I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this, we are to discuss Government amendment No. 10.

This Bill is a serious measure dealing with serious matters. I think that every member, from which ever side of the House, of the Standing Committee would agree that it was considered very seriously in Committee and that Government, Official Opposition and SLD Members made their best contributions to try to improve its wording. For that, I pay tribute to all concerned.

New clause is accompanied by Government amendment No. 10, which relates to the schedule that would go with the new clause. The schedule relates to compensation procedures for third parties whose land interests are affected by security measures. This matter was raised in Committee, and the Government indicated that they would introduce appropriate legislation. Both the clause and the schedule parallel existing provisions available under aviation security provisions.

Although, when the Bill was drafted, it was not envisaged that such compensation facilities would ever be needed—indeed, experience of the aviation provisions supports that view—it seems right to have a system available to ensure that no third party would ever be unduly penalised by security works. The compensation will be paid by the person who carried out the work required by a direction. It would be for him to decide how to finance the cost of the compensation, although, in all likelihood, it would be treated in the same way as any other security provision cost.

Despite the probably infrequent use of this clause, I commend its addition to the Bill as a necessary safeguard for, and help to, those people indirectly affected by the Bill's proposals.

In Committee, the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran) in particular was worried about how disagreements on levels of compensation might be settled. The proposed schedule in amendment No. 10 is modelled on a schedule that is already available in the Aviation Security Act 1982, which provides that the values will be calculated in accordance with rules laid down in the Land Compensation Act 1961.

In the event of any disagreement, the matter can be referred to the Lands Tribunal for settlement.

I think that the hon. Gentleman was also concerned about how the costs might be applied to certain people who were affected. I draw the hon. Gentleman's attention to clause 28(2), which allows that any person given a direction requiring works that affect a third party can object to it because the measures are excessively onerous. The onerousness could come from the level of compensation being sought. The minimum objection period of 30 days could be lengthened by the Secretary of State while the issue is resolved—probably by reference to the Lands Tribunal.

I hope that the new clause, which we discussed in outline in Committee, and the accompanying schedule commend themselves to the House.

I thank the Minister for the way in which he has introduced the new clause, which, as he made clear, deals with points that we raised in Committee.

I seek clarification of one or two aspects of the new clause. The Minister for Aviation and Shipping led us to expect that, under the new clause, the harbour board would be responsible for all compensation but it now appears that the party who is subject to the notice will be liable for his own compensation. That is obviously progress, although the Opposition remain concerned about a number of matters.

We have a now elaborate system of direction and enforcement notices, set out in legislation and backed by severe penalties but, as I understand it, where no compulsory powers are attached to the operation of the directions, any third party can stifle the operation and intention of a direction or enforcement notice served by the Secretary of State. That is a cause for concern not in respect of the more mundane changes that may be required in security arrangements—day-to-day changes, which are subject to negotiation—but in respect of urgent circumstances. Perhaps the Minister will explain exactly what will happen in such urgent cases.

I also seek clarification of the effect of the notices and directions. I am sure that the Minister is familiar with the circumstances in planning law under which property can become blighted. Is it possible that property will become blighted as a result of the service of directions, and what are the implications of that?

On the broader issues, we accept and welcome the new clause, because it takes account of the serious points made in Committee.

With the leave of the House, Mr. Speaker. Perhaps Ministers' explanations in Committee were not as clear as they might have been. The hon. Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran) has correctly understood that the directions can apply to any party, and that it is the party to whom the directions apply who will be responsible for awarding compensation to third parties who are affected; it could be a harbourmaster, it could be a shipping line or it could be another party.

I hope to go a long way to answering a number of the hon. Gentleman's questions by explaining that it seems likely that in many cases the works that need to be carried out will be works in the harbour area. In circumstances in which the works fall within the harbour area, the Bill settles the matter clearly because the directions within the harbour area overrule any other Act or rule of law—that is made clear in clause 34—and will apply irrespective of anything that might be in contract. If the works are in the harbour, it is clear that the direction takes precedence. The party to whom the direction has been addressed is responsible for ensuring that the works are carried out and can compensate a third party. In other words, the third party may well be within the harbour area.

For example, a harbour authority may be given a direction which required it to construct a wall. That wall may impinge upon a third party—for example, a shipping line which has property within the harbour area. The direction within the harbour area would take precedence over any other Act or rule of law or contract, but the harbourmaster would arrange compensation with the third party in that case.

My hon. Friend will be aware that we have discussed the concerns of the British Ports Federation on this point and the requirement on my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State under the Bill to order harbour authorities to demolish or alter buildings. Can my hon. Friend tell me whether the new clause has the agreement of the British Ports Federation and also meets the precise point with which the federation has been in consultation with the Department of Transport?

I have no further information about what discussions may have continued about that since we last spoke about it. Perhaps I will receive more news during the course of the debate and I will come back to my hon. Friend about that if I do.

So far as I can understand the new clause, it appears to meet the precise point that the British Ports Federation asked me to make in Committee.

I realise that my hon. Friend made his intervention in a helpful spirit, and I hope to give him some confirmation about that.

In response to the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South, I believe that it is rather unlikely that a third party outside the harbour area would be affected. If we were considering the construction of a wall along the boundary of the harbour and the adjoining area, the rules governing party walls, which I understand are general rules to be found in planning law, would apply.

If we were considering a matter that took the harbour authority considerably outside its own terrain, the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South would be right to say that there was nothing in the new clause to force the third party to grant that the necessary works be carried out. On the other hand, in such an unlikely event, there is a method in the new clause to settle the compensation.

To show how unlikely that event is, I should say that, during the time that the equivalent provisions have been in operation for aviation security, there have been no cases in which such compensation has had to be paid. Whereas most cases are likely to be within the harbour area, it is likely that the parties would agree among themselves on compensation. If a direction was given to the harbour authority and perhaps a corresponding direction to a shipping company and each must carry out works, I imagine that they would probably agree between themselves on appropriate compensation, although there is a fallback, in that it can be referred to the Lands Tribunal.

What about blight?

It seems most unlikely that blight will arise. The probability is that the works would be within the harbour area. I cannot see blight occuring within a harbour area, and that would not be blight in any commonly accepted way. I find it hard to imagine, except perhaps through the building of a wall along a boundary, what works would go far outside the harbour area. That is why the question of blighting does not arise. If, on reflection the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South believes that there is a point to pursue on that, perhaps he can take it up with me in correspondence.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to take the following: Government amendments Nos. 1 to 3.

Amendment No. 11, in clause 29, page 32, line 7, after 'Act)', insert,

'provided that the best endeavours of the Secretary of State have failed to secure compliance by the owner, charterer or manager of a ship with the direction to which such an enforcement notice relates,'.

Government amendments Nos. 4 to 7 and Government amendment No. 15.

The new clause follows on from the debate in Committee, in which we sought unsuccessfully to remove "master" from clause 17 and to insert "master" in subsequent clauses. Our purpose, then as now, was to recognise the reality of the world in which shipmasters operate.

In the Bill as originally drafted, the Government had implicitly recognised the difference between masters and the other three categories of persons, namely, the owners, charterers and managers, to whom directions might be given or from whom information might be sought. A distinction was made between foreign and British-owned ships. It was clear to us, and the Minister admitted in Committee, that the master of a foreign ship was being drawn into the provisions of the Bill simply because he was thought to be more accessible than the owners, charterers or managers. Opposition Members argued then and we still maintain that the onerous responsibilities and penalties that are imposed by the Bill should fall on those who have the resources and authority to comply.

Our new clause is an attempt to recognise those realities while accepting the Minister's intransigence. In new clause 2, we propose that when a direction is given, it is

"given first to the owners, charterer or manager".

In a consequential amendment, No. 11, we provide for an enforcement notice to be served on a master only when

"the best endeavours of the Secretary of State have failed to secure compliance by the owner, charterer or manager".

The National Union of Maritime, Aviation and Shipping Transport Officers complained bitterly that misconceptions about the power and authority of a shipmaster abound and that the law is being framed as though a master has complete control of his ship and can call on unlimited financial, technical and human resources. The union feels strongly that the Bill would place responsibilities on masters that legislators would not dream of placing on captains of aircraft.

A recent article on masters by Michael Gray in Lloyd's List states:

"Rich in responsibility but poverty stricken in authority would seem to sum up the wretched modern master and his miserable life afloat.…in port after port come the legions of those earnestly requesting the master's signature to sign his life away, to commit himself to all manner of circumstances over which he cannot possibly have any control whatsoever. He is required to take responsibility for matters well beyond his actual minimal authority. And no matter how energetically he notes protest, how carefully he seeks to absolve himself from the consequences of his actions, it is his signature that is on the document, it is he who is ultimately liable."

According to the article, at a recent conference, Captain Colin Evans, the secretary general of the International Federation of Shipmasters' Associations, said that he believed that

"the burden on shipmasters had increased beyond the bounds of reason.

He saw a combination of factors conspiring against the master's peace of mind—tight manning, the multi-cultural crew, ever increasing pressure to sail, to stand on, to arrive in time. The master, said Captain Evans, was just not given the resources or the authority to enable him to do his job properly."

It is in recognition of the facts as presented to us by NUMAST that we move new clause 2. Without that clause, Government amendments Nos. 1, 2 and 3 cannot be justified.

Briefly, the amendments would ensure that the same duties are imposed on masters of British ships as are imposed on masters of foreign ships. That is a retrograde step, because the real responsibility, whether they are British ships or foreign ships, lies with the owners, charterers and managers. We seek to place responsibilities on masters of British ships. It was previously acknowledged that the inclusion of "masters of foreign ships" was an expedient because it was most likely that masters could be contacted more easily than those who are actually responsible.

Surely it must be acknowledged that a master, in seeking to comply with a demand for information or with the onerous directions for search and so on, must consult his employers. He will undoubtedly need to do that, because they undoubtedly have the authority and resources. We believe that that is where responsibilities should properly be placed. Therefore, I have moved new clause 2 to give effect to those feelings.

We cannot accept the new clause moved by the hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Ms. Ruddock). For certain directions we have introduced an ability to give a direction to a master. There was considerable disquiet on this point among Opposition Members, but after considering their points, we feel that they are wholly unjustified. We shall extend the possibility of giving directions to masters only to matters on which they are competent and responsible to act. As they cannot be given directions under clause 24—the main direction-making power which can require measures to be taken—no liability is placed on them to take decisions which involve capital expenditure. That, of course, is the responsibility of the ship operator.

Masters will be likely to receive only directions which require information or prohibit them from allowing people or property to be brought near or on a ship, from allowing the ship to go to sea unless searches are carried out and from allowing a ship to go to sea unless certain modifications are carried out. All those matters are within the master's scope of responsibility.

The measures which the Minister suggests that a master might have to take are serious measures when it comes to commercial interests. It is our view that the master could not, or would not be willing to, undertake such measures unless he could consult the owners, operators or charterers.

The issues may be serious but so would the reasons why the directions were issued. We are not in the game of issuing directions for the sake of it. We are not taking the power to issue unnecessary directions or directions for minor reasons. Directions would be issued for serious reasons. They would be issued only where necessary and where, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, it was not possible to implement the same action against the ship operator.

Why does the Minister have such objection to this modest new clause? All it says is that the Secretary of State "may" give directions. Would it not be right for the Secretary of State to take a reserve power to cover all eventualities? No one expects the Minister to give directions to a master for minor reasons. Surely, in the interests of security and safety, the widest powers should be available in case they are needed.

That is exactly what we seek to do throughout the Bill. We seek to provide the widest powers possible, so that, in the eventuality, we have the right measures to require various operators to take the action that we require. If we have trouble finding the operators—I shall come to this when I deal with the Government amendments—we want to be able to serve notices on the master of the ship, because sometimes it may not be possible to trace the owners or operators as quickly as we should like.

I understand that it is convenient to speak now to Government amendments Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 15. Following the debate in Standing Committee, the Government undertook to take steps to remove the discrimination in the application of legislation to British and foreign ships. First, clause 21, which contains a power to impose restrictions on ships, can now be applied against both British and foreign ships when they are in harbour areas.

I stress that those powers of direction will not be the main way in which improvements in security will be implemented. Most directions to create a positive improvement will be given under clause 24—that is, the general powers to direct measures to be taken. The powers provided in clause 21 are for use only in certain circumstances.

I hope that my next point goes some way to answer the hon. Lady's point about amendment No. 11. We have introduced an ability to give a direction to a master. Again, the considerable disquiet about this point is not justified, because we shall extend the possibility of giving directions to masters only on those matters on which they are competent and responsible to act.

Does the Minister accept that our apprehensions relate not to his intentions, but to the way in which the law will operate in practice? As was made clear in Committee—and accepted by the Minister then—in every case the first line of contact will be the master, and no attempt will be made to contact the owner, charterer or manager, because whoever is responsible for enforcing the direction will go to the most obvious point, the master. We have tabled our amendments for that simple reason.

I appreciate the way in which the hon. Gentleman has made that point. I can only assure him time and time again that only if there are problems with contacting or communicating directly with the operator will we use the powers to contact the master. It would be wrong of us not to have those powers. That is why we have tabled our amendments and why we feel that the master needs to be included in the "final line".

If we have trouble in contacting the operator, we need to be able to contact the master. I emphasise that security reasons may be involved and that we would not do that lightly. We do not want to take that action at every stage, but if it is difficult to contact a foreign operator for whatever reason—there may be many reasons—we should be able to tell the master of the vessel that certain actions are required of him. We need the power in statute to do that. That is important.

The concern was raised in Committee, and in various other discussions with me, that we were somehow discriminating against British ship operators in favour of foreign ship operators. We had to do everything we could to explain that that was not the case and that we were taking the action so that ships of whatever nationality would be obliged to abide by what we are asking.

Even if Government amendment No. 1 is made, the clause still provides a seven-day period during which the information has to be given up. How often does the Minister think that the master of either a British or a foreign-owned ship will be in harbour for as long as seven days? Does not that period give the Minister ample time to contact the real owners, charterers or managers?

The hon. Lady raises an important issue. It is certainly true that modern ships and shipping operations are in harbour for only a brief period. That is why we need the power, if necessary, to place that responsibility and request on the master if we are having trouble in getting hold of the operator. That is an important point.

rose——

I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman, but then I should like to make some progress.

I apologise for not having scrutinised the Bill in detail, because the answer to my question may be there. Has the Minister taken the power to prevent ships from sailing if there is difficulty in contacting the owners or in getting the master to carry out the directions?

Yes: if the direction is not carried out, we have the power to prevent the ship from leaving the harbour until the direction is complied with. We have that power, and it is wholly right that we do. I do not believe that there is any difference between us on that point—there was certainly no difference on it in Committee.

If an elimination process were written into the Bill, it would inevitably cause delay, during which the ship could disappear because no prosecution or enforcement action could be effected unless it could be proved that adequate steps had been taken to reach the operator before tackling the master. A month may be necessary to convince the courts that adequate time had been given and reasonable steps taken for notifying foreign-based operators. To avoid this procedural trap and yet acknowledge and mitigate the concerns of the Opposition, it would probably be best to offer an assurance that, wherever practicable, action will always be taken against the operator first. We give that overwhelming assurance. It must be acknowledged, however, that the powers are needed at the end of the day.

No liability would be placed on the master of a ship to take decisions which involved capital expenditure. Such decisions are the responsibility of ship operators. Masters will be likely only to receive directions which require information or prohibit them from allowing people or property to be brought near or on their ship, or for the ship to go to sea unless searches are carried out or certain modifications are implemented. All these requirements come within the scope of a master's responsibility. The powers will be used only where necessary and where, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, it is not possible to impose the same requirements on a ship's operator. The provisions are far more likely to be used when dealing with the masters of foreign ships, as it is those ships that will present the most problems when it comes to locating the operators and achieving the desired results.

We are not legislating to ensure that only foreign ships implement the measures that we feel are required. Several foreign shipping lines have voluntarily introduced high levels of security standards. We want to be able to take the powers which we consider necessary. We shall always attempt, first and foremost, to contact the ship's operator and require him to give us information. When that is not possible, we feel that it is necessary to be able to serve a request upon the master of the ship. A master has considerable responsibility for the overall conduct and safe transit of his vessel.

Amendments Nos. 5 and 6 are essentially editorial. They represent an attempt to be more specific about the way in which administrative matters connected with the detention of a ship are implemented. Amendment No. 5 makes it clear that it is for an authorised person to certify that a direction has not been complied with. Amendment No. 6 places a requirement on an authorised person to deliver the certificate to the officer to detain the ship, if he does not use his powers to detain the ship himself. In both instances, a master must receive a copy of the certificate when his ship is detained, so that he knows the reasons for the detention.

I hope that the hon. Member for Southport (Mr. Fearn) and my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Mr. Field) will agree that the Government have gone a long way to meet some of the issues which were raised in Committee.

In Committee, we undertook to remove discrimination in the application of legislation to British and foreign ships. Amendments Nos. 15 and 7 ensure that that will happen, in two ways. First, the prohibition powers that are contained in clause 21 will, if the amendments are agreed to, be applied against both British ships and foreign ships when they are in harbour areas. These powers of direction will not be the main way in which we shall implement improvements to security. Most directions relating to positive improvements will come under clause 24. The powers in clause 21 are for use only in certain circumstances.

I ask the House to reject new clause 2 and to agree to the Government's amendments.

My concern is about the way in which the Government approach their responsibilities and how vigorously they intend to apply the proposed legislation. When I have approached the marine inspectorate about the alterations made to ships in harbour, which have caused people to believe that they might be unstable, quick action has been taken by the Department to put things right and to prevent a modified vessel from going to sea—this applies especially to trawlers—where there is a fear that safety and life might be endangered. That is something to be applauded.

On the other hand, there have been instances when the Department and other arms of the law have not acted in the proper spirit of the law. I have in mind especially foreign ships where the crews have not been paid Representatives of the National Union of Seamen have tried to prevent ships from sailing until the crews have been properly paid. However, the police are brought in. the representatives of the NUS are taken off the ship and arrested, the crew are simply placed on the quayside and the ship sails merrily off, having not met its international obligations and responsibility to members of the crew.

I seek from the Minister an assurance that he will act vigorously not only within the letter of the law as it will be when the Bill is passed, but within the spirit of it, so that there is no shilly-shallying. I hope that there will be nobody saying, "It's a bit difficult. It may be a marginal case so we will let things go." We have to be specific, rigorous and determined to apply the law. If the Minister gives that assurance, and subject to the advice of my hon. Friends on the Front Bench, I will not vote against the Government's amendments.

I hope that my hon. Friend can confirm that the amendments meet the concerns expressed by the General Council of British Shipping about foreign vessels and the ability of the Secretary of State to get to grips with them. If that is the case, as I believe it is, the deputy director-general of the council, Jim Buckley, has asked me to convey the council's gratitude to my hon. Friends for their acceptance of these amendments.

I was surprised by what the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) said, because it seemed to be more in accord with our views than those of his Front Bench spokesmen.

indicated dissent.

I see him denying that, and I do not want to embarrass him.

We are introducing a new kind of legislation, which is a mirror image of the security set up in the aviation industry as much as possible, although one cannot tie up the two word for word because of some differences. As a result of this legislation, we shall have on the statute book a set of directions that we can make and require companies to carry out. In such circumstances, I am conscious that it would be wholly wrong if foreign vessels were allowed to operate under a different set of rules from British operators and vessels. This legislation is designed solely to meet security directions, so it would not be a proper use of the legislation to extend it outside that power. That is an important point, but I am aware of the hon. Gentleman's concerns about the wider implications for the shipping industry.

I can give my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Mr. Field) the assurance that these amendments meet the various points brought to our attention by the General Council of British Shipping. I have explained some of the reasons why we have accepted them, one of which is that it would be wrong to introduce regulations applying to British shipping but not to foreign vessels. That is why we have tabled the amendments. I hope that they find favour with the House.

We are most disappointed by the Government's response to new clause 2, because we tried to produce a compromise. In Committee, the Minister assured us, as he has been assuring us all afternoon, that there will definitely be an attempt to contact, first and foremost, those who are truly responsible—the owners, the charterers and the managers. We are delighted that he has made that clear, but because he has done so, we find it difficult to understand why, after we has so carefully introduced this compromise and tried to reach agreement with him, he has been unable to accept the new clause. However, as he has made his position clear and I do not expect to persuade him any further, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 13, in clause 10, in page 15, line 6, leave out

'or by threats of any kind'.

No. 14, in clause 11, in page 15, line 27, at end insert—

'(c) by its nature or design, is intended to raise the apprehension that it is intended to destroy or damage a ship or fixed platform, or endanger the safe navigation of a ship, or safety of a fixed platform.'.

New clause 3 relates to discussions that we had in Committee, when I set out in detail events when a hoax bomb was planted on a gas production platform in Morecambe bay.

One matter that caused me concern when I read the details of the event was trying to relate it to what the Government propose in the Bill, which creates more that 40 new offences—some of them serious and carrying the most serious penalties—and a mass of restrictions and regulations, and a bureaucratic system of direction and enforcement. However, nowhere in the Bill have the Government or industry been given the responsibility to do the simplest thing—to train and to prepare for the type of events that occurred on that platform.

New clause 3 requires the Secretary of State to give directions which would apply to owners and managers of fixed platforms to meet the gap in the legislation.

For the benefit of hon. Members who were not able to hear the Committee proceedings, I shall summarise the circumstances surrounding the events on the CCP gas production platform in Morecambe bay which was operated by a subsidiary of British Gas.

On 9 October 1989, at about 8.30 am, a suspected bomb was found on the platform. None of the men on the platform was notified until about one hour later, and then they were not given detailed reasons why they were expected to gather at the muster points and life stations. It was not until a quarter past ten in the morning that the men were told that a bomb had been found, and that caused some alarm. It transpired that a taped package, measuring 6 in by 7 in, with wires that appeared to be a timing device attached, had been found in a cellar close to one of the 26 in gas riser pipes coming on to the platform. A number of such high pressure pipelines come on to the platform and all the men knew that they were of the same sort that exploded on the Piper Alpha platform and caused that tragedy. Therefore, there was some concern among the work force.

The men were kept at the muster stations in the recreation area until 2.30 pm, when the installation's operations manager decided to address them. He told them little more than they had been told in the morning, but he confirmed that the bomb had been found and that bomb disposal squads were not expected until 4 o'clock. Again, that caused some concern.

The men were aware that the package had been discovered at 8.30 am, and they were also well aware from all the hectic activity around them—the naval vessels and helicopters—that experts who would have been able to deal with a bomb were in the area because of the Conservative party conference which was taking place a few miles away in Blackpool. They could not understand why the experts could not reach the platform any sooner than 4 o'clock, despite the fact that the bomb had been found about eight hours previously.

The men were not told until 6 o'clock that the bomb disposal squad had decided to try to blow up the suspected bomb, and that also caused considerable concern. The men were aware that attempts had been made to depressurise the pipelines, but one had not been depressurised and the consequences of a bomb exploding in those circumstances would have been horrific.

Throughout the day, there had been some panic and pressure from the men to get off the platform, but none was allowed to leave. They were threatened that if they went off they would not be allowed back. Effectively, they were told that their jobs were on the line. I have told that story because it is a graphic example of a real emergency. I understand that legal proceedings are likely to follow.

As it took place on an offshore installation, the incident relates at least to part II of the Bill. According to the evidence that I have been given so far, the management dealt with it in a way that could not possibly be described as skilful; it could, indeed, have been calculated to cause the maximum distress. The men had no idea what to do. The arrival of the specialist bomb disposal experts was considerably delayed, and all their requests to be evacuated were refused. Although the package proved eventually to be a hoax, no one knew that until the disposal squad had dismantled it; meanwhile, unnecessary distress was caused. That could easily have been dealt with by management, who could have evacuated the platform.

In the Bill, the Government have created more than 40 new offences. They have also created a very bureaucratic system of direction and enforcement notices, yet the Secretary of State has not been given the simple power to require training and exercises to deal with such incidents. The problem is not hypothetical; oil and gas platforms are vulnerable, volatile and dangerous. In the event of a further hoax, or even the placing of a real explosive device on a platform, the men must not be subjected to such pressures again.

In Committee, the Minister said that he would contact the Department of Energy as a matter of urgency, and I shall be interested to learn whether the Department has any lessons to pass on. In the meantime, the new clause would allow the Secretary of State to enforce a requirement for training and exercises.

Amendment No. 13 would deal with a problem that was raised on Second Reading—threats against the work force. Industrial disputes have occurred on offshore installations, and I fear that there will be more this summer as a result of offshore unrest and dissatisfaction. Few people in the industry do not expect that to happen. On previous occasions, men working on North sea platforms have been subjected to intimidation of which an offshore management would not be capable.

I can give two examples. The first relates to industrial action taken on MSV Stadive earlier this year. The ship is used in the northern sector of the North sea, in the Shetland basin, as a special response vessel: it is expected to respond to emergencies, and its crew have already dealt with two highly publicised incidents. The first involved the Chinook helicopter disaster in 1986, when they were required to collect bodies; the second was the serious blow-out 18 months ago on the Ocean Odyssey drilling rig, in which a radio operator was killed.

The vessel's crew were required to remain with the vessel, which was positioned over the blow-out well for about three weeks until the emergency had been dealt with and the well capped. It was a dedicated crew. The men were employed by a company that acted as contractor for Shell UK Ltd. Recently, Shell UK Ltd. decided to dispose of that contractor and to employ a new one. Most of the men had worked for the contractor for nine years; some of them had been there for 15 years. All were told that they were to be made redundant. If they had been working onshore, they would have had certain rights; their employers would have been under an obligation to them.

As the men appeared to have no rights, the employers entered into a battle about who would be responsible for redundancy payments. The men were left high and dry in the middle. Industrial action followed. Every member of the crew was intimidated and threatened with the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1970, which provided for a maximum fine of £2,000. That ended the industrial action. All the men were sorely intimidated.

4.30 pm

According to the drafting of the provisions, an employer faced with industrial action would be entitled to threaten his men with the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, which might lead to a £2,000 fine, and with the provisions of clauses 9 and 10, and to say that an offence had been committed. The maximum penalty in that case would be life imprisonment.

The Minister has told me that any prosecutions under this measure would require the sanction of the procurator fiscal or the Crown Office. That would carry little weight with a work force that was engaged in an industrial dispute that was perfectly legal onshore. The evidence shows that employers would use such threats and that the work force would be intimidated. For that reason, therefore, we have tabled amendment No. 13.

Amendment No. 14 is designed to deal with what was perceived in Committee to be a major gap in the legislation. I relate it to the incident in Morecambe bay. The Bill deals adequately with threats and offences. However, it does not deal with the hoax which, as the Morecambe bay incident showed, can be just as alarming as a real threat or incident. According to the amendment, any substance or package that raises

"the apprehension that it is intended to destroy or damage a ship or fixed platform, or endanger the safe navigation of a ship, or safety of a fixed platform"

would also constitute the kind of offence that appears to have occurred on the CCP platform on 9 October. In Committee, all sides appeared to accept that that was a serious gap in the legislation. I shall be pleased to hear the Minister's response.

I remind the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran) that part II is intended to allow the United Kingdom to ratify and implement the provisions of the convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against safety of maritime navigation, which is known as the Rome convention, and the linked protocol, which is known as the Rome protocol. The hon. Gentleman will remember that, in Committee, we laid considerable emphasis on the need to establish in law very exact wording that was in line with the convention and the protocol. Under the convention and the protocol, all those who ratify the convention should introduce legislation that is more or less identical, so as to ease the extradition from one country to another of those who have committed offences. If the offences are defined in exactly similar terms, that process is considerably eased. For that reason, we are reluctant to deviate from the wording in part II. I admit that the part of part II relating to warships is outside the convention, but it does not touch in any way upon the wording of agreements under the protocol. I have difficulty with the hon. Gentleman's proposals on that point.

I shall take the amendments in reverse order. The matter raised in amendment No. 14 is already covered by section 51 of the Criminal Law Act 1977. I did not say to the hon. Gentleman in Committee that I thought there was a gap. The hon. Gentleman will know rather better than I do that United Kingdom law applies on platforms by virtue of the Continental Shelf Act 1989. Subject to further comments that the hon. Gentleman might make, his point about somebody introducing a package which is meant to look like a bomb and cause anxiety or fear is extremely serious, but is already covered in United Kingdom law which I hope applies to platforms.

The Criminal Law Act 1977 certainly applies to gas platforms in the southern sector and to the gas platforms in Morecombe bay, but it would not apply to installations in the Scottish section of the North sea—those lying off Aberdeen and Shetland. There may be an equivalent measure, but that is a different point.

The hon. Gentleman helps me by saying that there may be an equivalent measure. I suspect that that is the case, but I shall try to get him some verification of that.

On amendment No. 13, I had hoped that, when we discussed the matter in Committee, I had gone a considerable way to allay the hon. Member's fears. I had hoped that I had gone so far as to make it possible for him not to introduce a further amendment on the subject. Perhaps I can remind the hon. Gentleman how far I went in Committee:

"I offer the hon. Gentleman some further comfort by telling him that, in Scotland where prosecutions are initiated by procurators fiscal, they have considerable discretion but are subject to directions from the Lord Advocate. When a new Act is introduced, the Lord Advocate circulates information and sets out the policy on prosecutions. I shall draw his attention to this part of the Bill and ask him to take account of the point that it gives effect to a convention on terrorist acts and is not intended to be used in industrial dispute cases."

The hon. Gentleman was generous when he said at column 105:

"I am especially grateful to the Minister for suggesting bringing the matter to the attention of the Lord Advocate…I am still concerned, although not enough to wish to press the matter to a vote"—

and at column 106:

"I take on board all the points that the Minister has made and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment"— [Official Report, Standing Committee A, 13 February 1990; c. 104–106.]

I cannot say any more to the hon. Gentleman today than I did on that occasion. It is perfectly clear—as my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State confirmed a moment ago in answer to the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes)—that the Bill is about terrorist acts and security, and part II is about the Rome convention and protocol. If the Bill becomes an Act, I shall have no hesitation in fulfilling the undertaking that I gave to write to the Lord Advocate and point out to him the purpose for which the Bill is intended.

In regard to new clause 3, I well understand why the hon. Gentleman was so concerned about the incident which he reported to the Committee, and to which the Committee listened with great interest, and I understand why he would want to raise the matter again. I confirm that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State has written to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Energy to draw to his attention the points that the hon. Gentleman made in Committee and to ask him to consider the matter.

I also remind the hon. Gentleman of the point that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State made in Committee: there is a distinction between the measures proposed in the Bill to render more secure a platform, ship, aircraft or installation against attack or infiltration and the procedures that should be in place so that an installation may be evacuated in case of emergency. Sound evacuation procedures must be available to deal with a bomb, fire or another emergency.

The matters raised by the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South go beyond the scope of the Bill. They apply to the security of platforms against not only terrorist attack but natural threats such as fire and explosion. I understand that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Energy has issued the directions necessary for the purpose. Having received the letter from my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary and read the remarks of the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South, he may wish to reflect further on them, but at present he believes that new clause 3 is unnecessary.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Energy is responsible for the safety of fixed platforms. He takes the view that a special regime for them is no more necessary than for, say, a large chemical factory on the mainland.

In important respects, fixed platforms differ from ships and aircraft. They do not move, except between operations, and they do not carry passengers or, equally important, passengers' luggage. There is little or no international element involved in them. Although the objectives of new clause 3 are laudable, they are outwith the scope of the Bill.

Although fixed platforms may appear to be sitting targets, they are, fortunately, difficult to approach. or to board uninvited. With sophisticated equipment on board, platform managers know what is approaching and can communicate quickly with the mainland. The police can use their normal powers on platforms, and the ordinary criminal law applies.

I am not saying that the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South does not have an important point. He was right to raise his concerns, and I do not blame him for using the opportunity in Committee and on Report to do so, but the proposal to tighten platform managers' response to an emergency is well beyond the scope of the Bill. I hope that the regulations made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Energy will cover those procedures. The hon. Gentleman has given my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State the opportunity fully to consider those matters, but at this stage he does not wish to establish the special regime proposed in new clause 3.

I must admit to being disappointed by the Minister's response. He rested his case for not accepting new clause 3 or the amendments on the fact that they are well beyond the scope of the Bill. That defence carries little weight, because, had they been outwith the scope of the Bill, they would not have been accepted for debate. They are well within its scope and well worth arguing for.

It is difficult for hon. Members to appreciate the feelings of workers in the North sea. My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran) and I have had varying contacts with the survivors of Piper Alpha and of incidents such as Ocean Odyssey. Hon. Members think that they have some understanding of the psychology of workers in the North sea, but none of us appreciates the lingering horror for people directly involved in Piper Alpha or for anyone who lived through those dreadful hours from the moment when it was thought to be a minor incident to the sudden realisation of its full horror.

To some extent—perhaps this is a difficult argument to put—the fear of those not directly involved in Piper Alpha is greater than those directly involved. People's minds work differently. Those who have been through a traumatic incident often come to terms with it—some of those involved in Piper Alpha have returned to work in the North sea— whereas others who perhaps only saw what happened are more fearful. That uncertainty is of immense concern.

We are all worried about the time it takes to decide whether to evacuate. My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South spoke of an incident involving a hoax bomb. Hon. Members' blood must have chilled at the prospect of people hanging about not knowing what was happening, not knowing the location of the suspected bomb and not knowing what might happen if wrong or precipitate action were taken. The security of workers on a platform must be as important as any other consideration.

4.45 pm

A fatal accident inquiry is about to begin into the Ocean Odyssey incident. That inquiry should have begun earlier, but the problem is how all the different arms of Government should dovetail to work together on security.

The Minister takes too narrow a view of security. I understand that the aim of the Bill is security and that its main provisions aim to avoid risk to life and prevent attack from another source. He said that fixed platforms are different from aircraft and ships, because they do not carry passengers and they move only rarely. Nevertheless, baggage is taken on board, and security measures are necessary to check it. If necessary, we must advocate overkill.

The Minister argues that the Bill covers all eventualities, that we are being too cautious and that perhaps we are asking for measures that would be better covered by another Bill, but there are few opportunities to rectify anomalies or loopholes. Goodness knows when we shall consider another Bill on offshore installations.

I hope that the Minister will not close his mind to accepting new clause 3 or the amendments. I hope that he will carefully read Hansard and accept that we must cover every possible eventuality and ensure that decisions to evacuate are taken earlier rather than later. We all hope that there will not be another major incident, because it is no good saying afterwards, "If evacuation had taken place half an hour earlier, the incident would have been avoided."

We should act quickly and positively on security. That may sometimes mean platform owners bearing a cost that they would rather not bear, but the safety and security of the individual is far more important than temporary loss of production, although that may be expensive.

I hope that the Minister will accept the amendments, which are not harmful or redundant. They offer an extra safety net, and the Minister would do well to accept them; he can do no less if he is interested in the safety and security of workers in the North sea.

I should like to take the Minister's points in order. He rightly reminded me of my comments in Committee and of my gratitude to him for saying that he would emphasise the position to the Lord Advocate, but the hon. Gentleman ignored the thrust of my speech, which concerned not so much legal powers and provisions as the way in which they could be used to threaten the work force in a way that would not arise onshore. I do not resile one bit from my comments then. I should be delighted to note what response the hon. Gentleman gets from the Lord Advocate, but that still does not mean that the work force will not be intimidated by the threat of prosecution under these serious provisions.

On the Minister's points about new clause 3, of course the Department of Energy is mainly responsible for the security of offshore platforms. However, I recently received a letter from the Minister which seemed to deny that responsibility. The hon. Gentleman also ignores his Department's responsibility to offshore platforms. As I understand it, the Department of Transport is responsible for firefighting, life-saving and evacuation equipment, and for standby vessels, supply boats and so on. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) made clear, we get few opportunities to raise such issues in the House. Nothing in our discussions has suggested to me that the new clause and the amendments are inappropriate.

The Minister must bear the views of the work force in mind. Nearly 30,000 people work in the offshore industry. The hon. Gentleman said that it was difficult to board an offshore platform and to put on board the type of device that would create problems similar to those in Morecambe bay. He again ignored the practical experience in the North sea. Nearly two thirds of the men who work offshore are employed by contractors, and there is little check on their record. Any sensible terrorist would find that that work provided the easiest route onto the platform. He would not follow the official route or try to sneak up in the darkest hours but would get a job on a standby vessel or with a contracting company. As we noted from the Morecambe bay incident, it is not difficult to get devices on board. Someone learned his way around a platform and planted the hoax device.

I wanted to make two points. First, this matter comes within the Department's responsibility. Secondly, it is clear that there was a breakdown in communications between the management of the platform and the authorities responsible for dealing with the emergency created on the Morecambe bay platform. It is not good enough for the Minister to say that this is the responsibility of the Department of Energy; his Department has responsibilities.

In the light of the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North about the attitude of the work force offshore after the Piper Alpha disaster, it is not good enough to say that management and the Department of Energy will sort these matters out. Some of us have little confidence in the way in which that Department performs its functions in the North sea. To say the least, there is great scope for improvement, and this is just one example.

We do not intend to push the new clause to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Minister of State will be relieved to hear that we do not intend the new clause to result in the Secretary of State personally, his two deputies or his Department being responsible for reimbursing security costs. For technical reasons, we were unable to table the amendment that we should have preferred, which would have reinstated the aviation security fund. We did not have a debate on that matter in Committee, but we feel that this is the appropriate stage to have one.

Sadly, all too often over the years, additional security has been introduced only after tragedy or disaster. As long ago as 1986, following the loss of the Air India 747 off the west coast of Ireland, the Select Committee on Transport looked into security at Britain's airports. It recommended the re-creation of the aviation security fund, which was established by the Labour Government in 1978 and disbanded by the present Administration in 1983.

The Government rejected the re-establishment of such a fund on the grounds that it was bureaucratic, complicated and costly to administer, although they neglected to give any figures to back their assertion. They said that the fund's re-establishment would provide little incentive to efficiency. Following the second tragedy, at Lockerbie, the Government said that the industry would set up its own security fund. We should be interested to know from the Minister of State what progress has been made, if any, and whether such a fund is envisaged.

Following the loss of the Air India 747, the Select Committee on Transport, under the chairmanship of Mr. Gordon Bagier, made a list of recommendations, one of which was the re-establishment of the aviation security fund. In paragraph 56 of the report, the Committee stated:

"Although airports and airlines requested that the original Aviation Security Fund be wound up, it is this Committee's opinion that many are far from happy with the consequences. Some of the larger airports—and especially the BAA—may have benefited financially from running their own operation, but security as a whole has not."

Those words were given additional emphasis after the loss of the Pan Am 747 over Lockerbie at Christmas 1988. The Select Committee continued:

"The abolition of the fund has encouraged the splintering of security operations away from each other, so that too frequently the priority of security operators is to circumscribe as tightly as possible the limits of their own responsibility, rather than look to the needs of the whole system".

That criticism was echoed by the Transport Select Committee in its latest report on these matters. We are aware that, all too often, the present system appears to be based more upon the persuasive powers of those arguing to extract money from the Treasury than on the security needs of Britain's airports.

The Select Committee report continued:

"the Committee again draws attention to the European Parliament 'Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Transport on security at airports' which states 'the main question an institution with legislative powers such as the European Community should ask itself is whether these powers can be used to increase clarity, effectiveness and co-ordination between international and national rules governing security duties at Community airports'. For the reasons explained above, the Committee would encourage the Minister and the Department to pursue assiduously any such initiatives."

We should be interested to hear from the Minister of State how assiduously the Department has been pursuing these initiatives, especially in the light of paragraph 57 of the Select Committee report, which states:

"The public is concerned that airport security should be adequate and recent research has suggested that it would be willing to pay for it."

All research, but especially that since Lockerbie, has revealed a similar conclusion—that the public would be prepared to have a fee added to their tickets, to be spent on security. They and Opposition Members believe that, in that way, adequate funds could be made available for the provision of such a necessary facility at Britain's airports. Notwithstanding that report, the Government have not re-established the aviation security fund.

5 pm

Following Lockerbie, the Select Committee on Transport, this time under the chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Shettleston (Mr. Marshall), met again. In its report, published in July 1989, the Committee made similar recommendations and gave some reasons for doing so. Paragraph 30 of the report says:

"The levy"—

that is, the aviation security levy—

"did provide a means whereby airlines and the travelling public could see how much they were paying for security and make a judgment as to whether that represented value for money. At present, payment for security is subsumed under the general ground-handling charge. If greater security measures are imposed on an airport and they have, for example, to buy more x-ray machines, the cost is either accepted by the airport or passed on to the airlines. If it is passed on to the airlines, they have the choice of whether or not to pass it on to the passenger. Airlines often complain that BAA refuses to give them a breakdown on the amounts spent on security."

In making that complaint, the airlines are not alone. The BAA is not very keen to provide that sort of information to any of us. The authority maintains that, as security is an integral part of airport operations, it is difficult to extract exact financial information on aspects of it. I may be getting cynical in my old age, but I should hazard a guess that, if the aviation security fund were re-established, BAA plc would have no difficulty in justifying claims on it to meet expenditure at the airports that it controls. There would be no argument then about the difficulty of identifying the cost of such operations.

The Select Committee did not accept that argument. Paragraph 30 of the 1989 report, from which I quoted a moment ago, says:

"Modern accounting techniques should make it possible to break down the cost of security by specific operation."

So say all of us.

We should be interested to hear from the Minister of State what justification he thinks there is for the BAA's view. Regrettably, the Department of Transport, for the second time, declined to re-establish an aviation security fund. In paragraph XV of their observations on the Select Committee's recommendations, the Government say:

"The Government is not convinced by the Committee's arguments for re-establishing an aviation security fund paid for by a levy on passengers. The reasons for winding up the fund in 1983 remain valid despite the need now for substantially larger expenditure on aviation security measures. The fund proved to be bureaucratic, complicated and costly to administer."

When civil servants get their teeth into a phrase like that they cannot resist regurgitating it, no matter how many years later they are asked to consider a particular problem. They are good at regurgitating, but they are not particularly good at explaining why they came up with that response in the first place. Again we press the Minister of State to tell us how much the aviation security fund that was set up in 1978 cost to administer over the years, and why he or his Department believe that it was

"bureaucratic, complicated and costly to administer."

The Government's response goes on:

"In the Government's view it did not, and would not if re-established, help forward the aviation security programme."

It is easy to make such statements, but more difficult to justify them. I hope that tonight the Minister will produce some justification for that rather abrupt and sweeping conclusion.

The response continues:

"The particular measure mentioned in paragraph 31—the rebuilding of terminals to ensure the proper separation of incoming and outgoing passengers—is being pursued, but the Government believes that the most cost-effective solution will be achieved if the basic requirement is met by works financed by the airport authorities concerned."

But the airport authorities themselves are the first to complain about the cost of such work. We believe that the reintroduction of the levy to which this amendment refers, and on which the debate concentrates, would go a long way towards meeting those charges.

Paragraph XV of the Government's response concludes:

"The Government remains determined that no funding problem shall obstruct the implementation of the measures in the aviation security programme."

Again, the Minister will have to forgive Opposition Members for displaying some scepticism. We all know what financial pressures, whether in connection with security or with any other matter, are put on Ministers and Departments.

We are offering the Government an opportunity to look again at this problem and to tell the House that they will consider sympathetically the re-establishment of an aviation security fund. We ask for no more than that. For the reasons that I have already outlined, we do not ask them to accept the new clause, but I hope that the Minister of State will agree that the present position with regard to the funding of security is unsatisfactory, causes widespread concern among the travelling public, and leads Members on both sides of the House to the conclusion that, all too often, gaps are left in airport security that could be plugged if adequate funds were provided.

We await with interest the Minister's reply. As I have said, this is a matter which—also for technical reasons—we did not manage to discuss in Committee. The re-establishment of such a fund and of such a levy is something that Opposition Members have constantly advocated. Indeed, we voted against abolition of the fund in 1983. It seems to us that its re-establishment would be a comparatively painless means of funding the security measures that we all want to be introduced at Britain's airports. It is a step that would certainly be supported by the travelling public at large and, at least privately, by a good proportion of the aviation industry.

I do not often congratulate the Opposition, but I congratulate them today on this new clause. As a member of the Select Committee on Transport since it was set up, I have taken an interest in this subject, especially on the transfer of aviation from the Department of Trade to the Department of Transport. Indeed, it was I who suggested, after the Air India crash, the original study into airport security.

It behoves my hon. Friend to answer the points made by the hon. Member for West Bromwich, East (Mr. Snape). We ought to be told exactly why the unanimous decision of the Committee in relation to the levy was not accepted. We seem to be told, "Don't worry about costs. The money will be provided." The purpose of my intervention is to probe that a little further. We need an assurance that the money will be provided to ensure that adequate security is made available.

One of the first things that the Committee realised when it looked into this matter was that the problem arises from the fact that at any major airport there is dual responsibility for security: it is the responsibility of those: who own and operate the airport and it is also the: responsibility of the airline. The gaps in security arrangements that often appear arise out of that dichotomy of responsibility.

Unfortunately, there have been a number of international disasters but, as far as I am aware, our airports have not been the cause of any serious security problem. I put it on record that our airports and airlines have an excellent record in this respect, but—and there is a "but"—there is no doubt that those who engage in international terrorism are becoming more and more sophisticated. That means that our methods of detecting terrorists must also become more sophisticated. It would be idle not to accept that many in the aviation industry are concerned about the cost of ensuring a safer travelling scene. When the Committee first looked into the question, British Caledonian was still up and flying. It quoted to us the cost of the machines that it would have to install to satisfy itself that it had done all it could to protect the travelling public, and bluntly told us that it could not afford it.

That leads us to the fundamental question. If the Secretary of State decides that a certain level of search of persons, of aircraft or of cargo is necessary, he must also satisfy himself that the searches will be adequately carried out; otherwise, his reassurances to the travelling public will be empty words. As my hon. Friend the Minister will be aware, we can never achieve 100 per cent. security in relation to aircraft movement, but ever more sophisticated machinery is appearing and could be employed.

We have first to consider the sheer cost of introducing the equipment. How does my hon. Friend imagine that we shall ensure that all the foreign airlines will have the best equipment available to deal with the problem?

Moreover, it is not just a question of equipment: it is also a question of providing the environment in which that equipment can operate. I was appalled to discover on a visit to Gatwick that, immediately after the Lockerbie disaster, one American airline had brought in the most up-to-date piece of equipment to try to check all the baggage that went on its aircraft from Gatwick to the United States and had been told that there was no room for it. It took the British Airports Authority six months to find room at Gatwick to put that machinery into operation.

Given that airline's will to do the best for its passengers, it is worrying to think that the provision of space may inhibit the use of security equipment. We must consider the cost not only of the equipment but of providing room for the equipment to operate properly. I can understand the BAA's point of view, because its room is expensive and it can let it for a variety of purposes at a high revenue. It is not entirely surprising, therefore, if the authority is not willing to give up large spaces at a few moments' notice, which was exactly what happened after the Lockerbie disaster. My hon. Friend must show that sufficient pressure can be placed on bodies such as the BAA to ensure that the necessary space is provided.

No matter how good our security systems may be, the security of passengers flying in and out of this country will also depend partly upon the security at other airports in other countries. One of the main arguments in favour of the levy is that, if properly administered, it would apply not just to our major airports but to our minor airports, which find it difficult to meet the expense of installing the latest security equipment, and perhaps—with international co-operation—it could be extended to cover other airports, such as those in the Third world, where security is very lax. In the last resort, our security arrangements are truly interdependent and international.

I hope that my hon. Friend will look again at the new clause and try to spell out to my satisfaction proposals suggesting that the Government are aware of the dichotomy between airline and airport in relation to responsibility for security and that he is aware of the problems of the high cost of equipment and of the problem and cost of providing space for that equipment.

5.15 pm

The Committee did not reach its recommendations lightly on either occasion. It reached them in a non-partisan manner and after considerable deliberation. As the hon. Member for West Bromwich, East (Mr. Snape) made clear, we have not really had a satisfactory explanation of why the levy cannot be reintroduced. I believe that airport security perturbs the travelling public, and I think that many people would be happy to pay a reasonable charge for the comfort of knowing that everything is being done that can be done.

The great danger of the present system is that it will give rise to the suspicion that not everything is being spent that might be spent to ensure that the strongest possible security arrangements are made. At one stage in our investigations, we were given evidence, which we were unable to verify, that one improvement to security at Heathrow had not taken place because the budget for that year had been used up. The improvement therefore had to be delayed. We do not want to give the travelling public the impression that money will not be forthcoming to afford them the peace of mind they need.

I hope that my hon. Friend will satisfy me on those points.

The hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Fry) is very knowledgeable about these matters, having twice served on the Committee that reported specifically on security matters.

The terrible truth about security is that the price is always too high until people die. Those who say glibly that we have a high level of security at our airports and point to the changes that have taken place even in the past five years do themselves no great credit if they pretend that our service is capable of ensuring that no great terrorist incidents will occur in future, and I know that the Government have never taken that position.

For many airlines, security is an overhead that slips down the accounting priorities as incidents recede into the past. Immediately after a bad crash in which many lives are lost, there is enormous outcry about the facilities that are provided at airports. Unfortunately, it is a question of pounds and pence and, as that pressure recedes, airlines are likely to relax their arrangements. They will not do so consciously—I do not think that they set out to lower their standards—but those of us who use airports constantly—the larger airports are classic examples—know that the sheer press of passengers is leading increasingly to security measures that are not as exhaustive or intensive as they should be.

New machinery is being developed all the time, but one of the safest methods of ensuring that terrorists cannot place explosive devices among innocent travellers going about their lawful affairs is to ensure that proper searching, profiling and investigation take place at the point at which the passenger enters the airport. That is absolutely vital.

El Al representatives would say that the price of security is a life, and that there is no way in which we can put a price on a life. We have a responsibility in this House to tell the airlines that it is not enough to install security companies which, because of the pressure of bodies and freight and the number of people using the services, will inevitably monitor only a tiny percentage of the goods or people flying out of our airports. If that can be said of a country which has suffered the enormous trauma of the Lockerbie crash, how can we expect Third-world countries, which already face enormous problems of overseas debt, to invest in security systems which would safeguard our people?

British people travel all over the world on many different airlines. They have the right to ask that they travel in safety and not in fear. The explosion of air travel in my lifetime means that the modern child regards the aircraft in the way that I, as a child, regarded road transport or trains—as a perfectly routine form of transport. That would be the case but for those who try constantly to find ways to attract the attention of the world to their specific, narrow and murderous interests by destroying forms of transport used by many people.

Hon. Members will be aware that the Select Committee on Transport does not comprise hon. Members from only one political party. It has a wide membership and we have taken very moving and important evidence from those involved in the Lockerbie disaster. The Select Committee examined the manufacture of aircraft and specific problems with the safety of aircraft interiors; those matters will be reported upon in future. Above all, the Select Committee clearly stated that security was a legitimate expense and that, if it was to be provided at the level necessary for safeguarding our people, it had to be paid for.

It would be extraordinary if increasing deregulation lowered the price of air flight for the ordinary passenger but raised the price of providing proper security systems, in such a way that many international airlines began to regard security as an unnecessary expense. We could deal with that problem, and also with the constant battle behind the scenes between the British Airports Authority, the airlines and freight shippers, if we provided sufficient funds to equip and build proper security checkpoints in all our airports—and I mean all. As hub travel develops, more people will come into the airline system at small airports, and they may not always have had their baggage or goods properly checked.

I do not understand the Government's objection to this proposal. They can hardly pretend that they disapprove of taxes that are unwieldy, bureaucratic and expensive to apply. Given that they created the poll tax, that is not a legitimate or feasible response.

The Government believe that passengers are not prepared to pay to ensure that they are travelling safely. Who asked the passengers? Who asked the mothers who put their children on planes to send them back to school four times a year? Who asked the people who take their families on charter flights for their once-a-year holiday?

Who asked the families whose parents are at risk every time they travel from one part of Europe to another on business? I do not believe that the Government have put those questions to the people.

It is too late to consider security issues when we see the front pages of tabloid newspapers carrying horrific pictures of destroyed planes and bodies. One way that we can provide cash is to say to the passenger, "A levy will work and produce results. Will you support us in introducing a levy?" If the Government do not do that, they will be moving responsibility from themselves on to those least likely—even if they are able—to provide the proper quality of service. The cost to this country over the next 10 years may be very high in terms of human life.

Before I come to the points made by the hon. Member for West Bromwich. East (Mr. Snape), I want to comment on a matter raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Fry). He repeated a point that I have heard made so often. He said that one reason why space is not made available at airports, particularly those operated by the British Airports Authority, is that the authority could not be bothered to do that or could not afford it. That is grossly unfair.

I hasten to add that I have no interest to declare in the matter, other than that an enormous number of my constituents work at Heathrow airport, and they always feel slighted when they are accused of doing a shoddy job. However, the issue is not as simple as that described by my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough.

I assume that the reference by my hon. Friend to the equipment at Gatwick was a reference to the TNA machine. We are not arguing that selling a few pairs of knickers or a few newspapers is more important than safety. The security machines about which we are concerned are very large and heavy and are not readily available. Indeed, the environmental lobby in the United States considers the radiation which those machines emit to be unsafe.

The security machines to which I am referring weigh many tonnes. If they were installed in many of our airport terminals, they would fall through the floor and destroy the terminal.

I must confess that I have heard the hon. Gentleman put that argument rather better before. As we are anxious to maintain cross-party consensus on airport security, does the hon. Gentleman believe that the BAA would be as ready to accept a TNA machine, bearing in mind the drawbacks, as it is to install Sock Shop or Knickerbox units around Gatwick airport? Is it not legitimate for some of us to express suspicions that, as there is revenue to be earned from the latter and space to be taken up through the former, the BAA is more likely to opt for commercial occupancy of space at Heathrow than to allocate that space for security purposes?

Most certainly I would defend the hon. Gentleman's right to make those points, just as I am sure that he would defend my right to say that he is talking absolute nonsense when he suggests that that was the motivation of the BAA or any other airport operator. Of course all airport and airline operators want the best possible security and will fall over backwards to make that possible.

Does my hon. Friend believe that it is satisfactory that a machine was present and ready to be brought into operation at Gatwick, but it took six months before that machine was operational? There is no criticism about the commercial nature of the BAA. However, does my hon. Friend believe that a six-month delay was satisfactory, in view of what happened at Lockerbie and the public concern over aviation security?

When we consider a delay, it is important to be sure how it came about. One of the worst possible things to do with aviation security is to make statements to the effect that we will do this or that in a few moments and everything will be marvellous. That misleads the public and does no good. If it takes a week, a month or even a year to get things right, I shall defend taking the necessary time.

The important thing to consider is that one machine on its own is of no earthly use at all. They are large and they are slow—they do about 600 bags an hour. At peak time at a busy airport such as Gatwick, about 8,000 bags must be screened every hour. It would take until the year 2000 to build sufficient machines to cover all major airports in the world. It is misleading simply to say, "All we need is one of those machines at Gatwick, and bingo—all will be well."

The hon. Gentleman has missed the point. His hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Fry) made the simple point that a machine was offered for trial, and it took six months to find the necessary space. That point is simple but important.

I accept that. I thought that I had covered the point that one must do things in the right order. I do not have the facts on exactly why it took six months. I hope that the hon. Lady will give me the facts. If it turns out that there was a delay for the sake of delay—I hold no brief for BAA or for anybody else—and if criticism is deserved—surprise, surprise, I will criticise. However, until I see the evidence, I shall not do so.

My main reason for intervening was to deal with the comments by the hon. Member for West Bromwich, East. I have bad news for him. He made a point about accountants and about BAA's financial procedures. I shall not rise to that criticism, because my experience of accountants over the years——

The hon. Gentleman disappoints me.

I know that I disappoint the hon. Gentleman. However, as he said, it is a cross-party matter.

My experience of accountants over the years is that, if they must do something, they will end up doing it. If it were to become necessary, I am sure that they could do something. I agree with that. However, I do not agree with the basic premise of returning to a security fund. I recognise the argument that there are good reasons for doing so, but I hope that the hon. Member for West Bromwich, East will recognise the bad implications. On balance, the bad wins over the good.

I have three concerns about this matter. First, if one specifies how much one spends on security, one is revealing information to those who would like to know exactly what one is doing. One may not consider that on its own to be a justifiable reason, but it is true. My second concern is that, if we set a sum that should be spent on security, we will invite the response, "Fine, we will spend that, and we will discharge our responsibilities." There should be an open-ended commitment to spend whatever is necessary to provide the best possible security, not to set a sum of money. My third concern is that, if we specify sums of money, which will presumably vary from airport to airport, we will invite comparisons.

The hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mrs. Dunwoody) said that no one had asked the travelling public. I have done research, not on the travelling public but on the maritime sector, in which there is more choice than there is in the use of airports around London—cruise liners. I examined what was happening at the international cruise terminal at Tilbury. The operators said that their charge was £3 per passenger. They said that they were having great difficulties, because the charge at Southampton and elsewhere could be as little as less than £1

People were not flocking to Tilbury because it is the safest place to board a ship. Ship operators were saying "It is cheaper to go to Southampton than to Tilbury, so we will go there." Similarly, passengers were asking, "Why should we pay this much more when, at Southampton, we would pay much less?" I accept that that may be anecdotal, but it is not a one-way argument to say that, the more one charges, the happier people will be.

Will the hon. Gentleman tell the House how the 1978 aviation security fund actually worked and how the moneys that were levied from that fund were dispersed around United Kingdom airports for security purposes?

My reservation is that, however the money is dispersed, one publicly states how much one will spend, and what it will be spent on. Those matters outweigh the hon. Gentleman's arguments.

I am against the amendments giving the Secretary of State powers to pay, because they would lead to the argument, "All right, the Government will pay, so we need not bother." It will result in more buck passing, not less. Airport operators and airlines already try to pass the buck to one another, saying, "The airport should pay," or, "The airline should pay." If we introduce the Government into that, there will be three sides shuffling the buck, and that will make matters worse, not better.

I do not know whether I should begin by declaring an interest as a frequent air traveller. I suppose that I am in the air about twice a week—sadly, about 100 times a year. Before I give the impression that I am a notorious freeloader or free-tripper, I should say that virtually every trip is between London and my constituency in Aberdeen. I have great experience of how passengers regard security, and the cost of security.

The hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Fry) was extremely complimentary to the Opposition. I certainly respond in kind, because I know of his deep interest in the matter. We have always approached it in a non-partisan way and on a fairly uncontroversial note. That is why the remarks of the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire) are rather surprising. Of course, there are pros and cons in all such matters.

I wholly support the new clause, because it would provide a mechanism whereby money could be found to pay not only for immediate security but for research. It identifies exactly what the costs are and where they are to be found. I am sometimes nauseated when I occasionally suggest to airline or airport representatives that it will cost money to provide proper security, and they say, "We can't afford it—it will eat into the profits." Security must be afforded. It does not matter how the money is collected; the passenger or cargo shipper pays. Security costs will be passed on by the airport owner, the airline owner or the operator. No commercial organisation in the world would say, "We shall run at a loss to provide proper safety." It is a matter of cost-efficiency and profit making.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mrs. Dunwoody) said, people's perception of safety varies depending on the time of year and how long it is since there was a major disaster.

A major safety measure is that, if baggage is booked on to an aircraft, but the passenger does not get on the plane, the plane cannot fly. All the baggage must be taken off, put on the tarmac, identified and put back on the plane. The baggage of the passenger who has not checked in is then taken away to be examined. It is remarkable how often people book on a flight, get to the airport and check in their baggage, but, for some reason, do not turn up. That has happened to me six times this year on my way to Aberdeen.

Passengers are desperate to get home or to go away on business. There is at least an hour's delay, when baggage is unaccompanied. The passengers' perception is, "Heck, why do we have to hang about so long?" However, they did not say that immediately after Lockerbie. If I have my facts right, the package that caused the Lockerbie explosion was transferred from another plane. British airports' response is that responsibility for baggage checked in at another airport lies with the carrier. I do not agree. If baggage is put on one aircraft and transferred to another, it should be rechecked at every airport. Of course, people say, "What a waste of time hanging about." Generally, if they are asked whether they are willing to spend more on the levy to improve security, they will say yes.

I accept—here I agree with the hon. Member for Spelthorne—that the first time that people see a 1 per cent. surcharge for security on their ticket, they will say, "What is all this about?" Of course there are dilemmas, but we must make a judgment.

We must face the dire possibility of a terrorist attack. With modern technology, the terrorist is becoming more sophisticated and clever and may have access to better technology than that available for finding and identifying packages. We must always run ahead and anticipate the threat. We must do a great deal of research into new methods of discovering explosives, timing devices and so on.

Often airport authorities do not appear to use the equipment that they have. I am fed up to the teeth, as many passengers are, with turning up at terminal 1 at Heathrow at busy times to find masses of people queueing from the place where baggage goes through the X-ray machines right back as far as the shops. One is almost forced to buy something in a shop to pass the time. There are four X-ray machines, but seldom are more than two in operation. If there is a backlog of people waiting to pass through, there, is immense pressure on the staff.

We are all irritated by delays, even though we know it is for our safety. When I ask why only two machines are operating, I am told that the staff are not available to operate them. Security staff have asked me to speak to the British Airports Authority, because they are under tremendous pressure. Every bag goes through the X-ray machine and the staff have to look at every image on the screen. There is a random search of perhaps one in three or one in five bags. There is a great deal of pressure on staff, even though the facilities are there, which can lead to something slipping through.

Before the hon. Gentleman finishes his point about lack of staff at an airport such as Heathrow, will he consider the difficulties of recruiting people? There is not so much a lack of opportunities as a lack of people applying for the jobs. Another difficulty is the requirement to check back over 20 years of a person's previous work experience. That makes it a long job. It can take anything up to 16 weeks before a vacancy can be filled.

There may be difficulties, but the British Airports Authority has never told me that the reason why it has insufficient staff is that it is difficult to recruit or that it takes a long time to check credentials. I have been told that it cannot carry staff over a period simply to cope with short-term busy periods. People cannot be employed between, say, 5 pm and 7 pm when there is a huge mass of people through security simply to sit around for the rest of the day. People usually work shifts of seven or eight hours.

Personnel should be available and on call. All the machines available should be used, not just for the convenience of passengers, although that is important, but in order to make sure that people are not under pressure to let stuff go through. I do not accept that the reason for delays and the lack of staff is that not enough people apply for the jobs. Perhaps, if that is the case, BAA should consider the wages it pays. However, that is not a matter that I shall traverse tonight.

We must examine the methods by which money is found. It is not good enough simply to say that it is up to the airline or the airport authority to provide the cash. They will not provide it if there is pressure on their profits. It is as simple as that. However, the money has to be found. It would be far better to apply a levy to every ticket and for the Secretary of State to reimburse the money.

I was interested to hear the hon. Member for Spelthorne cite the example of Tilbury and Southampton. He said that operators would claim as a bonus—I hope that he is listening, because I am responding to his point——

Avidly.

I wish that the hon. Gentleman would show on his face that he was listening.

I do not doubt his word that people say, "Come to Southampton because the security is cheaper than elsewhere." I am surprised that he does not condemn whichever shipping company he was referring to for taking that attitude, instead of using it as a bonus point for his argument. It is disgraceful that people should say, "Come to us because our security is cheaper," as if cheaper security were something that people sought. It is a bogus argument, and the hon. Gentleman knows it.

If the hon. Gentleman was under the impression that I was saying that cheap security was an advertising plus, I apologise. That was not what I intended to say. I said that both shipping lines and passengers regard security as an opportunity to cut costs. Shipping lines and passengers appear to prefer cheaper security. I do not applaud that; I deplore it. I was merely observing that that is what happens.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that clarification and for accepting the point of my argument.

If a percentage of the cost of the ticket is levied and collected centrally, it could be distributed centrally so that there does not appear to be a difference between the cost of tickets at different airports.

The hon. Gentleman makes his pitch for the idea of a levy collected as a percentage of the cost of ticket, which would be held centrally and disbursed among airports to ensure proper security. Does he accept that security is as strong as the weakest link in the international chain? How would he deal with the problems of international terrorism and inadequate security at other airports—for example, in Third-world countries? To operate properly, any levy system would have to be operated by the International Civil Aviation Organisation on an international basis. Everyone would have to comply with it, because otherwise it would be pointless.

I do not know what proportion of people buy tickets in this country and travel out and back compared to the proportion who buy tickets outside and travel in and out again. If a levy were collected on every passenger's fare, it would be possible to organise collection of the levy from all carriers, whether they originated in Britain or elsewhere. People doing return journeys have to leave the country again. The argument that people who buy a ticket in the United States, for example, do not benefit from the levy because the point of origin is not in Britain, does not hold. Such passengers have to return. There would have to be an international agreement for collecting the money.

I shall not be diverted into a detailed discussion about safety. The hon. Member for Romsey and Waterside (Mr. Colvin) argued that, if one boards a flight outside this country, one does not know the standard of safety. That is true, but there is nothing that one can do about it. There is no way to guarantee the safety of someone who boards an aircraft in another country, whether Japan, Australia or elsewhere. I hope that, if we take the lead, we can persuade other countries to do likewise and enhance the system of security throughout the world.

Carriers and airport authorities wish to provide the safest possible method of travel because that is their business. If a major disaster is caused by terrorist activity, they will lose money through cancellations. However, this is not an issue about cash—as my hon. Friend the Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mrs. Dunwoody) has said, the debate is about the price of lack of safety, which is the price of a life.

The new clause would provide a good way of collecting the money and of ensuring that people understand what it is all about. It would also provide the Government with a better opportunity for putting leverage on everyone, to ensure that they do the research and apply the existing equipment as soon as possible.

The hon. Member for West Bromwich, East (Mr. Snape) made not only his own speech but mine. His speech was full of references to previous statements of Government policy. As the Government's policy on this matter is fairly well understood, it may not be necessary for me to dwell on it for long.

Two distinct issues have been raised in the debate. The first is whether there should be Government grants to fund an aviation security programme, and the second is whether we should recycle money from the airlines, through Government, and back to the airports.

The first point about whether there should be Government grants for aviation security is the issue addressed specifically by the hon. Gentleman's new clause. However, the new clause is unnecessary, because the power that it seeks to place in the Secretary of State already exists. Under section 32 of the Aviation Security Act 1982, as amended by this Bill, the Secretary of State can, with the consent of the Treasury, defray, out of moneys provided by Parliament, all or part of the expenses of the persons described in subsection (1) of the new clause for purposes to which part II of the 1982 Act applies—that is, protection of aircraft, aerodromes and air navigation installations against acts of violence.

I do not wish to extend the list in the way in which the hon. Gentleman proposes in his new clause, but the power already exists. I do not want to deny for a moment that the Government have not sought to use that power of making grants for security purposes, because we believe that security should be paid for by the airport, the airline and the passenger. I have no doubt that passengers are willing to pay for it; it is simply a question of how they are asked to pay for it.

I am satisfied with the present arrangements, which are that the Government specify the level of security arrangements that must be made in airports. Money does not enter into those considerations. People are required to meet the directions that the Secretary of State makes, and the Secretary of State makes the directions that he considers appropriate for the level of security he thinks fit, reflecting the degree of risk assessed for him by the security forces from time to time.

I have listened carefully to all the speeches, but no hon. Member has argued that our present security arrangements are inadequate or, if they are, how the directions should be reinforced. I have heard no evidence that finance or lack of finance could be said to be prejudicing the security in our airports. Some hon. Members seemed to assume that, without a fund recycled through the Government, there must be a lack of money and a lack of security provision. That is wholly illogical and fallacious.

The way in which the Government arrived at the present position of wishing to wind up the old aviation security fund and the reasons for doing so were spelt out for Parliament in a statement by my right hon. and noble Friend Lord Cockfield in another place. Extensive consultations preceded that decision, which embraced not only the airlines and airport operators, but also the British Air Line Pilots Association, the Transport and General Workers Union, the Air Transport Users Committee, the Association of British Travel Agents Ltd. and the International Air Transport Association. At that time, the Government weighed all the pros and cons of having a centralised fund into which moneys were paid and then paid out again.

The Department of Trade was responsible for such matters in those days and considered the measures that applied elsewhere. My right hon. and noble Friend said:

"The research showed that in continental Europe, with certain exceptions, airport security duties were generally carried out by national and local police and as a rule were not directly funded by revenue from airport operations. In contrast the research also showed that in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Switzerland, searching was paid for by arlines, and that in the United States and Canada all other aspects of airport security were also, in the end, paid for by the airlines. No other country operated a fund system along the lines of the United Kingdom model."

My right hon. and noble Friend thought that the arguments were fairly evenly balanced, but said that he was concerned that

"unnecessary and complex procedures would be avoided, incentives to carry out security measures efficiently would be increased, and cross-subsidisation eliminated, if the fund were wound up and airports and airlines financed security costs in the same way as their other operating expenditure."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 29 July 1982; Vol. 434, c. 359.]

Therefore, over a period, the Government have been straightforward in explaining how they have arrived at this position.

The hon. Member for West Bromwich, East wanted to know why we thought that it would be bureaucratic and unnecessary to proceed in this way. I remind him that, in the old days, a fund level per passenger had to be set, airport charges had to be collected, payments by the airports had to be made to the Government, claims by the airports and airlines for expenditure that they were to incur had to be made and then assessed and paid by the Department. The net result was that the security measures that the Government required to be taken were paid for by the passenger, but only after that enormous rigmarole, and the great procedure of recycling the money.

The hon. Gentleman wanted to know how much all that would cost. If we were were to reinstate it today, it would probably cost my Department about £50,000 for the officials who would be needed to implement the provisions, but that would be only the beginning——

Appoint a quango.

The hon. Gentleman says, "Appoint a quango." I am sure that he would be happy about that, but I believe that that is an unjustified cost, which does not even begin to deal with the costs that would unnecessarily fall on the airline industry. I repeat that the Government's approach is to specify the level of security and to ensure that that level is met—and that has nothing to do with money.

The hon. Member for West Bromwich, East was also concerned that there should be frankness and that the airports should tell the airlines the cost of security. For the sake of brevity, I refer him to what I said at columns 67 and 68 in Committee. I accept that any customer and supplier relationship should result in a willingness by the supplier to account for the reasoning behind his prices, and pointed out that section 35 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 provides that designated airports must have adequate facilities for discussing the management of the airports. The Civil Aviation Authority conducts a quinquennial review of specified airports, covering user charges, including security.

That point also covers many of the issues raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Fry), whom I was pleased to see in his place, because he speaks with great experience and considerable knowledge of these matters. The question whether up-to-date equipment is made available is really a question about whether the Government have specified the level of security that is to be met. The Government will insist that that level is adhered to by the operators. It has nothing to do with whether sufficient funding is available, because the Government will always require airports and airlines to take such measures.

My hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mrs. Dunwoody) referred to the difficulties of the Third world. I am not sure that a fund would be the right way to set about the problem. When dealing with the Third world, our problems go far beyond funding. It is not just a question of installing the correct machinery; it is also a question of the training and the discipline that should go hand in hand with it. Each nation that has great experience of aviation is now trying to contact those Third-world countries with which it has a special relationship, so that we can help in a variety of ways to establish the appropriate aviation security programmes. Our own airlines continue to have responsibilities when they operate to those places.

6 pm

Space at airports was debated in Committee. It is our intention that all hold baggage should be screened before it goes into the aircraft. That will take some time to achieve, but we wish to proceed in an ordered fashion towards that goal. We do not wish to find that certain airlines that come first in the queue are pre-empting space. It is important that machines should be installed and measures introduced in the order dictated by the security considerations that prevail in each instance, so that we meet the maximum security risk in the most timely fashion.

Some of the remarks about machinery being installed at airports were rather unfair. These are immensely complex matters that bear on passenger safety, space, and getting things in the right place. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire) said, with the TNA machine the issue of radioactivity has to be considered. The necessary certificate from the United States National Radiological Protection Board has only recently been granted. In fact, it was granted last week. As I have said, these are extremely complex matters.

I do not believe that there would be any advantage in recycling moneys in a long and cumbersome fashion, as some hon. Members have proposed. If they are saying that there should be powers for the Secretary of State, in certain circumstances, to be able to defray moneys with the approval of the Treasury, I tell the House that those powers already exist. I have heard no evidence during the debate that our levels of security are inadequate. I have heard no evidence that lack of funding has produced an undesirable situation. I have heard nothing to make me think that the recycling of moneys through a fund commends itself to me any more than it commended itself to Lord Cockfield when a thorough review was conducted, after considerable consultation, in 1982.

The House will be aware of the results which were announced by my noble Friend. I ask the House to reject the new clause.

I think that hon. Members on both sides of the House will have found the Minister's reply somewhat disappointing. The main thrust of his argument was that security had not suffered since the abolition of the aviation security levy, because the Government had at all times provided adequate funds. I have before me a draft parliamentary answer which was prepared for the previous Secretary of State for Transport after the Lockerbie disaster. It is the contention of my right hon. and hon. Friends and myself that aviation security—this was argued by my hon. Friend the Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mrs. Dunwoody)—comes to the forefront only after a disaster. The Minister of State has told us that funds have never been lacking and security has always been adequate.

In the draft reply, however—it looks as if it was the result of a planted question—there is reference to a package of measures to provide better security at restricted areas, the screening of all baggage and doubling the strength of the Department's aviation security division. Those provisions are introduced directly as a result of tragedy. The contention of the Opposition—it is the unanimous contention of two Select Committees over the past few years—is that these measures could be better provided for financially if adequate funds were made available from the beginning through the provision of an aviation security levy.

Now that the hon. Gentleman has the floor again, will he use the opportunity to make good a deficiency in his previous remarks? Will he demonstrate that there has been a lack of financing or that our security has suffered through a lack of finance, or that it would be improved by recycling moneys in a wasteful fashion through Government?

My purpose is to illustrate the argument that security issues arise only as a result of tragedy. Money has not been spent. Had it been available, it could and should have been spent to improve security. If it had been spent in the form of an aviation security levy, perhaps some of the gaps outlined in the draft repy to which I have referred would have been closed earlier, and perhaps before the Lockerbie disaster. I can put it no higher than that.

I ask the House to recollect the debate that took place on the Civil Aviation Bill on 16 January 1978, when the levy was first introduced. The then spokesman for the then Conservative Opposition was the right hon. Member for Hertsmere (Mr. Parkinson), who is now the Secretary of State for Transport. In those days, he was an avid supporter of the setting up of the aviation security fund. During the debate, he said:

"Many people argue that it is the responsibility of the State to protect its citizens and therefore the cost of providing that protection"—

that is, security at airports—

"should fall on the general body of taxpayers. It is argued that hijackers are seeking to pressure not individual airlines or airports but Governments, and therefore Governments should assume responsibility for meeting the cost of protection."

He then said:

"It is our considered view"—

that is, the Conservative party's considered view, as it was the Labour Government's view at that time—

"that there are even stronger arguments in favour of transferring the cost—some £19 million"—

that says much about inflation over the past decade, as well as security—

"from the taxpayers generally to those who benefit from the service provided, namely, those who travel by air. Such a proposal recognises something that many Labour Members are often reluctant to recognise—there is no such thing as a free lunch."

The right hon. Member for Hertsmere, who is now the Secretary of State for Transport, has changed his mind twice. He is against the provision of an aviation security levy and he is a living, walking and talking exponent of the free lunch if ever I saw one in this place. The right hon. Gentleman concluded that debate in a way that I hope will still appeal to some of his hon. Friends who have listened to today's debate:

"Why should the vast majority, who never set foot aboard an aeroplane, contribute to the cost which arises directly and identifiably from those who do? Why should pensioners, who have never travelled by plane in their lives and who never will, pay the costs of people who go on holiday to Majorca and to the Caribbean?"—[Official Report, 16 January 1978; Vol. 942, c. 78–80.]

The right hon. Gentleman has revised his views since then, but the Opposition have not. That is the reason——

I am genuinely puzzled by the argument that leads the hon. Gentleman to claim that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State was speaking on the hon. Gentleman's side of the argument. My right hon. Friend said that, in future, the costs would be borne by those who travel and not by the British taxpayer. That is what we stand for. That is the present arrangement. The hon. Gentleman appears to be saying that the fund should be recycled through Government, a proposal with which we disagree, or that it should be paid for by taxpayers generally. My right hon. Friend was explicit when he said that he thought that it would be wrong for taxpayers to bear the burden.

It is clear that the Minister has not read the report of the entire debate. We were talking about the principle of the aviation security levy in 1978. The right hon. Member for Hertsmere, who is now the Secretary of State, was then in favour of that sort of levy at the time, and so were the then Labour Government. We have remained consistent, even if the Secretary of State and his colleagues on the Treasury Bench have not. That is why we shall be pressing the new clause to a Division. Conservative Members who share our concern about security should vote for the new clause.

Does my hon. Friend agree that the logic of the Minister of State is at fault? He said in defence of the argument against the levy that the Government were prepared to find the money. The hon. Gentleman cannot have it both ways.

The illogical nature of the Minister's reply will dawn on him when he reads the Hansard report of our debate tomorrow.

I cannot find a sufficiently emotive phrase to end the debate again, and I do not think that the House would wish me to do so. The Opposition intend to pursue the matter this evening, I hope that hon. Members on both sides of the House who support the principle of better security will vote for the new clause.

I beg to move amendment No. 16, in page 4, line 10, at end add—

'(5) Before issuing the direction under subsection (1) above the Secretary of State shall seek the views of the manager of the aerodrome concerned.'.

The amendment deals with consultations on regional airports. It arises from the debate on the aviation security fund and, under the amendment, we have the opportunity to talk briefly about the costs for regional airports, post-Lockerbie. One of the reasons why Opposition Members plead for greater consultation with regional airport directors is that, post-Lockerbie, additional costs were incurred by regional airports for screening people who enter restricted areas there.

I understand from the Joint Airports Committee of Local Authorities that Birmingham airport has paid £86,000 in capital costs and will pay £514,000 for the running costs of additional safety requirements in the current year. East Midlands airport has had to pay capital costs of £405,000—which is an enormous sum for that airport—and current operating costs are £260,000. Luton airport has had to pay capital costs of £364,000 and current operating costs are £414,000 this year for new security measures.

I should have thought that hon. Members on both sides of the House would be desperately anxious that regional airports should not become the weak link in any security chain. I hope that the Under-Secretary will agree that security measures required at regional airports must be related to the perceived level of threat at those airports, particularly under the present financial regime.

In our view, one of the other positive arguments in favour of an aviation security fund is that it could meet the additional costs at regional airports, rather than the airports having to meet the costs.

The amendment would ensure that, before any additional measure was introduced at a regional airport, the widest possible consultation with airport managers, or directors—to give them their modern title—took place so that proposals were sensible and relevant to the individual airport.

The way that the hon. Member for West Bromwich, East (Mr. Snape) has moved the amendment is interesting, particularly in the light of previous debates. He drew some parallels with the security fund.

I think that the case made and the evidence quoted by the hon. Gentleman prove that we are laying down strict criteria for airports to abide by. We expect them to do that, and we feel that they should try to arrange finance for it. Therefore, the examples that the hon. Gentleman gave show that the requirements are costing airports money, but they are finding the money.

I know that the whole House agrees on the importance of regional airports for our aviation policy and in providing services for people in the region. We cannot excuse those airports from the necessity of aviation security, and it would be undesirable and wrong to do so. I accept that the Government have to ensure that the security measures required——

Will the Minister give way?

Yes, but very briefly.

Further to what the Member for West Bromwich, East (Mr. Snape) said, will my hon. Friend bear it in mind that, although we are talking about regional airports, many of them are becoming more international, for example, at Birmingham airport the range of flights is expanding all the time?

Most hon. Members accept the benefits that regional airports can bring to the regions and to the people who live in them. I take my hon. Friend's point.

The security fund was dealt with adequately and properly in the previous debate, in the reply given by my hon. Friend the Minister of State. The Government must ensure that the security measures that it requires are both practical and necessary. That is why the Department has been discussing draft directions with those whom we consider it desirable to consult. Such consultations enable the Department to understand the practical difficulties that the industry faces when implementing new security measures, and it also allows the industry to understand why measures are necessary to meet security problems. That is one of the reasons why we have decided to issue directions rather than trying to say what should happen at an individual airport by bringing in a statute law. By their very nature, directions can change to allow for the practical details at individual airports.

The amendment would handicap rather than enhance procedures. It requires the Secretary of State only to seek advice, and there is no requirement to take those views into account, but, what is more important, there is no exemption from statutory consultation when the direction has been issued as a matter of urgency, and that would certainly worry us.

Statutory consultations, as envisaged in the amendment, could result in the Department having to contact as many as 50 aerodrome managers before any directions under the proposed section 13A could be made. It would be unlikely to add anything to the present system of informal consultation. The amendment would require aerodrome managers, who are not so directed under clause 2, to give their views about directions which would require others to have searches carried out. That seems to us to be misconceived, because it does not require the Secretary of State to seek the views of those directly affected, and we have no intention of imposing unnecessary or unworkable security requirements on the industry.

Therefore, I assure the House that, except in cases of extreme emergency, the Department will continue to ensure that there is a dialogue between it and the industry about the long-term objectives and developments on aviation security, and about the details of proposed directions. The Department will, of course, take into account the views of the industry, while at the same time trying to persuade it that the proposed measures are necessary, feasible and reasonable. I ask the House to reject the amendment.

That was a disappointing reply. The Minister has said that consultation takes place between the Department and regional airports; we are merely seeking to formalise that arrangement by asking the Secretary of State to obtain the views of the management at the aeorodrome concerned. Surely that is not too much to ask. I remind the Minister that the Government have forced the establishment of local authority airports as arm's-length companies; should not they acknowledge the financial implications of their security directives, and seek the veiws of managers before introducing them?

I am also disappointed by the Minister's failure to concede that the security measures required at regional airports are expensive, and that they should be related to a perceived threat. In Committee, he said that the perceived threat was greater in some airports than in others. In the absence of a national security levy, many airports are identifying a separate security element in their landing charges, but that does not overcome the fact that the cost of security measures at individual airports is not related to passenger throughput.

It is a pity that the Minister does not agree that airport managers' views should be sought before directions are introduced, but I do not wish to press the amendment to a Division; therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

I beg to move amendment No. 12, in page 36, line 35, at end insert—

(2A) An authorised person may require the owner, charterer, manager or master of a ship, the harbour authority or occupier, to provide him with such information as shall enable the authorised person to assess whether any special conditions should be included in a direction issued under this Act.'.

Clause 36 gives the Secretary of State powers of inspection to enable him to decide whether to make a direction under clauses 21 to 24, or to ascertain whether any direction or enforcement notice has been complied with. In carrying out inspections under clause 36, the authorised person will clearly need to have in mind the powers set out in those clauses—powers to search people and property, to detain ships if necessary and to carry out modifications or alterations in harbours or on ships. No provision exists, however, to take account of the terms and conditions of work for people who will be on the receiving end of those security measures.

Let us suppose that an inspector is concerned about security on a ship, and that it is clear to him that the person or persons responsible for security is, or are, suffering from gross fatigue. Is it not more than probable that he will consider that crew members—and the master himself—are unlikely to be vigilant about security if they are suffering from fatigue?

In our view, good security depends on people being viligant, alert and able to make quick and accurate decisions. Our amendment seeks to give the inspector power to require information, so that he can assess whether special conditions should be included in any direction that he is to issue. He should, for example, be able to ask how long people have been on duty: that could apply not only to personnel working on the ship, but to security guards at harbours. He should also be able to take into account the fitness of the people involved in ensuring that security provisions are as effective as possible.

In Committee, we discussed private security services at some length. We identified many deficiencies in their organisation, and in the personnel that they sought to recruit; we also referred to a report by the National Union of Marine Aviation and Shipping Transport Officers— NUMAST—about fatigue on ships. The report states:

"Fatigue can be deadly. Its effects and dangers are well-known and acknowledged in many transport industries by controls on employees' hours—yet there are no effective limits on the hours worked by seafarers.

Ships … carry a range of cargoes, some capable of causing massive environmental damage. Ferries and cruise ships carry passengers, specialist ships service North Sea oil and gas installations. In all these sectors, the shipping industry has clear responsibilities to provide safe services"—

and, of course, to have regard to security.

"NUMAST has extensively researched the problems posed by fatigue at sea. Consultations with members have produced evidence of excessive working hours throughout the shipping industry. Evidence of breakdowns in personal performance as a result of excessive hours has also been given to NUMAST.

Increasing commercial pressures—including reduced crew levels, greater reliance upon new technology and faster turnround times in ports—are exacerbating the problem faced by our members"—

that is, members of crews and masters of ships.

"Changes in relationship between shipowner, managing company and charterers can distance shipowners from masters and officers. Demands of oil and gas operators in the North Sea override seamanlike judgement on safety factors, including hours worked."

For all those reasons, we thought it necessary to table amendment No. 12 to enable all the relevant factors to be taken into account when inspections are being conducted. There is ample evidence that in the shipping industry—which places no limits on the number of hours that can be worked—people are working excessive hours, with the result that their ability to cope with difficult circumstances is affected dramatically. That must have a major impact on their ability to handle security matters.

I believe that my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, East (Mr. Prescott) has already given notice of a related question that I wish to ask the Minister. Is he aware of an incident that occurred at the end of last year on a P and O ferry using Dover harbour? A report has reached us recently of a bomb being found on board such a ship. My hon. Friend has written to the Minister and we shall expect a reply in due course, but I should like to know now whether he knows of such an incident.

If inspectors are given the necessary information, and consider that it has a bearing on the implementation of the Bill, we believe that they should have the power to make special conditions to rectify what we consider to be a glaring omission in maritime law—the lack of regulation of working hours.

Let me deal first with the hon. Lady's question about the report of a device being found on a ferry. I have not yet received the letter from the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, East (Mr. Prescott), although I understand that it is on its way, and I shall carry out a thorough investigation when it arrives. It would be entirely inappropriate for me to comment on a report that I have not yet seen, as I have had no opportunity to check it.

With respect, my question was not whether the Minister had received the letter or was in a position to reply, but whether he was aware of such an incident. He does not need to have received the letter to answer the question.

I thought that I made it clear that I know of no such incident.

The Government are unable to accept amendment No. 12, for two reasons. First, it is always for the Secretary of State to decide which requirements should be included in any direction. It would be wholly inappropriate for an authorised person to have such a power, especially as the amendment provides that that should happen after the Secretary of State has made his initial direction. Secondly, under clause 19(1), the Secretary of State already has wide-ranging powers to require information, these being

"in connection with the exercise by the Secretary of State of his functions under this Part of this Act."

We therefore cannot accept the amendment. I ask the House to reject it.

I beg to move amendment No. 8, in page 47, line 35, after 'this Act' insert

'(including any provision of Part III as applied by regulations made under section 41 of this Act) or under regulations made under section 42 of this Act'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 9.

These are technical amendments. They extend the scope of clause 49 and of section 37 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 in respect of regulations relating to air and sea cargo agents and regulations requiring the reporting of aviation and maritime security occurrences. If an offence under any of these regulations is committed by a body corporate, and with the connivance of, or because of the neglect of, a director or other similar senior officer of the company, that person will also be guilty of the offence.

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

A number of hon. Members wish to speak on Third Reading, so my speech will be brief. The Bill has received general support throughout its stages. We had an interesting Second Reading debate on a number of matters relating to aviation and maritime security. However, there were no significant differences of opinion about the Bill's proposals. Harmony continued throughout the Committee proceedings.

Today, we have had our most serious disagreements. The positions adopted by the Government and the Opposition have been typical. Our response, predictably, has been that we should minimise the role of Government where it is unnecessary to extend it. The Opposition's response, predictably, has been that the establishment of a central fund to recycle money could add to security. I did not expect the hon. Member for West Bromwich, East (Mr. Snape) to agree with me, but I am pleased that it was only a rare moment of disagreement between the two sides.

Outside the House, the Bill's proposals have been widely welcomed, certainly by the aviation industry and the police. However, they have been given a less warm welcome by the maritime industry, which believes that the existing voluntary arrangements are working satisfactorily. I can reassure the maritime industry that the legislation will ensure that security measures are applied even-handedly to foreign as well as to British ships. The Government believe that voluntary action is no longer adequate and that standards should be set and enforced throughout the industry. I assure the House that the legal sanctions will probably be used infrequently. However, it is important that reserve powers are available to be used if needed.

I believe that we have made important progress towards establishing what I hope will become an Act of Parliament which will enable us to tighten up our defences against terrorism in the aviation and maritime industries. I commend the Bill to the House.

I made it clear from the outset in Committee that I support all moves to strengthen security arrangements at our airports and seaports. I was concerned about the extent of the powers contained in the Bill, as first printed, but I am pleased to say that many of my fears were allayed in Committee. The Minister knows that I have always been concerned about the strange anomaly that, to protect the freedom of our people—in this case, freedom of movement—we are giving the Government and other designated people the very powers that, in different circumstances, could be used to take freedom away.

Although we have uppermost in our minds the fact that we are endeavouring to defeat terrorism, the extensive powers of searches of persons and property—which are to be authorised by the owners and operators of our aerodromes, ports and the ships and aircraft that use our ports and by certain other categories of person under directives from the Secretary of State—are still very wide.

As drafted, the Bill makes it clear that most of the searches will be carried out by private security personnel. In the case of our harbours, the searches are likely to be conducted by hand. There is still no code of conduct or set of standards to cover such searches; nor is there any mechanism to monitor the process or to set up a complaints procedure. I mentioned that point in Committee on two separate occasions. I still consider such a mechanism to be essential. I am still worried about the extensive nature of this power of search, which can reach land, property and personnel far removed from any airport or harbour.

In Committee, I tried to amend the clause relating to the use of firearms. I am mindful that, in reply, the Minister said:

"I advise the hon. Member for Southport (Mr. Fearn) that his amendment No. 99 has considerable attraction. I intend to reconsider the phraseology of this part of the Bill, although I am not sure that what he proposes is strictly necessary. it is clear that the mechanism for securing searches by armed constables would operate when a person receiving a direction got in touch with the chief constable of a local police force, who would ensure that arms were carried by the policemen. That would happen in any case, but there maybe advantage in reviewing the wording.

A specific fault in the hon. Gentleman's wording is that it would require constables to be authorised to carry firearms, but that is not enough. We want to ensure that they actually carry them if that has been specified in the direction. For that reason, I shall not accept his wording. However, I should like to review it to see whether we can provide something better."—Official Report, Standing Committee A, 15 February 1990; c. 139.]

I see no evidence of that reconsideration, or of a review or of the provison of something better. Perhaps the Minister could say why.

As I have already stated, with the exceptions that I have mentioned, I feel that this is a good Bill. I therefore support it, as it will be an effective vehicle to combat terrorism.

I was pleased to welcome the Bill when it was given its Second Reading. Both in Committee and on Report, it has been further strengthened by the changes that have been made. However, I do not believe that the process should stop here. My hon. Friends the Ministers for Public Transport and for Aviation and Shipping are well aware that several matters still need to be considered. When the Bill reaches another place, I hope that it will be possible to introduce further changes.

The Bill improves security both at airports and at seaports. It clarifies responsibilities that have never been clarified before. The Secretary of State's role is defined. The Bill provides him with new powers to carry out his responsibilities. It ensures that everyone with access to airside at airports and with access to ships is responsible for public safety.

The Bill also improves the checking and monitoring of security. The powers of the inspectorate at airports are to be strengthened. The Bill will provide it with greater powers to carry out checks. However, the suggestion that, because there will be more inspectors, there will, for the first time, be random tests of the system is far from the truth. All sorts of people have been trying to test the system for a long time, but more inspectors will be a welcome addition. One of the most important improvements made in Committee was the insertion of the requirement that all future lapses in security must be reported.

The Bill provides effective sanctions that will enable enforcement to take place properly. It activates the Montreal protocol and creates new offences; the entire Committee agreed that that was about time too.

The Bill closes some loopholes that have existed for some time. In future, businesses that operate at an airport but also have premises away from the airport will find that security will catch up with them wherever they may be operating. That is not before time.

In Committee, it was also made clear that the cargo procedures, particularly at airports, would be tightened up. I welcome that, as does the entire aviation industry, but there is still some way to go; more thought is necessary before we can be absolutely certain that we have done everything possible to improve our existing cargo systems. Although the Bill contains all those worthwhile provisions, we have to remember that no Bill will ever be a cure-all for security, as 100 per cent. security is impossible. However many Bills go through the House, the personal responsibility of every passenger and employee and the eternal vigilance of all concerned are the only ways to maximise security, even when the Bill is enacted.

When we pass the Bill, we need to avoid three traps. First, we must not pretend to the public that we can achieve a level of security that cannot be attained, because we do not have the technology. Secondly, we must beware of bringing the system to a halt by demanding too many checks on huge numbers of people. Thirdly, as I said on Second Reading, we must avoid always looking backwards to try to close loopholes after a terrorist has found them. Having said that, I wish the Bill well. I believe that it is a practical response to a deeply worrying problem for the public.

Earlier in our deliberations, the Minister of State said that, at every stage of the Bill, the debate has been fairly harmonious and good-tempered. We endorse those sentiments. Right from the outset, the Opposition have been in a somewhat unusual position. Normally, we oppose Government legislation, but on this occasion we felt that there was much to be said in favour of the Bill, although we were unhappy with some aspects of it and felt that some loopholes should be closed. We have not been successful in closing those loopholes, but at each stage we were grateful to the Minister of State and the Under-Secretary of State for listening to the arguments, and for responding positively when they were able to do so and courteously when they were not. That is not always the case on such legislation.

From the outset, the Opposition believed and insisted that there should be a time schedule within which all aircraft baggage for transfer and in hold, as well as that carried by passengers, should be properly screened. We have not yet reached that laudable objective, although we have secured a pledge from the Minister of State that the Government will work towards it and, hopefully, it will be achieved sooner rather than later.

We remain of the view that the major obstacle to achieving that desirable goal is money. Notwithstanding the views that have been expressed this evening, we firmly believe that an aviation security fund will be necessary to fund security adequately at Britain's airports.

In Committee, we introduced the concept that a threat to damage or interfere with the safe passage of an airliner should be an offence. That view was shared by many Members on both sides of the Committee. Perhaps the Government's attitude will change. The perceived threat to airlines and airliners is often worrying to passengers. All too often, those who make such threats are aware that some people feel terrified, or at least uncomfortable, when they board an aircraft. The examples that we discussed in Committee showed that the threats themselves caused enormous concern to passengers and led to heavy delays and extra expense for the airlines involved.

Most of the maritime clauses of the Bill have been dealt with more than adequately by my hon. Friends the Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Ms. Ruddock) and for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran). We remain concerned and unhappy about the amount of private policing that takes place and will continue to take place around our docks and harbours.

I am sorry that the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Shersby) is not present, although I am sure there are good reasons for his absence. Some of the amendments that he tabled in Committee left us in no doubt about the concern of the Police Federation that so many policing duties are bring carried out by private security firms. In Committee, the Opposition attempted to do something about the principle of non-police officers doing work that should be carried out by the police.

We attempted to persuade the Minister to accept amendments that would have laid down minimum standards of pay and working conditions within the private security industry before those private security firms were employed at docks, harbours or airports. As we were unsuccessful in our attempts to persuade the Government that such amendments were necessary, we hope that their refusal to accede to those eminently reasonable demands will not rebound on them in the form of further breaches of security particularly at our docks and harbours in future.

We believe that the Bill is basically good. All right hon. and hon. Members are anxious that security at our airports, harbours and docks is the best that money can buy, regardless of where that money comes from. The fact that there was so much harmony in Committee illustrates the depth of feeling and concern, which crosses party lines. We do not whole-heartedly support every clause. We tried to close one or two gaps in the Bill, and the fact that we were unable to do so causes us concern. The parts of the Bill that must be strengthened will be considered in another place, so I conclude by expressing the Opposition's thanks to the Minister for Public Transport and the Under-Secretary for a courteous and informative debate, and I hope that they would reciprocate those sentiments.