asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many jobs in the north-east are (a) directly or (b) indirectly dependent on the Trident programme.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will estimate the number of jobs in Scotland which are directly and indirectly dependent on the Trident programme.

Mr. Speaker, may I first apologise for the absence of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who is on an official visit to the Far East?

Estimates of the total number of United Kingdom jobs dependent on the Trident programme are not made on a regional basis. However, it is estimated that the Trident programme will create on average 7,500 direct and 6,000 indirect jobs over its procurement period. Construction work alone in Scotland on Trident facilities will directly employ over 2,500 in its peak year.

Is my hon. Friend aware that about 800 men at Cleveland Bridge in my constituency have been working on the cradle construction for the Trident programme and that they are bidding for further work at Faslane and Coulport?

Is he further aware that the number one fear in Darlington is that an incoming Labour Government might cancel the Trident programme and put an end to that work?

I am aware of my hon. Friend's constituency interest. We must bear in mind that, although there are many direct jobs, a significant number of indirect jobs are also involved. I am sure that my hon. Friend's constituents are as concerned as anybody that the programme should be continued.

I am grateful for my hon. Friend's reply. Does he not find it remarkable that the Opposition parties are prepared, not only to gamble with the defence of this country, but to abandon a project upon which thousands of jobs depend, especially in the west of Scotland?

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. About 4,500 Ministry of Defence civilian employees currently work on the deterrent at Coulport, Faslane and Rosyth. If it comes to cancelling Polaris and Trident, the work for 2,000 employees will be lost in Rosyth unless it is replaced by other nuclear submarine work.

Will the Minister reflect that his strictures about job losses, particularly in Scotland, come ill from his mouth, when his Government. have lost nearly 20,000 jobs in Scotland because of the mismanagement of North sea oil?

Ask a question about Trident.

They will lose a lot more with Trident. On the question of Trident, will the Minister confirm that the construction work at Rosyth is not exclusively for Trident but is for dual-streaming and could be used for SSNs and SSKs?

On the second part of the hon. Gentleman's question, it is certainly true that it could be so used, but a reason why we are having to put in those facilities is the much larger size of Trident submarines. Therefore, they need extra facilities.

The Government cannot be blamed for the fall in the price of oil across the world and the decline of the North sea oil industry. The Opposition could be blamed for having policies that will destroy jobs in Scotland.

Will the Minister say how many jobs will be put at risk, particularly in the Royal Ordnance factories, at Swan Hunter, and at Marconi, because of the Trident's impact on the defence procurement programme?

No jobs are being put at risk in that direction at the moment. We have a large ordering programme.

My hon. Friend has referred to job losses in the north-east and Scotland. Will he note that in Barrow over 4,000 people, or 30 per cent. of the work force, are currently employed on the Trident programme, and that by 1990 75 per cent., or more than 9,000 people, will be employed on that programme? What are the prospects for those jobs if an incoming Labour or alliance/Labour Government cancel Trident overnight? What will 9,000 of my constituents do?

I am afraid that the impact on my hon. Friend's constituency will be devastating, and whatever plans there are to substitute that work they will take so long to come through that in the short-term those people will find themselves on the street.

Does the Minister realise that whatever jobs are tied to Trident in defined communities in Britain they are as nothing to the jobs that have been and will be lost as a result of the cut in conventional expenditure in the rest of Britain's defence industries? Does he realise that 1,800 jobs have already been lost at Westland as a result of the Government——

Order. That may well be, but the question is about Trident.

Does the Minister realise that the Trident expenditure has already cost 1,800 jobs in Yeovil and will cost more, and that the people of Yeovil have nothing to thank Trident for, because we are bearing the first fruits of this bitter pill?

There is no direct relationship between Trident and the orders at Westland.

Does my hon. Friend agree that the cancellation of Trident would, obviously, be serious for job losses? If Trident were cancelled, does he agree that it would be even more serious in terms of the destabilisation of NATO and our position in it?

I could not agree more with my hon. and learned Friend. There is no doubt that our commitment to our independent deterrent is, indeed, important.

The Minister knows well that 95 per cent. of the people employed in the defence industries in the north-east and Scotland are producing non-nuclear defence equipment. With the cuts that must come in the defence budget falling on non-nuclear defence equipment to pay for Trident, far more people will lose their jobs than those now employed on Trident. Why does the Minister not admit those facts?

It is difficult to admit that when the cost of Trident is falling.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence when he next plans to meet the United States Secretary for Defence to discuss nuclear defence policy.

My right hon. Friend next expects to meet the United States Secretary of Defence at the spring meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.

Now that the American authorities have admitted that the W79 nuclear shell has been deployed in West Germany, and that as long ago as Montebello the decision was taken to modernise battlefield nuclear weapons, how can the Minister justify the wholly contradictory, deceitful replies given from the Government Dispatch Box to my hon. Friends——

Order. Will the hon. Gentleman withdraw the word deceitful, please?

I shall withdraw deceitful. How can the Minister justify the replies that he and his colleagues gave to my hon. Friends the Members for Woolwich (Mr. Cartwright), for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown) and for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Wallace) that no such decisions had been taken?

I can certainly justify exactly what has been said, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will listen carefully to what has been said on that particular issue. At the Montebello meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in 1983 NATO agreed both a major reduction in the number of its theatre nuclear weapons in Europe and the need for possible improvements to ensure the effectiveness of the remaining stockpile. That was clearly set out in the communiqué issued at the Montebello meeting. Since then SACEUR has put forward his proposals for these improvements and these have been pursued with the individual nations concerned. But, as Defence Ministers have made clear to the House, no decisions affecting the modernisation of theatre nuclear weapons in service with British forces have yet been made. That is what we have said, that is correct, and it is completely straightforward.

Will my right hon. Friend ask the Secretary of State to remind the American Defence Secretary that during the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles, which are important to the twin-track negotiations, the alliance parties and the Labour party voted in this House against their deployment? Although today they try to pretend otherwise, that was how they acted at that time.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. He is of course entirely correct. Although some other parties in the House have sought to re-write the history of their actions in this House, only the Government have consistently adhered to the deployment of ground launched cruise missiles and Pershing 2 without which no INF negotiations would be taking place at the moment.

Will the Minister remind his right hon. Friend, when he next meets the United States Defence Secretary, that the new Chairmen of both of the Armed Services Committees in Congress, Mr. Les Aspin and Sam Nunn, are a good deal more nuclear-allergic than their predecessors? They probably typify a growing understanding throughout the Alliance of the importance of early INF agreement in Europe, about which the Prime Minister should be careful not to appear to be quibbling or dragging her feet?

In both the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States there is a total understanding that we can deter a nuclear threat only with nuclear weapons. The only allergy to nuclear defence exists on the Opposition Front Bench. They are undermining the whole of the NATO posture of a combination of nuclear and conventional deterrence?

Does my right hon. Friend not find it slightly strange to be questioned about the detail of nuclear policy by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Mossley Hill (Mr. Alton), bearing in mind that he represents a party in which 83 per cent. of the prospective parliamentary candidates are committed to unilateralism?

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for reminding us of that very important statistic. While we are on the subjects of polls, I noticed a very interesting poll produced in the Sunday press last Sunday. The sample was asked "Which party do you trust to make the right decisions about defence, nuclear weapons and disarmament?" In reply, 42 per cent. said the Conservatives, only 20 per cent. said Labour and the Liberal—SDP alliance was the least trusted of all parties, with only 15 per cent. support.

It is quite clear from the Minister of State's replies that his answers are now written by the politburo in Smith Square and are not really Government answers at all, or perhaps they are written by the chairman of the Conservative party himself. To return to the question, there is a certain amount of confusion. I do not charge the right hon. Gentleman with deceit. However, there is a certain amount of confusion between what was said in this House and what is said by some American officials. Will the right hon. Gentleman clarify the position? As I understand it, a decision was taken——

Put the question.

I will put my question in my own way.

As I understand it a general decision was taken at Montebello to modernise the remaining NATO theatre or tactical nuclear weapons. Is the Minister of State saying that British tactical nulear weapons and those American nuclear weapons that could be available to British forces in Germany were excluded from the Montebello agreement, or included? If they were included, a decision in principle has been taken.

The right hon. Gentleman must carefully study what I have said. The position is absolutely clear. A decision in favour of the modernisation of the residual stockpile was taken at Montebello as part of the agreement. However, as for the implementation of that decision in relation to theatre nuclear weapons in service with British forces, no decisions have yet been made.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence on how many occasions he has met representatives of the Atomic Veterans Associations and of the Section Ten Abolition Group; and if he has any plans to meet them in the future.

My right hon. Friend met a delegation including members of the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association and the Section Ten Abolition Group on 20 February 1986 and I received a petition concerning section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 from members of the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association on 13 November 1986. I understand that my noble Friend the Minister of State for Defence Procurement has agreed to meet representatives of the BNTVA.

The Minister will be aware that both those organisations are concerned with the welfare of ex-service and service personnel. Will he recognise that those ex-service men and women who have been disabled by negligence will continue their fight for the same right to sue for compensation as is to be given to present members of the armed services? Will he further recognise, on the question of bullying and brutality in the Army—another aspect of negligence—that hon. Members on both sides of the House have——

Order. I cannot relate that to atomic veterans.

I suggest that brutality in the armed forces is an aspect of negligence. Therefore, in so far as officers are being negligent, and hon. Members on both sides of the House have additional evidence that that brutality is taking place, will the Minister now undertake to meet a deputation of hon. Members from both sides of the House to discuss that evidence?

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence and I have made it plain that bullying and any mistreatment of soldiers is not and never has been tolerated in the British armed forces. My right hon. Friend and I are always happy to meet hon. Members and delegations to discuss any topic.

If the Government honestly believe that no British service man suffered injury as a result of the British nuclear weapons test, why do the Minister and his colleagues seem so reluctant to have that view tested in the courts?

The announcement by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence on 8 December last involving the Government's support for repeal of section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 showed a welcome change in law and procedure. That change, removing the burden from service men who could not sue for negligence, must be for the future and is certainly not retrospective.

With regard to the atomic experiment veterans, as the Government have been conducting only a statistical exercise, may we now have a firm date when the results of that exercise will be given to the House? Is the hon. Gentleman aware that, although we accept that no degree of bullying should be tolerated in the British Army, there is great concern about the recent number of cases which have come forward? It is necessary that the Government should not only conduct an internal inquiry, but should publish the results of whatever inquiry is carried out and say what steps they will take to eradicate any possibilities of it in the future.

Any complaints to do with the mistreatment of soldiers are always fully and properly investigated by the Ministry of Defence. I said on Second Reading of the Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Bill, the purpose of which is to abolish section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act, that we expect the report on the survey carried out by the National Radiological Protection Board to be received by the end of this calendar year. That is our expectation.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he is satisfied with the notification and investigation procedures regarding low-flying aircraft incidents; and if he will make a statement.

The investigation of low-flying aircraft incidents is a centralised responsibility within the Ministry of Defence. All instances where there is a prima facie case of a breach of low-flying regulations are subjected to full investigation. These are very thorough and I am satisfied with the operation of this procedure.

I thank the Minister for that reply. I appreciate the efforts that he is making in his office to discuss with hon. Members many issues relating to low-flying aircraft activity which constituents raise with us. It has been suggested to me that last year, for example, the Ministry of Defence in response to inquiries by The Observer, stated that there had been no collisions involving American F111 jets. That subsequently proved not to be the case, according to the Minister's recent written answer to me. Will the hon. Gentleman consider this matter, because genuine confusion seems to have been created in the public's mind by some of the public utterances of Ministry of Defence officials?

Conservative Members are very proud of the great skill of our RAF pilots in low flying, and I am sure that that sentiment is shared by all hon. Members. The RAF pilots perform a difficult job. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will join me in complimenting the RAF. As for The Observer article, if the hon. Gentleman cares to table a question or to write to me about it, I shall certainly have the matter investigated and respond to him.

Although I accept absolutely the necessity for low-flying training by the RAF, will my hon. Friend study the low-flying areas and consider whether they can be extended so that the frequency of visits by low-flying aircraft can be spread rather more widely?

It was the last Labour Government who, quite correctly, changed the basis of the low-flying areas. That change was implemented some eight or nine years ago and involved permitting low flying anywhere in the country except over large towns and air traffic control zones. I do not hold out any hope to my hon. Friend for any basic change in that system.

How many complaints have been made to the Department about such flights taking place at excessively low levels or at excessive speed? How many of those complaints have led to disciplinary action against MOD staff?

Over the past five years we have received approximately 5,000 complaints per annum from the public about alleged low-flying incidents. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the low-flying restrictions only permit pilots to fly down to 250 ft. I recently answered a question on the number of disciplinary actions taken. However, I shall write to the hon. Gentleman with the details to refresh his memory of the answer that I gave.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many small firms have consulted the Ministry of Defence small firms advice division; and if he will make a statement.

Over 500 in the four months since my noble Friend the Minister of State for Defence Procurement and my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State with responsibility for small businesses announced the MOD small firms initiative. The initiative is designed to increase competitive opportunities and to secure best value for money. The small firms advice division advises small firms seeking to penetrate the defence market individually, and through regional seminars, about MOD procurement policies.

I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. This service is a great encouragement to small firms in a wide range of areas. How many small firms have taken advantage of the opportunities offered by the MOD small firms advice service to get involved in defence research?

One part of this initiative is the small firms research initiative, which provides oppportunities for small firms with ideas for new and innovative products and processes to apply for a larger share of defence research funds. To date about 150 firms have been involved.

How many of those small firms have been placed on the list set up by his noble Friend Lord Trefgarne for the purchase of equipment?

I believe that the figure is about 200.

Will my hon. Friend consider making it a requirement for prime contractors to pay their small subcontractors more promptly? However good the work of the small firms advice service, the late payment of bills by main contractors to small subcontractors is a major cause of concern.

In principle the Ministry has no authority to intervene, because the matter is between the prime contractor and the subcontractor or supplier. However, there is a code of practice for competitive subcontracting that encourages prime contractors to pass to subcontractors payment terms no less favourable than those applying to the main contractor. Our payment terms are very good.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence when he last met the French Defence Minister; and what was discussed.

My right hon. Friend visited France on 9 and 10 March. He discussed a range of issues of mutual defence interest with M. Giraud. I have placed in the Library a copy of my right hon. Friend's opening statement at the press conference he held with M. Giraud.

Is the Government's wavering attitude towards the INF talks the result of the French Government's influence, or are we seeking to influence the French Government in favour of a zero-zero option? Surely that would be a good price to pay to remove all intermediate nuclear weapons from Europe? How far does co-operation with the French have a serious influence upon our attitude towards those talks?

The policy of the British Government has been entirely consistent—as has been the policy of the other NATO countries—towards the INF agreement. We are seeking to foster co-operation with the French in a variety of ways.

With regard to wavering, I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman has not addressed himself to the problem that he faces. Previously he has been campaigning enthusiastically against nuclear weapons, partly as a member of the national executive of CND, but now, presumably, he will be doing much more than wavering by campaigning enthusiastically for the Liberal-SDP Eurobomb.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that if the Government were to accept the Liberal party's advice to purchase the French M4 and M5 missiles the cancellation costs of Trident would be in excess of £3 billion? Given the present vogue for massage, would that be a gross massage of public expenditure?

I agree with my hon. Friend that that is one of the many unrealistic and impractical options that the Liberal-SDP alliance has put forward as an alternative to Trident. It is our assessment that if we were to take that route the time scale would not meet our needs and the costs would be substantially greater.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is a source of particular pleasure that so much excellent progress has been made with the French Government in the recent talks? Does he agree also that this progress is suitable as a further platform for strengthening European security?

My hon. Friend is right. We are encouraged by the progress that we have made with our French allies. We hope to deepen the dialogue that we have had with them.

Is it not the case that the French would be happy and content to have a European nuclear deterrent provided that there was only one finger on the trigger, and that finger happened to be French? If that is what the Liberal-SDP alliance wants, why does it not tell us that loud and clear?

I agree with my hon. Friend that the command and control arrangements that are implicit in what the Liberal-SDP alliance puts forward are completely incompatible with our own requirements. The French prize highly the independence of their own deterrent, as we do ours.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment his Department has made of the effects upon the British Army of the Rhine of NATO's possible use of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe.

The effects of nuclear weapons would be entirely dependent on the number and the yield of the weapons used. However, the central purpose of the possession of nuclear weapons is to ensure that a potential aggressor cannot contemplate either conventional or nuclear attack. That policy has had more than 40 years of uninterrupted success in western Europe.

Will the Minister admit that the decision was taken in Montebello in 1983 to modernise battlefield nuclear shells, which are potentially lethal to British troops at the front and which are already in the NATO stockpile? Does he agree that Ministers have misled the House on this issue over the years and that they should now resign?

The hon. Gentleman is wholly incorrect. If he wants to pursue the issue, I hope that he will address himself to how the Labour party, with its non-nuclear policy, will provide any sort of protection for the British Army of the Rhine.

Is not the factor of the shorter-range nuclear weapons in Europe one of the most important aspects of any agreement to be reached on INF? Would we not be wrong to go ahead blindly into an INF pact without addressing the problem? Will my right hon. Friend be reassured by the fact that most people in Britian are just as worried about the Russian preponderance of small-sized nuclear weapons as they are about medium ones?

My hon. Friend is entirely correct. It would certainly make no sense at all to enter into an INF agreement if we did not introduce some constraints over the shorter-range Soviet systems, in which the Soviet Union has an enormous superiority and which it can use perfectly well to cover those targets that are currently covered by its long-range INF forces. That is why we have made it quite clear that collateral constraints on some of the short-range systems are an integral part of any sensible INF agreement.

That is nonsense. You will regret saying that, Stanley.

Order.

He did not mean that.

Order. I do not know what the Minister meant.

Does the Minister accept that had it not been for Dan Plesch's work under freedom of information legislation in the United States of America, Britain would never have known of the modernisation programme that has taken place? Is he aware that I have a book with me that sets out three years of ambigous answers from Ministers and ambigous letters to individual hon. Members, all in the language of ambiguity and all trying to deny that the modernisation process has been undertaken? Why is it that the Government have sought to mislead Parliament for three and a half years in this way? Why did they not tell the truth after Montebello?

The hon. Gentleman, not for the first time, is talking absolute nonsense. The results of the Montebello meeting were set out in a public communiqué that has been in the Library of both Houses for over four years.

Will my right hon. Friend confirm that there will be no use by NATO countries of battlefield nuclear weapons or any other weapons unless they are attacked first, and that that is the whole basis of NATO's strategy?

I fully agree with my hon. Friend The whole essence of the possession of nuclear weapons is to provide an essential element of deterrence. That is the whole philosophy, and it has worked in theory and in practice for more than 40 years.

The right hon. Gentleman may have made an error earlier when he said that the agreement on short-range weapons was an integral part of INF negotiations. Would he like, on consideration, to withdraw that statement? Does the point that he made in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Tyne Bridge (Mr. Clelland), that no decisions have been made, as far as British forces are concerned, to modernise after the Montebello agreement, also apply to the weapons that are currently owned by the United States but which are in British care at the moment, namely, shells? Have they been modernised? Have any British forces been engaged in any exercises using modern shells?

Dealing with the second part of the lion. Gentleman's question first, the answer that I gave applies to nuclear weapons that are British-produced and, therefore, in British custody, and to American-produced weapons that are assigned for service with British forces. As far as the first part of the hon. Gentleman's question is concerned, nothing that I have said today is different from what has previously been said in the House. I refer the hon. Gentleman to what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said on this point on 12 March. I repeat it for his convenience. She said:

"An INF agreement must provide for restraints on those shorter-range systems which could he used to circumvent an INF agreement. These are the longer-range SRINF; in practice it means the Soviet SS12, SS22 and SS23. I believe that the draft treaty tabled by the United States will do that effectively."—[Official Report, 12 March 1987. Vol. 112, c. 461.]

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will list the numbers and types of representations on different defence and disarmament options which he has received from members of the public since the beginning of the current year.

According to available records, my Department so far in 1987 has received some 340 letters from right hon. and hon. Members and directly from the general public on defence policy and disarmament issues. Most of these are either requests for information or comments on aspects of nuclear policy and arms control.

Did any of the comments and suggestions in the party document "Europe's New Detente" include the ludicrous suggestion that there might be individual sets of negotiations with individual Warsaw Pact countries on conventional arms reductions, excluding the Soviet Union?

I notice that that publication has emerged only recently. I am not surprised that we have not had any representations in relation to it, but I expect that we shall certainly have some. I fully agree with my hon. Friend. It would be a ludicrous posture for any British Government to adopt.

Given the nature of the Warsaw Pact, is it not laughable to imagine that countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia would be allowed to make individual agreements with any Western countries, given the fact that hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops are stationed in those countries to hold down subject populations?

My hon. Friend makes a telling point. Our arms control posture is served well by advancing on a NATO-wide basis. That is the only sensible basis on which we can pursue negotiations on behalf of the Alliance as a whole.

How many representations has the Minister had concerning the deployment of cruise missiles at Molesworth? Will he confirm that cruise missiles have been taken to Molesworth this week in advance of the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev? Is this not a deliberate attempt to escalate world tension?

I can provide no such confirmation to the hon. Gentleman. I am quite certain that the great majority of people in this country now recognise that it is only by the successful deployment of NATO cruise missiles and Pershing 2 that we now have the possibility of making real progress in getting rid of a major class of weapons.

Will my right hon. Friend confirm that, in defence terms, the cancellation of Trident makes about as much sense as the Labour party conference decision in the 1930s to scrap the Royal Air Force?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reminding us of that very important piece of history. The removal of the British independent strategic deterrent makes absolutely no sense whatsover, just as it makes no sense whatsover to attempt to resist and to deter the nuclear threat with conventional weapons, which is the absurd policy of the Opposition Front Bench.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects to publish the 1987 Defence White Paper.

No decision has yet been taken. As in previous years, however, I hope that it will be possible to publish in the spring, in good time for an examination by the Select Committee on Defence and a full debate in the House before the summer recess.

Is the Minister aware that acknowledged experts in the field fully expect the 1987 White Paper to be yet another exercise in papering over the cracks that have resulted from the salami-style process of cuts during the last seven or eight years of defence expenditure? Does he not feel that the time is right for a full-scale defence review before the election?

I confidently expect the Defence White Paper to spell out very clearly what are the Government's defence policies, which is more than I can say of the defence policies of the alliance.

Is my hon. Friend able to say whether the 1987 White Paper will refer to the excellent decision of the Secretary of State to reprieve the Royal Military School of Music? Is he aware that this is a great day for Army bands, military music, Kneller Hall and Twickenham? May I thank my hon. Friend, his colleagues and the Prime Minister for their interest in this great decision, which will uphold standards for future generations?

I cannot comment on what will be in the Defence White Paper, but I can pay a great tribute to my hon. Friend for his powers of advocacy and persuasion in terms of reaching this decision.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what representations he has received seeking the deployment of an increased number of short-range nuclear weapons; and if he will make a statement.

We have no records of any such representations recently. However, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said in the INF debate on 9 March, NATO has called for a ceiling in Soviet shorter-range INF missiles in the 500 to 1,000 km range, with a United States right to match them.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is extremely dangerous to negotiate only about medium-range missiles and not to take into account the short-range missiles—the SS1, the SS23 and the SS12, which have a range of 1,000 km? Bearing in mind also that in conventional weapons the NATO countries are outnumbered by the Warsaw Pact by 3:1 and 2:1 on land, sea and in the air, should we not take that into account to protect our country and our freedom?

My hon. Friend is most certainly correct. As I said previously, it is part of the NATO position that the INF agreement has to deal also with the constraints on the shorter-range systems.

Will the Minister of State clarify what he said in answer to question 10? He seemed to go further than the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence when he said that short-range missiles were an integral part—"integral" was, I think, the word that he used— of an agreement on intermediate-range missiles. Is that the Government's position? If they are an integral part of that agreement, and if no agreement is reached on short-range missiles, presumably there will be no agreement on intermediate-range missiles.

All that I said is entirely in accordance with what was said by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence and also by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. I shall remind the right hon. Gentleman of exactly what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence said in the House on 9 March about the INF. He said:

"That is why part of NATO's negotiating position since 1982 has been that any INF agreement should include constraints on SRINF missiles of the 500 km to 1,000 km range, which means the Soviet Scaleboard and SS23 missiles. The NATO proposal has remained broadly the same over those years. It calls for a ceiling in Soviet systems of this range, together with a United States right to match them. It is an essential condition for any equitable INF agreement, but the Soviet Union has yet to agree it."—[Official Report, 9 March. 1987; Vol. 112, c. 40–41.]

That is the position.

asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a further statement on the implications for Her Majesty's Government's defence policy of the removal from Europe of intermediate nuclear forces.

We are confident that we shall be able to maintain effective deterrence in the event of an INF agreement on the basis outlined by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in the House on 12 March.

Is the Minister of State ready to reconsider the answers that he has given to previous questions? Will he accept that an INF agreement is indispensable for getting a scale-down of nuclear weapons in Europe? While we are all concerned about the removal of battlefield and theatre nuclear weapons, that should not be a precondition for reaching an agreement on INF.

It is certainly the case that an INF agreement is very important, but all my answers referred to the shorter-range INF systems, as the hon. Gentleman will clearly see when he looks at the text. I do not think that we need to take any lectures from the hon. Gentleman about the importance of an INF agreement. If we had followed the Labour party's policy of not deploying ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing 2 there would be no INF negotiations today.