T beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

I beg to second the Motion.

I have carefully considered this proposed new Clause in consultation with those who understand the subject a great deal better than I do, and I am satisfied, from what I have been told, that this is a Clause which I ought to recommend the House to accept. It is purely permissive. It follows what is a. common form in English documents today, and, as the hon. Member who moved it said, it is well recognised in Scottish Law. If the cautious folk across the Border think the Clause is safe, and, after experience, have adhered to it as part of their law, I do not think we shall he very rash in accepting it.

I beg to move, to leave out Sub-section (4).

I beg to second the Amendment.

Let me be frank with the House. This Amendment raises one of the first principles of the Bill, and it is an Amendment to which I could not possibly accede. One of the main principles of the Bill, as I explained to the House on Second Reading, is to get rid of different legal estates, as, for instance, life estates, and a common principle is to get rid of the division of one estate, so to speak, by a series of vertical divisions into a number of shares one by the side of the other. It is undoubtedly the fact that the system we have in our law to-day of having undivided shares, that is to say, an aliquot part of an undivided whole, is one that leads to very great complication in conveyancing work. You have to get all the parties interested and all the owners of the shares to concur in dealings in the land or you have to go to the Court with a partition action. The Mover and Seconder of the Amendment say that they have not come across partition actions in practice. The Seconder said that there were not as many partition actions as is supposed, because one partition action goes on for a long time.

I think the hon. and learned Gentleman is attributing to me words which I did not utter.

I said it.

Let me render tribute where tribute is due. There was one well-known action in the course of our English history which lasted a very long time, and it was not beyond criticism. It was the case of Jarndyce, v. Jarndyce.

That was not a partition action.

I did not say that it was, but T do say that one action may last a long time, and may involve a great deal of legal costs. The mere fact that the actions are few in number may easily be compensated for if each action lasts a long time. The conveyancing counsel whom I have consulted in the matter say that undoubtedly in many cases within their knowledge an estate has been used up in a partition action, so that there has been nothing left for the ultimate beneficiaries. That is the type of thing that one wants to prevent happening, because, when it does happen, even if it happens only very rarely, it is a grave scandal, and the proposal to get rid of undivided shares was for the purpose, inter alia, of getting rid of that particular scandal. Another object in getting rid of undivided shares is to shorten conveyances. One of the reasons why the transfer of land to-day is so costly is that so many documents have to be drawn up, and the purpose running all through this Bill, through every page of it, is to do everything possible to shorten the documents that lawyers have to draw up for people who want to deal in land. The shorter the documents, the less the lawyers will be needed, and the less they will be able to charge. That is a fundamental object of this Bill. There is not the shadow of doubt that the getting rid of legal undivided shares will, in the end, substantially help in shortening conveyancing documents.

I beg to move to leave out Sub-section (2).

(2) In addition to the aforesaid modes, capital money may, after the commencement of this Act, be applied in financing any person who may have agreed to take a lease or grant for building purposes of the settled land…

I beg to second the Amendment.

I supported the Second Reading of this Bill on the understanding that there was to be no danger to trust money. I think this Clause seriously endangers trust money. It has just been pointed out that you could not have a more speculative investment than that of advancing money to builders to develop estates. Two or three cases of startling failures are recorded in this respect. What is the main object of a trust? It is to ensure that the capital amount of the trust shall not be diminished. By a Clause of this kind, however, you are inviting trustees to enter into a speculative business with the almost certain knowledge that very serious pecuniary capital losses may arise. Sub-section (3) of this Clause says:

"This Section applies to settlements coming into operation either before or after the commencement of this Act."

If the epithets which have been applied to this Clause were deserved, I should certainly accept the Amendment, but I want those who have addressed the House on this Clause to consider one or two aspects which appear to have escaped their attention to some extent. In the first place, the tenant for life, in seeking to apply capital money to building purposes, is in a fundamentally different position to the man who is financing a builder for building on somebody else's land. In this ease the building is being done on his own land, thus increasing the value of his land, and if the builder goes bankrupt he will forfeit any unpaid instalments that have not accrued due, and any advance in the value of the land will go to the benefit of the estate. In the case where failures have occurred they have been financing builders who have been building on land belonging to somebody else.

Does the Solicitor-General really mean that there is no danger of loss because the building is taking place on his own land? Suppose I am the tenant for life, and I advance to a builder, say, £500 to erect a house, it being understood that certain walls have to be put up before I pass on the money, and that I only advance the balance when the roof has been placed on? Suppose the builder finds that he has made a mistake, and he fails, what has happened? I find myself in possession of part of a house with no roof on it. What am I to do? The result would be I should have to find more money to finish the building.

I quite appreciate the right hon. Baronet's point. I know that is the kind of thing that does happen from time to time, but it is not usual, and when it does happen it invariably happens that you have in hand, out of the moneys that would have been paid to the builder who fails, sufficient to pay any extra cost in getting another builder to complete the work. As a rule, the loss is a very small one, and a long way less than the one-third which you do not advance. So much as to the safety or unsafety of doing this.

I would like to ask if the late Mr. Justice Petersen ever expressed an opinion as to the powers of this Clause being exercised without the consent of the Court?

I am afraid that I cannot answer that question. I do not mean that the late Mr. Justice Petersen was dealing with this particular Clause, but what I say is that, on the broad question of principle of provision for the express purpose of facilitating by law what is the experience of everyday life during the last decade and what is considered desirable, that has been approved by a very large body of competent opinion in the profession. For that reason I cannot help thinking that the fears that have been expressed about this Clause are unfounded. As regard the suggestion made by the Mover, that this power should be subject to the leave of the Court, if it were only one application costing £35 or £40, of course, it would be a reasonable suggestion that we should put it in, but, as I understand the Clause, there would have to be not one application, but an application many times over each time an advance had to be made for any specific building. I do not see any other way in which the words suggested by my hon. and learned Friend can be read. As I understand those words, they mean that whenever an advance is to be made of this kind the person making the advance must go to the Court and get leave for so doing.

May I suggest a reason for my action? The landowner who enters into an agreement with the builder to grant a lease of 10 or 20 acres of land would go to the Court and say, "I propose to give the builder this lease and to make him certain advances accordingly as houses are built on the land." Surely that would only involve one application to the Court?

That would mean preparing a scheme under Section 26 of the Settled Land Act, 1882, and it would be a very elaborate business indeed, involving the employment of an architect and of quantity surveyors and the preparation of plans at an expense far exceeding the £35 which would be the cost of applying to the Court. It is to get rid of the necessity for that kind of extravagance which, in 999 cases out of 1,000, is not really required, having regard to the overriding protection of the Trustee Act, 1893. Since my hon. Friend spoke just now, I have ascertained that this particular Clause was before the late Mr. Justice Petersen, who went through the whole Bill, line by line, during many weeks, and who raised no objection whatever to this Clause. I ask the House to reject this Amendment.

I hope that the House will support the Solicitor-General in the position he has taken up. I can say, in addition to the authorities he has quoted, that this part of the Bill received very special attention at the hands of the Council of the Law Society. If caution be enshrined in its extremist form in any consultative body of people, it will be found in this Council of the Law Society. The members of the Law Society who took special charge of this part of the Bill were some of the ablest conveyancing authorities in the solicitors' branch of the profession in the whole kingdom, and we can therefore be quite sure that this proposal has been most carefully examined by men who are extremely cautious in their outlook, and who, in addition, have had an immense amount of practical experience, and certainly in the case of two or three of them forty or fifty years' actual practice in matters of this kind. I can therefore assure hon. Members, who may feel that this is going too far, that the proposal is supported, not only by the authorities whom my learned Friend has quoted, but also by the authority of men who have been in daily practical contact with this kind of work and who hold the very highest status in this branch of the profession. Certainly this Bill does not err on the side of rash experiment. If it errs at all it is on the side of caution.

I would like to ask the Solicitor-General one question. Are we right in understanding, in view of the wording of Sub-section (2), that this particular Sub-section which we are now discussing would have the effect of overriding a settlement which contained a definite prohibition of the use of the money of the estate for this purpose? Would it override a definite prohibition in a settlement drawn up years before the passing of this Bill?

The whole principle of law reform embodied in the Settled Land Acts has been to forbid wills and settlements preventing the utilisation of the land in a way which Parliament has thought desirable, and necessarily the effect of a provision enabling an individual to contract himself out of the Act would be to stultify the provision itself.

May I point out that what we are desirous of doing is not to prevent land being used for building purposes—for there can be no objection to that—if a builder comes forward with sufficient money for the purpose, but what we do object to is that the money for the actual building should be taken out of the corpus of the estate and used for that purpose.

I hope my hon. and right hon. Friends will not continue their opposition to this Sob-section. I cannot help thinking it is a valuable Subsection. Take the case of a landowner who desires to build cottages on his estate. Nothing is more common than the difficulties he is put into in finding capital for such a purpose.

If my Noble Friend will look at the next Clause, Sub-section (1), he will see that it gives power to build houses and cottages for persons employed on the estate.

But that does not meet the case. It may well be desirable to build cottages for the general benefit of the neighbourhood without necessarily confining the occupation of those cottages to people employed on the estate. It is the duty of landowners at the present time to provide cottages on their estates especially in districts near large towns. This Sub-section, as I read it, will greatly facilitate operations of that kind, and they ought not to be retarded by a possible chance of some injury being done, in very unlikely circumstances, to people having an interest in the estate. Such a chance ought not to override a provision which will make it easier to utilise and develop the land. It is really in the interest even of the land-owning class that this provision should be carried. They want to increase the value of their land, they want to make it more saleable and more easily developed. I very much wish that this Bill had gone a great deal further, and had touched mare nearly the root of the matter. Personally, I would have been glad to support a Measure which dealt with land under settlements generally in a much more drastic way than this Bill does. I am satisfied that the Bill is in the interests of everyone concerned in the land. With regard to the point raised by the Noble Lord the Member for Hastings (Lord E. Percy), I agree there is considerable substance in it. Where the terms of a settlement actually forbid any such advance of money, it might be desirable, if possible, to safeguard that particular case, but such cases would be very rare—indeed, I doubt if one could be found. Still if the Noble Lord has any particular case in his mind, where there is a settlement which forbids the use of the money of the estate for this purpose, the Solicitor-General might very well think it a proper case to be dealt with specifically, but as such cases are rare, it can scarcely be 'worth while providing for them in a. public Act. In cases where settlements are silent on this point I am satisfied that the change proposed would be an advantage.

May I ask the Noble.Lord the Member for Hastings (Lord E. Percy) whether he has in mind any particular case of a settlement forbidding this advance?

I have not.

The Noble Lord the Member of Hitchin (Lord R. Cecil) has spoken as a philanthropist rather than as an owner of land. I think there is a great deal too much philanthrophy at other persons' expense preached in these days, and I could wish that more land was developed at the expense of philanthropists themselves. What the Noble Lord suggests is that money belonging to the remainder man should be spent by the tenant for life in doing philanthropic work. That is a theory which has never entered into our jurisprudence or legislation. It may be desirable from some points of view to socialise the land and to say that men must use it for public purposes utterly disregarding the interests of the remainder man, but that is an entirely new and unheard of theory for dealing with settled land. Therefore, for the moment, I at any rate must disregard the very wide schemes which the Noble Lord appears to have in his mind. The Noble Lord the Member for Hastings (Lord E. Percy) has raised what I venture to think is an extremely important point, namely, whether supposing after the passing of this Act, a man, realising the danger of the ill-judged financing of builders, puts into a settlement a condition that the money of t he estate shall not be spent in financing builders, this Clause would override that settlement. The Solicitor-General has told us that the Bill as it stands, no matter how much the settlor may desire that the money of the estate shall not be dissipated in unwise building, speculations, would override that expression of his intention. In that case you would have this startling result: A mall settles his property. He says, "I do not want it to be dissipated on unwise building." But a builder comes along, and the tenant for life, who possibly may be a philanthropist like my Noble Friend, says, "Oh, but I want to spend money in speculative building for the benefit of the surrounding neighbourhood"; he goes to his trustees and converts them, by eloquence or otherwise, to that point of view, and the whole intention of the settler is set aside and the money is spent in this way. My right hon. Friend the Member for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean) assumes that those worthy gentlemen, and I have no doubt there are many, who have examined this Bill and who have not expressly spoken of the dangers of this particular Clause—perhaps they have never had it brought to their attention at all—must necessarily approve of it; but really, with a Bill of 300 pages, when some unfortunate person has to read it through and give, his opinion, are we to take it, because he has not seen the dangers of and the objections to a particular Clause, and has not condemned it, that therefore he approves of it I think my right hon. Friend is expecting too much of human nature, even in lawyers. I do not believe that any lawyer lives, or ever will live, who could read a Bill of this sort from end to end and see all the dangers that lurk in it. Therefore, I put aside that suggestion.

The hon. and learned Member who has just sat down speaks as though an estate is developed by one builder alone, but, having had some little experience of developing estates round London, I can tell him that that is not the case. In a great many cases 20, or even 30, builders have the property between them, and in practice the land is dealt with in small plots by small builders. I always say that the speculative builder is one of the greatest philanthropists we have ever known, and we miss him very greatly now. If we have to have an application every time a builder applies to a landlord for four or five plots for building small houses, the expense will be something tremendous, and therefore I suggest that we do not oppose this Subsection.

The arguments of the hon. and learned Member for York (Sir J. Butcher) are arguments from the past. They would have been perfectly good against the Settled Land Act, 1882, but, in spite of such arguments, that. Act. was passed by eminent Conservative lawyers of that day; and this Clause is merely a logical development, in the interests of the public, of the principle included in that Act. What are the precautions with which it is surrounded? Both the tenant for life and the trustees will have to agree in deciding whether this is to be done or not, and surely in the national interest, where it is difficult to get money for development in this particular way, the capital money which can only be invested in the land should be invested in houses on the land and made available in this way. The whole development of estates at the present time largely demands some such power, and, with the ordinary precautions which every tenant for life and trustee would exercise, the House will surely consider that we are not running any risk of danger to estates by passing a Clause of this sort.

I should like to join in supporting this Sub-section. The Mover of the Amendment, in his reply, insisted on making the same assumption that he made in his original speech, namely, that there is a great danger to the beneficiaries under a settlement through this Sub-section. He spoke about waste and about the danger to the reversioners, but I venture to think he ignored the point to which the Solicitor-General directed the attention of the House, namely, the great and complete protection afforded to the beneficiary under the Trustee Act, 1893. That is a very real protection. It means that there will be a valuation by an independent valuer, and that not more than two-thirds of the figure at which the property is valued is to be advanced out of the trust estate. As to the point made by the Noble Lord the Member for Hastings (Lord E. Percy) with regard to h prohibition in the settlement of advances of this sort, I think, bearing in mind that the law, as it at present stands, does not contemplate the making of advances of this sort by trustees, that it is contrary to all probability, and, indeed, is almost impossible, that any settlement would have prohibited trustees from committing a specific breach of trust, which could not have been within the contemplation of the testator at a time when the law never regarded such an investment as possible. Of course, there may lie more in the point that settlements are silent on the question of investment, and the objection has been raised that it is wrong of Parliament to override the intentions of a settlor or testator. But that has been done again and again in the history of law. A testator or settlor may make a settlement which breaks the rule against perpetuities, or which is in restraint of marriage, and in other ways he may make dispositions which the law overrides at the present time. Those dispositions are regarded as void, as being contrary to public policy, and the Courts or Parliament there override the intention of the testator.

rose.—

The hon. Member has exhausted his right to speak.

I only want to ask the learned Solicitor-General one question: How does the Trustee Act apply to advances of this kind? I cannot possibly see how it can.

That is an argument.

I beg to move, in Sub-section (3), after the word "applies" [''This Section applies"], to insert the word "only."

"This Section applies only to settlements coining into operation after the commencement of this Act."

There are two reasons why I cannot ask the House to assent to this Amendment. Firstly, it is contrary to the whole principle of the Settled Land Acts from the start. Let me read the words of Section 51 of the Settled Land Act, 1882, which has been acted upon ever since and which every lawyer in the country has ever since regarded as a great reform. Sub-section (1) of that Section says:

"If in a settlement, will, assurance, or other instrument executed or made before or after or partly before and partly after the commencement of this Act, a provision is inserted purporting or attempting, by way of direction, declaration, or otherwise, to forbid a tenant for life to exercise any powers under this Act—"

"that provision, as far as it purports or attempts or tends or is intended to have or would or might have the operation aforesaid, shall be deemed to be void."

I understand then the reason this Clause is put in, arid the reason my hon. and learned Friend will not accept my Amendment, is that he wants to build houses at the expense of a certain class.

I must protest against what is a ridiculous imputation, if my right hon. Friend will forgive the epithet. This expenditure will be made on the settled estate for the development of the settled estate for the benefit of all parties interested in the settled estate.

My hon. and learned Friend says there is a shortage of houses which everyone desires to abolish. However, I will not quarrel with him over that point, but it is extremely hard to bring in retrospective legislation in what is, after all, a very serious matter. He has read a Section from the Settled Land Act. My learned Friend below says that does not apply. If you are a lawyer you only have to say one thing and immediately another hon. and learned Gentleman, who is also a lawyer, says he disagrees with his learned brother. That I have found to arise in nearly every case I have had anything to do with, either on a Committee, in the House, or in any other place where I have the pleasure and the privilege of meeting gentlemen learned in the law. You get one hon. and learned Gentleman who says black is white and another hon. and learned Gentleman says politely it is nothing of the sort. Where are we unfortunate laymen who, after all, are the people who are making the trusts and whose property is being dealt with, to come in? I do not believe the Trustee Act comes into operation but we will presume that it really does. The Trustee Act says that if a trustee receives a report from a competent surveyor that certain things might be done he is to do them. We are all men of business. We know how an expert has been described. We know you can get a report from any expert to suit you, and therefore this is no protection whatever. I did not expect this from the Solicitor-General. I really-thought when I moved a reasonable Amendment like this he would certainly accept it. It. is a great shock to me.

I beg to move to leave out the Clause.

I am sure the House will have appreciated the serious spirit, as they were charmed by the serious voice, in which my right hon. Friend gave the House the benefit of his comments on this Clause. Assuming for the moment that behind his gaiety there is a serious object, I should like to say this. This Clause represents, as a whole, deficiencies which have been found in practice for the last forty years in the Settled Land Act, 1882. It represents really what are the ordinary provisions inserted in well-considered wills and settlements enabling tenants for life to deal with capital moneys for capital purposes on rational lines. The difficulty of legislation of the kind is that in the first Acts which are passed you nearly always find two phenomena: first, overcaution, resulting in the Act not going far enough, and, secondly, the omission of things which would have been dealt with had they been thought of. This Clause, as a whole, fills up gaps and gives powers which the experience of the last 40 years shows are desirable. As regards paragraphs (vii) and (viii), the objects mentioned are not capital expenditure in the full sense of the word, because it is wasting expenditure, and with regard to these I should welcome the Amendment in the name of the right hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury) and also in the name of the hon. and learned Member for York (Sir J. Butcher) to insert at the beginning of the paragraphs the words which we find in paragraph (ix):

"Subject to provision for the repayment of the capital money expended being made in the manner hereinafter provided."

I think it would be better to deal with this point when the hon. and learned Member for York moves his Amendment, rather than on the Amendment of the right hon. Baronet.

I understand that the Solicitor-General is prepared to accept some Amendments, and I thought he was prepared to accept the omission of paragraph (iii).

No, I cannot agree to that.

Perhaps it would be more convenient if I withdrew my Amendment in order that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for York may move the omission of paragraph (iii).

I felt that the Amendments on individual paragraphs of this Clause as a whole had a certain connection one with the other, and I therefore have obtained for the information of the House the views of one or two eminent conveyancers on the Clause as a whole, and I thought it was convenient that I should give that information to the House, in view of the way in which the right hon. Baronet introduced the Debate. If it meets with the approval of the Chair I propose to do that. The first opinion is from Mr. Underhill, senior conveyancing counsel to the Court, who has had very great experience. He writes:

"As to Clause 65, I am decidedly of opinion that the proposed Amendments"—

"would be a misfortune. It seems to me that one of the great objects of this great Bill, and surely a very commendable object is to give tenants for life and trustees, ail such powers as would be inserted in a settlement drafted by an experienced and skilful conveyancer, but which are only too frequently left out by practitioners who are neither one nor the other. I do not hesitate to state, that in all well-drafted settlements of real estate, whether the settlement be by deed or by will, a Clause similar to paragraph (iii) of Sub-clause (1) of Clause 65, is now invariably inserted, unless the contrary is desired by the parties. It has got into the books of precedents, and is, I think, universally recognised as an ordinary power. Only yesterday I had to advise a tenant for life and trustees under an old will that they had no power to develop the estate as a building estate except by granting long building leases which in the locality were not acceptable to builders. Such a position is neither good for the owners of the estate (whether tenants for life or remainder men) or for the public. With regard to paragraphs (vii) and (viii) of Clause 65, Sub-clause (1) I am inclined to agree with the proposed Amendment. These works are not of a permanent nature and should, I think, like the new roof or the like, be gradually paid out of income by the person for the time being in possession."

"I understand that objection is being taken in sonic quarters to the provisions of Clause 65, so far as they relate to the expenditure of capital moneys (1) in the development of the settled land as a building estate, (2) in providing heating, hydraulic, and electric power apparatus far buildings, and (3) in providing electric and other lighting installations. I sincerely trust that these objections will not be 'allowed to prevail. The existing Statutory provisions are in ninny respects arbitrary and unreasonable. For example, you can provide a water supply to a mansion, but you cannot supply a lighting installation. Yon can build a golf club house in connection with a building estate, but you cannot build new stables for the mansion. In many other respects the existing provisions are uncertain in their meaning, and constantly give rise to useless legal costs involved in taking opinions of counsel, and ultimately seeking the advice of the Court. All the proposed new provisions are within the general scheme of the existing Acts, namely, to authorise improvements which increase the value of the settled land. They are usually inserted in well-drawn settlements, thus adding to the expense in their preparation. We are all familiar with very numerous cases where the absence of power to provide electric lighting installations out of capital moneys has been found very detrimental to the interests of the settled estates."

I beg to move in Sub-section (1), to leave out paragraph (iii).

A great deal more.

Let us say £20,000,000 to begin with. Everyone has not £20,000,000 at his back to indulge in this sort of expense.

They are all peers.

These multi-millionaires can indulge in this most desirable thing. They can get it put into their settlement. In the case of a comparatively poor man, owner of a country estate, it is a most reprehensible thing to invite him and his trustees, without any check, to indulge in expenditure which he cannot afford and which may have the effect of ruining the family estate.

I am pleased to second the Amendment. I agree with a great deal of what the hon. and learned Member for York (Sir J. Butcher) has said. It has been pointed out to me that all these powers only apply where any particular scheme has been instituted, and these particular powers are necessary to that scheme. No doubt that to a certain extent does minimise some, of the objections which have been raised by the hon. and learned Member for York. Under this paragraph practically two-thirds of the value of the estate may be borrowed to invest in building operations. If these buildings operations turn out unsuccessful the whole estate is gone. Surely that is not what is intended. I understand that there may be one or two eases where a town has developed, and an estate is surrounded by buildings, and it may be necessary to allow that particular part to be converted to other uses. Surely that can be done without this Clause. The tenant for life, I understand, has now the power to sell. Therefore, if I am right, and I think I am, I do not see any reason for this particular paragraph. My hon. and learned Friend says that it may be necessary for very large estates. I think that he is right. Why should we legislate entirely for large estates? We have got to legislate here for a vast number of people who by thrift, hard work, or any other legitimate means, have secured a certain sum of money or estate which they desire to preserve to their descendants. Why should they run risks of this kind?? It is true that the Solicitor-General has read out certain letters from eminent people, members of the Bar, who say that in their opinion this sort of thing is right.

They have used this in practice.

Yes in the settlement which they have drawn. No one has a greater respect for the Bar than I have in their own sphere, and that is not investing money. I have had some experience of investing money, and I have had some experience of very eminent people, barristers, who have come to me and have asked my opinions about investing their money. On more than one occasion they have said to me, "We lawyers do not know anything about the investment of money. Though I have made a very large sum at the Bar, I have invested it so badly that I have lost a great part of it, and I would like to know what you would recommend." In those circumstances I do not see any use in the Solicitor-General reading out opinions from barristers about investments. They do not know anything about them. They are, I think, very bad advisers on that particular point. Therefore I do not think that the letters from these gentlemen have anything to do with the question whether or not we should give these enormous powers to the tenant for life. As I understand, under the Clause which has just been passed, the tenant for life can advance money to builders for the purpose of building. If that is so, why do you want this also? It is said that he can only advance two-thirds, and in all probability there will be a great deal of that two-thirds left if the speculative builder fails, but this paragraph enables him to run the whole of the risk himself. Surely, he ought to be content with the Clause, just passed. I hope that my hon. and learned Friend will go to a Division, and he will have at least one man in the Lobby, because it is not right for the Government to refuse to accept all these Amendments on a complicated Bill of this sort. This Amendment is a reasonable one and should be accepted.

The right hon. Baronet has been good enough to express his views as to the competence of barristers to advise on matters of investment and I do not propose to dissent. I would merely observe that the barristers who have written these very interesting letters, which I have read to the House, were not advising the House or anybody else as to what they should invest in. They were merely informing the House that those who, like my right hon. Friend the Member for the City of London, are extremely competent to advise others how to invest their money, should be given power, if they think right, to invest their money in settled estates, as indicated in this Clause.

Not their money.

The money of the settled estates. And we are entitled to assume that a man of business, exercising these powers, will act as a man of business. The Mover of this Amendment spoke as if the Clause put on the tenant for life the obligation to do these things. All this Clause does is to give power to a sane man to do these things if he thinks it right for the development of the estate, under all the safeguards that the law provides. I only read those letters for this specific reason. During the last ten or fiffteen years it has become customary and usual and proper for men of business in settling their estate, either by will or settlement, to insert these very powers contained in paragraph (iii), not because they desire to exercise the powers themselves, but because they think that the man coming after them ought to have those powers. All the Bill does is to give those powers to be used in precisely the way that competent men of business have been constantly using them during the last ten or fifteen years. These letters may have convinced the House or they may not, but I did not read these letters in order that I might quote these men as guides in business investments. I agree with my right hon. Friend that that is not their job. In those circumstances there is a primâ facie case for this paragraph. Add to that this. There are undoubtedly more settled estates in the ownership of the Members of the other House than is the case in this. The other House have considered this particular Clause with extreme care, with the advantage of a great body of expert opinion advising them about it, and the Law Saciety and various other advisers who have considered this Clause have all agreed that it is a. desirable Clause.

I am not terrified by what the learned Solicitor-General says about the views of the House of Lords. We are legislating here for ordinary men, among others owners of small settled estates, and he must not throw the House of Lords at my head. We are here considering questions and deciding them according to our qualifications and capacity, and I cannot allow the opinion of anyone who sits at the other side of the Lobby, upon a subject upon which I am competent in my own way, to overrule the opinion which my reasoned convictions lead me to adopt, and I am sure that no other Member of the House would accept the views which are thrown out from some other quarters on a subject upon which he is capable of forming an opinion himself. So let us get rid of these extraneous arguments and consider the thing on its merits. The Solicitor-General tells us that these things are generally put into the settlement. That is the very reason why we do not want them here. When there is a case for them they ought to be put into a settlement, but when they are totally inappropriate to the character of the property they ought not to be put into a settlement. The learned Solicitor-General says that because these provisions are suitable for large estates, they ought to be made applicable to all estates by Act of Parliament.

I did not say that.

I understand that that was the argument by which it was sought to support this Clause. My argument is that when they are appropriate to the estate they are in the settlement, and when not appropriate they are not in the settlement. These powers to build churches and chapels, cinemas, museums and libraries, and so on, are not suitable to be put into the settlement of every estate by Act of Parliament.

May I ask my hon. and learned Friend a question? If he had the power to build such a cinema would he exercise that power?

If I were in that position, I think I would be able to exercise the powers given me by Act of Parliament in a reasonable way; but I am not at all sure that every tenant for life is fully competent to do what this Act of Parliament enables him to do. Some tenants for life are persons of much larger views than I am, and attach more importance to cinemas and museums, and there may be many tenants for life who would think that that was a very appropriate way of spending money which is not their own. I say they ought not to be allowed to do it except with their own money. I would prevent people who are not wholly wise from using the powers. I would urge the Solicitor-General not to put temptation in the way of those who might not be very competent to resist it—powers which it would be most dangerous for them to exercise.

I beg to move, in Sub-section (1, iii), to leave out the words "gasworks, electric light or power works."

"engine houses, engines, gasometers,…plant, and other works required for the instalment of electric, gas, or other artificial light…"

I beg to second the Amendment.

I think the point of my hon. and learned Friend is founded upon a misapprehension of the precise effect of the wording of these paragraphs. Paragraph (iii) of Sub-section (1) deals with a development of a building estate. Paragraph (viii) deals with engine houses and gasometers and electric lighting apparatus. There are the words

"in connexion with any principal mansion house or other house or buildings."

"Gasworks, electric light or power works or any other works."

"in connexion with any principal mansion house."

The point is too subtle for me to understand. If the learned Solicitor-General is satisfied that he is right, I shall not, press the Amendment.

I beg to move to leave out Sub-section (3).

I beg to second the Amendment.

The word "Acts" is constantly referred to in this and other portions of the Bill. I should like the Solicitor-General to tell ca what. Acts are meant.

The Settled Land Acts.

It does not say so.

In Clause 71, Subsection (2), it is stated that

"The Settled Land Acts, 1882 to 1922, are referred to as 'the Acts'."

Why?

Because of the expense involved, which in practice has been found to be unnecessary. The Seconder of the Amendment asked what safeguards are left. If the House will turn to Subsection (4) of Clause 65, it will be found that it is there provided:

"Where the capital money to be expended is in the hands of the trustees of the settlement they may apply that money in or towards payment for the whole or any part of any work or operation comprised in the improvement, on—

"Provided that in the case of improvements not authorised by the Settled Land Acts, 1882 and 1890, or by the settlement, the trustees shall be entitled, if they shall think fit, before they make any such application of capital money to require that that money, or any part thereof, shall be repaid to them, out of the income of the settled land by not more than fifty half-yearly instalments."

I am not sure that Sub-section (4) does not contradict Subsection (3) which says, that "capital money arising under the Act" may be applied in certain ways. Sub-section (4) on the other hand says "where the capital money to be expended is in the hands of the trustees." Is not all capital money in the hands of the trustees?

In most cases.

Then what is the use of Sub-section (3)?

Sub-section (3) in terms provides for getting rid of the necessity of submitting schemes to the trustees. The provisions of Section 26 of the Act of 1882 require that a great number of elaborate provisions shall be complied with. That Section provides that where the tenant for life is desirous that capital money shall be applied in or towards payment for improvements, he may submit for approval to the trustees of the settlement or the Court, as the case may require, a scheme for the execution of the improvements showing the proposed expenditure thereon. Where the capital money is in the hands of the trustees, then, if the scheme is approved by them, the trustees may apply that money in or towards the payment of the whole or part on, first, a certificate from the Land Commissioners—that is, now, the Ministry of Agriculture—or a certificate that the work or alteration has been properly executed and that the amount is properly payable; secondly, the certificate of a competent engineer or surveyor; or, thirdly, an order of the Court, and so on. There are a number of elaborate provisions, compliance with which means the spending of a great deal of money on architects, quantity surveyors, consulting engineers and so forth, an expense which in practice is found to be unnecessary. The right hon. Baronet will not expect me to answer questions as if I myself were a tenant for life exercising all these various powers every day in the week. I have no personal experience in the matter; I merely speak from consultation with those who do know, and I give the House to the best of my ability the information I have been able to collect. The result of it is that in practice it is found that the system of schemes under the Act of 1882 is cumbrous and is not a real safeguard, and if we pass Sub-section (3), this, with the safeguards of Sub-clause 4, provides substantial protection as far as is necessary and at the same time gives an opportunity for reasonable development.

Let us suppose that I am a tenant for life and that my hon. and learned Friend is the trustee. I go to him with a proposal to invest certain capital money which is lying uninvested, and I do not submit a. scheme. I simply ask him to let me have the money to be invested in the improvement of the estate. He, as trustee, says to me, "Very well, I will do that provided you give me a certificate from a competent engineer or surveyor." Is that as far as this provision goes?

Or an order of the Court.

Are we to understand that the word "may" in Subsection (4)—"the trustees of the settlement may apply that money"—means "may," or does it mean "shall"? My point is this: Supposing the trustee says, "No, I know what you are going to do. I do not ask you to submit a, scheme, but I do not think it advisable in the interest of the estate to do it, and I shall not give my consent." What happens then?

There are, as I have pointed out, the conditions as to the certificate or the order of the Court. Then there is the proviso in regard to improvements not covered by the earlier Settled Land Acts. Furthermore, the trustees have the ordinary power to go to the Court if a. difference arises between the tenant for life and the trustees of the settlement respecting the exercise of any of the powers of the Act or any matter relating thereto, and on that the Court may give such direction as it thinks fit.

That is quite true, but that is not a real safeguard. The real danger arises where the trustees are more or less under the influence of the tenant for life. As I have pointed out on previous occasions, where that is so there is really no protection unless you preserve the scheme laid clown by the Act of 1882 or something like it. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London asked what safeguards are left if we abolish this scheme? That is a very clear question, and, in reply to it the Solicitor-General, in the first place, pointed to the provision with regard to the certificate by a surveyor. May I ask the attention of the House to this fact? This would be a certificate that the work has been done. It would not be a certificate that the work was necessary or that it was for the advantage of the estate or conducive to the development of the estate. The tenant for life may spend money on the exceedingly wide series of improvements which are now permitted, and, when we ask what safeguard there is and what guarantee there is that these are really for the benefit of the estate, the answer is that there will be a certificate from the surveyor that the work has been properly done. What is the other safeguard to which the learned Solicitor-General referred? It is a hypothetical one. He referred to the provision that the trustees might, if they thought fit, demand that the capital money spent on these improvements should be repaid by instalments, but I submit that that is no safeguard whatever, because the case which we are supposing, and the case where you do want a safeguard, is where the tenant for life and the trustees are acting together. The tenant for life naturally does not want capital money repaid by instalments. He wants to get as much out of the estate as he can, and he goes to the trustees and says, "Look here, let me point out what an excellent improvement this is There is no occasion to repay by instalments." The trustees assent, as they can do Where is the safeguard? It has gone, so that the only other alleged safeguard which the Solicitor-General pointed to is non-existent. Therefore, we come back to this, that the only real safeguard as to the improvement being a reasonable and proper one is that contained in the Act of 1882, which you are now abolishing by this Sub-section (3).

That is not the only or the real protection.

The hon. and learned Member was asked what were the protections, and he gave two illustrations of protection, both of which I have examined, and both of which, I venture to say, turn out to be nugatory. If there be any other protection, I shall be glad to know of it.

The tenant for life cannot spend any capital money without arranging beforehand with the trustees. If he does not, they will refuse to pay and tell him to go to the Court.

That is exactly my point. The dangers we have to meet are where the tenant for life has got the trustees more or less under his influence, and it is in order to provide for dangers of that sort that the Act of 1882 originally said there must be a scheme. Inasmuch as this scheme, which this Bill proposes to abolish, is one of the only protections left, I think the Solicitor-General ought to agree to eliminate Sub-section (3).

I beg to move, at the end of Sub-section (1), to insert the words

"and the foregoing repeal shall not apply where the land leased has been assigned, underlet, parted with, or disposed of, to a limited company."

I think this is a most extraordinary Amendment. Clause 78 purports to repeal amongst other things, Section 14 of the Conveyancing Act of 1881, and then we are to have added at the end of the repeal Clause that the repeal is not to operate in certain conditions. I think, if it had been intrended—and it probably is intended—that where there has been a transfer of a leasehold to a limited company the original Sections of the Act should still apply, that ought to have been clearly and properly stated, but to repeal a Section, and then to say that for certain purposes it is not repealed, is to create a confusion in the law of the most difficult and objectionable character. I was given to understand that, this Bill was one to clear up the law and to reduce it, on a great many of these points, to a code that could be easily looked at, so that the law could be ascertained with reasonable facility, but the method adopted here is most confusing. As this is the Report stage, and it would appear to be almost impossible to suggest that the intention should be inserted in intelligible language at a later stage, I venture to think this Amendment ought not to be adopted, because of the confusion that would inevitably arise in forming a conclusion as to whether these particular Sections were still law or not.

I hope my hon. Friend will not press his opposition to this Amendment. If it is really put in short words, it is one of the simplest possible things to understand. This Clause does not repeal Section 14 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881; it repeals only a very few words in that very long Section. The effect of the Clause in the amended form now proposed may be stated in a few of the simplest words possible. As my hon. Friend knows very well, Section 14 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, provides that relief against the forfeiture provisions in a lease may be given by the Court. There are certain cases where that relief may not be given, and one of those cases is the breach of a covenant against assigning, underletting, or parting with possession of the premises without licence. It has been held in the past that it would be reasonable—and I think my hon. Friend will agree—that the Court should be able to give relief against a forfeiture on that ground, and that was therefore the intention, to bring the Conveyancing Act up to date in the Bill; but attention has been drawn since to the fact that, if I may put it in simple, plain language, it is not an unusual form of swindle for people holding very valuable premises on lease occasionally to transfer them to a one-man company, or a rotten company of some kind, with no assets, for the express purpose of being able to get out of their liabilities for rent, and so on, under the lease. I therefore hope my hon. Friend will not press his opposition, for when the Clause gets into the text books it will be the simplest matter possible.

I was not arguing against the meaning and effect of what was clearly intended to be done, but against the very confusing way in which this Amendment was expressed.

This Bill, when it is an Act, will subsequently, as I said on Second Reading, be consolidated with other Acts, and we shall get all questions of drafting of this kind quite clear in the consolidating Act long before this Act comes into operation.

I beg to move, in Sub-section (1, i), after the word "benefit," to insert the words

"the whole or such part (if any) as may under all the circumstances be reasonable of."

I beg to second the Amendment. I will swallow that of my hon. Friend.

I beg to move, in Sub-section (11), to leave out the words "one hundred," and to insert instead thereof the word "ninety."

I beg to second the Amendment.

I shall be very glad to recommend to the House the acceptance of this Amendment, subject to conditions I will mention of a minor character. I agree with every word that has fallen from the lips of the hon. and gallant Member for Southport (Lieut.-Colonel D. White) as to the extreme importance of the Amendment. I, personally, would have been glad to accept it when he suggested it in Committee, but there were certain technical difficulties with regard to mining leases that I did not want to go into at that time, and need not go into now. Mining leases and mining questions generally are kept out of this Bill, ac it is the intention of the Government to introduce legislation on mining questions at as early a date as possible. Therefore, what I would ask the hon. and gallant Member to agree to is that, instead of his next Amendment on the Paper, which reads as follows:

"Provided that in the case of mining leases the term shall be more than one hundred years."

"Provided that this Sub-section shall not apply to mining leases or leases for mining purposes."

I shall be perfectly willing to agree to that suggestion.

On the understanding that the hon. and gallant Member's next Amendment will be moved in that form, I shall be glad to accept this, and to thank him, on behalf of the community to which he has referred, for his pertinacity in regard to this Amendment.

I understand that this will be the effect. Where a person has leased a house for 90 years, and 50 years of that lease have expired, then, even if there are any restrictive covenants in the lease, the leaseholder can use the house in any way he likes, It that so?

The right hon. Baronet has not, I think, appreciated that under Sub-section (11) the power to deal with restrictive covenants in a lease of freehold land is dealt with on the same lines as the power to deal with restrictive covenants in regard to freehold land which you find in the earlier part of the Clause. It is there hedged round with elaborate precautions, and it is there provided that, if a restrictive covenant be got rid of by the tribunal, compensation must be given to the person in whose favour the restrictive covenant has been made, if the covenantee suffers any loss by the removal of the covenant. It is for the purpose of getting rid of restrictive covenants that impede development in a neighbourhood, subject always to the greatest precautions and to compensation.

May I, as a layman, ask this question? Suppose I live in a square in which all the houses have been let for 99 years as dwelling-houses, but, owing to some railway coming near, it is impossible for me to live in that square, will this Clause allow me to let my houses for offices, without being penalised?

If the hon. Member will look at Sub-section (1 a) of this Clause the powers are these:

"The Authority…shall have power from time to time, an the application of any person interested in any freehold land affected by any restriction arising under covenant or otherwise as to the user thereof or the building thereon, by Order wholly or partially to discharge or modify any such restriction (subject or not to the payment by the applicant of compensation to any person suffering loss in consequence of the Order) upon being satisfied

(a) That by reason of changes in the character of the property or the neighbourhood or other circumstances of the case which the Authority may deem material, the restriction ought to he deemed obsolete, or that the continued existence thereof would impede the reasonable user of the land for public or private purposes."

I think it is a very good thing.

I do not think my right hon. Friend the Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury) need have any fear of the operation of this Clause. In fact, I am sorry to say he will not have any reason to fear it, because, in my view, it is a pity that we have this much more limited form of application of the Clause than that originally intended, and I would advise the right hon. Baronet to be thankful, from his point of view, that things are not worse. I wish, from my point of view, things were very much better. I regret very much the original proposal has been cut down to the extent it has been. Nobody who knows anything about the tenure of land in urban areas, and, indeed, outside urban areas, both freehold and leasehold—and particularly leasehold—can come to any other conclusion than that many of the restrictive covenants are obsolete, and most disadvantageous, not only to those who own the land, but to the community at large, and it is for the first time that we get in a Statute the application of something approaching commonsense in dealing with these questions. I am not, of course, making any reference to my right hon. Friend in that regard. I welcome this insertion, though it is hedged round with such safeguards that I doubt whether the benefits will be very large. I hope, at some later time, I shall be in this House to give effect to much wider and more sweeping and drastic powers than are contained in this very limited Clause now before the House.

My only objection is that the Clause and the Amendment restrict the application of common sense. The Clause says:

"Where a term of more than one hundred years is created in land."

"Where a term of more than ninety years is created in land."

On a point of Order. Would it be possible for me to move as an Amendment to the Amendment, that the period should be sixty years?

It could be done in this way: We must first of all remove "one hundred" from the Bill. Then I shall have to put the Question, "That the word 'ninety' be there inserted." If that be negatived, it will be open to the hon. Member to move the insertion of "sixty" instead of "ninety."

I wish to move as a further Amendment, "That the word 'sixty' be there inserted." I have no objection, of course, to the principle involved in the ninety years, but I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Edgehill (Sir W. Rutherford) that we should prefer to see the term sixty years. For that reason, I move that instead of "ninety" the word should be "sixty."

I beg to second that Amendment.

The House will have to negative the word "ninety." Then a second Amendment will be necessary to insert "sixty." I must first put the Question, "That the word 'ninety' be there inserted."

I have every sympathy with the proposal for a further reduction from ninety years, but one must draw the line somewhere, and I want to say why. We do not want to interfere with a contract freely made within the length of time for which the contracting parties may reasonably have anticipated that the contract as a contract would continue to be effected. Leasehold property, after the lapse of a certain length of time, ceases to have any really contractual character, and it becomes a type of tenure rather than the result of a mere contract or undertaking between parties freely made. We want to draw a reasonable line be- tween the anomaly we see at the present time of leasehold estates, long after the, leases have been created, becoming encumbered by obsolete covenants, and, on, the other hand, freedom of contract.

How can the Solicitor-General reconcile that argument with the limitation of fifty years, on page 74 of the Bill?

Will you make it seventy years?

I am told that the concession I have already made, down to ninety years, is as far as it is safe to go, for reasons that are known to those who, are concerned with conveyancing matters. I am afraid I must resist a reduction beyond the figure of ninety, though I have a good deal of sympathy with the hon. Member's proposal.

How do you reconcile that with the fifty years?

I am sorry the Solicitor-General has stated that he is rather unfavourable to this Amendment. I assure him—if I am right, I may, of course, be wrong—that I do not think there is anything in conveyancing which is objectionable at all. Every possible argument—and I say this with some knowledge of the matter—which can be brought to bear for bringing the operation of this Clause down to the ninety-nine years' lease, is applicable in the fullest sense to the seventy years' lease. The same kind of thing arises in seventy or seventy-five years' lease as in the ninety-nine years' lease. The only thing is, that in those parts of the country where it has-become the custom to grant a seventy-live years' lease instead of a ninety-nine years' lease, when those leases are granted it really does not make much difference to the grantor or the grantee at the time whether it is ninety-nine years or seventy-five years. It is a difference of about twenty years, which is a very, very long time off.

I have made further inquiries, and I am happy to say that if my hon. Friend (Mr. A. M. Samuel) will make it "seventy" instead of "sixty," I will accept it.

Have I your permission, Mr. Speaker, to withdraw "sixty" and substitute "seventy"?

We are still on the Question, "That the word 'ninety' be there inserted." If the House negative the "ninety," I will take the "seventy."

I beg to move, "That the word 'seventy' be there inserted in the Bill."

I beg to second the Amendment.

I beg to move, in Subsection (2), after the word "land" ["conditions of sale of land"], to insert the words

"to which reference may be made in any such contract or conditions."

"has been added in order to save the costs of printing, etc., which are incurred when contracts and conditions of sale are prepared. The new Sub-section will also enable the case of contracts by correspondence, which under the existing law are in a very unsatisfactory condition, to be dealt with to the satisfaction of both vendor and purchaser."

I beg to second the Amendment. I will not follow my Ion. Friend in his historical retrospect, but I do hope the Solicitor-General will be able to do something to meet this really important point. This House is jealous of its power in regard to legislation, and we do not want to delegate it. If there had been in this Bill a form of contract as there are other forms of contract, we should have known what we were about.

If any of the terrible disasters that the Mover and Seconder imagine are going to follow the application of this Clause were likely to follow, I should probably accept the Amendment, but, in my view, none of them will happen. Let us understand what the Clause is about. Parties who buy, sell, or lease land very often do it in a very casual way, by correspondence, and sometimes even by word of mouth. They do not put into their bargains the various conditions and stipulations which are necessary in order that they should really know what bargain it is that they are making. Not having done so, one thinks that something was meant which was not expressed, and the other thinks differently, and so they get to loggerheads. That is how a great proportion, a great majority, of disputes arise about dealings in land. I am sure that solicitors in the House will bear me out when I say that that is the most fruitful cause of the trouble which leads to expenditure upon those undeserving persons, the lawyers.

One can agree with practically every word the Solicitor-General has said in respect to this Amendment, but I think the hon. and learned Gentleman has overlooked what is the real effect of the Amendment itself. The real effect, read in conjunction with the next Amendment standing in the same names is this, that by the Clause as it stands it is sought to make these common forms that are to be prepared applicable in all cases whether there is any reference to them or not in the correspondence, whereas the effect of the Amendment is that they are only to be deemed to be included and part of the contract if they are referred to in the correspondence, which is exactly opposite to the Clause as it stands. The difficulty at the present moment is this: a contract is made for the sale of a house for a certain sum of money it is made by a certain exchange of letters. One man says to another, "I will give you £1,000 for your house, No, so and so, in a certain street." The seller accepts the amount. I should like to know from the Solicitor-General whether it is intended in these forms to alter or vary the Statute of Frauds. For instance, in the correspondence there may be no reference to the date for completion of the purchase—a very important matter. I do not know whether the forms that the Lord Chancellor or some other learned gentleman is going to prepare are going to say that a contract that is arranged by correspondence that has not the date of completion is going to be deemed completed at the end of three months or six months. This would be a complete alteration of the Statute of Frauds as we know it to-day—a Statute distinctly made for the purpose of preventing humbug or fraud in connection with the sale of property.

It is with some trepidation that I follow my hon. Friend who has just spoken, because I have only had about half the number of years' experience that he claims. I should like to support this Clause as it is drawn. The various conditions which have been drawn up and prepared by various law societies all over the country are rather dangerous documents. What particular document we are going to have I cannot say, but this Clause as drawn, and as it stands now, I am inclined to think, will leave open the possibility of using such a form as I think would be very useful. It need only be a very short form setting forth that where A agrees to buy and B agrees to sell so-and-so for so much, that then a number of other questions will be settled for the parties. Other conditions can be adopted by those who wish to carry out special provisions which may be embodied in the contract. In a simple case where someone says, "I will buy so-and-so for so much," and the other party says, "I will sell so-and-so for so much," surely certain other stipulations which are perfectly reasonable can very reasonably be embodied in a form which would be of great assistance to the ordinary individual doing business of this kind.

I hope the Solicitor-General will not accept this Amendment. I think hon. Members will agree with me when I say that one of the greatest curses that can come upon us is the adoption of any words affording a loophole for a misunderstanding in a contract. If you have a contract which may contain the provisions or exclusions embodied in this Amendment, then you do provide a loophole for a misunderstanding. If this Amendment is pressed to a Division I shall vote against it.

If the Solicitor-General will assure me that there is to be no alteration in the Statute of Frauds, it is possible that we might agree.

I do say so.

I do not think any business men entering into an arrangement with other business men would like to think that something is incorporated into an open contract of which they have no knowledge. Business men to whom reference has been made carrying out trade transactions in a large city may incorporate the conditions of the association to which they belong. That is quite a different thing because it saves them money and trouble, but what objection is taken to is two parties having thrust upon their contracts something about which they know nothing and did not intend. I know that the Solicitor-General made a reference to a responsible body who would decide upon these forms, and in that case I should have more confidence in the list drawn up. Nevertheless this is a considerable power to be given in such a case as that of a letter written by a man offering £500 for a house and the answer comes back, "I will give you £500 for the house." What is imported into that contract, and who is going to decide the conditions? Does the Lord Chancellor decide the length of the title? Supposing upon the publication of the list and the conditions which it is sought to incorporate into an open contract, the parties object to certain conditions, what remedy have they got?

I exclude those conditions, and I say when I make my bargain that I sell you this property on such and such terms excluding those conditions.

I am speaking of what may happen between two ordinary purchasers and sellers who have no knowledge of the Lord Chancellor's list. I will take the usual form. If a working man is selling his house, a letter may pass between the parties. It may be a simple document stating, "I intend to sell this house to you at a certain price." I am sure it will come as a surprise to them to know that the Lord Chancellor's conditions have been incorporated into such a contract. Supposing the parties consider that the conditions are wrong and should be amended or amplified. After all the Lord Chancellor has no particular knowledge of such conditions. If we complain of the list and the conditions, what remedy have we got? How can we amplify such contracts? How can we have the list altered if we think it is not bearing fairly and properly upon the transactions which have arisen? I hope we shall have some assurance on this point, and then perhaps it will not be necessary to take a division upon this Amendment. It has been suggested that there will be a consultation with the Law Society. I shall be quite satisfied if the consultation takes place with those who have daily knowledge of these transactions.

I did not say that the Law Society would be consulted on the contents of the forms. I meant that those members would be consulted who were best qualified to consider the drafting of such forms. The point of difference between the Clause and the Amendment is that under the Clause, as it is drafted, ignorant laymen may think they are making a good contract when they are not doing anything of the kind, and under the Clause they will be protected against the danger into which they may unwittingly fall. If they do not know of the existence of the Lord Chancellor s form, if they make a bad contract they will be protected. If we have the contract made in the form contained in the Clause, then the proper form will be automatically incorporated in the contract.

After the explanation which has been given by the Solicitor-General, I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.

I beg to move to leave out the Clause.

I beg to move, in Sub-section (7), after the word "time" ["to time cause"], to insert the words

"(but not more than once in every three years unless the nature of the trust, or any special dealings with the trust property, make it reasonable)."

I beg to second the Amendment.

I accept this Amendment.

I beg to move to leave out the Clause.

I beg to second the Amendment.

This is a very valuable Clause, and it is one that experience has proved to be most necessary. I cannot help feeling a little disinclined to again quote the conveyancer of Lincoln's Inn, whose experience in this matter is so invaluable, because it necessarily involves the inference that the hon. and learned Member who has moved the Amendment is not familiar with the existing practice. We in this House all appreciate the immense amount of time and trouble the hon. Member has given to his public duties, but the truth of the matter is that those public duties have taken him away from the daily practice of conveyancing for a great number of years, and I hope he will not think I am reflecting on his once great knowledge of conveyancing when I say it is there no longer. The present-day practice shows what present-day experience wants. May I just read a few sentences from a couple of letters in reference to this Clause Mr. Underhill, a learned conveyancer, writes:

"Clause 121 ought, I think, to stand. No one with experience would deny that for many years before 1881 it was always usual in well-drafted settlements and wills to provide (1) for the maintenance of infants even where only contingently entitled on attaining 21, and (2) for the) advancement to infants out of vested or contingent capital. In 1881 Parliament, in the 42nd and 43rd Sections of the Conveyancing Act, provided for the maintenance of infants but left the question of advancement to he dealt with by the settlors and testators expressly. In my opinion the time has now come for giving statutory force to a provision which we find in every well-drafted settlement or will."

"My answer to the proposal to leave it out is that some such Clause is inserted in almost every settlement or will. I should think it is not omitted in more than one case in twenty. If I were instructed to put all 'usual and proper Clauses,' I should as a matter of course, insert this Clause, and so I take it would all conveyancers. The causes for which advancements may be required are endless. It may be a matter of the utmost importance to be able to advance money for some urgent need, and if you have no ad- vancement Clause it would be necessary to go to the Court and have some scheme for charging the child's contingent interest and insuring the child's life, and to waste money simply for want of a 'common form' provision. Advancement is generally wanted when a child is starting in life, and that is not much under 21, and it would be a very rare thing for the child who is advanced not to become ultimately entitled to the settled fund. Even in the rare case of his dying, before becoming absolutely entitled to the whole fund, the money advanced will have been well spent for the benefit of one of the objects of the settlement."

The Solicitor-General may have done me unwittingly a benefit by suggesting I am or was an eminent conveyancer. I think he is mistaken. But this is not merely a question of conveyancing. It is a question of common sense. If a man leaves money contingently at the age of 21, and wishes to empower the trustee to advance half the money before that age is attained, he can provide that that be done. But if he does not put such a provision into the settlement, why should the money which belongs to one person be given to another person? It really passes my understanding that such a thing should be proposed. If a man says that A.B. shall receive a certain sum only when he attains the age of 21, and that if he does riot attain that age, C.D. shall get it, why should an Act of Parliament override such a provision?

The object of this Bill very largely is to save costs. This Clause is a Clause which it to be found in every well drawn will and settlement, and if it is not there, the beneficiaries under that will or settlement are at a very great disadvantage. If this Clause is retained, it will lessen costs and it will also supply a defect from which many beneficiaries may suffer. If a testator leaves a sum of money to a child, who is to receive it on attaining the age of 21 or 25, that child is primarily intended to be benefited, although it is not to have complete control of the money until the age definitely fixed is reached. Power is generally given to the trustee to apply a part of the money not exceeding one-half for the benefit of the child, and that is all that this Clause does.

I beg to move, at the end of Sub-section (1, b), to insert the words

"but the lord shall not be entitled to serve such notice till after the expiration of five years from such commencement."

I beg to move, in Subsection (1, b), to leave out the word "moiety" ["upon trust as to one moiety"], and to insert instead thereof the word "half."

I hope that the Solicitor-General, inasmuch as he has frequently spoken of the necessity of cheapening and simplifying and improving the law, will recognise that the lawyer members of the Committee on several occasions have brought forward suggestions with that intent. It was, he will remember, on the suggestion of the. Member for Central Portsmouth (Sir T. Brarnsdon) that the provision with regard to attaching the seal was taken out. He will also remember that on one occasion I asked that the Stamp Duty on a reconveyance might be removed, so that the procedure might be cheapened and made easier, and in view of the fact that the word "half" is well known to all, whereas the word "moiety" is known only to a few, it may perhaps be counted for righteousness on the part of the solicitors that we are anxious to have the law thus simplified.

May I say that I am very greatly indebted to the legal members of the Committee upstairs for their assistance then and on the Report stage as well.

I beg to move, in Sub-section (1, vi), to leave out the words

"Sixthly, for the great-grandparents of the intestate, and if more than one survive the intestate, in equal shares; but if no member of this class takes an absolute interest; then—"

"Sixthly, for the surviving husband or wife of the intrastate absolutely."

I beg to second the Amendment.

I venture to think that the House ought to accept this Amendment. May I—more, perhaps, for the gratification of the hon. and learned Member who moved it—read once more from Mr. Underhill's letter? He says:

"I am wholeheartedly in favour of the Amendment. I doubt whether one in a hundred persons cares a rap about any relation who is further removed than first cousin, and if he does he has only to make a will. My experience of 50 years at the Chancery Bar is that the costs of inquiries to ascertain remote next-of-kin is out of all proportion to the estate. Some few years ago, in my own experience, a man died intestate without any next-of-kin nearer than the descendants of his paternal great-grandfather and his maternal great-grandmother. He left £10,000 more or less. Of course, the administrator had to go to the Court for nil inquiry. This lasted for years, and advertisements had to be inserted in newspapers all over the world. Hundreds of claimants turned up, and their claims had to be investigated, and in the result, after payment of the costs, each claimant got under £5."

I beg to move, in Sub-section (6), after the word "corporation" ["not being a trust corporation"], to insert the words

"or an executor originally appointed to be executor to a will by a testator."

I beg to second the Amendment.

I hope the Mover of this Amendment will remember that, as regards his Amendments generally, I have given him "half," and that he will, therefore, forgive me if I refuse to give him this one. The whole scheme of the Bill is that, where individuals are trustees, as distinguished from a corporation, there shall be at least two, and this Amendment is inconsistent with that principle. It is a safeguard that we want to maintain.

I shall be very glad, indeed, to take the Third Reading now, if I am permitted.

I have no desire to obstruct the Bill in any way, but the Leader of the House announced that the Third Reading would be taken on Friday and there may be some hon. Members who want to be present.

The announcement was made by the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury on Monday that the Third Reading was to be taken on Friday.

I believe there was some understanding to that effect.

That was certainly announced on Monday during the proceedings, but to-day I was informed by the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury that there was an agreement that it should be taken to-night.