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Foreign Affairs

Volume 640: debated on Thursday 18 May 1961

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Question again proposed, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question.

6.44 p.m.

Black Rod descended between Europe and myself. I am rather hesitant to speak on this subject, because those of us who came here after the General Election are very conscious that these issues have been debated up hill and down dale ever since the war. Nothing is easier than for a late arrival to point to what could have or should have or might have been done. I am hesitant, too, because I believe that too much discussion and too much speculation on this subject, at this moment, could be harmful. If the Lord Privy Seal has some negotiating cards up his sleeve it is desirable that they should not all be laid face up on the table.

If there have been faults in the past, those faults have not been confined to one side of the House. When the war ended we had our own troubles, and plenty of them. It is true that we had our occupation zones in Germany and Austria, but it was asking a lot that we should take on the troubles of the whole of Europe as well. The fact remains that at the end of the war we failed to get into the business of rebuilding Europe. Many hon. Members can remember the early days of liberation, perhaps with short spells of leave in Paris, Brussels or Rome. There is no doubt that the atmosphere of welcome which then existed continued for some years. For some years we could have had the leadership of Europe on terms that we could state, but we were busy, preoccupied, and perhaps indifferent.

When the Council of Europe was first mooted we were deeply suspicious. It smelled too much of a European federation. Again, when the idea of a unified market for iron and steel for Western Europe was put forward, despite the fact that our steel industry is among the most highly competitive in the world, we shied away from it. It was another European adventure. When the European Defence Community was suggested we rejected it out of hand, because it was unthinkable that our Army should be added to a European Army. We had our worldwide commitments. As was pointed out in the debate yesterday, in 1955 we declined to send a Minister to Messina. Perhaps it was rather an inaccessible place, and perhaps we never believed that France would agree to a free market, or would throw open her frontiers to German competition.

Then, when the Treaty of Rome was signed, with 400 pages to read, perhaps we were too preoccupied with the Middle East. Perhaps we failed to grasp the significance of that treaty—the fact that countries with centuries of protective tariffs round them had agreed to trade freely, as one nation.

Nothing is more enjoyable or less constructive than jobbing backwards like this, but if it is true that we could have had the leadership of Europe then, it is equally true to say that today Europe goes it alone. In the last nine months the whole issue has come welling up again. Are we to go into some association with the Common Market?
"Will you, won't you, will you, won't you, will you join the dance?"
Some here have consistently favoured marriage with Europe. Yesterday my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones) spoke of a bride, a full-scale wedding and signing the register. But others have pointed out, quite rightly, that we are already married. They have therefore suggested that we can only contract what is called a "looser form of association." Yet others still shrink from any relationship with Europe at all. They think the only good thing between us and France is the English Channel.

Clearly, one school feels that the closer we get to Europe the more we shall have to share America with Europe. There is another school which fears exactly the reverse; that the longer we remain an offshore island the greater is the likelihood of America transferring her interest to the mainland. The Lord Privy Seal touched on that point in his reference to the trends in American investments.

That there is a lack of enthusiasm for Europe today is understandable. After all, we are faced with something of a change in our historic loyalties. In this country during the war we did not suffer the same political convulsions as they did across the Channel, where institutions capsized and perished and they were ready for new loyalties and new institutions. Here we have no partiality for written constitutions, elaborately drafted institutions. Our systems have evolved through long years of growth.

We have never relished European entanglements. We have no appetite for a closer integration of social and economic policies. We realise that this decision, in so far as it is our decision, is a matter of balance, of weighing arguments and counter-arguments. We realise that we cannot see quite where this road is leading. We realise that of necessity we cannot have complete assurance, and that in some degree it must be an act of faith—
"Will you, won't you, will you, won't you, …".
What is the answer?

We have deliberated this point for a good many years now. We have made a snail's progress in our deliberations. On balance, and I repeat on balance, the answer may lie further down on the same page in the same nursery rhyme:
"The further off from England, the nearer is to France
Then turn not pale, beloved snail, but come and join the dance."
It has been pointed out in this debate—rightly I think—that the whole trend today is towards a larger grouping or an association of States. Of course, in this the French may set the subscription too high. In those days when they invited us in we were very busy. But today the position has changed. Basically, our great mutual interest lies in fighting Communism. A divided Europe means a weakened N.A.T.O. I think that the Lord Privy Seal has pretty long odds against him. I do not rate his prospects very high. The French believe that they have got rid of British industrial competition from the Common Market and I think that they want to keep things that way. If the French industrialists and the Quai d'Orsay dig in their heels, what then?

I think that there should be no recriminations. In any case, we should not be in a strong position to throw stones. Certainly the matter could not be allowed to rest there. We must throw the net a lot wider than the area which was supposed to be covered by our free trade proposals. It must be the West or nothing. We must think in terms of an economic N.A.T.O. if we are to match the productive capacity of the Soviet bloc. I believe that, in any case, time will force this greater market on us. I look upon a closer union with Europe as no more than an interim measure. It is no use pretending that today we are at peace, and if these current discussions, or negotiations, or whatever they are, founder, as they may well, then we must go on to the next step. We must aim for a still wider coalition of the Western community patterned on the lines of the Common Market. I cannot persuade myself that what these six nations—including France and Germany, historically such bitter enemies—have done is beyond the power and will of the West itself to organise.

6.58 p.m.

The hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. M. Hamilton) referred in the earlier part of his speech to the fact that we could have had the leadership of Europe years ago and that we failed to take advantage of an opportunity which now has gone. Whether that be so or not, may I submit to the hon. Member that certainly we have offered a lead for Europe if not of Europe. In saying that I bring as evidence first, the manner in which we utilised Marshall aid in this country compared with the way in which similar aid was used in other countries in Europe. Had they used it economically in the same way as we did immediately after the war, there would have been a speedier progress towards the better times that now prevail.

Secondly, I submit that the manner in which we liberated India gave a tremendous lead which unfortunately was not always followed by the countries of Europe, particularly by our neighbour, France. In those two respects we have made an impressive contribution not only to the world in general but to Europe in particular. Nevertheless, I understand, as we all understand, why it was that the Lord Privy Seal yesterday spent such a large part of his speech emphasising the need, implicitly if not explicitly, to enter into the Common Market.

I do not share the criticism advanced from some quarters about the alleged indecision of the Prime Minister and the Government regarding entry into the Common Market. After all, he is turning, as hon. Members of this House are turning, from other considerations and loyalties. We must recognise that, though it is probable that we shall enter into the Common Market and join the big Six, or achieve some other kind of European economic co-operation, apart from other aspects of a very complex problem, that may mean—I do not put it higher—some diversion from support for the integration of the Commonwealth. That in itself would be a calamity. Undoubtedly it will appear from what evidence has been adduced that our economic interests today may lie with the Six and the Common Market and with an economically integrated, free Europe, but I am sure that most hon. Members will agree that that is not the only consideration nor the only criterion.

We have another criterion, a moral one. I am not pretending that it is the only criterion or necessarily the predominant one. It is the one that has relevance to the Commonwealth. Our obligation is to advance and encourage the Commonwealth particularly now that it has relieved itself of part of its previous incongruity by the secession of South Africa. I am not saying that with great delight because, in common with other hon. Members, I very much regret the circumstances which led to that secession. Although there are some remaining local incongruities and paradoxes—for the whole of the Commonwealth is not at present under what we call a free democracy—such incongruities are subordinate to the basic, paramount fact that the Commonwealth as a whole represents an invaluable contribution to the democratic peace of the world as distinct from other types of peace.

I say that because, although all nations and peoples want peace, that is not enough. The real issue is, what kind of peace is it they want? Russia has peace within its orbit at the expense of free political democracy. The conqueror wants peace when he subjects his adversary to his heel and keeps it on him. There is the peace of the prison compound. That is not the kind of peace we desire, nor would it be a true peace. The peace we want is peace consistent and consonant with certain democratic principles, even though they are variable in their expression and application.

That is why I refer to the Commonwealth today. I believe it is, and can be still more in the future, a very great influence on the moral plane for the peace of the world. It presents to the world a remarkable and impressive phenomenon of a free association of a variety of peoples, most of whom are Asian and coloured, who are bound by no legal or economic tie at all but who accept as their symbolic head the Queen of this country. In every other respect they associate together purely and solely on the basis of friendship, although there may be certain secondary economic considerations.

I believe that the United States of America presents another example of great influence in the world. Although we can criticise, and I certainly do criticise, the paradox of America having within itself the economic contradiction to the very peace and world co-operation which it advocates in the world as a whole, although there is this brash affluent idolatry in America, it is an impressive fact that there are fifty different States within a federated community. The States of America are in some respects almost as distinctive entities as are the sovereign States of Europe. They have their own law courts, and in many respects their own laws. One can pass from one State to another and find an entirely different atmosphere.

It is well for us to remember that the United States of America is a country of united States and not the United States of America. If we think of the 180 million in the United States of America and six or seven hundred million in the Commonwealth, we see that in two areas there has been some degree of success in the achievement of what I call a democratic peace. The moral strength of those two examples, I am sure, is bound to tell in the long run. In fact, I am sure it is telling now.

Since the war and before the war, I have been fortunate in being able to travel to many parts of the world. I well remember the impression I had in the Far East where there is a considerable Chinese population to some extent indoctrinated or under the influence of Communism. I found everywhere signs that were a counter-balance to the permeating effect of the Communist faith—for that is what it is—through the fact that India, and not only India, was pursuing a democratic pathway to a democracy as we understand it within the Commonwealth.

I should not under-estimate the tremendous influence of the Commonwealth in the way I have explained in counter-balancing the spread of Communist ideas and influence throughout the Far East. Yet it is true that underneath all subsidiary complex conflicts the real issue today is between the Communist world and another world. I do not say the free world because within what is called the free world there are all kinds of sociological paradoxes. I suppose that in the free world some include Spain and Portugal, which I should hardly classify as free countries. As I see it, the conflict primarily is between the Communist world and the Commonwealth. That may seem rather extravagant, but I ask the House to bear with me while I try to illustrate what I mean by that contention.

I have already referred to the United States as being in some measure a counterbalance, but I believe that the Commonwealth acts far more as a counter-balance in this respect. The Commonwealth type of democracy is largely conscious of social obligations in a way in which the United States of America is not. The Commonwealth has not the same degree of what I have called brash affluent idolatory as has the United States of America. Although, of course, the politics and economies of various parts of the Commonwealth vary, nevertheless there is that appreciation of the fact that not only must we be free politically, but also use that political liberty and freedom to release millions of human beings from the tyranny of poverty. Here, again, I am certain that millions of Asians and Africans—and, indeed. Latin-Americans—are far more inclined to look to this country and the Commonwealth for inspiration and example than to the vast and significant country of the United States.

When I was in the West Indies last year, close as those islands are to America—and also in one of the Southern States of America—I found that although there was considerable economic penetration from America almost everywhere there was an emphatic preference for British values. There was a longing, an almost poignant longing, that we should find economic resources to assist those countries in their development within our ethos rather than within the ethos of the United States.

I am not saying this because I am stupidly critical of America. I have already borne witness to the significance to world peace of the federation of fifty States. I know too, that America has most generously poured into the backward areas of the world billions of dollars—some, no doubt, with strings attached, but for the most part, I am positive, for purely humanitarian considerations. It is not good enough merely to look at all the weaknesses, the errors and inconsistencies in America and to ignore the facts to which I have referred.

It is still true that in India, and even in Pakistan, which at present is in a different position from India and is passing through a semi-dictatorship, in Burma, which might have been within the Commonwealth but for an unfortunate fluke, in Ceylon, in Malaya, in East and West Africa, in the Caribbean Islands, and in lands outside the Commonwealth, there is this open, quiet preference for our values rather than for the values which seem dominant in some quarters of the United States.

We have to face the fact that the Americans and America itself have indeed been generous in the way they have poured out from their storehouses this assistance to stricken areas. Yet we have to recognise the fact that the Communist world is exploiting and will continue to exploit the great poverty which prevails throughout two-thirds of the world's population, a poverty which is getting worse rather than easier. The tragic fact is that in spite of many plans to develop resources in India and elsewhere, in spite of generous assistance from outside, they have fallen back, because of the old Malthusian problem which haunts people in many parts of the world today.

Both the first and the second of the five-year plans in India achieved a considerable measure of success, but then it was discovered that, owing to the improvement of amenities, sanitation, medical services and health, the infantile mortality rate was startlingly decreasing, and, therefore, though the actual increase in production was substantial, it did not keep pace with the increase in population. That is true in other parts of the world, and I am not now suggesting ways and means by which the population might be limited, because that would be touching on a controversial matter. I am only stating objective facts, however we deal with them.

The same is true, though in other respects, in Venezuela, which I had the privilege of visiting last year. When I went to Caracas, the capital, I found that in this boom town, with its skyscrapers and great highways, thousands of shanties had been put up by those who had been drawn magnetically from the countryside by the prospect of higher wages in the capital of that State, with the result that the existing democratic régime is hard put to it to know what to do in that situation. Such a situation, of course, has already provided material for Communist exploitation.

The same is true in Cuba, and, in some measure, in the Aden Protectorate, which I have the privilege of visiting some time ago. No matter what has been and is being done in the Aden Protectorate, there is still this haunting fear of a population explosion. The same thing is true of Nigeria. We welcome the advent of Nigeria to independence at the moment, and we hope that she will also follow the same democratic pathway which India has chosen; but her economic problem may in time become serious.

Of all the States of Africa, Nigeria, with 35 million people, stands the best chance of attaining stability and of giving the world an example of democracy operating in an African context. Even so, if the population explosion in Nigeria takes place and if it is driven, as India has been driven into the situation in which the infant mortality rate declines and the population expands at a greater rate than production, the people will as a result have a sense of frustration, and the millions of simple people, who know nothing of theories of economy or Government, will be available for Communists to explore. The Communists will not hesitate to do that.

We have not only a greater obligation to sustain the Commonwealth, and to do so with at least as much fervour as in the past we have assisted the empire, but we have also to realise that it is not only a moral obligation, but politically expedient, simply to share our technological knowledge and our wealth in order to liberate millions from poverty. I am not saying that this is the solution of the problem of peace, but I am saying that if we can assist, and satisfy millions of people in the Commonwealth by extending to them this power to aid their social progress much more even than we are doing, we might well integrate them into the Commonwealth more effectively, and so produce a stability serving world peace which it would be very difficult for the Communist world to penetrate or overthrow.

Communism is undoubtedly fanatically ruthless in pursuit of its aims. As I see it, it is because it is wedded to a metaphysical dogma, just as much a dogma as that for which Protestants and Catholics and Muslims and others have fought and died in times past. It is the old historic fallacy that there is an absolute dogma and that this therefore justifies the elimination of all who stand in the way, though one might have private sympathies with those who suffer. There is a peril in this conception of absolute truth, and it is into that peril that the Communists have plunged. Although this is the basic issue, as I see it, I do not believe that Communism is either impregnable or inflexible. Expediency can teach and is teaching the Communist world a great deal in the same way as expediency has taught us. That is why most hon. Members of this House now recognise that the Communist world does not want war, not simply because of any moral aversion necessarily, though, being human, I am certain that there is an element of that. Do not let us assume that because we abhor the form of government of the Communist world, the human beings living there have been transformed into devils. There is this moral aversion, but it is not that which makes it clear to the Communist world that war is the final human disaster. It is the recognition that, whatever may be our policy, once nuclear war comes to this world, either the world itself will swiftly disappear, or it will be the prelude to the final disappearance of the world in a very short time.

I refer again to this necessity that we should make clearer to the world than we have done before, that though all nations and peoples want peace, nevertheless, the real issue is the nature of the peace—not any kind of peace. It may take a decade or generation before two things happen. Firstly, that the Communist world appreciates that the real free world is impregnable, and, secondly, before the essence and values of that truly free world can penetrate behind the resistance of the Communist world.

I have a firm but cautious hope not only that we shall avoid war, but that in the course of time this apparently monolithic world of Sovietism will begin to change or crumble. I want to point out one psychological fact, to which I do not attach undue importance, but which is important. If the Communist world is driven, as it is being driven, to extend education and an increasing measure of responsibility that carries with it a certain amount of freedom of judgment, inevitably this will stimulate the minds of men even though they be at the present time so powerfully and comprehensively indoctrinated by Communist ideology and dogma. In other words, I believe that in the course of time, if we do not perpetrate stupidities like the Suez and Cuba campaigns, the operations of the human mind, even at the crudest level, will burst through the totalitarian barrier which surround it today. I believe, therefore, that we must avoid such stupidities as those to which I have referred. I am not over-simplifying the issue, either in regard to Suez or Cuba. There were exasperations and provocations at Suez and Cuba. But it was playing into the hands of the Communist world to do as we did at Suez and as America has done at Cuba, which is almost parallel in many respects.

We must likewise avoid what I call subterranean pressures issuing from the United States or elsewhere. We must certainly not fall into the error of believing that the United States is to be put on a par with all the devilries in the world. Nevertheless, although there is a real desire for peace among Americans—I know them well—unfortunately there are agencies there which want to exploit the American will for liberty and peace. They want to exploit even the generous mutual aid provided by the American Government and people. There are many signs of that. Even with regard to Laos it is fairly evident.

The task of peace-making will take a long time, more than a decade or a generation, but we must believe it is possible. We must believe it is essential. The hope to which I have referred comes from a series of objective facts. I believe in the hope represented by the Commonwealth. There is some hope even in the Congo. In spite of the criticism of Mr. Hammarskjoeld and the apparent reluctance of the Belgian Government to act as straightforwardly as it should have done, and in spite of all the internecine strife and tragedy of that unhappy area in Africa, if may be that the cumulative influence of the United Nations will yet save the Congo from chaos and lay the foundation there of better and happier times. That is a sign of hope.

I believe that there is hope in the continuing work of the auxiliary agencies of the United Nations. Bringing together peoples of various kinds and getting them to work together for a common purpose is in itself of great psychological pacific value. Even in the actual continuation of the United Nations there is hope. The periodic gathering together of people of diverse types, including Mr. Khrushchev, though he may prefer to speak sometimes more with his shoes than with his mouth, is something. It means that they are at least talking together. Some ideas will thus inevitably flow over and through the barriers which men erect around their minds.

I have already said that there is hope in the continuation of Indian democracy and, indeed, of European democracy, in spite of all the threats and menaces. I believe that there is hope in the increasing cultural contacts between ourselves and the world behind the Iron Curtain, though, alas, as yet not behind the bamboo curtain. I believe that all these thing give rise to hope. That is why I believe that, if we can integrate our conception of democracy and freedom in our own country and in the Commonwealth in forms of constructive service to common human need, whatever military action we may take and whether we do or do not find some economic support for entering the Common Market, that in itself will in the end outlive and outlast the Communist world, which menaces our conception of liberty today.

7.23 p.m.

Before the war the hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Sorensen) used to provoke this side of the House to great expressions of opposition. If I may say so without appearing to be patronising to him, his speeches have undergone a marked change.

Tonight the hon. Member delivered a speech of extraordinarily persuasive force and eloquence, and I am sure that everyone on this side of the House was much impressed with the sentiments that he expressed. I do not go all the way with him in thinking that everything can be done by wise words and understanding. Violence is regrettably necessary from time to time to achieve a satisfactory policy result. When the hon. Member spoke about the Commonwealth and the influence it has and can have to a far greater degree than now upon world events and to the benefit of the Commonwealth's parent—the United Kingdom—he struck sympathetic chords of approval on this side of the House.

I thank and congratulate my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal for the speech he delivered yesterday. It was a courteous speech. I think that he went as far as he could in informing the House and the country as to the basic facts of the situation. He had given great care and thought to his speech. It was extensive. It was carefully canalised into the various aspects of policy which are now being elaborated as Government thinking is going forward on this subject. In general, he did a great service to the House in framing his speech in the way he did.

However, I cannot resist the conclusion that behind it was a coming policy decision of the Government which will cause the country very great confusion and, as I think, very considerable harm. I cannot avoid the conclusion that the thoughts of leading members of the Cabinet—may I say those of a liberal point of view on world events—are now settling quietly but firmly towards a major policy decision. My right hon. Friend was careful enough to avoid at this stage, not only, I dare say, for the sake of party and country-wide feeling but also so as not to disclose his hand in the forthcoming negotiations, declaring himself in favour of Britain joining the Common Market. But we read the papers every day. These speculators of public opinion in the daily Press who are so much maligned are, none the less, most astute, able and clever individuals. They have ways of finding out what is to happen. As I remember so well over the withdrawal from Suez, the abdication of power in Cyprus, the abdication of British influence in the retention of South Africa in the Commonwealth and a great many other things, the Press and their anticipations have nearly always been right.

I am firmly—but I hope not irrevocably, because it depends upon the circumstances—an opponent of Britain joining the Common Market. I want to ask myself and the House several questions and see if it is possible to find answers, if not in responsive echoes of thinking in the Chamber, at some stage in Governmental replies. Why do we have to go into the Common Market now? If we had wanted to shape this institution into something which serves the British purpose in Europe or, putting it a little more generously, if we had wanted to project Britain alongside Europe and see that the ensuing policy redounded to European credit, I should have thought that we would have gone in from the start. When M. Monnet began to frame these tremendous proposals for translating individual national feeling into supranational and federal feeling, I should have thought that the Cabinet at that time would have got some glimmer of apprehension of what was to happen and would have decided to take a part in it. The very opposite happened.

At the stage when we decided that the Free Trade Area was no longer a possibility and that these Six countries were wedded to a permanent cohesive concept, one would have thought that Britain would have taken action. But we took reverse action. We sedulously began to create—on quite excellent traditional lines, as I shall show in a moment—a group of like-minded, Nordic, non-Catholic States in Northern Europe and began to arrange it in line against the philosophy of the Common Market.

One could have said at any stage that the Common Market would come to nothing. One could have said right at the beginning that the idea was so tenuous that French nationalism or German nationalism—just as in the case of the very early and immediate collapse of the European Defence Community—might work to prevent the realisation of the Common Market. One could say the same thing today.

I do not understand why the Government have selected this moment in time, when nothing very formidable seems to me to have happened to bring it about, to begin to gravitate themselves, and cause the Press and the country to get prepared for this sudden reversal of our policy over the last two or three years with regard to the formation of E.F.T.A. and decide to go into the Common Market.

The Common Market is just as likely to collapse now. Do not let the Lord Privy Seal reply that the fact that the German currency revaluation the other day went through without sending a shock tremor through the whole of the Common Market has made the Government realise that this is a permanent institution that is likely to succeed.

At any moment there may be an expression of independent French nationalism. De Gaulle is known to be full of la gloire, la patrie et la victoire for France. He is not a man permanently to be attached to this group of neighbouring states in Europe, although it may have served him extremely well in the past. And even though the currency revaluation has gone through without a shock tremor, we do not know that very serious unemployment may not arise in one or other of these European countries that may bring about a strong nationalist feeling as it is realised that the Common Market institutions are not able to help them in their difficulties.

We are now at about the stage after the last war that we were after the First Great War when very serious unemployment began to supervene. It may be that the countries in Western Europe have risen to a level of prosperity that may be difficult, if not impossible to feed and maintain. Some of these European countries have not observed, and have not practised the techniques of full employment in a free society that we in Britain practise. Under Dr. Erhard's economics they may easily go into a situation of serious unemployment. Why do the Government not wait for that to happen, to be dealt with successfully and for the European Economic Community again to become triumphant before joining? No, for some extra ordinary reason they have decided that this moment in the month of May, 1961, is the right moment to make a move——

I am coming to Mr. Kennedy.

I asked myself also why we have to join this particular trading bloc. I do not suppose that anybody in this country would be extremely attracted to the idea of rushing into the Communist trading bloc and allying ourselves with it, and with nothing else. Nor, as far as I know, have we ever decided to become the 51st State of the United States of America. There is a very satisfactory, affluent, successful, commercially-competitive and capitalist trading bloc which, for some of my hon. Friends who are so keen to exemplify that characteristic in our lives, would seem to be very attractive, indeed. Nobody has suggested our doing that. The Commonwealth, as a trading bloc, has been allowed, if anything, to decline.

It cannot, therefore, be said that Britain has been particularly interested in maintaining or joining trading blocs—until this moment. Is it because it is only twenty miles across the Channel that we have to join? Is there some aspect in this matter of a third force in Europe? I thought that the idea that Britain should join the Western European nations and constitute itself and themselves a sort of independent pivot or link between East and West, playing off the Communist world against the American nation, had been discredited a very long time ago, but perhaps that is the reason.

If it is, as some newspapers have been telling us, a question of consolidating the civilisation of Europe, of holding together all the countries which are the parents throughout the world of great human endeavour and opportunity, I think that it is a selfish and disgraceful idea—the idea that we can walk into a glasshouse in Western Europe, and only Western Catholic Europe, leaving aside all those countries in the centre and East of Europe as of no account whatever.

Could we ask this group of the Six to make seven—or, if we were so lucky as to take Denmark with us, making eight countries in Western Europe—and say that in these countries there is enshrined a state of high civilisation which must be perpetuated as the tablets of stone, handed down from Mount Sinai, were perpetuated? If so, what is to happen to the colonial world that we are bringing to a state of self-government, and what is to happen to the French and other colonial systems?

It seems to me to be an incredible plan, a selfish plan, that we should stand together in a mute and tight little group in Western Europe and leave aside all our gigantic associations throughout the rest of the world. If we are to join a new trading bloc, I would much rather we went back to the idea of the Commonwealth and tried to do something to restore an economic association in this great group of nations in which we take pride, and in which the number of independent communities increases every few months.

Is it not time to rewrite the Ottawa Agreements? They have been allowed to lie fallow for the last thirty years. They originally enshrined the idea of a preference over the home market to the Commonwealth, and a tariff between the Commonwealth and the rest of the world. I do not know what we owe—in the cohesion of the Commonwealth when it came to war and the association and development of the Commonwealth since the war—to that splendid act. If the Government wish to do something adventurous—and that would be a change—let them turn their attention to some of these great and traditional designs.

Then I ask: Why are we prepared to do in peace what we did not do in war? The sole idea generated in the war of the association of Britain with the Continent was that put out, one fine night, without thought, by my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) when he suggested, early in 1940, the union with France. That took the nation by surprise. We would have done anything for my right hon. Friend at that moment—and we still will—but it was turned down by the French without a moment's contemplation.

After that, our war aim became the very reverse to the union of Europe. Governments were harboured here, men died fighting for the cause of re-establishing the independence of the countries of Europe. If it had been made the war aim, at a climacteric of our history, that Britain was to go in with her allies and make a new concept of Europe, and if our men had been taught to fight and die for that, I would have believed that there was something to the idea. But to crawl in in peace, in a shamed sort of way—because we do not feel that we have the power or opportunity to stand out of it—is extraordinary and beyond my understanding.

I do not see how the Government can do this without a General Election. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I have been turning up the Annual Register for 1931 and I would remind hon. Gentlemen that at that time, after the very much disliked Coalition, from the point of view of the opposite side of the House, of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Mr. Snowden, Mr. Thomas and Mr. Baldwin and others on this side of the House, there was a good deal of rather rushed and pressed bargaining on the question of policy. I wish to read only two sentences from this volume to indicate just what was the position. It is discussing the question of tariffs in the election of 1931—the formulation of the manifesto for that year, and it says:
"Meanwhile, though the desired formula had not been found, the Free Traders and the Protectionists in the Cabinet had drawn appreciably nearer. The latter had waived their demand that tariffs should be actually included in the Government programme, while the former had expressed their willingness to consider them as an emergency measure, even if Parliament should be immediately dissolved …. The programme of the National Party was to be simply a 'free hand' to deal with the crisis by means of any measures which should be judged expedient."
The result of that was a "doctor's mandate". A free hand was requested, demanded and taken by the Coalition Government of the day and that was the basis on which they went to the country. It was not long after that that, under the influence of the larger majority of the Conservatives, it was decided to call an economic conference at Ottawa to devise a tariffs system.

A free hand. That is precisely what the Government now have not got. They are tied to a manifesto at the last election, which speaks not at all about entering the Common Market or formulating any kind of association with the countries of Western Europe. They have no mandate whatever to go into the Common Market. On reflection, I am sure that the Prime Minister, the Leader of the House and other senior members of the Cabinet will realise that to slide in, on the basis of no mention whatever in the last General Election manifesto, is something which will infuriate the Tory Party in the country and will cause the utmost damage to their cause.

I beg the Government to make this decision a conscious one of government, to declare their intention and to get the endorsement of the people for it.

What is the alternative in joining the Common Market? The great Lord Falkland in the seventeenth century remarked that when it was not necessary to change, it was necessary not to change. The Government have clearly been going forward steadily on a course of assembling a considerable number of like-minded countries in the area surrounding the Common Market towards the concept of economic association with Britain. Everything we have done since the war, quite correctly, has been done on the basis of treaty-making associations—not by submergence of sovereignty, not by irrevocable concessions to the advantage of one interest or another but by pooling our intelligence, our armaments and by pooling our economic power for a common purpose.

We have retained the right in every case, whether N.A.T.O., Western European Union or O.E.C.D., in a crisis or at will, to withdraw that element, whatever it may be—element of sovereignty, armament or money.

To subscribe to the Treaty of Rome, unless it can toe widened so much that we can take all our associations—agriculturalists, Commonwealth and our E.F.T.A. partners—right in at an open door and establish them there—and I think it is far too much to hope for—will mean the abandonment of the principle on which Britain has been operating on all her associations since the war.

The Common Market arises out of a defeatist atmosphere in Western Europe. There can be no doubt about that. These nations have been washed over by the tides of war to such a degree that they have lost their will to independence. But Britain has not. There may be many people who think that the position of independence and integrity is too great for Britain to sustain, but I do not think that that really represents the core and true heart of this country at the present time.

We have not been washed over by the tides of war. We still have enormous economic, political and military power and I think that for Britain, in these circumstances, to neglect all that—her policy in the past and her position in history—and to slide in with as many associate nations as she can find to join her, is something which the great masses of this country will never be able to understand. Would it not be much better to ask the Common market to join us? They are the defeated nations. Let them become the eighth member of the European Free Trade Association. Has that invitation ever been extended?

What conceivable opposition could they put up to it? It would give them all their internal arrangements. The Common Market countries could reduce their tariffs within the Six to nothing at all, they could keep their universal external tariff, but they would still come into the European Free Trade Association and subscribe to our rules, which are the reduction by mutual agreement of our individual tariffs with each other while keeping our external tariffs individually as we require. Why are not the Government making that request to Dr. Adenauer and General de Gaulle?

I come now to the position of the United States of America. One has to be very careful what one says about a Head of State. President Kennedy is young, enthusiastic, honest, courageous, and learning his trade. He has not yet acquired the experienced figure of Uncle Sam with the magnificent beard and the calm and steady eye upon world events. He takes, I suppose, the sort of position that every young American would take when asked to gaze across the ocean and look at the cockpit of Europe, this association of States torn by war and rent by dissension. President Kennedy takes the view, no doubt—How correct, how purposeful, how suitable to the United States, it would be if they all lined up in a row like the horses in "Ben Hur" and drove him full tilt at the Soviet Union. I do not think that this country fits into that picture at all. I do not think that, when President Kennedy goes to see General de Gaulle, he will find that he fits into that picture.

We must beware of our position in these affairs. I do not wish to discredit the President of the United States in any regard. I say only that there are some people in the United States, in the Pentagon, in the State Department, who find Britain and our Commonwealth just a little bit inconvenient. Nothing would please them better than for the jaws of the Common Market to open just wide enough to take Britain's head and shoulders and then snap shut at our waist-line and allow the great appendages of Empire all over the world—this great maritime Commonwealth on which we pride ourselves—to be quietly nibbled up.

I hope that the Government will, after mature reflection, resist these proposals. If they are to set the whole apparatus in remorseless course, they must obtain the endorsement of the people. I would much rather that they kept on with their quiet system of building on traditional lines. Finland, a very significant State, came in the other day. Austria, a quite significant State, has been in for some time. There is Yugoslavia, a country of great independence and also, in some sense, a bridge in the world. Finally, though this will shock some of our friends in Europe, there is Eastern Germany. I have always agreed very strongly with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) when he has said that it is now time that we recognised Eastern Germany and regarded her as an established State. The business of trading with the Communist world and the satellites may be very difficult. It may be very complicated to turn tariffs into quotas and to translate private commerce into State trading, but it is not beyond the resources of my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade, a most astute and clever man.

Let us raise our eyes to the opportunities confronting this country. Let us realise that Europe is not necessarily composed of this taut little western centre but it is a very much larger concept than that. If we look back to our historical past, we see that Britain's ties of trade, of administration, of policy and of diplomacy have embraced the lot. Let not the Government, for reasons of ideology, under the impact of a violent piece of international liberal thinking directed by the United States, neglect their opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe.

There are those who will have it that the only way in which we can defeat the Communists is to impact ourselves into a group of Atlantic States, European States, or whatever it may be, just as powerful, just as dynamic, just as co-ordinated and just as purposeful. After the war, Mr. Speaker, a few of my hon. Friends on this side of the House were frightened about the position of the small trader. They thought that his day was done in face of the giant combines. They formed an association of small traders. It made some headway until it was realised that, of course, once the association was perfected, there would be no small traders. When that was realised, the organisation dissolved overnight.

One of England's greatest philiosophers and poets, Milton, said:
"They fret"—
I suppose he was thinking of the Government—
"and out of their own weakness are in agony, lest these divisions and subdivisions will undoe us. The adversarie again applauds, and waits the hour, when they have brancht themselves out, saith he, small anough into parties and partitions, then will be our time. Fool! he sees not the firm root out of which we all grow, though into branches: nor will beware untill he see our small divided maniples cutting through at every angle of his ill united and unweildy brigade."
That is the fate of Communism, if we have patience and if we wait; but if we enter upon foolish designs at this time we shall find that our opportunities are lost, and with them our freedom, too.

7.58 p.m.

The House has listened with pleasure to the speech of the noble Lord, the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke). We are accustomed to having our intelligence burnished by his speeches. I most heartily agree with him—as I tried to show yester- day when the Minister was kind enough to give way to me during his speech opening the debate—in believing that no Government, not even of my own party were it in power, would have the right to take a major decision on such a matter as entering the Common Market unless it first had a General Election. We have argued within my own party about this very point. We have said that this was not in our programme at a certain time, and, therefore, we could not implement it meanwhile. Before a major decision like this is made, the people of Britain must have the right to debate it with all the methods of mass debate we have today, both locally and nationally. There is much more in it, to my mind, than even the noble Lord showed.

I will admit a prejudice, because this Common Market—and we were led up the Common Market garden path yesterday—was spawned out of the cold war. It emanated from the cold war. It is an idea which looked upon an economic strengthening of certain nations within Europe linked to N.A.T.O., not with the vision and intelligence of which the noble Lord spoke, but with the hope of attracting countries like Yugoslavia and other parts of Eastern Europe into a viable economic unit inside Western Europe.

How well I liked the noble Lord's phrase when he said that we are pretty well crawling into this set-up on our hands and knees at a time when this nation and the Commonwealth have just witnessed the freeing of great nations in Africa and new conceptions and ideas throughout Asia. Just at that moment, when there is a new vivacity and energy entering the Afro-Asian nations, Britain, who had the opportunity of building them up through its engineering "know-how" and technical capacity and could show, as in India, a certain amount of leadership because we had maintained our honesty of purpose in giving India its freedom at the right moment, is throwing all that away and is depending on some propaganda and—I say this without fear of contradiction—the majority of pressure emanating from the United States.

I know that other hon. Members wish to speak and therefore I will not cover ground which has been covered before. If I am not interrupted, I will cut my speech to about ten more minutes to give other hon. Members a chance to speak.

What is it that hurts those of us who like the American people quite a lot? Many of us know the American people and have had the opportunity of meeting them here and in their own country. They are a generous, magnanimous and courageous people. Why do we always find ourselves criticising American policy in Asia? Let me take Laos as an instance, a country which I know and to which I have been twice. I went there just after the Geneva Conference, when the country was struggling under Souvanna Phouma to get a neutral government. By 1950 Souvanna Phouma had managed to build up a neutral government, so neutral that the Chinese and some of the Americans on the spot were willing to acknowledge that Souvanna Phouma was doing a successful job in trying to make Laos, a marvellous little country of 2½ million people, a neutral nation.

At that time, Chou En-lai said to me in Peking—another colleague of mine from this House was with me—"I must pay tribute to the job of work which your Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, has done in establishing a neutral Laos". Why was that work upset? It was upset because of the Dulles policy of massive retaliation about which my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, writing in the magazine Foreign Affairs, of July, 1954, said:
"I do not know what this speech of Mr. Dulles on massive retaliation has done to his enemies, but it certainly frightens me."
The American people, as my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) said, want peace as much as anybody else, but the force and pressure of the China lobby, of the Pentagon and of the military élite, at that time was not allowing the real true spirit of American men to influence world affairs in Asia, and Souvanna Phouma's efforts at establishing neutrality were frustrated.

Aid came to Vientiane and went to Luang Prabang and throughout Laos. I was told by an Asian ambassador in an embassy in Luang Prabang—I reported it over two years ago in this House and to the Foreign Office—"There will be trouble inside this country in the next few weeks. When you get home, please inform the Foreign Office of this." The British Foreign Office was well informed. I remember my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker), who made an excellent and wonderful speech this afternoon, asking for the International Control Commission and for the Geneva Conference to be recalled. If I troubled to look at my notes, I could give the reference in HANSARD, but there is no need.

What was the answer of the Government? They said, "In our judgment, this is not an appropriate time to intervene." This was over two years ago. Had the Government had the courage to adopt an independent British attitude to Asia at that time, the situation may have been saved. Instead, we threw away all the oriental "know-how" that we had acquired over hundreds of years in dealing with the best leaders in Asia.

The United States fails to understand why it is that aid is not transmitted to the right places. Five new millionaires were built up in two years in Laos as a result of corruption. That is where the money went, just as it went in Chiang Kai-shek's China. How long do we expect the free world to pretend that all this is for democracy, truth and justice for Asian man during this revolution of awakening expectation? Is this great assembly of debate prepared to take a lead and to say to the United States, "You must recognise the dynamic change which is taking place in Afro-Asia"?

Twenty-nine Afro-Asians met for the first time at the Bandoeng Conference, one of the most dramatic conferences in the history of the modern world. They made statements. Nehru, Chou En-lai and leaders of the West and East were there. Afro-Asian man established a permanent secretariat in Cairo. These two great Continents are no longer going to subject themselves to the old imperialisms of the white race. If we do not cooperate with them, there will be an explosion. It is no good calling it Communism.

Here I should like to quote President Soekarno's speech delivered at the university in Bandoeng when he gave concrete evidence—and the tragedy is that America pretends that she is not doing this—of ammunition, aeroplanes, guns and American pilots being used in the revolution in Sumatra. I have had the privilege of meeting President Soekarno and of listening to him. He said to the students at the university on 2nd May, 1958:
"In addition, tens of thousands of weapons were dropped on West Sumatra. They fell into our hands—tens of thousands of light weapons, hundreds of heavy weapons, which could not possibly have been bought and paid for by the rebels. This is a straight attack against us from foreign quarters."
He asserted that when Indonesia made its proclamation of independence on 17th August, 1945, it was a proclamation of Indonesia's own identity. He went on to say:
"We want to become a nation that stands on its own identity. We will follow a policy of self-reliance, not a policy of mendicancy. It means that we maintain our active, independent stand. We do not want to be a satelite of one or the other."
Speaking firmly, he added:
"Don't play with fire. Indonesia is not to be made a second Korea."
I will not quote the whole of the long and brilliant speech that he delivered to the students. There was the evidence from a responsible Asian leader.

After the coup by General Nosavan in Vientiane—no English paper has published this, but it can be found in the library in the African Record—Captain Lae said that he was so tired of interference inside Laos by foreign troops that something had to be done for his people to live in peace. He was tired of civil war. In his own battalion, there were ten Americans or American experts in each group. That was the evidence given by Lae.

Then, Boun Oum Champassek, the Prime Minister who was put into power by a military coup, told the world that he was being attacked by seven divisions from North Vietnam. Cheap yellow newspapers had banner headlines that may have driven the kind of boys from my constituency, and young men and women from America, who gave their lives in Korea into a major war because of a lie told by that man, who admitted two months later that he had said it to show the world that the rebels had friends in the West.

Are they the kind of responsible men that the free world is supposed to be lining up with? Is that the kind of responsible leader in Asia that the Tory Party is asking the British people to support? Is it not time that a stop was put to this? The truth was told and our Foreign Office knows it. The Government know the truth. They have lost their backbone. To build real friendship with the true American people, the British Government should have the courage to say, "We have had enough of supporting these Syngmann Rhees and these playboys of South-East Asia. This is not the way to peace. This is the way to death"

8.13 p.m.

I shall follow the excellent example of the hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) and keep the House for only a few moments. I should like to revert to the situation concerning the European Common Market. I am sorry that my noble Friend the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) will be going to bed frightened of so many things—strikes in Germany, events in France and Italy, and looking back on the past as the better time.

The idea that we shall lose sovereignty if we go into the Common Market is a bogy that is being dressed up, and it has been used very much by my noble Friend. I have recently visited several of the countries in Europe and I saw no sign that they were anxious or willing to renounce their sovereignty or nationality.

If we look at three recent happenings—the German currency changes, the French policy on Algeria, which is entirely her own, and, more recently, the new Italian petrol trading agreements—there is no sign of a renunciation of sovereignty on the part of any of these countries. It will take a very long time before we get anywhere near that stage. What we want to see is good government everywhere before we have amalgamated government. I am not frightened by the possible loss of sovereignty.

When looking at the past, one sees that the countries were amalgamated by war. For instance, the United States of America is a country which has been amalgamated by war. Surely, it is a step forward for Europe now to take the view that it wishes to amalgamate through persuasion and negotiation. That is a better system. Only the Communists are still inclined towards amalgamation by means of armies, tanks and fighting. We in the West have taken a step forward in the direction of trying to work and to co-operate together by persuasion.

I do not think that any treaty which we sign will quench the independent spirit of this country—that never has been the case—any more than the laws of the nation have quenched the independent spirit of the English, the Scots or the Welsh. In joining Europe now in some way, I see not a negative loss of sovereignty but a great gain in cooperation with some of the more intelligent countries.

I am not in favour of signing the Treaty of Rome as it stands. I do not agree with those who consider it a good idea for us to go in and sign and then modify the treaty. Such a source entails a certain degree of dishonesty which I do not like. One of the points which, perhaps, has escaped notice in all our discussions is the different approach between ourselves and many other nations in the signing of treaties and conventions. We do not regard them as "scraps of paper". Anybody who has been at the United Nations will have seen the distinction clearly. There we support a number of conventions with other countries. Many countries have no hesitation in ratifying conventions irrespective of whether they are likely to put them into operation. Our policy has always been not to ratify until we have felt ourselves to be in a position to fulfil completely the terms of the convention.

I suggest that we might proceed with the negotiations in two stages. This is a suggestion of my own. I should like to see us working on an instrument of accession. It would be a protocol or an instrument which had been drawn up on rather broad lines with the agreement of all countries, flexible enough to be modified in the next three, four or five years, and eventually it might be embodied in' a treaty, not necessarily exactly like the Treaty of Rome but a modification of it. By working in that way, we should have time to solve our difficulties on the agricultural side, which, of course, are difficulties to the European countries also, and time to solve our problems with E.F.T.A. and the Commonwealth.

I am certain that it is necessary and good for us to join Europe in some way. I am certain that it is essential for Europe that we should do so. To me, it is strange that people should regard this as an unusual and extraordinary thing to do. In our earlier history we were invaded and were part of Europe. Later, we invaded Europe and claimed large chunks which we added to the Crown. Later, we had our wars and our alliances with Europe. It is only in recent times, with the growth of our Empire and the Commonwealth, that our eyes have turned more overseas and that we have been distracted from Europe.

Now that the world has become so much smaller, now that our overseas commitments are uncertain and unpredictable, we must not ignore our immediate neighbours. Our neighbours have become very important. We must close the European ranks. Let hon. Members consider the effect which that would have on the Communist world and on Russia and what a tremendous sigh of relief there would be the world over if we did it. The dangers of Communism are growing. They are gathering very rapidly. The political situation in Europe is such that we should not delay too long. If one looks at the present set-up of the Governments in Europe one finds that in three big countries they are centre or right of centre and that in two there is a strong Communist Party.

My noble Friend the Member for Dorset, South said that things were precarious in France. There is only one man there between government and chaos. In Italy there is a very able young Prime Minister, as Prime Ministers go, who will lead his country extremely well, but the political situation is such that he has to balance on a tightrope. Germany is the most stable country within the Six at present. We should take advantage of the present situation and come to some terms with the Six.

When I was in Germany recently I spoke at the C.D.U. Conference, and I also did a television broadcast in Italy. On both occasions I made the point that concessions cannot be all on one side. There is no question of our crawling in. I cannot see our Prime Minister in that posture. I think it would be totally impossible. But the need is great on both sides, and if the West is to survive something must be done reasonably soon.

I appeal to hon. Members opposite—and I think that I have some friends among them—not to make this subject an election issue. This will be one of the hardest decisions that any Government have made for many years. It is one which should be made in consultation and one in which we should all consider ourselves, as we did in wartime, as working together for the common good. There is no question that we are at war, a cold war which is just as dangerous. The country would expect its leaders and all its best politicians to work together over this matter. The event will be a watershed, and it would be well, if we all take a decision upon it, in the next month or in the next year or two, in such a manner that we may look back on that decision with pride.

8.24 p.m.

The hon. Lady the Member for East Grinstead (Mrs. Emmet) began by firmly disagreeing with the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke). Since I found the noble Lord's speech stimulating and excellent in almost every way, I am sure that the hon. Lady will not be surprised if I say that I did not find her speech to be of that same calibre.

There have been a number of criticisms from both sides of the House of the Lord Privy Seal's speech in opening the debate and the fact that he spent so much of his time in dealing with the Common Market and Britain's entry into it, but I think that that speech has given us the advantage of now knowing more clearly than we did before the Government's state of mind on this question. There has been a period of speculation on what was in the Government's mind about their long-term plan for Europe. I think that the noble Lord was perfectly right and that it is now clear that the Government plan to join the Common Market. It is now, perhaps, an open question whether they will be able to do that, because it is well-known that there are many technical difficulties and many objections, such as our Commonwealth ties and traditional agricultural policy, and because sitting behind the Prime Minister are many supporters who are clearly identified with those objections.

My impression from the Lord Privy Seal's opening speech was that the Government may now be intending to join almost unconditionally, although, of course, they will put up a façade of negotiation and discussion and of an attempt to safeguard our Commonwealth ties, our links with E.F.T.A. countries, and our obligations to British agriculture. But I do not believe that it will prove possible in these negotiations—if that is the word—to secure from the Six a sufficiently substantial modification of the Treaty of Rome to enable us to join and at the same time to honour the three sets of obligations. I believe that it is the Government's intention to join the Common Market irrespective of the outcome of the talks which we are told are now proceeding, and I believe that that would be a profound mistake for Britain, just as the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South indicated that he believed it would be.

It would bring very doubtful economic advantages to us. The supposed advantages have been considerably magnified in the discussions on this question, but I believe that there would be an important political disadvantage because we would find that our capacity to act as mediator and negotiator between East and West and in other spheres would be seriously impaired if we went in completely with the Six.

It seems to me that the Lord Privy Seal was making two assumptions, as if he thought that they were not open to question, when they seem to me to be seriously open to question. He drew for us an impressive picture of the size, strength and economic growth of the Common Market countries, but he seemed to assume that this was a direct result of the Treaty of Rome. I agree that that is probably an important contribution to the economic growth of the Common Market countries, but it is by no means the only factor in the situation. It is much too sweeping an assumption to make that, because the Six have got together in the Common Market, ipso facto their economic growth has resulted from that act.

Secondly, when he indicated that this was a tremendous challenge—as it undoubtedly is—to our own economy, he seemed to make the too simple assumption that, if we could only find our way into the Common Market, economic advantages would automatically follow for us. That, too, I believe to be far too simple an assumption. Indeed, I think that there may be danger that, if we join, our economic difficulties will remain, while, in the process of joining, we might find ourselves, in Europe, playing second fiddle to Germany and France.

These economic questions are complex, and I propose to leave them at that, because I want to call attention to what I consider to be a serious political disadvantage that would result from joining—that is the undesirability of this country in any way loosening the ties which it has with the neutral countries of Europe. In yesterday's debate, the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw) in particular dealt with this point, and today the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South referred to it when he spoke of Finland, Yugoslavia and Austria as being particularly significant countries in Europe.

Both the Motion and the Amendment refer to the importance, which we all accept, of improving East-West relations. If, on both sides of the House, we are genuinely intent on building bridges between East and West and removing misunderstandings, we should not underestimate the very great importance of the links which we have through our membership of E.F.T.A. with traditionally neutral countries like Sweden and Switzerland, and, in the post-war situation, Finland and Austria, which, because of their geographical situation alone, are bound to maintain a neutral position in cold war politics.

The present talks on H-bomb tests in Geneva and the prospective summit meeting in Vienna themselves show the importance of these neutral countries, if only from the point of view of providing neutral territory in which people can meet to discuss these things. But I believe that their significance is much more important than merely as hosts to international conferences.

There is debate in the country about whether we can or should be neutral. I doubt whether there is a very strong body of opinion in this House supporting the idea that, in the present world situation, Britain can be neutral. But, be that as it may, what is most important is that we should maintain our links with neutral countries, and that is why I am a firm supporter of the E.F.T.A. concept and why I am profoundly disturbed by several references made by the Lord Privy Seal to the possibility of E.F.T.A. coming to an end.

He referred to Finland and expressed his pleasure that the President of Finland had recently been here, and that in July Finland will become associated with E.F.T.A. It struck me as a little ironical that these complimentary remarks were included in the same speech which, in another part, forecast the end of E.F.T.A.—because that, in effect, was what he was saying.

I want to quote briefly from a speech by the President of Finland to illustrate my point when I say that the neutrals of Europe are of great significance. After referring to the degree of understanding which Finland had found, on the one side, in the United Kingdom, and, on the other side, in the Soviet Union, he went on to say:
"Personally, I consider it to be an encouraging fact, from the point of view of developing international trade, that a neutral state like Finland has in this way been able to maintain her trade relations right across the lines of commercial blocks."
That is most important from the point of view of the trading relations which he mentioned, but also, in the diplomatic sense, it is very important that these neutrals should be brought into the scheme of things in order that there can be these bridges between East and West.

I wonder, now that the Lord Privy Seal has made his speech of yesterday, whether the President of Finland still feels the same encouragement about the position that Finland has been able to establish for herself. Will our other partners in E.F.T.A. have a feeling of encouragement about the present situation, or is it true, as I have heard suggested, that in the capitals of our E.F.T.A. partners the words "Perfidious Albion" are again being heard?

I notice, for example, from today's Guardian that Sweden and others seem to have made up their minds about what the British Government propose to do. In Geneva, at the headquarters of E.F.T.A., Sweden is already putting forward a proposal for a smaller version of E.F.T.A. on the assumption that Britain and Denmark will walk out of E.F.T.A. into the Common Market.

If that is the position, we will have a serious loss of good will among our partners in E.F.T.A. Part of the price we are to have to pay for going into the Common Market will be this loss of a valuable amount of good will which we have been building up in those countries on the fringe of Europe. Helsinki and Stockholm and Vienna and similar centres may not be so powerful or, in a sense, so important as Paris and Bonn, but in a diplomatic sense, in the interests of East-West relations and of world peace, those capitals and their influences are of great importance, and we lose influence there at our peril and at the peril of good international order.

The other day, when hon. Members on this side of the House were chaffing the Prime Minister for his ambiguity and evasiveness about the Government's attitude towards Europe, an hon. Member opposite scored a very fair point when he called attention to the fact that over here we have serious differences of opinion about the Common Market and related questions. It is true that there are serious divisions of opinion on this side of the House. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) spoke yesterday in a sense very different from that in which I am now speaking. I therefore conclude my remarks by expressing a hope about my own party's attitude after hearing the Lord Privy Seal's speech yesterday.

There were clear signs in his speech that the Government are about to abandon E.F.T.A., politely and diplomatically, no doubt, but nevertheless to do so. I hope that the Labour Party will not associate itself with that abandonment. The signs are there—and the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South referred to this as well—that the Government are preparing to sacrifice our Commonwealth links as part of the price for entering the Common Market. I hope that the Labour Party will firmly dissociate itself from any such action, for many reasons, of which I will mention one—that any such ditching of Commonwealth preference would be a serious blow for the under-developed countries within the Commonwealth.

We in the Labour Party are proud that we gave political freedom to a large section of the Commonwealth. Having done that, and having that proudly in our history, it would be a mistake to be associated with a blow at the economic welfare of that section of the Commonwealth.

There are signs, perhaps not in the Lord Privy Seal's speech, but in the speech of the Joint Under-Secretary of State, that the Government are prepared to make their agricultural supporters swallow what must be to them the very bitter pill of a radical transformation of the method of agricultural support in this country. Whether the Government succeed in getting their supporters to swallow that pill remains to be seen, but it is clear that they intend to try. Here again, I hope that the Labour Party will not be associated with this effort. One of the best things that we did when we were in office was to pass the Agriculture Act, 1947, and I hope that we shall not be associated with undermining the main principles of that Act, whatever the Government may be intending to do.

For those reasons, I was considerably troubled when I heard the way in which the debate was opened, and I hope that by the vote at the end of the debate the House, and in particular this side of the House, will warn the Lord Privy Seal and the Government that they ought not to go further along this rather dangerous path on which they obviously intend to embark.

8.42 p.m.

The hon. Member for East Ham, South (Mr. Oram) devoted the greater part of his speech to the question of the European Market, and he chose as the peg on which to hang his speech the speech of my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal. I also want to refer to the opening speeches of the debate, first to the speech of the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), because I was dismayed by his references to Portugal. I do not doubt that his opposition to the colonial régime which Portugal believes to be right is genuine and sincere. I do not doubt that there is much to be criticised in the way the situation has been handled, certainly by reference to the way in which we have handled our colonial administration, but I regret that he made no allowances.

The hon. Member made no allowance for the possibility of incitement from outside. He did not restrain himself in any way. I wish that he would sometimes be a little more self-disciplined in his criticism of friendly countries, because, having listened to his speech, I believe that far from trying to understand and help the Portuguese in the situation in which they find themselves, he was trying to foment and exacerbate an already tragically grave situation. [HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."] Even if he did not want to do that, his remarks will achieve nothing but that. I regret that he found it necessary to speak in the way he did.

I am glad that my hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State confirmed today that my noble Friend will go to Portugal. I hope that he will not be squeamish about fulfilling the engagements which have been planned for him, and I hope that he will make it clear to the Portuguese people and to their Government that the people of this country stand firmly behind them.

Furthermore, I hope that he will take the opportunity of his visit to offer them what help he can both here and in the United Nations, in order to ensure that order and personal security in Angola and the other Portuguese territories can be restored.

My right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal referred to the fact that there was a double theme in both the Motion and the Amendment. There was a single theme in his speech and the speech of the hon. Member for Leeds, East, namely, a readiness to have faith in the United Nations. That view has been expressed by a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House. They say, "Back the United Nations and all will be well." It is that attitude of a too ready acceptance of the so-called powers of the United Nations that I fear most. The hon. Member for Leeds, East said that he feared the confrontation of the great Powers.

I fear much more the delusion in which the Western Powers all too readily indulge of believing that countries and even continents can isolate themselves from the struggle that now engages us all. I fear even more than the confrontation of Powers the belief of individual nations that they can contract themselves out of the cold war situation. In my opinion, there is no room in the world for uncommitted nations.

I am coming to Laos and the speech of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) shortly. All nations are inevitably committed in the face of international Communism. Even the so-called neutral nations will inevitably look to the countries of the West for effective military guarantees in order to preserve their very neutrality against the possibility of Communist usurpation. This is a fact, whether the guarantees are given bilaterally or through the United Nations by way of the endorsement of a resolution. In any event, it must be recognised that the United Nations can be no more effective than the main powers of the non-Communist world are prepared to allow it to be. There can be no neutrality, in the sense that there is no non-alignment. This is not just a question of alignment; it is a question of survival for each and every one of these countries. More than that, it is a question of the survival of freedom itself.

This applies equally to the situation in Laos. It would be laughable if we now pursued the policy which we tried once before, and which failed, of establishing a neutral Government in Laos and then walking out on it and doing nothing further. What have we done since 1954 to help the situation in Laos, or to help the Americans bring about an improvement in that situation? The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne seemed to favour the re-establishment of a neutral Laos, but at the same time he condemned what he believed to be the action of the United States of America in backing the insurgents who attempted to seize power in Cuba. That is merely a parallel of what is going on in Laos. With Soviet Russia's approval and backing the Pathet Lao has tried to overthrow the established Government.

The best guarantee of the neutrality of Laos can come only if the Western Powers—the United States and ourselves in particular—work for the reorganisation of internal unity amongst the non-Communists in that territory. I fear that the situation in Laos is already virtually lost. I hope that we can retrieve something from the wreckage. I hope that the Communist influence in that area does not spread to neighbouring territories, because that would have serious consequences for us.

I should like to turn to the question of the Congo. I believe it astonishing that the United Nations has achieved anything at all in the Congo. But it has achieved something, and I fully accept what was said by my right hon. Friend. Although it is easy to be wise long after the event, I believe that sometimes one can learn something from past events which would be of use in confronting situations which may arise in the future. One can hope that this may be the case in respect of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne, particularly after the magnificent speech he made today in which he really electrified the debate. I know that the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) was not present and that he wants me to sit down in five minutes——

Then the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me that it was a first-class speech.

I hope that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne and the right hon. Member for Belper, as well as my right hon. Friend, will learn something from the situation which has arisen in the Congo and which has so tragically disturbed the country for the past year. I foresee that there may be a parallel in the situation in Angola. Could not we at this stage try to help the Portuguese in the situation in which they find themselves? Could not, for example, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Germany together offer specific assistance to the Portuguese people, first, to restore law and order in Angola and, secondly, through such advice and assistance as we could give, to persuade them to bring about natural changes in their colonial administration? I feel that some gesture of that kind would be better than passing resolutions at the United Nations, for far too often instead of solving problems such resolutions only manage to add to them.

I was very disturbed by the way in which my right hon. Friend handled the question of Mr. Tshombe's seizure in Coquilhatville. I condemn as supine the way in which he tried to find excuses to back out from doing anything more about it. I strongly dissociate myself from the view which my right hon. Friend appeared to hold that now that charges have been made against Mr. Tshombe there is nothing more that the United Kingdom Government could or should do. All too often one hears remarks, particularly from hon. Members opposite—now apparently to some extent endorsed by my right hon. Friend-that Mr. Tshombe, in establishing an independent Katanga, has done an evil thing. Is it the view of my right hon. Friend that the independence of Katanga could be bought and at the expense of losing Mr. Tshombe? Has my right hon. Friend had an opportunity of seeing the proposals that Mr. Tshombe himself brought to the Coquilhatville conference?

I have a copy of them here, and I will translate quickly from the French. In Article 41 there is a proposal that the Council of States of the Confederation should fix each year the contribution that the States should pay towards the expenses of the Confederation. That is an indication that he was prepared to join with the other Congo nations, or peoples, or tribes—call them what we will—in a Confederation of States and was prepared to assist them so they might collectively agree to the amount that they might pay for the financing of the operation of the Confederation. There is a lot more in his proposals, and I hope that they will not be lost sight of, even though apparently my right hon. Friend is prepared to lose sight of him.

I have been mildly critical of the United Nations, although I am well aware of the fact that one's main criticism of an international body should be directed to the member Governments who make up that international body. I may perhaps be forgiven for quoting from an earlier eminent Liberal statesman—a prophet one might almost say—Ramsay Muir, who said:
"The noblest movements are apt to outlive their usefulness, when their zeal develops into formation: an ideal creates an institution and then the institution suffocates the ideal."
That has not yet happened in the case of the United Nations, and I hope it does not, but there is a real danger that if we do not face its shortcomings and recognise its limitations it will happen.

There is the same danger, I fear, in the case of the forthcoming association with the European Common Market. I accept in great measure the economic arguments put forward by my right hon. Friend. I think they are forceful ones and that they will lead us inevitably into some closer form of association with the Common Market countries, but what I do not accept, and what I fear, is our membership of some of the institutions which are being set up in Europe. Unlike my hon. Friend the Member for East Grinstead (Mrs. Emmet), I believe that there is a threat of a loss of sovereignty in joining some of these institutions. What we want is not so much uniformity as unity. I believe we can get unity without uniformity.

I have slightly trespassed on the time of the right hon. Member for Belper and I apologise to him, although, in doing so, I may somewhat churlishly point out that there is many an occasion when I have to keep my seat while he occupies the attention of the House for far longer than I have thought he originally intended to do.

I conclude by saying that I hope my right hon. Friend will not devote all his energies and all his attention to solving this question of our association with the Common Market. I hope he will keep it in perspective, because I believe there are other and greater issues which concern us. The greatest issue is that we should put the interests of this country first and foremost. In a time of nationalisms all over the world I am unashamedly a United Kingdom nationalist. I do not think it does any harm to remind ourselves that we have special interests in this country. I hope that whatever proposals may be put forward for association in future with these institutions we shall carefully preserve the freedom of this country and preserve the identity of our people, for we are a unique race. History has benefited a very great deal from that uniqueness. I hope that nothing my right hon. Friend will do will destroy it.

8.58 p.m.

The hon. Member for Bournemouth, West (Mr. Eden) need not describe himself as churlish. On the other hand, I am sure that the Lord Privy Seal and I will share to the extent to which the hon. Member has eaten into our time, fifty-fifty-wise.

We have had an interesting debate, in some ways a peculiar debate. It has been a debate on a Motion put down by the Government after much to-ing and fro-ing. It was not, in fact, the first Motion put down. Ours was first, but things happened so that in the ordinary way the Government Motion took precedence. The Government Motion as it appears on the Order Paper has nothing to do with the Common Market. Nevertheless, hon. and right hon. Members opposite have spent pretty well the entire time talking about the Common Market. If the Government had wanted a debate on the Common Market they should have said so. I am sure that the House would have accommodated them.

We on our side thought that there ought to have been a debate on foreign affairs. Apart from the Common Market, there are very many things happening across the world of great complexity and great importance. I think that one is entitled to repeat at the end of this two-day debate the objection which my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) stated at the beginning—that we should have so concentrated, as it were, on one particular matter which in many ways is not the critical matter at this moment.

What is even more interesting, is to look at what is happening to British influence and to the British impact at this moment. The Lord Privy Seal said yesterday:
"We can then see the danger which faces us of a decline in political influence in the world at large and in our Commonwealth."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th May, 1961; Vol. 640. c. 1389.]
Let me remind the right hon. Gentleman that I think we are witnessing a very considerable decline in Britain's political influence, both in the world and in the Commonwealth, and I think that this is happening because nowadays we never seem to take a stand on principle. We equivocate about everything.

If a country aspires towards leadership, as this country always has done, and, in my humble opinion, always should, it must stand for principles. We must be seen to stand for particular principles. If today we assume—and there have been a number of speeches from the other side admitting this—that Mr. Khrushchev has become a sort of "Leader of the Opposition" in the world, I am bound to say that we then find the British Prime Minister as the "Leader of the Abstentionists". If we think of Mr. Khrushchev as the Leader of the Opposition, we think of the Prime Minister occupying the third bench below the Gangway.

Nothing has happened in recent times where we have not been the abstentionists. Whether it has been in Africa, Asia or in Europe, we have been the leaders of those who did not make up their minds, and it seems to me a very important issue that on so many critical matters arising at this moment we lead the abstentionists, somebody else leads the opposition, and America leads—but not very well—the positive voices in the world.

Most of the debate, as was most of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, has been about the Common Market. I was very surprised to hear the speech which the right hon. Gentleman made, because at the end of it I could not see what it did otherwise than to encourage the French to stiffen their terms. If his intention was so to arrange things that we would find it rather more difficult to get in, I think he made the right sort of speech for that purpose. When I was at Strasbourg recently, I did what I could to help the Government—because I was abroad and not for any other reason. I put the thing across as well as I could, but when I come back and I hear the right hon. Gentleman, I begin to ask myself how the devil one helps a Government who are so uncertain and so unsure where they want to go.

I have a good deal of sympathy with the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones), who is not with us at the moment, and with the hon. Member for Newbury (Sir A. Hurd), who also is not with us, but both of whom have addressed us earlier. I thought that the right hon. Member for Hall Green put up a very great case, speaking as an industrialist, I gathered, picking up the threads of the right hon. Gentleman's arguments for us going into the Common Market as it now stands—that is to say, signing the Rome Treaty as it now stands. I asked him if he was arguing that we should sign it unconditionally, and though he did not quite answer "Yes" or "No" to that question, I believe that, on the whole, he meant "Yes". On the other hand, the hon. Member for Newbury, equally taking his text from the Minister, gave us so many warnings against doing so that I can see each of them making the same speech which they did make, contradictory speeches, from the same text. I have a good deal of sympathy with them. This really will not do for a Britain which wants to be other than the "Leader of the Abstentionists".

The noble Lady the Member for Aberdeen, South (Lady Tweedsmuir) said that when Mr. Ernest Bevin was at the Dispatch Box he said that we could not accept the political and federal complications involved in the original idea of a European organisation. I understand what she means. There has been a great change in the climate of public opinion and, indeed, public understanding of what is involved since those days so long ago. What has happened since has been partly the success which the Coal and Steel Community and the E.E.C. have had in building themselves up. They have had a rather greater success than some of us thought they would have. There has been some subsequent political developments and rather greater awareness of the dangers of a divided Europe than at that stage we thought likely.

Most important of all, there has been a much greater recognition of the economic consequences for us, particularly of a switching of investment to Europe which might otherwise take place here. There has been a recognition and appraisal that the Commonwealth and domestic agricultural problems are not as serious as ten years ago we thought they would be. There has been a recognition that the political objections which we then felt so strongly—Mr. Bevin felt them strongly, and I felt them strongly—are not as insuperable as at that stage it was thought they would be. They cannot be, otherwise France, given General de Gaulle's present outlook on the world, could not have been as keen a member of the E.E.C. as she is in fact.

I want to make it perfectly plain that we on this side think that three things are required. What shook me about the Minister's attitude was that he did not make these first. We cannot walk out on our E.F.T.A. partners. It can be argued that, whether we were wise or unwise to set up E.F.T.A. or take part in the operation of setting it up, having done so we cannot now discuss whether we join the Common Market as though E.F.T.A. did not exist. Whatever we do now, there has to be an arrangement for those who can join with us—and such there are; for those who cannot join with us but for whom a particular arrangement can be found, and for those like Finland for whom even that does not arise. We must arrange something for each of our associates in E.F.T.A. We also have to arrange for our Commonwealth associates and friends, particularly for the food producers in the Commonwealth, for whom a large all-round tariff would be an enormous burden. We cannot let them down either.

We must arrange something for our domestic agriculture, which, I repeat, is not quite such a burden as we once thought it would be but is still a problem and must be taken account of. Speaking for small farmers in my constituency, I express the view that they cannot be sold down the river at this stage. What shook me about the Minister's speech was that he did not start by saying to the countries of Europe, "We must arrange for these". He seemed to be saying, "Keep your terms up"—almost, "Put your terms up. You do not even have to bother". He left the others to follow.

If it has been decided—and, on the whole, from all the leaks—and I must say that the Government leak rather more than any other organisation I know, and that is saying something—it looks as though the Government have made up their mind to go in—I do not mind them saying that that is their view, but I want them to accompany their declaration that they are willing to go in with an equally firm declaration that there are these three issues—E.F.T.A., the Commonwealth and our domestic agriculture—on which the Six have to be willing to make an adjustment to allow us to come in.

I should have been much happier yesterday had the Lord Privy Seal made that very clear, but I am bound to tell him that he did not sound to any of us on this side as though he had made it clear at all. He made it sound as though he had virtually invited the French to build up their position and to bid up their terms, having told them in advance that all they had to do was to wait until we came in. I think that the right hon. Gentleman's speech will have done a great deal of harm, which I hope he will seek to remedy later in this debate.

Talking of the European economic situation leads us easily to the European political and defensive situation. I thought that when the right hon. Gentleman was talking about N.A.T.O. he made a remarkable statement. He was speaking of the Oslo meeting of the N.A.T.O. countries and said that the Government's view was that N.A.T.O. was not suffering from an indefinable malaise—from which I deduced that he really meant that it was suffering from a definable malaise.

That is exactly our view, and we would be very much happier if we could get the Government to understand what the malaise is. As the Lord Privy Seal said, this is not a military debate, a defence discussion, so I will not spend too much time on it, but the operations of the North Atlantic alliance are very much political operations.

I suggest to the Minister that we are overdue—long overdue—a reappraisal of the military strategy that N.A.T.O. is pursuing. If I may say it to him, this is made much more urgent than ever before by the statements that are pouring out of Washington on the question of new weapons—long-range nuclear weapons—and their relationship to Europe. We hear about Polaris, about submarines, almost every other week in a different relationship all the time, as far as I can see, from the statements to Europe. We are long overdue a statement about how the nations that make up N.A.T.O., and that includes us, see these things as fitting in.

We are also long overdue a revision of the arrangements for the effective political control, not only of the weapons but of the decisions inside the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. That, after all, affects our relationship with France and Germany. It affects very much the whole business of Europe, and we have to arrange some effective political institutions in N.A.T.O., which do not at present exist, to give effect to all this.

Discussion about N.A.T.O. raises the question of the individual policies of the member States. It is quite true that to have a military organisation such as N.A.T.O. we do not need a monolithic policy covering all the States. On the other hand, quite clearly, what individual member States do affects their Allies. This brings us clearly to Angola which, I am bound to say, was the most remarkable omission from the Lord Privy Seal's speech yesterday.

How one could make a speech at that time without even noting that Angola was troubling the world, is one of the things that will always pass my understanding. As I understand it, there is no dispute about the nature of the trouble there. Portugal is one of the few nations of whom it can be said that it does no worse for its colonies than it does for its own subjects. Nor is the knowledge of what is happening there anything new. It has been going on for a long time.

We have been suffering the disgrace of our abstention in the vote in the United Nations and to that disgrace we have now added the supreme folly of sending a warship—H.M.S. "Leopard"—to Angola at a time when the trouble there was really serious. The Admiralty say "Do not blame us. The Foreign Office gave us authority to do so." This is incredible.

Surely there was no reason for our sending a warship on its way back from Sierra Leone to Simonstown to call in on Angola unless we decided, for some special reason, that it should do so. Why was it decided, when there was tremendous colonial conflict going on between Africans and the Portuguese, that a ship that was coming home should deliberately put off her return and go to Luanda?

That seems to be one of the most stupid and irresponsible acts I have ever seen in the fifteen years I have been in this House. There was no reason to do it unless we failed to understand—and the Lord Privy Seal must, I suppose, understand this—that when in future we go to the United Nations we will be faced with a situation in which the Afro- Asian-Arab nations constitute a majority. There is nothing we can do unless we appeal to them.

If we understand that—and every United Nations delegate must understand it—what point was there in sending one of our warships to Luanda at a time when the Africans were fighting a first-class war with the Portuguese over their rights, and so on? Do the Government want to turn the Afro-Asian-Arab group against us? Are we to take on our shoulders the mantle of colonialism, which we have been so keen to get rid of?

Since we have been anxious to get rid of that mantle, why do we now take on the Portuguese? People may say, "If you do not do that, what about the N.A.T.O. alliance?" We formed that alliance for the mutual benefit of us all—Portuguese as well as ourselves—and we are as free to say to Portugal, "You must measure up to the requirement and the spirit of alliance" as Portugal is free to say to us, "You must support us, or else!"

I do not go quite as far as those who say that, politically, one should get rid of Portugal, but I am not prepared to underwrite the alliance to the point of saying that we have to suffer and stomach any colonial policy that Portugal, or other nations, choose to adopt. I do not see, however, that that matter is involved. The alliance would be a good deal stronger if we said frankly to each other than the spirit of the alliance requires certain things which Angola does not measure up to, rather than if we go on, rather half-heartedly, leading the abstentionists, which we have been doing.

I ask the Minister again a question which the Under-Secretary of State did not answer today. Yesterday, my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) drew attention not only to Angola but to the fact that we had refused a visa to Captain Galvão. The Under-Secretary earlier today answered by saying that he had been refused and that the Home Secretary never gave reasons for refusals. We do not regard that as a sufficient answer. Why did we refuse a visa for Captain Galvão to come to this country? I have here a cable from Captain Galvão saying that he had asked for the visa and had been refused. None of us see why this country, with its long history of willingness to shelter not exactly political refugees but chaps who are in political difficulty at home, should refuse a visa for Captain Galvão to visit this country. I ask the Lord Privy Seal to give us a rather better answer than we had from the Under-Secretary today.

The right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends should bear in mind that it is a tragic circumstance that, after having to go through all the difficulties involved with South Africa, after having to make our own reappraisal of the situation and condition ourselves to the fact that South Africa had to leave the Commonwealth, we should now find ourselves virtually supporting Portugal when the only other supporter she has in the United Nations is South Africa because their policies on that continent are so similar. We reject the one and support the other.

How can the right hon. Gentleman say that? Whatever are the merits of those policies, how can he say that South Africa's policy of apartheid is similar to the utter lack of racialism in Portuguese territories?

Very easily. In some ways, the Portuguese are more sensible than the South Africans. They at least have arranged for 30,000 out of 4½ million to be assimilated. Having done that, they have, they think, given themselves a good argument. They have said, "If we have 30,000 assimilados, we do not have to worry; there is no apartheid". But the remainder of the 4½ million still suffer exactly the same consequences as the other chaps suffer in South Africa. [An HON. MEMBER: "Much more brutal."] I hear someone say, "Much more brutal". They both seem to me to be very brutal. We cannot stand one. All I am saying is that I cannot see why we should stand the other. They both go together.

We believe, as we have tried to make clear in our Amendment, that the Government ought to base their foreign policy on support for and the strengthening of the United Nations. We believe that the only guarantee we can have for real peace is to replace the present anarchy of the power blocs by real world Government. We live in a divided world. The main function of the United Nations, I suppose, is to promote coexistence. We have had a good deal of discussion about what that co-existence could be.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East said yesterday, in terms of Mr. Khrushchev's idea of co-existence we have a good deal with which to disagree. One of our problems is to persuade him that his idea of co-existence is not something with which we could live; but, having said that, we have to deal with the situation which arises thereafter.

At the moment, the immediate problem about co-existence shows itself in the Geneva test ban discussions. We are not getting very far. We can blame the Russians for not being able to get very far. That is all right. But when we have blamed them—and my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Tomney) thinks that they will never change—we still have to find a situation and a world in which we can live. That means that we have to make some proposals ourselves and to put forward some policy which will control the West and will fit in with our own definition of co-existence.

My own worry is that we are not dealing with this problem. I understand the frustration that Ministers feel in dealing with Russia, with the changes of mind and the way in which they make enormous changes on the very last day after one thought that one was getting everywhere, to substitute a triumvirate for one man, for example, with the power of veto. But we in the West have to adopt a posture which will fit the kind of co-existence which we are demanding. It seems to me that that means having a policy, for example, on nuclear weapons, which fits the policy which we are asking them to endorse.

I see nothing in our present attitude towards nuclear weapons in the West which would fit peaceful co-existence and the desire for a genuine agreement even if the Russians were willing to have one. I do not see why we should go on appearing to maintain the case for every ally in the West having her own nuclear deterrent if we want to create a climate in which we can get an agreement with the Russians.

On a famous occasion some time ago when I met Mr. Khrushchev, it became very clear that there was one thing which he and I had in common, and I understood it. [Laughter.] I understand what hon. Members have in mind. May I say that I discovered another thing which we had in common, and that was a great concern about Germany. It was very clear that Germany was very much in Mr. Khrushchev's mind. Unless I miss my guess—I have never met him since—the thought that some day Germany will be, either by her own volition or by our help, a nuclear Power fills his horizon more than anything else and terrifies him very much.

It therefore seems to me that we ought to be putting forward a policy within the Western Alliance which would help to reassure Mr. Khrushchev against this risk. We in the Labour Party, in our documents and in our proposals, have tried to do this. One of the troubles about the Government is that they have not done this at all. We continue to claim to be an independent nuclear Power which clearly we cannot be. We keep up the pretence which encourages the French to go on and which, in due course, will encourage the Germans to go on, as Mr. Khrushchev fears. We are continuing to create a barrier to the issue of co-existence which, for him, is the central point of the argument. I should have thought that there was a great deal to be said for the Government being more forthcoming on our idea of co-existence and, in particular, of removing the point of conflict between us, and for the moment the nuclear conflict is the central one.

We have two propositions before us. I ask my hon. and right hon. Friends to vote for our Amendment and to divide the House. Why am I doing that? Obviously, we cannot congratulate the Government, as their Motion asks us to do. It is true that on the occasion of Laos, the Government rather belatedly got it right, but it was very belatedly. It was about the only occasion on which they got it right. The fact that they cannot always be wrong is not particularly a reason for congratulating them.

The Government were hopelessly wrong over Angola. Over Angola, they hoped to encourage the divisions and the problems rather than the other way round. On critical issues like the economic arrangements in Europe, they are incredibly muddled even now. For these reasons, I ask the House to divide against them tonight and to vote for the Amendment.

9.31 p.m.

For two days, we have been debating what amounts to a Motion of censure on the Government's foreign policy. I hope that hon. and right hon. Members opposite will forgive me if I say that were it not for the speech of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) and the last minute and a half of the speech of the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), nobody would have known that this was a Motion of censure on Her Majesty's Government.

The Motion has been a broad one to allow a wide-ranging debate. I congratulate the two hon. Members who have made their maiden speeches, my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Pym) and my hon. Friend the Member for The High Peak (Mr. Walder). Both of them discussed in part Europe and in part wider issues. I congratulate them on their speeches and I should like to say how much we look forward to hearing them again.

There has been complaint in the open-speech of the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) and the speech of the right hon. Member for Belper that, in moving the Motion, I should have devoted a large part of my speech to the question of Europe. From long experience, I know how little is said in public of what passes between the usual channels. In view, however, of what has been said from the Opposition Front Bench, I must make it plain that we for our part indicated that during this debate we wished to discuss the whole question of Europe, including the Common Market. We knew also that hon. and right hon. Friends of mine on this side of the House wished to do the same. Many hon. Members, indeed, have spoken on the subject. This bears out the fact that it is a matter of great interest and it shows how justifiable it was to devote part of this debate to it.

I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Belper because, in the first part of his speech, he expressed for the first time a view from the Opposition Front Bench about these great matters which we discussed yesterday at the beginning of the debate. There are two points made by the right hon. Gentleman with which I should like to deal. First, he raised the serious question of the effect that a speech in the House of Commons might have on the possibility of achieving an arrangement of this kind. As I said at the beginning of the debate, in discussing these matters and trying to make plain the issues to the House and to the country, one is to a certain extent divulging the position from which one is trying to find a basis for negotiation.

I should also like to tell the right hon. Gentleman——

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way? This is an important matter——

—that in what I said in the House yesterday, there was nothing which was not already fully known and appreciated by the members of the Six and of E.F.T.A. Secondly, I tried also to make plain the advantages to the Six and to Europe, as well as to E.F.T.A., of being able to achieve an arrangement of the sort that I discussed yesterday. It is not a one-way movement. It is a two-way movement, and unless it is that, we shall never succeed in getting an arrangement at all.

The second point that the right hon. Gentleman asked concerned undertakings. He said that I appeared to have given no firm undertaking on the three matters that concern him and his right hon. Friends. If he will consult my speech yesterday, he will find all three firmly given, as they have been given on a number of occasions. First, on agriculture, I said:
"We have, of course, given firm pledges to our farmers, and any change in the method of support we consider would have to take a full account of them."
There cannot be a firmer statement than that.

Secondly, on the Commonwealth, I said:
"We have always made it plain—and I repeat it now—that we shall keep in close touch with other Commonwealth Governments, and will have full consultation with them before we decide on the course to follow."
That is what the Commonwealth countries have asked for and that is the undertaking that we have given them.

On E.F.T.A. I said:
"We have always made it plain that the interests of E.F.T.A. must be safeguarded. We have kept the member countries of E.F.T.A. fully informed at all stages of the ideas that have been put forward and examined."
I then examined the charge that we or other countries were going to "go it alone" and I said:
"We are not prepared to abandon our E.F.T.A. partners in any way in trying to find a solution …."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th May, 1960; Vol. 640, cc. 1394–5.]
Those are three categorical statements about our position.

The real reason why we debated this yesterday was that we believe that there are dangers in Europe being divided into two economic groupings. We believe that the strength of Europe is vital to the strength of the free world and in the Motion that we put forward we asked for support for our efforts in this. We did not even ask to be congratulated—I assure the right hon. Member for Belper—we asked for support.

The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne, in a very passionate and dramatic speech, said that he could not stand the expression "the free world". He discarded it as of no importance and said that it was a cold war expression which served no other purpose. That is a conception which I cannot accept. The purpose of unity between countries which have their own independence is to protect them and their friends. At the same time we remain ready, as I tried to say yesterday, to settle differences peacefully. That is our objective. No one, least of all Her Majesty's Government, underestimates the importance of uncommitted countries or non-aligned countries or whatever term one prefers, and we are doing our utmost to help them.

My point was a little different. It was the equation of freedom with capitalism that I cannot accept as being correct.

That is a particular doctrine about which I do not wish to argue now. All I wish to ask about the uncommitted countries is: if it were not for the organised strength of the countries of the free world exactly how long would they be able to remain uncommitted?

I do not want to deal further with Europe except to answer briefly some of the points that have been raised. One point was put by the right hon. Member for Belper and was mentioned by certain hon. Members on the Liberal benches. It is the argument that the Government do not know where they want to go and cannot make up their minds. I have tried to explain that this is an endeavour to find a settlement between a very large number of countries and it is not a question of hesitating or not making up one's mind. It is a question of trying to ascertain what is possible; and the essence of this is what is possible in an arrangement which is immensely technical and complicated and has great political importance.

Does anyone in the House really argue that we should offer to make an agreement blind, without being able to carry out any of the undertakings for which the right hon. Member for Belper asked and which I have given? It is a sterile argument to offer to come forward and make an agreement and then negotiate, and not the other way round. What is important is that we should have a broad outline of what is possible in an arrangement. That is what we are trying to get and I make no apology on behalf of Her Majesty's Government for adopting that procedure.

We also had a very powerful speech from my noble Friend the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke). I want to make several comments about his approach. He made his speech with great power and irony, but sometimes I felt that it was rather far off the mark in this modern world. Naturally, we helped to build up E.F.T.A. It is a very varied group. I am not certain that all the E.F.T.A. countries would like themselves to be described as non-Catholic—to use the phrase which he used. It is a group which is working well and which we should develop.

The prime purpose of founding it, however, was to enable us to reach agreement with the other countries of Europe. That is not a narrow conception, as he tried to indicate, because the Six themselves have already taken one other country, Greece—he particularly referred to South-Eastern Europe—into association and is now working with Turkey, while E.F.T.A. has taken in Finland.

Our object must be a wider association between the countries of Europe. We must not approach this in a narrow and dogmatic way, for that, in modern conditions, is quite wrong. Then my noble Friend said that we must leave everything aside, including the Commonwealth, and must not be tied to the United States. I endeavoured to explain yesterday that the reason why all these negotiations are taking so much time and effort is that we are trying to find a way to bring in our Commonwealth friends in a way that will be of benefit both to the Commonwealth and to Europe.

He asked why nobody thought of asking the E.E.C. countries to join E.F.T.A. They have been asked, and they are not prepared to do so. It is not a form of organisation which they are prepared to accept. We must face practical politics; and that is not a possibility. He also asked why we should do this in the month of May. But we have been trying to do it for a long time. We have been working on this for the last nine months, and we have still a long way to go before we can get a clear idea of what is a possible arrangement.

I should like to deal with many other points which my noble Friend raised, but I will now turn to some of the other matters referred to in the debate. Whatever the right hon. Member for Belper may say, Europe has not been the only subject discussed in the debate. I myself raised the question of Laos, the Congo, the United Nations and Berlin, and very little other mention was made of them. My hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State discussed the nuclear tests—about which, alas, comparatively little was said by other speakers—disarmament, Angola and Cuba. From the Front Bench we have dealt with all the subjects mentioned in the Amendment.

As my hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary said, Angola is a most serious situation—a grievous situation in that there is strife and people are losing their lives. We recognise that, but at the United Nations our position was made quite plain. We abstained because of Article 2 (7) of the Charter.

The right hon. Gentleman began by saying that this Government never stand on principle. On this occasion in the United Nations we were standing on principle again—on Article 2 (7). We made our position plain, and what we thought of the situation, and we followed the course which we have always maintained on Article 2 (7). It is not comparable to our position on apartheid in South Africa, which has also been made plain.

There were two other questions about Portugal. The first concerned the Foreign Secretary's visit. I was asked whether my noble Friend was going to attend the celebrations of Dr. Salazar's coup d'état on 28th May. I have made careful inquiries, and I find that 28th May is the 35th anniversary of the Army rising led by Marshal Carmona and General da Costa in 1926. It is not connected with Dr. Salazar, who joined the Government only in 1928 and became its leader later. I just wish to indicate that the celebrations have nothing to do with Dr. Salazar personally.

If the hon. Member will wait for a moment, perhaps I can tell him that I have looked at the Secretary of State's programme and I find that 28th May is a Sunday, which he is spending as a day of rest before leaving for Madrid.

The right hon. Gentleman also asked me about the visa for Captain Galvão. I have nothing to add to the reply given by my hon. Friend and I know that the right hon. Gentleman knows full well that these matters of visas are for my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and that it is a long-standing practice that the Home Secretary does not give reasons for refusals of visas.

I do not want to breach traditions, but even so this is rather surprising. Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether the Home Secretary consulted the Foreign Secretary before he refused this visa?

I am sure that the Home Secretary carried out all the normal processes in dealing with these matters.

The last point which the right hon. Gentleman raised was the question which has been introduced in order to allow this Motion of censure to be put down, and I think that on reflection the right hon. Gentleman will agree that it should be put into perspective. To say that the visit of a frigate—not the ordering of a warship to go to Luanda—as the right hon. Gentleman was trying to imply—is some great emergency measure, when the visit was arranged long ago and when the frigate was returning to Simonstown from celebrations in Sierra Leone——

I may not have, but I had two years at the Admiralty and I know very well what political decisions underlie these friendly visits.

If the hon. Member is doubting the veracity of his old Department, I expect that it hopes that he will never go there again.

The situation in Luanda was quiet at the time the ship went there and remained quiet. There were no incidents. The visit gave some pleasure to the British colony there who were expecting the visit, and no harm has been done. If the right hon. Gentleman had accused the Government or Ministers of an error of judgment or misjudgment of some kind, that would have been understandable, but for the right hon. Gentleman and his friends to put down a Motion of censure on this matter is another thing.

One point which caused considerable concern to the hon. Member for Leeds, East and the hon. Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) was the effect on the obligations of the Governments which had signed the treaty of a nuclear test by a country which was not a party to it. My hon. Friend gave a general answer this afternoon and I should like to give a slightly more detailed answer as it affects the draft treaty which we are hoping to negotiate at Geneva.

Under the draft treaty, recently tabled by the United Kingdom and the United States, such a test by a country not a party to the treaty would not automatically and at once relieve the parties of their obligations. But the Western draft provides that the parties may decide what other countries must adhere if the objectives of the treaty are to be secured. Should such a country refuse to adhere, the point would eventually be reached, where—and I quote the actual provisions of the draft treaty—
"the provisions of the Treaty are not being fulfilled".
When this point is reached, it brings into play the right of the parties to withdraw and to be relieved of their obligations. It would also be brought into play by a failure to set up at the due time all the control posts provided for, which includes posts on the territories other than the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. I hope that this has now defined the position clearly as it exists in the draft Treaty. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is a matter of importance.

The other theme which has been running through the speeches in the debate has been the theme of East-West relations; the importance of them, and the attempt to find an arrangement between East and West. Since I have been at the Foreign Office as a Minister, I have found, as have some other right hon. Members, that one has to deal with a remarkable diversity of problems which seem to pass across one's desk with extraordinary rapidity. Having more than eighty countries with which to deal, one is constantly switching from one problem to another, but I think that any Minister at the Foreign Office must always have at the back of his mind the question of East-West relations. What are the things which are motivating the Soviet Union, China, and the Soviet allies? What is really making them behave in the way they do? How can one get into their minds and understand what are their real ambitions and intentions?

We have in this debate had two very clear views as to what their intentions are. The hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Tomney) gave one view, and the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne gave another view; and, in opening the debate, the hon. Member for Leeds, East and, in winding up, the right hon. Member for Belper contributed greatly.

In looking at this problem as one can do only briefly when winding up, one sees the position in which Mr. Khrushchev, as the head of one of the two great Powers in the world, has abounding confidence, and one understands what lies at the back of that. One sees great material wealth, great scientific knowledge and practical achievements. At the same time, one has to try to recognise the ideological background of Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues, and the doctrinal differences now emerging within the Soviets and their allies and the pressures which this creates, together with the economic and political pressures which are going on.

The right hon. Gentleman mentioned, too, the very deep feelings which exist in the minds of the Soviet leaders about certain problems. We may not think them right. We may think that there are ways in which they ought to be reassured about Central Europe. At the same time one has to assume a certain amount of natural exuberance and extravagant language when they are mischief-making about the world.

It seems to be a formidable task to try to penetrate what is really activating and motivating the Soviet leaders, and the hon. Gentleman pointed to two quotations from speeches. He quoted Mr. Khrushchev's speech in Moscow on 6th January, when he said:
"Peaceful co-existence is a form of intense economic, political and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international arena."
He went on to say:
"We recognise wars of liberation as sacred. Communists support such wars fully and without reservation."
The hon. Member for Hammersmith, North had a clear view of what this meant; that there could in fact be no sort of accommodation at all. I felt that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne was at times rather under-estimating the importance of that attitude of Mr. Khrushchev.

The hon. Member for Leeds, East said that there is a policy of duality in his co-existence and in his belief in co-existence, and I believe it to be profoundly true that that is the policy of Mr. Khrushchev, that he accepts that nuclear war is no longer inevitable. Yet, if one may think of that as a top level of policy, underneath is a lower level of policy in which he believes that peaceful co-existence is an intense form of struggle of all kinds in all places wherever it can be carried on, and thus, with the pressure from China and some of the other satellites, he is forced to give an aggressive interpretation and to use aggressive language in his dealing with it.

What did the hon. Member suggest? He said that we must tell Mr. Khrushchev that he cannot carry on this duality of policy. It is true that it makes the carrying out of policy, not only in our own country but in the other democratic countries, immensely difficult. At the same time, so long as Khrushchev is under pressure from inside the Soviet alliance he has less freedom to manoeuvre in carrying on this double policy, so we must face the fact that for a long time to come we will see this duality, and we must make up our minds that we have to live with it. In living with it we must face a challenge. We must find how we can live with it in such a way that we can maintain the independence of countries, particularly the newly-emerging countries, and allow them to retain their freedom and carry on their own way of life. That should be our purpose in carrying out our foreign policy—to be absolutely firm in showing Mr. Khrushchev and his Soviet allies exactly what our position is in all countries, particularly those bordering the Soviet boundaries, where there must be no mistake; and in showing other countries, including those which have just become independent on the rather heady brew of nationalism, that we want them to keep their independence and to play their part in the United Nations, and that we will help them to do so.

We can help them in other ways than the Soviets. We can help them with trade, in which we have no ulterior motive—trade for its own sake. We can help these countries and help in the struggle for peaceful co-existence. Soviet trade all too often has political implications, but we can help them with aid, which we are doing, to a large extent, without strings. Over the last six years—and this is a figure which the House ought always to remember—the United Kingdom has extended four times as much aid to under-developed countries as has the Soviet Union. This is something of which we can well be proud.

All too often the West is accused of acting too late in this matter; of always letting the victory go to the other side, and never thinking ahead in order to see where the next challenge will come. Perhaps that has been true at times. It has been true for very good and natural reasons, one of which is that it is much more difficult for democracies and independent countries to organise themselves to deal with this situation and, as the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North said, to take advantage by making a publicity point of everything that happens. These are natural difficulties, but in looking ahead we must realise that there is one particular danger point today, namely, that the Soviet Union, with its friends, is likely to devote more and more of its attention to South America. It is to that part of the world that the United States devotes over 600 million dollars of aid, and help within Europe is now being organised, with which we, in a small and modest way, may be able to help. There is great work to do in helping these countries in order to win the challenge which comes from co-existence.

There is a great measure of agreement between the two sides of the House. We are agreed about the peaceful settlement of disputes; we are agreed about maintaining the independence of our countries, and we are agreed about aid for the uncommitted countries. I am sorry that the right hon. Member and his hon. Friends, in this debate, and with this agreement, should have introduced the question of the visit of Her Majesty's Ship "Leopard" to Luanda, but since they have done so I must ask my hon. Friends to support our Motion and to vote against the Amendment moved by the Opposition.

Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:—

Division No. 175.]


[10.0 p.m.

Agnew, Sir PeterGammans, LadyMcLean, Neil (Inverness)
Allason, JamesGardner, EdwardMacIeod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)
Amery, Rt. Hon. Julian (Preston, N.)Gibson-Watt, DavidMacLeod, John (Ross & Cromarty)
Arbuthnot, JohnGlyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)McMaster, Stanley R.
Ashton, Sir HubertGlyn, Sir Richard (Dorset, N.)Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harold (Bromley)
Barber, AnthonyGodber, J. B.Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)
Barter, JohnGoodhart, PhilipMacpherson, Niall (Dumfries)
Batsford, BrianGoodhew, VictorMaddan, Martin
Baxter, Sir Beverley (Southgate)Gough, FrederickMaginnis, John E.
Bell, RonaldGower, RaymondMaitland, Sir John
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos & Fhm)Grant, Rt. Hon. WilliamManningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.
Berkeley, HumphryGrant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R.Marlowe, Anthony
Bevins, Rt. Hon. Reginald (Toxteth)Green, AlanMarshall, Douglas
Bingham, R. M.Gresham Cooke, R.Mathew, Robert (Honiton)
Birch, Rt. Hon. NigelGrimston, Sir RobertMatthews, Gordon (Meriden)
Bishop, F. P.Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. C.Mawby, Ray
Black, Sir CyrilGurden, HaroldMaxwell-Hyslop, R. J.
Bossom, CliveHall, John (Wycombe)Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.
Box, DonaldHamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)Montgomery, Fergus
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. JohnHare, Rt. Hon. JohnMore, Jasper (Ludlow)
Boyle, Sir EdwardHarris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)Morgan, William
Braine, BernardHarris, Reader (Heston)Nicholls, Sir Harmar
Brewis, JohnHarrison, Brian (Maldon)Nicholson, Sir Godfrey
Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir WalterHarvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)Noble, Michael
Brooman-White, R.Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)Nugent, Sir Richard
Browne, Percy (Torrington)Harvie Anderson, MissOakshott, Sir Hendrie
Buck, AntonyHastings, StephenOrr-Ewing, C. Ian
Bullard, DenysHay, JohnOsborn, John (Hallam)
Burden, F. A.Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir LionelPage, John (Harrow, West)
Butcher, Sir HerbertHeath, Rt. Hon. EdwardPage, Graham (Crosby)
Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)Henderson, John (Cathcart)Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)
Campbell, Sir David (Belfast, S.)Henderson-Stewart, Sir JamesPartridge, E.
Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)Hendry, ForbesPearson, Frank (Clitheroe)
Carr, Compton (Barons Court)Hiley, JosephPeel, John
Carr, Robert (Mitcham)Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)Percival, Ian
Cary, Sir RobertHirst, GeoffreyPeyton, John
Channon, H. P. G.Hobson, JohnPickthorn, Sir Kenneth
Chataway, ChristopherHocking, Philip N.Pilkington, Sir Richard
Chichester-Clark, R.Holland, PhilipPitman, I. J.
Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)Hollingworth, JohnPitt, Miss Edith
Cleaver, LeonardHornby, R. P.Pott, Percivall
Cole, NormanHornsby-Smith, Rt. Hon. PatriciaPrice, David (Eastleigh)
Collard, RichardHoward, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives)Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)
Cooper-Key, Sir NeillHoward, John (Southampton, Test)Prior, J. M. L.
Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral JohnPrior-Palmer, Brig. Sir Otho
Cordle, JohnHughes-Young, MichaelProudfoot, Wilfred
Corfield, F. V.Hulbert, Sir NormanPym, Francis
Costain, A. P.Hutchison, Michael ClarkQuennell, Miss J. M.
Craddock, Sir BeresfordIremonger, T. L.Ramsden, James
Critchley, JulianIrvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)Rawlinson, Peter
Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.Jackson, JohnRedmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin
Crowder, F. P.James, DavidRees, Hugh
Cunningham, KnoxJennings, J. C.Rees-Davies, W. R.
Curran, CharlesJohnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)Renton, David
Currie, G. B. H.Johnson, Eric (Blackley)Ridley, Hon. Nicholas
Dalkeith, Earl ofJohnson Smith, GeoffreyRidsdale, Julian
Dance, JamesJones, Rt. Hn. Aubrey (Hall Green)Rippon, Geoffrey
d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir HenryJoseph, Sir KeithRoberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)
Deedes, W. F.Kerans, Cdr. J. S.Robson Brown, Sir William
de Ferranti, BasilKerr, Sir HamiltonRodgers, John (Sevenoaks)
Digby, Simon WingfieldKershaw, AnthonyRopner, Col. Sir Leonard
Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. M.Kirk, PeterRoyle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)
Doughty, CharlesKitson, TimothyRussell, Ronald
du Cann, EdwardLagden, GodfreySandys, Rt. Hon. Duncan
Duncan, Sir JamesLangford-Holt, J.Scott-Hopkins, James
Duthie, Sir WilliamLegge-Bourke, Sir HarrySeymour, Leslie
Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)Sharpies, Richard
Elliott, R. W. (Nwcstle-upon-Tyne, N.)Linstead, Sir HughShaw, M.
Emery, PeterLitchfield, Capt. JohnShepherd, William
Emmet, Hon. Mrs. EvelynLloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'nC'dfield)Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir Jocelyn
Errington, Sir EricLongden, GilbertSkeet, T. H. H.
Erroll, Rt. Hon. F. J.Low, Rt. Hon. Sir TobySmith, Dudley (Br'ntf'rd & Chiswick)
Farr, JohnLucas, Sir JocelynSmithers, Peter
Fell, AnthonyLucas-Tooth, Sir HughSmyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)
Fisher, NigelMcAdden, StephenSoames, Rt. Hon. Christopher
Fletcher-Cooke, CharlesMacArthur, IanSpearman, Sir Alexander
Foster, JohnMcLaren, MartinSpeir, Rupert
Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)Maclean, Sir Fitzroy (Bute & N. Ayrs.)Stanley, Hon. Richard

The House divided: Ayes 277, Noes 201.

Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)Thornton-Kemsley, Sir ColinWatts, James
Stodart, J. A.Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)Webster, David
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir MalcolmTilney, John (Wavertree)Whitelaw, William
Storey, Sir SamuelTurner, ColinWilliams, Dudley (Exeter)
Studholme, Sir HenryTurton, Rt. Hon. R. H.Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)
Summers, Sir Spencer (Aylesbury)Tweedsmuir, LadyWolrige-Gordon, Patrick
Sumner, Donald (Orpington)van Straubenzee, W. R.Wood, Rt. Hon. Richard
Talbot, John E.Vane, W. M. F.Woodhouse, C. M.
Tapsell, PeterVaugham-Morgan, Sir JohnWoodnutt, Mark
Taylor, Edwin (Bolton, E.)Vickers, Miss JoanWorsley, Marcus
Teeling, WilliamVosper, Rt. Hon. DennisYates, William (The Wrekin)
Temple, John M.Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)
Thatcher, Mrs. MargaretWalder, DavidTELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)Walker, PeterColonel J. H. Harrison and
Thompson, Richard (Croydon, S.)Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Sir DerekMr. Finlay.
Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. PeterWatkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold


Abse, LeoHart, Mrs. JudithOswald, Thomas
Ainaley, WilliamHealey, DenisOwen, Will
Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)Henderson, Rt. Hn. Arthur (Rwly Regis)Padley, W. E.
Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)Herbison, Miss MargaretPaget, R. T.
Awbery, StanHewitson, Capt. M.Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)
Bacon, Miss AliceHill, J. (Midlothian)Pargiter, G. A.
Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.)Hilton, A. V.Parker, John
Bence, Cyril (Dunbartonshire, E.)Holman, PercyParkin, B. T.
Benson, Sir GeorgeHolt, ArthurPavitt, Laurence
Boardman, H.Houghton, DouglasPearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)
Bowden, Herbert W. (Leics. S. W.)Howell, CharlesA. (B'ham, Perry Br.)Peart, Frederick
Bowles, FrankHowell, Denis (B'ham, Small Heath)Pentland, Norman
Boyden, JamesHughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)Popplewell, Ernest
Brockway, A. FennerHughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)Prentice, R. E.
Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)Hunter, A. E.Probert, Arthur
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)Proctor, W. T.
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)Irving, Sydney (Dartford)Pursey, Cmdr. Harry
Callaghan, JamesJanner, Sir BarnettRankin, John
Chapman, DonaldJay, Rt. Hon. DouglasRedhead, E. C.
Cliffe, MichaelJeger, GeorgeReid, William
Collick, PercyJenkins, Roy (Stechford)Reynolds, G. W.
Corbet, Mrs. FredaJones, Dan (Burnley)Robertson, John (Paisley)
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)Jones, Jack (Rotherham)Ross, William
Crosland, AnthonyJones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.
Cullen, Mrs. AliceJones, T. W. (Merioneth)Short, Edward
Darling, GeorgeKenyon, CliffordSilverman, Sydney (Nelson)
Davies, Harold (Leek)Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.Skeffington, Arthur
Davies, Ifor (Gower)King, Dr. HoraceSlater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)
Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)Lawson, GeorgeSlater, Joseph (Sedgefield)
Deer, GeorgeLedger, Ron.Small, William
Delargy, HughLee, Frederick (Newton)Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)
Dempsey, JamesLever, Harold (Cheetham)Snow, Julian
Diamond, JohnLever, L. M. (Ardwick)Sorensen, R. W.
Dodds, NormanLipton, MarcusSoskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank
Donnelly, DesmondLoughlin, CharlesSpriggs, Leslie
Driberg, TomMabon, Dr. J. DicksonSteele, Thomas
Dugdale, Rt. Hon. JohnMcCann, JohnStewart, Michael (Fulham)
Ede, Rt. Hon. C.MacColl, JamesStonehouse, John
Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)McInnes, JamesStones, William
Edwards, Robert (Bilston)McKay, John (Wallsend)Strachey, Rt. Hon. John
Edwards, Walter (Stepney)Mackie, JohnStrauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)
Evans, AlbertMcLeavy, FrankStross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)
Fernyhough, E.MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)Swain, Thomas
Finch, HaroldMallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Fletcher, EricManuel, A. C.Swingler, Stephen
Foot, Dingle (Ipswich)Mapp, CharlesSymonds, J. B.
Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)
Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)Marsh, RichardThomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)
Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. HughMason, RoyThompson, Dr. Alan (Dunfermline)
Galpern, Sir MyerMayhew, ChristopherThomson, G. M. (Dundee, E.)
George, Lady Megan Lloyd (Crmrthn)Mellish, R. J.Thorpe, Jeremy
Ginsburg, DavidMendelson, J. J.Timmons, John
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.Millan, BruceTomney, Frank
Gourlay, HarryMilne, Edward J.Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn
Greenwood, AnthonyMitchison, G. R.Wainwright, Edwin
Grey, CharlesMonslow, WalterWarbey, William
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)Moody, A. S.Watkins, Tudor
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llaneily)Mort, D. L.Weitzman, David
Griffiths, W. (Exchange)Moyle, ArthurWhite, Mrs. Elrene
Grimond, J.Neal, HaroldWhitlock, William
Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)Wigg, George
Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.
Hamilton, William (West Fife)Oliver, G. H.Wilkins, W. A.
Hannan, WilliamOram, A. E.Willey, Frederick

Williams, D. J. (Neath)Woof, RobertTELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Williams, W, R. (Openshaw)Wyatt, WoodrowMr. John Taylor and
Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)Yates, Victor (Ladywood)Mr. G. H. R. Rogers.
Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)Zilliacus, K.

Main Question put and agreed to.


That this House supports the efforts of Her Majesty's Government to strengthen the unity of the free world and thus to create, in co-operation with the Commonwealth and with their allies, greater opportunities for the improvement of relations between East and West and for the promotion of conditions of peace and order throughout the world in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.