I beg to move in page 2, line 17, after "diversion," to insert
This Amendment raises less contentious and smaller issues than those raised by the previous Amendments, but it has a certain importance in those parts of the country in which it may well be that the Government will exercise powers given by this Bill for the stopping up of highways for defence purposes. As I understand the Clause, two methods for stopping up a highway are provided. There is the first method dealt with in the first five subsections, which is, I understand, intended to apply where the stopping up will be temporary. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary said so on the Second Reading, and when one compares the words used with the reference to permanent stopping up in the second part, it is obvious that some contrast is intended. The second method in the second part of the Clause deals with permanent stopping up. The effect of my Amendment would be to ensure that the temporary procedure should only be used when it was, in fact, going to be a temporary stopping up. Temporary powers should not be allowed to have a long-term effect. The Amendment seeks, therefore, to restrict to a period of 18 months the stopping up which may be effected by the first procedure. I do not think that imposes any unfair burden on the Defence Departments. If they desire to stop up a highway for a longer period, they can use the procedure set out in subsection (5) and the following subsections, and make it permanent; if they want to do so for more than 18 months they would be forced to use that procedure. It seems to me that the advantage of forcing them to use that procedure is that it provides far greater protection for the interests adversely affected than it is possible to provide where it is only a temporary urgent stopping up which is needed. 6.15 p.m. The effect, therefore, as I understand, if the Amendment is accepted, is that under the first procedure a highway may be stopped up for 18 months. If at the end of 18 months it is desired to continue the stopping up, then the second half of the Clause must be called in aid and the procedure therein set out may be used. I am not entirely tied to 18 months; I think it is a fair compromise, but I should be open to any argument that the Solicitor-General might have as to whether that was an appropriate period. What seems to be important is that there should be some definite period laid down for the purpose of the temporary procedure."for a period of not more than eighteen months."
I do not think the hon. Member has given sufficient weight to subsection (4), and I hope that when I direct his attention to it rather more particularly he may agree that his Amendment is not necessary. The position is as he stated it. That is to say, the first four subsections provide for a method of stopping up highways temporarily, and then the succeeding subsections provide for permanent stopping up. Under the first four subsections the result will be that a road can be stopped up only for the period indicated in subsection (4).
Subsection (4) provides:that is to say, to make orders temporarily stopping up highways—"The power to make orders under subsection (1) of this section"—
That means December, 1951. The original 1945 Act expired in December last year, and then there was the Motion to which we have had reference this afternoon to extend it for a further year up to 10th December, 1951. Then the proviso goes on to say:"shall cease to be exercisable on the expiry of the Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Act, 1945."
that is to say, in force immediately before December, 1951—"Provided that any such order in force immediately before the expiry of that Act"—
That is to say, the maximum period for which it could possibly continue in force, unless the 1945 Act is further extended, is up to December, 1953. Supposing this Bill becomes law quite soon, and supposing, for example, the Minister of Transport stopped up a highway under subsection (1) in June of this year, the hon. Gentleman's Amendment would mean that the stopping up would continue until December, 1952."shall, unless previously revoked, continue in force for a further period of two years."
Could.
It could continue until December, 1952. So that really there is only one year's difference between the position as it would be if this Amendment were accepted and the position as it is under the Bill as drawn. I feel that there is no need to abbreviate the comparatively short period as it is at the moment, as the hon. Gentleman would seek to abbreviate it. Not only is that the case, but the advice that I have received is that in a great many cases in which highways are temporarily stopped up it would be very difficult to determine within a period of 18 months after they are stopped up whether it was desirable to convert the temporary stopping up into a permanent stopping up.
In a great many circumstances which one can envisage, the situation would not be clear enough at the end of 18 months to enable a firm decision to be taken whether the highway should be permanently stopped up under the succeeding provisions of the Clause. Indeed, it would occasion a good deal of inconvenience, unnecessary expense and administrative action. I hope the hon. Gentleman will agree that there is not a sufficient case for abbreviating the period as he desires. It is true, as he has just intimated by his interjection, that the Supplies and Services Act can be continued, but it has to be continued as a result of discussion in this House. It can be continued only if a Motion is put down and carried under the terms of Section 8 of the Act of 1945. It is only after the House has decided that it is to remain in force for an extra year that the period specified in subsection (4) of the Clause can be prolonged. Inasmuch as the hon. Member's Amendment does no more than abbreviate the maximum time from December, 1953 to December, 1952—and it is the maximum time in both cases—with the result that it would often be very difficult by December, 1952, to take a decision whether the necessary steps should be followed permanently to stop up the highway, I urge upon the Committee that no useful purpose could be served by accepting the Amendment, and my advice is that it should not be accepted.The right hon. and learned Gentleman's argument sounded very convincing until one considered that it was based upon one hypothesis, and that a demonstrably false hypothesis—that the Supplies and Services Act would not in any circumstances be extended beyond 10th December of this year. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman comes to that Box in order to give that assurance on behalf of His Majesty's Government, well and good; but in the present state of the world no hon. Member believes that that will be the case. The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows perfectly well that from time to time power has been taken to continue these statutes in force, Not only that, but that power has been taken by, to my mind, the singularly objectionable procedure of continuing them in force by Motion.
Let me relate that to this issue. Suppose, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman admits is possible, the Acts are continued in force beyond 10th December of the present year and suppose, as he suggested, that is done by Motion. On that Motion it will be quite impossible as indeed was the case last October, to amend the powers at all. The House will be presented with the whole thing and will be told, "Take it or leave it," as was the case on 23rd October last year. At that stage it will be impossible to impose any time limit at all upon the period during which the supposedly temporary power to stop up a highway can be exercised. I must confess that what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said, particularly by implication, made me feel that my Amendment is rather more necessary than had appeared to be the case, because his comparison between the time in the Clause and my argument is a wholly artificial comparison. The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows perfectly well that in the unlikely event of this Government continuing in power until 10th December, 1951, there is every intention either of providing the permanent statute promised in the King's Speech or of continuing the present statutes in force. The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows that. Once that is accepted, the whole of his argument—that there will be only a very limited period up to December, 1953, during which the temporary stopping up can be carried on—is quite clearly false. I am not at all happy about the attitude disclosed by the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I think it indicates at least the possibility that this temporary procedure—intended to be temporary, with all the lack of safeguards for the interests concerned which are perhaps acceptable in a temporary Measure but are wholly inacceptable in a permanent one—may in point of fact be continued for so long a period as to impose quite considerable injustice upon those affected. There is no point in my detaining the Committee with examples, but hon. Members are aware that closing up a means of access, for example to traders' establishments, or the closing of a road to a garage or public house, can effect very serious loss. There is very little protection if the temporary procedure is followed; there is very little cover for those people and very little chance for them to make representations. Although, as I said, this is a relatively small point, I am bound to say that the line taken by the right hon. and learned Gentleman is very disquieting and the possibility of some injustice being done in a limited number of cases is a real one.Amendment negatived.
I beg to move, in page 4, line 13, at the end to insert:
I move this Amendment without any elaboration or even very much by way of illustration or illumination because my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing), who is primarily interested in it is unfortunately detained elsewhere. I think the purpose of the Amendment is quite plain upon the face of it; and equally that upon the face of it, hon. Members in all parties would wish that where the State has in the general interest to destroy or diminish somebody's legitimate right in something, the person so damaged should have the prospect of equitable compensation. I think it will be in the recollection of hon. Members who have been interested in the Bill that on Second Reading the Secretary of State for Air said—I will not overcall it; I do not say he gave anything we would endeavour to use as an assurance—at least, he admitted that there was substance in the suggestion now embodied in this Amendment, and gave an assurance that the matter should be looked into. I hope that at least the matter is now fully understood on the Treasury Bench, and I venture even to hope that it may be admitted that there is something in the Amendment which was desired by my hon. Friend and which in his absence I am afraid I move rather inadequately, but I hope I have made the quite simple point plain enough.(9) Any person who has any estate or interest in land which is injuriously affected by any order made under this section shall be entitled to recover from the Minister of Transport compensation for the injury to that estate or interest; and any question whether compensation is payable under this subsection or as to the amount of any compensation so payable shall, in default of agreement, be determined by the Lands Tribunal.
As it stands, the Clause incorporates by reference certain provisions for compensation. Compensation is payable in the first place to persons whose land is acquired for the purpose of providing an alternative route. It is payable also to statutory undertakers who may be required to move their pipes and other apparatus to the alternative route provided. That is done by incorporating Defence Regulation 51 and Section 49 (3) of the Town and Country Planning Act. That is so far as the former category of compensation is concerned. The latter category of compensation is similarly—
Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman remind us which is the former and which is the latter?
The former category are persons whose land is acquired for the purpose of providing an alternative route.
They get compensation?
They get compensation under the regulations, and the way that is done as a matter of machinery is that Defence Regulation 51 is applied by subsection (3) of the Clause. In the case of permanent stopping up of highways it is done by incorporating subsection (3) of Section 49 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947. That is the first category of compensation; compensation in the second category is brought about by incorporating in subsection (3) Defence Regulation 50 and, in the case of a permanent stopping up, by incorporating Section 49 (6) of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947. That is done by subsection (6) of this Clause.
But to go further and to do what the hon. Member proposes would be to introduce a wholly novel precedent in these stopping up codes. What he would seek to do—and I infer that by reference to the language which he uses, namely, by reference to his inclusion of "injuriously affected" land—is to incorporate the compensation provisions of Section 68 of the Land Clauses Act, 1845. 6.30 p.m. That, as hon. Members know, is the general provision which contains compensation provisions and which is made applicable in a number of statutes in the case where land is acquired, but in the codes which deal with stopping up of highways there is absolutely no provision for compensation such as the hon. Gentleman desires. I refer to the Highway Act, 1835, which is the main existing code, and to Section 49 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, which is the new code by which the Highway Act was partly replaced; and I also refer to the Requisitioned Land and War Works Act, 1945. None of these three codes, all of which deal with stopping up of highways, contains any such provision for compensation as the hon. Gentleman desires. Not only that, but the Requisitioned Land and War Works Act, deals with the case which is almost exactly analogous to the case with which this present Bill deals; that is, dealing with the case where a highway has been temporarily stopped up under emergency powers and is permanently stopped up. That is very similar to the sort of case which is dealt with by Clause 2 of the present Bill, and not even in that Act of 1945 is there any compensation provided for as the hon. Gentleman desires in this Clause. Not only is that an objection to the proposal which he makes, but if one were to accept the Amendment as he has drafted it in very few cases would it result—if, indeed, in any case—in compensation being paid at all, because the words "injuriously affected" in Section 68 of the 1845 Act have been construed in a number of judicial decisions as being limited to providing compensation for an actual infringement—I am speaking in general terms—of some easement or other right incidental to the ownership of land. A very typical case is that where works which are done on adjoining land, under the provisions of the Act, consist of the erection of a larger building and where the effect of the erection of that building is to block ancient lights rights, and the owner of adjoining land claims compensation. That is a typical case, and it has been said in general that compensation is only payable under Section 68 of the 1845 Act where one can say that some right inherent in the land has been interfered with as a result of the works done on adjoining land. Therefore, if one applies that interpretation of Section 68 to this kind of case it will, I think, be perfectly clear that in almost any case one can conceive there will be no compensation payable under that provision. Inconvenience, loss of business, and that sort of thing is not a subject of compensation under Section 68.Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman allow me? I am trying to follow him. I apologise to the Committee for interrupting. This is not really my baby, and I do not understand as fully as I hope I do in general when I have begotten the creature. Is the Solicitor-General telling us that the effect of the words "injuriously affected" would be to limit compensation wholly within the purview of Section 68 of the 1845 Act?
I think it would do so. The crucial words upon which the whole subsection hinges are those words, as the hon. Gentleman will, I think, agree:
and here come the crucial words—"Any person who has any estate or interest in land which is"—
It is those words which have been interpreted. Therefore, I hope the Committee will agree with me that the Amendment should not be accepted on these two grounds. The first, which is not, perhaps, a conclusive one, but one which, in this context, should have some weight, is that in none of the codes which deal with stopping up land is there any such provision for compensation being paid. There is different provision, and there is provision, indeed, in this particular Clause, for certain types of compensation. That is the first ground, though not a conclusive one, and hon. Gentlemen opposite say we should start a new precedent; but one should not start a new precedent in this context unless there were some reason for singling it out from other similar circumstances. The second, which is the more cogent, is that, as the Clause is drafted—and it is not only a matter of drafting because it is omitting a whole system of law, as it were—it could very rarely actually result in compensation being paid."injuriously affected…"
May I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman about a concrete case? I think my hon. Friend, when discussing this on Second Reading, had in mind small garages, small teashops, and the like, that had been started upon the highway; and if the highway were shut, of course the whole business, and a man's whole savings put into the business, would be completely lost. Cannot he get compensation in a case of that sort?
I think that in a case like that no compensation would be payable under Section 68. That is not a case in which a right inherent in the land is interfered with. It is a case in which one may say that a man suffers considerable inconvenience—loss of business, and so on; but that is not the kind of loss which has been held to be within the purview of Section 68.
There is just one point to which, I feel, the Solicitor-General has not devoted quite enough attention, if he will forgive my saying so. Under the old code, in stopping up a highway, after the formalities had been gone through before the justices, and the plan had been made out, and so on, there was a right of appeal to quarter sessions, as he will remember, and the issue of fact which on rare but well-known occasions was left to the jury at quarter sessions was, first, whether the new highway was nearer and more commodious to the public, and second, whether the appellant was aggrieved.
The Solicitor-General will remember that the judicial definition of "aggrieved" was whether the appellant had suffered some special loss which the general public had not incurred; and, although he is strictly correct in saying that did not provide for compensation, it did give the person who was affected the opportunity of making out his case, to try to prevent the alteration so that he would not sustain the damage, even if he could not be compensated for it. What worries us is the case made by my hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Mr. Pickthorn) and elaborated in a particular example by my right hon. Friend the Member for Epsom (Mr. McCorquodale), that we may have someone who has a business and who not only loses his business but is, if the right hon. and learned Gentleman is right, excluded where a public access to the land is cut off. There would be, at any rate, an arguable case—I imagine how strongly the right hon. and learned Solicitor-General would argue it—for saying that his estate, his interest in the land, was injuriously affected. We were limiting the compensation to that amount. The right hon. and learned Gentleman will appreciate that we were being very reasonable in the matter. We were asking for a very limited compensation. He would be a rash man who, in a case of legislation by reference, would say that he had followed every possible consequence of the references made to so many Acts of Parliament as are made in this case. I cannot find that the person who is affected in the way described has even an efficacious right of protest. In these circumstances we felt it was right that he should get this very limited compensation for which my hon. Friend asks. I think it is most regrettable that nothing had been done to secure that he can even state his case. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman can relieve my mind on that point, so much the better, but on a reading of the Clause, I certainly cannot find any opportunity for the person affected, even to make a protest. I do not know whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman can help me on that point. I am sure it is important to all of us who are considering a part of the community who will be very badly treated; they will lose not only their business which they may have built up, but also access to the position in which they live and carry on their being. I should, therefore, be grateful if the Solicitor-General could help us on that point.For the case of permanent stopping up, not temporary stopping up, there are a number of provisions embodied in the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, in Section 49, and also in the Sixth Schedule. Paragraph 4 of the Sixth Schedule provides for inquiries, and so on, and the Minister is required to give notice of his intention. It says:
In certain circumstances he is not bound to do so. There is, therefore, certainly in the case of permanent stopping up, effective provision in the 1947 Act for the voicing of grievances, which can be said to be the counterpart to the provision for appeal in the 1835 Act. There is not that provision in the case of temporary stopping up. Of course, temporary stopping up is envisaged, generally speaking, in not necessarily an emergency, but in a near emergency. In that case there is less provision, but there is at any rate some provision for the voicing of a grievance to be found in subsection (2). It is not nearly as effective as in the other case, but it is there, and the Committee may agree it is not inappropriate to the kind of circumstances envisaged with a temporary stopping up where, generally speaking, there is very often contemplated a rapid and perhaps near emergency. There the Minister has to give 21 days notice; it has to be published in the newspapers, and so on. I agree that it does not go to the length of ensuring that there must be an effective hearing, but it does give an opportunity to those who are aggrieved, even in the case of a temporary stopping up, to make such representations as they think fit. I therefore do not think it would be right to say that in the modern system there is no counterpart to the 1835 appeal procedure. In a permanent stopping up there is a very effective counterpart. Even in temporary stopping up it cannot be said that the person affected must be wholly voiceless."If before the expiration of the said period of three months an objection is received by the Minister of Transport from any local authority or undertakers on whom a notice is required to be served under this Schedule, or from any other person appearing to him to be affected by the order, and the objection is not withdrawn, the Minister shall cause a local inquiry to be held."
6.45 p.m.
The Solicitor-General has taken a rather legalistic view of this Amendment. He has limited his reply to those cases of stopping up and of injurious affection as it might be defined in the 1835 Act. I do not believe that was really what my hon. Friends who drafted this Amendment had in mind. I think they were taking a much wider view and thinking of the man with a small business who might have his business impaired, or even have to close down because of some action taken by way of requisition, or something affecting the property. If I understood him aright, I think he said that in the case of gas and water undertakings, and so on, some compensation was payable, or some relief was available to them. Of course, it does not come as any surprise to us to find that the only people who benefit in this way are nationalised undertakings—
indicated dissent.
Did I misunderstand the right hon. and learned Gentleman?
Certainly I did not say that. I carefully indicated that there were two categories of persons entitled to compensation. The first were persons whose land was required for the purpose of providing an alternative route, so the prejudicial observations of the hon. and learned Gentleman were founded on a complete misconception.
If I was wrong I withdraw my remarks, but I certainly understood the right hon. and learned Gentleman to say that there were wider opportunities for compensation in the case of nationalised industries than there were for the individual. I thought that was what the right hon. and learned Gentleman was saying. As I say, that does not surprise anybody on this side of the Committee. I do not think, however, that this is such a narrow issue. What we should have in mind more is what will happen to the unfortunate man who, as a result of some action taken under this Clause, finds himself perhaps deprived of the whole of his livelihood.
I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman could, without taking too much of a lawyer's view about it, and without resorting so much to the actual term "injuriously affected," look at this in a wider way and consider what happens to the man whose business is affected. Perhaps the words "injuriously affected" appearing in the Amendment have misled the right hon. and learned Gentleman into thinking that my hon. Friends were thinking only in those terms. I feel that that is not the case, and I hope the Solicitor-General will look at this again.The course of this discussion has made me think of that fictional character who always heard the sound of his horse's hoofs on the road as it trotted "cloppity-cloppity" as a recital of the words, "property, property." In this debate it has sounded to me where compensation for property is concerned, as though the party opposite are very much like that fictional character and turn all things to the account of property. Yet there are many people who may be injuriously affected by the stopping up of roads whose interests are not the interests of property at all, but whose interests do not seem to have been thought of by hon. Gentlemen opposite.
During the Second Reading debate I referred to the stopping up of a road adjacent to a railway station. It may be a stoppage affecting 100 yards of the road, but it may compel those who have to go to the station for their train in the morning to walk an extra two miles. It may compel a man going to work in the locality to travel a very long distance round. In referring to people who own shops on roads that are to be interfered with under these provisions, hon. Gentlemen opposite should have remembered also the women shoppers who are affected, who may be compelled to travel very long distances because of the stopping up of only 100 yards of road.The hon. Gentleman will also no doubt have in mind the most tragic case of those who would have to go an extra two or three miles to the nearest licensed premises for refreshment.
I can well understand hon. Members opposite remembering that. The general interests of the public, quite apart from property owners, are interfered with very gravely by the provisions of the Bill. I do not see why, when compensation is not particularly provided for for the people whose walking is so much extended by what may take place under the Bill, the special class of property owners ought to be singled out for claims for compensation, as hon. Members opposite have been trying to secure. I am opposed to the Amendment because I think that the property owner in this matter should be on precisely the same basis as any other section of the community.
I hope that it is in order, Major Milner, now, rather than on the Motion "That the Clause stand part of the Bill"—I shall not bother the Committee then—as the Law Officer called in aid in resisting this Amendment, subsection (2), to ask him how he proposes to place a copy of his notice at both ends of a highway, because it seems to me that unless he makes some new invention or has that proposal redrafted, we are going to have the traffic tied in knots in a quite new sense.
It seemed to me that the reply of the Solicitor-General to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe) in regard to procedure for objection was not wholly satisfactory, and, indeed, I got the impression that he was not himself satisfied. It is, of course, quite true as he said in regard to orders for a permanent stopping up that they attract the provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, which is beginning to be a well-tried procedure; but when we are concerned with temporary orders, the provisions of subsection (2) have almost graver shortcomings than those to which my hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Mr. Pickthorn) has just drawn attention.
As the right hon. and learned Gentleman realises, that is a provision only for advertisement or notification. There is no duty placed by that subsection on an authority to take notice of any protests made or to consider them in any way. It is not unsual that that should be so, because, of course, that is the ordinary position under the Defence Regulations. It is the ordinary position in regard to requisitioning powers that there is no machinery for taking into account objections. That is all right where the powers are exercised solely in conditions of real emergency. The trouble with these temporary powers is that they become progressively extended and still the machinery of objection is limited, or, indeed, virtually non-existent. I do not think that to draw attention to the powers of advertising under subsection (2) is really to meet the very forceful and cogent point put by my right hon. and learned Friend. The other observation which I wish to make is this—and I must apologise to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that I was not here for the whole of his first speech on this Amendment. In regard to the question of compensation, I think that I am right in saying that broadly speaking this falls into the same category as all the requisitioning powers under the Defence Regulations in that no provision is made for compensation for injurious affection at all—injurious affection by way of severance, for example, where part of a property is requisitioned and the remaining part which is not requisitioned may suffer severe damage by reasons of the severance. In all the years that the Compensation Defence Act, 1939, has been in force, there has been no provision made for compensation for injurious affection in these cases. That is, of course, a wider problem than the one with which we are concerned in this Bill. I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will allow me to make use of this Clause and the desirability of giving compensation for injurious affection to remind him that there is no compensation for injurious affection in the much wider range of cases arising out of Defence Regulation 51 and the Compensation Defence Act, 1939. May I ask him, as these powers are now being continued so much longer than was anticipated at the time, to have regard to that question, and to advise his colleagues that, if powers of requisitioning are to continue almost indefinitely, there should be a general right to compensation for injurious affection arising from severance, as there is under the well-established procedure of the actual compulsory acquisition of land.Amendment negatived.
I beg to move, in page 5, line 9, to leave out from "and," to the end of the line, and to insert:
It is quite true that this Amendment, in one sense, paves the way for a subsequent Amendment, but I ask the Committee to believe that it is a point of substance in itself, even if the next Amendment is not accepted. The effect will be to ensure that temporary as well as permanent orders for stopping up or diverting highways should be made by Statutory Instrument. Even if we were to fail, and the Instrument was not made subject to Parliamentary procedure which is so much in our minds at the moment, we believe that orders of this kind should be officially published and attract the provisions of the Statutory Instruments Act, which was so carefully drawn in order to achieve that purpose. I do not think that I need say any more, because the Committee are familiar with this point."any such power as aforesaid."
The proposal is that the stopping up of highways temporarily should involve publication of the stopping up order as a Statutory Instrument. It seems to me that that is a perfectly intelligible and sound provision when we are considering permanent stopping up, but when we are considering temporary stopping up very little advantage is gained by anybody by the formal printing and publication of the temporary stopping up order as a Statutory Instrument.
As the right hon. and learned Member for West Derby (Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe) said, in a sense this Amendment paves the way for a subsequent Amendment, and no doubt the Committee may desire to discuss rather more fully the later Amendment, dealing with annulments. If one deals with this Amendment in isolation, and asks oneself if any useful purpose is to be served by placing an obligation upon the Minister to print in the form of a statutory rule and order a temporary stopping up, it seems to me extremely doubtful. 7.0 p.m. The major provision is that at the site of the place where the stopping up is to take place a copy of the notice has to be posted. Those affected will see it and be cognisant of the fact that the highway is stopped up by going to the place and seeing the notice there posted. I cannot see what satisfaction it would give by the notice being subsequently reprinted and included in one of the statutory notices and orders. I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will agree that if we look at this Amendment in isolation there is very little to commend it. Indeed, I had that impression from his speech, because he did not seem to be pressing the matter very strongly or with his usual vigour.The right hon. and learned Gentleman must not draw too strenuous a conclusion from the placid intonation which occasionally creeps into my voice. I put it to him that no one desires this procedure to be unnecessarily used or used to too great an extent. The people affected in the locality will, of course, have their own problems and, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman has had to concede, very little opportunity to make their local and personal views felt in the case of a temporary stopping up—they can make a protest, but that is the end of the matter.
What could happen if this Amendment were accepted is that if there was a tendency for these powers to be used in far more cases than the House expected, the House would be able to see the results from publication. I noted that the right hon. and learned Gentleman did not say that the Amendment would be a great deal of trouble or expense to anyone. I cannot see why he should worry or feel that it will impose any burden on the Ministry of Transport. Why cannot he let us have our little publication in these circumstances? He has not let us have anything else today. Surely the publication of an order is not too much to get out of several hours' discussion.There is one aspect of this matter I should like to submit to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I think it is a point of substance. We are here discussing whether temporary stopping up can be brought into line with permanent stopping up with regard to publication of the instrument. I suggest that the word "temporary" in this connection is something of a misnomer. A great many highways, and particularly footpaths and rights of way, which were closed as a result of the war have not yet been released, some as near as Hampstead Heath.
While the right hon. and learned Gentleman may well say that this is only a temporary affair and ask why, in these circumstances, we should publish a notice about something that is happening in such a transitory manner, am I not right in thinking that the word "temporary" means not only such time as the Act may function, with renewal year by year, but for two years beyond that? When we remember that, is it not the case that the adjective "temporary," while it may be the correct term legalistically, does not, in fact, describe the situation? It means that we are not discussing a period of months but years. Is there not something to be said, therefore, for the Amendment my right hon. and learned Friend has moved persuasively, if not in an inflammatory manner? I am surprised that the right hon. and learned Gentleman should expect thunder and lightning on every occasion that someone rises from this side of the Committee, although that may be coming later—I do not know. Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman not be good enough to have another look at this between now and Report? It seems a very small thing to ask, although it may be of great convenience to the public.I have listened to the argument of the right hon. and learned Gentleman. Would he be content to withdraw the Amendment on the understanding that we think over the argument that has been put? The difficulty that presents itself is that I cannot see what advantage would be gained, except for what the hon. and gallant Member for Bristol, North-West (Lieut.-Commander Braithwaite) has just said, that "temporary" is probably a misnomer. I am not sure what advantage would be obtained by printing the order in the form of a Statutory Instrument, but if the right hon. and learned Gentleman will withdraw the Amendment we shall consider the argument used, without, of course, any commitment.
On the undertaking that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will consider this, and because I know that consideration from him means that the matter will be thoroughly canvassed with those concerned, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave withdrawn.
I beg to move, in page 5, line 11, at the end, to add:
This Amendment secures that the orders made under this Clause shall be subject to some degree of Parliamentary control. I do not know whether it is your wish, Major Milner, that the Amendment which follows and raises the same issue shall also be discussed. I refer to the Amendment, in page 5, line 11, at the end, to add:"which shall be subject to annulment by resolution of either House of Parliament."
Perhaps you would give some indication of the effect of this Amendment on the second Amendment."which shall be subject to annulment by resolution of either House of Parliament. Provided always that if on any day permitted for that purpose by subsection (1) of section five of the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, a motion to annul such a statutory instrument appears on the Order Paper of either House but the said motion is not moved by reason of the adjournment of the said House, such day shall be deemed not to be a sitting day for the purposes of sections five and seven of the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946."
The second Amendment raises two issues. Therefore, it would be desirable to have them discussed separately. In the event of the first Amendment being passed by the Committee I propose to call only the proviso of the second Amendment, which concerns the conditions under which prayers of annulment can be made. In the event of the first Amendment not being accepted the second Amendment will fall.
Do I understand that in the event of the present Amendment not being accepted the second Amendment will fall?
Yes, that is so.
I am obliged. This Amendment is perfectly simple.
In view of what my hon. Friend has said, that in the event of this Amendment not being accepted there will be no debate on the second Amendment, will it be possible to debate the value of the negative procedure on this Amendment?
I understand that you have ruled, Major Milner, that the most convenient course for the Committee is to discuss the first of these two Amendments and then, if the first Amendment is carried, you propose to call the second so that we might have a debate on the proviso, but that if the first Amendment is not carried the latter part of the last Amendment will fall with it. It seems to me that that would be the most satisfactory course for the Committee to adopt.
I am obliged to the hon. Member who has repeated precisely what I said. It is desirable to pass the first Amendment, if the Committee thinks fit, which establishes the principle, and then the conditions under which annulment shall take place will be decided on the second.
The effect of the Amendment I have moved is, of course, to subject those orders, which under the Clause, will be in the form of Statutory Instruments, to that degree of Parliamentary control, which is permitted by the negative procedure. After what has been said on previous Amendments I do not think it need be argued that some of these orders—and we are here concerned, as I understand it, only with orders affecting the permanent stopping up of highways—will be of very great importance not only to a number of people but to the district directly concerned. They will be at least as important to those districts as, for example, the question of whether the cinemas in such districts should be open on Sundays. The Committee will recall in the case of that particular form of local activity, not only is there Parliamentary control but it is not merely by the negative procedure but by the affirmative procedure. It has been laid down that before that matter can be dealt with an affirmative Resolution of both Houses is required.
What we are asking for in this Amendment is less than that. The case for some degree of Parliamentary control is strong; otherwise, constituents seriously affected by these matters will come to hon. Members, and they will have to say to them that their objections are hopeless. It would be much better if there were some means of discussing these matters in the House. The method asked for is the lowest form, a form which, in recent weeks, if I may coin a phrase, has been somewhat devalued, but at any rate, some form of Parliamentary control is allowed. The procedure laid down in the Clause does not take us very far. It provides that Statutory Instruments shall be listed as such. I do not know whether it means that they will be reviewed by the Select Committee, but it means that they will appear on the list, and all hon. Members can do about it, if they disapprove, is, if they are very fortunate at the Table, to put Questions to Ministers. They cannot take any other really effective Parliamentary action. If these were not Statutory Instruments, at all, but treated as administrative measures of so trivial a nature as to be of no concern to hon. Members, it would be arguable that they should be dealt with by Parliamentary Questions only. But it is conceded by the Government, in the form in which they have introduced the Bill, that these are matters of such importance as to be exercisable in the form of Statutory Instruments. That being accepted, it is surely not impossible that those Statutory Instruments should be subject to the same degree of Parliamentary control as the greater number of Statutory Instruments and be subject to the negative procedure. Hon. Members on the other side of the Committee may say, "It is no use providing for the negative procedure, because the Patronage Secretary has decided that Prayers against these orders shall not be allowed at any rate up to two o'clock in the morning." If that is what they say, the argument really recoils upon them, because they will then be arguing that there is very little difference between the procedure laid down in the Bill and the procedure proposed in the Amendment. I do not take that view. I believe that the Government will see reason. The control of delegated legislation is a matter on which not only the House, but the country feels extremely strongly, and that feeling cannot be thwarted with impunity. What we are asking for here is the lowest form of Parliamentary control. It may be we are asking for too little, but that is no objection from the point of view of the Government. It is our view that these orders are at least as important as the vast majority of the orders which are laid in the normal way on the Table of the House and subject to negative Resolution. It is in the belief that they are at least as important that I beg to move this Amendment.7.15 p.m.
I hope the Committee will not accept this Amendment. What we are discussing is the stopping up of a highway. A purely local matter of that sort cannot be an appropriate subject for discussion in the House by way of Prayer under the negative Resolution procedure.
To what extent is it more local than the Sunday opening of cinemas?
Obviously, quite different considerations arise. The opening of Sunday cinemas raises much broader issues, on which people have very different views, and they are quite different from the executive action which is entailed in the closing of a particular road. Whether that road is to be closed or not must depend on purely local consideration of which hon. Members, unless they get some evidence deployed before them, are, of necessity, almost wholly unaware. It would be a sheer waste of time to ask the House to consider such a local question by way of the negative Resolution procedure.
Not only that but it would involve the House taking on the opposite to what was expressed in a somewhat similar context. If we look at Section 49 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, which expresses the wishes of the House in matters of that sort, there is no provision for the annulment of orders by negative Resolu- tion by either House of Parliament, but what is there and what is equally reproduced in this Clause is a much more appropriate procedure for a local inquiry. When we are dealing with local matters of this sort, we desire to ascertain what are the wishes and feelings of the local inhabitants who will be immediately affected by a closing order. Provision is made in the 1947 Act, and equally in this Bill, for ascertaining the wishes of these persons. In a discussion on an earlier Amendment I called the attention of the Committee to paragraph 4 of the Sixth Schedule of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, which is made applicable to closing orders. Under it the Minister has to publish the fact that he proposes to make an order; he has to take into account any objections; and there is provision for the holding of a local inquiry. That is an appropriate procedure for ascertaining what are the objections in the case of any proposal to stop up any particular highway, but what advantage there is to be gained for anybody in the House, with its large membership of hon. Members who, only by the merest chance, have any knowledge of the local conditions of a particular highway, is very difficult to see. The hon. Member who represents the constituency in which the highway is situated may know something about it, but why other hon. Members should know about it I do not know. It would be very difficult for them to be informed unless some procedure is involved which has the effect of deploying the evidence before the local inquiry. That these purely local proceedings should form the subject of discussion by way of a Prayer in the House would be quite purposeless, and I hope the Committee will agree that this Amendment should not be accepted.I was very disappointed with the Solicitor-General's speech. He is always impressive as the Minister in charge of Measures of this kind, but I think he must have been affected by what the Prime Minister said in his broadcast the other day about the battle of Waterloo, and a time when normally nobody travelled more than about three miles from their homes. To say, as the Solictor-General has just done, that the stopping up of a highway is a matter of purely local interest is surely nonsense. We see many motor cars parked in Mr. Speaker's courtyard and they travel very long distances, and the gentlemen to whom they are allocated, at the public expense, sometimes use them for that purpose.
The other day when I was speaking on my Ten Minute Bill I used an argument for the purpose of extending this principle of annulment. I drew attention to the extraordinary anomalies in this matter of highways. We had a debate on highways the other day, and I then learned to my amazement that when we want to re-open a highway, the order proposing to do it is subject to annulment. I do not know whether the Solicitor-General has been adequately briefed on this point and whether he knows that we close highways under one Act of Parliament, under which we can have no Prayers, and re-open them under another, under which we can pray against the re-opening. I never heard of anything more stupid than that. For the Solicitor-General to say that the stopping up of a highway is not a matter of general public interest indicates that the Solicitor-General's solicitor did not brief him very well on this point, and I hope that the Solicitor-General will look into the point more carefully. I believe that he is a member of the Temple. If the traffic authorities want to make a one-way street near the Temple which, according to the Solicitor-General, is only a matter of very local interest, it means, as I believe the Solicitor-General will discover, that it would require an order which would be prayable in this House. I know that the Commissioner of Police sometimes does it illegally. Not far from where I live a notice was put up for about eight months saying, "No entry this way," and it had no legal validity whatever. A couple of months after I asked a Question about it in the House, the notice was taken away, without anyone saying anything. The Solicitor-General ought to study this aspect of the law a little, from the red books which will be found in the Aye Lobby, the "Revised Statutes." I assure him that the highway laws are in great confusion on this matter of the right to pray. On this matter of the stopping up of a highway being only of local interest in which only a few hon. Members are concerned, I think I might well refer to the Bills from local authorities which come before the House, on the Motion of yourself, Major Milner, as Chairman of Way and Means, petitioning Parliament for certain additions to their powers. We say the magic word "Object," and those Measures do not get a Second Reading on that day. If we say "Object" often enough, you put them down for a Second Reading at seven o'clock. I would remind the Solicitor-General that many of those Bills seek to amend the highway laws and that the major speeches are often made by a couple of local M.P.s. To suggest that where there is only a local interest we are not entitled to take up the cudgels for people in localities who think that they have been "steamrollered" by the administrative machine is not up to the usual standard of the Solicitor-General. I do not think that bureaucratic power should ever be without Parliamentary control. I agree that the affirmative procedure should only be used in very exceptional cases, but the right of annulment ought to be used in all cases where laws are made by the decree of bureaucrats.I speak as a member of the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments. We examine a vast quantity of Statutory Instruments. We have not the right to examine all of them, and perhaps it is a pity that we have not. From my experience on that Committee I assure the Solicitor-General that we examine countless Statutory Instruments of particular local interest. Reference has been made to orders for stopping up roads and for making streets for one-way traffic. These and many others are subject to negative resolution. There are Instruments laying down regulations in regard to parks. I might say that quite a quarter, except that I do not want to give any figures—at any rate a large proportion—of the Statutory Instruments that we consider are concerned with purely local matters.
I quite understand why the Solicitor-General is opposing the Amendment. He does not want to get himself into deeper water in these matters. I suppose, the state of parties being what it is, that the Amendment will be defeated in the Division Lobbies. This situation forces me to say on this Amendment what I intended to say on the next Amendment. I feel that the Committee ought to give serious attention to the principles involved, concerning the opportunities for review and annulment offered to hon. Members in relation to Statutory Instruments. The Select Committee of the House ought certainly to consider whether it is not possible to set up machinery by which hon. Members should have the power—That point does not arise on the Amendment.
I did not think that my hon. Friend would get so far.
I may say that I quite agree with your Ruling, Major Milner.
The Solicitor-General's defence against the Amendment consisted partly in the suggestion that as this concerns a local matter, the House should not deal with it. That point has been more than adequately covered by my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams). The other point of defence was that the procedure given by paragraph 4 of the Sixth Schedule of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, was a better procedure than that of annulment by negative Resolution, and that there was, therefore, no need for any further safeguard.
What the Solicitor-General appears to have overlooked in this case, though he expressly drew attention to it during the debate on the previous Amendment, is that by the terms of the Clause the procedure of inquiry by which local feeling can be ascertained, as provided in that Sixth Schedule, would apply only to permanent orders made under subsection (6). That, of course, would provide no safeguard in respect of temporary orders made under the Clause. It seems to me likely that nearly all the orders made under the Clause will be temporary, especially if there is no safeguard for the citizen in regard to the temporary order. What will happen in practice no doubt is that the orders will be made as temporary orders and then, under subsection (5), it will be decided that they shall be converted into permanent orders. At that stage only, the Solicitor-General's safeguard of inquiry comes into operation, but at that inquiry it will be said that in these cases the highway has already been stopped up for a long time as a temporary measure and there has been no great inconvenience, and, therefore, the order will duly be confirmed, despite the machinery for a local inquiry. That is not good enough. It was a little disingenuous for the Solicitor-General to produce this argument and not to remind the Committee again that it would have effect only in the case of permanent orders. If the great majority of them are to be temporary orders, to be converted later into permanent orders, it seems that there will be no redress and no safeguard for the citizen. 7.30 p.m. If the machinery of inquiry could be made to work effectively there would be something to be said for the view of the right hon. and learned Gentleman that that might in some cases, though not in all, be the preferable method. But if the choice is between having an illusory safeguard only in the exceptional cases, which is the remedy of the right hon. and learned Gentleman in reliance on the Sixth Schedule or, on the other hand, the real safeguard of the possibility of annulment by negative Resolution, it is right that the Committee should not leave the citizen without any remedy or protection but should incorporate the remedy proposed in the Amendment.I have been out of the Chamber for only five minutes since three o'clock—it was during a small part of this debate—and, therefore, I apologise if perhaps I am repeating what has been said, or perhaps doing an injustice to the Solicitor-General. But it did seem to me that his speech—I would not venture to estimate whether it was up to his usual logical and legal level—was not really quite up to his usual level of candour. He spoke as if this were wholly a matter of local interest. But that, surely, is less than half of the question.
The fact that matters of local interest are often subject to Prayer procedure—all that I will not go into—has been sufficiently proved and I do not think will be any longer contested, but the point which I think is new—I apologise if it is not—is this one, that the matter here is of the balance of interest between a local inconvenience, which everybody must admit to be there, in the shutting up of a highway, and the presumed national interest, for the purposes of defence mainly, which we must all presume that His Majesty's Government can judge better than persons in the locality, and so on. That is the point, surely, and to say that this is unsuitable for Parliamentary consideration by Prayer because it is local is really, in the strictest sense, nonsense. The reason for asking for the safeguard is that, suppose there should be a bad Government, suppose there should be invasion or near invasion, at a moment when the country has few or no resources, poor currency, and many Ministers who are not trusted, and so forth—some, perhaps, who were conscientious objectors or pacifists until the day before yesterday—some such situation is not beyond conceiving—in such a situation the question is: Can the Ministers be trusted, without any possibility of appeal to Parliament, when they say that there must be local inconvenience because the central need for defence demands it? Can we be sure that they will always judge that balance correctly? It must be plain that no Opposition, and certainly no supporters of the Government, would possibly use this in a factious way in such circumstances. When, with any colourability, the Treasury Bench can say, "We know more than you. We assure you that for the defence of the nation it is necessary to cut off half a mile of the highway outside Little Puddlecombe," that is the last kind of thing upon which Oppositions or dissidents can afford to be tiresome. It is quite true that we have seen an Opposition tiresome about matters of defence, and up against defence to the last moment and beyond it and get away with it through the inscrutable interventions of Providence, but it is not the kind of thing likely to happen very often. All we are asking is that where the Government is going to decide that for central purposes these local inconveniences must be inflicted, there Opposition shall be entitled, at its peril, to say, "That ought to be looked at again," and to compel the Minister to spend half an hour, or it may be less than half an hour, on defending it. That is what is being asked, and if there is a good case against that, then I suggest with confidence to the Committee that it has not been put by the Solicitor-General. The whole of his attention was on the question of locality, but the whole point is the proportion between the inconvenience to the locality and the central considerations.I am appalled at the defence put forward by the Solicitor-General in opposing the Amendment. I suppose that one should not be appalled, because it was a characteristic misunderstanding of the functions of the House, one which has permeated the whole of the party opposite. The principle is that when there is a grievance an hon. Member should be entitled to bring it to the House. That is a fundamental right of all of us who sit in the House. What the Solicitor-General is saying is that, although there may be a case, it is just a little local affair and the hon. Member ought to be precluded from bringing it to Westminster. Every one of us has a duty and a right, and always has had, to bring local grievances to the House and air them before this public tribunal. That is one of the main functions for which we are here, and I was surprised that the right hon. and learned Gentleman should have taken the line he did.
I do not accept the hypothesis that these are necessarily entirely local matters. If the main road to the great port of Southampton were stopped up, would the right hon. and learned Gentleman say that that was purely a local matter? That would be a matter of great urgent national interest, and it would certainly be a case to be brought to the attention of the House by the local hon. Member or anybody else. Even accepting the view which he put forward that this is limited entirely to local matters, every hon. Member has a right to bring local matters to the House. The whole strength of the House arises from the agglomeration of our knowledge of local matters. That makes this place what it is. In taking the attitude he has taken, the right hon. and learned Gentleman is doing great damage to democracy.I hope that the Solicitor-General will reconsider his position on this matter. I cannot understand why he treats so lightly in itself the withdrawal of rights from people. As the hon. Member for Ealing, North (Mr. J. Hudson), pointed out, that is a commencement in the matter. What may affect these people in the localities, according to the Solicitor-General's own statement and as elaborated by my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford (Mr. Walker-Smith), will, in probably the majority of cases, occur without any further right accruing to the people affected than seeing a notice of what is to happen. The fortunate people, according to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, are those who will have the right to appear at a local inquiry, but, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman has argued so often in other places, the Minister need not pay any attention whatever to the balance of opinion or the views expressed at that local inquiry. So that right is not of very great advantage.
I cannot help thinking that the views expressed by the right hon. and learned Gentleman go deeper than that. I took my part, in the days when there were not party divisions, in discussions about the future of town and country planning and the form that the machinery might take. I would emphasise that what was said so often against anything but the representation of town and country planning by a Minister who would be answerable in the House was that in the case of planning—highways fall into the same category—local problems arouse the keennest passion and feeling. I can quite understand that just as some question of planning boils up into an issue which overflows any local bounds and becomes a national issue, so the fact that a community—it might easily be, as in the other example I gave, an historic community—is suddenly cut off, or the path they have used for centuries is suddenly changed, will arouse an issue which is well deserving of the attention of the House. My hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Mr. Pickthorn) put the other aspect of it which, in my view, really decides the case. What will be the arguments put against the local view? It is that it is necessary for the defence interests of the country. There is no other place that is suitable to discuss that issue except the House of Commons, and that is an unanswerable point. I was trying to get the ring of the argument of the right hon. and learned Gentleman when he was dealing in depreciatory sentences with the Prayer procedure. You will remember, Major Milner, how the right hon. and learned Gentleman said, "If you had this procedure, if you were allowed to put down a Prayer to annul, only the local Member would have some slight knowledge, and nobody else in the House of Commons would know anything about it." I asked myself where I had heard that before. Curiously enough, in his book "Law and Orders," Dr. C. K. Allen used it as an argument for the insufficiency of the procedure of annulment by negative Resolution. That seemed to me a most extraordinary position for the Solicitor-General, who is trying to prevent even the procedure which Dr. Allen spent so many pages in saying was insufficient, by saying that the House of Commons and local Members are incapable and unable to secure that a debate will take place which will justify the attention of the House. If that is the view of the right hon. and learned Gentleman after six years in this House, he has been unfortunate because, believe me, some of the most interesting and valuable debates, and some of the most interesting expositions of the personalities of the House in the period I have been here, have been made when hon. Members have been concerned with a local matter which has touched them and, of course, their constituents very deeply. Therefore I suggest here that when we, first of all, had taken away the old procedure that I mentioned on an earlier Amendment, by which anyone aggrieved by the stopping up of a highway could have the issues tried by a jury at Quarter Sessions, because it was too cumbrous—the next in degree, the local inquiry, will now only apply to a small number of cases and, with regard to the majority of cases, the people affected will have no remedy. 7.45 p.m. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has advanced many propositions in the House of Commons, but I did not imagine that he would ever argue at the opposite Box so blatantly for injury without remedy—the one thing which English law has refused to tolerate in the centuries of its existence. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman is not prepared to meet us on this point, I have no alternative but to advise my right hon. and hon. Friends to divide on the Amendment.
Question put, "That those words be there added."
Division No. 67.]
| AYES
| [7.48 p.m.
|
Aitken, W. T. | Garner-Evans, E. H. (Denbigh) | Odey, G. W. |
Amory, Heathcoat (Tiverton) | Gates, Maj. E. E. | O'Neill, Rt. Hon. Sir Hugh |
Arbuthnot, John | Gridley, Sir Arnold | Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D. |
Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M. | Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans) | Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.) |
Baldwin, A. E. | Harden, J. R. E. | Orr-Ewing, Ian L. (Weston-super-Mare) |
Banks, Col. C. | Harvey, Air Codre. A. V. (Maclesfield) | Osborne, C. |
Beamish, Major Tufton | Hay, John | Perkins, W. R. D. |
Bell, R. M. | Head, Brig. A. H. | Peto, Brig. C. H. M. |
Bennett, Sir Peter (Edgbaston) | Heald, Lionel | Pickthorn, K. |
Bennett, William (Woodside) | Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W. | Powell, J. Enoch |
Bevins, J. R. (Liverpool, Toxteth) | Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe) | Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.) |
Bishop, F. P. | Hill, Dr. Charles (Luton) | Profumo, J. D. |
Black, C. W. | Hornsby-Smith, Miss P. | Raikes, H. V. |
Boothby, R. | Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Florence | Redmayne, M. |
Bossom, A. C. | Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire) | Remnant, Hon. P. |
Bowen, E. R. | Howard, Greville (St. Ives) | Roberts, Major Peter (Heeley) |
Boyd-Carpenter, J. A. | Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.) | Roper, Sir Harold |
Boyle, Sir Edward | Hulbert, Wing Cmdr. N. J. | Ropner, Col. L. |
Bracken, Rt. Hon. B. | Hurd, A. R. | Russell, R. S. |
Braine, B. R. | Hutchison, Lt.-Com. Clark (E'b'rgh, W.) | Shepherd, William |
Braithwaite, Lt.-Cmdr. Gurney | Hutchison, Colonel James | Smith, E. Martin (Grantham) |
Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. | Jones, A. (Hall Green) | Snadden, W. McN. |
Browne, Jack (Govan) | Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W. | Soames, Capt. C. |
Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T. | Kerr, H. W. (Cambridge) | Spearman, A. C. M. |
Butcher, H. W. | Lambert, Hon. G. | Spens, Sir Patrick (Kensington, S.) |
Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden) | Lennox-Boyd, A. T. | Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard (N. Fylde) |
Carr, Robert (Mitcham) | Lindsay, Martin | Steward, W. A. (Woolwich, W.) |
Clarke, Col. Ralph (East Grinstead) | Linstead, H. N. | Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.) |
Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmouth, W.) | Lockwood, Lt.-Col. J. C. | Storey, S. |
Clyde, J. L. | Longden, Gilbert (Herts, S.W. | Strauss, Henry (Norwich, S.) |
Colegate, A | Lucas, P. B. (Brentford) | Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray) |
Conant, Maj. R. J. E. | Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh | Summers, G. S. |
Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert (Ilford, S.) | McAdden, S. J. | Taylor, Charles (Eastbourne) |
Corbett, Lt.-Col. Uvedale (Ludlow) | McCallum, Major D. | Thomas, J. P. L. (Hereford) |
Craddock, G. B. (Spelthorne) | Mackeson, Brig. H. R. | Thompson, Kenneth Pugh (Walton) |
Cranborne, Viscount | Maclay, Hon. John | Thorneycroft, Peter (Monmouth) |
Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C. | MacLeod, Iain (Enfield, W.) | Thornton-Kemsley, Col. C. N. |
Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E. | MacLeod, John (Ross and Cromarty) | Thorp, Brig. R. A. F. |
Crouch, R. F. | Macmillan, Rt. Hon Harold (Bromley) | Touche, G. C. |
Cundiff, F. W. | Macpherson, Major Niall (Dumfries) | Turner, H. F. L. |
Davidson, Viscountess | Manningham-Buller, R. E. | Turton, R. H. |
Davies, Nigel (Epping) | Marlowe, A. A. H. | Walker-Smith, D. C. |
de Chair, Somerset | Marples, A. E. | Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth) |
Deedes, W. F. | Marshall, Douglas (Bodmin) | Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C. |
Digby, S. W. | Marshall, Sidney (Sutton) | Watkinson, H. |
Dodds-Parker, A. D. | Maude, John (Exeter) | Watt, Sir George Harvie |
Donner, P. W. | Maudling R. | Webbe, Sir Harold |
Drayson, G. B. | Mellor, Sir John | White, Baker (Canterbury) |
Drewe, C. | Molson, A. H. E. | Williams, Charles (Torquay) |
Duncan, Capt. J. A. L. | Morrison, John (Salisbury) | Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge) |
Eden, Rt. Hon. A. | Morrison, Rt. Hon. W. S. (Cirencester) | Williams, Sir Herbert (Croydon, E.) |
Erroll, F. J. | Mott-Radclyffe, C. E. | Wills, G. |
Fisher, Nigel | Nabarro, G. | Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro) |
Fort, R. | Nicholls, Harmar | Wood, Hon. R. |
Foster, John | Nicholson, G. | York, C. |
Fraser, Sir I. (Morecambe & Lonsdale) | Nield, Basil (Chester) | |
Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir David Maxwell | Noble, Cmdr. A. H. P. | TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
|
Galbraith, T. G. D. (Hillhead) | Nugent, G. R. H. | Mr. Studholme and |
Gammans, L. D. | Nutting, Anthony | Major Wheatley |
NOES
| ||
Acland, Sir Richard | Bottomley, A. G. | Collick, P. |
Adams, H. R. | Bowles, F. G. (Nuneaton) | Cook, T. F. |
Albu, A. H. | Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth | Cooper, Geoffrey (Middlesbrough, W.) |
Allen, Arthur (Bosworth) | Brook, Dryden (Halifax) | Cove, W. G. |
Anderson, Alexander (Motherwell) | Brooks, T. J. (Normanton) | Craddock, George (Bradford, S.) |
Anderson, Frank (Whitehaven) | Brown, Thomas (Ince) | Crosland, C. A. R. |
Awbery, S. S. | Burke, W. A. | Crossman, R. H. S. |
Ayles, W. H. | Burton, Miss E. | Cullen, Mrs. A. |
Barnes, Rt. Hon. A. J. | Butler, Herbert (Hackney, S.) | Daines, P. |
Bartley, P. | Callaghan, L. J. | Dalton, Rt. Hon. H. |
Benn, Wedgwood | Carmichael, J. | Darling, George (Hillsborough) |
Beswick, F. | Castle, Mrs. B. A. | Davies, A. Edward (Stoke, N.) |
Bing, G. H. C. | Champion, A. J. | Davies, Harold (Leek) |
Blenkinsop, A. | Clunie, J. | de Freitas, G. |
Blyton, W. R. | Cocks, F. S. | Deer, G. |
Boardman, H. | Coldrick, W. | Delargy, H. J. |
The Committee divided: Ayes, 173; Noes, 201.
Diamond, J. | Keenan, W. | Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvonshire) |
Dodds, N. N. | Kenyon, C. | Ross, William (Kilmarnock) |
Driberg, T. E. N. | Kinley, J. | Royle, C. |
Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C. | Lee, Frederick (Newton) | Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E. |
Edwards, W. J. (Stepney) | Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock) | Simmons, C. J. |
Evans, Albert (Islington, S. W.) | Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.) | Slater, J. |
Evans, Edward (Lowestoft) | Lindgren, G. S. | Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.) |
Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury) | Logan, D. G. | Snow, J. W. |
Ewart, R. | Longden, Fred (Small Heath) | Soskice, Rt. Hon Sir Frank |
Fernyhough, E. | McAllister, G. | Sparks, J. A. |
Field, Capt. W. J. | MacColl, J. E. | Steele, T. |
Finch, H. J. | McGhee, H. G. | Stewart, Michael (Fulham, E.) |
Fletcher, Eric (Islington, E.) | McInnes, J. | Strachey, Rt. Hon. J. |
Follick, M. | McKay, John (Wallsend) | Stross, Dr. Barnett |
Foot, M. M. | MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling) | Summerskill, Rt. Hon. Edith |
Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton) | Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.) | Sylvester, G. O. |
Freeman, John (Watford) | Mann, Mrs. Jean | Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield) |
Ganley, Mrs. C. S. | Manuel, A. C. | Taylor, Robert (Morpeth) |
Gibson, C. W. | Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A. | Thomas, David (Aberdare) |
Gilzean, A. | Mathers, Ht. Hon. G. | Thomas, George (Cardiff) |
Glanville, James (Consett) | Middleton, Mrs. L. | Thomas, I. R. (Rhondda, W.) |
Gooch, E. G. | Mikardo, Ian | Thomas, Ivor Owen (Wrekin) |
Gordon-Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C. | Mitchison, G. R. | Thorneycroft, Harry (Clayton) |
Grey, C. F. | Moody, A. S. | Thurtle, Ernest |
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley) | Morley, R. | Tomlinson, Rt. Hon. G. |
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly) | Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.) | Ungoed-Thomas, A. L. |
Gunter, R. J. | Mort, D. L. | Viant, S. P. |
Hale, Joseph (Rochdale) | Moyle, A. | Wallace, H. W. |
Hall, John (Gateshead, W.) | Murray, J. D. | Webb, Rt. Hon. M. (Bradford, C.) |
Hamilton, W. W. | Neal, Harold (Bolsover) | Wells, Percy (Faversham) |
Hannan, W. | Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. J. | West, D. G. |
Hardy, E. A. | O'Brien, T. | Wheatley, Rt. Hon. J. (Edinb'gh, E.) |
Hargreaves, A | Oldfield, W. H. | White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint) |
Harrison, J. | Oliver, G. H. | White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.) |
Hastings, S. | Paling, Rt. Hon. Wilfred (Dearne V'lly) | Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W. |
Hayman, F. H. | Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury) | Wigg, G. |
Holman, P. | Pannell, T. C. | Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B. |
Holmes, Horace (Hemsworth) | Pargiter, G. A. | Wilkins, W. A. |
Houghton, D. | Parker, J. | Willey, Frederick (Sunderland) |
Hubbard, T | Paton, J. | Williams, David (Neath) |
Hudson, James (Ealing, N.) | Pearson, A. | Williams, Ronald (Wigan) |
Hynd, H. (Accrington) | Peart, T. F. | Williams, Rt. Hon. Thomas (Don V'lly) |
Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe) | Poole, C. | Winterbottom, Ian (Nottingham, C.) |
Irving, W. J. (Wood Green) | Popplewell, E. | Winterbottom, Richard (Brightside) |
Janner, B. | Porter, G. | Wise, F. J. |
Jay, D. P. T. | Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.) | Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A. |
Jenkins, R. H. | Pursey, Cmdr. H. | Wyatt, W. L. |
Johnson, James (Rugby) | Rankin, J. | Yates, V. F. |
Johnston, Douglas (Paisley) | Rees, Mrs. D. | |
Jones, David (Hartlepool) | Reid, Thomas (Swindon) | |
Jones, Frederick Elwyn (West Ham, S.) | Rhodes, H. | TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
|
Jones, William Elwyn (Conway) | Richards, R. | Mr. Bowden and Mr. Kenneth |
Robinson. |
Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.