I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read the Third time."

indicated assent.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman agrees that I am not misquoting him. The Board will be dealing with principles of valuation common to both countries. The Board provided for in this Bill and in the English Bill will be advised so, far as Scotland is concerned by the valuation department of the Board of Inland Revenue, and if there is to be consistency and uniformity on general policy questions it is essential, I submit, to have one Board operating for the country as a whole. This does not mean, as the Opposition have suggested, that the detailed administration of the Board must necessarily be the same in both countries or that no decisions can be taken by the Board's Scottish Office without reference to London. Scotland has its own distinctive legal system and its own form of land tenure, and of itself this will necessitate a special treatment of Scottish cases. For example, I can say quite categorically that the Board's Scottish Office will fix the amount of development charges in Scottish cases without reference to London. They will do so in consultation with the chief valuer for Scotland. There will, therefore, be no running back and forward to London for instructions.

Does that mean that the Scottish members of the Board will in effect act as a Committee of the larger Board in dealing with specific Scottish questions?

I do not want to use the word "Committee." They will be part of the Central Land Board. They will have a say in the general policy which is to be adopted for Great Britain, but in the application of that policy, and subject to directions from the Secretary of State for Scotland, they will do their work in Scotland. Another criticism levelled against the Bill in the Motion for rejection is that it:

"…subjects the development of Scotland …to the veto of the President of the Board of Trade."

indicated dissent.

I am saying quite definitely and categorically that there is no substance whatever in that charge. I am rather surprised at the source from which it has come because the Distribution of Industry Act was passed by the Coalition Government and, according to my recollection, the right hon. and learned Member for Hillhead was a Member of that Government. There is, of course, no substance in that charge. The control of development will be the responsibility of the local planning authorities working under the general guidance and direction of the Secretary of State, and not the affair of a Whitehall Minister.

"…consistently with the proper distribution of industry."

I beg to move to leave out from "That" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:

"this House declines to give a Third reading to a Bill which subjects the development of Scotland to the control of a Land Board located in London and to the veto of the President of the Board of Trade; which denies to an owner compensation as of right for the loss of development value and establishes no principle for the division of the fund which is to be set aside to meet cases of hardship; and which, by the removal of incentives to development and by the imposition of charges of an indeterminate amount, will hinder any policy for the full employment of the Scottish people."

I do not think I ever said there might be two. I said there was a minimum of two, and there was a chance of getting three.

I was remembering that in the English Bill provision was made for the establishment of a Central Land Board which would not exceed nine members.

Plus the chairman.

Plus the chairman. That would be 10 members, and Scotland is now to have two and, it may be, three. That is a good deal better than the eleven-eightieths of the Goschen formula. I do not deny that for a moment. But the Board still has only three main functions. The first is to divide the £300 million global sum as between England and Wales, on the one hand, and Scotland, on the other. When that is done, its functions, as far as Scotland is concerned, become purely Scottish. It has to assess the development charges, and the right hon. Gentleman has told us that that is now in any case to be done by the office in Edinburgh, with the advice of the Chief Scottish valuer to the Inland Revenue Department. It has also to act as a "middleman" under the terms of Clause 40 of the Bill by holding land which has been acquired, and reselling it to developers, plus a development charge. That is a purely Scottish function. I cannot see any valid reason why, after the initial divide up of the £300 million between England and Wales, on the one hand, and Scotland, on the other, there should not be a separate board dealing with what after all are purely Scottish matters. I cannot see how it is possible for a Land Board of 10 members to be subject both to the directions of the Minister of Town and Country Planning and to the directions of the Secretary of State for Scotland. I believe it is wrong in principle, harmful in practice and a betrayal of Scotland's interests that Scotland, which has its own planning Bill, should not also hold entirely in its own hands the machinery for implementing the provisions of this Measure.

Is it not the case that in Scotland we have had a continual cry about the drift of industries to the South because there was no planning?

I would say to the hon. Member in the words of Proverbs, 18:

"He that answereth a matter before he heareth it, it is folly and shame unto him."

I beg to second the Amendment.

The hon. Member for West Aberdeen (Mr. Thornton-Kemsley) prefaced his speech with a generalisation which I think is very true. The real clash about this Bill has not been, and is not, over the planning provisions, but over the provisions dealing with compensation and the charging of development values. About those provisions there has been a lot of disagreement, and, for my own part, I cannot see where this disagreement can be reconciled, because there are fundamental differences of opinion, as the Secretary of State pointed out, over these matters.

We on this side of the House recognise that a Town and Country Planning Bill was necessary, but we do not accept the suggestion that this is the best Bill that could have been produced. As, undoubtedly, there has to be a separate Scottish Bill, we realise that it should be along roughly the same lines as the earlier English Bill. We do not expect differential treatment on the main principles, but where we quarrel with the Government on this particular Bill as it affects Scotland is on the question of the representation of Scotland on the Central Land Board, which is on quite a different footing from the suggestion that we wanted a different Measure from that which deals with England. I am firmly convinced that we deserve more Scottish representation on the secondary stage of planning for the future development of Scotland. I believe that, in the years to come, we shall probably get it. We shall find that it is necessary, and that it is not practical that so much of Scottish business should be determined by England.

I do not want to speak very long, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Edinburgh (Mr. Willis) has dealt with a large number of the points to which I had intended to refer. In view of some of the statements which have come from the opposite side of the House in opposing the Bill, I do not know whether it is a case of simply not wanting to understand the Bill or of wanting to misrepresent it. The Amendment states:

"That this House declines to give a Third Reading to a Bill which subjects the development of Scotland to the control of a Land Board located in London.…"

"…and to the veto of the President of the Board of Trade."

In the East End of Glasgow.

Yes. The other day it was with dismay that I heard hon. Members talking about the highly skilled engineers who would be affected by a certain tax. Hon. Members were totally unaware that these industries had their birth in Scotland, and that that skill originated in Scotland among Scottish workmen and was brought South not by the Government of the day, but because there was no planning at all in this island, and because the only incentive in industry was to go to the place where the costs would be least and the profits highest.

"by the removal of incentives to development …will hinder any policy for the full employment of the Scottish people."

"will hinder any policy for the full employment of the Scottish people."

I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman the Member for West Renfrew (Mr. Scollan) thinks this Bill is going to prevent industries which turn out in future to be unprofitable from moving down from Scotland, whether to England or elsewhere. I do not see how he is going to prevent that, short of nationalisation, which, as we know, runs everything at a loss.

What about the Post Office?

I should like to start by asking the Secretary of State one question. While there is a considerable amount of agreement on the principles of this Bill, the first thing this House must see to is that its application to the individual is not burdensome. In the Third Reading Debate on the English Bill an undertaking was given by the Minister of Town and Country Planning, that he would attempt, at any rate, to ensure that one single application by the individual would suffice for him to obtain a decision on his by- law application, on his ribbon development application, on his planning application, and on the development charge. I should like to ask whether one single application will do all that in Scotland?

"for regulating the performance of their functions."

"any local planning authority or to local planning authorities generally."

After listening to this Debate today, and having listened all through the Second Reading and to a great part of the Committee stage, it seems to me perfectly clear that the main opposition to this Bill arises from the view that the £300 million is much too small a sum for compensation. Indeed, in listening to this Debate one begins to wonder whether this is a planning Bill for Scotland or is merely a Bill to decide what compensation we are to pay to certain people in Scotland. The hon. Member for West Aberdeen (Mr. Thornton-Kemsley) spoke—as we so often hear from the Opposition nowadays—about the individual who bought a piece of land, but had paid more than its face value because he hoped that after a time he would get extra money from it through development. According to the hon. Member, that man will lose as a result of this Bill. But, surely, the Opposition, who are such ardent believers in and supporters of private enterprise, must also subscribe to the view that if a man is a speculator he must take risks. There cannot be any objection to that, because the Opposition believe so seriously in it.

I regret that I am unable to share the optimism of the hon. Lady the Member for North Lanark (Miss Herbison) about the prospects for Scotland, with or without this Bill, under this Government. The main impression that has been borne in on my mind as I have sat through the prolonged proceedings on this Bill has been that it is not primarily a planning Bill at all. Considerable claims were made, following on claims which had been made for the English Bill, that it did great things of planning. I could understand the Minister in charge of the English Bill making those claims because, after all, he does have an enormous staff of some 1,300 people in his Department, and no doubt he has to put up some claim to justify them. But the Secretary of State for Scotland takes a much more realistic and, if I may say so, much better view of his functions as a planning Minister. He has, I think, only 33 members in his Town Planning Department, compared with 1,300 in the Ministry in England. Accordingly, it would not be right for him to press—and I do not think he does press—that this Bill greatly increases national as against local planning.

Is the Opposition's Amendment founded on love of profit?

The Opposition's Amendment is founded on what I believe to be the realistic view, that if we want to get prosperity in this country without the use of compulsion, we must provide incentives. I prefer incentives to compulsion, and we must have one or the other. In so far as this Bill takes away incentives, which it does to a large extent, it is prejudicing the future prosperity of Scotland. That is my answer to the hon. Member. The Government agree that it cannot tackle nationalisation of the land on a large scale, for many reasons. They agree that they must rely on the initiative of individual developers of the land of Scotland. The Government must really make up their mind whether they want to encourage, or hinder and hamper, the invidual. This Bill will hinder and hamper him, because it sets out to do so. The development charges machinery depends on the view that one can calculate in advance what profit is likely to be made by the developer, who is then charged anything up to 100 per cent. of that sum. Is that not going to hamper and hinder? So long as the industrialists of Scotland sit back and do not try to do anything, they are not touched. If there is any unearned increment in those circumstances, they get it without its being taxed, but as soon as they try to increase the size of their undertaking and provide more jobs, for the people, anything up to 100 per cent. of the prospective profit is to be taken away from them. It is bad enough to tax profit after it has been realised, and we know from P.A.Y.E. up to Surtax how hampering excessive taxation is; but it is far worse to tax people in anticipation of profit, and it is equally bad to tax people on no intelligible principle.

Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman suggest that where there is compulsory acquisition it will not be on the current market value?

I have not come to that, I am saying that it is wrong for the Government to take away any man's property and deny him compensation. It came out quite clearly in the proceedings on Report stage that it was proposed, by the operation of some kind of means test as yet undetermined, to take away from some people the valuable rights of property and deny them any kind of compensation. That seems to me to be a new principle, even for this Government, which we must mark and oppose.

We have come to the final stages of what is a great and in many ways a remarkable Bill, in the sense that it is technical, is fairly long, and deals with a subject which has never been tackled during my political experience, not even by the right hon. and gallant Member for the Scottish Universities (Lieut.-Colonel Elliot). An added responsibility was, therefore, thrown upon those in charge of government, and especially in government for the first time, in taking on a Measure of this kind. Much has been said for and against the Bill, but there is common ground in regard to the fact that, during the long Committee proceedings, we tried with fairness and courtesy, to examine the views of the Opposition. The right hon. and learned Member for Hillhead (Mr. J. S. C. Reid) has done himself less than justice. I have learned to respect him, although it has often been the case that he and I were on opposite sides of the argument. He has said that Amendments which we put down on Report not only made concessions to the Opposition point of view, but covered also points with which they disagreed. I can only think of two which might be referred to. The one was in regard to dead ripe land. We do not take the view that is taken by the right hon. and learned Gentleman. The second might be the comparatively minor matter that aroused his ire, relating to what we may call the labouring classes.

I can tell the hon. Gentleman at least two more. There was the concurrent acquisition of land along with the proceedings where an order was going to be made to apply to the land, and the re-framing of the Clauses from the 1945 Act greatly stiffened the position against present tenants and occupiers.

We took the opposite view, because there were concessions, I have not looked at that in the same light. If it had not been raised in Committee, we might not have altered it. I will now turn to some of the issues which have been raised. I want to single out the hon. Member for West Perth (Mr. Snadden) for answer. Hon. Gentlemen must not think that is discourtesy. I do so because I want to say a word or two on the issue he raised—agriculture and agricultural land. He raised the question of consultation with the agricultural executives. On Report stage the Secretary of State gave an undoubted assurance—and I repeat it now—that when the regulations were made steps would be taken to see that the agricultural executives were consulted. That statement stands. With regard to cottages which may be erected and may be part and parcel of the agricultural community, as long as those cottages remain agricultural cottages, we shall exempt them from the development charge. A cottage may be put up as an agricultural cottage, but it may not necessarily always remain one. When I sat on the Rent Control Committee, we found that one of the curses was the large number of agricultural cottages which were becoming week-end cottages for townspeople. We do not propose to exempt them.

J beg to move, in page 1, line 12, after "Act," to insert:

"or might have been the subject of a declaratory judgment under the Rules of the Supreme Court."

"Right to sue the Crown."

This Amendment, if I may say so with respect to my hon. and learned Friend, is misconceived. It is necessary to replace by other procedure, proceedings by way of petition of right and proceedings under the statutory provisions which are repealed by this Bill, and that is precisely what this Clause does. There is nothing in this Clause which affects any other proceedings against the Crown which might otherwise be taken, and there is certainly nothing in the Bill which prevents a person from proceeding by action for a declaration against the Attorney-General under the rules of court. The Amendment is inappropriate and unnecessary, and would not achieve the purpose which my hon. and learned Friend has in mind.

I beg to move, in page 1, line 21, after "law," to insert "or under any statute."

I am afraid I am not in a position to accept this Amendment. If Subsection (1) (b) were to include this reference to any Statute, it would, of course, have the effect of imposing on the Crown an obligation to comply with Statutes, which, when they were passed by Parliament, were intentionally made not binding on the Crown. It is not the intention of this Bill to alter the existing substantive law in regard to matters of that kind. In regard to the question of which Statutes should bind the Crown and which should not, it is a matter for Parliament to deal with in the case of each particular Statute it passes. Parliament has sometimes thought it proper that the Crown should be bound by the statutory duties being created; in other cases it has thought not. It is for Parliament to say, in relation to each Statute, whether it is to bind the Crown or not, and it would create the greatest possible confusion to endeavour now to bind the Crown by every Statute without first examining whether it was really appropriate that the Crown should be bound by it or not. We cannot seek to do that by an Amendment to this Bill.

Will the Attorney-General tell us whether the Crown is bound, by the statutory duty as to fencing, etc., contained in the Factories Act?

Yes.

Owing to the large extension of the activities of the Crown as an employer of labour, it might be well that this matter should be cleared up as soon as the Government are able to do so. If the Attorney-General does not want to accept this Amendment, which deals with a small but I believe not easily defined omission of the Crown's liability, we must accept that. I should have thought that the Crown could have gone so far as to say, "Now we are coming into line with good employers and will undertake their obligations without further boggling about it." I cannot press the matter. If the Crown are not prepared to assume all the obligations of a good employer, I must just leave if there. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 6, line 39, after "employed," to insert:

"unless such servant or agent shall have been guilty of wilful neglect or default and loss or damage has been occasioned thereby."

I think I ought to say that the argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman on this Amendment might cover the later Amendments which stand in his name.

I was about to suggest, for the convenience of the Com- mittee, that it might be well to take all the Amendments in my name to Clause 9 at the same time. After the first Amendment, the rest are consequential. This Amendment seeks to make the Crown liable in cases of wilful neglect or default by a servant or agent in relation to the loss or damage of a postal packet or in connection with telephone communications or telegrams. I think I am correct in saying that the law at present is that whereas the Postmaster-General himself is not liable for any wrongful act, if any loss or damage befalls a postal packet, or takes place in connection with a telephonic communication or telegram, his subordinates in the post office are liable for any wrongful act by them in relation to those items or matters. If that is correct, then Clause 9 of this Bill deprives the subject of rights which exist in his favour at this moment. I suggest to the Committee that it is depriving the subject of very important rights and that the consequences of the deprivation may reflect serious loss or damage. The Crown ought therefore to consider the question of amending the Clause in the way that I suggest.

The purpose of this Amendment appears to be to make the Crown and the servants of the Crown liable for loss of or damage to postal packets, including telegrams, or for consequential damage resulting from the miscarriage of some telephonic communication in the case where a postal servant has been guilty of "wilful negligence or default." May I say a word first about that expression?

I do not think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has made out a case in defence of the Clause as it stands at present. I think he overlooked the fact that the Government are here removing a right from the public, and in order to do that, they have got to bring forward a very strong case indeed, and they have not done so. This right, which they are removing, is, as the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) has said, the personal right of any member of the public, who uses the postal service in the ordinary way for unregistered letters, to proceed against any individual servant or agent of the Post Office who may be found guilty on the evidence adduced of neligence or default; in other words, as we commonly express it, negligence. That right has been removed, and the only reason one can see for that—the reason given by the right hon. and learned Gentleman—was that, in his view, a postal servant employed by the Government at a salary of £6 a week is a man of straw against who it is not worth while a member of the public having the right to take proceedings. That, quite obviously, with all respect to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, is not for him to decide, or for us. If the right exists, there is no reason why it should not be available, and I do not think it is a proper constitutional line of thought to seek to do away with a right of the public simply and entirely on those grounds.

Put the plug into the wrong hole, and there is an action for slander.

What the right hon. and learned Gentleman is seeking to do is to protect the employee, not the member of the public who may have cause for complaint. I hope we may have a little more enlightenment on that minor point, and that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will more seriously consider the major point which I think is one of substance, and one which the Committee should not pass without very careful consideration.

I agree with a great deal of what the right hon. and learned Attorney-General said with regard to this actual Amendment, and, indeed, with regard to what was said in favour of its acceptance. I think that, as at present drafted, the Clause goes too far in the way of protecting Post Office servants. Let me give an absolutely extreme example, which I think illustrates the point. If I hand my letter over to the postmaster of a village and I see him tear it up before my nose, I can, I suppose, under the existing law, bring an action against him for something. If he happens to be my rival and knows that the letter contains a proposal of marriage, I dare say I might find it worth while to seek an injunction to prevent him from doing it again.

I agree with what has been said in support of this Amendment, and I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General will look at this matter again. A few days ago, some Post Office workers in my constituency were erecting a pole on which telephone lines were to be distributed to various houses. The pole was being erected at the end of a garden of one of my constituents, and in order to give himself leverage, one of the men put his leg against the garden gate, and the gate gave way. Under the Clause as it now stands, my constituent will have no right of action against either the servant or the Postmaster-General.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin (Mr. Asterley Jones) has not, I am afraid, appreciated the significance, if not the subtlety, of the drafting Amendment which I introduced at an earlier stage of this Bill. The effect of it is that claims for negligence are excluded only in regard to matters actually relating to the particular telephonic communication. In the case where a linesman has climbed to the top of a telephone pole and has dropped a pair of pliers or a hammer on one of my hon. Friend's constituents, the constituent would have a right of action. What we are excluding is a right of action where there has been negligence in connection with the actual transmission of the telephonic communication, where, for instance, the plug is taken out in the course of an important conversation with the result that the caller at one end, having asked a question—I will not suggest what—is unable to hear the answer given to him by the subscriber at the other end, or where, perhaps, the hon. Member having sent a telegram to his bookmaker, in order to put a half-crown on some horse for the 2.15 finds that his telegram has been delayed, and has reached the bookmaker only at 2.30, with the result that the half-crown has not been put on the horse which, has come in at 100 to I. That is the kind of case where we exclude liability in connection with a telephonic communication by the words here used, and that is the effect of the introduction of the word "a."

I think that the substance of this Amendment opens up a terrifically wide field for fraud. I think I can say that I might have clients who would willingly swear that they had sent £500 in an unregistered letter, and who would bribe the postman to say that he had lost the packet. What a racket that would open up. On the other hand, I think that there is a point of substance in what was said by the hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Hogg). If a postmaster tears up a letter before the hon. Member's eyes, the hon. Member is surely entitled to have some right of action against him.

An action of that kind would be quite outside the scope of this Clause which relates only to things that are done in the course of actual employment and in relation to the postal packet: it would be outside the course of the employment. That point was considered by persons in another place whose opinion on the law is far more authoritative than mine.

I do not think that ray right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General has met the point at all. As I understand it, he rests his case on two things. The first is that the Crown cannot undertake this liability, and the second is that it must place its servants in at least as good a position as the servants of any other undertaking. In my humble submission, there is no substance whatever in either of those two points. First, as the law now stands, the Crown is liable, and has always accepted liability for the negligent acts of its servants. No case has been made out, and no illustration has been given of anything which has occurred in the meantime to show why that liability ought not to be continued. As the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr. Joynson-Hicks) said, where a Bill seeks to remove a right which already exists in the subject, then the Government must make out a very strong case indeed before it is allowed to take that right away. I feel that no case whatever has been made out on this by the learned Attorney-General. My hon. Friend the Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale) said that the Amendment as framed would open the door to fraud. If that is so, it is an extraordinary thing that it has not done so in the past. It is not suggested that the law as it stands today has been the means of creating fraudulent claims. That argument is completely unjustified.

If my hon. and learned Friend will allow me, I would point out that Bevan on Negligence says that the addition of the word "wilful"

"does not carry the case any further."

That may be so, but what Bevan says there about negligence does not interest me at the moment. The Attorney-General may have taken a textbook like that and taken something out of it on the question of negligence. I have studied the authorities and the cases on this matter, and I say advisedly that the word "wilful" is in an entirely different classification from, say, the word "gross," and it does import, and add, meaning and colour to the word "neglect," For all those reasons, I ask the Attorney-General to look at this point again between now and the Report stage to see whether an improvement in that respect can be made to this Clause.

I will certainly do that.

If the Attorney-General says he will do that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 6, line 45, to leave out from "telegram," to the end of line 4, page 7.

Surely, the case is covered by the maxim "res ipsa loquitur "?

Will my hon. and learned Friend, and also the hon. Gentleman the Member for Chichester (Mr. Joynson-Hicks), allow me to say that there is really nothing between my hon. and learned Friend and me on the one hand and the hon. Gentleman the Member for Chichester on the other on this point.

I did not think that the hon. Member for Chichester had finished his speech, and I thought he had only given way to the hon. and learned Member for Crewe (Mr. Scholefield Allen). I have not yet put the Question.

I will conclude quickly, and leave the Attorney-General to make his observations. I think I have made my point clear. Surely, there is an insurance value in this particular transaction ?

The practical difficulties which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Chichester (Mr. Joynson-Hicks) very properly has in mind are, in fact, covered and overcome by a subsequent provision in the Bill—in the last paragraph of Subsection (2) of the Clause which is now before the Committee. There it is provided that there shall foe a presumption that the loss or damage was due to neglect by a servant of the Crown unless the contrary is proved by the Crown, and the result is that the reasons for the Amendment, namely, that it would be very difficult for a person to prove negligence in the circumstances of the carriage of a registered packet, are overcome by the subsequent provision. We put in this in order to deal with the precise difficulty which the hon. Member has in mind, and I think we successfully deal with it. I hope in those circumstances the hon. Member may see fit to withdraw his Amendment.

I had already appreciated the words to which the right hon. and learned Gentleman has drawn attention, and had intended to say something about them, but if he has nothing further to say, it is still quite evident what is the meaning of the words. I think the Bill would be better drafted if he had not put in a requirement and then taken it out; and I think it would be better if he accepted my Amendment.

We cannot accept the liability of an insurer in these matters, but we do accept this presumption which, I hope, will cover every reasonable and ordinary case.

I am not sure if the hon. Member for Chichester asked leave to withdraw the Amendment or not.

I thought I had done so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 7, line 9, to leave out paragraph (b.)

The purpose of this provision is to prevent claims against the Post Office in respect of consequential damages, and we are adopting in this matter—as, indeed, we have been invited to do by both sides of the Committee—exactly the same position as is commonly adopted by ordinary commercial concerns -which undertake the carriage of goods. Let me take a particular example. A person may send a registered letter containing information, and may claim that, by reason of the loss of the letter or delay in transmission of the letter, he has suffered the loss of a market on which, if he had had the information in time, he would have been able to secure some advantage because of a rise of the market price; or something of that kind. Such damages would be exceedingly difficult—indeed, impossible—for the Post Office to check, and exceedingly difficult for any court to assess, and the Post Office are not able to undertake a liability of that kind.

I quite appreciate what the learned Attorney-General has said about the difficulties of assessing the value of information, and so far as that part of the paragraph is concerned, I must confess I am with him rather than with my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr. Joynson-Hicks); but I do not think the Attorney-General has met the real point of substance in my hon. Friend's Amendment, namely, that the phrase "market value" may, in certain circumstances, give rise to very considerable difficulties. Let me put one example to the learned Attorney-General. It is the practice, as I understand it, in ordering clothing by post, to send clothing coupons in an envelope. Now, the right hon. and learned Gentleman may be aware that there is a market value for clothing coupons, but that is not a legal market value. They may well have a market value—

The hon. Member is probably aware of the fact that a recent judgment has shown that there is a market value.

I shall not enter into an argument with the hon. Member on the subject of "black market" transactions, because I cannot match his knowledge on the subject. [Interruption.]The hon. Member for West Leicester (Mr. Janner) knows perfectly well that I am not casting any imputation upon him. He saw fit to interrupt me with a legally in accurate observation, and I replied flippantly, as he very well appreciates.

It was not an inaccurate observation. It is a matter of fact that a judge has so held.

I am afraid I cannot accept that from the hon. Member, because it so happens that my hon. Friend was present in court during the hearing of the case to which I have referred, and I am assured by him that the judge said no such thing. In any event, if the hon. Member for West Leicester were right—which he is not—it has remarkably little to do with the point, which is that the learned Attorney-General must recognise that the assessment of market value can, in the case of certain articles—-particularly of articles sent by post—give rise to considerable practical difficulties. "Therefore, I submit to the Committee that it would be very much easier and more satisfactory to leave the assessment of damages in this matter to the good sense of the courts, which are engaged every day in assessing damages, bearing in mind that the Crown is protected, as my hon. Friend has said, by the following paragraph. I hope the learned Attorney-General will give some attention to this point, because I feel that the Clause as it stands gives rise to wholly unnecessary difficulties.

I do not want to enter into a controversy with the hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter), but I would have him know that the case to which I was referring was not the case to which his hon. Friend was referring. The fact of the matter is that, in the particular instance of which he spoke, a market value for coupons was given. I, too, can conceive of matters in which it would be literally impossible to decide what is the market value of any commodity. In particular, I should like to refer my right hon. and1 learned Friend to the position with regard to deeds and documents which may be lost. In a matter of that kind it is extremely difficult to assess the market value. It might become necessary to make searches, in order to be able to replace those documents. I think that ought to be left to the court; or at least we ought to have an assurance from the learned Attorney-General that, although proceedings cannot be taken under this particular Bill when it becomes an Act, his Department will make it clear that that will not exclude the right or possibility, which exists at present, of the postmaster making good any such loss.

I agree with my hon. Friend' the Member for West Leicester (Mr. Janner). I think the case of the deed is a very clear case in point, because the market value of a deed is the secondhand cost as a piece of parchment, and the cost of replacement is more. I want to make a point with regard to registered postal packets, which the learned Attorney-General contemplates as ordinary commercial usage, because there is the question of insurance. If a fee for insurance is paid, and if the price is to be increased, people are entitled to the full measure of the insurance as against the loss they have sustained. There maybe a firm which has spare parts specially made for a machine which has broken down. It may be some small piece of machinery of only slight value, which is specially made and is sent out to the factory in order to get that machine going again. If it is merely said: "We will repay you the 3½d. which had to be paid for that special screw of which you had not a spare" that will be wholly inadequate, because the machine will' have remained idle. There should be-some means of dealing with consequential loss. With regard to the words "market value," there does seem to be a fundamental objection. We wish to avoid vexatious -actions, but we certainly wish to ensure that there is fair value. Certainly the words "market value" appear to be wholly inappropriate, in view of the variety of articles involved.

I understand from the speeches of the hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) and my hon. Friends the Members for West Leicester (Mr. Janner) and Oldham (Mr. Hale) that they are in favour of acceptance of liability in respect of consequential loss. All the instances they have given are those of consequential damage and not direct damage. Thus, the loss of deeds may result in other deeds having to be drawn up, searches having to be undertaken, and matters of that kind. Those are consequential losses and consequential damages. I should have thought, with respect, that that was clearly a case of consequential loss. The other instances that were given were all cases of consequential loss. Indeed, the hon. Member for Oldham said that this is a form of insurance, and it ought to cover consequential loss. He said so in terms. It may well be that the paying of a registration fee does give rise to a certain form of insurance, but the risk covered is the risk of loss of the articles carried, and not of consequential loss. When one pays a premium one ascertains before paying it what risk is being covered. That is the risk which the particular insurance company in these matters if one so regards the Post Office is prepared to undertake for the payment of 3½d., or whatever it may be; to repay the actual value of the article which has been lost, but not to cover any consequential damage. That, contrary to the suggestion of the hon. Member for Oldham, is what the railway company does and what the common carrier does. I think there are standard terms, and in every case they say—

The learned Attorney-General is referring to the common carrier which is analogous to the ordinary rate, the ordinary 2½d. form of postage.

The hon. Member is mistaken. I am taking the case of the railway company carrying at the company's risk. They do not insure against consequential loss; they exclude it in terms.

They have a higher fee.

I suppose anyone might cover any risk for a fee which was high enough. That may well be so. We are not prepared to enter into transactions of that kind. We accept a limited class of insurance for a premium. The only risk we are going to insure against is the actual value of the loss sustained. I quite agree that some articles which are carried in registered packets may be such as have no market value. If that is the case, there would be no difficulty in dealing with the matter, because the effect of the maximum exclusion would not then apply, and the courts would have to ascertain what was the real value of the article, disregarding consequential damages.

I do not regard this as the most important part of the Bill; nor this defect the Bill's principal defect. I do not think the Attorney-General has treated the argument fairly. It is rather a pity that the real point involved should be obscured by an ambiguous use of the wordm "consequential." If he insist upon it, let it be conceded that the kind of damage which, it is claimed ought to be covered, could be fairly described as "consequential." No one is saying that all the consequential damages which flow from the loss of a registered packet should be insured by a registered stamp. What has been said is that a limited form of consequential damage ought to be covered—perhaps the replacement value in the particular circumstances and of the particular article. No one is claiming the loss of a contract, or failure to deliver in time, as being consequential damages of this kind. It is quite a different thing from immediate consequential damage. I do not see why there should be any difficulty if we said that the article will be replaced, or a fair value will be given. That would satisfy everyone, and it would not involve the Post Office in any great liability.

I do not wish to detain the Committee any longer on this matter, because we have had a fairly thorough Debate upon it. The Attorney-General was continually referring to the actual value of the article, but I would point out that in the case of many articles the actual value is not even the market value, and we therefore immediately begin to get into a point of difference on the Attorney-General's own words. I think I must have as great a mind as the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hale), because as he produced his words "replacement value," I was writing them down. It seems that we both had the same thought at the same time. I think that if any value should be inserted, it should be the replacement value.

I beg to move, in page 8, line 41, to leave out "and," and to insert:

"if—

(a) at the time when that thing is suffered by that other person, he."

I want to controvert the last statement of the Attorney-General that the pensions rights will be as valuable as those which are likely to be given by a civil court. This is a matter of real difficulty. It is obvious that men in the Armed Forces can and do sustain injuries from tortious acts, which are part of the warlike actions they carry on. One cannot hope to distinguish, for instance, between the accidental firing of a rifle causing injury, and injury caused by a rifle bullet in war. There is a large class of motor accidents which give rise to very real difficulties. It is not necessary to say that the rights of a widow who has lost her husband by tortious act, under the Disabled Persons Pensions Act, are nothing like the rights she has under common law if she pursued an action for damages.

I beg to move, in page 9, line 10, to leave out Subsection (3).

I would like to say a word or two in support of the Amendment. It was a great mistake to put Clause 10 into the Bill, and I hope to take an opportunity of saying so shortly. It seems to me wholly unreasonable to put this Subsection into Clause 10, even if we want the Clause. The principle has been quite lucidly stated, but I would like to put it in my own way. It used not to be the law in this country that there could be any contribution between wrong-doers of any kind, and that if two people together committed a wrongful act, both of them or either of them were responsible to the person injured at the option of the person injured.

I do not wish to add anything on the merits, because I agree entirely with what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford (Mr. Hogg). I want only to raise two points of procedure. The Lord Advocate will be aware that if this Subsection stands, it will be necessary to re-introduce into Scottish procedure a method which was tried and rejected as being unsatisfactory, and why should this be? The other point of procedure is this: it is a complete novelty that there shall be power to bring in and make a party in a case in court somebody who admittedly has no interest in that case at all. This Subsection contemplates that the Attorney-General or the Lord Advocate shall be made a party if the Crown is sued, or that the soldier himself shall be made a party, when admittedly it does not matter to him who wins or what happens. The defendant may join the other person who has no interest whatever in the litigation. That is a complete novelty in the law of Scotland, and the fact that it is necessary to bring in that anomaly shows how ill-founded is the conception on which the whole Subsection is based.

The hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Hogg) was good enough to write to me about his proposed Amendment, and although I am compelled to tell him that' we shall be unable to accept it, I would like him to know that it has been given by my noble Friend and myself the most careful thought and consideration. It was said by the hon. Members who have spoken that this Clause introduces some principle which is alien to our general law, but I must point out that it was supported by everyone, including a number of very eminent lawyers, who spoke to the Clause in another place. It was moved into the Bill by Lord Simonds and it was apparently regarded by those who spoke to the Clause there as being an act of elementary justice which would remove what would otherwise have been an unintended consequence from the general provisions of Clause 10 which would have formed a blemish on the Bill.

He has now.

He has a right of contribution, but that does not affect the Crown. I am dealing with the position of the defendant, if my hon. Friend will listen. I am coming to the position of the plaintiff, but one has to deal with separate matters separately. So far as the defendant is concerned, it was thought unfair to leave him in the position of having to pay the whole of the damages without the right which he has now of contribution against the Crown or against the Crown servants. So far as the position of the plaintiff is concerned, he is a person who must always be, for this exclusion to apply at all, in the service of the Crown, on duty as a servant of the Crown at the time the accident occurred. He will, therefore, get his pension rights from the Crown in respect of the accident, and those rights, in addition to the damages which he may recover from the private wrongdoer, will prevent any real hardship arising. I am sorry, therefore, that we are not able to accept the Amendment.

I am very much surprised at the answer given by the Attorney-General. I thought this was an enabling and extending Bill to extend the rights of private individuals, but into this Clause a limitation is introduced. As the Attorney-General has said, there are two persons concerned, the plaintiff in the action and the defendant in the action. Under the law as it now stands, a defendant who has been unsuccessful in his defence has the right of contribution against the joint tort feasor. Until recently he had to be prepared to pay the full damages. As the hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Hogg) and the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) said, each of the tort feasors is responsible for the full amount, and only recently has the question of giving them the right of contribution among themselves been brought in.

Although time is pressing, I cannot let this Clause go without joining in the general protest from all sides of the Committee. I am not impressed because a number of learned law lords in another place think they are doing something which is fair. I think that if the King's Bench judges, with practical experience of working out this rule in courts of first instance, had been considering this matter, they would not have agreed with the rara avisin another place. Every judge of first instance values the Law Reform (Contribution Between Joint Tort Feasors) Act but also values the fact that the plaintiff himself is entitled to take his full damages from any of the tort feasors. A plaintiff is now so entitled to get full damages from either party, leaving the defendants to fight it out. This Clause might be all right if the percentages were always fifty-fifty. But in one case the judge may say that one of the defendants is only 5 per cent. liable, or even 1 per cent. liable. There may be a number of cases where the defendant is held to blame to the extent of 10 per cent. If this Clause becomes law the citizen with a right will be indulging in catch-as-catch-can. He may get his pension plus 10 per cent, or his pension plus 90 per cent, damages. That disposes of the argument of the Attorney-General. I say that this is cutting down the right of the plaintiff in a manner with which this Committee ought not to agree.

I understand that time presses. If I were to follow my convictions in this matter, I should press it to a Division, but I do not wish even the time of a Division to interfere with the progress of this excellent Bill. If my hon. Friends agree, I will not press the Amendment to a Division, but I ask the Attorney-General to take to his noble Friend the universal howl of execration with which this Subsection has been greeted in this Committee, and that it even be whispered to the other noble Lords that it has not met with approval in this place, and that perhaps it might be dropped at the next stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I said on Second Reading what I had to say about this Clause. In my view, which I am glad to think is shared in many parts of the Committee, it is a great pity that this Clause was ever brought into this Bill at all. There was not the slightest need for it; it does only injustice, and produces all sorts of complications that are totally unnecessary. It can work in no one's advantage, and I hope that before we part with the Bill altogether, there may still be time for second thoughts and the withdrawal of this Clause altogether.

I agree. Would the Attorney-General consider, with his noble Friend, whether it would not be better to take out Clause 10 altogether, and do whatever is necessary with regard to the matters therein mentioned by introducing them in a separate Bill?

I would like to support that suggestion.

I would also like to support it.

I do not rise to join in the chorus but to express the hope that if this Clause is to be reconsidered, as I hope it will be, attention will be given to Subsection (4), which provides that a certificate by the Admiralty or a Secretary of State about a person being on duty may be produced. A certain amount was said about that on Second Reading, but I am still not satisfied that a conclusive certificate is necessary. It should be possible for a person who disputes what is said by the Department to be allowed to say so, and if the whole of the Clause is being put into the melting pot again, perhaps a little of the heat might be applied to Subsection (4).

May I briefly support the plea for the withdrawal or reconstruction of this Clause? If, in fact, it is withdrawn, I think it will be found in practice that the liability of which the Government are trying to rid themselves is so small as not to justify the inclusion of this particular Clause as it stands.

I beg to move, in page 9, line 48, to leave out from "for," to "issue," in page 10, line 1, and to insert "defence of the realm."

It is by no means the case that the prerogative powers of the Crown are restricted to matters concerning the defence of the realm. If that were the case, there would be great substance in the submissions made by the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but whilst the prerogative is undefined, there are a great many other matters not connected with military Forces at all which come within the scope. Questions about aliens, harbours, patents, and the right of the Crown to suppress disorder and maintain peace are matters of prerogative. It is true, however, that the prerogative power also covers, in time of peace, the whole of the maintenance, the training and efficiency of the Armed Forces of the Crown. It is commonly supposed, I know, that as a result of the passing of the annual Army Act the Armed Forces rest for their existence upon that statutory authority and are maintained by the Crown exclusively under that Statute. That is not the case. The discipline of the Forces depends upon the Act, but the efficiency of the administration of the Army which the Crown is authorised by Parliament to maintain depends entirely upon the prerogative powers. That also applies to the Navy.

I certainly cannot agree with the argument of the Attorney-General, particularly in regard to the last part where he says that it is for the courts to define the nature and extent of the prerogative and that that will remain with them if this Clause is passed. I cannot believe that, because the certificate here will be to the effect that the matter was properly done or omitted to be done in the exercise of the prerogative and it will, therefore, take that matter out of the hands of the courts altogether. I regret very much that this Subsection should be insisted upon. I feel sure that it does alter the powers of the court but, as has been pointed out by other hon. Members, this is not an occasion when we wish to divide the Committee. I feel that this goes very much further than the Attorney-General has admitted, and I hope that he will look into the matter again. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 10, line 10, to leave out "forty-seven," and to insert "forty-six."

The purpose of the Amendment is to ante-date the operation of Part I of the Bill to February, 1946. I am afraid we cannot accept that proposal. I have no doubt that the hon. and learned Gentleman has based his Amendment upon the fact that a decision in the case of Adams v.Naylor was given, not in February, but in the early part of 1946, and that, therefore, as from that date, certain proceedings against Crown servants should no longer be taken. For that reason, the hon. and learned Gentleman would wish us to ante-date the provisions of this Bill to the time when that became the case.

I quite agree with the answer given by the learned Attorney-General, but I would put one question to him. Did all those people who had the right to make claims know of the possibility of the arbitration machinery

In any case where a claim was submitted they certainly knew of that matter, and, if a claim was put forward, the individual concerned would be acquainted with it. The arbitration procedure is well in hand and is being used, and much publicity was given to it at the time. I was asked a Question about it in this House, and the matter was also mentioned in another place.

I think that all the people concerned were well aware of that provision.

In those circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I beg to move, in page 13, line 12, at the end, to insert:

"unless the court or judge at the instance of any party orders otherwise."

The reason for this provision, which was recommended by the 1921 Committee, is that in some—I dare say very few—important cases, cases of constitutional difficulty, or cases which are important for some other reason, it is necessary to have Treasury Counsel and a Law officer appearing for the Crown. That would be really quite impossible in existing circumstances unless the Crown were able to fix the trial in London. Of course, under the provisions of the Bill as it now stands, if the Crown does elect to have the case tried in London, it will have to bear the additional cost occasioned by trial in London rather than by trial at Assizes. As a matter of fact, of course, a very large proportion of cases are already dealt with at Assizes, and will continue to be so dealt with. Ordinary common law actions, running down actions, and actions of that kind, where no question of constitutional interest arises, always go to Assizes. If the court, in the exercise of its discretion, considers it convenient for the parties that the trial should take place there that practice will be continued. Even the case of Adams and Naylor, which gave rise to issues of considerable constitutional importance, originated in the Liverpool Assizes. We have considered the matter, and we shall not operate the Clause harshly. But, in cases where Law Officers have to be engaged, or in cases which raise matters of constitutional interest and where Treasury Counsel have to be employed, we must have the right to have the trial in London, if need be.

I beg to move, in page 14, line 46, to leave out "proceedings in the High Court," and to insert, "an action."

I beg to move, in page 15, fine 38, at the end, to add:

(4) Subject to the provisions of any Order in Council made under the provisions hereinafter contained, this part of this Act shall not affect proceedings initiated in any court other than the High Court or a county court.

I beg to move, in page 16, line 34, at the end, to insert:

"(3) If the order provides for the payment of any money by way of damages or otherwise, or of any costs, the Certificate shall state the amount so payable, and the appropriate Government department shall, subject as hereinafter provided, pay to the person entitled or to his solicitor the amount appearing by the certificate to be due to him together with the interest, if any, lawfully due thereon;

Provided that the court by which any such order as aforesaid is made or any court to which an appeal against the order lies may direct that, pending an appeal or otherwise, payment of the whole of any amount so payable, or any part thereof, shall be suspended, and if the certificate has not been issued may order any such directions to be inserted therein.

(4) Save as aforesaid no execution 01 attachment or process in the nature thereof shall be issued out of any court for enforcing payment by the Crown of any such money or costs as aforesaid, and no person shall be individually liable under any order for the payment by the Crown, or any Government department or any officer of the Crown as such, of any such money or costs."

I should like to raise a matter which was briefly referred to by the Attorney-General in moving the Second Reading, and that is the proviso to Subsection (2). As the Committee will appreciate, that is the proviso which keeps alive the provisions for committal in two specific cases of debts owed to the Crown—debts incurred in the case of Purchase Tax and in the case of Death Duties. On the Second Reading, the learned Attorney-General told the House that that power was preserved because in those cases, and apparently in only those cases, the money had come into the hands of the person concerned as a kind of trustee, and that, therefore, it was necessary to preserve it in this case. But I think we are entitled to hear a little more of the reason why, in the case of two specific taxes, this very considerable power is preserved. A variety of taxes are imposed by a variety of methods in this country today, and it seems a little oppressive that in the case of these two particular taxes, this very considerable power should be preserved. I do not think the Committee should part with the Clause without hearing some justification for it.

I rise in support of my hon. Friend the Member for Kings-ton-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) in order to give the learned Attorney-General an opportunity of perusing the paper which he has just recived and which, I trust, deals with this Clause.

No, it does not.

The point that has been raised is one on which the Committee is entitled to have, and indeed would welcome, some further explanation from the Attorney-General. This power of the Crown to imprison people for debt is an anachronism. It has long since been given up in the ordinary way, in regard to private debts, and we have heard a good deal from the Attorney-General as to the desirability of the Crown being a good employer and on a par with private concerns, in other connections. Why should the Crown not also be on a par with the private individual in regard to the recovery of sums of money? The Committee should demand some further enlightenment on these two rather unusual and minor exceptions to the ordinary run of law, and as to why this power of imprisonment should be retained.

I think there is a little confusion about this matter. The special Crown remedy, the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum will not survive. It will not be used even in regard to these two cases. What is being done by this provision is to add two cases, those of Purchase Tax and Death Duties, to the six special cases which are already provided for in the Debtors Act. I do not think any hon. Member will wish me to enumerate the six existing cases, but I would mentioned two because I think they are, in a sense, analogous—default by a trustee in paying over money in his possession, and default by a solicitor in paying costs under an order to make payment. There are analogous cases to those under Section 4 of the Debtors Act, where the trustee of money has failed to pay over. That is, in a sense, also the position of a man who is under a liability to pay Death Duties or to pay Purchase Tax. He has presumably had the money out of which he ought to have paid the Purchase Tax or out of which he ought to have paid the Death Duties, and experience with these two classes of case has shown that it is very useful to have in reserve this remedy, a remedy which is never utilised unless there is a real reason for thinking, as I indicated on Second Reading, that the person has the money salted away and could pay if he would. This is a method to encourage him to desire to pay.

I am a little disappointed not to see any Amendment by the right hon. and learned Attorney-General on Clause 28, having regard to the discussion we had on Second Reading. I do think some regard ought to have been taken of the strongly grounded objections that were made to Clause 28. I think something ought to be done about narrowing down the exemption from about narrowing down the exemption on the wide ground of public interest, to the ground of public safety and defence. Whether the privilege claimed in Subsection (2) is a good one or a bad one I do not propose to debate now. As no Amendments have been put down I reserve the right to put some down on Report stage. I hope the matter may be considered in the meantime.

I beg to move, in page 20, line 36, to leave out paragraphs (c) and (d.)

To a great extent the purposes of default and summary judgment procedure are to obtain quick judgment in case the defendant disposes of his assets or clears out of the country. That, of course, cannot apply to the Crown, and, in all the circumstances, we feel unable to accept this Amendment. I do not think it is appreciated what an enormous amount of work is involved in Government Departments at the present time, or will be involved when the whole field of tort is thrown open to the private litigant. I will be quite frank with the Committee. In regard to this matter the Crown simply cannot face at the moment having judgment signed against it in default of appearance without the leave of the court; that is to say, without notice of an application to that effect having first been given to it. I ask my hon. Friend to agree that it would be unreasonable to subject the Crown to the risk of snap judgments of this kind, and that there really is no hardship on the subject in imposing this provision.

I beg to move, in page 21, line 44, to leave out:

"Save as aforesaid expressly provided."

"and have not been determined by judgment or otherwise"

"for the purposes of this section."

I am afraid we are unable to accept this series of Amendments. If my hon. and learned Friend looks at this again he will see that they would not achieve the purpose which he appears to have in mind, and would, indeed, make the application of the Bill a matter of extreme difficulty.

I beg to move, in page 26, line 31, at the end to insert:

"(3) If the order decerns for the payment of any money by way of damages or otherwise or of any expenses, the appropriate Government department shall, subject as hereinafter provided, pay to the person entitled or to his solicitor the amount appearing from the order to be due to him together with the interest, if any, lawfully due thereon:

Provided that the court by which any such order as aforesaid is made or any court to which an appeal against the order lies may direct that pending an appeal or otherwise payment of the whole of any amount so payable, or any part thereof, shall by suspended.

(4) No such order as aforesaid shall warrant any diligence or execution against any person to enforce payment of any such money or expenses as aforesaid, and no person shall be individually liable under any order for the payment by the Crown, or any Government department or any officer of the Crown as such, of any such money or expenses."

Perhaps the learned Lord Advocate would tell those hon. Members of the Committee who, like myself, do not know, what the fourth word of Subsection (3) means?

The word "decerns" means "decrees."

We ask the Committee to leave out Clause 50 of the Bill in order to substitute a new Clause, which will enable us to apply the Bill as a whole to Northern Ireland, with such necessary Amendments as are required by the different system of law and administration in that country.

I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

I should like to express the gratitude of many of us who are interested in these courts for this provision.

I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

Can we be told why, in connection with the laying of the Order, the period is for 28 days instead of the more modern form?

It was thought that this was a sufficient period in the circumstances of this particular class of Order.

I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time."

I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Clause, to leave out lines 21 and 22.

I am prepared to accept the Amendment.

I am much obliged.

I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time."