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Orders Of The Day

Volume 486: debated on Tuesday 3 April 1951

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Supplies And Services (Defence Purposes) Money

Resolution reported:

That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to extend, for defence purposes and purposes relating to world peace and security, the Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Act, 1945, and Defence Regulations and other instruments having effect by virtue of that Act, and to make provision for the stopping up or diversion of highways for such purposes and for matters incidental thereto, it is expedient—
  • (a) to authorise the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of any expenses incurred by any Minister of the Crown or Government department in consequence of the passing of the said Act of the present Session, and any increase attributable to the passing of the said Act in any sums falling to be paid under any other enactment out of moneys provided by Parliament; and
  • (b) to authorise the payment into the Exchequer of any sums which, in consequence of the passing of the said Act, are recovered under section two of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, as applied by the Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers') Act, 1945.
  • Resolution agreed to.

    Supplies And Services (Defence Purposes) Bill

    Considered in Committee.

    [Major MILNER in the Chair]

    Clause 1—(Purposes Of Supplies And Services (Transitional Powers) Act, 1945, To Include Defence And Maintenance Of World Peace)

    3.38 p.m.

    I beg to move, in page 1, line 7, to leave out "and always to have included."

    This Clause of the Bill is indeed its most important one. Perhaps I may read out the part in which these words appear:
    "The purposes specified in subsection (1) of section one of the Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Act, 1945, shall be deemed to include, and always to have included, the purposes of—"
    This Bill extends the powers under the previous Supplies and Services Act to certain defence purposes. I heard it described in very much those words last night on the B.B.C. If the words which we propose to delete are left in the Bill they whitewash and legalise anything which may have been done by any Minister in the past under the previous Acts, even though it was not proper. We challenged the Minister on this subject on the Second Reading and said that if we were not given a satisfactory answer we should probe the matter to the full. The Minister was making very heavy weather with his reply, as the House will remember, when a life-line was thrown to him by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) who asked whether the words were not restrospective but declaratory. The Secretary of State for Air, who was replying, seized hold of that life-line with great eagerness and said that the hon. Gentleman had put it even better than he could have done himself.

    I suggest that this description was not entirely accurate. These words may to a certain extent be regarded as declaratory, but they are certainly retrospective as well. Probably the hon. Member who threw the life-line did not appreciate at the time that the words cover not only the 1947 Act but the 1945 Act as well, and certainly the purposes described in this Bill could not possibly be regarded as being covered by the 1945 Act. These words go right back to the beginning of the complicated legal history of the Supplies and Services Act.

    Therefore, I think we can take it that these words are retrospective as well as declaratory. Indeed, I am emboldened to argue further on that point, citing the Foreign Secretary himself, who, introducing the Bill on Second Reading, said:
    "We are satisfied that if existing powers can be used for those new purposes…."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st February, 1951; Vol. 484, c. 1316.]
    "Those new purposes." Therefore, I suggest that to say that these words are merely declaratory is not strictly accurate. They are certainly retrospective as well. We on this side of the Committee frankly do not like retrospective action, and especially do we not like retrospective action in a Bill which gives such sweeping powers to the Government, and we want the clearest proofs of the necessity of any Clause such as this before we can agree with it. Certainly, we had no such proofs on Second Reading from the Secretary of State for Air. Indeed, we had nothing of any value whatever, if I may say so.

    I ventured to quote on Second Reading the words used by the Foreign Secretary when he introduced the 1947 Bill. He referred to Ministers using these sweeping powers—or who might use these sweeping powers—improperly for purposes which had not been strictly defined in the previous Act. Let me repeat the relevant words to the House. I think they are of some interest. This is what the Foreign Secretary said:
    "We do not want Ministers to stretch the meaning of the law in the framing and administration of Defence Regulations. It would be unconstitutional, undesirable and thoroughly objectionable."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th August, 1947; Vol. 441, c. 1796.]
    It would be unconstitutional; it would be undesirable; and it would be thoroughly objectionable. If that is the case, then we challenge the Minister to tell us which of his colleagues has been responsible for acting in this remarkable way; or if, on the other hand, no Minister has acted in this thoroughly undesirable and objectionable manner, why then are the words necessary? The Secretary of State, in reply, announced over and over again that none of his colleagues had in any way acted unconstitutionally or improperly. I would quote some of his words:
    "I can assure the right hon. and learned Gentleman that we have no reason to believe that any Minister has done anything which requires an Act of indemnity…. There is nothing in the Bill which is in the nature of an indemnity"
    And so on. He went on to say:
    "All I can say is that there is nothing new in inserting in a Bill the words to which I have referred."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st February, 1951; Vol. 484, c. 1375–7.]
    He maintained, therefore, that no Minister had in any way exceeded the powers granted by any previous Act. We asked him, but got no reply, why on earth these words were inserted in the Bill if they were not necessary. I say we got no reply. An hon. Friend of mine has referred me, and I should like to refer the House, to a passage in that classic story called "Through the Looking Glass," because that is the only world in which one can find any examples which correspond to the action of the Government, and of the Secretary of State for Air, who replied for the Government, and gave the excuse for the introduction of these retrospective words. These were the words used by Alice in the story:
    "I was wondering what the mousetrap was for," said Alice. "It is not likely that there will be any mice on the horse's back." "Not very likely, perhaps," said the White Knight, "but if they do come I do not choose to have them running all about. You see, it is as well to be provided with everything. That is the reason the horse has all those anklets round its feet." "But what are they for?" Alice asked.
    This is worthy of the Secretary of State for Air.
    "To guard against the bites of sharks," the White Knight replied. "It is an invention of my own."
    3.45 p.m.

    I do not think these words are an invention of the Government's own, but the only excuse that the Secretary of State for Air gave us, in virtually the last sentence of his speech on this subject, was: "All I can say is that there is nothing new in inserting words of this sort in the Bill." Of all the lamentable excuses for bringing into a most important piece of legislation giving sweeping powers over the subjects of the Crown, a retrospective Clause going right back to the beginning of the whole series of Acts based on this principle! To say, "All I can say is, there is nothing new in it," is not really sufficient for this House.

    It is outrageous that the Government, in a Bill of this sort, should come down and put in words of this character—retrospective words: if I may say So, offensively retrospective words—when they proclaim that there is not the slightest necessity for them. They have not even the excuse that they are words of their own invention. They are put in not because they are words of their own invention. There is no need for them whatever. We hope the Minister will reconsider this matter, and will agree with us that this retrospective Clause can be omitted, and that we can get on with our further business. I am sure that something very much better than what was put up to us on Second Reading will be necessary before my hon. Friends will be willing to pass a Clause of this sort.

    As I understand the argument that has been addressed to us today, and, I think, the argument that was addressed from the opposite benches during the Second Reading debate on this Bill, it really amounts to this: Hon. Members opposite, in effect, say, as I understand them, "If this is purely declaratory—in other words, if all you are doing by these words is removing doubts about what the pre-existing legislation means—then we do not mind its being retrospective." On the other hand, I think they are saying, "Suppose by this Clause you are giving some additional powers to those which are already possessed by the Government, then we object to the powers being made retrospective, and in particular do we object if the effect of their being made retrospective is to give an indemnity to some Minister who, in the past, has exceeded the powers which he has." Well now, I hope hon. Gentlemen opposite will accept that as a fair summary of their argument.

    May I qualify what I said then by saying that I now assume that they object to its being retrospective in any event. But I think they will probably go this length with me, in saying that they do not mind so much its being retrospective if it is purely declaratory, as that they do object to any Clause which gives powers in addition to those which were previously possessed.

    Let me answer that argument. We feel—and we felt—that it is certainly arguable that the existing powers under the 1945 and 1947 Acts do cover all that is required; but, particularly in relation to two categories of action, we think that there may be some reasonable room for doubt as to whether they do go as far as that. The Foreign Secretary, in opening the debate on Second Reading, indicated what those two cases were. One related to the requisitioning of ships for the hostilities in Korea, and the other related to denying to potential enemies services and supplies which might be useful to them.

    With regard to all other defence purposes we felt that the existing Acts went far enough, but with regard to those two categories of action we thought that, although it was arguable whether existing Acts covered them, there was real doubt as to whether the existing Acts were wide enough to embrace them. In those circumstances we thought it necessary, as the Foreign Secretary explained, to be quite certain that we were acting within the four corners of the law in taking that kind of action, that kind of action being action which was indispensable for the preparation of our defence system.

    I therefore address myself now to the first question put to me this afternoon. It is rather difficult to say whether this is purely declaratory or whether it is not. If we were right in thinking—as we were rather disposed to feel—that the existing legislation goes far enough, it follows that this new Clause is simply declaratory, simply removing a possible doubt. If, on the other hand, our caution is justified, and we are right in thinking that perhaps the existing legislation does not go as far as that, then obviously this Clause gives additional powers to those we already possess. That is how the matter stands at the moment.

    Proceeding to the other point under discussion, I have looked into the matter and I can assure the Committee that, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Air said during Second Reading, there is no question of giving any Minister retrospective indemnity. We are not conscious of doubt having arisen about whether any action taken by any Minister with regard to this class of legislation can be called into question. Therefore I can relieve hon. Members opposite of any anxiety in that respect. We are not trying by a side-wind to indemnify any particular Minister in respect of any action he has already taken. That is not our purpose in making this provision retrospective, whether it is declaratory or whether it confers additional powers.

    We are making this provision retrospective because if we did not do so we would be importing a doubt as to what the pre-existing legislation means. Hon. Members who have had cause to consider drafting problems will be very familiar with that kind of question. In a subsequent Act of Parliament wording is introduced, and as a result doubts begin to arise as to whether action which was thought to be safe and within the four corners of the pre-existing legislation is in fact covered. We thought it desirable to make this provision retrospective because we felt that if we did not, if in 1951 we suddenly began to indicate for the first time that defence measures were within the provisions of these successor Supplies and Services Acts, we would begin to raise all sorts of doubts in the minds of those who are already administering these matters under the terms of the previous Acts.

    I hope hon. Members opposite will agree that it would be most undesirable to give rise to those sorts of doubts. The right hon. and learned Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe) was Attorney-General at one time, and he will know perfectly well the danger of that kind of thing arising. If in 1951 we suddenly started enacting that, in effect, anything to do with defence is now for the first time to be included in this scheme of legislation, we should immediately begin to give rise to doubts in the minds of those who have to consider the pre-existing legislation as to how far it went.

    Hon. Members will be familiar with the 1945 and 1947 Acts and will know the general terms of the purposes embodied in those Acts. The relevant purpose in the 1945 Act is
    "for the purpose of so maintaining controlling and regulating supplies and services as—(a) to secure a sufficiency of those essential to the wellbeing of the community."
    Those words, which go very far, are supplemented by the further words in Section 1 (1, c) of the 1947 Act, which deals with
    "ensuring that the whole resources of the community are available for use, and are used, in a manner best calculated to serve the interests of the community."
    Now, of necessity it is not possible to put any precise limit on those words. During Second Reading, hon. Members opposite gave expression to their general view on these enabling Acts. Those broad questions of policy are not immediately relevant to the rather narrow issue we are now discussing, and when they see our purpose in making this retrospective I hope they will feel it would have been very foolish not to make it retrospective, whether or not it is declaratory.

    I have indicated the difficulty I find in answering the question whether, strictly, it is declaratory or whether it goes further, but I hope the Committee will agree, on looking at it, that from the commonsense point of view there is no alternative but to take the course we have in order not to give rise to the innumerable doubts which would make it extremely difficult to implement this Bill and the other two Acts. It is for that reason that this provision is put in. In particular, I hope their anxiety that this was really a side-wind device to give indemnity to some Minister without indicating to the Committee that it was being done will have vanished. We are not doing so. We are simply making this provision retrospective for the purpose I have indicated, and I hope the Committee will accept it.

    In listening to what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said I had in front of me the main provisions of the old Acts, and I am bound to say it comes as a shock to me to think that under those provisions it would be legally possible to requisition on a large scale ships to take troops and supplies to Korea. That seems to me to be stretching the words of those Acts beyond any possible legal interpretation. When speaking of supplies and services, to say that the phrases

    "to secure a sufficiency of those essential to the wellbeing of the community or their equitable distribution, or their availability at fair prices,"
    and
    "generally for ensuring that the whole resources of the community are available for use, and are used, in a manner best calculated to serve the interests of the community,"
    authorise a general requisitioning of the mercantile marine to take troops and supplies to Korea seems to me almost beyond the belief to which any party in this Committee could come.

    In those circumstances, the existing retrospective legislation, if it is to cover those actions, becomes obviously necessary; but then the Committee has been completely deceived by what was said by the Secretary of State for Air when he told the House that it was not to cover any action of that sort, which clearly went beyond the law as it exists. Therefore it seems essential that the Committee should realise that it is not a question of possibility but of very great probability that this Committee is being now asked to make legal what was illegal six months ago.

    It is something which obviously the Government have got to do, but the Government should have come here straight away, when they would have got those powers, as this House always gives powers for anything which is essential to defence or anything of that nature. But to have this Bill introduced, as the Foreign Secretary said, as a matter of minor importance giving only a few unessential powers, when anybody who took the trouble to read Clause 1 would see that it was for conferring vast additional powers on the Executive, then to be told by the Secretary of State for Air that there was nothing of this sort in contemplation, then to listen to the speech we have just heard from the Solicitor-General, to look at the phrases in the old Acts and then to be asked to believe that nothing substantial is being done by making this Bill retrospective, is to my mind beyond what reasonable men should be asked to accept.

    4.0 p.m.

    The Committee should realise that it is essential that the Government should have these retrospective powers to justify what has been done in respect of Korea, and it is up to the Committee to make up its mind in the circumstances whether they are going to grant them. If the Government had come to the House immediately the Korea affair started and informed the House what powers they required in order to get forces and supplies to Korea and had said that there was a perfectly obvious doubt about the matter, I do not think that the learned Attorney-General or the learned Solicitor-General would have had the slightest hesitation in advising that the House should give the Departments the powers essential, so that they could have clear powers to do what they wanted to do.

    The hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens) is a very distinguished member of a profession to which I in a humble capacity also belong, but I must say that I found that the argument which he addressed to the Committee extraordinary. If he is right, it means that all that has been done since last June to carry out our obligations to the United Nations has been done without any legal powers—

    I am wondering when it was that the hon. and learned Gentleman found that out, because, so far as I know, there has not been a single question during all these months directed either from the Opposition or from this side of the Committee to the Government about it What has the hon. and learned Gentle- man been doing all that time? Has he known about it all that time and kept silent, allowing the executive to do things which it had no legal power to do at all?

    If the hon. Gentleman really wants an answer, it is this: The attention of the House was not drawn to the matter at all until this Bill was introduced. The present Foreign Secretary said that there was nothing in this Bill of any importance. The Secretary of State for Air said that there was no question of validating anything that had been wrongly done in the past.

    I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman is under a misapprehension for which, I am quite sure, I was responsible. No ships in fact were requisitioned. I say quite frankly that I think that the previous Acts would not have covered requisitioning. The doubt was whether the previous Acts would have covered requisitioning. I think that probably they would not have done so. The fact was that these ships were not requisitioned for that purpose; they were chartered. The necessity may arise to requisition ships, and it is in order that power should be clearly within the existing powers that we are introducing this Bill.

    If the Government require new powers they can get them without this retrospective action. They have done nothing wrong in the past.

    If they have done nothing wrong in the past, there is no reason why the hon. and learned Gentleman should have made his speech at all.

    I confess at once that I understood from the learned Solicitor-General that ships had been requisitioned since the war in Korea began. I understand now that none has been requisitioned. All I can say is that that makes the hon. and learned Gentleman's speech for retrospective legislation far weaker than it was.

    I thought that what the Solicitor-General was doing was to make this declaratory and not retrospective. I thought that the difference between declaratory legislation and retrospective legislation was this: In the case of retrospective legislation, one was legislating in order to make legal an act done that was illegal when it was done; whereas declaratory legislation makes clear the legality of an act if it is done, though the actual act has not in fact been done.

    I think that is perfectly clear, and if the hon. Gentleman will exercise his very real intelligence, which he does occasionally though not often in his contributions to the Committee, he will see the point which I am making. Whether a particular phrase in a particular Act of Parliament is retrospective in its effect or declaratory in its effect depends largely on whether acts have been done or not, and if there are any invalid acts to validate.

    If the hon. and learned Gentleman was thinking of the requisitioning of ships then, of course, he could have no complaint or objection to the declaratory phrase which the object of this Amendment is to remove from the Bill. The hon. and learned Gentleman no doubt clearly sees that if the Committee were to accept the Amendment, on his argument, there would be no power to requisition ships to take troops to Korea or to bring them home.

    Is that not right? If not, perhaps he will explain. I thought that what he was saying was: Of course the Government ought to have power to requisition ships. If under the old Act they had not the power to requisition ships, they ought to take that power to requisition ships. If, in the words in the Bill, as the Government have drawn it, they will in future have that power, of what is the hon. and learned Gentleman complaining?

    If these words are left out, the Government will take and will have in the future, the powers which they want.

    I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman must make up his mind. If his point is that the words now in the Bill give the Government powers which they did not have before, then it is impossible to regard his objection as anything but empty rhetoric. If, on the other hand, he thinks that the words now give the Government power which they had not before, and if he concedes that the Government ought to have that power, then it is impossible to think that he will oppose the Bill. He did not go so far in his speech as to say that he supported the Amendment. Perhaps the explanation of that is that he carefully avoided saying any such thing because it would be completely inconsistent with his argument.

    That seems to me to dispose of the non-political side of his argument. When we come to put it into its political context, then perhaps his argument is not so difficult to understand, coming from where it does. Hon. Members opposite have always had a limited view on the well-being of the community. His argument was that the words "well-being of the community" were not sufficient to cover us. There may be a difference of opinion as to how far this kind of action should take place and when and in what variety of political conditions; but to say that the question of the peace of the world is not contained in the idea of the well-being of the community is an idea which could only be put forward from that side of the Committee and which would never be accepted on this side. I should have thought, if there was any doubt, "the well-being of the community," as properly understood, would certainly give the Government powers to deal with all the matters that have been in dispute between the two sides in the course of this discussion.

    Is not the hon. Member putting forward a case in direct contradiction to that put forward by the Solicitor-General, who said that it was necessary because he had some doubts? I take it that the hon. Member does not have any doubts.

    I do not think it very important whether I have any doubts or not. What I am saying is that if there are any circumstances, or any persons, or any set of facts which might import into this phrase any degree of doubt, if it was argued in any responsible quarter that there is some doubt, then it is surely a very good thing to have that doubt removed, especially if, at the same time, it is conceded the law is not being altered.

    I understood the Solicitor-General to say that in his opinion the previous Acts did not cover requisitioning.

    On balance, although I think it is arguable both ways, I think the previous Acts would not cover requisitioning.

    That is the exact situation in which a declaratory Clause is obviously the appropriate course to take when there is a new Bill. If there is a balance of argument, if some may interpret one way and some another, then those are ideal circumstances in which to have a declaratory phrase to resolve the matter. The alternative is to leave the doubt in every one's mind, leaving it to be argued and challenged in the courts, and leaving, if the Solicitor-General is right, the balance of the argument on the side where every one does not want it to be.

    The hon. Member says that there is doubt and that all we need is a declaratory statement to resolve the doubt. The doubt is about the requisitioning of ships.

    I think that the hon. and learned Member has inadvertently missed my point. Suppose that in future we wanted to requisition ships. We are back again to the point I thought we had disposed of—the difference between declaratory and retrospective legislation. It is desired that the Government shall have power to requisition ships. There is doubt whether under the old Acts there would have been any such powers. If the Government had in fact requisitioned ships, then in those circumstances this phrase that it is sought to delete would have been retrospective legislation. But since these acts did not take place, these words are not retrospective legislation but declaratory legislation to which there cannot be any objection.

    4.15 p.m.

    The Committee is working under a certain handicap, in that the Ministers who first paraded this Bill on Second Reading have disappeared from the scene. We are now confronted with a change of bowling at both ends. At one end we have the Minister of Labour, always a versatile player, who looks to me as if he would rather be over here ridiculing these words—he would enjoy himself greatly—and at the other the Solicitor-General who, I imagine, is loosening his muscles prior to the lengthy spell he will shortly be having on the Finance Bill—I imagine that he has been put up to introduce that soothing atmosphere which he always imparts to our discussions.

    I was glad to hear the Solicitor-General say one thing, which will now be on record, namely, that he and his friends disapprove of a general indemnity for something that has happened in the past. He feels, with us, that where a Minister takes action which is not covered by legislation there should be a special Bill to indemnify the Minister for that action, rather than have it put into a Bill of this kind by a side wind. We agree that there should not be restrospective legislation of any kind without some compelling and good reason.

    I followed the right hon. and learned Gentleman so far, but it was when he moved to his next point that he confused me. That confusion has been added to considerably by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman). The right hon. and learned Gentleman went on to say that the retrospective aspect of these words was to remove some doubt which existed in the mind of the Government regarding their powers under previous legislation. I take that to mean the Supplies and Services Acts of 1945 and 1947, which were of course a hang-over from the sweeping powers taken during the war and were revised in the aftermath of the last Parliament.

    The Solicitor-General went on to say that nothing has gone wrong since; that no Minister has committed any act which requires indemnity. Nothing has gone wrong, and because nothing has gone wrong we must take retrospective powers about the future. That is where, in my lay mind, I begin to feel how right it was that my right hon. Friend the Member for Epsom (Mr. McCorquodale) introduced the simile of the adventures of Alice in "Through the Looking-Glass." Therefore, this Bill is surely concerned only with the present or the future. That seems inescapable.

    Then came my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens), who, with his great legal knowledge, stressed much the same point about the powers which existed under the Acts of 1945 and 1947 and reminded the Committee, as did the Solicitor-General, that the necessity for all this arose to a considerable extent from the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, which has become an almost universal umbrella for all kinds of unpleasant happenings, such as the rise in the cost of living—it now has a close rival in the battle of Waterloo after Saturday night.

    Nothing has gone wrong over the requisitioning of ships, we are told, but then the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne rises and says that it is all right as it is purely declaratory and we must make quite certain that nothing could have gone wrong since July last. But if nothing has gone wrong since the Korean aggression in June, and we have now got to the month of April, 1951, without any improper action by the Government then what we are now trying to do is to arm the Government with the necessary powers for the future and for the present. That is surely the first object.

    I cannot follow the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne, who is so anxious to have these words included. There is no one to indemnify, and, therefore, they are unnecessary. I am sure that if the right hon. and learned Gentleman were sitting over here he would say that the words were redundant and even otiose. The Government would lose nothing by accepting the Amendment. They would lose no powers of any kind. They would still be fully equipped. I do not believe that the Solicitor-General has made out a case for the retention of these words, because they are no longer necessary. I cannot see how one can deal with the future in retrospect. If the Government want to avoid making themselves ridiculous in yet another field, they would be wise to accept the Amendment.

    From the discussion that we have had it seems that the Opposition do not know what they want or the reason why they are putting forward the Amendment. I hope that before the debate is finished the right hon. and learned Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe) or the hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) will give us their opinion whether or not it is necessary for these words to remain to cover anything that has been done since the beginning of the episode in Korea.

    Shortly before the defence powers under the Supplies and Services Acts were due to expire in December, we had a debate on 23rd October as to whether or not the existing powers under the Supplies and Services Acts of 1945 and 1947 should be renewed for another year. In October the events in Korea were very much in everybody's mind. The Leader of the House indicated why the existing defence regulations under those Acts should be renewed for another year; arguments were put forward based principally on the situation in which the events in Korea were taking place, the great debate we had had about the defence of the country, and the fact that we were committed to certain measures of re-armament, and so forth.

    Both sides of the House agreed that for the purposes of defence and preserving peace it was essential to renew those Acts. The only point on which any divergence occurred between the two sides was whether it was necessary for those wide powers to be retained by the Executive in peace-time. We thought they should, but the Opposition were opposed to it. But the Opposition conceded, because of the critical international situation which had then arisen, that it was essential to renew those powers for a year.

    The odd thing was that not a single hon. Gentleman opposite said—as presumably some of them will now say if they are honest in supporting the Amendment—that merely to renew the existing defence powers was not enough and that we needed to go further and to extend the purposes for which the defence regulations existed. It was assumed all round that the existing powers under those Acts were fully sufficient for all the purposes for which they were wanted and particularly for Korea, requisitioning ships, dealing with military preparations and so forth.

    The Government have now introduced this Bill, and particularly this Clause, with what is called "retrospective operation" because there may be some doubt as to whether what everybody agreed in October was or was not the case. The Opposition are very prompt in criticising the Government on what they are pleased to call "retrospective legislation," but there is nothing of a retrospective character in the words proposed to be left out by the Amendment.

    I do not entirely agree with the distinction drawn by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) between retrospective legislation and declaratory legislation. Retrospective legislation, which the House has agreed is normal and proper in certain circumstances, is designed to legalise something which was quite definitely illegal at the time it was done. Declaratory legislation is intended to declare, so that there shall be no doubt whatever in future, something about which there was a doubt and which may or may not have been legal at the time it was done.

    Opinions may differ as to whether or not what the House assumed to be correct in October was or was not so. The only possible object of the declaratory words in the Clause is to give effect to the state of the law as hon. Members on both sides of the House assumed it to be in October last. For that reason, there seems to be no substance or sincerity in the Amendment.

    I hope that one immodest legislator may forgivably thrust his way in where there have been so many modest lawyers, because I think that even my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bristol, North-West (Lieut-Commander Braithwaite) is in this matter a kind of a sea-lawyer, and I am bound to admit that when he spoke I did not think he was as good a sea-lawyer as I had supposed before, because he persisted in talking about side winds as if they were indecent, which I assure him—and so would anyone who has been "in sail" as they say—is not the fact.

    I really was puzzled by the Solicitor-General and a good deal more puzzled by his reinforcements from below the Gangway. Of course, it is true that no absolute and unadulterated good can be done except in eternity and by omnipotence. The nature of human life—I am speaking with the utmost seriousness, and all amateur theologians present will, I am sure, agree with me—is that the human mind cannot conceive, still less execute, what is wholly good. We really must not be taken in by arguments of hon. and even learned Gentlemen who say that, provided they announce beforehand, "This is for the good of the people, or the well-being of the community, or the equitable distribution of material goods," they thereby put it out of court that there should be any criticism or resistance. As far as I could gather, that really was the substantial argument from below the Gangway.

    4.30 p.m.

    That the words in fact are retrospective seems quite plain to a layman on the face of it and, as I understand it, this was not merely admitted but asseverated by the Solicitor-General. He made it quite plain in terms that the Government had decided that it was necessary to make this provision retrospective. They cannot have thought of that merely to fill in some logical but not practical gap. I can quite understand the motive for making a provision that one's great grandfather was legitimate retrospective, if one wanted something to happen, legally, between the date of his unfortunate conception and one's own miserable appearance upon this sublunary scene. In the present case, the proudest boast of those who are responsible for its conception is that nothing ever came of it. That leaves one slightly puzzled.

    Although I am putting this point in a form which appears risible I hope that hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite will take it seriously. If they are going to start laughing at me then my pride will compel me to go on until I have convinced them that this is a serious point.

    I am not laughing at the hon. Gentleman, but with him.

    I know. I was not grumbling about it, but merely trying to get the flattery down in HANSARD.

    Perhaps I might go back for a moment to something which was said from a point so far above me in station, from South Kensington (Sir P. Spens.) The Committee will remember the argument which came to us from South Kensington. I think that it had an important corollary which I do not think was specifically made. It is that upon the argument used by the Solicitor-General, and still more upon the argument from below the Gangway, it is difficult to see how in future Parliament is ever going to give powers for any at all general purpose without giving them for every other benevolent purpose. I do not know whether the Solicitor-General can bear to listen to this point, because I expect he has already seen it. If the argument used by himself and the fears from South Kensington are right, how in future is the House of Commons ever going so to draft a Clause as to give an at all general power without the generality becoming a universality?

    If it is to be said that for any general estimable purpose we could not do any good and do it wholly well without reaching all the other estimable purposes too, and that therefore because the general power was given in order to improve, say, the character of children or the distribution of milk, and because those things are all tied up with importing coarse grains from Manchuria or what not, and that therefore all other good purposes must be held not only to be, but always to have been, subsumed under and in the general power—if that is the argument—it is a serious matter for consideration whether we are not really making it impossible for Parliament in future ever to grant the Executive a general benevolent power for a highly estimable, in itself, unchallengeable object, without thereby granting those powers for all other estimable and hardly challengeable objects. The point I have been making seems to make the general argument against retrospection very much more difficult to remove in this specific case.

    I apologise to the Solicitor-General because I missed his speech, and because I do not normally intervene in a debate, even for a short time, without having heard the speech of the Minister. I want to reinforce some of the things which have been said, and in particular to answer some of the arguments of the two hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway who thought that the Amendment was unwise. The hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher), kept speaking of "what is called 'this retrospective provision'." I wonder why he can never understand a retrospective provision or recognise one when he sees one. One thing which is admitted in every quarter of the Committee by those most competent to speak is that this is a retrospective provision. It may be wise or unwise, but that it is retrospective cannot be doubted.

    The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), to whose argument I listened with care, as I always do, thought that the provision was not retrospective on the ground that it was declaratory. I think that, on reconsideration, he will probably agree with me that you can only call a provision in a statute "declaratory" if it declares what is believed to be the law. In so far as the Clause contains the words which we are attacking, it declares—to adopt the hon. Gentleman's phrase—as law in the past something which the Solicitor-General has said he believes was not law in the past. To say that we can describe as "declaratory" a provision that makes a false declaration about the law is an abuse of language. We can only describe a provision in a statute as declaratory if it declares what in fact is believed to be the law.

    That cannot be quite right, can it? If a provision resolves doubts about the interpretation of a statute because a subsequent law has altered it, that is assuredly retrospective. If it is conceded that there is a doubt whether the law might be declared to be this or to be that then the law which declares it to be this or that is assuredly declaratory.

    I do not think that the hon. Member is quite right in thinking that the words "declaratory" and "retrospective" are mutually exclusive. I think that he is labouring under a slight confusion. If we want to excuse what is at first sight a retrospective provision by saying that it is only declaratory, my submission is that that is only tolerable if what we declare to be the law is what the best authorities in the law declare was the law. The Solicitor-General has said, in so far as the words which we are attacking are concerned, that the effect of adopting them in the Bill is to declare that to have been law in the past which in fact was not the law in the past.

    My next submission, in which I hope most hon. Members will agree with me, is that to do any such thing is wholly improper, unless an absolute necessity for doing it is proved. To declare that something has been the law which the Law Officers of the Crown advise us was not the law, seems, unless some case is put forward for doing it, a quite intolerable thing for the Committee to do.

    From the moment when this Bill becomes an Act of Parliament, the Government will have all the powers that they desire. The Government have no reason to think that there will be any act which they will want to cover, considering what has happened in the past and what will happen in the period between the present moment and the time when the Bill becomes an Act. Nevertheless, they ask us to pass these extraordinarily wide words, which will cover anything. There is no reason to think that there will be anything that the Government will wish to cover, but if something does occur, for which the Government need some indemnity, then it is surely better for them to come to this House and to describe what it is they want covered and for this House in a proper case to give an indemnity.

    To give an indemnity which will cover anything at a time when the Government have, in fact, nothing to which they can point as needing to be covered seems to be an intolerable abuse of the process of legislation. It is really reducing the care of Parliament for the rights of the citizen to an absolute nullity. We are taking no care at all. At the moment there is some doubt about the power which the Government may want in the future, and so the Government say, "Not only shall we have this power in the future, but it shall be deemed that we have always had it in the past." That is an intolerable situation. It is far better to come to the House and ask for an indemnity for specific matters if such indemnity is needed, than to put in such wide words as would cover everything, and then come to this Committee and ask for those words to be made law.

    The hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher), was good enough to address a question to me. He asked whether in view of the Korean situation I or any of my colleagues favoured the giving of the powers provided by this Bill. In so far as I am in order in answering that question on this Amendment, the answer must manifestly be "Yes." However, that does not conclude the matter of this Amendment as he appears to feel. We have had assurances given twice in this House. We had an assurance from the Secretary of State for Air six weeks ago, and another today that there are no acts taken by His Majesty's Government, which require the cover given by the retrospective provision of these words, with which alone at this moment the Committee is concerned.

    If the hon. Member for Islington, East, will allow me, I would say that he was barking up the wrong tree when he introduced the Korean war into this matter. I believe that defence is a legitimate purpose for using Defence Regulations. Indeed, I might be tempted to suggest that other purposes were infinitely less legitimate, but when we are assured that there is not one single act taken by a Minister of the Crown for which the provision of these words is required to give a legal cover, it is making nonsense of the legislative process of this House to provide a cover of indemnity for acts which we are solemnly assured have never taken place at all.

    It is a harsh thing to say, but I think that the Solicitor-General did even worse than the Secretary of State for Air. He said that the object of these words was to remove a doubt as to what pre-existing legislation means. To leave it like that was a little bit unworthy of him. If there are no acts with which pre-existing legislation is concerned, what does it matter if there is an academic doubt suitable for discussion over senior commonroom tables? It is no purpose of the legislature to indemnify academic doubts existing in the past. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman wants to do that, he might try retrospectively to amend the Statute on Treason, and he would have a great deal of fun over that.

    4.45 p.m.

    If there are no acts taken in the prosecution of the Korean war or for the purposes of defence needing to be covered by this provision, which we are solemnly asked to believe is an academic provision, it seems to me that it is not morally right for a Committee of the House of Commons to give its assent to it. Surely it is our duty only to assent to Ministerial legislative proposals where practical need for them is made out by a Minister of the Crown. When these proposals are commended by a Minister of the Crown on the unique ground that there is no need for them whatever, it seems to me to be the duty of this Committee to reject them.

    After the discussion which we have had I hope the Government will agree to accept this Amendment, because during the time we have been discussing it no one has suggested a single reason for these words being in the Bill. We have been assured time and time again that nothing has been done which is outside the purview of existing Acts. My point in regard to this form of legislation—I am sure the Minister of Labour will consider seriously the point that I am making—is that in order to use it the Minister must put his hand on his heart and say, "The act which I am now operating is necessary for the purposes laid down in the Act." Whether that act is intra vires or ultra vires depends on the purposes outlined. Here the position and the intention is to include a new purpose.

    If the right hon. and learned Gentleman had come to this House and said, "We are extremely sorry, but in the sudden emergency with which we are faced, certain acts have taken place," that would be a matter which we should have to consider. It is an important thing that if one is asking for an indemnity, it should be in the form of an indemnity, and that is what we should be prepared to consider. But the right hon. and learned Gentleman has come to this Committee and has told us that there are no acts of which he knows which are ultra vires. Then he says, "Of course, if we had done certain things they would have been ultra vires." Do not let us be in any doubt about this—the Opposition are prepared to help the Government in regard to future acts. If we omit the words,
    "and always to have included",
    there remain the words
    "deemed to include",
    which means that from the date of the passage of this Bill full powers are given, and everything that the Government want is given.

    Hon. Members may put to us the query, if that is the position what is the harm in leaving the words in? If this Committee is going to leave in a Bill words with retrospective effect without any cause being made out for them at all, we are abdicating our position, and I know very well that if right hon. Gentlemen opposite were on these benches they would not tolerate that form of legislative procedure. In all the 16 years that I have had the honour to be in the House I have never known any party in opposition—indeed, on many occasions I am glad to think Government supporters have joined in refusing it—allowing retrospective legislation unless a case is made out. The essence of the approach of the Government today is that there is no case for it. Therefore I ask the right hon. Gentleman, in the interests of the position of this House as a legislative body, to reconsider the position of the Government.

    I do not want to traverse the ground which my hon. Friends have covered so well, but I want to make the following point. The framework of this Measure is based on the words "deemed to include"; that is, we are adding to the old purposes some new purposes and saying that the old purposes shall from this date be deemed to include the new ones. That makes it perfectly clear, on any construction which I have ever heard, that up to this time they do not include the new purposes.

    Therefore, to suggest that this can be slipped in, that we can salve our consciences with the ideas that we are merely passing declaratory legislation, is not only wrong, but is clearly manifestly wrong, from the very basis of the Measure we are discussing. In fact we are not only doing something which is useless, we are proclaiming ourselves to be fools and idiots by doing it. To put it shortly, either give us a reason for this, tell us some acts of which the Government are afraid, or else accept this Amendment. Unless that is done, I must advise my right hon. and hon. Friends to divide the Committee on this point.

    I should like to reply shortly to the debate. I am sure it is entirely my own fault, but hon. Members opposite have attached too much importance to one part of my argument and have almost overlooked the other part of it. I instanced the requisitioning of ships and the denying of supplies to potential enemies as being two things which we thought on balance were outside the purview of existing legislation. I said that we had not, in fact, requisitioned ships, but I added that we might want to do so at any time and therefore we have to be certain that we had the power to do so should the occasion arise.

    Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman allow me to interrupt? We cannot be at cross purposes in that. If I may say so, I know him and his attainments too well. He has these powers from this Measure by the words "deemed to include" and they operate from the time the Act is passed. We are quite prepared to give him the powers for the future, but we want to know why it is that he requires these powers in the past.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman interrupted me when I was just about to give the reason, good or bad, which I had given already in the course of my arguments because hon. Gentlemen opposite, I think, have not appreciated the importance that we attach to it. In my earlier remarks I said that the reason which actuates us is that we are frightened that if we do not make this provision retrospective a number of doubts may arise on various matters as to which at the moment there is no doubt. May I indicate why? The 1945 and 1947 Acts are undoubtedly primarily directed towards economic rehabilitation—if I may use that as a broad expression.

    Division No. 65.]

    AYES

    [4.58 p.m.

    Acland, Sir RichardBrown, George (Belper)Davies, A. Edward (Stoke, N.)
    Adams, H. R.Brown, Thomas (Ince)de Freitas, G.
    Albu, A. H.Burton, Miss E.Deer, G.
    Anderson, Alexander (Motherwell)Butler, Herbert (Hackney, S.)Delargy, H. J.
    Anderson, Frank (Whitehaven)Callaghan, L. J.Diamond, J.
    Ayles, W. H.Carmichael, J.Dodos, N. N.
    Barnes, Rt. Hon. A. J.Castle, Mrs. B. A.Donnelly, D.
    Bartley, P.Champion, A. J.Driberg, T. E. N.
    Benn, WedgwoodClunie, JDugdale, Rt. Hon. John (W Bromwich)
    Benson, G.Cocks, F. S.Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.
    Beswick, F.Coldrick, WEdelman, M.
    Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)Collick, P.Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)
    Bevin, Rt. Hon. E. (Woolwich, E.)Cook, T. F.Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)
    Blenkinsop, A.Cooper, John (Deptford)Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)
    Blyton, W. R.Corbet, Mrs. Freda (Peckham)Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)
    Booth, A.Cove, W. G.Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)
    Bottomley, A. G.Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)Ewart, R.
    Bowden, H. W.Crosland, C. A. R.Fernyhough, E.
    Bowles, F. G. (Nuneaton)Crossman, R. H. S.Field, Capt. W. J.
    Braddock, Mrs. ElizabethCullen, Mrs. A.Finch, H. J.
    Brook, Dryden (Halifax)Daines, P.Fletcher, Eric (Islington, E.)
    Brooks, T. J. (Normanton)Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.Follick, M.
    Brought, Dr. A. D. D.Darling, George (Hillsborough)Foot, M. M.

    But we have always thought that, with the exception of those two matters—the requisitioning of ships and the denying of supplies to potential enemies which, of course, may arise hereafter—we could say that defence was one of the services essential to the community. Therefore we have always thought that the Acts as they existed, broadly speaking, covered the requirements of defence.

    The reason why we make these provisions retrospective is because, there being on the Statute Book two statutes primarily directed to economic questions, if we now in 1951 proceed to extend them in terms to defence matters, doubts may arise and may seriously perplex persons who have administered the previous Acts as to whether defence questions were ever within the purview of those Acts. That may be a fear which is justified or not, but it certainly actuates us. That was the reason I gave when I first addressed the Committee on this subject.

    Whether hon. Members opposite agree with the reason or not I hope they will agree that the case has been made. Having listened to the arguments adduced, I would not be disposed to advise my hon. Friends to accept this Amendment.

    rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

    Question put, "That the Question be now put."

    The Committee divided: Ayes, 225; Noes, 197.

    Forman, J. C.Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)Ross, William (Kilmarnock)
    Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)Lindgren, G. S.Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.
    Freeman, Peter (Newport)Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.Silverman, Julius (Erdington)
    Ganley, Mrs. C. S.Logan, D. G.Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)
    Gibson, C. W.Longden, Fred (Small Heath)Simmons, C. J.
    Gilzean, A.McAllister, G.Slater, J
    Glanville, James (Consett)MacColl, J. E.Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)
    Gooch, E. G.McGhee, H. G.Snow, J. W.
    Gordon-Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.McInnes, J.Soskice, Rt. Hon Sir Frank
    Greenwood, Anthony (Rossendale)Mack, J. D.Sparks, J. A.
    Grenfell, D. R.McKay, John (Wallsend)Steele, T
    Grey, C. F.McLeavy, FStewart, Michael (Fulham, E.)
    Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.
    Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)Mainwaring, W. H.Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)
    Gunter, R. J.Mann, Mrs. JeanStross, Dr. Barnett
    Hale, Joseph (Rochdale)Manuel, A. C.Sylvester, G. O.
    Hall, John (Gateshead, W.)Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)
    Hamilton, W. W.Mathers, Rt. Hon. G.Taylor, Robert (Morpeth)
    Hannan, W.Messer, F.Thomas, David (Aberdare)
    Hardman, D. R.Middleton, Mrs. L.Thomas, George (Cardiff)
    Hardy, E. A.Mikardo, IanThomas, Ivor Owen (Wrekin)
    Hargreaves, AMitchison, G. R.Thorneycroft, Harry (Clayton)
    Harrison, J.Moeran, E. W.Thurtle, Ernest
    Hastings, S.Monslow, W.Tomlinson, Rt. Hon. G.
    Hayman, F. H.Moody, A. S.Ungoed-Thomas, A. L.
    Hewitson, Capt. M.Morgan, Dr. H. B.Vernon, W. F.
    Holman, P.Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)Viant, S. P.
    Holmes, Horace (Hemsworth)Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Lewisham, S.)Wallace, H. W.
    Houghton, D.Mort, D. L.Webb, Rt. Hon. M. (Bradford, C.)
    Hubbard, T.Moyle, A.Wells, Percy (Faversham)
    Hudson, James (Ealing, N.)Murray, J. D.West, D. G.
    Hughes, Moelwyn (Islington, N.)Neal, Harold (Bolsover)Wheatley, Rt. Hon. J. (Edinb'gh, E.)
    Hynd, H. (Accrington)Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. J.White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)
    Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)Oliver, G. H.White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)
    Irving, W. J. (Wood Green)Paget, R. T.Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.
    Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.Paling, Rt. Hon. Wilfred (Dearne V'lly)Wigg, G.
    Janner, B.Pannell, T. C.Wilkins, W. A.
    Jay, D. P. T.Pargiter, G. A.Willey, Frederick (Sunderland)
    Jeger, George (Goole)Parker, J.Willey, Octavius (Cleveland)
    Jenkins, R. H.Paton, J.Williams, David (Neath)
    Johnson, James (Rugby)Pearson, A.Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Abertillery)
    Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)Peart, T. F.Williams, Ronald (Wigan)
    Jones, David (Hartlepool)Poole, C.Williams, Rt. Hon. Thomas (Don V'lly)
    Jones, Frederick Elwyn (West Ham, S)Popplewell, E.Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)
    Jones, Jack (Rotherham)Porter, G.Winterbottom, Ian (Nottingham, C.)
    Jones, William Elwyn (Conway)Pursey, Cmdr. H.Winterbottom, Richard (Brightside)
    Keenan, W.Rankin, J.Wise, F. J.
    Kenyon, C.Rees, Mrs. D.Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.
    Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.Reid, Thomas (Swindon)Wyatt, W. L.
    Kinley, J.Reid, William (Camlachie)Yates, V. F.
    Kirkwood, Rt. Hon. D.Rhodes, H.
    Lee, Frederick (Newton)Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvonshire)

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

    Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)Mr. Royle and
    Mr. Kenneth Robinson.

    NOES

    Aitken, W. T.Bullock, Capt. M.Dugdale, Maj. Sir Thomas (Richmond)
    Alport, C. J. M.Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.
    Amory, Heathcoat (Tiverton)Burden, Squadron Leader F. A.Duthie, W. S.
    Arbuthnot, JohnButcher, H. W.Eccles, D. M.
    Assheton, Rt. Hon. R. (Blackburn, W.)Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)Eden, Rt. Hon. A.
    Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.Carr, Robert (Mitcham)Erroll, F. J.
    Baldwin, A. E.Channon, H.Fisher, Nigel
    Banks, Col. C.Churchill, Rt. Hon. W. S.Fort, R.
    Baxter, A. B.Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmouth, W.)Foster, John
    Beamish, Major TuftonColegate, A.Fraser, Sir I. (Morecambe & Lonsdale)
    Bell, R. M.Conant, Maj. R. J. E.Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir David Maxwell
    Bennett, Sir Peter (Edgbaston)Corbett, Lt.-Col. Uvedale (Ludlow)Galbraith, T. G. D. (Hillhead)
    Bennett, William (Woodside)Craddock, G. B. (Spelthorne)Gammans, L. D.
    Bevins, J. R. (Liverpool, Toxteth)Cranborne, ViscountGarner-Evans, E. H. (Denbigh)
    Birch, NigelCrookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C.Gates, Maj. E. E.
    Bishop, F. P.Crouch, R. F.Gridley, Sir Arnold
    Black, C. W.Crowder, Capt. John (Finchley)Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)
    Blackburn, A. R.Cundiff, F. W.Grimston, Robert (Westbury)
    Bossom, A. C.Davidson, ViscountessHarden, J. R. E.
    Bowen, E. R.Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)Hare, Hon. J. H. (Woodbridge)
    Boyd-Carpenter, J. A.Davies, Nigel (Epping)Harvey, Air Codre. A. V. (Macclesfield)
    Boyle, Sir Edwardde Chair, SomersetHarvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)
    Braine, B. R.De la Bère, R.Heald, Lionel
    Braithwaite, Lt.-Cmdr. GurneyDeedes, W. F.Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.
    Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W.Dodds-Parker, A. D.Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)
    Brooke, Henry (Hampstead)Donner, P. W.Hill, Dr. Charles (Luton)
    Browne, Jack (Govan)Drayson, G. B.Hinchingbrook, Viscount
    Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.Drewe, CHollis, M. C.

    Hornsby-Smith, Miss P.Maude, Angus (Ealing, S.)Snadden, W. McN.
    Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. FlorenceMaudling R.Soames, Capt. C.
    Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N,.)Mellor, Sir JohnSpearman, A. C. M.
    Hudson, Rt. Hon. Robert (Southport)Molson, A. H. E.Spens, Sir Patrick (Kensington, S.)
    Hudson, W. R. A. (Hull, N.)Morrison, John (Salisbury)Steward, W. A. (Woolwich, W.)
    Hurd, A. R.Morrison, Rt. Hon. W. S. (Cirencester)Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)
    Hutchinson, Geoffrey (Ilford, N.)Nabarro, G.Storey, S.
    Hutchison, Lt.-Com. Clark (E'b'rgh W.)Nicholls, HarmarStrauss, Henry (Norwich, S.)
    Hutchison, Colonel JamesNicholson, G.Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)
    Jones, A. (Hall Green)Nield, Basil (Chester)Studholme, H. G.
    Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.Noble, Cmdr. A. H. P.Summers, G. S.
    Kerr, H. W. (Cambridge)Nugent, G. R. H.Taylor, Charles (Eastbourne)
    Lancaster, Col. C. G.Nutting, AnthonyThompson, Kenneth Pugh (Walton)
    Lennox-Boyd, A. T.Odey, G. W.Thorneycroft, Peter (Monmouth)
    Linstead, H. N.O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir HughThornton-Kemsley, Col. C. N.
    Llewellyn, D.Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.Touche, G. C.
    Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (King's Norton)Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)Turner, H. F. L.
    Lloyd, Maj. Guy (Renfrew, E.)Orr-Ewing, Ian L. (Weston-super-Mare)Turton, R. H.
    Longden, Gilbert (Herts, S.W.)Osborne, C.Vane, W. M. F.
    Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)Peake, Rt. Hon. O.Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.
    Lucas, P. B. (Brentford)Perkins, W. R. D.Walker-Smith, D. C.
    Lucas-Tooth, Sir HughPeto, Brig. C. H. M.Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)
    Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. O.Pickthorn, K.Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.
    McAddon, S. J.Powell, J. EnochWatkinson, H.
    McCallum, Major D.Prescott, S.Watt, Sir George Harvie
    McCorquodale, Rt. Hon. M. S.Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)Webbe, Sir Harold
    Macdonald, Sir Peter (I. of Wight)Profumo, J. D.Wheatley, Major M. J. (Poole)
    Mackeson, Brig. H. R.Raikes, H. V.White, Baker (Canterbury)
    McKibbin, A.Redmayne, M.Williams, Charles (Torquay)
    McKie, J. H. (Galloway)Remnant, Hon. P.Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)
    MacLeod, Iain (Enfield, W.)Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)Williams, Sir Herbert (Croydon, E.)
    MacLeod, John (Ross and Cromarty)Roper, Sir HaroldWills, G.
    Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold (Bromley)Ropner, Col. L.Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
    Macpherson, Major Niall (Dumfries)Russell, R. S.Wood, Hon. R.
    Manningham-Butler, R. E.Savory, Prof. D. L.York, C.
    Marlowe, A. A. H.Scott, Donald
    Marples, A. E.Smiles, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

    Marshall, Douglas (Bodmin)Smith, E. Martin (Grantham)Mr. Digby and Mr. Edward Heath.
    Marshall, Sidney (Sutton)Smyth, Brig. J. G. (Norwood)

    Question put accordingly, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."

    Division No. 66.]

    AYES

    [5.8 p.m.

    Acland, Sir RichardCooper, John (Deptford)Ganley, Mrs. C. S.
    Adams, H. R.Corbet, Mrs. Freda (Peckham)Gibson, C. W.
    Albu, A. H.Cove, W. G.Gilzean, A.
    Anderson, Alexander (Motherwell)Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)Glanville, James (Consett)
    Anderson, Frank (Whitehaven)Crosland, C. A. R.Gooch, E. G.
    Ayles, W. H.Crossman, R. H. S.Gordon-Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.
    Barnes, Rt. Hon. A. J.Cullen, Mrs. A.Greenwood, Anthony (Rossendale)
    Bartley, P.Daines, P.Grey, C. F.
    Benn, WedgwoodDalton, Rt. Hon. H.Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
    Benson, G.Darling, George (Hillsborough)Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
    Beswick, F.Davies, A. Edward (Stoke, N.)Griffiths, R. J.
    Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)de Freitas, G.Hale, Joseph (Rochdale)
    Bevin, Rt. Hon. E. (Woolwich, E.)Deer, G.Hall, John (Gateshead, W.)
    Blenkinsop, A.Delargy, H. J.Hamilton, W. W.
    Blyton, W. R.Diamond, J.Hannan, W.
    Booth, A.Dodds, N. N.Hardman, D. R.
    Bottomley, A. G.Donnelly, D.Hardy, E. A.
    Bowden, H. W.Driberg, T. E. N.Hargreaves, A
    Bowles, F. G. (Nuneaton)Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John (W. Bromwich)Harrison, J.
    Braddock, Mrs. ElizabethEde, Rt. Hon. J. C.Hastings, S.
    Brook, Dryden (Halifax)Edelman, M.Hayman, F. H.
    Brooks, T. J. (Normanton)Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)Hewitson, Capt. M.
    Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)Holman, P.
    Brown, George (Belper)Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)Holmes, Horace (Hemsworth)
    Brown, Thomas (Ince)Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)Houghton, D.
    Burton, Miss E.Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)Hubbard, T.
    Butler, Herbert (Hackney, S.)Ewart, R.Hudson, James (Ealing, N.)
    Callaghan, L. J.Fernyhough, E.Hughes, Moelwyn (Islington, N.)
    Carmichael, J.Field, Capt. W. J.Hynd, H. (Accrington)
    Castle, Mrs. B. A.Finch, H. J.Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)
    Champion, A. J.Fletcher, Eric (Islington, E.)Irving, W. J. (Wood Green)
    Clunie, J.Follick, M.Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.
    Cocks, F. S.Foot, M. M.Janner, B.
    Coldrick, W.Forman, J. C.Jay, D. P. T.
    Collick, P.Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)Jeger, George (Goole)
    Cook, T. F.Freeman, Peter (Newport)Jenkins, R. H.

    The Committee divided: Ayes, 225; Noes, 196.

    Johnson, James (Rugby)Mort, D. L.Stross, Dr. Barnett
    Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)Moyle, A.Sylvester, G. O.
    Jones, David (Hartlepool)Murray, J. D.Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)
    Jones, Frederick Elwyn (West Ham, S.)Neal, Harold (Bolsover)Taylor, Robert (Morpeth)
    Jones, Jack (Rotherham)Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. J.Thomas, David (Aberdare)
    Jones, William Elwyn (Conway)Oliver, G. H.Thomas, George (Cardiff)
    Keenan, W.Paget, R. T.Thomas, Ivor Owen (Wrekin)
    Kenyon, C.Paling, Rt. Hon. Wilfred (Dearne V'lly)Thorneycroft, Harry (Clayton)
    Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.Pannell, T. C.Thurtle, Ernest
    Kinley, J.Pargiter, G. A.Tomlinson, Rt. Hon. G.
    Kirkwood, Rt. Hon. D.Parker, J.Turner-Samuels, M.
    Lee, Frederick (Newton)Paton, J.Vernon, W. F.
    Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)Pearson, A.Viant, S. P.
    Lewis, Arthur (West Ham. N.)Peart, T. F.Wallace, H. W.
    Lindgren, G. S.Poole, C.Webb, Rt. Hon. M. (Bradford, C.)
    Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.Popplewell, E.Wells, Percy (Faversham)
    Logan, D. G.Porter, G.West, D. G.
    Longden, Fred (Small Heath)Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)Wheatley, Rt. Hon. J. (Edinb'gh, E.)
    McAllister, G.Pursey, Cmdr. H.White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)
    MacColl, J. E.Rankin, J.White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)
    McGhee, H. G.Rees, Mrs. D.Whiteley, Rt. Hon W.
    McInnes, J.Reid, Thomas (Swindon)Wigg, G.
    McKay, John (Wallsend)Reid, William (Camlachie)Wilkins, W. A.
    McLeavy, F.Rhodes, H.Willey, Frederick (Sunderland)
    MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvonshire)Willey, Octavius (Cleveland)
    Mainwaring, W. H.Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)Williams, David (Neath)
    Mann, Mrs. JeanRoss, William (Kilmarnock)Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Abertillery)
    Manuel, A. C.Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.Williams, Ronald (Wigan)
    Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.Silverman, Julius (Erdington)Williams, Rt. Hon. Thomas (Don V'lly)
    Mathers, Rt. Hon. G.Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)
    Messer, F.Simmons, C. J.Winterbottom, Ian (Nottingham, C.)
    Middleton, Mrs. L.Slater, J.Winterbottom, Richard (Brightside)
    Mikardo, IanSmith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)Wise, F. J.
    Mitchison, G. R.Snow, J. W.Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.
    Moeran, E. W.Soskice, Rt. Hon Sir FrankWyatt, W. L.
    Monslow, W.Sparks, J. A.Yates, V. F.
    Moody, A. S.Steele, T.
    Morgan, Dr. H. B.Stewart, Michael (Fulham, E.)

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

    Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.Mr. Royle and
    Morrison, Rt. Hon. H. (Lewisham, S.)Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)Mr. Kenneth Robinson.

    NOES

    Aitken, W. T.Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C.Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
    Alport, C. J. M.Crouch, R. F.Hollis, M. C.
    Amory, Heathcoat (Tiverton)Crowder, Capt. John (Finchley)Hornsby-Smith, Miss P.
    Arbuthnot, JohnCundiff, F. W.Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Florence
    Assheton, Rt. Hon. R. (Blackburn, W.)Davidson, ViscountessHudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)
    Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)Hurd, A. R.
    Baldwin, A. E.Davies, Nigel (Epping)Hutchinson, Geoffrey (Ilford, N.)
    Banks, Col. C.de Chair, SomersetHutchison, Lt.-Com. Clark (E'b'rgh W.)
    Baxter, A. B.De la Bère, R.Hutchison, Colonel James
    Beamish, Major TuftonDeedes, W. F.Jones, A. (Hall Green)
    Bell, R. M.Digby, S. W.Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.
    Bennett, Sir Peter (Edgbaston)Dodds-Parker, A. D.Kerr, H. W. (Cambridge)
    Bennett, William (Woodside)Donner, P. W.Lancaster, Col. C. G.
    Bevins, J. R. (Liverpool, Toxteth)Drayson, G. B.Lennox-Boyd, A. T.
    Birch, NigelDrewe, C.Linstead, H. N.
    Bishop, F. P.Dugdale, Maj. Sir Thomas (Richmond)Llewellyn, D.
    Black, C. W.Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.Lloyd, Maj. Guy (Renfrew, E.)
    Bossom, A. C.Duthie, W. S.Longden, Gilbert (Herts, S.W.)
    Bowen, E. R.Eccles, D. M.Low, A. R. W.
    Boyd-Carpenter, J. A.Eden, Rt. Hon. A.Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)
    Boyle, Sir EdwardErroll, F. J.Lucas, P. B. (Brentford)
    Braine, B. R.Fisher, NigelLucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
    Braithwaite, Lt.-Cmdr. GurneyFort, R.Lyttelton, Rt. Hon. O.
    Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W.Foster, JohnMcAdden, S. J.
    Brooke, Henry (Hampstead)Fraser, Sir I. (Morecambe & Lonsdale)McCallum, Major D.
    Browne, Jack (Govan)Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir David MaxwellMcCorquodale, Rt. Hon. M. S.
    Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.Galbraith, T. G. D. (Hillhead)Macdonald, Sir Peter (I. of Wight)
    Bullock, Capt. M.Gammans, L. D.Mackeson, Brig. H. R.
    Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.Garner-Evans, E. H. (Denbigh)McKibbin, A.
    Burden, Squadron Leader F. A.Gates, Maj. E. E.McKie, J. H. (Galloway)
    Butcher, H. W.Gridley, Sir ArnoldMaclay, Hon. John
    Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)MacLeod, Iain (Enfield, W.)
    Carr, Robert (Mitcham)Grimston, Robert (Westbury)MacLeod, John (Ross and Cromarty)
    Channon, H.Harden, J. R. E.Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold (Bromley)
    Churchill, Rt. Hon. W. S.Hare, Hon. J. H. (Woodbridge)Macpherson, Major Niall (Dumfries)
    Clarke, Col. Ralph (East Grinstead)Harvey, Air Codre. A. V. (Macclesfield)Manningham-Buller, R. E.
    Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmouth, W.)Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)Marlowe, A. A. H.
    Colegate, A.Heald, LionelMarples, A. E.
    Conant, Maj. R. J. E.Heath, EdwardMarshall, Douglas (Bodmin)
    Corbett, Lt.-Col. Uvedale (Ludlow)Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.Marshall, Sidney (Sutton)
    Craddock, G. B. (Spelthorne)Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)Maude, Angus (Ealing, S.)
    Cranborne, ViscountHill, Dr. Charles (Luton)Maudling, R.

    Mellor, Sir JohnProfumo, J. D.Thompson, Kenneth Pugh (Walton)
    Molson, A. H. E.Raikes, H. V.Thorneycroft, Peter (Monmouth)
    Morrison, John (Salisbury)Redmayne, M.Thornton-Kemsley, Col. C. N.
    Morrison, Rt. Hon. W. S. (Cirencester)Remnant, Hon. P.Touche, G. C.
    Nabarro, G.Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)Turner, H. F. L.
    Nicholls, HarmarRoper, Sir HaroldTurton, R. H.
    Nicholson, G.Ropner, Col. L.Vane, W. M. F.
    Nield, Basil (Chester)Russell, R. S.Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.
    Noble, Cmdr. A. H. P.Savory, Prof. D. L.Walker-Smith, D. C.
    Nugent, G. R. H.Scott, DonaldWard, Miss I. (Tynemouth)
    Nutting, AnthonySmiles, Lt.-Col. Sir WalterWaterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.
    Odey, G. W.Smith, E. Martin (Grantham)Watkinson, H.
    O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir HughSmyth, Brig. J. G. (Norwood)Watt, Sir George Harvie
    Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.Snadden, W. McN.Webbe, Sir Harold
    Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)Soames, Capt. C.White, Baker (Canterbury)
    Orr-Ewing, Ian L. (Weston-super-Mare)Spearman, A. C. M.Williams, Charles (Torquay)
    Osborne, C.Spens, Sir Patrick (Kensington, S.)Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)
    Peake, Rt. Hon. O.Steward, W. A. (Woolwich, W.)Williams, Sir Herbert (Croydon, E.)
    Perkins, W. R. D.Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)Wills, G.
    Peto, Brig. C. H. M.Storey, S.Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
    Pickthorn, K.Strauss, Henry (Norwich, S.)Wood, Hon. R.
    Powell, J. EnochStuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)York, C.
    Prescott, S.Summers, G. S.
    Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)Taylor, Charles (Eastbourne)

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

    Mr. Studholme and Major Wheatley.

    5.15 p.m.

    I beg to move, in page 2, line 13, at the end, to add:

    (3) Nothing in the said Act or in this section shall be held to authorise the making of any order under Regulation fifty-eight A of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939.
    This Amendment would make it impossible to reintroduce the direction of labour by Statutory Instrument. My object is not to discuss the merits of direction of labour on this Amendment, even if you were to allow me to do so, Sir Charles; it is to discuss the method by which direction of labour should be introduced, whether, as under this Bill it should be introduced by Statutory Instrument, or whether a different method should be adopted. I want to make it clear that I am not going into the merits of the question.

    Before asking for elucidation of the view of the Government, I wish to put the attitude of my hon. Friends and myself on this matter. First, we say that the direction of labour in any permanent enactment would never be countenanced by those on this side of the Committee. Second, we say that the direction of labour in peace-time in any form could not be agreed to, unless it were shown to be quite indispensable for re-armament. Third, we say that, even if it were shown to be indispensable, it should be introduced by statute, so that the justification would be made clear in the Second Reading debate and Amendments would be able to be introduced in Committee. That being our basic view, it follows that we think that Regulation 58A could be dispensed with and that no orders should be made under it in peace-time, even for defence purposes, and this our Amendment provides.

    The difficulty in which we are arises from the contradictory statements that have been made by members of the Government. Prima facie the fact that orders may be made for these new purposes makes it more likely that the Regulation will be used. Therefore, we have to examine rather carefully what the Government have said. I begin with a statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 23rd October, 1950:
    "I could not honestly and conscientiously say that within the next 12 months it is quite out of the question that we should need to make orders under this regulation."
    He was referring to Regulation 58A, the one dealing with the direction of labour He continued:
    "The reason for it, of course, would be in connection with the defence programme."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd October, 1950; Vol. 478, c. 2588.]

    Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman mind reading the last part of that quotation again? He seemed to me to put something in parenthesis, as if it were a comment.

    I am sorry. I was explaining that these words, which were actually those used by the Chancellor, referred to Regulation 58A. As the right hon. Gentleman will appreciate, I did not intend to add any colour to the Chancellor's remarks.

    I cannot give the exact words of the next statement for a reason that will be obvious to the Committee. The essence of the next Government statement was that any provision which conflicted with the freedom of the individual, such as the direction of labour, should be left out of any permanent Bill placing these powers on a permanent basis; and that if such a provision was needed, owing to difficult circumstances, the Government would come to Parliament "with an express Bill." I ask the Committee to note the words "with an express Bill," because that is very like the position which I have already declared to the Committee to be that upon which my hon. and right hon. Friends stand. That is the effect of what Lord Jowitt, the Lord Chancellor, said in another place on 2nd November, which was a few days later.

    That, naturally, aroused considerable hopes that the two sides of the House might be coming together on this point. But then, five days after, there was a debate in this House in which the matter was taken up—including the statement which was made by the Lord Chancellor—by the Minister of Local Government and Planning, who set himself the task of making the matter pellucidly clear. After reading a column of what the right hon. Gentleman said, I cannot say that the clarity became any more pellucid to me, but at all events we have the advantage of his gloss upon the Lord Chancellor's statement.

    It is interesting to see how he put it, in view of what I have already summarised as being what was said in another place, because the right hon. Gentleman began by saying that both the Lord Chancellor, to whom I have referred, and he himself, were speaking with the full authority of the Cabinet. He again said:
    "the Bill we shall introduce"—
    that is, the permanent Bill—
    "will not contain any provision for the direction of labour. We do not have it in mind to introduce a Bill providing for the direction of labour."
    He then went on to say that if there occurred some misadventure or crisis the Government would have to consider it again. Then he repeated:
    "But we have no intention of introducing, in this Bill or in any other Bill, a provision providing for the direction of labour."
    The right hon. Gentleman then went on to make a fundamental mistake, because he said:
    "A few months ago we dispensed with them,"—
    that is, the orders under the Regulation—
    "to the great chagrin of the Opposition, who were looking forward to a debate which was, unfortunately for them, disposed of by the fact that a few days before my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour dispensed with those powers."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th November, 1950; Vol. 480, c. 889.]
    That was a mistake because, of course, the then Minister of Labour had not dispensed with the powers. Regulation 58A was still in operation. What he had dispensed with were the orders which he had made under the Regulation, and the Minister of Local Government and Planning was under a complete misapprehension in stating to the House that the powers had been dispensed with.

    That brings up the story to a point which the right hon. Gentleman sitting opposite and I remember, because I am sure it will be the only occasion in my life in respect of which the right hon. Gentleman will ever say that, after a speech of mine, his first intention and necessity was to reduce the temperature of the House. The right hon. Gentleman has the occasion in mind. He said, in the course of letting the mercury run down in the tube, that he would deal, if I might put it in this way, with both employers and employed, and he said that the measures that would be taken by the Government would deal equitably with both.

    May I again make clear the reason why, as I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will appreciate, I am doing this? I am not arguing that point; I fully appreciate that there might well be circumstances in which that was a necessary policy for the Government. During the war we saw the necessity for concentration as well as for the direction of labour. I am not arguing whether the time is ripe or when the time would be ripe—that would not be relevant. But I do say—and I hope the right hon. Gentleman may think it—that to deal equitably with any aspect of this problem it should be done by legislation and not by regulation, as can be done under this Bill.

    The Secretary of State for Air, who dealt with this matter on the Second Reading of the Bill, did not seem to have had the advantage of the opinion of the Solicitor-General, which the Committee has had this afternoon, because the Secretary of State for Air said flatly:
    "all I can say is that they"—
    meaning the Government—
    "have powers under the Regulations to do so"—
    that is, to bring in direction of labour—
    "in any circumstances and spheres that they think necessary."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st February, 1951; Vol. 484, c. 1378.]
    Of course, the whole purpose of this Bill is to give the Government power for the purposes and in the sphere of dealing with defence matters.

    5.30 p.m.

    We feel that a problem of this perplexity, which has an effect on personal liberty, ought to be dealt with by statute. I have given the first reason. If a Bill is introduced the Minister has to justify the need for the Bill by a speech on principle on Second Reading. Our support of this Bill, which I reiterated a short time ago, shows we should be prepared to consider, on the merits and according to the circumstances of the time, whether or not there was a need. But if hon. Members in all quarters of the House required a Bill for compulsory military service, so that they could deal with the aspects of the problem which the needs of their constituents underline, I cannot see why they should not require the same method of dealing with it when it is a question of directing to jobs people who remain civilians, but whose efforts are so important to the country.

    I would put it on two grounds. First, the requirement for a reasoned justification to us, wherever we may sit, on Second Reading. Second, that we ought to have the opportunity of introducing Amendments to deal with special cases. It is only when we come to the House on Committee stage and hear somebody who has special knowledge of one section of industry, or some occupation, that we begin to appreciate the special problems. I consider, therefore, that amendment is essential in a matter of this kind. The alternative is making orders which can be prayed against, but cannot be amended, and that is wholly inadequate to the subject matter.

    I apologise to the Committee for dealing with the matter at some length, but hon. Members will appreciate that it was necessary for me to take that line about Government statements so that the right hon. Gentleman would be able to see the difficulties which are in our minds and could attempt to clarify them for us.

    I am obliged to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for having stated the position with such clarity. At the same time, he said that it is not necessary—although I think it would be in order—to discuss the merits of the direction of labour. I hope that what I shall have to say will make it unnecessary for us to go into that question to any great degree.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman quoted a number of my colleagues on this subject. As he said, it is possible to put a different tangent of interpretation upon various statements which have been made, because the whole position is not so clear as it might be. Indeed, I think the Amendment itself shows that there is a certain lack of clarity in the position; because it would be assumed from the Amendment that the power to direct labour arises from an order made under the Regulation. That is not the case. The power derives directly from the Regulation itself, and not from an order made under it. I quote here from the first paragraph of Regulation 58A:
    "The Minister of Labour and National Service (hereinafter in this Regulation referred to as 'the Minister') or any National Service Officer may direct any person in Great Britain to perform such services in the United Kingdom or in any British ship not being a Dominion ship as may be specified by or described in the direction.…"
    So we are not here dealing with powers taken by the Minister under an order. We are here dealing with powers conferred upon the Minister by regulation, and that, I think, is the reason for the slight confusion which has arisen among those responsible for the Amendment.

    May I put this point? During the war a great many documents were issued entitled "directions" but they were, nevertheless, Statutory Rules and Orders.

    The only point I am making, to clear our minds about it, is that the power is there and can be exercised by the Minister by means of directions; either by himself or by an officer acting on his behalf. Therefore, it is not necessary to have an order to bring those powers into existence. I merely make that point to get the technicalities right. I agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman that the real point here is whether the House of Commons considers it is desirable that power over the individual, the liberty of the subject, should be taken by the Government by an instrument that can only be prayed against; or whether such powers should be exercised in peace-time at all. That is the issue.

    I take the view that, except in very exceptional circumstances indeed, it is not desirable, in peace-time, to direct labour. I also take the view that if it is desirable to do it, it ought to be done by a Bill; and that we ought not, it seems to me, to give to the Executive such extraordinary powers over personal liberty except by statute, in which they can be properly defined and in which the House can put whatever safeguards it considers necessary. I would, therefore, like to put on record this statement: no further use will be made of the powers given by Regulation 58 A either (a) to direct men or women to perform specified services or (b) to require them to remain in specified employment unless and until an immediate attack on this country is anticipated. If, for any other reason, such powers are deemed to be necessary, legislation to obtain them will be introduced.

    I am afraid, however, that that does not entirely dispose of the Amendment. I believe—I hope I am correct in saying this—that the Opposition have moved the Amendment on this point only. But there are powers under Regulation 58A that we shall need. For instance, in addition to the power to direct labour it gives power to make orders to require workers to register themselves, or the employers to register particulars about their employees. It also gives power to make essential work orders; and to require employers to keep necessary records and to give information; and for inspectors to enter premises and inspect with a view to securing compliance with directions given under the Regulation. In our opinion those powers may be absolutely essential if we are to carry out the re-armament programme. They are not powers which constrain the liberty of the subject, but they are powers which I might find it necessary to use. I am advised that if the Amendment were carried all these powers would be killed, and I am quite sure it is not the desire of the Opposition to do that.

    My right hon. Friend refers to the retention of powers relating to essential work orders, and, earlier, in his prepared statement, he said that he had no desire to retain people in industry. Would he make that a little clearer?

    Yes, certainly. It may still be necessary to identify a certain industry as essential and then to direct the employer that he should take on no more workers there. That does not interfere with the liberty of the individual. It does not say to the employer, "You shall work here or you shall work there" or, to the employee, "You shall work here or you shall work there." It is merely power to concentrate production for the purposes necessary for defence. It is also power to secure that the defence programme itself does not eat too substantially into the necessity for exports.

    So, we have these two purposes which, I suggest, are dominant purposes. The first is to maintain the export drive in order that an unfavourable balance of trade may not jeopardise our position, and the second is to carry out the re-armament programme. Suppose that we have said to an industry, "You are necessary for the export drive." As hon. Members know, industries produce for the home market as well as for the export market. Suppose, in the allocation of raw materials or in the right to employ larger numbers of workers, something was done on the ground that the industry was producing for the export trade, and then we had cause to suspect that what was being given for the extension or for the maintenance of export trade was, in fact, used for production for the home market. In that case we must have powers to inspect to find out whether the purposes were not being violated by the employer.

    That, again, is not a power over the liberty of the subject. It is a power to secure that we get the necessary information and that the necessary disciplines are applied to keep industry moving in the direction which it is nationally desirable that it should move. There are various powers, all contained in Regulation 58A, which it may be necessary to use. I am sure, from what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has said, that the Amendment moved by the Opposition does not desire, as it were, to decapitate the powers, but only to secure from me an undertaking of the nature I have already given. That being the case, I hope that the Opposition will be satisfied with the statement and will withdraw the Amendment.

    The announcement which the right hon. Gentleman has just made is, as he is very well aware, one of very great importance. It justifies the efforts against direction of labour in time of peace which my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe) has made over a number of years. The right hon. Gentleman, after some four years of effort against him and his predecessors, has largely met the points which were urged in vain in this House when there were 400 Members on the benches opposite.

    I appreciate the technical and mechanical difficulties which the right hon. Gentleman would be in if he were to accept this Amendment. I do not know what my right hon. and learned Friend will do, but, if the Amendment is to be withdrawn without any further assurance, we shall be left in the unsatisfactory position that Regulation 58A will still be there in full effect, and that it would always be possible for a successor of the right hon. Gentleman to make an order under it. I am not casting any aspersions upon any right hon. Gentleman who may occupy the office which the Minister now holds, but where we are concerned, as we are here, with the liberty of the subject, it is not a wholly satisfactory position.

    I ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider this suggestion. Why is it not possible for him to accept the Amendment and then to introduce—I imagine that it would have to be by statute—the necessary provisions which he wishes to save from Regulation 58A? That would then give the House an opportunity, now long overdue, to review a good many of the subsidiary provisions of Regulation 58A. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, these provisions are a good many years old. The time has come when many of them could be reconsidered. An opportunity for that would be given if the right hon. Gentleman could do something on those lines.

    5.45 p.m.

    If the hon. Gentleman reads my announcement, which he cannot do now, he will see that I said:

    "unless and until an immediate attack on this country is anticipated."
    We are living in unusual times. I have not given an undertaking that in no circumstances whatever will these powers be used. Let us take the case of an unexpected air attack. We might have to act at once. Therefore, I could not give the undertaking in such precise terms as the hon. Member indicated. I think that it would be most unusual to refuse to accept an undertaking from a spokesman of the Government made in such precise and particular terms. Indeed, I cannot imagine the House of Commons allowing the Government to take these powers except in circumstances that would justify them after such an undertaking being given.

    In the disastrous circumstances which the right hon. Gentleman has envisaged, clearly it would be necessary for a great deal of emergency legislation to be put through, as the right hon. Gentleman will recall that it was put through in the first days of September, 1939. Speaking for myself, I cannot see why it should be impossible to put through, if it be necessary, direction of labour at a time when other emergency legislation would have to be put through. I cannot see what the difficulty is.

    I cannot imagine in such circumstances any Minister waiting even for the House of Commons. He would act first, and these would be the powers under which he would act. Then he would have to justify his action by the circumstances of the time. It is not good enough to say that in face of action of that sort, he could come to the House of Commons for emergency powers. The House would expect him to take emergency action and justify it afterwards.

    I know that the right hon. Gentleman will not think that I am for a moment questioning his bona fides if I give reasons why I should prefer something in the legislation rather than a mere undertaking, but I agree with him, in part, in what he has said about the technical objections to our Amendment as it stands. The two points I want to put to the right hon. Gentleman are these: first, I think it is always difficult critically to examine the form of an undertaking which is read to the Committee, as the right hon. Gentleman very usefully read it. Nevertheless, my first impression was that it was generally satisfactory. If he would allow me to make one criticism, which I assure him is not frivolous, I am sorry that he used the word "anticipated" when I think he meant "expected." I think he will find that his undertaking would be better if he said "expected" instead of "anticipated" in the place where it occurs. There is a difference between the two. I say that to the right hon. Gentleman with the less hesitation, because I know that he has himself some appreciation of the accurate use of language.

    But the whole of the undertaking he has given would be capable of being placed in this Measure. I do not think that anything drafted by amateur draftsmen would be wholly satisfactory to the right hon. Gentleman, but I am certain that his own draftsmen could draft the undertaking he has given in satisfactory form and incorporate it in this Measure. The second point is that, apart from the emergency in which he might, for the reasons he has given, want to retain even the power of direction of labour, all the other powers he mentioned as those which he might wish to retain arise, I think, under paragraph (4) of the Regulation.

    I think that either of two methods of drafting could give more satisfaction than the undertaking in the Minister's speech has given. He could set out in the Measure either those things which he wishes to retain or those things which he is quite content to abandon. Therefore, while in no way quarrelling with the general tone and purpose of his speech, as I understood it, I would ask him to consider whether his undertaking could not be incorporated in this Measure which we now have before us, because, if so, I think he will agree—and on the basis of his past speeches he certainly ought to agree—that it would be much more satisfactory to hon. Members in all parts of the Committee who have some concern with a possible invasion of human liberties.

    I do not want to stop any of my hon. Friends who have any particular points on which they want to ask the right hon. Gentleman, but I am sure that he will appreciate my feeling that I ought to rise now to signify a course which seems to be right to me. Whether or not I ask now, Sir Charles, for leave to withdraw the Amendment, you will understand that that is what I intend to do. In intimating that to the Committee, may I say that the right hon. Gentleman has expressed quite clearly—and, of course, he was speaking with all the responsibility of his position—the view that he does not like, and does not intend to have, the direction of labour in time of peace, and he has also indicated what he means by "time of peace" with sufficient clarity for my purpose and approach. Further, he has acceded to the principle that, if direction of labour is introduced, it should be introduced by statute.

    I feel that it is most important that, when the two great parties, through their spokesmen, come to an agreement on an important point, it ought to be accepted, and that I ought to say that here is a point of agreement which we should ask everyone to support. Therefore, I felt that it would be right at an early stage to intimate to you, Sir Charles, that I shall, at the proper moment, formally ask for leave to withdraw the Amendment on the undertaking and explanation which have been given by the right hon. Gentleman. But, of course, I am anxious not to stand between my hon. Friends behind me and any specific questions which they may desire to ask. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention.

    There is one point which I should like to put to the Minister. I think that this afternoon, we may have done something of great value to industry. It is quite obvious that the only way of getting over our difficulties in the next few years—and there is no difference between the two sides of the Committee on this question—is by achieving a greater degree of productivity.

    The point which I want to put to the right hon. Gentleman—not having had the benefit of reading and carefully considering the statement which he has made—is whether it will be made quite clear to those who work in industry that any threat of the direction of labour is now removed from them—unless, of course, a Measure for that purpose is introduced in the House—except and until we are actually on the threshold of a fighting war. The particular point about which I am concerned is this. Let us suppose that there is an intensification of the cold war, and we have other adventures like Korea elsewhere in the world. Would that be taken to be the anticipated threat—"anticipated" was the word the Minister used—that might cause any Minister to bring in an order under Regulation 58A, or will it only be the direct threat of hostilities against this country itself? It is a small point, but it is essential that industry as a whole should have its mind clear on these things, because if they can feel that, in going to do this job, they are acting of their own free will and not under any direction from a Minister, we shall get very much better production results.

    The only point which I wish to bring to the notice of the Committee concerns the value of dealing with matters of this kind by legislation. For a long period, we have been seeking the withdrawal of Regulation 58A, and, in effect, that has now been achieved, because the Minister says that, except in particular circumstances, he will not exercise his powers of direction of labour which exist in that Regulation. This is a power which we have been endeavouring for a long time to abolish, and we have used every method of doing so, including the use of the Prayer. When we get legislation which comes before us on the Floor of the House, the effect is achieved. I hope that hon. Members will remember this very valuable lesson, and will also remember that it is better to legislate by means of a Bill than by decree.

    I really must ask the hon. and learned Member for Hove (Mr. Marlowe) not to make the suggestion that Regulation 58A has been withdrawn.

    I did not say that. I said that it no longer contained the power for the direction of labour.

    It is much more. I must not run the risk, later, of exposing myself to an attack of bad faith. All that I have said, and I repeat the language, is this:

    "No further use will be made of the powers given by Regulation 58A either (a) to direct men or women to perform specified services, or (b), to require them to remain in specified employment unless and until an immediate attack on this country is expected."

    "If for any other reason such powers are deemed to be necessary, legislation to obtain them will be introduced."
    All the other powers of Regulation 58A remain. I said that it may be necessary to use all or some of them, but they will not be powers directly relating to the liberty of the subject in the way that the direction of labour does. I do want to assure the Committee that the language is precise. I could not do what the hon. and learned Member for Norwich, South (Mr. H. Strauss) suggested, because it would still be necessary, even if I were to take out the powers from this Bill, to put them back again.

    In these circumstances, I think the assurance I have given is more useful than the Amendment would be. It is always difficult to try to put into a Bill all kinds of concrete circumstances that might make it necessary to do this. For example, an attack on this country might be made by means of directed missiles or anything else. We should find the greatest difficulty in defining the circumstances in which it might be necessary to act, and I think it is better to leave it in this way, in view of the unprecedented circumstances in which we are placed.

    I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."

    6.0 p.m.

    There is one matter which I desire to raise with the right hon. Gentleman. We have now disposed of the question of the direction of labour, but there is another aspect of the powers contained in this Clause to which an oblique reference was made during the debate both by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe) and the Minister of Labour himself. Could the right hon. Gentleman say a word to us on the powers dealing with the concentration of industry to which he referred in his speech a few moments ago? We had considerable experience during the recent war of the operation of this procedure. The right hon. Gentleman told us that it may be necessary to use these powers for a variety of reasons. Dispersal is sometimes necessary, and concentration may be necessary for reasons of production and strategy.

    The most likely case is where there is such a shortage of a raw material affecting an industry that it is necessary to have some sort of central organisation or pool from which various factories concerned in that particular form of production would have to draw. In the event of our having to re-concentrate certain sections of industry, I should like to know whether, broadly speaking, he would be prepared to follow the procedure adopted in the recent war by which a scheme of concentration was prepared within industry itself and submitted to the Minister for his blessing or approval or any criticism.

    That would mean, of course, the right hon. Gentleman retaining the right and power to say, "This scheme is no good and I propose to proceed along different lines as advised by officials at the Ministry who have experience of these matters." But I think he will agree that, broadly speaking, during the recent war schemes of concentration which were put up from within industries and largely administered by committees of persons from within those industries, worked satisfactorily. That is the kind of line we ought to follow should it become necessary again. I think that this might be a suitable opportunity for the right hon. Gentleman to say a word to the Committee on that subject.

    I should like to refer to the effect on another aspect of our life of powers conferred by this Clause to take possession of land and chattels and to use land in any way that is desired. I am certain we all recall that during the war the grim necessity existed to take over premises or land at very short notice indeed. Great hardships were imposed upon many owners or occupiers of land and buildings and those people incurred great losses.

    Regulation 51 confers power to take possession of any land and to make such use of it as a competent authority thinks to be expedient, and no period of notice is specified at all. Regulation 52 enables any land to be used for Army, Air Force or Naval purposes and again no period of notice is specified. Regulation 53 enables chattels to be requisitioned, including ships, whether they are in this country or outside this country, if they belong to British owners. Regulation 54 gives power to permit nuisances, and in that case there is a period of notice.

    It seems to me that there is an essential difference between giving these powers for defence purposes and giving them for civil purposes. We all appreciate that where defence purposes are concerned there may be circumstances in which great urgency will arise, but I should have thought it possible so to draft the Bill as to give the Minister power by declaration to re-enter into certain powers which he himself had abrogated, as it were. The Minister has said that he will not use certain powers under Regulation 50A except in certain circumstances. I hope he will give the same kind of assurance on the period of notice and the circumstances in which he will take over land and chattels.

    The hon. Member is now discussing an Amendment I did not select.

    I think I am entitled to refer to the powers that are conferred by this Clause. I do not desire to refer to any particular remedy. In point of fact, the remedy I have suggested was not the remedy suggested in the Amendment—not precisely at any rate.

    It does not make any difference whether it was in the Amendment or not. It is not in the Clause and therefore it is out of order.

    May I make reference to the effect of this Clause as far as the regulations to which I am referring are concerned? I was dealing with the degree of notice required by these regulations and I trust that is in order. I was about to say that, for example, under the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) (Scotland) Act, 1947, periods of notice were laid down for what was considered urgent procedure. A period of notice was provided which enabled representations to be made within 14 days of publication in local newspapers. There was no public inquiry but there was power for a Minister to consider any representations made against the notice.

    Under the powers given in this Bill no notice is required. Therefore, there can be no possibility at all of protesting against any action that the Minister or those whom he authorises may take. This is a very important point. We all recognise that in the case of imminent danger urgent powers would be required. But in the period of cold war or the sort of twilight in which we exist at the present time, it seems that so far as these regulations are concerned powers might be modified, at any rate in such a way as to limit the possibility of applying them in full until certain most serious circumstances arise. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will say how it is intended to apply these powers.

    I think the hon. Member has misunderstood the purpose of the Clause. It does not confer any new power whatsoever. It only widens or re-defines the purpose for which existing powers can be used. If the hon. Member will look at the Clause—and I do not want to resurrect the previous discussion—he will find it merely makes it quite clear in this Bill that the powers that exist already can be used for the purposes defined in the Clause.

    It would be quite impossible to give notice of requisitioning for defence purposes. It might be possible in certain circumstances, but it is very difficult indeed to define circumstances in which notice must be given, or circumstances in which it need not be given, because emergency action is necessary. Indeed, it is very much in the national interest that action should be taken without notice quite often, because notice to do something for military purposes is not only notice to the owners of the property but it might be notice to the enemy of what our intentions were.

    Therefore, it may very often be necessary to consummate the act simultaneously with the notice being given. I think it would be quite improper here to modify the conditions in which requisitioning could take place. That would apply to ships as well as to land and property. It certainly would be undesirable, for example, to give long notice to the owner of a vessel that that vessel was to be subject to requisitioning. I hope, therefore, that the hon. Member will not press the point.

    With regard to the concentration of industry, these powers are conferred upon the President of the Board of Trade—not upon the Minister of Labour—under Regulation 55, and I am sure that my right hon. Friend will take the view that where concentration is necessary the higher the degree of the voluntary element in that concentration the better. I should not imagine that he would be at all loth to consider any schemes put up in order to bring about that concentration with the least disturbance to private interests. But, as will be recognised, I can give no undertaking at all of a precise nature at the moment. We do not know how this is going to alight on any particular industry, because not only are there the additional requirements for rearmament but there is, of course, a shortage of raw materials in certain cases which would very much complicate the matter. But I agree that where we do have concentration it is far better to have it by a scheme satisfactory to all concerned.

    Question put, and agreed to.

    Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 2—(Stopping Up Of Highways For Defence Purposes)

    I beg to move in page 2, line 17, after "diversion," to insert

    "for a period of not more than eighteen months."
    This Amendment raises less contentious and smaller issues than those raised by the previous Amendments, but it has a certain importance in those parts of the country in which it may well be that the Government will exercise powers given by this Bill for the stopping up of highways for defence purposes. As I understand the Clause, two methods for stopping up a highway are provided. There is the first method dealt with in the first five subsections, which is, I understand, intended to apply where the stopping up will be temporary. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary said so on the Second Reading, and when one compares the words used with the reference to permanent stopping up in the second part, it is obvious that some contrast is intended. The second method in the second part of the Clause deals with permanent stopping up.

    The effect of my Amendment would be to ensure that the temporary procedure should only be used when it was, in fact, going to be a temporary stopping up. Temporary powers should not be allowed to have a long-term effect. The Amendment seeks, therefore, to restrict to a period of 18 months the stopping up which may be effected by the first procedure. I do not think that imposes any unfair burden on the Defence Departments. If they desire to stop up a highway for a longer period, they can use the procedure set out in subsection (5) and the following subsections, and make it permanent; if they want to do so for more than 18 months they would be forced to use that procedure. It seems to me that the advantage of forcing them to use that procedure is that it provides far greater protection for the interests adversely affected than it is possible to provide where it is only a temporary urgent stopping up which is needed.

    6.15 p.m.

    The effect, therefore, as I understand, if the Amendment is accepted, is that under the first procedure a highway may be stopped up for 18 months. If at the end of 18 months it is desired to continue the stopping up, then the second half of the Clause must be called in aid and the procedure therein set out may be used. I am not entirely tied to 18 months; I think it is a fair compromise, but I should be open to any argument that the Solicitor-General might have as to whether that was an appropriate period. What seems to be important is that there should be some definite period laid down for the purpose of the temporary procedure.

    I do not think the hon. Member has given sufficient weight to subsection (4), and I hope that when I direct his attention to it rather more particularly he may agree that his Amendment is not necessary. The position is as he stated it. That is to say, the first four subsections provide for a method of stopping up highways temporarily, and then the succeeding subsections provide for permanent stopping up. Under the first four subsections the result will be that a road can be stopped up only for the period indicated in subsection (4).

    Subsection (4) provides:
    "The power to make orders under subsection (1) of this section"—
    that is to say, to make orders temporarily stopping up highways—
    "shall cease to be exercisable on the expiry of the Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Act, 1945."
    That means December, 1951. The original 1945 Act expired in December last year, and then there was the Motion to which we have had reference this afternoon to extend it for a further year up to 10th December, 1951.

    Then the proviso goes on to say:
    "Provided that any such order in force immediately before the expiry of that Act"—
    that is to say, in force immediately before December, 1951—
    "shall, unless previously revoked, continue in force for a further period of two years."
    That is to say, the maximum period for which it could possibly continue in force, unless the 1945 Act is further extended, is up to December, 1953.

    Supposing this Bill becomes law quite soon, and supposing, for example, the Minister of Transport stopped up a highway under subsection (1) in June of this year, the hon. Gentleman's Amendment would mean that the stopping up would continue until December, 1952.

    It could continue until December, 1952. So that really there is only one year's difference between the position as it would be if this Amendment were accepted and the position as it is under the Bill as drawn. I feel that there is no need to abbreviate the comparatively short period as it is at the moment, as the hon. Gentleman would seek to abbreviate it. Not only is that the case, but the advice that I have received is that in a great many cases in which highways are temporarily stopped up it would be very difficult to determine within a period of 18 months after they are stopped up whether it was desirable to convert the temporary stopping up into a permanent stopping up.

    In a great many circumstances which one can envisage, the situation would not be clear enough at the end of 18 months to enable a firm decision to be taken whether the highway should be permanently stopped up under the succeeding provisions of the Clause. Indeed, it would occasion a good deal of inconvenience, unnecessary expense and administrative action. I hope the hon. Gentleman will agree that there is not a sufficient case for abbreviating the period as he desires. It is true, as he has just intimated by his interjection, that the Supplies and Services Act can be continued, but it has to be continued as a result of discussion in this House. It can be continued only if a Motion is put down and carried under the terms of Section 8 of the Act of 1945. It is only after the House has decided that it is to remain in force for an extra year that the period specified in subsection (4) of the Clause can be prolonged.

    Inasmuch as the hon. Member's Amendment does no more than abbreviate the maximum time from December, 1953 to December, 1952—and it is the maximum time in both cases—with the result that it would often be very difficult by December, 1952, to take a decision whether the necessary steps should be followed permanently to stop up the highway, I urge upon the Committee that no useful purpose could be served by accepting the Amendment, and my advice is that it should not be accepted.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman's argument sounded very convincing until one considered that it was based upon one hypothesis, and that a demonstrably false hypothesis—that the Supplies and Services Act would not in any circumstances be extended beyond 10th December of this year. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman comes to that Box in order to give that assurance on behalf of His Majesty's Government, well and good; but in the present state of the world no hon. Member believes that that will be the case. The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows perfectly well that from time to time power has been taken to continue these statutes in force, Not only that, but that power has been taken by, to my mind, the singularly objectionable procedure of continuing them in force by Motion.

    Let me relate that to this issue. Suppose, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman admits is possible, the Acts are continued in force beyond 10th December of the present year and suppose, as he suggested, that is done by Motion. On that Motion it will be quite impossible as indeed was the case last October, to amend the powers at all. The House will be presented with the whole thing and will be told, "Take it or leave it," as was the case on 23rd October last year. At that stage it will be impossible to impose any time limit at all upon the period during which the supposedly temporary power to stop up a highway can be exercised.

    I must confess that what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said, particularly by implication, made me feel that my Amendment is rather more necessary than had appeared to be the case, because his comparison between the time in the Clause and my argument is a wholly artificial comparison. The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows perfectly well that in the unlikely event of this Government continuing in power until 10th December, 1951, there is every intention either of providing the permanent statute promised in the King's Speech or of continuing the present statutes in force. The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows that.

    Once that is accepted, the whole of his argument—that there will be only a very limited period up to December, 1953, during which the temporary stopping up can be carried on—is quite clearly false. I am not at all happy about the attitude disclosed by the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I think it indicates at least the possibility that this temporary procedure—intended to be temporary, with all the lack of safeguards for the interests concerned which are perhaps acceptable in a temporary Measure but are wholly inacceptable in a permanent one—may in point of fact be continued for so long a period as to impose quite considerable injustice upon those affected.

    There is no point in my detaining the Committee with examples, but hon. Members are aware that closing up a means of access, for example to traders' establishments, or the closing of a road to a garage or public house, can effect very serious loss. There is very little protection if the temporary procedure is followed; there is very little cover for those people and very little chance for them to make representations. Although, as I said, this is a relatively small point, I am bound to say that the line taken by the right hon. and learned Gentleman is very disquieting and the possibility of some injustice being done in a limited number of cases is a real one.

    Amendment negatived.

    I beg to move, in page 4, line 13, at the end to insert:

    (9) Any person who has any estate or interest in land which is injuriously affected by any order made under this section shall be entitled to recover from the Minister of Transport compensation for the injury to that estate or interest; and any question whether compensation is payable under this subsection or as to the amount of any compensation so payable shall, in default of agreement, be determined by the Lands Tribunal.
    I move this Amendment without any elaboration or even very much by way of illustration or illumination because my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing), who is primarily interested in it is unfortunately detained elsewhere. I think the purpose of the Amendment is quite plain upon the face of it; and equally that upon the face of it, hon. Members in all parties would wish that where the State has in the general interest to destroy or diminish somebody's legitimate right in something, the person so damaged should have the prospect of equitable compensation.

    I think it will be in the recollection of hon. Members who have been interested in the Bill that on Second Reading the Secretary of State for Air said—I will not overcall it; I do not say he gave anything we would endeavour to use as an assurance—at least, he admitted that there was substance in the suggestion now embodied in this Amendment, and gave an assurance that the matter should be looked into. I hope that at least the matter is now fully understood on the Treasury Bench, and I venture even to hope that it may be admitted that there is something in the Amendment which was desired by my hon. Friend and which in his absence I am afraid I move rather inadequately, but I hope I have made the quite simple point plain enough.

    As it stands, the Clause incorporates by reference certain provisions for compensation. Compensation is payable in the first place to persons whose land is acquired for the purpose of providing an alternative route. It is payable also to statutory undertakers who may be required to move their pipes and other apparatus to the alternative route provided. That is done by incorporating Defence Regulation 51 and Section 49 (3) of the Town and Country Planning Act. That is so far as the former category of compensation is concerned. The latter category of compensation is similarly—

    Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman remind us which is the former and which is the latter?

    The former category are persons whose land is acquired for the purpose of providing an alternative route.

    They get compensation under the regulations, and the way that is done as a matter of machinery is that Defence Regulation 51 is applied by subsection (3) of the Clause. In the case of permanent stopping up of highways it is done by incorporating subsection (3) of Section 49 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947. That is the first category of compensation; compensation in the second category is brought about by incorporating in subsection (3) Defence Regulation 50 and, in the case of a permanent stopping up, by incorporating Section 49 (6) of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947. That is done by subsection (6) of this Clause.

    But to go further and to do what the hon. Member proposes would be to introduce a wholly novel precedent in these stopping up codes. What he would seek to do—and I infer that by reference to the language which he uses, namely, by reference to his inclusion of "injuriously affected" land—is to incorporate the compensation provisions of Section 68 of the Land Clauses Act, 1845.

    6.30 p.m.

    That, as hon. Members know, is the general provision which contains compensation provisions and which is made applicable in a number of statutes in the case where land is acquired, but in the codes which deal with stopping up of highways there is absolutely no provision for compensation such as the hon. Gentleman desires. I refer to the Highway Act, 1835, which is the main existing code, and to Section 49 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, which is the new code by which the Highway Act was partly replaced; and I also refer to the Requisitioned Land and War Works Act, 1945. None of these three codes, all of which deal with stopping up of highways, contains any such provision for compensation as the hon. Gentleman desires.

    Not only that, but the Requisitioned Land and War Works Act, deals with the case which is almost exactly analogous to the case with which this present Bill deals; that is, dealing with the case where a highway has been temporarily stopped up under emergency powers and is permanently stopped up. That is very similar to the sort of case which is dealt with by Clause 2 of the present Bill, and not even in that Act of 1945 is there any compensation provided for as the hon. Gentleman desires in this Clause.

    Not only is that an objection to the proposal which he makes, but if one were to accept the Amendment as he has drafted it in very few cases would it result—if, indeed, in any case—in compensation being paid at all, because the words "injuriously affected" in Section 68 of the 1845 Act have been construed in a number of judicial decisions as being limited to providing compensation for an actual infringement—I am speaking in general terms—of some easement or other right incidental to the ownership of land.

    A very typical case is that where works which are done on adjoining land, under the provisions of the Act, consist of the erection of a larger building and where the effect of the erection of that building is to block ancient lights rights, and the owner of adjoining land claims compensation. That is a typical case, and it has been said in general that compensation is only payable under Section 68 of the 1845 Act where one can say that some right inherent in the land has been interfered with as a result of the works done on adjoining land. Therefore, if one applies that interpretation of Section 68 to this kind of case it will, I think, be perfectly clear that in almost any case one can conceive there will be no compensation payable under that provision. Inconvenience, loss of business, and that sort of thing is not a subject of compensation under Section 68.

    Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman allow me? I am trying to follow him. I apologise to the Committee for interrupting. This is not really my baby, and I do not understand as fully as I hope I do in general when I have begotten the creature. Is the Solicitor-General telling us that the effect of the words "injuriously affected" would be to limit compensation wholly within the purview of Section 68 of the 1845 Act?

    I think it would do so. The crucial words upon which the whole subsection hinges are those words, as the hon. Gentleman will, I think, agree:

    "Any person who has any estate or interest in land which is"—
    and here come the crucial words—
    "injuriously affected…"
    It is those words which have been interpreted.

    Therefore, I hope the Committee will agree with me that the Amendment should not be accepted on these two grounds. The first, which is not, perhaps, a conclusive one, but one which, in this context, should have some weight, is that in none of the codes which deal with stopping up land is there any such provision for compensation being paid. There is different provision, and there is provision, indeed, in this particular Clause, for certain types of compensation. That is the first ground, though not a conclusive one, and hon. Gentlemen opposite say we should start a new precedent; but one should not start a new precedent in this context unless there were some reason for singling it out from other similar circumstances.

    The second, which is the more cogent, is that, as the Clause is drafted—and it is not only a matter of drafting because it is omitting a whole system of law, as it were—it could very rarely actually result in compensation being paid.

    May I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman about a concrete case? I think my hon. Friend, when discussing this on Second Reading, had in mind small garages, small teashops, and the like, that had been started upon the highway; and if the highway were shut, of course the whole business, and a man's whole savings put into the business, would be completely lost. Cannot he get compensation in a case of that sort?

    I think that in a case like that no compensation would be payable under Section 68. That is not a case in which a right inherent in the land is interfered with. It is a case in which one may say that a man suffers considerable inconvenience—loss of business, and so on; but that is not the kind of loss which has been held to be within the purview of Section 68.

    There is just one point to which, I feel, the Solicitor-General has not devoted quite enough attention, if he will forgive my saying so. Under the old code, in stopping up a highway, after the formalities had been gone through before the justices, and the plan had been made out, and so on, there was a right of appeal to quarter sessions, as he will remember, and the issue of fact which on rare but well-known occasions was left to the jury at quarter sessions was, first, whether the new highway was nearer and more commodious to the public, and second, whether the appellant was aggrieved.

    The Solicitor-General will remember that the judicial definition of "aggrieved" was whether the appellant had suffered some special loss which the general public had not incurred; and, although he is strictly correct in saying that did not provide for compensation, it did give the person who was affected the opportunity of making out his case, to try to prevent the alteration so that he would not sustain the damage, even if he could not be compensated for it.

    What worries us is the case made by my hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Mr. Pickthorn) and elaborated in a particular example by my right hon. Friend the Member for Epsom (Mr. McCorquodale), that we may have someone who has a business and who not only loses his business but is, if the right hon. and learned Gentleman is right, excluded where a public access to the land is cut off. There would be, at any rate, an arguable case—I imagine how strongly the right hon. and learned Solicitor-General would argue it—for saying that his estate, his interest in the land, was injuriously affected. We were limiting the compensation to that amount. The right hon. and learned Gentleman will appreciate that we were being very reasonable in the matter. We were asking for a very limited compensation.

    He would be a rash man who, in a case of legislation by reference, would say that he had followed every possible consequence of the references made to so many Acts of Parliament as are made in this case. I cannot find that the person who is affected in the way described has even an efficacious right of protest. In these circumstances we felt it was right that he should get this very limited compensation for which my hon. Friend asks. I think it is most regrettable that nothing had been done to secure that he can even state his case.

    If the right hon. and learned Gentleman can relieve my mind on that point, so much the better, but on a reading of the Clause, I certainly cannot find any opportunity for the person affected, even to make a protest. I do not know whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman can help me on that point. I am sure it is important to all of us who are considering a part of the community who will be very badly treated; they will lose not only their business which they may have built up, but also access to the position in which they live and carry on their being. I should, therefore, be grateful if the Solicitor-General could help us on that point.

    For the case of permanent stopping up, not temporary stopping up, there are a number of provisions embodied in the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, in Section 49, and also in the Sixth Schedule. Paragraph 4 of the Sixth Schedule provides for inquiries, and so on, and the Minister is required to give notice of his intention. It says:

    "If before the expiration of the said period of three months an objection is received by the Minister of Transport from any local authority or undertakers on whom a notice is required to be served under this Schedule, or from any other person appearing to him to be affected by the order, and the objection is not withdrawn, the Minister shall cause a local inquiry to be held."
    In certain circumstances he is not bound to do so. There is, therefore, certainly in the case of permanent stopping up, effective provision in the 1947 Act for the voicing of grievances, which can be said to be the counterpart to the provision for appeal in the 1835 Act.

    There is not that provision in the case of temporary stopping up. Of course, temporary stopping up is envisaged, generally speaking, in not necessarily an emergency, but in a near emergency. In that case there is less provision, but there is at any rate some provision for the voicing of a grievance to be found in subsection (2). It is not nearly as effective as in the other case, but it is there, and the Committee may agree it is not inappropriate to the kind of circumstances envisaged with a temporary stopping up where, generally speaking, there is very often contemplated a rapid and perhaps near emergency. There the Minister has to give 21 days notice; it has to be published in the newspapers, and so on.

    I agree that it does not go to the length of ensuring that there must be an effective hearing, but it does give an opportunity to those who are aggrieved, even in the case of a temporary stopping up, to make such representations as they think fit. I therefore do not think it would be right to say that in the modern system there is no counterpart to the 1835 appeal procedure. In a permanent stopping up there is a very effective counterpart. Even in temporary stopping up it cannot be said that the person affected must be wholly voiceless.

    6.45 p.m.

    The Solicitor-General has taken a rather legalistic view of this Amendment. He has limited his reply to those cases of stopping up and of injurious affection as it might be defined in the 1835 Act. I do not believe that was really what my hon. Friends who drafted this Amendment had in mind. I think they were taking a much wider view and thinking of the man with a small business who might have his business impaired, or even have to close down because of some action taken by way of requisition, or something affecting the property. If I understood him aright, I think he said that in the case of gas and water undertakings, and so on, some compensation was payable, or some relief was available to them. Of course, it does not come as any surprise to us to find that the only people who benefit in this way are nationalised undertakings—

    Certainly I did not say that. I carefully indicated that there were two categories of persons entitled to compensation. The first were persons whose land was required for the purpose of providing an alternative route, so the prejudicial observations of the hon. and learned Gentleman were founded on a complete misconception.

    If I was wrong I withdraw my remarks, but I certainly understood the right hon. and learned Gentleman to say that there were wider opportunities for compensation in the case of nationalised industries than there were for the individual. I thought that was what the right hon. and learned Gentleman was saying. As I say, that does not surprise anybody on this side of the Committee. I do not think, however, that this is such a narrow issue. What we should have in mind more is what will happen to the unfortunate man who, as a result of some action taken under this Clause, finds himself perhaps deprived of the whole of his livelihood.

    I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman could, without taking too much of a lawyer's view about it, and without resorting so much to the actual term "injuriously affected," look at this in a wider way and consider what happens to the man whose business is affected. Perhaps the words "injuriously affected" appearing in the Amendment have misled the right hon. and learned Gentleman into thinking that my hon. Friends were thinking only in those terms. I feel that that is not the case, and I hope the Solicitor-General will look at this again.

    The course of this discussion has made me think of that fictional character who always heard the sound of his horse's hoofs on the road as it trotted "cloppity-cloppity" as a recital of the words, "property, property." In this debate it has sounded to me where compensation for property is concerned, as though the party opposite are very much like that fictional character and turn all things to the account of property. Yet there are many people who may be injuriously affected by the stopping up of roads whose interests are not the interests of property at all, but whose interests do not seem to have been thought of by hon. Gentlemen opposite.

    During the Second Reading debate I referred to the stopping up of a road adjacent to a railway station. It may be a stoppage affecting 100 yards of the road, but it may compel those who have to go to the station for their train in the morning to walk an extra two miles. It may compel a man going to work in the locality to travel a very long distance round. In referring to people who own shops on roads that are to be interfered with under these provisions, hon. Gentlemen opposite should have remembered also the women shoppers who are affected, who may be compelled to travel very long distances because of the stopping up of only 100 yards of road.

    The hon. Gentleman will also no doubt have in mind the most tragic case of those who would have to go an extra two or three miles to the nearest licensed premises for refreshment.

    I can well understand hon. Members opposite remembering that. The general interests of the public, quite apart from property owners, are interfered with very gravely by the provisions of the Bill. I do not see why, when compensation is not particularly provided for for the people whose walking is so much extended by what may take place under the Bill, the special class of property owners ought to be singled out for claims for compensation, as hon. Members opposite have been trying to secure. I am opposed to the Amendment because I think that the property owner in this matter should be on precisely the same basis as any other section of the community.

    I hope that it is in order, Major Milner, now, rather than on the Motion "That the Clause stand part of the Bill"—I shall not bother the Committee then—as the Law Officer called in aid in resisting this Amendment, subsection (2), to ask him how he proposes to place a copy of his notice at both ends of a highway, because it seems to me that unless he makes some new invention or has that proposal redrafted, we are going to have the traffic tied in knots in a quite new sense.

    It seemed to me that the reply of the Solicitor-General to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe) in regard to procedure for objection was not wholly satisfactory, and, indeed, I got the impression that he was not himself satisfied. It is, of course, quite true as he said in regard to orders for a permanent stopping up that they attract the provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, which is beginning to be a well-tried procedure; but when we are concerned with temporary orders, the provisions of subsection (2) have almost graver shortcomings than those to which my hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Mr. Pickthorn) has just drawn attention.

    As the right hon. and learned Gentleman realises, that is a provision only for advertisement or notification. There is no duty placed by that subsection on an authority to take notice of any protests made or to consider them in any way. It is not unsual that that should be so, because, of course, that is the ordinary position under the Defence Regulations. It is the ordinary position in regard to requisitioning powers that there is no machinery for taking into account objections. That is all right where the powers are exercised solely in conditions of real emergency. The trouble with these temporary powers is that they become progressively extended and still the machinery of objection is limited, or, indeed, virtually non-existent. I do not think that to draw attention to the powers of advertising under subsection (2) is really to meet the very forceful and cogent point put by my right hon. and learned Friend.

    The other observation which I wish to make is this—and I must apologise to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that I was not here for the whole of his first speech on this Amendment. In regard to the question of compensation, I think that I am right in saying that broadly speaking this falls into the same category as all the requisitioning powers under the Defence Regulations in that no provision is made for compensation for injurious affection at all—injurious affection by way of severance, for example, where part of a property is requisitioned and the remaining part which is not requisitioned may suffer severe damage by reasons of the severance.

    In all the years that the Compensation Defence Act, 1939, has been in force, there has been no provision made for compensation for injurious affection in these cases. That is, of course, a wider problem than the one with which we are concerned in this Bill. I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will allow me to make use of this Clause and the desirability of giving compensation for injurious affection to remind him that there is no compensation for injurious affection in the much wider range of cases arising out of Defence Regulation 51 and the Compensation Defence Act, 1939.

    May I ask him, as these powers are now being continued so much longer than was anticipated at the time, to have regard to that question, and to advise his colleagues that, if powers of requisitioning are to continue almost indefinitely, there should be a general right to compensation for injurious affection arising from severance, as there is under the well-established procedure of the actual compulsory acquisition of land.

    Amendment negatived.

    I beg to move, in page 5, line 9, to leave out from "and," to the end of the line, and to insert:

    "any such power as aforesaid."
    It is quite true that this Amendment, in one sense, paves the way for a subsequent Amendment, but I ask the Committee to believe that it is a point of substance in itself, even if the next Amendment is not accepted. The effect will be to ensure that temporary as well as permanent orders for stopping up or diverting highways should be made by Statutory Instrument. Even if we were to fail, and the Instrument was not made subject to Parliamentary procedure which is so much in our minds at the moment, we believe that orders of this kind should be officially published and attract the provisions of the Statutory Instruments Act, which was so carefully drawn in order to achieve that purpose. I do not think that I need say any more, because the Committee are familiar with this point.

    The proposal is that the stopping up of highways temporarily should involve publication of the stopping up order as a Statutory Instrument. It seems to me that that is a perfectly intelligible and sound provision when we are considering permanent stopping up, but when we are considering temporary stopping up very little advantage is gained by anybody by the formal printing and publication of the temporary stopping up order as a Statutory Instrument.

    As the right hon. and learned Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe) said, in a sense this Amendment paves the way for a subsequent Amendment, and no doubt the Committee may desire to discuss rather more fully the later Amendment, dealing with annulments. If one deals with this Amendment in isolation, and asks oneself if any useful purpose is to be served by placing an obligation upon the Minister to print in the form of a statutory rule and order a temporary stopping up, it seems to me extremely doubtful.

    7.0 p.m.

    The major provision is that at the site of the place where the stopping up is to take place a copy of the notice has to be posted. Those affected will see it and be cognisant of the fact that the highway is stopped up by going to the place and seeing the notice there posted. I cannot see what satisfaction it would give by the notice being subsequently reprinted and included in one of the statutory notices and orders. I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will agree that if we look at this Amendment in isolation there is very little to commend it. Indeed, I had that impression from his speech, because he did not seem to be pressing the matter very strongly or with his usual vigour.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman must not draw too strenuous a conclusion from the placid intonation which occasionally creeps into my voice. I put it to him that no one desires this procedure to be unnecessarily used or used to too great an extent. The people affected in the locality will, of course, have their own problems and, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman has had to concede, very little opportunity to make their local and personal views felt in the case of a temporary stopping up—they can make a protest, but that is the end of the matter.

    What could happen if this Amendment were accepted is that if there was a tendency for these powers to be used in far more cases than the House expected, the House would be able to see the results from publication. I noted that the right hon. and learned Gentleman did not say that the Amendment would be a great deal of trouble or expense to anyone. I cannot see why he should worry or feel that it will impose any burden on the Ministry of Transport. Why cannot he let us have our little publication in these circumstances? He has not let us have anything else today. Surely the publication of an order is not too much to get out of several hours' discussion.

    There is one aspect of this matter I should like to submit to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I think it is a point of substance. We are here discussing whether temporary stopping up can be brought into line with permanent stopping up with regard to publication of the instrument. I suggest that the word "temporary" in this connection is something of a misnomer. A great many highways, and particularly footpaths and rights of way, which were closed as a result of the war have not yet been released, some as near as Hampstead Heath.

    While the right hon. and learned Gentleman may well say that this is only a temporary affair and ask why, in these circumstances, we should publish a notice about something that is happening in such a transitory manner, am I not right in thinking that the word "temporary" means not only such time as the Act may function, with renewal year by year, but for two years beyond that? When we remember that, is it not the case that the adjective "temporary," while it may be the correct term legalistically, does not, in fact, describe the situation? It means that we are not discussing a period of months but years.

    Is there not something to be said, therefore, for the Amendment my right hon. and learned Friend has moved persuasively, if not in an inflammatory manner? I am surprised that the right hon. and learned Gentleman should expect thunder and lightning on every occasion that someone rises from this side of the Committee, although that may be coming later—I do not know. Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman not be good enough to have another look at this between now and Report? It seems a very small thing to ask, although it may be of great convenience to the public.

    I have listened to the argument of the right hon. and learned Gentleman. Would he be content to withdraw the Amendment on the understanding that we think over the argument that has been put? The difficulty that presents itself is that I cannot see what advantage would be gained, except for what the hon. and gallant Member for Bristol, North-West (Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite) has just said, that "temporary" is probably a misnomer. I am not sure what advantage would be obtained by printing the order in the form of a Statutory Instrument, but if the right hon. and learned Gentleman will withdraw the Amendment we shall consider the argument used, without, of course, any commitment.

    On the undertaking that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will consider this, and because I know that consideration from him means that the matter will be thoroughly canvassed with those concerned, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

    Amendment, by leave withdrawn.

    I beg to move, in page 5, line 11, at the end, to add:

    "which shall be subject to annulment by resolution of either House of Parliament."
    This Amendment secures that the orders made under this Clause shall be subject to some degree of Parliamentary control. I do not know whether it is your wish, Major Milner, that the Amendment which follows and raises the same issue shall also be discussed. I refer to the Amendment, in page 5, line 11, at the end, to add:
    "which shall be subject to annulment by resolution of either House of Parliament. Provided always that if on any day permitted for that purpose by subsection (1) of section five of the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, a motion to annul such a statutory instrument appears on the Order Paper of either House but the said motion is not moved by reason of the adjournment of the said House, such day shall be deemed not to be a sitting day for the purposes of sections five and seven of the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946."
    Perhaps you would give some indication of the effect of this Amendment on the second Amendment.

    The second Amendment raises two issues. Therefore, it would be desirable to have them discussed separately. In the event of the first Amendment being passed by the Committee I propose to call only the proviso of the second Amendment, which concerns the conditions under which prayers of annulment can be made. In the event of the first Amendment not being accepted the second Amendment will fall.

    Do I understand that in the event of the present Amendment not being accepted the second Amendment will fall?

    In view of what my hon. Friend has said, that in the event of this Amendment not being accepted there will be no debate on the second Amendment, will it be possible to debate the value of the negative procedure on this Amendment?

    I understand that you have ruled, Major Milner, that the most convenient course for the Committee is to discuss the first of these two Amendments and then, if the first Amendment is carried, you propose to call the second so that we might have a debate on the proviso, but that if the first Amendment is not carried the latter part of the last Amendment will fall with it. It seems to me that that would be the most satisfactory course for the Committee to adopt.

    I am obliged to the hon. Member who has repeated precisely what I said. It is desirable to pass the first Amendment, if the Committee thinks fit, which establishes the principle, and then the conditions under which annulment shall take place will be decided on the second.

    The effect of the Amendment I have moved is, of course, to subject those orders, which under the Clause, will be in the form of Statutory Instruments, to that degree of Parliamentary control, which is permitted by the negative procedure. After what has been said on previous Amendments I do not think it need be argued that some of these orders—and we are here concerned, as I understand it, only with orders affecting the permanent stopping up of highways—will be of very great importance not only to a number of people but to the district directly concerned. They will be at least as important to those districts as, for example, the question of whether the cinemas in such districts should be open on Sundays. The Committee will recall in the case of that particular form of local activity, not only is there Parliamentary control but it is not merely by the negative procedure but by the affirmative procedure. It has been laid down that before that matter can be dealt with an affirmative Resolution of both Houses is required.

    What we are asking for in this Amendment is less than that. The case for some degree of Parliamentary control is strong; otherwise, constituents seriously affected by these matters will come to hon. Members, and they will have to say to them that their objections are hopeless. It would be much better if there were some means of discussing these matters in the House. The method asked for is the lowest form, a form which, in recent weeks, if I may coin a phrase, has been somewhat devalued, but at any rate, some form of Parliamentary control is allowed.

    The procedure laid down in the Clause does not take us very far. It provides that Statutory Instruments shall be listed as such. I do not know whether it means that they will be reviewed by the Select Committee, but it means that they will appear on the list, and all hon. Members can do about it, if they disapprove, is, if they are very fortunate at the Table, to put Questions to Ministers. They cannot take any other really effective Parliamentary action. If these were not Statutory Instruments, at all, but treated as administrative measures of so trivial a nature as to be of no concern to hon. Members, it would be arguable that they should be dealt with by Parliamentary Questions only. But it is conceded by the Government, in the form in which they have introduced the Bill, that these are matters of such importance as to be exercisable in the form of Statutory Instruments.

    That being accepted, it is surely not impossible that those Statutory Instruments should be subject to the same degree of Parliamentary control as the greater number of Statutory Instruments and be subject to the negative procedure. Hon. Members on the other side of the Committee may say, "It is no use providing for the negative procedure, because the Patronage Secretary has decided that Prayers against these orders shall not be allowed at any rate up to two o'clock in the morning." If that is what they say, the argument really recoils upon them, because they will then be arguing that there is very little difference between the procedure laid down in the Bill and the procedure proposed in the Amendment.

    I do not take that view. I believe that the Government will see reason. The control of delegated legislation is a matter on which not only the House, but the country feels extremely strongly, and that feeling cannot be thwarted with impunity. What we are asking for here is the lowest form of Parliamentary control. It may be we are asking for too little, but that is no objection from the point of view of the Government. It is our view that these orders are at least as important as the vast majority of the orders which are laid in the normal way on the Table of the House and subject to negative Resolution. It is in the belief that they are at least as important that I beg to move this Amendment.

    7.15 p.m.

    I hope the Committee will not accept this Amendment. What we are discussing is the stopping up of a highway. A purely local matter of that sort cannot be an appropriate subject for discussion in the House by way of Prayer under the negative Resolution procedure.

    To what extent is it more local than the Sunday opening of cinemas?

    Obviously, quite different considerations arise. The opening of Sunday cinemas raises much broader issues, on which people have very different views, and they are quite different from the executive action which is entailed in the closing of a particular road. Whether that road is to be closed or not must depend on purely local consideration of which hon. Members, unless they get some evidence deployed before them, are, of necessity, almost wholly unaware. It would be a sheer waste of time to ask the House to consider such a local question by way of the negative Resolution procedure.

    Not only that but it would involve the House taking on the opposite to what was expressed in a somewhat similar context. If we look at Section 49 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, which expresses the wishes of the House in matters of that sort, there is no provision for the annulment of orders by negative Resolu- tion by either House of Parliament, but what is there and what is equally reproduced in this Clause is a much more appropriate procedure for a local inquiry. When we are dealing with local matters of this sort, we desire to ascertain what are the wishes and feelings of the local inhabitants who will be immediately affected by a closing order. Provision is made in the 1947 Act, and equally in this Bill, for ascertaining the wishes of these persons.

    In a discussion on an earlier Amendment I called the attention of the Committee to paragraph 4 of the Sixth Schedule of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, which is made applicable to closing orders. Under it the Minister has to publish the fact that he proposes to make an order; he has to take into account any objections; and there is provision for the holding of a local inquiry. That is an appropriate procedure for ascertaining what are the objections in the case of any proposal to stop up any particular highway, but what advantage there is to be gained for anybody in the House, with its large membership of hon. Members who, only by the merest chance, have any knowledge of the local conditions of a particular highway, is very difficult to see.

    The hon. Member who represents the constituency in which the highway is situated may know something about it, but why other hon. Members should know about it I do not know. It would be very difficult for them to be informed unless some procedure is involved which has the effect of deploying the evidence before the local inquiry. That these purely local proceedings should form the subject of discussion by way of a Prayer in the House would be quite purposeless, and I hope the Committee will agree that this Amendment should not be accepted.

    I was very disappointed with the Solicitor-General's speech. He is always impressive as the Minister in charge of Measures of this kind, but I think he must have been affected by what the Prime Minister said in his broadcast the other day about the battle of Waterloo, and a time when normally nobody travelled more than about three miles from their homes. To say, as the Solictor-General has just done, that the stopping up of a highway is a matter of purely local interest is surely nonsense. We see many motor cars parked in Mr. Speaker's courtyard and they travel very long distances, and the gentlemen to whom they are allocated, at the public expense, sometimes use them for that purpose.

    The other day when I was speaking on my Ten Minute Bill I used an argument for the purpose of extending this principle of annulment. I drew attention to the extraordinary anomalies in this matter of highways. We had a debate on highways the other day, and I then learned to my amazement that when we want to re-open a highway, the order proposing to do it is subject to annulment. I do not know whether the Solicitor-General has been adequately briefed on this point and whether he knows that we close highways under one Act of Parliament, under which we can have no Prayers, and re-open them under another, under which we can pray against the re-opening. I never heard of anything more stupid than that.

    For the Solicitor-General to say that the stopping up of a highway is not a matter of general public interest indicates that the Solicitor-General's solicitor did not brief him very well on this point, and I hope that the Solicitor-General will look into the point more carefully. I believe that he is a member of the Temple. If the traffic authorities want to make a one-way street near the Temple which, according to the Solicitor-General, is only a matter of very local interest, it means, as I believe the Solicitor-General will discover, that it would require an order which would be prayable in this House.

    I know that the Commissioner of Police sometimes does it illegally. Not far from where I live a notice was put up for about eight months saying, "No entry this way," and it had no legal validity whatever. A couple of months after I asked a Question about it in the House, the notice was taken away, without anyone saying anything. The Solicitor-General ought to study this aspect of the law a little, from the red books which will be found in the Aye Lobby, the "Revised Statutes." I assure him that the highway laws are in great confusion on this matter of the right to pray.

    On this matter of the stopping up of a highway being only of local interest in which only a few hon. Members are concerned, I think I might well refer to the Bills from local authorities which come before the House, on the Motion of yourself, Major Milner, as Chairman of Way and Means, petitioning Parliament for certain additions to their powers. We say the magic word "Object," and those Measures do not get a Second Reading on that day. If we say "Object" often enough, you put them down for a Second Reading at seven o'clock.

    I would remind the Solicitor-General that many of those Bills seek to amend the highway laws and that the major speeches are often made by a couple of local M.P.s. To suggest that where there is only a local interest we are not entitled to take up the cudgels for people in localities who think that they have been "steamrollered" by the administrative machine is not up to the usual standard of the Solicitor-General. I do not think that bureaucratic power should ever be without Parliamentary control. I agree that the affirmative procedure should only be used in very exceptional cases, but the right of annulment ought to be used in all cases where laws are made by the decree of bureaucrats.

    I speak as a member of the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments. We examine a vast quantity of Statutory Instruments. We have not the right to examine all of them, and perhaps it is a pity that we have not. From my experience on that Committee I assure the Solicitor-General that we examine countless Statutory Instruments of particular local interest. Reference has been made to orders for stopping up roads and for making streets for one-way traffic. These and many others are subject to negative resolution. There are Instruments laying down regulations in regard to parks. I might say that quite a quarter, except that I do not want to give any figures—at any rate a large proportion—of the Statutory Instruments that we consider are concerned with purely local matters.

    I quite understand why the Solicitor-General is opposing the Amendment. He does not want to get himself into deeper water in these matters. I suppose, the state of parties being what it is, that the Amendment will be defeated in the Division Lobbies. This situation forces me to say on this Amendment what I intended to say on the next Amendment. I feel that the Committee ought to give serious attention to the principles involved, concerning the opportunities for review and annulment offered to hon. Members in relation to Statutory Instruments. The Select Committee of the House ought certainly to consider whether it is not possible to set up machinery by which hon. Members should have the power—

    The Solicitor-General's defence against the Amendment consisted partly in the suggestion that as this concerns a local matter, the House should not deal with it. That point has been more than adequately covered by my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams). The other point of defence was that the procedure given by paragraph 4 of the Sixth Schedule of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, was a better procedure than that of annulment by negative Resolution, and that there was, therefore, no need for any further safeguard.

    What the Solicitor-General appears to have overlooked in this case, though he expressly drew attention to it during the debate on the previous Amendment, is that by the terms of the Clause the procedure of inquiry by which local feeling can be ascertained, as provided in that Sixth Schedule, would apply only to permanent orders made under subsection (6). That, of course, would provide no safeguard in respect of temporary orders made under the Clause.

    It seems to me likely that nearly all the orders made under the Clause will be temporary, especially if there is no safeguard for the citizen in regard to the temporary order. What will happen in practice no doubt is that the orders will be made as temporary orders and then, under subsection (5), it will be decided that they shall be converted into permanent orders. At that stage only, the Solicitor-General's safeguard of inquiry comes into operation, but at that inquiry it will be said that in these cases the highway has already been stopped up for a long time as a temporary measure and there has been no great inconvenience, and, therefore, the order will duly be confirmed, despite the machinery for a local inquiry. That is not good enough. It was a little disingenuous for the Solicitor-General to produce this argument and not to remind the Committee again that it would have effect only in the case of permanent orders. If the great majority of them are to be temporary orders, to be converted later into permanent orders, it seems that there will be no redress and no safeguard for the citizen.

    7.30 p.m.

    If the machinery of inquiry could be made to work effectively there would be something to be said for the view of the right hon. and learned Gentleman that that might in some cases, though not in all, be the preferable method. But if the choice is between having an illusory safeguard only in the exceptional cases, which is the remedy of the right hon. and learned Gentleman in reliance on the Sixth Schedule or, on the other hand, the real safeguard of the possibility of annulment by negative Resolution, it is right that the Committee should not leave the citizen without any remedy or protection but should incorporate the remedy proposed in the Amendment.

    I have been out of the Chamber for only five minutes since three o'clock—it was during a small part of this debate—and, therefore, I apologise if perhaps I am repeating what has been said, or perhaps doing an injustice to the Solicitor-General. But it did seem to me that his speech—I would not venture to estimate whether it was up to his usual logical and legal level—was not really quite up to his usual level of candour. He spoke as if this were wholly a matter of local interest. But that, surely, is less than half of the question.

    The fact that matters of local interest are often subject to Prayer procedure—all that I will not go into—has been sufficiently proved and I do not think will be any longer contested, but the point which I think is new—I apologise if it is not—is this one, that the matter here is of the balance of interest between a local inconvenience, which everybody must admit to be there, in the shutting up of a highway, and the presumed national interest, for the purposes of defence mainly, which we must all presume that His Majesty's Government can judge better than persons in the locality, and so on.

    That is the point, surely, and to say that this is unsuitable for Parliamentary consideration by Prayer because it is local is really, in the strictest sense, nonsense. The reason for asking for the safeguard is that, suppose there should be a bad Government, suppose there should be invasion or near invasion, at a moment when the country has few or no resources, poor currency, and many Ministers who are not trusted, and so forth—some, perhaps, who were conscientious objectors or pacifists until the day before yesterday—some such situation is not beyond conceiving—in such a situation the question is: Can the Ministers be trusted, without any possibility of appeal to Parliament, when they say that there must be local inconvenience because the central need for defence demands it? Can we be sure that they will always judge that balance correctly?

    It must be plain that no Opposition, and certainly no supporters of the Government, would possibly use this in a factious way in such circumstances. When, with any colourability, the Treasury Bench can say, "We know more than you. We assure you that for the defence of the nation it is necessary to cut off half a mile of the highway outside Little Puddlecombe," that is the last kind of thing upon which Oppositions or dissidents can afford to be tiresome. It is quite true that we have seen an Opposition tiresome about matters of defence, and up against defence to the last moment and beyond it and get away with it through the inscrutable interventions of Providence, but it is not the kind of thing likely to happen very often.

    All we are asking is that where the Government is going to decide that for central purposes these local inconveniences must be inflicted, there Opposition shall be entitled, at its peril, to say, "That ought to be looked at again," and to compel the Minister to spend half an hour, or it may be less than half an hour, on defending it. That is what is being asked, and if there is a good case against that, then I suggest with confidence to the Committee that it has not been put by the Solicitor-General. The whole of his attention was on the question of locality, but the whole point is the proportion between the inconvenience to the locality and the central considerations.

    I am appalled at the defence put forward by the Solicitor-General in opposing the Amendment. I suppose that one should not be appalled, because it was a characteristic misunderstanding of the functions of the House, one which has permeated the whole of the party opposite. The principle is that when there is a grievance an hon. Member should be entitled to bring it to the House. That is a fundamental right of all of us who sit in the House. What the Solicitor-General is saying is that, although there may be a case, it is just a little local affair and the hon. Member ought to be precluded from bringing it to Westminster. Every one of us has a duty and a right, and always has had, to bring local grievances to the House and air them before this public tribunal. That is one of the main functions for which we are here, and I was surprised that the right hon. and learned Gentleman should have taken the line he did.

    I do not accept the hypothesis that these are necessarily entirely local matters. If the main road to the great port of Southampton were stopped up, would the right hon. and learned Gentleman say that that was purely a local matter? That would be a matter of great urgent national interest, and it would certainly be a case to be brought to the attention of the House by the local hon. Member or anybody else. Even accepting the view which he put forward that this is limited entirely to local matters, every hon. Member has a right to bring local matters to the House. The whole strength of the House arises from the agglomeration of our knowledge of local matters. That makes this place what it is. In taking the attitude he has taken, the right hon. and learned Gentleman is doing great damage to democracy.

    I hope that the Solicitor-General will reconsider his position on this matter. I cannot understand why he treats so lightly in itself the withdrawal of rights from people. As the hon. Member for Ealing, North (Mr. J. Hudson), pointed out, that is a commencement in the matter. What may affect these people in the localities, according to the Solicitor-General's own statement and as elaborated by my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford (Mr. Walker-Smith), will, in probably the majority of cases, occur without any further right accruing to the people affected than seeing a notice of what is to happen. The fortunate people, according to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, are those who will have the right to appear at a local inquiry, but, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman has argued so often in other places, the Minister need not pay any attention whatever to the balance of opinion or the views expressed at that local inquiry. So that right is not of very great advantage.

    I cannot help thinking that the views expressed by the right hon. and learned Gentleman go deeper than that. I took my part, in the days when there were not party divisions, in discussions about the future of town and country planning and the form that the machinery might take. I would emphasise that what was said so often against anything but the representation of town and country planning by a Minister who would be answerable in the House was that in the case of planning—highways fall into the same category—local problems arouse the keennest passion and feeling.

    I can quite understand that just as some question of planning boils up into an issue which overflows any local bounds and becomes a national issue, so the fact that a community—it might easily be, as in the other example I gave, an historic community—is suddenly cut off, or the path they have used for centuries is suddenly changed, will arouse an issue which is well deserving of the attention of the House.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Mr. Pickthorn) put the other aspect of it which, in my view, really decides the case. What will be the arguments put against the local view? It is that it is necessary for the defence interests of the country. There is no other place that is suitable to discuss that issue except the House of Commons, and that is an unanswerable point. I was trying to get the ring of the argument of the right hon. and learned Gentleman when he was dealing in depreciatory sentences with the Prayer procedure. You will remember, Major Milner, how the right hon. and learned Gentleman said, "If you had this procedure, if you were allowed to put down a Prayer to annul, only the local Member would have some slight knowledge, and nobody else in the House of Commons would know anything about it." I asked myself where I had heard that before. Curiously enough, in his book "Law and Orders," Dr. C. K. Allen used it as an argument for the insufficiency of the procedure of annulment by negative Resolution.

    That seemed to me a most extraordinary position for the Solicitor-General, who is trying to prevent even the procedure which Dr. Allen spent so many pages in saying was insufficient, by saying that the House of Commons and local Members are incapable and unable to secure that a debate will take place which will justify the attention of the House. If that is the view of the right hon. and learned Gentleman after six years in this House, he has been unfortunate because, believe me, some of the most interesting and valuable debates, and some of the most interesting expositions of the personalities of the House in the period I have been here, have been made when hon. Members have been concerned with a local matter which has touched them and, of course, their constituents very deeply.

    Therefore I suggest here that when we, first of all, had taken away the old procedure that I mentioned on an earlier Amendment, by which anyone aggrieved by the stopping up of a highway could have the issues tried by a jury at Quarter Sessions, because it was too cumbrous—the next in degree, the local inquiry, will now only apply to a small number of cases and, with regard to the majority of cases, the people affected will have no remedy.

    7.45 p.m.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman has advanced many propositions in the House of Commons, but I did not imagine that he would ever argue at the opposite Box so blatantly for injury without remedy—the one thing which English law has refused to tolerate in the centuries of its existence. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman is not prepared to meet us on this point, I have no alternative but to advise my right hon. and hon. Friends to divide on the Amendment.

    Question put, "That those words be there added."

    Division No. 67.]

    AYES

    [7.48 p.m.

    Aitken, W. T.Garner-Evans, E. H. (Denbigh)Odey, G. W.
    Amory, Heathcoat (Tiverton)Gates, Maj. E. E.O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir Hugh
    Arbuthnot, JohnGridley, Sir ArnoldOrmsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.
    Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)
    Baldwin, A. E.Harden, J. R. E.Orr-Ewing, Ian L. (Weston-super-Mare)
    Banks, Col. C.Harvey, Air Codre. A. V. (Maclesfield)Osborne, C.
    Beamish, Major TuftonHay, JohnPerkins, W. R. D.
    Bell, R. M.Head, Brig. A. H.Peto, Brig. C. H. M.
    Bennett, Sir Peter (Edgbaston)Heald, LionelPickthorn, K.
    Bennett, William (Woodside)Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.Powell, J. Enoch
    Bevins, J. R. (Liverpool, Toxteth)Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)
    Bishop, F. P.Hill, Dr. Charles (Luton)Profumo, J. D.
    Black, C. W.Hornsby-Smith, Miss P.Raikes, H. V.
    Boothby, R.Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. FlorenceRedmayne, M.
    Bossom, A. C.Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)Remnant, Hon. P.
    Bowen, E. R.Howard, Greville (St. Ives)Roberts, Major Peter (Heeley)
    Boyd-Carpenter, J. A.Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)Roper, Sir Harold
    Boyle, Sir EdwardHulbert, Wing Cmdr. N. J.Ropner, Col. L.
    Bracken, Rt. Hon. B.Hurd, A. R.Russell, R. S.
    Braine, B. R.Hutchison, Lt.-Com. Clark (E'b'rgh, W.)Shepherd, William
    Braithwaite, Lt.-Cmdr. GurneyHutchison, Colonel JamesSmith, E. Martin (Grantham)
    Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W.Jones, A. (Hall Green)Snadden, W. McN.
    Browne, Jack (Govan)Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.Soames, Capt. C.
    Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.Kerr, H. W. (Cambridge)Spearman, A. C. M.
    Butcher, H. W.Lambert, Hon. G.Spens, Sir Patrick (Kensington, S.)
    Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)Lennox-Boyd, A. T.Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard (N. Fylde)
    Carr, Robert (Mitcham)Lindsay, MartinSteward, W. A. (Woolwich, W.)
    Clarke, Col. Ralph (East Grinstead)Linstead, H. N.Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)
    Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmouth, W.)Lockwood, Lt.-Col. J. C.Storey, S.
    Clyde, J. L.Longden, Gilbert (Herts, S.W.Strauss, Henry (Norwich, S.)
    Colegate, ALucas, P. B. (Brentford)Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)
    Conant, Maj. R. J. E.Lucas-Tooth, Sir HughSummers, G. S.
    Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert (Ilford, S.)McAdden, S. J.Taylor, Charles (Eastbourne)
    Corbett, Lt.-Col. Uvedale (Ludlow)McCallum, Major D.Thomas, J. P. L. (Hereford)
    Craddock, G. B. (Spelthorne)Mackeson, Brig. H. R.Thompson, Kenneth Pugh (Walton)
    Cranborne, ViscountMaclay, Hon. JohnThorneycroft, Peter (Monmouth)
    Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C.MacLeod, Iain (Enfield, W.)Thornton-Kemsley, Col. C. N.
    Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.MacLeod, John (Ross and Cromarty)Thorp, Brig. R. A. F.
    Crouch, R. F.Macmillan, Rt. Hon Harold (Bromley)Touche, G. C.
    Cundiff, F. W.Macpherson, Major Niall (Dumfries)Turner, H. F. L.
    Davidson, ViscountessManningham-Buller, R. E.Turton, R. H.
    Davies, Nigel (Epping)Marlowe, A. A. H.Walker-Smith, D. C.
    de Chair, SomersetMarples, A. E.Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)
    Deedes, W. F.Marshall, Douglas (Bodmin)Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.
    Digby, S. W.Marshall, Sidney (Sutton)Watkinson, H.
    Dodds-Parker, A. D.Maude, John (Exeter)Watt, Sir George Harvie
    Donner, P. W.Maudling R.Webbe, Sir Harold
    Drayson, G. B.Mellor, Sir JohnWhite, Baker (Canterbury)
    Drewe, C.Molson, A. H. E.Williams, Charles (Torquay)
    Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.Morrison, John (Salisbury)Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)
    Eden, Rt. Hon. A.Morrison, Rt. Hon. W. S. (Cirencester)Williams, Sir Herbert (Croydon, E.)
    Erroll, F. J.Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.Wills, G.
    Fisher, NigelNabarro, G.Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
    Fort, R.Nicholls, HarmarWood, Hon. R.
    Foster, JohnNicholson, G.York, C.
    Fraser, Sir I. (Morecambe & Lonsdale)Nield, Basil (Chester)
    Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir David MaxwellNoble, Cmdr. A. H. P.

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

    Galbraith, T. G. D. (Hillhead)Nugent, G. R. H.Mr. Studholme and
    Gammans, L. D.Nutting, AnthonyMajor Wheatley

    NOES

    Acland, Sir RichardBottomley, A. G.Collick, P.
    Adams, H. R.Bowles, F. G. (Nuneaton)Cook, T. F.
    Albu, A. H.Braddock, Mrs. ElizabethCooper, Geoffrey (Middlesbrough, W.)
    Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)Brook, Dryden (Halifax)Cove, W. G.
    Anderson, Alexander (Motherwell)Brooks, T. J. (Normanton)Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
    Anderson, Frank (Whitehaven)Brown, Thomas (Ince)Crosland, C. A. R.
    Awbery, S. S.Burke, W. A.Crossman, R. H. S.
    Ayles, W. H.Burton, Miss E.Cullen, Mrs. A.
    Barnes, Rt. Hon. A. J.Butler, Herbert (Hackney, S.)Daines, P.
    Bartley, P.Callaghan, L. J.Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.
    Benn, WedgwoodCarmichael, J.Darling, George (Hillsborough)
    Beswick, F.Castle, Mrs. B. A.Davies, A. Edward (Stoke, N.)
    Bing, G. H. C.Champion, A. J.Davies, Harold (Leek)
    Blenkinsop, A.Clunie, J.de Freitas, G.
    Blyton, W. R.Cocks, F. S.Deer, G.
    Boardman, H.Coldrick, W.Delargy, H. J.

    The Committee divided: Ayes, 173; Noes, 201.

    Diamond, J.Keenan, W.Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvonshire)
    Dodds, N. N.Kenyon, C.Ross, William (Kilmarnock)
    Driberg, T. E. N.Kinley, J.Royle, C.
    Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.Lee, Frederick (Newton)Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.
    Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)Simmons, C. J.
    Evans, Albert (Islington, S. W.)Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)Slater, J.
    Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)Lindgren, G. S.Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)
    Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)Logan, D. G.Snow, J. W.
    Ewart, R.Longden, Fred (Small Heath)Soskice, Rt. Hon Sir Frank
    Fernyhough, E.McAllister, G.Sparks, J. A.
    Field, Capt. W. J.MacColl, J. E.Steele, T.
    Finch, H. J.McGhee, H. G.Stewart, Michael (Fulham, E.)
    Fletcher, Eric (Islington, E.)McInnes, J.Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.
    Follick, M.McKay, John (Wallsend)Stross, Dr. Barnett
    Foot, M. M.MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)Summerskill, Rt. Hon. Edith
    Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)Sylvester, G. O.
    Freeman, John (Watford)Mann, Mrs. JeanTaylor, Bernard (Mansfield)
    Ganley, Mrs. C. S.Manuel, A. C.Taylor, Robert (Morpeth)
    Gibson, C. W.Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.Thomas, David (Aberdare)
    Gilzean, A.Mathers, Ht. Hon. G.Thomas, George (Cardiff)
    Glanville, James (Consett)Middleton, Mrs. L.Thomas, I. R. (Rhondda, W.)
    Gooch, E. G.Mikardo, IanThomas, Ivor Owen (Wrekin)
    Gordon-Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.Mitchison, G. R.Thorneycroft, Harry (Clayton)
    Grey, C. F.Moody, A. S.Thurtle, Ernest
    Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)Morley, R.Tomlinson, Rt. Hon. G.
    Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)Ungoed-Thomas, A. L.
    Gunter, R. J.Mort, D. L.Viant, S. P.
    Hale, Joseph (Rochdale)Moyle, A.Wallace, H. W.
    Hall, John (Gateshead, W.)Murray, J. D.Webb, Rt. Hon. M. (Bradford, C.)
    Hamilton, W. W.Neal, Harold (Bolsover)Wells, Percy (Faversham)
    Hannan, W.Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. J.West, D. G.
    Hardy, E. A.O'Brien, T.Wheatley, Rt. Hon. J. (Edinb'gh, E.)
    Hargreaves, AOldfield, W. H.White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)
    Harrison, J.Oliver, G. H.White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)
    Hastings, S.Paling, Rt. Hon. Wilfred (Dearne V'lly)Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.
    Hayman, F. H.Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)Wigg, G.
    Holman, P.Pannell, T. C.Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.
    Holmes, Horace (Hemsworth)Pargiter, G. A.Wilkins, W. A.
    Houghton, D.Parker, J.Willey, Frederick (Sunderland)
    Hubbard, TPaton, J.Williams, David (Neath)
    Hudson, James (Ealing, N.)Pearson, A.Williams, Ronald (Wigan)
    Hynd, H. (Accrington)Peart, T. F.Williams, Rt. Hon. Thomas (Don V'lly)
    Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)Poole, C.Winterbottom, Ian (Nottingham, C.)
    Irving, W. J. (Wood Green)Popplewell, E.Winterbottom, Richard (Brightside)
    Janner, B.Porter, G.Wise, F. J.
    Jay, D. P. T.Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.
    Jenkins, R. H.Pursey, Cmdr. H.Wyatt, W. L.
    Johnson, James (Rugby)Rankin, J.Yates, V. F.
    Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)Rees, Mrs. D.
    Jones, David (Hartlepool)Reid, Thomas (Swindon)
    Jones, Frederick Elwyn (West Ham, S.)Rhodes, H.

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

    Jones, William Elwyn (Conway)Richards, R.Mr. Bowden and Mr. Kenneth
    Robinson.

    Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 4—(Extension Of Act To Colonies And Other Territories)

    I beg to move, in page 5, line 25, at the end, to add:

    (2) Any Order in Council made under this section shall be laid before Parliament and shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of forty days from the date on which it is made unless at some time before the expiration of that period it has been approved by resolution of each House of Parliament, but without prejudice to anything previously done thereunder or to the making of a new Order.
    In reckoning any such period of forty days no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.
    Under Clause 4 power is taken not only to apply this Measure to a number of territories outside the United Kingdom, but to adapt and to modify it in the process. The Amendment provides that when that is done, a measure of Parliamentary control shall be exercised. I do not think that any hon. Member would dispute that the application of the Measure, possibly adopted and modified, to an entire territory to which it does not at present apply, is obviously a matter of first class importance. That being so, the question arises, first, whether it is not right to provide that there shall be some control by the House of Commons and, secondly, to decide, if that be so, what particular measure of control shall be exercised.

    The Amendment proposes that the affirmative procedure should be adopted, the particular form of this affirmative procedure being the one under which the Government have the full power to make an order but that the order itself lapses unless approved by affirmative Resolution during 40 sitting days. That form of the affirmative procedure is proposed in order to deal with the situation which might arise in some emergency when the House of Commons was not sitting. There is nothing in the Amendment to prevent the Government acting promptly and applying the Measure to the colonial territory concerned. All that is required is that during the 40 sitting days of the House the required affirmative Resolution shall be put through. This suggestion embodies a fair compromise between the possible demands of an emergency situation and the necessity for maintaining some control by the House.

    It is a matter calling for a good deal of research to discover what are the territories to which, under the Clause, this Measure can be applied. It is a case not only of legislation by reference, but of legislation by reference twice over. The territories are those referred to in Section 5 (4) of the 1945 Act, but on referring to that subsection one is merely referred back to the 1939 Act. It is, therefore, a matter calling for a certain amount of research, but as I understand it—the Solicitor-General will correct me if I am wrong—the territories we are considering in this matter are, first, the Colonial Empire and, secondly, any territories effectively occupied by His Majesty under some other form of authority.

    We in the House of Commons owe a very definite duty to the Colonial Empire. We are responsible for what His Majesty's Government do in that Empire, and if we pass the Clause as it stands we are handing over to the Government very substantial power to legislate for the Colonial Empire without any control whatever by the House. It seems to me that to do that would really be to abdicate the duties which we owe to our fellow subjects under the Crown in the Colonial Empire, and that it would be entirely wrong for us to do so.

    8.0 p.m.

    On the Second Reading, the Secretary of State for Air, during a speech which I do not suppose he will recall as one of his happier forensic efforts, said that the reason why no provision for Parliamentary control was made in this Measure was that no similar provision was made in the 1939 Act. To that I would say two things. I have never taken the view, although it seems to have adherents on the Government Front Bench, that everything done in 1939 was so obviously right as to be sacrosanct. Nor should one ignore that in 1939 we were faced with a situation of actual war on a great scale when, quite obviously, not only was the attention of this House very properly focussed on rather different matters, but equally under the ordinary understandings of our constitutional system much less regard was paid to the necessities for preserving Parliamentary control.

    We are not at this moment in that situation, and for that reason it does not seem to me that the precedent of 1939, on which the Secretary of State for Air relied, really has any validity today. In any event, this Committee is perfectly free now to decide this matter and I would remind hon. Members that if we decided in the sense of preserving the Clause as it stands we would be providing a very strong precedent for future Governments who seek to legislate for the Colonial Empire without any control by this House. We would be doing so with our eyes open and in a time of what is at any rate technically peace.

    I cannot see how hon. Members opposite, who are often so ardent in their desire to protect colonial peoples from alleged oppression, can possibly reconcile that attitude with apparently being prepared to allow a Measure of this sort—a Measure for the control of those peoples by emergency powers—to be applied by His Majesty's Ministers without the House of Commons having any direct control over it at all. It seems to me that if they are prepared to swallow that a rather curious light is thrown on their protestations of concern for the welfare of the peoples of the Colonial Empire.

    It is a matter of principle that this House should not give this great power to the Government without keeping some control for itself. For it is a very great power to be able to apply a complete statute and to be able to amend and modify it in the process of applying it to complete territories. Even the Solicitor-General cannot say that it would not be worth debating it because hon. Members would not know enough about it; on either side of the Committee there are hon. Members with direct knowledge of the Colonial Empire.

    The Amendment seems to me to put forward an issue of not inconsiderable importance in principle. If accepted it can involve no embarrassment to His Majesty's Government and no diminution of their power to act speedily and effectively in an emergency. All it will do is to retain ultimate control over their actions in the House of Commons.

    It is of course a matter of history that, for years, statutes of this country have been applied to the Colonial Empire by Orders in Council, and I believe that the power of doing so and to make exceptions, adaptations and modifications is of very long standing. But it does result in this, that while we discuss and debate the wording of the Bills which come in front of us the Executive alone here and in the colony or territory concerned decide what form the statute shall take as applied to that territory, and the power to modify and make exceptions and adapt has resided often in very substantial differences between the Measure as passed in Parliament here and the Measure as it is put into force in the Colony or Territory.

    It is only necessary to take one general Act of any sort, for instance the Companies Act, and compare its wording as passed by Parliament here with the form it takes in various parts of the Colonies to realise that in fact every time we give this power to the Executive we are giving very wide power to modify and alter the form of legislation approved in this country. It is something which is of long standing but something which, I suggest, is of great constitutional importance and something which this House ought to consider.

    If this Bill is to be applied with modifications and alterations to any territory surely the Government ought to come back to this House and justify the alterations, exceptions and modifications to us and explain to us why, after we have approved a Bill in a certain form in this House, it should go in a different form to some part of the Empire. I cannot believe that hon. Members realise what has been going on in this way during the last 30 or 40 years. Quite frankly, I had no idea of it until it became my duty to construe Acts applicable to India which had been given a local effect in this way. One imagined one would find the same Sections and Acts, but suddenly one found alterations in the wording. I suppose it was often justified on some local ground, but time after time one took the view that some draftsmen, either in this country or elsewhere, thought they could draft parts of a Section or proviso rather better than this House had approved it.

    I believe this is a serious constitutional matter and this House ought to insist that whenever any Act of Parliament of importance is applied by Order in Council to parts of the Empire, unless it is practically verbatim the same, it ought to come back to this House in order that the differences should be explained and approved by this House. For that reason I support the Amendment.

    In framing the Clause in this way we were simply following precedent and very strong precedent. One hon. Member said that when reference was made to the Emergency Powers Act, 1939, that after all was an Act passed in contemplation of the imminent outbreak of war. That is perfectly true, but it is nevertheless true that the circumstances were not in any material sense different in this case and the form of wording was incorporated in that Act which was passed by a Conservative Government. The provision was also made in that Act that the particular enactment should be applied to the Colonies with or without modification, which meets the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens).

    I think the Order in Council procedure goes back to before the First World War, but it has been so used that substantial adaptations and modifications have been made, and I venture to think that this House would not approve of them. That should be reconsidered and this House ought to obtain control over such procedure.

    The hon. and learned Gentleman is now arguing right in the face of the current of established precedents. He has just referred to precedents earlier than 1939, and I should like to remind the Committee of one or two of them. I have just reminded the Committee of the fact that, in regard to the 1939 Act, it can be said that there was the prospect of an imminent outbreak of war, but, if one goes back further—and I have carried out some researches in this matter—one finds precedent after precedent providing for modifications to enactments applying to this country and without any provision for Parliamentary control such as is sought to be imported into the Bill by this Amendment.

    I think I ought to remind the Committee of some of these precedents. For example, the Visiting Forces Act, 1933, contains such a precedent, and, in Sections 5 and 6, it is provided that the Act can be applied to the Colonies with or without modifications. Equally, if one takes another example of about that time, the Whaling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1934, provides a similar precedent, showing that, in the mind of the Government of that day, there was a very consistent view on this matter. Here, again, if hon. Members will look at Section 13 of the Act, they will find:
    (1) His Majesty may by Order in Council direct that the provisions of this Act shall extend, with such exceptions, adaptations or modifications, if any, as may be specified in the Order, to the Isle of Man, any of the Channel Islands, Newfoundland or any colony.
    There is another precedent in the Geneva Convention Act, 1937, which again contains a similar provision. I think these precedents are sufficient to establish that it must have been the very consistent policy of pre-war Governments, and Conservative Governments in particular, to adopt this particular form for what we are now doing. It cannot really be said that they were temporarily driven from the path of rectitude by the prospect of the outbreak of war in 1939, because again, and for the fourth time which I have discovered, they followed the exact precedent which we have incorporated in our Bill.

    But it does not stop there. It would be extremely difficult now to depart from these precedents. In 1945, the Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Act adopted the same form and made applicable Section 4 of the Emergency Powers Act, 1939, again making applicable precisely the same machinery as we are adopting now, and, again, that procedure was used in 1947 for the Supplies and Services (Extended Purposes) Act of that year.

    That current of authority does indicate a settled policy extending over a great many years as to what is the right way of treating this matter. The hon. and learned Gentleman who last addressed the Committee said that we were now, for the first time, departing from that. The mere fact that a practice is settled does not necessarily mean that it should always remain, and, in this particular instance, it would be extremely difficult to do that. If hon. Members will look at Clause 4, they will see that
    His Majesty may by Order in Council provide for extending any of the provisions of this Act, with such exceptions, adaptations and modifications, if any, as may be specified in the Order, to any of the countries or territories to which any provisions of the Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Act, 1945, extend by virtue of subsection (4) of section five of that Act, and any such Order may be varied or revoked by a subsequent Order.
    The effect of adopting the Amendment would be this, and I would illustrate the point by reference to a particular Defence Regulation which I select at random. I select Defence Regulation 55, which reads, and I read only the material words:
    "(1) A competent authority, so far as appears to that authority to be necessary for any of the purposes specified in subsection (1) section one of the Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Act, 1945, may by order provide—"
    certain things. If we adopted this change in the new context in which it is sought to be proposed, the result would be this. What the Bill does in the case of an ordinary Defence Regulation, such as No. 55 to which I have referred, is to include the purposes specified in the 1945 Act as well as the purposes specified in the present Bill.

    8.15 p.m.

    If we adopted this proposal to make adaptation to the Colonies subject to the affirmative Resolution, the result would be that, when we were looking at Defence Regulations and considering them as not incorporating certain purposes, we should not have to have an affirmative Resolution if it was desired to apply it to the Colonies, but, when we were considering Defence Regulations in this new form, and incorporating new purposes which this Bill introduces into it, we should have to have an affirmative Resolution before applying it to the Colonies. I think everybody would agree that that would be hopelessly illogical and quite absurd.

    If this is a wrong procedure—and here I would address my remarks particularly to the hon. and learned Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens)—and if we are to make this change it really is a most difficult time at which to make it. It is a most inopportune moment, having regard to the way in which previous Acts have used the precedent. On some future occasion, perhaps, we might reconsider the whole position, but I really do urge the Committee to accept the view that to do this now and make this violent break with tradition, with the result that we shall introduce into the Measure some really absurd inconsistencies, in that we shall have to have an affirmative Resolution in the one case and not in another, really cannot serve any useful purpose.

    I hope the Committee will agree that it would be producing a very undesirable result to make this change now, though at some future time perhaps we might consider it. I do not wish to be taken as assenting to the view that the process should be changed, but, whether it should be changed or not, this is a most difficult stage in the evolution of this legislation at which to do it.

    Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman tell us what is the position in regard to Newfoundland?

    I do not want to make any mystery about it. The 1945 Act refers us back to the 1939 Act, which contains a reference to Newfoundland. Clearly, however, we ought not to legislate for Newfoundland. Obviously, I am not making a party point, and I shall try to catch your eye, Sir Charles, in a moment or two. In the meantime, I want to know if the Government have considered this, because we should not legislate for a part of the Dominion of Canada.

    As to what is the precise constitution, and what are the results of constitutional changes, in Newfoundland, I should want to look into more fully, but I have no doubt that the provisions of the Statute of Westminster would be applicable, and that that, probably, would provide the answer to the right hon. and learned Gentleman's question. I assume that the Statute of Westminster would apply, and would exclude the territory from the category of territories dealt with in the Act.

    I am sure that the right hon. and learned Gentleman appreciates the point that we do not want even to purport to be legislating for parts of the Dominions, but this legislation by reference and going from one Act to another is difficult to follow. I do not want to make any difficulties for the Government on this point, but perhaps—

    I am much obliged to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for raising the point. Obviously, it is a point which we should look into. In 1939, to which reference has been made, the status of Newfoundland was different from what it is today. I am obliged to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for drawing attention to this matter.

    I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for undertaking to look into it, because it is worthy of consideration for we should not appear even in curia to legislate—

    If I may be allowed to intervene, I believe the position to be that the 1950 Act contained the necessary provisions which would exclude Newfoundland from the ambit of Section 4 of the 1939 Act as made applicable in this Bill.

    I am sure the right hon. and learned Gentleman will confirm that that is the position, because I think it is important that we should clear up the point. I am rather worried by the aspect of this matter raised by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens). I think the House ought to try to approach it irrespective of party and irrespective of our views on other matters on which we have divided today. The right hon. and learned Gentleman gave us an argument on what the precedents are and made a very strong argument, if that were enough. But I always remember, when I was arguing a case in another place in its judicial capacity before Lord Macmillan, among others, that Lord Macmillan said to me, "You have shown us what the law is but what I am interested in is why that is the law."

    I think we all agree that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has shown us what the precedents are, but I do not think he has quite satisfied us as to why these precedents are still effective today. If one puts into a statute the right to apply one of our Acts to a Colony, then I cannot see why that should be left to the Executive without any Parliamentary control, and I do not think the right hon. and learned Gentleman has really answered that point. He has given us an argument with regard to this special subject matter with which I shall deal in a moment, but surely it is our job in this House, so long as we keep the right to consider and criticise administration in the Colonies, to see that if our Acts are applied the method by which they are applied can be considered by us.

    I am not speaking in any provocative or party spirit at the moment, but I should have thought it was an aspect of dealing with our Colonies which many hon. Gentlemen opposite would have felt was one of great importance and interest to them. It seems an extraordinary way for the central Parliamentary machine to do its work to say that this Act may be applied to overseas territories, including the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands and Colonies and Mandated Territories and the like, and it can be applied with any alterations which the Executive choose to make, and we do not care about it again, we do not want to see it again. We do not care how it is applied or with what methods or modifications it is applied. I think my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington, South, has done the Committee a great service in raising this point.

    With regard to the particular subject matter I confess I do not see the great difficulty which the right hon. and learned Gentleman raises. The way it would work out would be that before the Order in Council applying this Act or a regulation to any Colony gave that Colony or the Executive of that Colony the right to use it for defence purposes, as opposed to other purposes already in being, there would have to be the confirmative approval of this House. I do not see any particular illogicality in having to have the confirmative approval of this House before these powers are used for the purposes which are set out in the Act.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman has said that that is going to cause administrative difficulty. I think he has over-stressed the difficulty. The time has come for us to review this as a procedure. It is an extraordinary inversion of the ordinary accepted things that the party for whom I speak should be asking for a fresh approach to the application of imperial legislation to the Colonies and the party for whom the right hon. and learned Gentleman replies should say, "Ah, but remember these precedents. Do not budge from the procedure which was applied in 1939 and again applied in 1945. I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman and hon. Members opposite, if I may make so bold, to approach it from the point of view of the merits of the problem and of the duties of the House of Commons.

    I shall not advise my right hon. and hon. Friends to divide against the matter, therefore, I make this appeal without the usual House of Commons in terrorem background. I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman to consider this problem. I hope that as I have not even asked it as a condition, he will consider it all the more and that we can look at it again from the aspect of colonial administration.

    Amendment negatived.

    Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Bill reported without Amendment; read the Third time and passed.

    Purchase Tax (No 3) Order

    Motion made and Question proposed,

    That the Purchase Tax (No. 3) Order, 1951 (S.I., 1951, No. 397), dated 9th March, 1951, a copy of which was laid before this House on 13th March, be approved.—[Mr. Kenneth Robinson.]

    8.29 p.m.

    I hope we are going to have some explanation of this matter even though the Financial Secretary to the Treasury in whose name I think it is, has only just arrived. If there is one thing that is more difficult to understand than the Order itself it is the explanatory note which does succeed in making the not inconsiderable confusion of the Order itself worse confounded. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman can give some explanation of what is the effect of this Order. The explanatory note merely refers to the groups of certain categories of article, and that in itself without reference to the Purchase Tax Schedules, does not take one very far.

    The other matter on which I must confess I am in considerable doubt is why this Order is produced at all at this time. At Question Time the Financial Secretary and his right hon. Friend spend most of their time indicating with a becoming affectation of sorrow that they were unable to anticipate their Budget statement. They thereby remind us of the fact that we are within a week of the Budget. Can we be told what necessitates this Order being brought forward now, only seven days before the Budget? I am aware that Purchase Tax variations can be effected either through the Finance Bill procedure or by Statutory Instrument, but when we are so close to the Budget it would seem that some extraordinary degree of urgency must arise to justify the use of Statutory Instrument procedure now.

    That there is such urgency is made the more curious when one recalls that the day before the House rose for the Easter Recess this Order was on the Order Paper, but that His Majesty's Government indicated their lack of belief in its urgency by the Leader of the House moving the Adjournment of the House immediately before this Order was due to be taken. It was apparently, therefore, not urgent before the House rose for the Recess. We are seven days from the Budget, and therefore we are surely entitled to know what peculiar urgency makes it so urgent now that we cannot wait a week, when by the very action of the Government 10 days ago we were made to wait a further 10 days.

    8.32 p.m.

    I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving me an opportunity to say a word about this Order. He asked first what urgency induced us to bring it forward at this moment so close to the Budget. I think he knows that a number of minor Purchase Tax changes are made by order throughout the year right up to the time of the Budget, and this order was actually made on 9th March—about four weeks ago. The only reason why it was not taken in debate before the Recess was because of the somewhat unusual events in debate of those few days. Had it not been for the various occurrences of that week, no doubt we should not be discussing this Order within seven days of the Budget.

    This is really a clarifying Order which makes no material difference to Purchase Tax law. What it does is to remove the doubt about the application of Group 12 of the Eighth Schedule of the 1948 Finance Act, and it excludes from charge under that group what are defined as
    "interval timers incorporating an alarum mechanism."
    The Order arises from an opinion given by independent counsel. Under the arrangement reached in 1949 with the Federation of British Industries and other industrial bodies, by which matters of interpretation were to be submitted to counsel, there was submitted the question whether a certain type of interval timer was chargeable under Group 12. The view of counsel was that the wording of Group 12 excluded appliances which did not either supply heat or transfer heat.

    The relevant words of the group were:
    "Cooking, heating, refrigerating and other appliances and apparatus, whether mechanically operated or not, being appliances and apparatus of a kind used for domestic purposes, except mechanical lighters."
    Looking at this as a matter of plain English, I cannot see that the words
    "Cooking, heating, refrigerating and other appliances and apparatus"
    can mean anything except cooking, heating and refrigerating appliances and also appliances other than for cooking, heating and refrigerating. That is my view as a matter of language. That, of course, was what the wording had been taken to mean both by the Customs and by industry since the 1948 Act was passed.

    Since the reference to counsel had been made as an agreed procedure, however, we felt bound to introduce this clarifying Order which, by the words in Section 1 (2), "appliances and apparatus," etc., makes it perfectly plain beyond, I hope, any conceivable doubt in the minds of lawyers or anybody else that the Group means what it has always been taken to mean. No new tax or increased tax is imposed on any goods by the alteration in the wording but the doubt about interpretation is removed.

    Secondly, the Order excludes from tax the interval timer. An interval timer, as I am sure you will be aware, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, is not quite the same thing as a clock. An interval timer records the passage of predetermined intervals of time but does not record the time of day. It can be used to measure the length of an industrial process or the time to boil an egg or the time taken by an hon. Member in making a speech in this House. At the end of the period a chime or other sound indicates that the period had ended.

    We propose the exemption of these timers partly because they are generally used in industry and also because the distinction between the domestic and the industrial type is rather vague. When such a timer is also a clock or watch, as in the case of an alarm clock or a stop watch, it will, of course, remain chargeable to tax under Group 17 of the Schedule. With that explanation I hope that the House will agree that we have taken the right course in exempting these appliances and at the same time removing doubts about the scope of the rest of the group.

    8.38 p.m.

    I have some doubt as to whether this is merely a clarifying Order, as the Parliamentary Secretary said, because if I remember correctly under the Finance Act of 1948 the affirmative Resolution is required only where an Order extends or increases the incidence of Purchase Tax. In all other cases the negative procedure is permissible, and one notices that the Government never adopt the affirmative procedure if they can possibly adopt the negative procedure. I am afraid I am being suspicious about this, for I believe the Order has the effect of increasing Purchase Tax on some articles and is not limited to clarification.

    In answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter), the Parliamentary Secretary said it is quite common, in making minor changes in Purchase Tax right up to the moment before the Budget, to deal with those things by Order. But when I have asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer questions on minor matters relating to Purchase Tax I have received the stock answer, "I regret I cannot anticipate my Budget statement." Again, I am afraid I am suspicious. I believe that the real reason why this matter is not reserved for the Finance Bill is that the Government do not want to put anything at all about Purchase Tax in the Finance Bill in order that they may avoid having a debate on the subject. We have had experience of that in the past. Perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary would like to reconsider his answer on that point and to give a little clearer answer to the House.

    Question put, and agreed to.

    Resolved:

    That the Purchase Tax (No. 3) Order, 1951 (S.I., 1951, No. 397), dated 9th March, 1951, a copy of which was laid before this House on 13th March, be approved.

    Utility Apparel

    8.39 p.m.

    I beg to move,

    That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, praying that the Order, dated 9th February 1951, entitled the Utility Apparel (Maximum Prices and Charges) Order, 1951 (S.I., 1951, No. 216), a copy of which was laid before this House on 12th February, be annulled.
    I think it would be for the convenience of the House, which we are most intent on considering, if, together with this Order, we considered Statutory Instrument No. 250 entitled Utility Apparel (Women's and Maids' Underwear and Nightwear), about which there is a Motion in my name on the Order Paper for the annulment of the Order.

    This is neither a flippant nor a frivolous Motion. An earlier attempt was made by me and by my hon. Friends to have this same Motion considered, but it was, in fact, defeated by the House being adjourned, and today is the last day upon which a Prayer is available to us on this first Order. Meantime, trade negotiations by the President of the Board of Trade have been broken off because, as I understand it, this system of using the Parliamentary, constitutional method of examining the problems the House is charged with examining has not met with the approval of the right hon. Gentleman. He pretends that it is difficult to negotiate with industry while there is a chance of arrangements that he has made being annulled by a Prayer of this kind.

    I should like to ask the Parliamentary Secretary how many orders have, in fact, been annulled, and, indeed, in how many cases where we have used this same and only method open to us to discuss the details of these orders has he not found our representations helpful, and incorporated them in adjusted or amended orders. If the right hon. Gentleman believed that by his action he was influencing trade and industry improperly to try to influence me and my hon. Friends to desist from these Prayers, he has been wrong, and if he thought that I and my hon. Friends would be deflected from carrying out our duty towards the public and to our constituents he was, again, equally wrong.

    I should like to say, at the outset, that I have no intention of asking that this Order be annulled in its entirety. On balance, the situation would, in fact, be worse—it might be chaotic—if, suddenly, this Order were to be annulled, but I do want to emphasise to the hon. Gentleman and to his right hon. Friend that this method we have at our disposal is the only method open to us of being able to consider the details of what his action means. Maybe, the system is wrong. It is not for me, at this point to discuss that. Maybe, there ought to be some amendment of our Parliamentary procedure which would allow us to discuss Amendments to Orders, but so long as this method is the only one open to us I for one propose to continue to pursue it.

    The right hon. Gentleman, in thinking he might deflect us from our duty has done very two very serious things. He has attempted—and I am not sure that the Leader of the House, in moving the Adjournment the other night, was not aiding and conniving at it—to thwart the decisions of Parliament, because the parent Act, the Goods and Services (Price Control) Act, 1941, was approved by the House only subject to the power of hon. Members to be able to pray, and to use this system of discussion on Orders which came up under the Act. I wonder, indeed, if the action of preventing Prayer does not merge on the illegal. The second thing he has done—

    I think that that is going far beyond this Order.

    I shall, therefore, come back to the Order—the two Orders, in fact—and to the matters of their detail. Order No. 250, which came into operation on 26th February, had the effect of increasing manufacturers' prices on all this range of underwear which we are considering. Concurrently with this Order No. 250, which increased manufacturers' permitted prices, Order No. 216 was brought into operation. These Orders, if I may say so, are in tandem. Order No. 216 governed the permitted margins that could be added to these goods, and, indeed, to a wider range of goods—the permitted margins that could be added by the distributors, that is to say, the wholesalers and the retailers. In addition, Order No. 216 refers to what are known as "Related Schedules." These Schedules have turned out to be the nigger in the woodpile the whole way through, because the Related Schedules applicable to a variety of goods, though not all the goods covered by Order No. 216, lay down selling prices.

    Taken together, Orders Nos. 216 and 250 fix the price at which these goods can be sold in the shops. It is clearly obvious that if a parent Order like Order No. 216 is brought out, allowing the margins which can be added to the manufacturers' prices in order to arrive at the selling price, and, at the same time, the Government say, "You must not add the permitted margin to the manufacturer's price until you have seen the selling price which is permitted for your goods under the Related Schedule," that obviously holds up the whole flow and system until the Related Schedule makes its appearance. So, although the trade knew quite well what their final prices would be by taking the manufacturer's permitted price and adding the permitted margin under Order No. 216, they were not allowed to do that; they had to wait until the Related Schedule, namely, No. 4L, made its appearance.

    Perhaps the easiest way to show the sort of nonsense that has arisen would be to take a simple case out of these two Orders. I ask hon. Members to look at Order No. 250 and to take the first example, which can be found on page 2. There, the price for cotton slips of a quality of cloth designated X3130 in its smallest size can be sold, as from 26th February, at a maximum price of 60s. 9d. per doz. Under Order No. 216, in relation to those identical goods the wholesaler has to refer to the Related Schedule 4K. Turning to the Related Schedule 4K and hunting for the same article, we find that the same cotton slips made of a quality of fabric X3130 in the smallest size can be sold by the wholesaler at only 60s. 4d. per dozen.

    So the fantastic situation has arisen in which the wholesaler has to pay to the manufacturer 5d. more per dozen than the price at which he is allowed to sell. That, clearly, holds up the whole flow of goods. The goods disappear from the shelves and are not available to the public; the flow of these articles dries up; they are not available for sale, and the unfortunate housewife, hunting for one of these garments, discovers that, for example, finding utility nightwear has become a nightmare.

    What is the explanation for this nonsensical state of affairs? The explanation is that throughout the Government have assumed that there are considerable quantities of unsold stocks of these garments all the way through the pipeline. They think that it is wrong for a distributor to sell goods at a new and increased price if he has bought them at the old and reduced price. I do not want to detain the House on this particular aspect of the matter, although there is a great deal to be said as to the incorrectness of that theory. I will content myself by pointing out that the stocks do not exist; they are not there, and the whole of this assumption that the goods will be available for sale for a certain period of time because they are in the pipeline is wrong because the system is not working. So great is the demand for these articles, that no sooner do they come in than they are sold, and no sooner do the slips come in than they slip out.

    I make two suggestions for the cure of this state of affairs. Either these Related Schedules should come out at the same time as the parent Order, or very close to it, or at least the distributor should be allowed to add to the manufacturer's price the permitted margin which is allowed in the parent Order. It is a simple matter to make the calculation. The public have their protection, and, at any rate, until the Related Schedule comes out, they should be allowed to make use of that system.

    I want to examine each of these suggestions. It is quite obvious that closer timing between the parent order and the Related Schedule is essential. It has, in fact, been recognised by the Board of Trade themselves, because in certain negotiations which took place on articles of this kind, they promised that the trade would not be asked to wait longer than two weeks for the Related Schedule beyond the date on which the parent order came out. In the case which I quoted, the Related Schedule was delayed for between four and five weeks. For that period the whole thing has not functioned.

    What of the suggestion that the distributor might be allowed to add the permitted margin to the manufacturer's permitted price? That is, clearly, a system which has been found to work by the Board of Trade because, whereas formally almost the whole gamut of utility goods was controlled by the dual price system, it has been abandoned in all except six groups, of which the group which I am discussing is one. If it can be abandoned and found to work with other similar articles, I suggest that the hon. Gentleman should extend it. I know part of the reason why this confusion exists. The Board of Trade have found it, as they say, administratively difficult to keep pace with the needs of trade. I can understand that, but that is no argument for making the public suffer when the cure is as simple as the one which I have indicated. Until the administrative machine can catch up with its duties and responsibility, they must adopt a system of allowing the permitted margin to be added to the manufacturer's price.

    One other criticism of the Order which I have to make is this. It falls from more important lips than mine, because it was criticised by the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments. Both the two Orders to which I have put down a Motion tonight came under their fire because of the delay in making out the parent Order, and on top of that delay we now have nearly five weeks' delay in bringing out the Related Schedule which allows the Order to work. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will give some assurance that this is not to continue.

    I have taken perhaps a little time to travel over rather technical and complicated matters, and I find myself in somewhat unusual company among the hon. Members who have supported me. I hope that my fellow-travellers will be persuaded that what is happening now is causing injury to the consumer. I am not primarily interested in the trade in this matter but in the consumers, who are largely inarticulate and can only look to us to raise a voice on their behalf. It is they whom the right hon. Gentleman is trying to stifle at the present time.

    8.55 p.m.

    I beg to second the Motion.

    I wish to deal only with the last point mentioned by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Scotstoun (Colonel Hutchison), and that is the observations of the Select Committee upon the delay in publication of the Order. The Select Committee obviously took a rather serious view, in making their Report to the House, of the delay in the publication of Order No. 216. The Report says:
    "Your Committee…are of the opinion that the special attention of the House should be drawn to them"—
    that is, four Orders, including No. 216 and No. 250—
    "on the ground that there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in their publication."
    In the case of Order No. 216, it was made on 9th February and not published until 23rd February, a delay of 14 days. The Select Committee must have taken a very serious view of a delay of 14 days, because in the case of the other orders the delay is only seven days. Therefore, we ought to have some better explanation as to the delay in publication of Order No. 216.

    The Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, provided for the prompt publication of Orders. Section 2 (1) provides that:
    "Immediately after the making of any statutory instrument, it shall be sent to the King's printer of Acts of Parliament and…copies thereof shall as soon as possible be printed and sold by the King's printer of Acts of Parliament."
    If Members will turn to the Report of the Select Committee which they have no doubt obtained and have fresh in their minds and look at Appendix A, which is the Memorandum by the Board of Trade laid before the Select Committee at their request, they will find in the second paragraph that:
    "The time allowed between signature and publication is normally agreed with His Majesty's Stationery Office on the basis of a standard scale showing the times within which publication can normally be arranged."
    The Board of Trade speak of a standard scale of times, but the Act says that an order shall be published as soon as possible and not according to some standard scale. In my submission there has been a clear breach, certainly in regard to No. 216, of the provisions of the Act. Later, in paragraph 6 of the same Memorandum, we find this:
    "Each of the three Orders under consideration was sent for printing on the morning of the day after it was made."
    Why was it not sent upon the same day? The Act says that it shall be sent immediately to the King's printer after it has been made. Why was there a delay of one day in sending the Order for printing? My hon. and gallant Friend referred to the fact that at least one of the related Schedules was not published until many weeks after the publication of the Order. If the Parliamentary Secretary will look at paragraph 3 of the same Memorandum, he will find in the last sentence that:
    "The Order itself could, no doubt, have been published earlier, but it is submitted that no purpose is served by publishing an Order in advance of any Related Schedule which it brings into operation."
    We are now told that the Related Schedule was published many weeks after the Order. The whole thing seems to be entirely nonsensical. This is a serious matter. It is quite clear that the intention of Parliament as laid down in the Act of 1946 was that there should be a rapid publication of orders immediately after they are made. That certainly has not been fulfilled in the case of the Orders under discussion, and I hope we shall have an explanation from the Parliamentary Secretary which is a great deal better than that made to the Select Committee.

    9.2 p.m.

    If I were to address myself at any length on this particular Prayer it would be to rebut some of the controversial remarks made by the hon. and gallant Member for Scotstoun (Colonel J. R. H. Hutchison) in the first part of his speech. Firstly, no doubt I would be ruled out of order, and, secondly, I have no wish to stir up acrimony tonight, because if rumour has it aright, peace and common sense may break out at any moment. I shall be delighted to associate myself with the hon. and gallant Member and be a crypto-prayer with him, and I shall listen with interest to the Minister's reply.

    9.3 p.m.

    I am in some difficulty tonight, because my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Scotstoun (Colonel J. R. H. Hutchison) has moved that Statutory Instrument No. 216 be annulled. Tonight is the last night on which we can pray about this Instrument. I presume hon. Members have got a copy of it. I have one in my hand. I see that in the Third Schedule there appears the words:

    "Gaberdine raincoats—Related Schedule No. 16B."
    No doubt most hon. Members think we are discussing that. As a matter of fact, we are not. We cannot discuss it.

    I think that that Schedule has been revoked by Order No. 296, and we are only discussing Statutory Instrument No. 216 without the Third Schedule.

    I am delighted, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that you have drawn the attention of the House to the fact that at the moment we are discussing something which, in part, no longer exists. That is most unsatisfactory from the constitutional point of view. On a Committee stage of a Bill we have the Bill in front of us. We go through it Clause by Clause. Every now and then the Motion is put that Clause so and so stand part, and we are entitled to assume that the Clause is somewhere there. We put down Amendments to leave out words and to insert words. On this occasion I do not think that hon. Members or those who devised this have the foggiest idea what is in the Order and what is left out.

    The whole story about Order No. 216 is very strange. The first Order was made on 9th February and the Order which takes part of it away—I presume we can discuss the fact that part of it has been removed from our purview tonight—was made on 22nd February so, quite obviously, the Board of Trade underwent a very rapid change of mind.

    I think the other two Orders, Nos. 296 and 413, have not been prayed against.

    One of the objections which I have to the Order we are praying against is the fact that the Board of Trade showed no stability of mind. That is a legitimate point. We are entitled to examine not merely the Order, but what I call "the political morals" of those who made the Order. This Order was signed on 9th February, but 13 days later it was altered. Therefore, what is being prayed against is the whole Order. I do not know what information you have, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, about part of this Order having been removed by a subsequent Order.

    It was presented to the House, and the Third Schedule has been taken out of it.

    I am not quite clear—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] This is the first time that the point has ever been raised, and I therefore think that it is a point of substance. I know that hon. Gentlemen opposite are not interested in good law-making, but I am, and that is the point which I wish to raise. On 9th February, an Order was made regulating certain prices. That came into operation on 26th February, but four days later an Order is made which takes it out of operation. It removes not the whole of the Schedule but the part of it, which was removed by Order No. 296. The interesting thing is that Order 413 removes the whole of the Third Schedule and not only the part of it which had been removed before.

    I am making a protest against the most incompetent draftsmanship of the Board of Trade. Nobody in this House can understand this Order without having all these documents in his possession—all of them. They relate to gabardine raincoats, women's domestic overalls and aprons, knitted apparel, nylon hose, women's—

    No, Sir. If they are in the First Schedule they are in order, but some are in the Third Schedule and this—

    On a point of order. I would like to get this matter quite clear. Surely we are praying that the Third Schedule should be annulled—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—although the Third Schedule, by a subsequent Order, has been removed. Surely we are correct in saying why we agree that the Third Schedule should be removed, because in fact it has been removed. Surely we are in order in saying that it should be removed and not in order in saying that it should be retained.

    Both would be out of order. Perhaps I could explain what has happened. S.I. No. 216 was amended by S.I. No. 296. S.I. No. 296 was revoked by S.I. No. 413. S.I. No 216 stands, except for the Third Schedule, which has been replaced by the Third Schedule in S.I. No. 413.

    We are all deeply grateful to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but looking at the Third Schedule, I do not find the related schedule No. 4L. That is still in. Therefore, I think I can at least read out its title—"Women's and maids' underwear and nightwear and other knitted apparel." [Laughter.] Quite seriously, at this moment I am quite satisfied that no hon. or right hon. Member, except possibly the Parliamentary Secretary, is really aware of what remains in the document which is now under discussion.

    My purpose in taking part in the debate is not that I necessarily oppose or support anything in Statutory Instrument No. 216, but that I think the time has come when this delegated legislation ought to be handled better. If we go into a shop, whether it sells food or underwear, we find a great mass of these documents stuck on the walls to help the shop assistants to comply with the law. Every now and then people are prosecuted because someone sells one of these articles at a price different from that in the Schedule, and the prosecution is directed not only against the shop assistant who made the mistake—in 99 cases out of 100 it is a mistake—but also against the employer, whether a person or a firm.

    We ought to take a little more trouble. I have here 100 pages of documents all of which are concerned in this matter. Some of the pages are full of lists, numbers, initials and prices. [Laughter.] Hon. Members opposite treat this as a great joke. Some of them represent the employees in the distributive trade. Some of them profess to represent the Co-ops., who are large traders; but they are not always respectable. My local Co-op. was fined £33 today for selling coal under weight. That interpolation was definitely out of order, but I have been slightly provoked by hon. Gentlemen opposite.

    The Board of Trade ought to behave better in this matter. In respect of some orders they behave quite well because they incorporate the Schedule in the Order. As a whole, the Ministry of Food are much better than the Board of Trade, because they never publish an order which has a related Schedule attached to it, but always publish a complete document. I cannot understand why one Department of the Board of Trade—I am certain that it is one Department—adopts the practice of having related Schedules while other Departments publish complete documents.

    I make a most serious appeal to the Parliamentary Secretary that the Board of Trade should mend its habits so that when we go to the Vote Office and ask for an Order we shall be supplied with not only the Order itself but all the pertinent documents attached thereto. Parliament and the people are not being treated fairly so long as we have these great masses of documents through which we have to search to find what the original Order sought to do and what changes have been made by the amending Order.

    9.14 p.m.

    I have to disclose an interest in the trade. If we find it so difficult to understand these great masses of regulations for which we are responsible, how much more difficult it must be for the men engaged in industry to carry them out. I plead with the Parliamentary Secretary, who has experience in the textile industry, for a much greater simplication of the regulation of economic affairs. Men in the industry who ought to be responsible for increasing the efficiency of their plants and seeing that cheaper and better goods are produced have to spend their time trying to understand regulations which we ourselves find it difficult to follow.

    Furthermore, if the policy represented largely by hon. Members opposite is carried to its extreme, and trade is controlled by S.I. this and S.I. the other, trade will soon be so confused that men will lose heart and will not give their best to industry. I think the Parliamentary Secretary will agree that today in the textile industry which is affected especially by S.I. 250, far too much time is spent by men at the top in committees trying to unravel the difficult and complicated regulations, instead of in their factories making the goods that the people of this country require.

    Apart from the political aspect, I plead with the hon. Gentleman from the practical point of view that he should do his utmost in his Department to simplify these orders so that they can be easily correlated, and to see that we have far fewer of them than we have at the present time.

    9.16 p.m.

    May I say at once how much I appreciate the way in which this Prayer has been brought forward tonight. The hon. and gallant Member for Scotstoun (Colonel J. R. H. Hutchison) usually makes a constructive contribution and, during the time that I have been at the Board of Trade, when a matter of importance has been raised, he has usually indicated the line he intended to follow. Hon. Members are entitled to know the ins and outs of these different orders, and I should like to take the opportunity to try to explain what is probably one of the most difficult and intricate series of orders that have been prayed against up to now.

    To begin at the end, may I say to the hon. Member for Louth (Mr. Osborne) that while I appreciate the gist of his remarks, they were really out of order because Order No. 216 is a distributors' Order and not a manufacturers' Order. The other is a manufacturers' Order, but it is not a cloth Order, and the hon. Member was trying to refer to the manufacturer of cloth. The remarks of the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams) were constructive until the last part of his speech.

    I shall try to explain the sequence of these Orders. S.I., 1951, No. 216 introduced three amended schedules, 3H, 4K and 6L. The numbers should be ignored because they are related to the type of garment manufactured, whereas the letter relates to an amendment. The Order also continued in force three Related Schedules, 1K, 16B and 17. The reason for that is, first, if hon. Members will look at 3H and 4K—[Interruption.] If the hon. Members who have raised this Prayer are interested enough to look at them so that I can make a serious explanation, I shall be glad. Those two schedules related to a previous manufacturers' Order.

    On a previous occasion, the hon. Member for Croydon, East, raised the question of the laying of related schedules at the same time as an order was laid. Those Related Schedules were laid at the same time as the particular Order was laid. They are laid in triplicate, and in both Houses. One copy goes back to the Board of Trade, receipted from each House.

    What I raised the other night was that I went to the Library to try to get the Related Schedules involved, but could not find them in the usual volume of printed and bound statutory orders. The Vote Office did not have any, although we learnt that some had been sent there. The Related Schedules which are laid are the ones which are put in the box in the Library—that is, the official laying. The ordinary volume which hon. Members consult did not up to that time contain the Related Schedules. I am glad to say that tonight I have had no difficulty in obtaining the schedules to the orders we are discussing. Therefore, I did some good the other night.

    The hon. Member should not have had any difficulty on that other night either. Perhaps I may say where the Board of Trade responsibility begins and ends, which may save a lot of argument on future occasions. When an Order is laid, three copies are laid in both Houses. One copy is sent back to the Board of Trade, receipted. On the date of publication, the Board of Trade assistant solicitor, in his capacity as liaison officer to the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments, sends 15 copies to that Committee. Once these two first steps have been taken, the job of the Board is done, and the question of how the orders are distributed or put out in the Library is a matter for the administration in the House.

    The job of laying—that is, sending a copy to the Library or to the Votes and Proceedings Office, I am not quite certain which—is the job of the Board of Trade, but the provision of adequate copies in the Vote Office is the job of the Stationery Office; and they, and not the Board of Trade, are the people who failed.

    I am glad that the hon. Member has given me the opportunity of correcting him. The job of sending the copies to the Library is not the job of the Board of Trade, but of the administration of the House. The job of the Board of Trade is to see that the Vote Office receives three copies—

    —yes—three copies of the order and of the attendant related schedules; and after the 15 copies have been sent to the Select Committee, the job of the Board of Trade has finished. The hon. Member is perfectly correct in that afterwards the Stationery Office and the Vote Office between them decide how many copies they want. While the hon. Member, quite rightly, told the House that on the night in question he was not able to get a copy from the Vote Office, it was not because they were not there but because the regular servant of the House who looks after the Vote Office was away on leave. In fact, the copies were there and could have been produced at a moment's notice by the person who knew about them. I wanted the opportunity of saying that, because I did not want that particular servant to have any blame in the matter.

    On that occasion the Home Secretary went out and brought back four copies, but they were four copies of the order which had been superseded and the official was on duty and supplied him with the four wrong ones, but not the four right ones.

    That is not accurate in this sense that the four copies were of a previous Order, U.F.5 and those were brought back, but if the servant of the House in the Vote Office had known where the others were and could have laid his hand on them, copies of U.F.6 would have come out also. I think we can leave that as satisfactorily explained.

    No, it is not a muddle. There was a statement made which was not true and I have explained why it was not true. I think I am quite entitled to do that.

    To come to the argument advanced by the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Sir J. Mellor) in regard to the delay in publication, I also must turn to the Third Report of the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments. The explanation is quite adequate. It may be a matter of opinion as to whether there should be more time allowed or not, but they were in the hands of the printers and if the hon. Baronet will look at Appendix B, on page 5, and see the remarks made by the Board of Trade in reply, he will see that it says:
    "It should be noted that the Order and Schedules were published on the 23rd February, whereas the date of operation was 26th February."
    That does not appear to be long, but these were in respect of prices going up and there was no danger of the retailers concerned being subject to proceedings if they went wrong. If it had been a case of prices going down, I should say that a minimum of three weeks would be required to allow retailers to keep within the law by marking down the stuff they had in their shops. That is the explanation. I cannot be more explicit than that. It does refer specifically to No. 216 and to No. 250, and I cannot give a better explanation as to why there was delay in that case. We do try to keep them as up-to-date as possible.

    Turning to the point raised by the hon. and gallant Member for Scotstoun, who was concerned with the delay between publication of orders increasing manufacturers' prices and publication of such orders, as that under discussion, which introduced new related schedules to allow distributors to get their permitted margins on manufacturers' prices, I can assure hon. Members that we do our utmost to keep them up-to-date.

    Related Schedules Nos. 3H and 4K, which came out with Statutory Instrument No. 216, were in relation to a previous maximum prices order. The Related Schedule could not come out without the Order; they are both part and parcel one of the other. Leaving the No. 6L, which was a reduction, and taking 1K, 16B and No. 17—[Interruption.] Be patient; I was patient with the hon. Member the other night. He has asked for an explanation, and, if he wants a proper and serious explanation, let him please take it seriously. As we carried on, it was necessary to bring 3H and 4K up to date by bringing in an amending Order No. 413, which came into force on 29th March, and which brought in 3J and 4L in place of 3H and 4K. I take it that the hon. and gallant Gentleman is now quite clear on that.

    Of course, and I regret as much as the hon. and gallant Gentleman the necessity for the delay, and I will come to the reasons for it in a moment.

    The first amending order referred to by the hon. Member for Croydon, East, was No. 296, which brought into force two amended Related Schedules—16C and 17A, and that was for the same purpose—to bring the prices up to date, so that there would be no more confusion about them. Sometimes, when delay has been likely to last for several weeks, I understand that it has been the practice in the past to revoke a Related Schedule of that description and allow the maximum prices as defined in the Order itself to take effect until the revised Related Schedule was ready.

    The hon. and gallant Member for Scotstoun is very well versed in these matters, and he will appreciate that, if he looks through Order No. 216 and examines the Third Schedule, he will find a number of descriptions there which are just brief statements, not to be compared with the large number of descriptions preceding them in the Second Schedule. The reason for that is that it is purely for enforcement purposes that the Related Schedules are put in there at all, and if it was possible to do it without the Related Schedules we would do so, because an enormous amount of work is involved.

    Anyone looking through the Related Schedules would see how difficult it is carrying through each item and relating a specific price to a specific item in the Related Schedule. It is a big job and one that calls for a tremendous knowledge of calculation and slide rule. It is for enforcement purposes, and the intention of the Related Schedule is that the maximum prices or long stop prices can be defined, bec