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Trident

Volume 75: debated on Thursday 21 March 1985

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asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether the £700 million originally allocated for the missile processing facilities at Coulport was to come from the United Kingdom proportion of the Trident budget or the United States of America's proportion of the Trident budget.

The £700 million is the approximate saving at 1984–85 average prices and at an exchange rate of £1 = $1·38 to the Trident budget of processing missiles at King's Bay instead of Coulport. Savings apply to both the United States and the United Kingdom components of the budget.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will give an up-to-date estimate of the total cost of purchase of the Trident missile system.

I refer to the answer given by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence to the hon. Members for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Strang), for Cynon Valley (Mrs. Clwyd) and for Leeds, West (Mr. Meadowcroft) on 29 January, at columns 134–37. The estimated cost of Trident is £9,285 million at average 1984–85 prices and at an exchange rate of £1= $1·38.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether the communications and satellite missile guidance facilities necessary for the deployment of the Trident missile will be under the operational control of Her Majesty's Government.

The facilities necessary for communicating with submarines of the United Kingdom Trident force and other facilities that are essential to the effective operation of the force will be under the operational control of Her Majesty's Government.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence to what extent the proposed Trident missile force for the United Kingdom represents an escalation in nuclear capability compared with the present Polaris force, in terms of total megatonnage, targeting and accuracy.

In comparison to Polaris, the United Kingdom Trident force will provide an enhanced capability to the extent necessary to maintain an effective deterrent in the face of Soviet ABM defensive capabilities as they are modernised and improved. It has been the practice of successive Governments not to discuss the detailed capabilities of our nuclear weapons systems.