I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This amendment fulfils an undertaking given in Committee in the other place to introduce a quorum for the tribunal. It means that no decisions may be taken in the name of the tribunal by fewer than two of its members. It has been necessary to recast paragraph 3 of schedule 1, but the other adjustments are essentially consequential and do not affect its substance. In particular, the president of the tribunal will, as in the original version, remain responsible for determining how business will be conducted, and so for deciding how many members in addition to the minimum two should be concerned with any particular matter.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This is a minor drafting amendment. The effect of removal of a justices' licence to different premises is that the premises to which the licence originally related cease to be licensed premises. The words "or removal" thus add nothing to the final words of the subsection.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this it will be convenient to consider Lords amendment No. 9, in page 5, line 22, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

"(4) Where an order under that section is in force in respect of any premises and application is made not less than twenty-eight days before the order is due to expire for renewal of the order or for a further order in respect of the premises, the first-mentioned order shall not cease to have effect by virtue of subsection (1)(b) above until the application is disposed of by the magistrates' court."

Both of these amendments are designed to protect football clubs which undergo a change of licensee. As the Bill is drafted, such a change could in certain circumstances terminate the exemption order with no possibility of a new order for at least 28 days. That would mean that no alcohol could be sold at the premises during that period. We see no justification for penalising a club under those circumstances, which are probably outside its control. The amendments permit the current exemption order to continue in force until the courts have dealt with a fresh application for a new order by the new licensee, provided that the application is made in good time before the expiry of the current order. The amendments are somewhat technical, but I hope that the House will agree to accept them.

I understand that the amendment originated with a firm of Liverpool solicitors which managed to see the Bill and comment on it in time for its suggestions to be included. That is a victory for people who will be closely affected by the Bill. The Bill was rushed. Not many of us were able to see such comments in time for them to be debated, and it took the other place to rectify that shortcoming. It is therefore right that the other place had longer than us to discuss the Bill. The Bill is bad in many respects and I hope that the promised monitoring exercise is effective.

I accept that, through the co-operation of the official Opposition and the other parties, the Bill was granted rapid progress. However, I think that the hon. Gentleman will agree that the circumstances in which the legislation was brought before the House are, I hope, exceptional, in both their character and importance.

The hon. Gentleman referred to monitoring. The assurance given by my noble Friend Lord Glenarthur in the upper House is clear. It is our intention to review the position during the season in relation to the legislation on public order that will be brought before the House in due course. My noble Friend gave the assurance that the long title of that Bill would allow, if it were necessary, and if my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary deemed it right, for amendments to be brought forward. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will recognise that further amendment would have to be looked at carefully in relation to the state of the game at the time.

As we are coming to the end of the not exactly protracted proceedings on the Bill, and as the Act will be in operation at the beginning of the football season in fewer than four weeks from now, may I ask the Minister whether the Government have any plans to keep the House informed of the progress of the monitoring exercise, so that we may share in the information that the Government will be gaining on the use of the Act? For example, it would be interesting if the House could be informed periodically of the number of exemption orders being granted. There may be no reason why we cannot be given a list of the clubs that have been granted those orders. It would also be interesting and useful, if we have to reconsider these matters in future more permanent legislation, for the police, the football authorities and others to give us some idea, first of the success of the Act in dealing with the serious problem that every one of us in the House wants to be dealt with, and secondly of the financial effect on the clubs because, inevitably, that has given rise to a great deal of concern. It would be useful if, over the next season, we could be kept informed of how things were going on that front, too.

I fully understand why it would be useful to keep the House informed. I am sure that that will be done through the questioning procedure.

The consequences on the football clubs were the crucial factor giving rise to the concern expressed about the exemption procedure, particularly for sponsored boxes. I understand that it is the intention of the football league itself to keep my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary advised on how it views the position. Its information could form the basis of any evidence that is put before us. However, the right hon. Gentleman is right. We have agreed to review the matter as the season progresses.

The right hon. Gentleman said that there might be a review of the legislation to put it on a more permanent footing. I remind him that it is primary legislation, which is therefore already on a permanent footing.

Of course, we have the questioning procedure, but we do not always know when information is available to the Government. It would be useful if the Government, of their own accord, could make information available to the House from time to time. It may well be that the Minister is unaware of the device of the planted question. I should like to remind him of it. It is something to which he might have recourse to keep the House informed.

Of course, as I am so close to the Floor, I rarely stoop so low, but I understand that there is such a device. I shall bear in mind what the right hon. Gentleman has said.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

The amendment corrects a drafting defect in relation to the Scottish legislation—the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980. As presently drafted, it gives the impression that the Secretary' of State would designate grounds outside Great Britain, whereas all that is required is that events, or classes of event, should be designated. The amendment now makes that clear.

It is ironic that the last Lords amendment that we should consider brings us back to the basis on which the Bill was introduced—an event that took place outside Great Britain at a sportsground that is incapable of being designated, even under the amendment. Useful though the provisions will be in controlling alcohol in football grounds. I believe that they leave unanswered many of the problems of football hooliganism, including some of those that may have contributed to the original cause of the Bill. Those problems will require the continued attention of Ministers.

I remind the hon. Gentleman that it was not purely the event that occurred in Brussels that gave rise to the legislation, although it was the last straw. I am sure that he recognises that the problem of violence in football grounds has been steadily getting worse in recent years, culminating in major events during the last season here in the United Kingdom.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to take Government amendment No. 30.

The purpose of the new clause is to provide a definition in the Bill of the expression "associate", and follows from our discussions in Committee. The definition covers the principal categories relevant to personal bankruptcy of persons who are defined as being associates for the purposes of the Insolvency Bill. The definition will allow for arty necessary changes to it to be made by regulations. The amendment to clause 72 makes a consequential change in the interpretation clause.

I welcome the new clause. In Committee I said that it was unsatisfactory that the Bill did not contain a definition of "associate" and I welcome the fact that we now have it.

I take it that, although the wording is different, the effect of the clause is basically the same as the effect of the definition in the Insolvency Bill. Perhaps the Minister will confirm that.

for Scotland: I am happy to give that confirmation. The effect is the same. As I said, the only difference is that, should it be necessary to extend that classification, it could be done by regulation in future.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to take Government amendment No. 23.

Hon. Members will be aware that the Government have been considering, both in the context of this Bill and the Insolvency Bill. the introduction of the provision to give some protection to certain members of the debtor's family who were living in his property when it vested in the permanent trustee in his sequestration and who are therefore vulnerable under present law to being required to leave that property as soon as the permanent trustee wishes to sell it for the benefit of the creditors.

The new clause achieves that, first, by requiring the permanent trustee to obtain the court's authorisation if he wishes to sell or dispose of the family home. For this purpose, "family home" is defined as meaning any property in which, immediately before the date of his sequestration, the debtor has a right or interest and which is used as a residence by the debtor's spouse or former spouse or by the debtor and his children. Secondly, the clause requires the court to take into account all the circumstances of each case when considering whether to give such authorisation or any action which would have the effect of requiring them to leave that home. Among the circumstances which the court is specifically required to take into account are the needs and financial resources of the spouse, former spouse or children in the family home, the interests of the creditors and the length of time—both before and after the debtor's sequestration—in which they have lived in the family home. Thirdly, the court is empowered to refuse or impose conditions upon the granting of any such authorisation or decree or to postpone the granting of such authorisation or decree for up to 12 months.

I recognise that the provision represents a significant inroad into the rights of creditors to all the assets of the debtor, but it was clear during the Insolvency Bill's passage in another place that there was a strong feeling that some regard should be given in these circumstances to the needs of persons who are dependent upon the debtor to the extent that, as a consequence of the sequestration, they may be evicted from property in which they have lived as their family home. I believe that the provision before us represents a reasonable balance between those conflicting interests, in that it gives the court the flexibility to make an appropriate decision in every case, after weighing up the different interests. I therefore commend it to the House.

Again I welcome the new clause, which deals with a matter which I raised in the context of another clause in Committee. A consultation document was issued for the Insolvency Bill, and now there is a similar provision in that Bill.

The final words of the Solicitor-General for Scotland sum up the whole business. It is necessary to take account of the interests of the creditors, but, equally, the bankruptcy of an individual should not impose undue hardship on his wife, or, in the case of a bankrupt woman, her husband, and the rest of the family. It is necessary to strike the right balance.

I shall not presume to deal with the clause in detail, because we have had little time to consider the detail of it, but its approach. which balances the interests of the creditor and the family, is right, and gives the court the full power of discretion in dealing with these difficult matters. I welcome the clause, especially the approach adopted in it.

Not for the last time, I echo the words of my right hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Millan). The Solicitor-General for Scotland properly said that the change was significant and that the new clause was not merely a technical amendment. If one were hostile, one would say that the provisions infringe the rights of the creditor and the powers of the permanent trustee. I think that I speak for many people—I certainly speak for Labour Members—when I say that the provision seems humane and sensible. It is absolutely right that a court should have to give permission for the sale of a home which is occupied by the debtor's spouse or the debtor and his children, and should have the power to weigh all the competing interests and to refuse an application or grant a postponement for up to 12 months to allow the family to make other arrangements for accommodation. Obviously, the matter is important, and the new clause introduces an element of flexibility which is eminently reasonable. I am grateful to the Government for introducing the new clause.

I am grateful to both the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Millan) and the hon. Member for Glasgow, Garscadden (Mr. Dewar) for welcoming the new clause, and the flexibility that it introduces.

I should have drawn their attention to a small technical point. In line 27 of the new clause, as printed, where the word "jointly" appears, there should have been substituted the words "in common". I am sure that, as a distinguished conveyancer, the hon. Member for Garscadden will understand why.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Although this is an excellent new clause, I am not as confident that the Government will accept it as I was about the other two clauses. It deals with compensation for debts due to and by the Crown. It is a modified version of the new clause which I moved in Committee, in that it is a more modest attempt to reduce the procedure of compensation at present available to the Crown.

Later we shall deal with the question of Government preference. In a bankruptcy, the Government have both preference on debts and the advantage that, if they owe money to the debtor's estate, they can search for another Government Department which may be owed money by the debtor and set one against the other. That applies to both statutory debts and ordinary debts arising from contractual obligations, which may be in respect of the supply of goods under an ordinary commercial contract.

As the Government are now all pervasive—not all persuasive, because they are greatly unpersuasive—and large numbers of Government Departments are involved in all sorts of different activities, the Crown has advantages which no individual creditor can possibly have. The principle of compensation and set-off is well established in Scottish law. In the case of the Government, it is taken to extremes. The new clause would limit it to either contractual debt obligations or statutory obligations. It is a restrictive new clause.

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Apart from the equity of the matter, there are practical difficulties in settling sequestrations in certain circumstances. Those who are involved in this area of activity tell me that it is sometimes difficult to get money from a Government Department because it will spend a great deal of time making absolutely sure that it cannot avoid paying the money and that the debtor did not owe it or another Department money. As the rest of the Bill reduces Government preference, it is anachronistic to maintain the full rights of compensation and set-off of the Crown. The clause would reduce the set-off considerably. It is an excellent new clause and it will be a pity if the Government do not accept it.

I am pleased that the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Millan) recognised the difficulties that would have ensued if he had sought, as he did in Committee, to prevent a set-off of debts owed to and by different Government Departments. With regard to the remainder of his new clause, my arguments in Committee remain unchanged, and unless he and and other hon. Members wish me to rehearse them, I shall not do so.

A further factor must be considered. If a change were made in the Bill to the law relating to compensation, it would create an anomaly, not only between the English and Scottish personal bankruptcy procedures, but between the law of compensation as it relates to company insolvency in Scotland and as it would relate to personal bankruptcy in Scotland. [Interruption.] If the right hon. Member for Western Isles (Mr. Stewart) did not care for the first argument, he will see the force of the second.

The right hon. Member for Govan said in Committee in relation to Crown preferences that the argument for a consistent approach throughout the United Kingdom was powerful. The same is true for compensation and set-off. To have one system applying to personal bankruptcies in Scotland and another to all the remaining insolvency procedures in Great Britain is a recipe for considerable confusion and dissatisfaction.

I believe in consistency, which is why I tabled a similar new clause to the Insolvency Bill last Thursday, not with conspicuous success.

I appreciate that the right hon. Gentleman is anxious to secure consistency. He may feel that he has been badly done by in the House, in that his argument has not secured the favour that he believes it deserves. Nevertheless, if the right hon. Gentleman appreciates that he cannot secure a general change, he should found on his failure and have a consistent approach here.

For that reason, and without rehearsing the more general arguments on compensation or set-off, I ask the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw his new clause.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Millan) will not have been surprised by the Minister's response. Indeed, there was a hint of his expectation in the way in which he moved the new clause. It is unfortunate that the Government are not prepared to consider the arguments more sympathetically. I did not have the advantage—I use the word a little timidly—of serving on the Committee or of being involved at any stage in the Insolvency Bill, which overshadowed and prejudged many of the decisions made in connection with this Bill. However, I am not greatly impressed by the Minister's arguments on this occasion, although I did not have the advantage of hearing him at length in Committee.

The fact that there would be a gap between insolvency law for companies and personal bankruptcies might lead to some difficulty, but, as my right hon. Friend said, if the new clause were valid, it would be logical to import a similar approach into the other Bill and not merely to trump the argument by saying that we had made a mistake in the first place. The merits of the matter should rule. In any event, company law has always been on a United Kingdom basis, whereas, almost from the first decade of this century, bankruptcy law has been considered on the different Scottish legal basis.

I agree with my right hon. Friend that there is a problem with the unbridled right to compensation which the Crown has, and the new clause is clearly an attempt to find a reasonable limitation by stipulating that the right to set-off should be limited, as described, to sums owed and sums payable under statute, or to the set-off between sums that arise from contractual obligations. That is a reasonable proposition, but the Minister has clearly set his face against it.

Although the hon. Gentleman is not persuaded by the Government's approach to the matter—I appreciate that he was not a member of the Committee, so he may have missed the arguments—the Scottish Law Commission, not surprisingly, gave some attention to it when preparing its report. It said that we might need to find a satisfactory solution to the common law on compensation as it stands now, but it did not believe it appropriate to make such a change solely in the context of bankruptcy. It suggested that any change should become part of its examination of the law of obligations in Scotland. That is the best way to approach the matter.

That may be so, and no doubt that is a persuasive argument for putting off anything. The trouble is that, as we know, the law of diligence has been under review for about a decade, and although the cathartic moment of production is almost upon us—I understand that from a written answer the other day—it has been a long and weary road. I am not entirely convinced by the argument that we should leave this matter until the Scottish Law Commission considers the law of obligations, because its review may take a long time. My right hon. Friend was considering the specific problem of compensation and the privileges of the Crown, which are regulated to some extent by statute. If we need a change in the law now, I should have thought that it would be reasonable to try to strike the right balance.

I should outlive my welcome if I tried to rehearse the arguments that I did not hear in Committee. Therefore, I merely record my regret that Ministers have taken—I suppose predictably—a conservative view of the matter.

I beg to move amendment No. 1, in page 3, line 33, leave out

'or is not a fit and proper person to act as an interim trustee'.

With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 2 and 31.

Hon. Members who attended the Committee stage of the Bill will recall that the Government introduced several amendments to provide an interim system relating to the qualifications required for insolvency practitioners under the Bill until part I of the Insolvency Bill comes into effect and the system contained in that part can be used throughout Great Britain.

These amendments retain that interim provision, but also provide for the time when part I of the Insolvency Bill comes into force. It was originally intended that such provisions would be inserted into this Bill by part I of the Insolvency Bill when that part became effective, but on further consideration we have decided that it is simpler and more convenient to amend now so that the Bill's provisions tell the whole story.

This is another matter which I raised in Committee, and I am glad that the provision is being tidied up. One difficulty with the Bill is that it ran simultaneously with the Insolvency Bill and the Government seemed unable to make up their mind about many important matters in the Insolvency Bill. All the provisions relating to insolvency practitioners were rewritten during the Report stage of the Insolvency Bill last week, which produced an almost completely new part I. I am still unhappy about at least one aspect of the insolvency practitioner provision in that Bill, but it would be more appropriate to pursue that with the Department of Trade and Industry than with the Solicitor-General.

In the meantime, I am glad that the interim arrangements have been clarified by the amendments.

I beg to move amendment No. 3, in page 8, line 13, leave out from 'due' to end of line 27.

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 and the following amendments: No. 8, in page 8, line 17, leave out '3' and insert '4'.

This amendment deals with a matter raised by the Scottish Consumer Council, unfortunately after the Committee stage of the Bill. The matter was not discussed in Committee, but, having considered it with Scottish Members, I believe that the Scottish Consumer Council has a valid point. It is worried about paragraph (d) of clause 7(1), and the first of my amendments would simply eliminate that paragraph. Amendment No. 8 would extend the period of notice from three to four weeks.

If the Government do not accept that we should reconsider this entire matter, I hope that they will at least accept that we should give a debtor a longer period of notice than three weeks. One week is a modest increase. I hope that the Solicitor-General will not tell me that a clause in the Insolvency Bill—I believe that it is clause 113—provides only three weeks' notice in cases of personal bankruptcy in England and Wales. On this matter there is no virtue in consistency, and it is wrong to have only three weeks in the English Bill. The period of notice should be longer than three weeks.

The merits of the matter rest on the procedure which allows a creditor simply to serve a notice—a demand for payment—on a debtor. If the debtor does not pay within three weeks, under the terms of the Bill, he will be treated as apparently insolvent. That brings in all the other provisions, including petitions for sequestration, provided in the Bill.

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That is a fairly stringent provision, because in other circumstances, before one can say that a debtor is apparently insolvent, other conditions have to be fulfilled, and they are outlined in the earlier part of the clause. In many cases they involve some sort of preliminary court action, but here there need be no court action at all; simply a notice in a prescribed form by a creditor to a debtor. If, on the basis of that, the debtor does not pay, the whole process of sequestration can follow.

I am not as worried about this situation as the Scottish Consumer Council appears to be, because in most circumstances the creditor would find the initiation of the whole procedure of sequestration an elaborate way of obtaining payment when, by taking appropriate court action, he could obtain payment of his debt in some other way. Thus the procedure would not be used frequently, certainly not by a creditor as a matter of course. Nevertheless, the Bill says that lodging a demand for payment and not being paid within three weeks is an indication of an apparent insolvency and everything else can follow from that. That worries me considerably.

It may be that part of the answer lies in the phrase "in the prescribed form". Perhaps the Solicitor-General can let us know what will be included in the prescribed form. Presumably, it will include a warning to the debtor about the dire consequences which may follow if he does not pay within three weeks. We do not know whether that is the case, because we have not seen the prescribed form and have not been given any indication of what might be in it.

Having looked at the provision, I am not at all convinced that it is necessary to have it in the Bill as one of the indications of an apparent insolvency. No creditor will be put to any disadvantage if we simply take it out. If a creditor goes through the courts and obtains a successful decree against the debtor, and the debtor does not pay, then, as I understand the rest of this clause, that by itself is sufficient for him to be able to petition for sequestration. I do not see why the creditor should not be able to go through the court. A simple solution to the problem would be to remove the paragraph altogether.

The second of my amendments, which would simply extend the period of notice from three to four weeks. is second best. It is not an appropriate way of amending the provision, but the very least we ought to do is to give rather more notice to the debtor. To be frank with the Solicitor-General, when I first looked at the representations of the Scottish Consumer Council I was a bit sceptical. However, having considered them more carefully, I consider that there are strong grounds for being concerned about this paragraph. As I say, I do not believe it will be used as frequently or in the sorts of circumstances about which the Scottish Consumer Council is anxious. The way to deal with those anxieties is to remove the paragraph, and that is the purpose of amendment No. 3.

Clause 7(1)(d) was introduced to provide a relatively uncomplicated means of access to the sequestration process where there is no dispute that a debt equal to or exceeding the relevant amount is payable. For that reason, it also provides a straightforward method for a debtor to avoid being prejudiced by the procedure. He can achieve that by a straightforward denial that a sum of £750 or more is payable. The provision is designed to cover situations where the debtor has not acknowledged that he has ceased to pay his debts but where he is, none the less, prepared to accept, if it is put to him, that he is unable to pay that debt. In those circumstances, it may be in his best interests to have his estate sequestrated.

The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that if the only way in which that can be done is by having the debt judicially constituted, that procedure involves additional expense. It is not a particularly large sum, but at a time when we are constantly trying to ensure that administrative costs are kept to a minimum, if the opportunity is given to the debtor in terms of a letter in a prescribed form and he does not deny the debt, it is a key-in to the sequestration procedure and obviates an unnecessary action for debt which could cost money.

The trouble with that argument is that whatever is in the prescribed form, and whatever is in the paragraph, there will be circumstances where the debtor does not understand the full significance of what is being said to him. Ordinary people understand that if they are taken to court it is a serious matter, but unfortunately quite a number of people get letters asking them to pay bills and pay little attention to them. That applies whether or not the letters are sent by recorded delivery, for which the amendment provides. Many debtors should be paying their bills and perhaps are perfectly able to pay them, but they will not realise the full significance of this simply because it does not involve court action.

I understand the point made by the right hon. Gentleman, but he pre-empts the argument that he knows I am about to make. This is not just a little brown envelope coming through the door. As the right hon. Gentleman is aware, when it comes in the prescribed form it will be by recorded delivery. He is correct in that we have not yet decided what the prescribed form will be, but it is expected that the form will spell out clearly that if the debt is in any way disputed a simple denial of the debt will be sufficient to stop a sequestration procedure.

The right hon. Gentleman and I could go on endlessly disputing whether the form could be set out in a style appropriate enough to make the point clear to every debtor who receives it. Recently we have had cause to be proud of the forms that we have set up, and the Scottish Consumer Council has complimented us in the last two years on a form which was provided.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland is positively smiling.

The hon. Gentleman says that I am positively smiling, and he is correct. Those compliments were in relation to the form prescribed for the simplified method of divorce. I recognise the anxieties of the right hon. Gentleman, but this provides a simple, cheap and desirable technique.

The right hon. Gentleman's first amendment seeks to exclude the paragraph altogether, but coupled with it are a number of Government amendments. As he may recall, he was concerned in Committee that a series of debts amounting to £750 might be prescribed as well as a single debt of not less than that amount, and this would entitle a creditor to use clause 7(1)(d). I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for raising that point and I hope that the Government amendments make the point clear. Amendment No. 5 provides that a demand under clause 7 must be served on the debtor by recorded delivery. That is to avoid the possibility of the debtor not being aware of the letter because he is on holiday, for example.

I deal finally with the right hon. Gentleman's amendment changing the period from three weeks to four weeks. With some perception, the right hon. Gentleman anticipated my argument. It is not just an illogical difference between English and Scottish personal bankruptcy provisions. Once again it is the difference in Scotland between personal bankruptcy and corporate insolvency procedures. The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Bill, as well as relating to individual insolvency, deals with the insolvency of such entities as partnerships and bodies corporate as well as registered companies. I see that as an anomaly, and accordingly there is no great value in the right hon. Gentleman's proposal.

More importantly, because we recognise that there must be some anxiety that too short a period might mean that inadvertently or without the knowledge of the debtor this procedure got under way, we inserted the provision that such a letter had to be served by recorded delivery. That seems to me to be a greater safeguard than three, four or even five weeks. It might be anticipated that ordinary people went on holiday for a fortnight, but there could be any one of a variety of reasons which took someone away from home for a longer period and simply having a letter popping through the letter box could create problems. Because we intend to require such a letter to be served by recorded delivery, I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that the problem that he sees arising is better dealt with in that way than by moving the period from three weeks to four weeks.

I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman can enlighten me about one matter raised by the Scottish Consumer Council. The hon. and learned Gentleman spoke of the debt being accepted by the debtor or repudiated, in which case the procedure would follow. What happens if the debtor offers to pay in part? I gather from the council that that would not be acceptable—it has to be all or nothing.

I share a good deal of the concern expressed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Millan). He said, quite properly, that for most of us the starting point was the briefing from the Scottish Consumer Council. There is nothing wrong in that. It is one of the most valuable roles of informed groups, such as the council, that they alert hon. Members to matters giving rise to anxiety in lengthy, complicated and highly technical legislation. My attention having been drawn to it, I concluded that there was cause for the concern which the Scottish Consumer Council expressed, and that has not been removed by the Minister.

I accept that the Government amendment which says that the notice under clause 7(1)(d) has to be sent by recorded delivery is a useful minor improvement, but it seems to me to be a little bit of conscience money and does not strike at the heart of what was canvassed by the Scottish Consumer Council.

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We are dealing here with any sum of more than £750. Although that might once have been a large sum, it is no longer so. As the council points out, it might well cover a wide range of consumer debts, and it is below the summary cause limit, for example, which puts it in some perspective. Furniture or a motor car—even an elderly, decrepit secondhand one—will cross the mark, allowing the purchaser to fall within the procedure envisaged in the clause.

I have a great deal of sympathy with the argument that the simplest way would not be to improve with minor changes such as the introduction of recorded delivery letters but to excise the subsection from the Bill. The reason is one based upon the psychology of the people likely to be involved. I am especially unsympathetic to the argument of the Solicitor-General for Scotland that we could not, for example, extend the period to four weeks because that would take us out of line with similar provisions which apply to companies.

There is a world of difference between the approach of a company, even a small closed company, and that of the kind of person who might find himself in difficulty as a debtor under this provision. I accept that companies have to be on the same basis north and south of the border. It might be inconvenient if they were not, and company law has always been on a United Kingdom basis, but I see no reason why in Scotland we should not have a different approach to the individual debtor from that applied to a company.

Very often there are circumstances in which letters are winging out. many of them by recorded delivery no doubt, saying "Pay up. or else." There are people who are used to getting them and used to turning up at court, once they are summonsed, to minute their views on instalment payments or dissent. Even if a form is very carefully drafted, an enormous number of people who fortunately do not know what insolvency, liquidation or bankruptcy is will be asked to understand that they are about to be plunged into a legal process the consequences of which are very serious.

Sequestration means that assets are taken over by a trustee. The debtor has to reveal all sorts of information about his personal and financial affairs to the trustee administering his assets. If he continues to work, there are implications about paying a proportion of his income to the trustees. It is quite out of the ordinary and very different from the action for debt which may be pursued under a summary cause. It is a difference of degree, and I do not believe that even a form drafted with personal care by the Solicitor-General for Scotland is likely to ensure that people know exactly what is happening and what the significance may be.

I fear that in many cases a recorded delivery letter will be seen by the recipient as another attempt to recover money which he owes. He may not owe it, and he may not even realise the significance of having to dispute the debt at that stage. Thinking that he can deal with it as he would deal with a summary cause action for the normal form of recovering debt, he may find that he has given up the right to dispute the debt, and he is then on the slippery slope towards sequestration and in a difficult legal position with which he is not well qualified to deal.

The fact that the letter has to be sent in the prescribed form—I am not sure how it is prescribed—

By regulations.

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. However carefully it is prescribed, we are in that difficult position. There is a point of principle here because, as the Scottish Consumer Council pointed out, we are initiating a sequestration without a court decree stating that the debt is owed. That is dangerous. If the Solicitor-General for Scotland received a letter saying, "We shall sequestrate you and an apparent insolvency will be established if you do not within the specified period write and deny the debt," I have no doubt that he would know what to do. After all, he is a man of the law. But I can think of constituents of mine who would not understand. In the unlikely event of this machinery being used, they would find themselves slipping into a very hazardous position.

The second line of argument which has been properly advanced by my hon. Friend the Member for Govan is that it is unlikely in the event that this machinery will be used very often. If it is, the consequences could be unfortunate. However, an important point is that it is in no way illogical to argue that it is unnecessary to have this provision if it is unlikely to be used very often. There are all kinds of other ways in which a creditor could proceed against a debtor. It would in no way be a substantial infringement of the rights of a creditor to excise paragraph (d) from the Bill. It would remove the fears to which we have referred; fears which in a small number of cases could become very real.

In an earlier debate the Solicitor-General for Scotland referred to the fact that the Scottish Law Commission was carrying out a number of general reviews. One relates to the system of debt enforcement and diligence. If it decided to introduce changes which made the law of diligence in Scotland a little more humane and sensible, it would seem to be unwise to put paragraph (d) of clause 7(1) on the statute book. It might stand out as an unsatisfactory procedure which ran counter to the general reform which we hope will emerge from the lengthy review of the law of diligence which is being carried out by the Scottish Law Commission.

This provision would endanger individual liberties and might be misunderstood. Therefore, I urge the Solicitor-General for Scotland to accept the admirably clear amendment of my right hon. Friend the Member for Govan. There is nothing wrong with its drafting; it merely asks for this provision to be deleted. In no sense would it prejudice the creditor, and in a small number of important cases the debtor would be protected if this provision were removed from the Bill.

By leave of the House, Mr. Deputy Speaker, may I say that if this provision is left in the Bill. we shall ultimately regret it. Eventually it will have to be removed from the legislation. The arguments advanced by the Solicitor-General for Scotland were singularly unpersuasive. He made it sound as though it was for the good of the debtor that there should be a simplified procedure. He has completely misunderstood its effect. Recorded delivery is useful, but this paragraph means that the debtor is already under an obligation to give his denial by recorded delivery. It is astonishing that recorded delivery was never applied in the first instance to the demand. It puts the debtor on the same basis as the creditor in terms of recorded delivery.

The right hon. Member for Western Isles (Mr. Stewart) raised an interesting point on denial—that even an offer to pay is not a denial if the money is owing and that under this paragraph it has no effect. There may be many occasions when there is no dispute that the money is owed, although the debtor may have difficulty in paying the money within the stated time. But that does not help him. Unless he says that the money is not owed, sequestration will be enforced. If I were advising a constituent who received a recorded delivery letter, I would say that he ought to tell a lie and write back saying, "I deny that the money is immediately payable." That would afford protection under this clause. That is absurd, but it is his only protection. He does not have to demonstrate that the debt is not immediately payable he merely has to say that it is not immediately payable, even if, when he says that, he knows that he is telling a lie. That cannot be right.

As for the parallel with companies, that again is absurd. A trading company employs solicitors, accountants and other professional advisers. The Solicitor-General for Scotland looks sceptical, but a company will certainly employ accountants, because there is a statutory obligation to have an audit. Solicitors would also have been involved, when the company was set up, to draw up the articles of association. A trading company presumably takes matters of this kind seriously and would understand the implications, whereas an individual debtor may not fully understand them.

In certain trades and businesses one finds that there are notoriously bad payers, in the sense that they do not pay their debts frequently. Farmers are a good example. Many perfectly reputable farmers who have been farming for many years do not pay their debts within three weeks. However, if they do not pay their debts within three weeks their assets can be sequestrated. Either this paragraph will not be used, in which case it is unnecessary, or its use will mean that a number of farmers will suddenly find that their assets have been sequestrated. If their farms are in the constituencies of Conservative Members, this provision will have to be deleted. The Solicitor-General for Scotland smiles, but this is a serious point. If this provision were enforced against farmers, we would be unable to retain this provision in the law of Scotland.

This point was not raised in Committee. Most hon. Members did not understand its full import. My original scepticism about the point made by the Scottish Consumer Council has given way on my part, and on the part of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Garscadden (Mr. Dewar) and the right hon. Member for Western Isles, to real anxiety. I believe that if it should be used Ministers will regret having retained this paragraph.

I believe that this is a valuable way to constitute insolvency. I am at one with the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Millan) in believing that this provision will be used infrequently. It will not frighten farmers or anybody else into paying their bills if they are insolvent. All one is doing is setting up an elaborate procedure for sequestration. If that is what one wants to do, the simplest way to set about it is to take action to have the debt judicially constituted.

The hon. Member for Glasgow, Garscadden (Mr. Dewar) said that his constituents who might have small, outstanding debts would have recorded delivery letters suddenly popping through their letter boxes which would cause confusion. To that extent, it is important that there should be a lower limit of £750. Even in 1985 that is a very considerable sum of money to owe either to a group or to an individual, so the lower limit is important.

I would point out to the right hon. Member for Western Isles (Mr. Stewart) that if one was in this position one could not offer to pay the debt by instalments. Either the debt is owed, or it is not. That is the point that would be followed through if such an action were to be pursued, as the right hon. Member for Govan suggested that it should be pursued by taking it to the courts. A debtor might say, "I accept that I owe Mr. X £100, but I deny that I owe him £750." In that case, the process leading to sequestration would not be set in motion.

6.30 pm

We are introducing a novelty, but I do not share the anxieties expressed in the debate. Given our fruitful cooperation with the Scottish Consumer Council in the past, I hope that we shall be able to draw up a letter, in a prescribed form, leaving people in no doubt about what steps they should take if they accept that they owe a sum in excess of £750 or, if they deny that they owe the money, what steps they should take to avoid the prospect of sequestration.

I beg to move amendment No. 10, in page 25, line 17, at end insert

'(e) a person who is an associate of the debtor'.

It seems strange that, now that we have in the Bill a definition of an associate, we should not, when dealing with those who are not eligible for election as a permanent trustee, exclude a person who is an associate of the debtor. It may seem obvious that such a person should not be appointed as a permanent trustee, but a number of other fairly obvious people who should not be so appointed, including the debtor himself, for example, are mentioned in the subsection.

I intend the amendment to improve the Bill. Indeed, that has been the aim of all my amendments, but the Solicitor-General for Scotland has not seen them in that light. I hope that he will accept this one.

I have to disappoint the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Millan). However, before he gets too gloomy, I should add that he may find that I am in a more favourable frame of mind later. I understand the reasoning behind the amendment, but I think that it is undesirable and unnecessary.

The amendment is undesirable because, having regard to the definition of an associate in new clause 2, it would prevent a person from acting as an insolvency practitioner in cases where there was no likelihood of any conflict of interest. That was the main reason why a similar provision was omitted from part I of the Insolvency Bill. The amendment would require persons who wished to be insolvency practitioners in a sequestration in Scotland to meet more stringent conditions than would be required in the case of a Scottish company liquidation or English bankruptcy proceedings.

The amendment is unnecessary because persons proposing to act as insolvency practitioners under this Bill will be subject to the provisions in part I of the Insolvency Bill when that part comes into operation. As a result of an amendment made to the Insolvency Bill on Report last Thursday, regulations will be able to be made

"prohibiting a person from acting as an insolvency practitioner in prescribed cases, being cases in which a conflict of interest will or may arise."

In the interim period, pending the commencement of part I of the Insolvency Bill, consideration will be given, in consultation with the professional bodies, to including in regulations as one of the prescribed requirements for a person being qualified to act as an insolvency practitioner a requirement which, in effect, would prevent him from acting where there is likely to be a conflict of interest.

I take it that the right hon. Gentleman is anxious to avoid such a conflict of interests. I hope that he will appreciate that, given the amendment that was made to the Insolvency Bill last week, his objection will be met.

I am not persuaded, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

I beg to move amendment No. 11. in page 33, line 3, after 'bankruptcy', insert

'or other similar orders in, or in connection with, bankruptcy proceedings'.

With this we may take Government amendment No. 12.

The purpose of the amendment is to put beyond doubt the fact that the trustee's act and warrant will be registered in the appropriate register in the part of the United Kingdom where the estate is studied and to ensure that acquisitions for value of the bankrupt's estate prior to the registration will not be prejudiced by it. This savings provision virtually re-enacts the provision at the end of section 97(3) of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1913.

I beg to move amendment No. 13, in page 33, line 20, leave out subsection (7).

With this we may take Government amendments Nos. 18 and 27.

The amendments are designed to meet a point raised by the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Millan) in Committee about the unfairness of the provisions that vest immixed funds of a debtor and spouse in the permanent trustee, even though most of them belong to the debtor's spouse, and then have the spouse to rank as a postponed creditor in respect of her share. The amendments delete those provisions and will mean that the ownership of such funds will be a matter of fact to be determined, in the event of an unresolved dispute, by the court. I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Govan for raising the matter.

I am glad to acknowledge that the Solicitor-General for Scotland listened to my arguments in Committee and I am pleased that he has responded.

I beg to move amendment No. 14, in page 34, line 6, leave out from 'may' to 'shall' in line 9 and insert

', after having regard to all the circumstances, determine a suitable amount to allow for—

(a) alignment for the debtor; and

(b) the debtor's relevant obligations;

and if the debtor's income is in excess of the total amount so allowed the sheriff.

With this, we may take Government amendments Nos. 15, 16, 21 and 22.

The amendments have as their common theme the need for consideration to be given in bankruptcy proceedings to the maintenance of the debtor and his family. Amendments Nos. 14 and 15 are intended to ensure that the court, when deciding the level of the income that should be left to him, will take account of the debtor's need to maintain himself and his family, including any spouse or former spouse and children even though they are not living with him.

The amendments to clause 35 provide that in considering whether to recall an order awarding a capital payment or a transfer of property on divorce, the court must consider all the circumstances, and in particular the financial circumstances of the person from whom the payment or property would be recovered in the event of recall of the order.

The purpose of amendment No. 16 is to make it clear that any creditor, even an alimentary creditor, whose debt would be discharged in the sequestration by virtue of clause 54 should not be able to do diligence in respect of that debt against any income vesting in the debtor after the date of his sequestration. As drafted, clause 32(4) does not prevent alimentary creditors, who can claim in the sequestration—and whose claim would be discharged by virtue of clause 54—from, as it were, "coming out" of the sequestration and doing diligence directly against the debtor's post-sequestration income. That would be an unfortunate result. The amendment prevents it from taking place.

I beg to move manuscript amendment No. 75, in page 35, line 14, leave out from "dealing" to "is" in line 16.

With this, we may take amendment No. 17, in page 35, line 14, leave out "before" and insert

'within a period of 3 months commencing on'.

Following the tabling of amendment No. 17 by the hon. Member for Glasgow, Garscadden (Mr. Dewar), we have given further consideration to the period after the date of sequestration within which certain transactions between a debtor and a third party would be protected.

The hon. Member for Garscadden is probably aware that the Scottish Law Commission gives no reason for its view in paragraph 11.38 of its report that the protection for such dealings, which at present is unlimited, should continue only until the date of publication of the award of sequestration in the Edinburgh Gazette. It would appear, however, that it might have been influenced by the thought that publication in the Edinburgh Gazette should be taken as notice to the world of sequestration. That is not correct either as a matter of fact or of law.

We have accordingly concluded that there should be no time limit upon the protection afforded to such dealings and I have tabled a manuscript amendment to this effect. This would appear to be preferable to the amendment extending the period for three months because it is equally arbitrary to have a three-month period as to have the period as at present specified in the Bill.

I appreciate, of course, the argument that it is important to avoid any fraudulent misuse of this period to the detriment of the creditors, but having looked carefully at the provision, I am convinced that the safeguards contained in it are more than adequate. Certainly section 107 of the 1913 Act which is similar in many ways to what we are now proposing has not, to my knowledge, caused any difficulty in the 72 years that it has been operating.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Garscadden and I hope that he thinks that the Government amendment is desirable. I suspect that he chose the three-month period because he did not believe that he would be successful in achieving any time limit.

The Minister is partly correct. I am grateful to him for tabling his manuscript amendment which goes further than my amendment. I enjoyed his modest knocking of the Edinburgh Gazette and its role in the world. I do not know who edits that august publication, but the Solicitor-General's view was probably realistic.

I agree that any period of protection would be arbitrary and that it is better to remove the restriction and to leave protection to be dealt with by clause 32(8)(b) which states

"the person dealing with the debtor was.… unaware of the sequestration and had.… no reason to believe that the debtor's estate had been sequestrated or was the subject of sequestration proceedings."

That means that in a bona fide case the person will be completely protected. That is a sensible approach which has worked well for many years under the law of Scotland. It is a good amendment, even if it had to be scrawled in quill pen at the last moment by one of the Solicitor-General for Scotland's aides.

I beg to move amendment No. 19, in page 37, line 6 leave out from 'that' to second 'or' in line 7 and insert

'immediately, or at any other time, after the alienation the debtor's assets were greater than his liabilities.'.

The amendment makes it clear what is meant by absolute solvency. It is in line with existing case law based on the Bankruptcy Act 1621, which this Bill replaces

I beg to move manuscript amendment No. 76, in page 42, line 34, leave out "subsections (6) and (7)" and insert "subsection (6)"

With this we may discuss Government amendments Nos. 24 and 33.

The manuscript amendment is consequential on amendment No. 24 and comes immediately before it.

I am sure that the amendment is only technical, but we do not have a copy of it. Perhaps the Solicitor-General for Scotland will explain it. I understand from the noises behind me that no one else has seen it.

Perhaps the Solicitor-General for Scotland will help the House by explaining a little further.

I had hoped to move quickly since there is nothing mysterious about the amendment, which reads

"page 42, line 34, leave out 'subsections (6) and (7)' and insert 'subsection (6)'."

I am sure that the hon. Member for Garscadden agrees that the amendment is desirable and necessary.

I beg to move amendment No. 25, in page 45, line 16, after 'Act,', insert

'as amended by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985'.

With this we may discuss Government amendment No. 26.

These are drafting amendments.

I beg to move amendment No. 29, in page 66, line 38, at end insert 'or any individual creditor'.

With this we may discuss Government manuscript amendments Nos. 73 and 74.

Fortunately, the amendments need not detain us long because the Solicitor-General for Scotland has decided to fall into line with admirable advice that he has been given and table more skilfully drafted amendments which have the same effect. Clause 66(7) states:

"A debtor who is engaged in trade or business shall be guilty of an offence if … he pledges or disposes of … any property which he has obtained on credit and has not paid for unless he shows that he did not intend to prejudice his creditors."

It is suggested that a car might be bought on hire purchase and that the debtor might sell that car and use the proceeds to satisfy some of his creditors. He would not act in any sense to their prejudice, but would specifically prejudice the hire purchase company which would lose the car and the security which it represents.

The amendment makes it clear that the phrase "prejudice his creditors" covers the prejudice of any individual creditor. The Minister proposes a different solution in his manuscript amendment No. 74, which includes the words

"references to intent to prejudice creditors shall include references to intent to prejudice an individual creditor."

That is more elegant, but it has the same intent and I am pleased with it.

The purpose of the amendment is to prevent a debtor who has unlawfully disposed of goods on hire purchase from claiming that the disposal, far from prejudicing the general body of creditors, has benefited them at the expense of the unfortunate creditor involved in the hire purchase agreement.

Such a case is unlikely to arise frequently, but I accept that it is not beyond the bounds of possibility. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Glasgow, Garscadden (Mr. Dewar) for tabling his amendment. However, acceptance of the amendment in its present form might permit the debtor to establish a defence if he shows either that he did not intend to prejudice the general body of creditors or that he did not intend to prejudice any one of them.

My amendment makes it clear that the debtor must establish that he intended to prejudice neither the general body of the creditors nor any one of them. A similar point might also arise in connection with clause 66(2) and 66(6). The manuscript amendments cover those sections.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

I beg to move amendment No. 34, in page 73, line 24, at end insert—

'() Unless the context otherwise requires, any reference in any enactment or document to a person's estate being sequestrated under the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1913 shall be construed as, or as including, a reference to its being sequestrated under this Act; and analogous references shall be construed accordingly.'.

With this we shall discuss Government amendments No. 48 and 52.

These are purely drafting amendments.

I beg to move amendment No. 35, in page 79, line 12, leave out 'twelve' and insert 'six'.

With this we shall discuss Government amendments Nos. 36 to 38, and the following amendments: No. 39, in page 79, line 29, leave out 'twelve' and insert 'six'.

No. 40, in page 79, line 38, leave out 'twelve' and insert 'six'.

No. 41, in page 79, line 43, leave out 'twelve' and insert 'six'.

Government amendments Nos. 43 and 44.

The amendment deals with the question of preferred debts. I intend to say little about this, not because the matter is not of considerable importance—it is one of the most important matters in the Bill—but because we dealt with it in Committee and again on the Report stage of the Insolvency Bill last Thursday.

Whatever the quality of the arguments that I put forward, the Solicitor-General will simply say that we must be consistent with the Insolvency Bill and that he cannot accept my amendments. I want to put on record that I am glad that the Government have accepted their defeat on VAT and reduced the preference from 12 to six months. I shall not embarrass the hon. and learned Gentleman by quoting back at him some of the things that he said in Committee about VAT and PAYE. However, it is not logical that the Government have accepted the reduction in preference on VAT from 12 to six months, yet are not willing to accept the reduction in preference on PAYE and national insurance contributions—which would be the effect of my amendment. I know that the Government will not accept it because they turned down a similar amendment on the Report stage of the Insolvency Bill.

It is a pity that, having given way more or less gracefully on VAT, the Government have not accepted the logic of the matter and reduced the preference on PAYE. I do not hold out any hope that there will be a conversion at this late stage, unless the Solicitor-General takes a bold step and says, "I do not care what happened with the Insolvency Bill, this is such a powerful argument that I shall accept it." On past behaviour, I do not think that he will do that.

I simply record my disappointment that the Government have not accepted the logic of the position and reduced preference in a way that ultimately will be to the benefit of small firms, which are the ordinary creditors. For a Government who are anxious to say how much they support small firms and want to help them in every possible way to deny themselves the opportunity to give them help by reducing Government preference in bankruptcy is, to say the least, unfortunate.

I wish to place on record that I have been consistently trying to reduce the ravages of Government in bankruptcies in favour of small firms and ordinary creditors.

I would have been quite happy if the right hon. Gentleman had referred to what I had to say; I doubt whether anyone else would have been at this stage.

The purpose of the Government amendments is twofold. First, they reduce the preference period for VAT debts to six months, bringing the Bill into line—as the right hon. Gentleman appreciates—with the Insolvency Bill. Secondly, they clarify the six months period relating to VAT charged on supply of goods and services made prior to the date of sequestration, even though, because of the VAT accounting arrangements, payment need not at that time have been made to Customs and Excise. A similar clarificatory amendment has been inserted in the Insolvency Bill.

As the right hon. Gentleman said, during the course of the two Bills at various stages, and in another place, the matter of Crown preference was discussed exhaustively. A position has been adopted in the Insolvency Bill, and it appears that, at this stage, there is little purpose in pursuing the matter further.

I beg to move amendment No. 46, in page 88, line 34, at end insert—

'7A. In the case of a trust deed to which paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Schedule apply, the trustee shall, not later than 28 days after final distribution to creditors of the estate which falls to be distributed under the trust deed registered under paragraph 5(D) of this Schedule, send to the accountant in bankruptcy a certificate that the estate has been distributed in accordance with the provisions of the trust deed together with a statement in the prescribed form as to the realisation of the estate and its distribution.

7B(1) Where a trustee under a trust deed to which paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Schedule apply has, in terms of that trust deed, obtained a discharge from the acceding creditors and from the debtor, he may give notice of his discharge to each qualified creditor who has not acceded to the trust deed.

(2) Subject to sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) below, where notice has been given in terms of sub-paragraph (1) above then the creditors who did not accede to the trust deed shall be deemed to be parties to the discharge of the trustee.

(3) A qualified creditor who has not acceded to the trust deed may within 28 days of the date of the notice given in terms of sub-paragraph (1) above apply to the court for an order setting aside his deemed participation in the discharge of the trustee.

(4) The court shall make such an order if, but only if, it is satisfied that the conduct of the trustee has been such as to preclude a deemed discharge from the creditor concerned.'.

With this we will discuss Government amendment No. 47.

I shall not spend a great deal of time discussing this amendment. It deals with a matter that I raised in Committee. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland drew attention to the fact that schedule 5 did not contain a provision for the discharge of the trustee in dealing with the voluntary trust deeds for creditors. I tabled the amendment to try to deal with that position. The Government's amendment is, no doubt, better drafted and I shall be happy to see it adopted.

I am grateful to the Solicitor-General for responding to the point that I made in Committee.

As the right hon. Gentleman indicated, there is no substantial difference between the two amendments. The Government amendment covers one or two minor points of detail not covered by the right hon. Gentleman's amendment. On that basis, and that basis alone, I ask the House to accept our amendment.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.