year we had to show the extra men who were called up during the dispute at the time of the coal strike. They were between 8,000 and 9,000 men, and that represents the difference in the figure, and why it is not asked for this year. As far as pay and allowances are concerned, it is the number of officers and men whom we are sending out to Iraq, and who come on to the foreign service rate of pay and allowances. There has been one other point raised; that is, why it takes so many men to train a small number of recruits. The best answer I can give now, without hav- ing more time to go into it, is, as I said earlier, the immense variety of the trades that have to be taught. I admit that on the face of it, and as the question is put to me, it would look as though that answer of mine were insufficient. I will ascertain whether it is sufficient, but on the face of it I would remind hon. Members that the variety of trades which have to be taught undoubtedly increases the number of instructors to pupils out of all proportion to any other Service. If I find on reference that this is an incomplete answer, I will provide another on a suitable occasion.I asked why it was necessary to have more chaplains than last year.
I hope it does not mean that the morals of the force have deteriorated, but there must also here be some very simple explanation as to that, and at Question Time I will supply my hon. Friend with a reply. The hon. Member for Maidstone (Commander Bellairs) gave me an opportunity to raise a point about which we are Very anxious indeed, and on which there should be no misunderstanding. It is whether or not there is a prospect of a career for any young officer who joins the Service, and I wish again to emphasise that we have three forms of officers' service—permanent commission, short-service commission, and now the N.C.O. pilots scheme. We give no more permanent commissions than we can guarantee, and out of the 3,000 commissions which have been given the number of permanent officers will never exceed the number of careers that are possible to every member of the Force from the day he joins to the day he comes out of the Force. They have every chance that the subaltern who joins the Army has of becoming a General. I hope the Committee will assist me in making this quite clear outside the House wherever it is mentioned. The short service commission is on a different basis, and not having been asked about it this evening, I will not refer to it again now.
As regards co-ordination, I am anxious that hon. Members representing the Navy should be satisfied that, as far as the Air Ministry is concerned, there is a determination on our part to throw our heart into co-ordination with that great Service, and to do our utmost to make it a success. My Noble Friend the Member for Battersea (Viscount Curzon) asked some questions which, equally, I am bound to ask for a little time to ascertain the details about. For instance, there is the laundry question. It is very hard for me to say exactly who it is that spends this money on laundry, but there are other points with which I will deal. There was the question of Ascot, which my Noble Friend could not find in the Estimates. Ascot is a packing station where machines are packed for sending abroad. If my Noble Friend can report to me that the station is in a condition of neglect, or that anything is out of order, I shall be grateful to him, and shall make it a special duty to look into it.Where do the engines come from that are packed there?
12 M.
That is a matter I will have looked into. I am asked a question of greater importance on Vote IV. It is that while there is a saving of £1,000,000 on this Vote there is a complaint that we are spending too much, and that economies could be effected by transferring to some of the now-disused premises of the Army and Navy. You cannot move an Air Force station as easily as you could move, say, a regiment quartered in one town or another. The same sort of accommodation may suit both, but you cannot move an air training unit from a place where you have aerodrome equipment and a workshop to an empty barracks evacuated by the Army or Navy, because you cannot carry on the flying training and produce the efficient unit you wish to have. Such opportunities are very much restricted. I was asked about sick quarters at several places, and why it was that we did not use the naval hospitals. I could not answer that off-hand, but I suggest that on the Navy Estimates the same question might have been asked. It might have been asked, Why the Navy did not make use of the unused sick quarters of the Air Force in the same place? That, again, is one of the subjects in connection with which we must consider how best we can accommodate all our services in given areas, so as to effect economies all round. I was asked why the Estimates for the Air Ministry were not ready in time for the Navy Debate. I think the Committee appreciates that it has been extremely difficult, this year, to get the Estimates ready in time. The Geddes Committee's Report and the Government decision upon it, kept us hung up, week after week, until almost the last moment. I am glad to say that the Air Ministry by a terrific effort have been able to produce the Estimates, almost in complete detail. I hope this state of financial panic and the difficulties attaching to it will not occur again.
I now come to the points raised by the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy), who moved a reduction, and also by the hon. and gallant Member for East Newcastle (Major Barnes) who, I take it, feels the same way. Both have proceeded on the strict line of dividing the black sheep from the white, in regard to economy. The 20 per cent. economy obtained in response to the Treasury circular is a fact. Nobody will doubt it, as far as the Air Ministry is concerned. This 20 per cent. economy was effected in July last and must be carried to whatever further economies we have been able to obtain. I only take half as due to actual economics; the other half is due to the fall in prices, but this 20 per cent. saving was effected in July on the Estimates for the year. I must refer to the further economies we have been able to obtain. Member for East Newcastle has more definitely queried. There is an economy of £6,000,000 apart from appropriations-in-aid. It is in fact, £6,500,000, but £500,000 I do not claim, as it is a reduction in War liabilities. The £6,000,000 is a net saving. The normal appropriations-in-aid, and the Middle East appropriations-in-aid, I have deducted from both sides of the account. I explained this very carefully in my statement so as to give the figures plainly in order that there should be no doubt, or no suggestion that there was any juggling with figures. A question was raised in reference to the saving on equipment and warlike stores. That is attributable to two causes, the first of which is the fact that to some extent we have been living on stock. That is not a businesslike method of handling a business concern in normal times, but as we have been faced with a request for economy, more particularly in the next two years, we have had to show that we are prepared to risk a moderate depreciation of oar stock if by so doing we can obtain economy over the next critical period.I think prices are falling.
The other cause to which some of this economy is attributable is the fall in prices. The last question asked me came from my right hon. Friend the Member for Camborne (Mr. Acland). I did not, for an instant, mean him to think that I was seeing this document for the first time. I was only anxious to make quite certain that he had gone to no other page except page 1. On page 1 he will see that the first line gives the figure of £10,895,000 as being our net Estimate, after taking appropriations-in-aid. I said the Estimate came under £10,000,000 net for expenditure on air matters, and that figure, as I think the Committee will agree, is reasonably and properly obtained by deducting the war liabilities, for which we are not responsible this year, amounting to £959,000, which leaves a net Estimate of just under £10,000,000. I hope I have succeeded in answering the main questions addressed to me and any which have been left unanswered will be dealt with if brought to my notice.
The right hon. Gentleman has not referred to the £50,000 for insurance
Without having had opportunity to correct myself, I am of opinion that this is purely following the procedure adopted in the Army; it is the insurance of the troops against accidents.
No; either health or unemployment.
I must confess that I am not in a position to answer that without obtaining further information on the point.
I do not know whether my hon. and gallant Friend is going to divide the Committee on this Amendment, but- if he does I think it is as well that I should say a word or two as to why I intend to vote for the Amendment. I shall do so partly on the ground that the Geddes Committee has recommended a reduction amounting to more than the reduction which my hon. and gallant Friend has himself moved. The Geddes Committee recommends a reduction in the squadrons of 8½, and I under- stand the Government is only adopting the recommendation to the extent of two squadrons. The difference in the number of the squadrons, so far as the personnel are concerned, will come to far more, I understand, than the 1,000 men, which is the reduction moved by my hon. and gallant Friend. The right hon. Gentleman has gone with great detail into the various questions which have been put to him, but he has not dealt with this big, broad question, which after all is the main issue before us at the present moment, in view of the urgent necessity for economy. The Geddes Committee were business men who inquired carefully into this thing, and I am sure they would, not have made these recommendations without paying due regard to the necessities of the Service and the security of this country. A great many of these men are accounted for by the men who are kept at Constantinople and in Iraq, where we think they ought not to be. The keeping of this large personnel is not the thing which will give us the security that we need in the future. We are not going to have a war for 10 years, according to the Cabinet themselves, but when we do have that war the personnel and the machinery which we have to-day will not be of the slightest use.
What we want is to concentrate our expenditure on experiment, research, and science, but instead of doing that the Ministry are reducing that service by £320,000 and keeping on a lot of personnel who will not be of the slightest use to us in a future war, if it is to take place, as a great many Members opposite seem to think it must take place. Therefore the one item of reduction which we can safely embark upon is this reduction in the personnel which has been moved by my hon. and gallant Friend. The Geddes Committee recommends reductions of £5,600,000, and the Government is only adopting that to the extent of £2,500,000, which is a much smaller proportionate reduction than in the case of either the Army or the Navy, and I think we have not had an adequate explanation of that small reduction. The direction in which our future security can be assured lies along the lines of experiment and research, and also in the encouragement of civil aviation. This keeping on of a large personnel in the permanent Air Force is one which will not help us at all in a future war, and it is merely because the men who have vested interests in I this thing cannot see their way to making these large reductions. I am quite; certain that the reduction which has been moved by my hon. and gallant Friend in no way jeopardises the future
Division No. 53.]
| AYES.
| [12.12 a.m.
|
Acland, Rt. Hon. Francis D. | Gretton, Colonel John | Rattan, Peter Wilson |
Adamson, Rt. Hon. William | Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool) | Smith, W. R. (Wellingborough) |
Salfour, George (Hampstead) | Grundy, T. W. | Thomson, T. (Middlesbrough, West) |
Barker, G. (Monmouth, Abertillery) | Halt, F. (York, W. R., Normanton) | Thorne, G. R. (Wolverhampton, E.) |
Barton, Sir William (Oldham) | Hartshorn, Vernon | Walsh, Stephen (Lancaster, Ince) |
Bowerman, Rt. Hon. Charles W. | Hirst, G. H. | Watts-Morgan, Lieut.-Col. D. |
Brown, James (Ayr and Bute) | Hogge, James Myles | |
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton) | Johnstone, Joseph | TELLERS FOR THE AYES.— |
Edwards, C. (Monmouth, Bedwellty) | Kiley, James Daniel | Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy and. |
Entwistle, Major C. F. | Locker-Lampson, G. (Wood Green) | Major Barnes |
Foot, Isaac |
NOES.
| ||
Amery, Leopold C. M. S. | Greig, Colonel Sir James William | Nicholson, Brig.-Gen. J. (Westminster) |
Atkey, A. R. | Guest, Capt. Rt. Hon Frederick E. | Parker, James |
Baird, Sir John Lawrence | Hailwood, Augustine | Pollock, Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Murray |
Barnett, Major Richard W. | Hamilton, Major C. G. C. | Pownall, Lieut.-Colonel Assheton |
Barnston, Major Harry | Harmsworth, C. B. (Bedford, Luton) | Purchase, H. G. |
Bellairs, Commander Carlyon W. | Hinds, John | Raper, A. Baldwin |
Betterton, Henry B. | Hood, Sir Joseph | Renwick, Sir George |
Berwick, Major G. O. | Hope, Lt.-Col. Sir J. A. (Midlothian) | Richardson, Sir Alex, (Gravesend) |
Boscawen, Rt. Hon, Sir A. Griffith- | Hopkins, John W. W. | Rodger, A. K. |
Bowyer, Captain G. W. E. | Hopkinson, A. (Lancaster, Mossley) | Roundell, Colonel R. F. |
Boyd-Carpenter, Major A. | Hotchkin, Captain Stafford Vere | Samuel, Samuel (W'dsworth, Putney) |
Breese, Major Charles E. | Jameson, John Gordon | Sanders, Colonel Sir Robert Arthur |
Brown, Major D. C. | Jodrell, Neville Paul | Seddon, J. A. |
Buckley, Lieut.-Colonel A. | Jones, J. T. (Carmarthen, Llanelly) | Seely, Major-General Rt. Hon. John |
Casey, T. W. | Kidd, James | Shortt, Rt. Hon. E. (N'castle-on-T.) |
Chamberlain, Rt. Hn. J. A. (Birm, W.) | King, Captain Henry Douglas | Stanley, Major Hon. G. (Preston) |
Cobb, Sir Cyril | Law, Alfred J. (Rochdale) | Stephenson, Lieut.-Colonel H. K. |
Courthope, Lieut.-Col. George L. | Lewis, T. A. (Glam., Pontypridd) | Strauss, Edward Anthony |
Davidson, J.C.C. (Hemel Hempstead) | Lindsay, William Arthur | Sueter, Rear-Admiral Murray Fraser |
Edge, Captain Sir William | Lloyd-Greame, Sir P. | Sutherland, Sir William |
Edwards, Major J. (Aberavon) | Locker-Lampson, Com. O. (H'tingd'n) | Thomson, Sir W. Mitchell- (Maryhill) |
Evans, Ernest | Lort-Williams, J. | Thorpe, Captain John Henry |
Eyres-Monsell, Com. Bolton M. | M'Lean, Lieut.-Col. Charles W. W. | Wallace, J. |
Ford, Patrick Johnston | Manville, Edward | Walton, J. (York, W. R., Don Valley) |
Fraser, Major Sir Keith | Moore-Brabazon, Lieut.-Col. J. T. C. | White, Col. G. D. (Southport) |
Gange, E. Stanley | Morden, Col. W. Grant | Wild, Sir Ernest Edward |
Gibbs, Colonel George Abraham | Murchison, C. K. | Wise, Frederick |
Gilbert, James Daniel | Murray, John (Leeds, West) | Wood, Hon. Edward F. L. (Ripon) |
Gilmour, Lieut.-Colonel Sir John | Neal, Arthur | |
Green, Albert (Derby) | Newman, Sir R. H. S. D. L. (Exeter) | TELLERS FOR THE NOES.— |
Green, Joseph F. (Leicester, W.) | Newson, Sir Percy Wilson | Colonel Leslie Wilson and Mr. Dudley Ward. |
Greenwood, William (Stockport) | Newton, Sir D. G. C. (Cambridge) |
Original Question put, and agreed to.
Pay, Etc, Of The Air Force
Resolved,
"That a sum, not exceeding £3,781,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of the Pay, etc., of His Majesty's Air Force at Home and abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1923."
Works, Buildings, And Lands
Resolved,
"That a sum, not exceeding £1,826,000, toe granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of the Works, Buildings, Repairs, and Lands of the Air Force, including Civilian Staff and other Charges connected
security of this country, and this broad issue has not been touched upon by the Minister at all.
Question put, "That 30,176 all ranks be maintained for the said Service."
The Committee divided: Ayes,27; Noes, 92.
therewith., which will come in course of payment during the vear ending on the 31st day of March, 1923."
Quartering, Stored (Except Technical), Supplies, And Transport
Resolved,
"That a sum, not exceeding £1,530,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Quartering, Stores (except Technical), Supplies, and Transport of the Air Force, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1923."
Technical And Warlike Stores
Resolved,
"That a sum, not exceeding £1,295,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Technical and Warlike Stores of the Air Force, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1923."
Air Supplementaryestimate, 1921–22
Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1922, for additional expenditure on the following Air Services, namely:—
£ | £ | |
Vote 1. Pay, etc., of the Air Force | 303,400 | |
Vote 2. Quartering Stores (except Technical), Supplies, and Transport | 110,700 | |
Vote 3. Technical and Warlike Stores | 234,000 | |
Vote 4. Works, Buildings, and Lands | 111,000 | |
Vote 9. Experimental and Research Services | 43,450 | |
802,550 | ||
Deduct Excess Appropriations-in-Aid and Surpluses on Votes 6 and 9 | 802,540 | |
Net Amount | 10." |
This Estimate was brought forward at a somewhat late hour last night. I will content myself to-night by simply protesting against the bringing forward of this Estimate at 10. 15 last night, and now at 20 minutes after midnight. I think the Government will be ready to admit that the Estimates which we have just passed have not taken up very much time in view of their great importance. It is not worth beginning a serious discussion of this Estimate at this time of the night. As hon. Members are aware, it has become the practice of the Government to bring in bunches of Supplementary Estimates in this way. On this side of the House, at any rate, we have a duty to the country to perform, and it is to examine this expenditure. There is much in this Estimate which needs discussion, and if we allow it to pass now I hope we shall have an undertaking that the Report stage will be taken at a reasonable hour. We are only a small minority here to-night, and it is difficult for us to make an adequate protest in view of the late hour. I shall, however, reserve my examination of this Estimate for the Report stage.
In view of what my hon. and gallant Friend has said, may we be told when the Report stage will be taken?
The Committee will understand that I am the last person to keep the Committee sitting late, but there is certain financial business which must be done before the end of the financial year. I agree that there should be a discussion on these Supplementary Estimates, but if the Report stage be put down as the second Order on Thursday, I hope that will provide an adequate opportunity for discussion, on the understanding that it will take about two hours.
I would like to ask what is meant by the discussion lasting only about two hours? Does the hon. and gallant Gentleman mean that the other Votes which have been passed over so quickly to-night will be expected to go through as quickly the next time? There is a very serious item on page 4 of the Estimates upon which some of my hon. Friends will have a good deal to say. We must have some assurance that these Estimates will be put down at a time which will enable a proper discussion to take place. Several millions have been voted in Supplementary Estimates already, and we really must have a definite assurance that we shall be allowed to debate this Vote in good time.
I have given an undertaking that Supply, Report (24th February), shall be put down on Thursday, and I have been assured that the discussion will not last more than two hours. That will enable this Supplementary Estimate to come on at a reasonable hour in the afternoon.
I want to ask if the hon. and gallant Gentleman will keep his own side down, so that we may have a proper opportunity for discussion. This Vote of £300,000 raises a very important matter as far as we are concerned, and if the hon. and gallant Gentleman will undertake that he will keep his own side down we will guarantee that we shall not take up much time with it.
Question put, and agreed to.
Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.
Committee to sit again To-morrow.
Reports 17Th March
Civil Services And Revenue Departments Supplementary Estimate,1921–22 Unclassifiedservices
Resolution reported,
"That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £100,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1922, for the Cost of certain Miscellaneous War Services."
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution."
This is a Vote of £100,000 for the relief of the Russian famine, and in spite of the late hour I cannot allow this Vote to pass sub silentio. The Committee stage was taken on Friday. I am sorry that on this occasion the Minister of Education is not present. We had a very painful Debate, and a Debate that I would like to forget. However, we cannot forget what is going on out there, and, although I do not propose at this hour of the night to develop the arguments that have been stated very fully and frequently, I do wish to take this opportunity of expressing such dissatisfaction and indignation as I can at the very unpresentable policy that we are following with regard to famine relief in Russia, especially in comparison with the United States of America. One of the most humiliating things I have heard of is the refusal of the Government to ask this House for a Vote of Credit in order to remedy the state of life in the areas for which we assumed the responsibility, and that we should appeal to a charity organisation in the United States for the money.
I suppose in no case could there have been shown more clearly the helplessness of the Prime Minister in doing nothing right. At this Dispatch Box last November he described, as only he can, the most terrible sufferings of the people in that part of the world and said it was our bounden duty to humanity to come to the rescue of the people who were suffering through no fault of their own. It is notorious that the Prime Minister has wished that we should do more in this direction and feels the humiliation in which we are placed in asking the American charitable private organisations to undertake the work, because, as a result of the over-representation of the Conservative interest in this House, and now in the Cabinet, he is impotent. We have heard a great deal of the Prime Minister's intended or rumoured resignation. If he resigned on this issue it would be something to be proud of. He ought to have resigned on many other matters. [Laughter.] I am afraid the time is getting rather too late, and I do not want my hon. Friends to laugh at the suggestion.They may laugh at you.
You may laugh at me if you like. I do not mean that the Prime Minister will not have to resign even if a question of this sort were eliminated. We are also told to-day that on 20th April the Genoa Conference will meet. What is the use of talking about the economic restoration of Europe if we allow 10 millions of potential workers and producers of food and wealth to perish? What is the good of sending our experts to discuss ways and means of restoring the markets and commerce of the world and setting the wheels of industry going and having food and wealth produced when we could help to prevent this destruction I We have passed a Vote of some 10 or 9½ millions for the Air Services, but unproductive expenditure will not improve the wealth of the world. When it comes to doing something that will help our unemployed by keeping our potential customers and doing something to help the helpless who are sick and weak, we send them our unwanted stores and the surplus of our Army disposal dumps. That is all we can send out. Late as the hour is I wish to make a protest in the strongest manner I can think of against the action of the Government which is cowardly and contemptible. They can ask a vote of confidence for the Genoa Conference if they like, but I will resist them in that by every means that I can, as will also every man who has some respect for the honour of this country.
Question put, and agreed to.
Reports 9Th March
Civil Seevices And Revenue Departments Supplementary Estimate, 1921–22
Class V
Resolution reported,
"That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £1,737,600, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1922, for Salaries and Expenses in connection with Middle Eastern Services under His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, including certain Grants-in-Aid."
Resolution read a Second time.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution."
I wish to call the attention of the House to the late hour at which it is proposed to grant this great sum of money to the Government. It is quite useless at half-past twelve to think that all these very large amounts can be adequately discussed. I am not going to take the task but I only desire to call the attention of the House to what is being done. The sums to be voted amount to £2,860,000, with an amount of over one million pounds deficit on the civil administration of Iraq before it was handed over to a native ruler. Then there is £890,000 representing the loss on exchange of goods supplied by India. We ought to have had some explanation of these. There are other large amounts involved, and as against this sum of £2,860,000 there are savings anticipated of £124,000. Not one single piece of information is given to the Committee or to the House as to what these savings would be. They come down out of the blue, and we get no information of any kind whatever. Mr. Speaker, I do not want to weary the House but I really think some protest ought to be made against the way in which the Government brings financial business before us. The House is not being treated with proper consideration in these matters. On the few opportunities we have had, hon. Members have endeavoured to do their duty, and to ascertain what the current expenditure is, but the Government have so arranged their business in order to get it through by the end of the financial year, and we have to deal with these large sums in this manner, and unfortunately, not only on money, but questions of policy, they have not treated the House or the country in a proper manner. I think the House itself has in years past been very largely to blame for the state of things that has arisen. We cannot go into all that tonight, but I only rise to make an emphatic-protest against trying to deal with this financial business at this time of the night, and I hope and trust some other protest will be made to reinforce mine, and to tell the Government that hon. Members in this House are not disposed to go on in the present way of doing financial business.
I only wish to emphasise what has been said. Even if we had a good many hours in front at us it is almost impossible to discuss an Estimate which is bound up with two or three other Departments. In order to discuss this Estimate you have to have the Air Estimates, the Army Estimates, and, I think, some others. Without them it is impossible properly to understand the Estimate, and I would say that I hope that in future a perfectly plain statement will be made by the Colonial Secretary as to what the actual expenditure upon his Department is. I am quite sure from the documents at our disposal it is impossible to say, because there are cross-references 'between the Air Ministry and the War Office and his Department, so that with the papers as they exist you really cannot understand what the actual expenditure is. I hope the Under-Secretary will do his best to see that the matter is rectified in the future.
The hon. Member for Wood Green (Mr. G. Locker-Lampson), when he complains of the system of account keeping, which now finds expression in these Estimates, should remember that a year or two ago exactly the opposite complaint was being made; that owing to the Estimates not being kept under the control of one office it was difficult for the House to say what Iraq was actually costing. It was to meet these complaints that this system of bookkeeping was adopted, under which the Colonial Office is responsible for the bulk Estimate, and, by a system of cross-payments and cross-bookkeeping, we pay the War Office and the Air Ministry for the services they perform. I do really protest against the charge that this system is designed to mislead Members.
I did not say that.
That, at any rate, was the tenour and the inevitable conclusion. In fact, this system was adopted in order to meet the protests of Members, and to place them in possession of the full thing in one view. If my hon. Friend studies the Estimates, he will certainly find cross-references and cross-payments, but he will also find a single charge under a single office.
The House will never succeed in understanding these-difficult Estimates until the Financial Procedure of the House is altered. The Government are in no way to blame except in so far as they do not bring forward a different system of Financial Procedure. What we need is that these Estimates should be scrutinised by small Committees of three or four Members upstairs who will report to the House. Then we will understand from their Report what is involved. Question put, and agreed to.
The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.
It being after Half-past Eleven of the Clock upon Tuesday evening, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to, the Standing Order.
Adjourned at Sixteen Minutes before One o'Clock.