I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

I understand that it is convenient, with this amendment, to consider the following Lords amendments:

No. 2, in line 38, leave out "him "and insert

"the discriminator or any other person"

No. 3, in line 41, leave out "him" and insert

"the discriminator or any other person"

No. 4, in line 44, leave out "him" and insert

"the discriminator or any other person"

No. 5, in page 3, line 1, leave out "him" and insert

"the discriminator or any other person"

No. 6, in line 5, leave out "he" and insert "the discriminator".

These amendments are the result of the consideration which the Government undertook to give to points made on Report in this House by my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Miss Richardson) about the scope of the definition of "victimisation". As Clause 4 stood, a person, X, victimised another person, Y, where he treated Y less favourably than other persons on the ground that Y had done any of the things specified in subsection (2); for example, instituted proceedings under the Act against him. However, the clause did not define as victimisation the less favourable treatment of Y by X on the ground that Y had done any of the things specified in subsection (2) against a third person, Z. The amendments to Clause 4 secure that the definition of "victimisation" is extended to cover such a situation.

I suppose that at this stage of the Bill it is rather hopeless to oppose these amendments, but I think some words should be said against them because these things tend to slip through, particularly in the later stages of a Bill, without their significance being considered by the House. One feels grateful that the alphabet ends with Z, otherwise this sort of thing could go on and on in ever-increasing circles.

The amendments strike at someone who treats less favourably, in employment for example, a person on the grounds that he has done or intends to do anything by reference to this Bill in relation to that first person. The "anything" that is done by reference to this Bill does not refer to proceedings under the Bill, to giving evidence or information under the Bill or to allegations of a contravention of the Bill. One could understand all that, whatever one thoughth of it, but that is not referred to. That is all dealt with under Clause 4(i)(a), (b) and (d).

The "anything" must be the holding or expressing of disagreeable opinions about this measure. There is nothing else it can be, and that is the significance of this extension of the clause. It does not just mean the person who is guilty of the conduct, if I may be allowed to use that expression; it is now widened from X and Y to Z. In the comparable provisions of Clause 13(2), it is laid down in the most explicit terms that where an authority or body is required to take into account or assess the character of a person for the purposes of employment, then the fact that someone disagrees with this Bill is to be evidence of bad character. Somebody who says to another: "You are the sort of person who agrees with this Bill. I do not think I like you" will be guilty of discrimination under the Bill. This is a dangerous path on which to tread. The expression of opinion about the policy of an Act will be treated as evidence of a bad character, and a person who, like me, thinks this measure is bad and wrong in principle will be struck at by the extension proposed in the amendment.

I realise that I speak in vain. Even if I spoke with the tongues of men and of angels, there is hardly anyone here to listen, so I could not persuade them, but before this Bill becomes an Act it is right that one voice should be raised to point to the dangers in the way the law is increasingly being used to stigmatise and, in a sense, outlaw the expression of certain opinions about matters of controversy.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This amendment is a rewording of the first genuine occupational qualification criterion, and is an attempt to meet some of the criticisms made at an earlier stage. Some people thought that preconceptions about a woman's rôle would cloud the interpretation of our intentions. We do not think the amended wording differs significantly in effect from the wording as it left this House, but it has the additional merit that it makes the intention rather clearer.

Once again I feel it necessary to say some words of dissent on this proposal. The wording that is being replaced was inevitably and naturally the subject of some fairly astringent comment in the earlier stages of the Bill and I do not consider that any improvement has been made. On the contrary, the faults of the Bill are brought into focus rather more sharply by the proposed change.

The extraordinary words "excluding physical strength or stamina" in the amendment underline the absurdity of this Bill. I heard the hon. Member for Isle of Ely (Mr. Freud) mention physiognomy at one point. As I understand it, physiognomy might get past as a necessary characteristic, particularly if one wanted a character with a beard. At least we have got away from the attitude of a former Home Secretary who said that, if necessary, a woman could have a beard stuck on in order to avoid discrimination. If there is one thing which validly differentiates men and women it is physical strength and stamina, yet they are expressly excluded.

I choose this amendment for an intervention at this late stage because in it is distilled, in the purest form, the phrenetic absurdity which underlies the whole Bill. To me it is sad to see the House of Commons lending its grave attention to proposals which spring from nothing better than a shrill and peevish militancy of a sectional lobby. The Bill, of course, will not work. No one thinks that it will. It is offensive and objectionable in principle.

4.30 p.m.

I can give two illustrations on the question whether it will work. One of them I raised on Report, and it concerns the police. I asked how, if physical strength and stamina were excluded, it would be possible to ensure a police force which could deal with disorder in the streets, with holding back crowds and with all those occasions where physical strength of relatively young men is regularly engaged. I raised this point in the hope of getting an answer, and in the end I was told that somehow or other the police would make sure that they got an adequate number of men, as distinct from women. That can mean only that this kind of thing is to be a broad principle in the Bill but that in practice it will be winked at where convenient. The Forces are excluded, and they have to be. The police should be excluded, but they are not, and so these things will be done in a covert way.

I saw in the daily Press that the fire service is worried over securing the proper recruitment of men. The Chief Fire Officer of East Sussex has said that the fire service should be excluded from the Bill. I wonder, if physical strength and stamina are not to be matters of differentiation, how it is proposed to get an adequate number of male firemen without discriminating on the ground of sex.

My hon. and learned Friend is raising an important point, and I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure us about it. I hope that my hon. and learned Friend is not right in saying that physical strength and stamina may no longer be grounds for discrimination. It may be that one would want to choose a woman precisely because she was strong and had more stamina, but it is important that we should be reassured that my hon. and learned Friend is not right and that we are not disallowing the factor of physical strength and stamina as a basis for discrimination.

The Lords amendment in the new phrasing of the exemption, which before referred to authentic male characteristics, now uses a form of words which speaks of

"physiology (excluding physical strength or stamina").

That explicit and express exception must mean something, and I should be very glad to know what it means. When I raised this question on Report in relation to the police I was told that somehow the police would manage to get the number of men, as distinct from women, that they wanted. I suppose that the fire service will also—by breaking the law—recruit the number of men it wants.

I can imagine that the Minister will give us a wildly impractical answer. He will probably say that it is necessary to have a mainly male police force and fire service. The police will have to hold back crowds, deal with fighting and arrest people, and therefore, they will say that they need 90 per cent. of strong, large constables. Those are the sort of constables they will interview. Of course, the only strong and large ones will be men, and that is how the objective will be achieved. That is the nonsense that we shall have arrived at. The Minister must give an answer, and there is no other which can be thought of.

I do not intend to go through the Lords amendments restating the different facets of my opposition to these proposals because basically I am opposed to the principle of this kind of legislation at all. If one gets involved in the details of a Committee or Report stage or in consideration of Lords amendments one is, before one knows it, embroiled in the whole issue and is subject to inferences of partial acceptance, which would not be correct in my case. I therefore propose to intervene on these two groups of amendments and then to leave the matter to the inevitable course of nature, if I may so describe it.

It is only a matter of regret to me that when important issues like this reach the House, almost invariably on a Friday but at other times, too, they are greeted by empty benches. I say that regardless of which side of the argument I am on. I have seen it through the years. On Fridays we have gone through proposals about divorce and abortion, and quite often I have been on the same side of the argument as some Labour hon. Members on these subjects, surprising though that may seem, but nearly always the House is empty. Our colleagues seem to be locked in their economic dogfights, almost to the exclusion of all other considerations. When these matters, which go far deeper and are far more pervasive and go much further in shaping the development of society, are discussed no one is present to listen to the arguments and perhaps be persuaded by them.

Is the hon. and learned Gentleman not aware that women always have had to take second place in this House? The situation arose in which a dogs Bill came before women, and the Lotteries Bill came before women, both of them before quite a full House. That is the situation today. Not even male members of the Committee can be bothered to turn up for the debate.

That is no doubt true but it does not have much to do with women taking second place, which is not the case in my experience during my time in the House. It would be ungracious to say that they have hogged the time—I must find a more elegant expression than that—but they have had their fair share of the time and there may be those who would say that matters relating to women are always something of a lottery anyway.

I feel that my duty in this matter is not in any way to hold up the procedural progress of the Bill. It is to make my own position on it perfectly clear over this extension of the use of legislation which I regard as wrong in principle and thoroughly dangerous. Having made that position clear, I must say that if people have to learn from painful experience rather than precept at least the responsibility is not mine.

I think I should start by paying a compliment to the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell). Throughout the proceedings about equality for women, whenever he has made a contribution on the subject, he has strengthened the backbone of the lobby for women's equality, and to that extent he has pushed the legislation along.

I deal with his point by reference to an example concerning the fireman. If there is an advertisement for people to become firemen, both men and women can apply. It will be unlawful to discriminate against a woman making an application for that kind of job. However, of course, the fire authorities can impose a requirement about stamina or strength, because that is an essential condition for carrying out the job. Therefore, the amendment does not prevent recruitment, and recruitment conditions which include requirements about stamina or strength.

I turn to the second example which is the one that we intend to cover in the Bill. If one advertises for somebody to play the part of Juliet, in our view it makes sense that the person inserting the advertisement or contacting an agent can require that a woman performs that part. I should have thought that that was fairly obvious. That is the exception where one can specify that only a woman is wanted for the job. That is why we have introduced this particular qualification into Clause 7.

How will one assess the stamina? Will it be at the interview or by filling in questions on a form? This is not plausible. We all know that there are physical differences of strength as well as other differences between men and women. Surely, the only way is the practical way. As to the theoretical way, if it were applied one could advertise not for a woman to play the part of Juliet but for someone with female characteristics, and there are plenty of such people around. It is not altogether easy in these days to know at whom one is looking in the Underground. Some men could pass quite well for Juliet. Does not the Minister think that it is all a little fanciful?

No, I do not think that it is fanciful. It would bring the legislation into disrepute if there were not some occasions on which one would specify that only a man or a woman was required for the position. Therefore, we thought it right to introduce this genuine occupational qualification for carrying out, for instance, a dramatic part. That is why we have the exception.

I shall now explain why we further amended the exception. There are certain jobs where there might be a different opinion whether one needed authentic male characteristics to carry out the job at all. Let us take as an example the job of a waiter. Some of my hon. Friends feared that a job such as that of a waiter might be considered by some people to be one which required authentic male characteristics of physique, appearance and so forth. We disagreed with that proposition and wanted to make it clear that the condition that had to be fulfilled in order to obtain the exception was that there was only to be a requirement as to physiology and gave the example of entertainment and dramatic performances. I hope that I have made the distinction clear.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

The need for the amendment arises in connection with communal accommodation available on ships. We have been advised that the words

"the only such premises which are available"

in Clause 7(2)(c)(i) must relate to the totality of the living accommodation on a ship and that, therefore, the requirements of subparagraph (i) cannot be met by any ship which has more than one unit or block of sleeping and sanitary accommodation for its crew.

By definition, such a ship is equipped with separate sleeping and sanitary accommodation which could be used by women in privacy from men, although, in fact, it may not be available for this purpose. Where, for example, a ship which was recruiting a crew for a voyage had three units of communal living accommodation, one for deck crew, one for engine room crew, and one for catering ratings, and a woman applied to join the ship, it would not be possible even to attempt to claim that Clause 7(2)(c) applied because the ship would fail to meet the requirements of subparagraph (i), as it would have separate sleeping and sanitary accommodation which could be used by women. This would be so whether the woman was the first applicant or the last.

The effect of the amendment is to restrict the reference to "premises" in Clause 7(2)(c)(i) to premises which are available for persons holding the job in question.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this we may take Lords Amendment No. 13, in page 15, line 29, leave out "female" and insert "woman".

A point was raised in another place by my noble Friend Lord Gardiner about the use of the word "female" instead of "woman" in Clause 22. It was suggested that though Clause 2 provided for "man" to be read where appropriate for "woman", it did not allow "male" to be read for "female", with the result that Clause 22 does not deal with discrimination against men in the area of education. The analysis is equally relevant to Clause 9, which speaks of a "female contract worker". We think, therefore, that the word "woman" in place of the references to "female" will avoid any possible argument on the point.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Clause 13(2) is based on a precedent in the Consumer Credit Act 1974. There was some criticism of the inclusion of the word "associates", and the Government now accept that the word "associates", although appropriate in the Consumer Credit Act, would not be appropriate in the Bill. The amendment is made for that reason.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this we may take Lords Amendment No. 19, in page 22, line 34, leave out "any" and insert "a significant number".

It has been clear from the debates on these clauses both in this House and another place that many hon. Members and noble Lords have taken the view that the phrase "any of its followers" was too wide and open to misinterpretation. The amendments, therefore, replace the word "any" by the words "a significant number". We believe that, while safeguarding the position of those Churches in which there exist genuine disagreements as to what are or should be the received doctrines, these amendments should go some way to reassure those who fear that change might be held up by a single objector.

Will the hon. Lady give some indication of what "a significant number" means?

It would be for the courts to decide in a particular case.

It certainly would be for them to decide, but there must be some reason for inserting the words. The Government must have some idea what they mean, otherwise they would not have made the alteration.

Although the religious susceptibilities test has been modified by these amendments, it is still an essential one to avoid placing on courts and tribunals the difficult and invidious task of making decisions on questions of religious doctrine, and also to give sufficient flexibility so that genuine religious feelings which fall short of religious doctrine may be respected.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

The amendment ensures that in so far as ordination to the ministry—and its equivalents in the case of the non-Christian Churches—amounts to the conferring of a professional qualification under Clause 13, the Clause 19 exception will apply to such ordination as well as to employment under Clause 6.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this we may take the following Lords amendments: No. 15, in page 17, line 37, leave out from "Act" to end of line 38.

No. 16, in page 18, line 4, leave out from "Act" to end of line 5 and insert:

"(4) The sanctions in subsections (2) and (3) shall be the only sanctions for breach of the general duty in subsection (1), but without prejudice to the enforcement of sections 22 and 23 under section 63 or otherwise (where the breach is also a contravention of either of those sections)."

These amendments are drafting amendments. It is the Government's policy that enforcement of the education clauses should rest in the first place with Education Ministers. The amendment ensures that the Secretary of State's power under Sections 68 and 69 of the Education Act 1944 can be used in cases where the obligation imposed by Clauses 22 and 23 has been breached, as well as in enforcing the duty imposed by subsection (1).

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

The purpose of this new clause is to deal with what I think the House will agree is a lacuna in the provisions of the Bill dealing with the disposal of premises. Subject to the small dwellings exceptions in Clause 31, Clause 30(1) makes it unlawful to discriminate in the disposal of premises. This would deal with the situation in which a landlord refused to grant a woman a lease on the ground of her sex, and it would also make it unlawful for a tenant to discriminate by refusing to assign the lease or sublet the premises to a woman on the ground of her sex.

The new clause is designed to deal with the situation in which a tenancy agreement in respect of provisions covered by the Bill provides that the landlord's licence or consent is required to assignment or subletting and in which the landlord withholds his licence or consent on the grounds of the prospective assignee. It is right that this kind of discrimination should not escape the Bill. I commend the new clause to the House.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This is a technical amendment to correct an oversight in the drafting of the Bill.

The difficulty about the use of "prison" as an example in this clause is that that which is provided in prison cannot properly be said to constitute goods, services or facilities to the public or a section of the public, except in so far as the facilities are those which are afforded to visitors. In other words, prison is a bad example for the purposes of Clause 34(1)(a) because that which is provided in prison is not caught by Clause 29(1) of the Bill. Therefore, there is no point in providing an exception for it in Clause 34.

The words which this amendment would substitute,

"reception centre provided by the the Supplementary Benefits Commission ",

give a different example, which does not suffer from the same defect as "prison", of a single sex establishment for people requiring special care, attention or supervision.

I am not sure that I have followed the hon. Lady's argument entirely clearly. I am not certain why the reception centre should be that of the Supplementary Benefits Commission. I cannot understand why it should not cover, and why there should not be specified in the drafting, reception centres provided by other voluntary organisations like the Salvation Army, the Church Army, and so on. Are we to understand that they fall into the category of

"other establishments for persons requiring special care"

and are, therefore, covered already, or is it an omission that voluntary organisations providing reception centres are net mentioned?

The words,

"reception centre provided by the Supplementary Benefits Commission",

are chosen as a good example of a place which makes provision whereby persons without a settled way of life may be influenced to lead a more settled life. This example was chosen because most people are acquainted with it. I think that the hon. Gentleman's example would be equally reasonable.

So the hon. Lady can, therefore, categorically say that "reception centre", although the Bill specifies the Supplementary Benefits Commission, will also include voluntary reception centres provided by the Church Army, the Salvation Army, and so on?

Yes.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this amendment it will be convenient to take the following Lords amendments: No. 79, in Schedule 4, page 66, line 11, at end insert—

"1A. Until 1st January 1978, section 12(2) does not apply to any organisation of members of the teaching profession where at the passing of this Act—

(a) the organisation is an incorporated company with articles of association, and

(b) the articles of association restrict membership to persons of one sex (disregarding any minor exceptions), and

(c) there exists another organisation within paragraphs (a) and (b) which is for persons of the opposite sex and has objects, as set out in the memorandum of association, which are substantially the same as those of the first mentioned organisation, subject only to differences consequential on the difference of sex.

1B.—(1) Until a date specified by order made by the Secretary of State the courses of training to be undergone by men as a condition of the issue of certificates to them under the Midwives Act 1951 (1951 c. 53) or the Midwives (Scotland) Act 1951 (1951 c. 54) (as amended by section 20) must be courses approved in writing by or on behalf of the Secretary of State for the purposes of this paragraph.

(2) Until the date specified under sub-paragraph (1), section 9 of the Midwives Act 1951 and section 10 of the Midwives (Scotland) Act 1951 (regulation of persons other than certified midwives attending women in childbirth) shall have effect as if for the words from the beginning to (but not including) "attends a woman in childbirth" where they first occur there were substituted the words—

"If a person other than—

(a) a woman who is a certified midwife, or

(b) in a place approved in writing by or on behalf of the Secretary of State, a man who is a certified midwife".

The amendment made by this sub-paragraph shall be read without regard to the sections 35A and 37A inserted in the said Acts of 1951 by section 20(4) and (5)

(3) On and after the said date the words to be substituted for those, in the said sections 9 and 10, mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) are—

"If a person who is not a certified midwife".

(4) An order under this paragraph shall be laid in draft before each House of Parliament, and section 6(1) of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 (Parliamentary control by negative resolution of draft instruments) shall apply accordingly."

No. 83, in Schedule 6, page 67, column 3, leave out from beginning of line 7 to end of line 8.

No. 84, in page 67, leave out from beginning of line 11 to end of line 12.

This group of amendments deals with two somewhat controversial matters—single sex unions in the teaching profession and male midwives. Both were the subject of reversals between Committee and the Bill coming back on to the Floor of the House.

On the single sex unions, we have given consideration to anxieties which have been expressed and have come to the conclusion that it would be right to give the Joint Four teaching unions, which appear to be the only ones involved, a period of two years' exemption from the provisions of the Bill. That is the same concession as is made in respect of arrangements for multi-sex trade unions. I hope that these provisions will be welcomed.

I turn now to male midwives. The Government are aware of the strong feelings in some quarters that men may not be acceptable to some women as mid-wives, even though there has been general acceptance of the principle of eliminating discrimination here. One problem is that there is no real evidence—there cannot be any evidence without experience—about the difficulties which may arise from admitting men to midwifery training and practice. It has always been the Government's intention to proceed carefully in this sphere and, as hon. Members will be aware from previous debates, the Bill contains wide safeguards.

The Government's amendments made during the passage of the Bill in another place have the aim of making further safeguards and at the same time paving the way for obtaining evidence on the practical problems. The amendments introduce a transitional provision for a limited entry of men into midwifery under carefully controlled conditions before any general relaxation of the barriers is made.

The effect of the second half of Amendment No. 79 and Amendments Nos. 83 and 84 is to allow the present legal barriers to male midwives to be removed on the coming into force of the statute, but at the same time to impose fresh transitional restrictions which could only be removed by a statutory instrument which would be laid before Parliament in draft.

The effect of the transitional restrictions is to confine the training of men to become midwives to courses approved for the purpose by the Secretary of State and, similarly, to restrict the employment of men who qualify as midwives to particular places. Our intention is to approve courses initially at only two midwifery training schools, selected in consultation with the Central Midwives Board and the health authorities. Employment would be only at hospitals associated with the training schools. Progress would be carefully monitored and firm evidence on which to base discussions on a general relaxation of barriers should emerge.

These have been matters of controversy. I hope that, although the amendments will not entirely remove the controversies, at any rate they will take some of the edge off them.

The Under-Secretary of State said that it had always been the Government's intention to proceed with care in these matters. That was not the impression that we gained at the outset of the discussions, but I am glad to learn that that is the intention.

These amendments are welcome. I still think that the teaching unions and the midwives should have been left out of the Bill. A certain amount of time and trouble would have been saved. The situation now would have been better for both of them. However, the Government have come some way to meeting us and we, therefore, accept that improvement.

The fact that only two midwifery training schools will be used is encouraging news. I already had that information from the midwives, but it is good to have it confirmed by the Minister. I suggest that to use more would seem to be an unnecessary waste of money at this time when the National Health Service is in a more critical condition than when we discussed these matters in the summer. Are these courses ready, or will they be affected by the inquiry to which the Leader of the House referred during business questions this afternoon? If the Minister can give any information about that I shall be grateful, but the amendments are welcome in that they are an improvement on what was there before.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this we are to take the following Lords amendments:

No. 22, in page 24, line 17, at end insert:

"or which would be likely to result in such an act of discrimination if the persons to whom it is applied were not all of one sex".

No. 23, in page 24, line 22, leave out "can" and insert "would".

These amendments arise from an undertaking that I gave to the hon. Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison). When we discussed Clause 36 on Report, the hon. Gentleman expressed reservations about "could result" or "would be likely to result" or "can", and I gave an undertaking to consider the matter. These amendments were made in another place as a result of that consideration.

Clause 36 deals with discriminatory practices, and we are invited to consider Lords Amendments Nos. 21, 22 and 23 to that clause. I intervene only to point out that before the measure has been passed British Railways have started to remove "Ladies Only" notices from railway carriages.

I am taking the matter up with Mr. Richard Marsh. He tells me that this was done in anticipation of the Bill becoming an Act. Having further considered the matter, British Railways' solicitor has advised them that the measure is not as restrictive as they thought it was. I seek an assurance from the Minister that there is nothing under this heading of discriminatory practices that will prevent British Railways from doing what they have been doing on certain lines for a long time, and that is to provide "Ladies Only" compartments, a practice that is much valued by ladies who travel on certain lines where there have been instances of attacks on females. I hope that the Minister can give such an assurance and confirm that the solicitor to British Railways has got in right for once.

I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept the spirit in which I reply. I should like notice of that. There is nothing in the law that prevents or compels British Railways from having "Ladies Only" compartments. The hon. Gentleman has raised a point about safety and security. Perhaps I may undertake to examine the matter and write to him about it.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this we are to take Lords Amendment No. 25, in page 25, line 4, leave out "it was effected" and insert "the advertisement was published".

These are drafting amendments, designed to clarify the meaning of subsection (4). They were prompted by comments in another place by Lord Drumalbyn.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this we are to take Lords Amendment No. 62, in Clause 77, page 47, leave out lines 9 to 14.

These amendments are largely technical and clarificatory. They transfer the definition of charitable instrument from Clause 7, the definition clause, to this clause, which deals with charities. They also effect a small change in the Scottish definition to bring it into line with the English one.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this we are to take Lords Amendment No. 28, in page 27, line 44, at end insert—

"( ) Neither subsection (3) nor subsection (6) is a defence to an act of sex discrimination under Part II unless such arrangements as are reasonably practicable are made to compensate for the detriment caused by the discrimination; but in considering under subsection (6)(b) whether the use of communal accommodation could lawfully be refused (in a case based on Part II), it shall be assumed that the requirements of this subsection have ben complied with as respects subsection (3)."

The effect of the two amendments is to correct a defect in the drafting of the clause. It is intended that where a woman is refused a benefit in the employment field under this clause reasonable steps should be taken to compensate her for the detriment not only where the accommodation consists of communal accommodation but also where other benefits are refused because they are necessarily associated with communal accommodation. The amendments ensure that the clause has that effect.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this we are to take Lords Amendment No. 30, in Clause 46, page 28, line 17, leave out subsections (2) and (3).

New Clause B consists mainly of provisions from Clause 46 allowing a limited degree of positive discrimination in training which have already been agreed by the House. Only subsection (3) of the new clause is entirely new to the Bill, and it results from the Government's view that there is one more area where training bodies should be able to make special provisions for providing benefit to women without any fear of a breach of the terms of the Bill. This is the area of special training for persons who, for domestic or family reasons, have been out of full-time employment for some considerable time.

A woman—or a man—coming back to the labour market may find that her old skills are no longer in demand or they need modifying. It could be that the ex-housewife could benefit from a more general course which would enable her to readjust to a pattern of working life after a long time away from employment In any case, she will have special problems which result from her absence from the labour market.

Under the Bill as it left this House, a course confined to women returning to the labour market would have been un-lawful, and a training body confining a course to women and men who had been out of the labour market for domestic reasons might have been challenged to show under Clause 1(1)(b) that this was "justifiable".

I hope the House will recognise that there is merit in providing special courses for mothers or fathers who have had family responsibilities to help them train for a return to the world of employment and widen their opportunities. For that reason, I commend the new clause to the House.

The worrying thing about the original Bill was the suggestion that there could not be positive discrimination. For that reason, I am sure the House will welcome the introduction of this new clause, which will help considerably in an area where women often find the greatest discrimination, and that is when they return to work after having raised their families or undertaken a domestic responsibility and find that they cannot get a suitable type of training. I am sure that many women will be pleased to see these provisions included in the Bill.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

The clause provides that trade unions and other bodies to which Clause 12 applies may take special steps to encourage persons of one sex to become members or to train persons of one sex for posts of any kind within the organisation and encourage them to take advantage of opportunities for holding such posts, where that sex has in the past been under-represented among the members or officials of the organisation. In effect, this takes account of the fact that in many unions women may need some special encouragement if they are to overcome any diffidence and any assumption that union affairs are more naturally the preserve of men, and come to play a full and equal part within the bodies that represent them.

New Clause C seeks to take this principle one step further by allowing the reservation or creation of places for persons of a particular sex on committees, delegate conferences and other elected bodies within the organisation. I think we have to accept that, for a multitude of reasons, those women who participate actively at all levels within their unions together with men are the exception rather than the rule. A number of unions have attempted to alter this pattern by steps designed both to encourage women to participate fully in union affairs and to ensure that women are seen to be working alongside men on the decision-making bodies of the organisation. The Government feel that for the Bill to force those unions which have chosen this means of encouraging women's participation to abolish those arrangements at once would be a retrograde step of no benefit to either sex. Should other unions choose to follow the example of the few who have made such arrangements, we feel they should be allowed to do so.

Over time, we hope that it will generally cease to be necessary to take any special steps to ensure the representation of women, and a further amendment, which was agreed in another place and which we shall be considering shortly, will enable this new clause to be amended or repealed entirely when no longer needed. More and more a person's sex should become an irrelevance in the selection of representatives—men and women alike will put themselves forward and be chosen on merit. Until that day comes, and in the interests of speeding its arrival, I hope hon. Members will agree to the new clause contained in the Lords amendment.

I beg to move, as an amendment to the Lords amendment, after subsection (2), insert—

'(2A) Without prejudice to other matters that may be included in any reports of the findings in any formal investigation, the Commission shall include in each report a statement of their findings regarding the relevance of the matters so investigated to the operation of the Equal Pay Act 1970'.

I hope that this amendment to Lords Amendment No. 32 will be acceptable to the Government. However, I do not expect it to be because I believe that they will follow the pattern that they established during the Committee stage of the Bill, when nearly every amendment to improve the Bill and to make it a Bill that had real meaning to women, was opposed by them and supported by Opposition Members. Where are those hon. Members today? Is it not about time that we televised the proceedings of the House so that the empty benches in the House of Commons would be revealed to the British nation? It can be truthfully said that the Government obtained consent for this basically bad Bill in a coalition between Labour and Conservative Members. It is interesting that the only real opposition to the Bill was that of the four Labour women Members of the Committee. I hope that this message will go out from the House to women who genuinely care about feminism.

On that basis alone this cannot be a good Bill. It is no good the Government constantly patting themselves on the back about it. There are vast areas of sexually discriminatory legislation—for example, pensions, taxation, and social security—which remain on the statute book.

It should be made clear that not all women have been deceived by the grandiose descriptions given to the Bill by some politicians. In particular, the Women's Liberation Movement does not share this House's general satisfaction with the Bill. Until the question of equality of treatment is dealt with, to talk of equal opportunities and about the ending of sex discrimination in society is both hypocritical and illusory.

Why do I and my hon. Friends believe that this amendment is important and significant? It is important because even at this late stage the amendment can go some way towards making the Equal Pay Act effective. Both measures are due to be implemented in 1975. The Equal Pay Act is to be fully implemented. Who better to monitor the workings of that Act than the Equal Opportunities Commission? It is an integral part of its job because there is no doubt that employers have found and are constantly finding ways and means of avoiding equal pay, for example by job evaluation schemes which place more importance on physical strength than on manual dexterity. However, many women's jobs have completely disappeared. One of the things that worries me about combating blatant discrimination under both these measures is that they combat only the blatant discrimination which results from and does not cause women's inequality. Legislation such as this will have only a limited effect on the rôles that women play in the economy.

5.15 p.m.

In the present serious economic situation, sexual rôles will, as in the past, be enforced even more strongly. There is no doubt that a clear sexual division of labour saves money for employers and the State, while fierce competition between men and women for a decreasing number of jobs weakens trade unions. There is no doubt also that sexual division of labour is at the root of women's inequality. Social conditioning maintains that division. Women today have two rôles to play in our economy. The first is that of housewife—unpaid labour. The second is that of cheap labour. In the words of the 1974 Government handbook,

"Women form the only substantial reserve which can be employed or dismissed with relative ease according to economic fluctuations"

More than half the women over 15 years of age go out to work and they receive approximately half the pay of men. The increase in the labour force over the past 15 years is accounted for by married women in unskilled and semiskilled jobs. If, for example, they received unemployment benefit in their own right or earned the same as men, a massive redistribution of income would be needed. I suspect that that massive redistribution will not happen unless we monitor the effects of the Equal Pay Act.

Far from working for pin money, in 19 per cent. of the households women are the main breadwinners and it is essential that the Equal Opportunities Commission should monitor what will happen to women when the Equal Pay Act becomes fully operative. It would be unthinkable that that Commission should not do so. I cannot understand why it should be necessary at this late stage to table an amendment such as this, and why those who drafted the Bill did not think about this aspect in the first place and table a similar amendment.

The Equal Opportunities Commission must have some such rôle to begin the important work that this House hopes will end discrimination. The Commission will be able to examine the trade unions and what they are doing about fighting for equal pay for their women members. It can look further into the blatant male chauvinist prejudice on the part of employers and even on the part of some members of trade unions. It will be able to issue reports and will have the people and machinery to do the job. Today, Parliament can give that Commission this job by law.

For far too long women in our society have been big business to employers. It will be a new departure to monitor closely and carefully an Act of Parliament, for more often than not Acts of Parliament are legislated for and then forgotten. It would be tragic if that happened over the Equal Pay Act because 44 per cent. of all women who work are single, separated or widowed.

I commend this amendment to the House and to the Government. I hope that the Government will not say that it is implicit that the Equal Opportunities Commission has the power to do this job. For once, let us write the powers in so that that Commission knows what its job is. At the end of the day let there be a reconciliation between the Government and the women members of the Standing Committee. I hope that during the last stages of the Bill the Government will have the dignity, the civility and the good common sense to accept what is, after all, a logical amendment.

I wish to give my warm support to the amendment to the Lords amendment, because it has merit. I do not agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North (Mrs. Colquhoun) that the Bill is totally bad. I have in the course of a number of speeches said many nasty things about the Bill, but I believe that it is a good Bill at the end of the day, the best that we could have secured in the circumstances.

I should have been much happier if the Government had accepted all our amendments. However, they have gone some way towards meeting us by noting some suggestions which we made in the form of an amendment on Report in another place. I am very grateful for that.

I am pleased—I think that I speak for my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North (Mrs. Miller) in this respect—that the Bill has reached this stage and is about to go on to the statute book because, limited though it is, it will do much to improve the general status of women.

I welcome the extended provisions of Clause 47 which I believe arise directly from an amendment which we tabled on Report in this House. I am grateful to the Government for having taken up that amendment.

The amendment to the Lords amendment has merit because, although the Equal Opportunities Commission is making formal investigations and although the Government may say that what we seek to achieve is implicit, anyway it would be sensible to make it explicit that the Commission will have the job also of monitoring the Equal Pay Act.

We all know that the provisions of the Equal Pay Act by itself, without the sex discrimination legislation, and laudable though the intentions are of the Equal Pay Act are being evaded and have been evaded since 1970. Employers have been getting round the Act. They have been regrading staff. They have been creating new unisex grades into which to push women who were previously in a different grade so as to pay them less than men who do similar work.

Conditions of employment have been deliberately, almost insidiously, changed over the past few years, often in a way which the women themselves do not appreciate, so that the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall be evaded. Jobs have been reclassified. I know of many cases where male members of staff have been promoted, perhaps unnecessarily and not on merit, simply because of the firm's desire to avoid complying with the provisions of the Act.

With the Equal Pay Act coming into full operation at the end of 1975, what better opportunity is there to see how the Act is working and whether some of the bigger private enterprise firms are operating it as it should be operated? As the opportunity will be afforded to the EOC to look into the matter when it is making a formal investigation, we should wherever appropriate lay upon the Commission the duty of carrying out this monitoring. I hope that the Government will consider the amendment in the spirit in which it is intended. Our only intention is to make the Act as workable and as strong as possible.

As a male chauvinist beast I should like to add at least one fairly deep voice to the outcry which has emerged from our benches. I am desperately in favour of equal pay and against sex discrimination. Equally, I cannot agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North (Mrs. Colquhoun) that this is a Bill cooked up by those who wish to see women sent back to the kitchens for ever.

The Bill is a perfectly sensible start and, if it works properly, it can do much good. My worry is whether it will work as the promoters of the Bill hope that it will. I support the amendment to the Lords amendment because I think we are all entitled to see as often and as clearly as possible how the legislation is working in practice.

I have two major worries. The first is that the effect of the Bill in the main will depend upon a complaints procedure that will be operated through industrial tribunals. It is right that these informal tribunals should deal with this territory along with unfair dismissals, employment protection, maternity pay, redundancy pay, and so on.

It is wrong that those who wish to obtain rights under these various enactments should not have the benefit of legal aid. Unless a woman who seeks to enforce her rights and fights her employer has a pretty tough union behind her she is very greatly disadvantaged, because her employers will have legal aid to fight the case and she will not.

In an ordinary case before one of these tribunals it does not matter much. Indeed, in some cases there is much to be said for there not being legal representation in what are essentially informal procedures, but when it comes to arguing a difficult point of law or considering whether a new Act of Parliament is being properly applied, it is grossly unfair that the claimant should not have the benefit of legal representation, although in practice the employer will always have that benefit.

No doubt the chairmen will continue to do their valiant best to ensure that justice is done, but it is not possible for a woman applicant in a case such as this to present her case with sufficient accuracy; to quote the authorities; to compete with a man who is, after all, a trained, qualified, skilled advocate—or, indeed, a woman who is a trained, qualified, skilled advocate, that woman acting on behalf of the employers.

The employee must too often appear on her own. The employer seldom does so. The Bill cannot change the legal aid rules, although I understand that the Lord Chancellor can do so without even coming to the House with new legislation. Meanwhile, for this, the first of my reasons, let us have the legislation and its effects monitored as carefully as possible.

The second point is more subtle but, I believe, far more dangerous to women's rights. It is the fear that many of us have that the total effect of the Equal Pay Act, the Sex Discrimination Act and the Employment Protection Act maternity benefit provisions as they will be, will be to encourage employers to evade the new law en masse, on the same basis and with the same sorts of impropriety as employers in totally different circumstances evaded the anti-closed shop provisions of the Industrial Relations Act.

In other words, when given the choice between a man and a woman to employ for a managerial or executive post, employers will tend to choose the man and to put against the name of the woman who is not employed the one word "unsuitable". Monitoring should take place.

As the provisions of the Bill come into effect I fear that vast harm may be caused. The reason for that is simple. Women, at last, will get equal pay, but there will be difficulties. There will be those employers, as my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Miss Richardson) correctly pointed out, who will attempt to evade their responsibilities by regrading. However, I believe that in the main most employers will seek to comply with the Act in due course. I note that my hon. Friend the Member for Barking shakes her lovely head, but I believe that that will happen. I believe that in 10 years' time people will look back on the days when there was not equal pay as an age of barbarism. I believe that they will be unable to understand how such a distinction was made. Further, I believe that maternity pay for six weeks will be accepted in due course.

It is not long enough.

I know that my hon. Friend feels that that period is not long enough. I voted with my hon. Friend against the Government because I believed that that provision should have come in at an earlier date and that it should not be necessary to wait two years.

The combination of equal pay, combined with its being more expensive to employ a woman of childbearing age and with the duty of an employer to take a woman back into the job that she left at any time within 21 weeks, and if necessary to dismiss the replacement—that being unfair dismissal if the replacement has been employed for six months or more unless he or she has been told that it would be necessary to go when mother returns—with the additional risks of trouble before industrial tribunals will induce employers to seek to evade these combined new statutes.

Let me make my position perfectly plain. I support these combined new statutes. However, as my hon. Friends well know. I am concerned that the combination of these measures will destroy the very equality which they are designed to create. I am afraid that they must recognise that risk. If they do not recognise it they are closing their eyes to reality. Proper monitoring must take place so that we know what is happening. It is no good making laws and asking people to comply with them, giving people rights before tribunals which are not as real as they would appear to be because people cannot enforce them through lack of legal representation, and then not watching with the greatest possible care to ensure that such rights are implemented in a fair and proper manner.

These are new laws. They are part of a vast assembly of much-needed employee protection. These are protections in addition to those given to men in industry. It is right that women should now be given this protection, but it is wrong that those who have campaigned for it so valiantly and for so long should fail to recognise the difficulties which will undoubtedly be created in implementation.

The amendment seeks to set up a form of monitoring in connection with the investigations and inquiries which will be set up in any event. It would seem that the Government could accept the amendment as it would help in the monitoring of important rules. It would help in the initial stages at least to ensure that these real attempts to overcome the difficulties that have existed in the past will not die as a result of deliberate frustration by employers. That applies to both male and female employers. Indeed, some of the people most prejudiced against women are themselves women. We must ensure that the accusation cannot be made that women do not have the representation that they should have from the law. We must ensure that these measures are not misused by industry by any of the methods, however subtle, outlined by my hon. Friend the Member for Barking.

Perhaps you will permit me, Mr. Deputy Speaker, to begin by saying something totally irrelevant. I was reminded of this matter by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, West (Mr. Janner). On the last occasion when I replied to my hon. and learned Friend in the House I may inadvertently have suggested that the Wig and Pen Club was a discriminatory institution. I wish to correct that suggestion. In fact, it is not a discriminatory institution. I make that correction especially in view of the number of letters I have had from women on the subject.

I turn to the points that have been raised in the debate. I hope that my hon. and learned Friend will not denigrate or devalue the effectiveness of the tribunals. During the time in which they have operated, notwithstanding the absence of lawyers, they have had a remarkable record of success, not least perhaps because they have the assistance of conciliation officers in the early stages of proceedings.

I did not say that there was an absence of lawyers. I said that there was an absence of lawyers on the side of employees when lawyers are present on the side of employers. With respect, I do not denigrate the work of the tribunals, in spite of that unfairness.

I am glad that my hon. and learned Friend says that. We must make it clear to those who intend to present their cases before the tribunals that their chances, on past performance, are fairly high. I do not dissent from the proposition that there may well be circumstances in which the assistance of a lawyer on behalf of the complainant is necessary. Of course, the Lord Chancellor's committee is considering legal aid before tribunals. I am not suggesting that there may not be some difficulties, but on the whole the tribunal system, even without legal aid, has been extraordinarily successful. I do not think that anything we say in the House should deter people from making use of the system when they present cases under the unfair dismissal provisions, under the Equal Pay Act, or under this measure.

I hope I do not misunderstand my hon. and learned Friend's emphasis, but I think he was suggesting in one part of his speech that the Equal Pay Act, the operation of the Employment Protection Bill and the operation of this measure may reduce the chances of employment and promotion for women. It was implicit in what he said that employers might find it less attractive or too expensive to take them into their workforce. During the run-up to the Equal Pay Act there has been no evidence that that is the case. The country as a whole, and employers and unions in particular, have accepted the spirit of that legislation. I rebut any suggestion that this kind of legislation will reduce opportunities for women.

My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North (Mrs. Colquhoun) said that this is a limited Bill. Indeed, it is a limited Bill. It does not deal, for example, with social security or taxation although it deals with pensions. However, the fact that it is a limited Bill does not mean that it limits the opportunities of women. The Bill deals with employment and the supply of goods, services and facilities, and to that extent it is a radical measure. It is a widespread measure, a measure equalled in only very few countries. My hon. Friend is right in saying that it does not extend to social security or taxation, but I do not believe that those are areas which limit the opportunities of women, although they are areas that must be considered. I hope that the Equal Opportunities Commission will consider them, but I must assert that the Bill is a radical measure which will do a great deal to improve the opportunities of women.

I now turn to the matters raised in the amendment and the arguments behind them. The amendment seeks to provide that progress towards equal pay and the operation of the Equal Pay Act should be monitored by the Commission. We were well aware that there was a necessity for the Commission to interest itself in the operation of the Equal Pay Act. For that reason, in Clause 50(1)(c), there is placed upon the Commission the duty not the power,

"to keep under review the working of…the Equal Pay Act 1970."

That is a duty which is imposed upon it. It is not an option for a discretion but something that the Commission is obliged to undertake. We have imposed that duty upon the Commission. In Clause 64(1)(d) we give the Commission a power to serve a non-discrimination notice in respect of any act which is a breach of an equality clause. That is the phraseology which is taken from the amended Equal Pay Act. We are giving the Commission not only the duty to keep under review the working of the Act but the power to serve a non-discrimination notice in respect of non-observance of the Act.

Finally, we recognise that there may be some women who are unable themselves to present their cases to the industrial tribunals. In Clause 72 we give the Commission the power to represent women before tribunals. It is a power that will be enjoyed in addition to a similar power to be exercised by the Department of Employment. Therefore, I hope that my hon. Friends will study carefully those provisions in the Bill.

I turn to the technical effect of the amendment. There are circumstances in which the Commission might undertake an investigation into, say, the conduct of single-sex schools. It would be inappropriate for that body to add provisions relating to the Equal Pay Act 1970 since it would be entirely irrelevant to that type of investigation. The same argument would apply if the Commission were to conduct an investigation into the provision of banking and credit facilities.

I ask my hon. Friends to consider another proposition. I hope that some investigations will be undertaken by the Commission into the working of the 1970 Act. If we were to be entirely logical and symmetrical in our thinking, we would need to give an obligation to the Commission to state its findings on the sex discrimination legislation. That would underestimate the sense and fail to recognise the duties of the Equal Opportunities Commission. In cases where equal pay was being investigated, it would be of the essence that any report should deal with those matters. If such a body were to investigate matters concerning equal pay and equal opportunity, it would address itself to matters relevant to the Equal Pay Act 1970. But the obligations and powers already exist and to include such a provision would add nothing to the situation. Indeed, it would be an unwieldy addition.

I accept that the question of equal pay needs to be monitored. I have greatly concerned myself in monitoring the progress of equal pay, and indeed I have done so even before the legislation comes into operation. Where I have disc over discriminatory collective agreements, I have not hesitated to refer them to the Industrial Arbitration Board. There have been regular checks by my Department, including visits to individual firms, to check the progress towards equal pay. Indeed evidence has been published in the Department of Employment Gazette about progress in that regard. We have undertaken a widespread publicity campaign to ensure that people understand their rights under the Act.

The Department of Employment is very much better equipped to get at the details of the operation of the Act than is the Equal Opportunities Commission because of the information flowing into the Department dealing with wage rates and collective agreements. I give an assurance that my Department will continue that monitoring process, although I am not saying that I regard the Equal Opportunities Commission as having no part to play. Indeed it is given powers in the Bill to enable it to play an important part.

I hope that my hon. Friends will not press the matter to a Division. I hope that I have given them some reassurance about the contents of the Bill and the responsibilities which I regard my Department as undertaking. I promise to bear these matters in mind as the legislation becomes a reality.

Will the Minister confirm that up to the present time not one employer or employers' organisation has yet informed the Department that it will be unable to operate the requirements of the Equal Pay Act?

Nobody to my knowledge has informed me that he will be unable to operate the requirements of the Equal Pay Act. Some concerns—although not very many—when we were considering the limitation of wage increases in the current year thought that they would get away with it then. That was the reason for our making equal pay the only significant exception to the £6 a week maximum.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This amendment is primarily designed to correct two defects in Clause 59. The first defect was that the clause, as it stood, would have allowed a person to seek an injunction in respect of a contravention of the employment provisions of the Bill. Since only a court may grant an injunction, this would mean that a court could have found itself dealing with a "Part II case" without the matter ever having been referred to an industrial tribunal. The amendment corrects this defect.

The second defect was that Clause 59 did not exclude the High Court's jurisdiction generally to make declaratory judgments. Thus, it would have been possible for an aggrieved person to bypass, say, a county court and go straight to the High Court for a declaratory judgment. The amendment ensures that the powers to make declarations are restricted to those expressly given to tribunals and county courts or sheriff courts by the Bill.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

The amendment places a statutory duty on conciliation officers to encourage the use of voluntary grievance procedures, or any other appropriate procedures, in cases under this Bill and the Equal Pay Act. In practice, conciliation officers, who are part of ACAS, already do this in appropriate cases relating to unfair dismissals, but the amendment will give this practice a statutory basis. It will ensure that all parties to disputes will, where appropriate, be encouraged, but not compelled, to use voluntary procedures wherever these exist.

I very much welcome the amendment which is very much in line with what some of us have been saying for some time. It is a considerable improvement.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

The amendment will reduce from four months to two months the period between the submission of a complaint to the Education Ministers and the time when the complainant could take proceedings in the county court. The Government accept that it is reasonable to expect the majority of complaints to have been dealt with within the shorter time. If this does not prove possible in a number of cases, the Education Ministers will continue to consider the complaints after the two months period has elapsed, and to issue a direction if this is appropriate.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This amendment corrects a printing error.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this it will be convenient to take Lords Amendments Nos. 40 to 45.

We held a lengthy, slightly erudite debate on this matter during the Report proceedings. A number of constructive and useful criticisms were made. The purpose of these amendments is to take account of the criticisms made mainly by the hon. and learned Member for Southport (Mr. Percival). They were discussed in the House of Lords and I hope will prove acceptable to this House.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This amendment increases from three to six months the period from the date when the act complained of was done, within which proceedings may be brought in a county or sheriff court in respect of that act. Industrial tribunal proceedings would remain subject to their normal three-month limitation, which is in fact prescribed in subsection (1).

The institution of county or sheriff court proceedings however are rather slower, more formal, and more elaborate; and the potential litigant has to consider the question of cost and, possibly, apply for legal aid.

Having considered the matter, the Government concluded that a three-month period would be an unreasonably short period within which to require county or sheriff court proceedings to be instituted and we therefore decided to recommend a six-month period.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

As it stands, Clause 73(5) enables a court or tribunal to entertain a complaint out of time if it considers that it was not "reasonably practicable" for the complaint to have been brought within the prescribed period. In this amendment we are proposing that courts and tribunals should have a rather more generous discretion to entertain complaints out of time than that which is allowed them by the "reasonably practicable" test.

The principal argument in favour of extending this discretion is that because the individual complainant has to decide in which forum to bring her complaint, provision ought to be made for the complainant who institutes proceedings in one forum, only to discover that they should have been brought in the other, and that she is out of time in that other forum; that is, they should be able to entertain out of time complaints if it is "just and equitable" to do so.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This amendment is largely clarificatory. Subsection (2) of Clause 74 provides that a term in a contract which is discriminatory against a party to the contract shall be unenforceable against that party; and subsection (4) that such terms are to be capable of revision by a county or sheriff court on the application of either party to the contract. There will be cases where justice and equity require that an order revising a term should make provision for the period between the time when the term became unenforceable and the date of the making of the order. The amendment makes it clear that orders may relate to this period.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this it may be convenient to discuss Lords Amendment No. 53.

These amendments are purely consequential on Lords Amendment No. 51. They do no more than adjust the order of the subsections in Clause 74.

I beg to move. That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this it will be convenient to take Lords Amendments No. 55 and 61.

In response to an amendment moved during Report stage by my hon. Friend the Member for Welwyn and Hatfield (Mrs. Hayman), I said that the Government were sympathetic to the intention underlying the amendment which was concerned with charities, although for a number of reasons it could not be accepted as it stood. I said that the Government proposed to introduce an amendment relating to educational trusts, and the new clauses fulfil the undertakings that I then gave.

The new clauses permit trustees of educational trusts whose objects are restricted to benefiting persons of one sex to apply to the Education Ministers for an order removing or modifying the restrictions so that the benefits can be made available to persons of the other sex. The Government believes that the new clauses are in accordance with the spirit of the Bill. They will enable, for example, trustees providing scholarships for men only to apply for approval to make them available also to women. They will also make it easier for the trustees of an independent single-sex school to move towards co-education.

New Clause D relates to England and Wales. New Clause E is a separate clause relating only to Scotland and is designed to take account of the different legal framework governing educational charities in Scotland. Amendment No. 61 is consequential upon the new clause. The intention is that orders made under the new Clause D are not, with the exception of orders modifying enactments, to be subject to the procedural requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Clause 76. In Scotland, schemes for the reorganisation of educational endowments under Part VI of the Education (Scotland) Act 1962 are normally made by statutory instrument unless they relate to a small endowment—that is, one with an annual value of less than £500—in which case a simplified procedure applies. Amendment No. 61 also ensures therefore that similar procedures apply to orders under new Clause E.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this it will be convenient to take Lords Amendments Nos. 57 and 58.

These amendments have two main purposes. First, they update Clause 75 to take account of the new clauses which have been added to the Bill both here and in another place. The amendments add to the provisions already covered in Clause 75(1)(a): subsection (2) of new Clause A, the new clause relating to consent for the assignment or subletting of premises; Clause 33, the voluntary bodies exception; Clause 45, the communal accommodation exception; and new Clause B, the clause dealing with discriminatory training. These are all new exceptions which may need to be amended in the light of experience. The amendments also add new Clause A to the clauses specified in clause 75(1)(b).

The second purpose of these amendments is as follows: Amendment 57 provides that four provisions will be subject to amendment or repeal by order made by the Secretary of State. Such orders, like the other orders which may be made under Clause 75, will be made by statutory instrument subject to an affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament.

The four exceptions concerned are political parties—Clause 32, elective bodies of trade unions—new Clause C, the exception for provisions relating to death or retirement in partnerships—Clause 11(4) and the exception for provisions relating to death or retirement as they affect trade unions and other bodies in Clause 12(4).

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This is a drafting amendment consequential upon the amendments to Clause 46 which we discussed earlier.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

The amendment relates to the Secretary of State's power to bring in the Sex Discrimination Act by Commencement Order and seeks to empower him to make transitional adaptations of provisions in the Bill. This power is needed as a consequence of Lords Amendments Nos. 73 and 76 to Schedule 1, which are designed to incorporate the provisions relating to equal access to occupational pension schemes into the Equal Pay Act. The equal access provisions will not take immediate effect. They have to run in line with the Social Security Pensions Act and that is why the transitional power is needed.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendment Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74 and 75.

The main purpose of this group of amendments is to carry out the Government's intention to include in the Bill a clause creating a general duty on a Minister of the Crown or Government Department not to discriminate in considering persons for, and in making, public appointments. The Government intend by the new Clause F which would be inserted by Lords Amendment No. 70 to make an unequivocal declaration of public policy in this matter.

The new clause applies to offices held by persons appointed by Ministers of the Crown and Government Departments where there is no relationship which is properly analogous with an employer/employee relationship between the person appointed and the appointing Minister or Department. Subsection (2) introduces a duty not to discriminate in the arrangements for considering and making appointments, and provides that this duty shall not extend to a case in which such discrimination would not be unlawful under Part II if the Crown were the employer. In the nature of things this kind of public duty is not capable of enforcement under Part II of the Bill, but there is the possibility of enforcement by prerogative writ under Clause 59.

All the other amendments—except part of Lords Amendment No. 68 which I will come to in a moment—are in some sense consequential on the new clause. Lords Amendments Nos. 64 to 67 and 69 and that part of Lords Amendment No. 68 which deletes the existing subsection (3) clarify the application of Clause 80 so that it applies only to "service of the Crown" which in substance involves an employer/employee type of relationship.

Lords Amendments Nos. 71, 72, 74 and 75 to Schedule 1 keep the Equal Pay Act in step with Clause 80, since both of these relate to employer/employee relationships.

That leaves the part of Lords Amendment No. 68 which deals with armed services cadet forces. The purpose of this amendment is to enable the cadet forces to be opened to girls on a controlled entry basis.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With that amendment it will be convenient to take Lords Amendment No. 76.

The purpose of these amendments is to incorporate into the Equal Pay Act 1970 provisions which will extend the requirement of equal treatment for men and women so as to include terms and conditions of employment relating to access to membership of an occupational pension scheme. The provisions were previously included in the Social Security Pensions Bill. This provision will come into operation at the same time as the corresponding provisions of the Social Security Pension Act, that is to say, in April 1978.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

The amendment corrects an omission from the Scottish paragraphs of the schedule.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

The purpose of the amendment, which was prompted by an amendment tabled in another place by Lord Colville, is to make express provision enabling the Equal Opportunities Commission to make arrangements for the conduct of its business, including the delegation of its functions.

I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this it will be convenient to take Lords Amendment No. 81.

I intend at the appropriate time to move the amendment on the Order Paper in lieu of Lords Amendments Nos. 80 and 81. The Government's substitute amendment will have the effect of leaving the substantial intention of the Lords amendments in the Bill. It is intended that in future the Equal Pay Act should apply to terms of employment relating to marriage in the same way as it applies to other terms of employment. However, it is also intended that, where an employer has an obligation to pay a marriage gratuity to a female employee under a contract made before the Sex Discrimination Act received Royal Assent, he can honour that obligation without incurring a similar obligation in respect of male employees.

The intention of the other House was that the amendments should allow this policy to be implemented without allowing other forms of sex discrimination in matters related to marriage, which are contained in existing contracts of employment, to be excluded from the provisions of the Act. Unfortunately, owing to a subsequent amendment made in another place, these amendments are now technically defective. The Government amendment will secure the intention of the Lords amendments whilst removing the defect therein contained.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

On Report, I gave an undertaking that we would try to seek amendments to operate this protective legislation on an equal basis, but I pointed out that there might be some difficulty over Section 20 of the Factories Act. The amendment fulfils the undertaking in general, but, as I forecast, it proved too difficult to amend Section 20 of the Factories Act in this Bill. However, as I also promised the House on Report, we have accordingly made a request to the Health and Safety Commission to undertake an early review of this section of the protective legislation. I am advised that the matter can be dealt with only in that way.