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Orders Of The Day

Volume 171: debated on Tuesday 24 April 1990

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Human Fertilisation And Embryology Bill

Second Allotted Day

Further considered in Committee

[MR. HAROLD WALKER in the Chair]

3.52 pm

On a point of order, Mr. Walker. Having seen the selection list I note that two important amendments to new clause 4—amendments (aa) and (bb)—have not been selected; nor has amendment (ee), which would exempt Scotland from the legislation. If we are not to have the chance to consider those amendments, will there be other opportunities for debating those issues?

I am required not to give reasons for my selection or non-selection of amendments. I expect that the debate will be a wide debate and if the hon. Lady is fortunate enough to catch my eye, I shall give sympathetic consideration to allowing her to cover the substance of the matter that is reflected by her amendments.

On a point of order, Mr. Walker. I have heard what you have told the hon. Member for Glasgow, Maryhill (Mrs. Fyfe) about amendments, but should like to seek your guidance. My amendment—amendment (u)—is the only amendment that deals with the grounds on which an abortion can be obtained. It adds the word "serious" to new clause 4 which has been tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the House. Is the fact that my amendment has not been selected a bar to it being raised during future debates on the Bill? Would it be in order for it to be referred to on Report—subject, again, to selection?

All that I can do is offer the hon. Gentleman the advice that I gave to the hon. Member for Glasgow, Maryhill (Mrs. Fyfe). He has raised this matter with me. I assure him that I am not being facetious when I say that I take his point seriously. The selection of amendments on Report is a matter for Mr. Speaker. No doubt his attention will be drawn to what has been said, the representations that have been made about today and those which the hon. Gentleman will undoubtedly make in future.

New Clause 4

Amendment Of Law Relating To Termination Of Pregnancy

'.—(1) For paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 1(1) of the Abortion Act 1967 (grounds for medical termination of pregnancy) there is substituted—

"(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family; or
(b) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or
(c) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-eighth week and that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.".

(2) In section 1(4) of that Act, for "to save the life" to the end there is substituted—

"(a) to save the life of the pregnant woman, or
(b) to prevent grave permanent injury to her physical or mental health, and, in the latte r case, that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week.".—[Sir Geoffrey Howe.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the clause be read a Second time.— [Sir Geoffrey Howe.]

With this we may consider the following amendments to new clause (4): (a), in line 3, leave out 'twenty-fourth' and insert 'eighteenth'.

(b), in line 3, leave out 'twenty-fourth' and insert `twenty-eighth'.

(c), in line 3, leave out 'twenty-fourth' and insert 'twentieth'.

(d), in line 3, leave out 'twenty-fourth' and insert 'twenty-sixth'.

(e), in line 3, leave out 'twenty-fourth' and insert 'twenty-second'.

(f), in line 6, at end insert—
'(aa) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman; or'.
(g), in line 6, at end insert—
(aa) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-eighth week and that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman; or'.
(x), in line 8, leave out from 'woman,' to 'or'.

(i), in line 9, leave out
'that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-eighth week and'.
(j), in line 9, leave out 'twenty-eighth' and insert

'twenty-fourth'.

(s), in line 11, at end insert '; or

(d) that the pregnancy is due to an act of rape or incest.'.

(h), in line 11, at end insert—

'( ) In section 1(2) of that Act, after "(a)" there is inserted "or (aa)"'.

(k), in line 12, leave out from beginning to end of line 16.

(y), in line 12, leave out from 'Act,' to end of line 16 and insert
'after "practitioners" (in line 3) the words "and to time limits" shall be inserted.'.
(l), in line 15, leave out 'twenty-fourth' and insert 'eighteenth'.

(m), in line 15, leave out 'twenty-fourth' and insert 'twenty-eighth'.

(n), in line 15, leave out 'twenty-fourth' and insert 'twentieth'.

(o), in line 15, leave out 'twenty-fourth' and insert 'twenty-sixth'.

(p), in line 15, leave out 'twenty-fourth' and insert `twenty-second'.

(q), in line 16, at end insert—

'(3) For section 5(1) of that Act (effect on Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929) there is substituted—
"(1) No offence under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 shall be committed by a registered medical practitioner who terminates a pregnancy in accordance with the provisions of this Act.".'.
(r), in line 16, at end insert—
'( ) In section 1(2) of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (presumption that child is capable of being born alive), for "twenty-eight" there is substituted "twenty-four".'.
(dd), in line 16, at end insert—
'( ) In section 1(2) of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (Presumption that child is capable of being born alive), for "evidence that a woman had at any material time been pregnant for a period of twenty-eight weeks or more shall be prima facie proof that she was at that time pregnant of a child capable of being born alive" there is substituted "to be considered being capable of being born alive, a foetus must be capable of sustained independent survival".'.

We are also to consider at the same time the following:New clause 1— Amendment of Abortion Act 1967

'.—(1) The Abortion Act 1967 shall be amended as follows.
(2) For subsections (1) and (2) of section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 ("the principal Act") there shall be substituted—
"(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is teminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith, that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve—
  • (a) risk to the life of the pregnant woman; or
  • (b) risk of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or
  • (c) risk of injury to the physical or mental health of any existing children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or
  • (d) substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.
  • (2) In determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would involve such risk of injury to health as is mentioned in paragraph (b) or (c) of subsection (1) of this section, account may be taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable environment:
    (2A) No pregnancy may lawfully be terminated after the end of its twenty-fourth week—
  • (a) under sebsection (1)(b) of this section, unless two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith, that the termination of the pregnancy is essential to prevent serious damage to the mental or physical health of the pregnant woman; or
  • (b) solely on the ground of subsection (1)(c) of the section.
  • (2B) Where at the time of the termination of pregnancy two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith, that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week, that opinion shall, for the purposes of subsection (2A) of this section, be conclusive."
    (3) For section (5)(1) of the principal Act there shall be substituted—
    "5.—(1) No offence under Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 shall be committed by a registered medical practitioner who terminates a pregnancy in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
    (4) This section shall come into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the date on which it is passed.'.

    New clause 2— Time limit for termination of pregnancy—

    '.—(1) Section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 (termination of pregnancy not to be a criminal offence where specified in the section) shall apply only to a termination up to the end of the twenty-fourth week of gestation.
    (2) It shall not in any case be an offence under the law relating to abortion for a pregnancy to be terminated by a registered medical practitioner in a case where he is of the opinion formed in good faith, that the termination is immediately necessary to save the woman's life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.
    (3) For section 5 of the Abortion Act 1967 there shall be substituted—
    "5. No offence under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 shall be committed by a registered medical practitioner who terminates a pregnancy in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
    (4) In this section, "the law relating to abortion" means sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and any rule of law relating to the procurement of an abortion.
    (5) This section shall come into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the date on which it is passed.'.

    New clause 3— Medical judgment: termination of pregnancy—

    '(1) The Abortion Act 1967 shall be amended as follows.
    (2) After section 1(1)(b) there shall be inserted—"and
    (c) that the foetus is not viable and capable of sustained survival at the time the pregnancy is to be terminated."
    (3) For section 5(1) there shall be substituted
    "(1) The provisions of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (protecting the life of the viable foetus) shall not apply to any treatment for termination of pregnancy carried out under the provisions of this Act.".'.

    New clause 5— Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment of 1967 Act)—

    '.—(1) Section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 is amended by leaving out the condition imposed by the words beginning with the word "two", following the word "if' in subsection (1) to the end of the subsection, and by leaving out subsection (2).
    (2) In place of the words left out there are inserted the following words—
  • "(a) the pregnancy has not exceeded its twelfth week and the termination is with the consent of the registered medical practitioner on whose list the pregnant woman is, or
  • (b) the pregnancy has exceeded its twelfth but not its twenty-fourth week, if both the practitioner who carries out the termination and another registered medical practitioner of not less than consultant level certify in good faith that the pregnancy puts at grave risk the mother's physical or mental health, or that there is a foetal abnormality with a strong probability that the child would suffer a condition both incurable and wholly destructive of the quality of life, or that conception arises from rape or child abuse or that the mother was a minor at the time of conception,
  • (c) the continuation of the pregnancy would result in the death of the pregnant mother or irreversible grave damage to her health."
  • (3) Section 1 of the 1967 Act is further amended by leaving out of subsection (4) the reference to two medical practitioners in subsection (1).'.

    On a point of order, Mr. Walker. Could you explain to the House in the best and most clear form available to you exactly how the procedures will operate today and how the voting will take place on the amendments on the order paper?

    I am bound by the recommendations of the Business Committee. We shall have a debate lasting until 11 pm, on the assumption that hon. Members sustain the debate until then. All the signs are that that is the case. On new clause 4, the various amendments listed in the selection list and the substance of new clauses 1, 2, 3 and 5, the voting will follow the sequence of the amendments and new clauses on the selection list, conditioned, of course, by the outcome of each Division. We shall follow the sequence on the selection list.

    Further to that point of order, Mr. Walker. Could you make certain that it is made clear to hon. Members exactly what they are voting on before each Division takes place?

    That is a matter for the judgment and common sense of hon. Members. Of course, when the time comes to put the amendments to the House, we shall seek, as far as is practicable for the Chair, and short of appearing to advise hon. Members on how they might vote, to respond to what the hon. Gentleman said and to make sure that hon. Members know what they are voting on. In the course of the debate, Members will be aware of what they are discussing and what the Division about.

    I do not think that that is good enough. Yesterday, a list of amendments was put in the No Lobby. It showed what type of amendments would be taken today. Even they were complicated. Nevertheless, that is what we expected. Today the agenda is different. I have no doubt that many Members of Parliament here today are working on the principle that what they saw in the No Lobby yesterday will apply. Apparently, that is no longer the case. We have already heard that certain amendments tabled by my hon. Friends on the Front Bench have not been selected. Those amendments apparently will not be taken.

    Furthermore, we are dealing with an unusual procedure. It is not normal practice for the House of Commons. In the first place, the idea that the debate will continue until 11 pm is unusual. From then on, a series of amendments will be put to the House. In many cases, which one is called will depend on which amendments have been carried. That is not the case on any other occasion. This procedure should not have been started in arty case. It is only because of the pressures brought by certain individuals that we are dealing with abortion on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill. People have been twisting and turning on the Bill ever since it began.

    The Chair has a duty to explain, before the business begins, exactly what amendments will be taken, in what order, and which will fall subsequently if others are carried, so that everyone is aware of what is happening. There is a serious danger that, if certain amendments are carried, some hon. Members will think that that is the end of the business. They might leave this place, with the result that a change might take place at 2, 3, or 4 o'clock in the morning. It is high time that the Chair fully explained what the amendments are, in what order they will be taken and which will fall consequent on others being carried.

    4 pm

    The normal procedure of the House has been followed for the selection of amendments. There is nothing unusual in the fact that, for various reasons, some amendments have not been selected. I have explained that I am not required to give reasons for non-selection. There is nothing unusual about that. The extension of our sitting time to 11 pm was decided by the House following the recommendations of the Business Committee.

    I am bound by the decisions of the majority of the House. The hon. Gentleman asked about the sequence of the amendments put to the House. At the conclusion of the debate, the occupant of the Chair shall again follow the usual practice of the House and put them as they are set down on the selection paper. Clearly, some amendments are conditional on what may happen to preceding amendments, but that can be determined only in the light of events after 11 pm.

    On a point of order, Mr. Walker. Is it right that this debate will be more like a Second Reading debate than an ordinary Committee debate on abortion? In answer to the hon. Member for Glasgow, Maryhill (Mrs. Fyfe), you said that the debate would be wide. Does that mean that it will be like a Second Reading debate on abortion, only with amendments?

    The hon. Gentleman is correct, in so far as the new clause deals with abortion. We are responding to the question whether the clause will be read a Second time, and to that extent it will be like a Second Reading debate. It may be a little unusual that, within that one debate, we shall also discuss all the amendments which I have selected and which are set down on the selection paper.

    Further to the point of order of the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner), Mr. Walker. Is it not the case that the lists for today and yesterday are identical except that today, not surprisingly, the words "First Allotted Day" are omitted?

    Further to the point of order of my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner), Mr. Walker. I am sure that the public at large, as well as hon. Members, feel that this complicated procedure has been drawn up to confuse, in the hope that the anti-abortionists will at last get their way. I am disappointed that we shall not have a full explanation of each amendment and clause as it is debated.

    If the hon. Lady finds the procedure difficult, the Chair finds it no less difficult. Like all hon. Members, I have to recognise the Standing Orders and established procedures of the House. It provides difficulties for the occupant of the Chair no less, and perhaps even more, than for ordinary Members. Surely, the explanation of the amendments rests not with the Chair, but with those responsible for them. It is not for me to guide the House on the merits of the amendments. I am following the established procedures of the House, and on an occasion such as this, they become rather difficult and complicated.

    We are taking up valuable debating time. Perhaps we can move on.

    Just before we get on to the debate, may I urge you, Mr. Walker, because of the views put to you from various parts of the House, to recognise that this is an unusual procedure which you have adopted? Members of Parliament will be in difficulties if you follow exactly the same sort of procedures which are normally followed by the Chair. Members of Parliament would appreciate a great deal more clarity when you announce the various questions about exactly what we are voting on. I urge you to consider that.

    I must tell the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford (Mr. Wells) that they are not procedures that I have adopted but the procedures of the House, reinforced by the recommendations of the Business Committee, upon which the House voted. I have not chosen the procedures, but I must apply them. I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's point that these are not easy matters and that, at the end of our debate, the House should be quite clear when it is required to vote. Certainly I shall bear in mind what the hon. Gentleman has said and, whether I or anyone else is in the Chair, we shall ensure that we are alive to the hon. Gentleman's point and that the House is clear, in so far as the Chair can make it clear, exactly what it is to vote upon. I do not think that I can go beyond that. Perhaps we can now proceed.

    In rising to speak to this new clause I am clear that, perhaps above all others, this is an issue on which there are deeply felt and sincerely held views on all sides in the House and in the country.

    On questions relating to abortion, the Government, like their predecessors, do not have a collective view. The issue is one on which Ministers and Members of all political parties, and also adherents of many religious beliefs, take differing views. It is essentially a matter of individual judgment and conscience to decide in this area what the law should permit and what it should ban.

    On abortion it is also a matter of individual judgment and conscience what a person should do within what the law permits. In what follows I shall distinguish my role as a Minister and my position as the Member of Parliament for Surrey, South-West. Being a Health Minister gives me no special basis upon which to advise anyone on matters of conscience or morality. That is a measure of the special nature of the matter now before us.

    In speaking to the new clause on time limits for abortion, which stands in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the House, it would be helpful to the Committee to go into some detail about the background to it, its effect if carried in its present or modified form, and on the ways in which the Committee may be able to reach a coherent conclusion on those matters. In view of the importance and complexity of the questions, I have arranged for copies of my speech to be made available in the Vote Office as soon as possible so that hon. Members can study it in more detail and perhaps draw on it as the day proceeds.

    I shall concentrate on the new clause and the amendments in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State. Other amendments will no doubt be the subject of detailed discussion later in the debate.

    The Government have an inescapable role in administering what Parliament has decided to enact. With it comes the role of advising Parliament if a legislative proposal seems confusing, or difficult to operate in practice, or inconsistent with some other provision. With it also comes the further role of advising Parliament of ways in which changes over time and the recent developments in medical and scientific practices may have affected the existing legislation in ways in which Parliament should take account. It is in that context that the Government have considered the question of abortion time limits.

    The Abortion Act 1967—private Member's legislation—applied to Great Britain but not to Northern Ireland and did not include specific references to time limits. It linked instead with the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. That Act, which applies to England and Wales, made it a criminal offence to destroy the life of any child capable of being born alive, except where it is done to save the woman's life, and for that purpose provided a rebuttable presumption that a woman who had been pregnant for 28 weeks should be presumed to have a child capable of being born alive. At and above 28 weeks, the onus is on the defendant to show that the child would not have been viable. Below that time, the onus is on the prosecution to show that the child would have been born alive.

    The 28-week figure was established on the basis of the medical and scientific knowledge available at that time, more than 60 years ago. In Scotland, the only legislative proposals are those contained in the Abortion Act 1967. As I have made clear, the 1967 Act does not include reference to time limits, so in Scotland satisfaction of the grounds for abortion as set out in section 1 of that Act is all that is needed to ensure that a termination of pregnancy is lawful.

    I am deeply grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. Before she goes on, will she accurately define what she means by "viable" in this context?

    For a child to be born viable, it must have a beating heart and sustainable respiration. I shall go on to talk about the recommendations of several organisations involved with the subject as to what is an appropriate way to respond to the issue of viability. Under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, that is a matter for the prosecution to substantiate in the case of a child born under or over the limit. Since 1929, advances in medicine have altered the position on foetal viability. Some foetuses of less than 28 weeks gestation, which would at one time have stood little chance of surviving after birth, now have a greater chance of survival. That is the issue about which my hon. Friend is concerned.

    In 1980, the Government invited a working party of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, including representatives of medical and midwifery professional bodies, to consider the question of foetal viability. In 1985, they presented a report. Its conclusion was that the presumptive age of capacity to be born alive should be reduced from 28 weeks to 24 weeks. That advice was confirmed by the royal college and the associated organisations when they reviewed the report at the end of 1987.

    In a statement issued only this month, the royal college reiterated its view that 24 weeks should be the age at which a foetus is considered viable. In their view, a gestational age limit below 24 weeks would have an inequitable and adverse effect on those women in need of having their pregnancies terminated. Ministers have indicated on several occasions, in this House and in another place, in debates on private Members' legislation on this subject, that a reduction to 24 weeks, as proposed in the royal college report, would be in line with current medical opinion and practice.

    The Government have taken administrative action to ensure that no abortions above 24 weeks are carried out in private clinics licensed by the Secretary of State for the purpose of the Abortion Act. The number of such abortions carried out in National Health hospitals is now small—the figure for Great Britain in 1988 was 23.

    Has the Minister had a chance to consider the ruling of Mr. Justice Brooke, who said that viability was to be defined as the capacity to survive for a few minutes unaided? Where does the definition that she has just given leave babies such as the Carlisle baby, which was born and survived for three hours struggling for life in a petrie dish before being incinerated?

    The Carlisle baby case has been subject to much discussion, not least in a debate in this House in which my hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State, Home Office took part. The other case to which the hon. Gentleman refers is a matter for civil law. I am making it clear that there is a considerable body of opinion which believes that the Infant Life (Preservation) Act limit should be reconsidered, and that viability should be reconsidered at the stage of 24 weeks. In cases where that is challenged, it is a matter for debate in the courts.

    I am sorry to press the point about viability, but I am concerned as to whether the viability test includes the lack of a brain, or its function, and major defects, both mental and physical, in the foetus in the women's body. Therefore, I should be grateful if the Minister could make it clear whether or not her term "viability" includes those considerations.

    I have made it clear that viability has to do with being able to sustain life, having a heartbeat and being able to sustain respiration——

    The fundamental question to many of us concerns the life of the child. How many women miscarry after 20 weeks, because that seems fundamental to the question of how many children we are killing?

    4.15 pm

    I cannot tell my hon. Friend how many women miscarry after 20 weeks, but I can tell him that there have been about 3,000 legal abortions after 20 weeks.

    I should like to return to the point in the Minister's speech when she first gave way, and to the recommendation that we should come down to a 24-week limit—which I support, with exceptions for hard cases. Can the hon. Lady confirm for the record that, of babies born at 24 weeks, only about 15 per cent. survive—with all the medical technology that we have—and that large numbers of them are brain-damaged? It should be recorded that we are discussing the very brink of viability of a child.

    I can confirm that many of these early infants sustain either physical or learning disabilities. I cannot give the precise proportion, but it is considerable.

    I hesitate to rise, because I realise that my hon. Friend is in the middle of her speech, but a far more important question with which the House must deal concerns the state of the present law. Does the Infant Life (Preservation) Act lay down that it is a crime to abort a child capable of being born alive? If we relate that to the age at which children are being born alive and surviving, we get a clue—nay, an answer—to the issue which should constitute this debate.

    As the Father of the House knows the terms of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act full well, he will know that it is for the prosecution to substantiate its claim to rebut the assumption of the limit at which a child should be presumed to be capable of being born alive. I know that my right hon. Friend feels strongly about this subject and no doubt he will have the opportunity to speak later in the debate, but I should make some headway.

    In the many debates on abortion, in this House and in another place, there has been movement towards changes which would include specific time limits for Great Britain within the Abortion Act 1967, rather than merely amending the 1929 Act. That was the proposal made by the Select Committee in another place and in various recent Bills, including the Abortion (Amendment) Bill, which recently came to us as private Member's legislation from another place. For convenience I intend to refer to it as the current abortion Bill.

    Members are all aware of the lengthy and complex debates that have taken place on this subject in recent years in this House and in another place. The Committee now has this opportunity to debate and decide on these matters. Both outside and inside Parliament a view has increasingly developed that Parliament should decide where it now stands on this vital issue. There have been lengthy debates in the country as well as here. Parliament many now be ready to reach a conclusion on those questions.

    It may be the view of the House that a clear outcome should be reached which would take into consideration the changes in medical and scientific practices, but I must emphasise again that the Government are not seeking to lay down whether a change should be made or, if so, what the change should be. The Committee may wish to leave the law as it is, or to alter the Infant Life (Preservation) Act only, or to bring time limits within the Abortion Act at various possible levels.

    Since the gynaecologists started to make their report on the viability of foetuses, and then brought in their revised report, a massive change has taken place in technology; so the so-called figures put on the so-called record by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Ms. Short) are quite fictitious because techniques are advancing so rapidly that disabilities of that kind can be overcome much more readily. We are supposed to be legislating for the future, not for the current state of play or what has happened within the year, but for what will happen in the next 10 years.

    I am afraid that in a sense I can confirm to my hon. Friend that the learned bodies have only recently reviewed and reconfirmed their previous advice. It is estimated that about 40 per cent. of small infants born before 24 weeks have some learning disability or some other serious disability. Perhaps I could make some progress now.

    As hon. Members are well aware, the role of the Minister is to help the Committee, if it wishes to debate these matters and to reach conclusions, to do so in an orderly and logical way. We have already agreed on timetable motions to ensure that there is adequate time for debate and to allow votes on the amendments. It is up to the Committee whether it uses those opportunities. It is evident that it would be possible to produce outcomes which were to a greater or lesser extent coherent or confused.

    From the detailed soundings that my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the House has made in all parts of the Committee, it appears to be the overwhelming wish to avoid an inconclusive outcome and to produce a definite workable result. In view of the responsibilities of the Department of Health for administering the abortion provisions, my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Health, with the Leader of the House, and with other Health Ministers considered how best procedural help could be offered to the Committee.

    The subject is complex not only because of the wide range of choices available, but also because of the interaction in England and Wales between the Infant Life (Preservation) Act and the Abortion Act. The House will be grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the House for putting down a comprehensive new clause setting out a coherent scheme based on what may be a possible consensus. I use the word "possible" rather than "likely" because the new clause is not intended in any way to pre-empt discussion and decision. The position is quite the reverse. The new clause tries to cover the main aspects on which the House needs to reach a decision one way or another, both on the time limits for the various provisions in the Abortion Act and on the rebuttable presumption in the Infant Life (Preservation) Act.

    Will the Minister tell us why we were not given the opportunity fully to debate the Houghton Bill as the Lords were? That is what we wanted.

    I think that I have made it clear that my right hon. and learned Friends the Leader of the House and the Secretary of State for Health have used their best efforts to ensure that it is possible for the Committee to debate the main principles involved so as to try to reach some sort of consensus. These subjects have been debated frequently in recent years without reaching a conclusion. Efforts have been made to ensure that people are fully able to debate the key issues not only in the House but in the country.

    The Minister has said that there have been soundings of hon. Members. I am not aware of who was sounded out. May we take it that she can tell us exactly who the Leader of the House spoke to? Were members of the pro-life group asked to give their opinion in order to try to get them off the Government's back? Notwithstanding the soundings of pro-life representatives, I can assure the Minister that from listening to interviews on the radio it is clear that the pro-life group will not go away. Irrespective of what happens today, they will come back because the Ceaucescu lobby is here to stay. I want to know who was sounded out. Was it Opposition Members, people on the Front Bench or members of the pro-life group? The hon. Member for Liverpool, Mossley Hill (Mr. Alton) was sounded out. How many more people were sounded out?

    I have little sympathy for the hon. Gentleman's intervention. It is clear that a period of time has been set a part to debate these crucial issues. There is strong feeling not only in the House but in the country on these questions. I have made it clear that my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the House has sounded out a number of people who have a strong interest. They were people in both parties with various interests and those who have strong views on the subject. He was trying to take a balanced view to make sure that everyone could contribute. I hope that the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) will have an opportunity to make a fuller contribution to the debate.

    The new clause is put forward in my right hon. and learned Friend's role as Leader of the House. It does not necessarily comprise his views as the Member for Surrey, East. The new clause contains only possible answers. We have been anxious to present the House with a range of possible amendments on various aspects of the new clause, drafted in what we believe, after taking advice, would be a workable way. The rules of the House understandably prevent my right hon. and learned Friend from moving amendments to his new clause. For that reason, to assist the Committee my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Health agreed to put down a series of amendments. Some propose to relax particular limits in the new clause and others would make them more stringent.

    I rise on a point of clarification, which my hon. Friend may not be able to answer. Perhaps our right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State can answer when he replies to the debate. Some people feel that amendment (f) might have been inadvertently misdrafted. Perhaps we could have clarification on whether, if it is passed, the termination level would be unlimited, or whether it would be at the level that we previously would have agreed when we voted on the various weeks contained in earlier amendments. Perhaps we could have clarification of that before we reach the votes.

    I can make that clarification now, but then I must proceed with my speech so that other hon. Members can have the opportunity to make their speeches. Amendment (f) has no time limit, whereas amendment (g) introduces a time limit of 28 weeks in the case of grave permanent injury to the health of the woman.

    My right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the House has already provided hon. Members with a fair amount of written material which sets out the background to the subject, the nature of the new clause and the amendments to it that he and my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Health have put down, and the main procedural issues which seem to us to arise when the time for decision-making comes. I urge all hon. Members to study that material carefully because it seeks to set out as clearly as possible the effect of the new clause and of my right hon. and learned Friends' amendments to it.

    An attempt has been made to provide hon. Members with relevant material. It is nevertheless inevitably complex and difficult legally, over and above the moral and ethical complexities that the subject presents to us. It may help the Committee to go through the new clause in some detail, referring to possible variations which might be made in it and explaining at the same time how hon. Members may wish to reach a decision so as to avoid inconsistency and difficulty in practical matters. I apologise to the Committee in advance that in discussing the new clause and my right hon. and learned Friends' amendments I shall need to go into complex options and choices where action in one area may impinge on what is done in other areas. However, if the Committee permits I shall try in my speech to make the position as clear as I can. Copies of my speech will be available.

    The main object of the new clause is to put specific time limits in the 1967 Abortion Act while leaving the system of the rebuttable presumption in the 1929 Infant Life (Preservation) Act to operate as well. I shall say more later about the 1929 Act. Unless changes are made in the 1929 Act to separate it from the 1967 Act completely, anything said about specific time limits needs to be qualified in respect of England and Wales by reference to the 1929 Act. If hon. Members do not wish to put time limits into the 1967 Act, they should vote against the new clause.

    Subsection (1) of new clause 4 deals with the ordinary case where termination of pregnancy has to be approved by two doctors. That is to be distinguished from the emergency provisions in section 1(4) of the 1967 Act where the approval of only one doctor is needed, and to which I shall return later. The new clause sets out three separate grounds for abortion. Those are essentially the same as those in the 1967 Act, but have been rearranged to bring them out more clearly. The 1967 Act included two of them in one paragraph.

    The first ground in new clause 4, subsection (I)(a), deals with abortion where two doctors consider that the continuation of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman, or any existing children of her family. I shall refer to this as injury to physical or mental health. That is by far the most common ground on which abortions are at present carried out, and accounted last year for 89 per cent. of the total. In such cases, the new clause would provide as a time limit that the pregnancy has not exceeded the 24th week.

    Will the Minister give way on that point?

    4.30 pm

    No.

    Under the clause, the 1929 Act would still apply in England and Wales, so that it would not be legal to perform an abortion even at or below 24 weeks if the child was capable of being born alive. Twenty-four weeks was selected as perhaps the most commonly suggested limit, but my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State has moved amendments to substitute other figures at two-week intervals from 18 to 28 weeks. Those are amendments (a) to (e), and they appear on the Order Paper in what is referred to as the "pendulum order".

    If the new clause is accepted, the first of those amendments that is passed will set the time limit in the new clause. If no amendments are passed, the time limit will be the proposed 24 weeks. That may be so regarded by most people outside the House.

    Paragraph (b) provides for abortions where the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman greater than if the pregnancy were terminated. That makes no change from the 1967 Act. There is little or no dispute that that provision should remain.

    Unlike all the other provisions, it is not affected by the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, since the 1929 Act makes a specific exception for actions done in good faith

    "for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother."
    Paragraph (c) of the new clause deals with cases where there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped. That is regarded as the "serious foetal handicap" category.

    There is widespread recognition that such cases present particular difficulty for several reasons. A special factor is that foetal handicap may not be diagnosable until fairly late in the pregnancy, although we hope that new medical techniques will increasingly make earlier diagnosis of some of those abnormalities possible, a subject that we debated yesterday. A time limit of 28 weeks has been suggested. That is subject to the provisions of the 1929 Act.

    My right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Health has put down amendments which, if selected, would give the options of a 24-week limit for that type of case, amendment (i), or no limit at all, amendment (j), as provided in the current Abortion Bill passed by another place. In either case, the amendments would be subject again to the overriding provisions of the 1929 Act, unless the House decides to remove those too. I refer to amendment (q).

    The three criteria set out in the new clause and in the 1967 Act are not the only ones that can be proposed. As the first example of this, the new clause does not provide in abortions approved by two doctors for the special test of
    "grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman".
    That form of words is specified as a ground for abortion in the emergency provisions in section 1(4) of the 1967 Act to which I shall refer later.

    My right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State has put on the Order Paper amendments to insert this as a ground, either with no time limit, amendment (m), or a 28-week time limit, amendment (g). Either would be subject to the 1929 Act unless, as I have made clear, the House decided otherwise, and that would be amendment(q)

    Subsection (2) deals with what are generally referred to as the "emergency" situations where an abortion can be carried out by one doctor without the second opinion that is normally required. That is covered at present in section 1(4) of the 1967 Act on two grounds—to save the life of the pregnant woman, or to prevent grave permanent injury to her physical or mental health. On the first ground—that of saving life—there is at present no time limit, and the 1929 Act does not apply. No change is proposed here.

    In the case of grave permanent injury, the effect of the 1929 Act in England and Wales is to apply at present a limit of, in effect, 28 weeks. That can be misunderstood. If time limits come to be applied in the Abortion Act to non-emergency abortion, it would seem logical that such time limits should also apply to this category of emergency abortions. The new clause proposes a limit of 24 weeks in line with the main limit. My right hon. and learned Friend refers to that aspect in his guidance for right hon. and hon. Members. In that area, in particular, it may be felt that the position should be different from the main limit.

    My right hon. and learned Friend's amendments propose various alternatives. Amendment (k) would omit subsection (2) of the new clause altogether, thus leaving the situation as in section 1(4) of the 1967 Act, with the application of the 1929 Act as well. Amendments (l) to (p) set out other time limits for the emergency provision, varying from 18 to 28 weeks. My right hon. and learned Friend makes clear the importance of consistency in terms of the emergency and non-emergency limits. They should be taken in the same way as the similar changes proposed for the main limits.

    It is necessary to say a further word about the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, which applied only to England and Wales and for which no equivalent exists in relation to Scotland. Under the new clause and my right hon. and learned Friend's amendments down to and including (p), the 1929 Act remains, and it provides an overriding test of viability where the rebuttable presumption remains at 28 weeks.

    My right hon. and learned Friend's last two amendments, (q) and (r), address that subject. Amendment (q) would separate the 1967 Act from the 1929 Act and would mean that any new time limits placed in the 1967 Act overrode the 1929 Act. That is proposed in the current Abortion Bill passed by another place. In other words, a main limit of 24 weeks, or for some other figure, would apply without consideration of whether or not the child was viable.

    The 1929 Act would remain for abortions above those limits. Under amendment (q) by itself, the rebuttable presumption on viability would remain at 28 weeks. The 1929 Act does not apply to Scotland, and the effect of the new clause is setting out time limits on abortion would be the only one relevant to Scotland.

    Amendment (r) amends the 1929 Act to make the rebuttable presumption apply at 24 weeks rather than 28 weeks. By itself, amendment (r) would simply mean that the 1967 Act and the 1929 Act both had to be taken into account but that the 1929 Act had a new and lower level for the rebuttable presumption.

    If amendments (q) and (r) were both accepted by the Committee, the 1929 Act would apply only to abortions that were not covered by the specific limits in the amended 1967 Act but it would apply at the lower level of 24 weeks instead of the present 28.

    In considering amendment (r), right hon. and hon. Members will wish to bear in mind difficulties that might arise if the levels set in the 1929 Act were lower than any of the levels set in the 1967 Act as amended, which were disapplied, unless amendment (q) were also passed to separate the operation of two Acts. For example, if the 1929 Act were reduced to 24 weeks, but the limit in the 1967 Act for serious foetal handicap was retained at 28 weeks, the resulting presumption that a child over 24 weeks is capable of being born alive would probably prevent abortions being carried out between 24 and 28 weeks for serious foetal handicap.

    This explanation is inevitably rather complex. It may help the Committee to understand the basis of the new clause and the main possibilities for amendment which arise on it. The arrangement is that there will be a single debate on the new clause and on the various selected amendments together. That will be followed by a vote on the new clause. If it is accepted, there will be votes on the amendments selected.

    I am sure that the Committee is grateful for the Minister's explanation, but I am mindful that all her remarks relate to the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 and to the situation in England and Wales. Will the Minister clarify for the record the situation in respect of Scotland? She will be aware that the law there is very different from that in England and Wales. In Scotland, there is effectively no time limit—but the law is to be radically amended by new clause 11, apparently without consultation and in the absence of a Scottish Office Minister. Will the Minister confirm the precise impact of the new clause and of the amendments on Scotland?

    As the hon. Gentleman is well aware, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 Act does not apply in Scotland. That may be a subject for further discussion and the hon. Gentleman may wish to refer to it later. The Abortion Act 1967 applies, but the 1929 Act does not apply in Scotland. That is simple and clear.

    Regardless of which amendment the Committee finally agrees upon and what time limit, what would be the effect on the Scottish position?

    The only time limits that would apply in Scotland would be those in the new clause. As I have made clear, the 1929 Act does not apply in Scotland. At a later date we may wish to tidy up the position to ensure that there is a coherent framework within which the law can operate. Certainly the position in Scotland will require careful consideration.

    No.

    Other new clauses and amendments to the Government's new clause will be moved and many issues will be raised during our debate today. They will cover a range of topics in addition to the strict time limits issue. For example, they will cover subjects such as the exemptions for rape or incest. They may specify the nature of the abnormality by the certfying doctor and alter the basis on which doctors may consent to a termination.

    At the conclusion of today's proceedings, I hope that the Committee may be able to reach a clear, coherent and workable position either to leave existing legislation as it is or to make a series of amendments to it. However, in this complex situation, it may not be possible to reach a position in which all the loose ends have been tied up. I referred to that point in relation to the intervention made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran).

    The Government will carefully consider the outcome of the debate to see whether what emerges satisfies the tests of coherence and workability. If necessary, amendments may be moved on Report, and it may be the wish of the House that that should be so.

    In the end, the Committee will have made clear to the Government, to another place and to the large number of people outside the House who are deeply concerned about such matters, what the position is on the proper time limits for abortion in the light of current knowledge and experience. I hope that we can conduct our debate, in a way that is appropriate for such issues of individual judgment and conscience, always remembering that each individual instance where the question of abortion arises represents, whatever one's moral stance, a personal tragedy to all involved. I urge the Committee to support the new clause standing in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the House.

    I doubt whether any Minister has ever had the task which the Minister for Health has had to carry out today in taking the Committee through such a complexity of amendments and their consequences. I am glad that she said that a copy of her speech would be in the Lobby. I only wish that I had had time to dash out of the Chamber and pick up a copy, because her speech was extremely hard to follow.

    The method that the Government have used to arrange this important debate with new clause 4 as the core and amendments to it from every conceivable angle, is about as chaotic and crazy as the idea of attaching a clause on abortion to a Bill about embryology. We remain bitterly opposed to the inclusion of abortion in the Bill and we bitterly oppose the method of discussing it today.

    The Government have come forward with this method in an attempt to buy off those who bring in restrictive abortion Bills every year. I have been involved in these issues for several years. Other hon. Members have been involved as well, notably the Father of the House. Over the years he has taken the opposite position from mine and he has highlighted abortion every year. I have had to suffer his antics each year when he sought to try to restrict women's rights to abortion.

    No. Let me get going a bit first. I shall come back to the hon. Gentleman if I feel like it.

    As far as I can guess, the deal is that if the anti-abortionists can have a vote tonight they will go away for a few years. That is absolute rubbish. If the hon. Members believe that, they are more stupid than I gave them credit for.

    It may be all very well for one or two people to have given undertakings. I do not know whether that has happened, but if undertakings have been given, other hon. Members may appear with different ideas. For example, we are two years away from a general election and there may be new Members and other people who may not feel bound by any commitments that might have been given.

    4.45 pm

    The hon. Lady has complained about the method by which we organised the debate. Does she accept that the fact that abortion law is within the scope of the Bill is a matter for the House authorities, not for the Government? That decision has been taken and we must address abortion in the Bill. The arrangements in the Order Paper, proposed by my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the House and myself, admittedly with some complexity because this is a complex subject, provide a wide range of opportunities to allow the Committee to have a properly conducted debate and to reach a decision after considering all the options.

    Does the hon. Lady further accept that neither she, from the Opposition Front Bench, nor the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) from the Opposition Back Benches, nor anyone else has put forward the slightest alternative or constructive suggestion as to how the debate might be arranged? When the Business Committee met to discuss the matter, the sum total of the Labour party's contribution to marshalling debate was shown by the fact that not a single member of the Labour party selected for that Business Committee turned up for the meeting.

    We did not come to that Business Committee meeting because we did not want to be a party to such action.

    It is all very well for the Secretary of State to say that the Government have tried to give the Committee every opportunity and every option. I appreciate that, but it has made the whole position tonight more complicated and more chaotic. If the Government believe that, by allowing abortion into the Bill through extending its long title, people who are per se anti-abortion will go away, they are wrong.

    The hon. Lady said that no hon. Member can give an undertaking that, if we were to achieve a significant result tonight, we would go away. While it is true that any private Member may present a Bill—no hon. Member would dispute that—the hon. Lady must appreciate that the grievous pressure from which Parliament has suffered as a result of a series of non-decisions over the years has been caused not simply by the fact that one hon. Member presented a Bill. Rather it has been caused by the huge feeling in the House that a decision had to be taken and because outside the House a great deal of pressure was being mounted by pro-life groups. That is what caused the pressure. A single private Member's Bill does not cause that pressure.

    Therefore, even if an hon. Member decided to present a private Member's Bill, unless it was backed by the pro-life movement, it would not be a particular pressure on the House. What would be the benefit of returning to Parliament in a short while if Parliament has already taken a clear decision?

    In spite of what the hon. Lady has said, I still think that some hon. Member, perhaps not her——

    This one here, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Mossley Hill (Mr. Alton).

    As my hon. Friend says, that one there. Perhaps an hon. Member will present a Bill to the House with further restrictions. There may well be pressures from outside.

    If the hon. Member for Liverpool, Mossley Hill (Mr. Alton) is going to ask me to give way, the answer is no.

    The Government have plainly given in to what they believe is pressure. They have overlooked the fact that the overwhelming majority of people, particularly women, want to leave the Abortion Act 1967 as it is.

    No, I shall return to the right hon. Gentleman later. I am sure that he will have some reason to rise later.

    The Government's deal will achieve nothing. With the number of Divisions that we shall have tonight, we could even end up with very bad law,. The Minister rather suggested that we might come up with what she called "loose ends" that may have to be tied up. I believe that we shall come up with bad law, and perhaps with law that has been made by mistake. People may go into one Lobby believing that they will achieve their aim when they should go into another Lobby. The voting will be extremely complicated. There must be about a dozen idiots' guides, trying to advise people on both sides of the debate how to vote, going round the House.

    The pendulum system swings from 18 to 28 weeks, from 20 to 26 weeks and from 22 to 24 weeks. That could result in mistaken voting and we shall be then be stuck with the law, despite the Minister's promise to tie up the loose ends.

    The hon. Lady was kind enough to refer to me earlier. She and I have been in the House long enough to know that the House has given a Second Reading to abortion reform Bills, often by a substantial majority, yet those Bills have then been sabotaged by a relatively small minority of determined Members. As no Government were ready to give extra time, as was done with the Abortion Bill in 1966–67, all the other Bills failed. The will of the majority in the House was completely frustrated time and again by the hon. Lady, in her customarily charming way, and by numbers of her colleagues, contrary to the will of the British people.

    Plenty of private Members' Bills receive a Second Reading, but are blocked later.

    The hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Browne) had one and look what happened.

    That is right. The Bill of the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Browne) was blocked. Bills are constantly blocked by the Government Whips, who do not even say who they are. It has always been considered that abortion would naturally fall within private Members' legislation. With private Members' Bills, one has to take one's chance with the procedures of the House.

    We may end up tonight with a law that we shall be stuck with and that we do not want. More importantly, women outside will be stuck with it. It is an insult to women that the Government should bring forward this lottery system to decide a matter that will have such a long-term effect on women's lives.

    New clause 4 is more restrictive than the Abortion Act 1967. Under the Act, for example, a registered medical practitioner may terminate a pregnancy if he or she is of the opinion that it is necessary to save the life of the woman or
    "to prevent grave permanent damage to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman."
    In other words, a time limit does not operate. New clause 4 is said to be the main core of the proposal. Under new clause 4, a medical practitioner may act to prevent "grave permanent injury" to the "physical or mental health" of the pregnant woman only up to the end of the 24th week. I realise that the new clause could be amended later, but the proposal is monstrous and the new clause must be amended back to the position under the 1967 Act.

    Under new clause 4, after the 24th week, a woman suffering from, for example, serious and progressive kidney disease, serious and deteriorating lung disease or certain types of congenital heart disease, which may be aggravated by the stress of pregnancy, would not be able to have an abortion. Those conditions may not only worsen during pregnancy, but may be diagnosed during pregnancy. That is especially so in the case of the HIV positive mother, as health authorities are increasingly informing women of the risks of pregnancy and AIDS and more women may seek tests during pregnancy. We must consider those matters with the utmost seriousness to ensure that we get the law absolutely right.

    There is one point—there are probably several others—on which, although I tried to follow the Minister's speech carefully, I am still not clear. There is a possibility that at least one of the amendments—amendment (f)—is misleading or defective. It is intended to ensure that there is no time limit when there is a threat of "grave permanent injury" to a woman's health. I have taken advice and it seems that amendment (f) may be affected by paragraph (a) of new clause 4, and would therefore be subject to the time limits for which hon. Members vote—in other words, 18 or 24 weeks, or whatever. I seek an assurance from the Secretary of State that amendment (f) would ensure that this ground was exempt from the time limits restriction.

    As a result of the complexity of the procedure—the Secretary of State asked why I did not propose something different—I tried to construct amendments to be taken first, which would have formed a package. That package would have included 24 weeks, but would also have included the maximum number of exceptions for 28 weeks and the maximum number of exceptions with no time limit.

    I tabled my amendments, which was difficult in the context of new clause 4. I now find that only two parts of my package have been included in your selection of amendments, Mr. Walker. I am not suggesting that you deliberately added to the complexity as I know that you would not want to do that. However, it is an illustration of what happens when we try to amend a new clause that we do not want by means of a package of amendments. I understand that you, Mr. Walker, from your position as Chairman of Ways and Means, may not have appreciated that my amendments were a package and should have been taken in that sense. We are stuck with our present selection, which makes everything more complicated.

    I am not returning to the argument about procedure. It is a bit unsatisfactory if the answer to the hon. Lady's question waits until the end of the debate, thus leaving continuing doubt about amendment (f). Amendments (f) and (g) both relate to the new category of "grave permanent injury" to the health of the woman. Amendment (f) would follow the word "or" in line 6. It would not, therefore, be governed by the reference to the "twenty-fourth week" in paragraph (a). It is important to confirm that amendment (f) would have the effect of introducing no time limit in the case of "grave permanent injury" to health. Amendment (g) would introduce a time limit of 28 weeks. The House must make a choice between those or the 24 weeks in the new clause.

    I am grateful to the Secretary of State for clarifying that point. Again, the position is complex, as the Secretary of State has given us two options and we shall have to get our heads round that later.

    I want hon. Members to look carefully at what we are doing. We are threatening the lives and futures of countless thousands of women who may need an abortion now or in the future. If we decide to bring clown the present upper time limit from 28 to 24 weeks, we shall deny the possibility of an abortion to a very small, but important, number of women and young girls. In 1988, the latest year for which we have published statistics, only 23 women had abortions over 24 weeks.

    There are young girls who become pregnant without knowing that they are pregnant. They may have had irregular periods, a not uncommon phenomenon in teenage girls. They may have unsupportive parents and be afraid of revealing that they are pregnant. They may feel unable to go to their GP or find it hard to locate a doctor—not just one, but two doctors—who will terminate their pregnancy. All such events lead to delays that may take them over the 24th week.

    When discussing the failure of young girls to recognise pregnancy, we must not overlook the stance of some hon. Members, which suggests that they are against sex education in schools. If we had more such education, more girls and young women would be better able to appreciate their sexuality and the way in which their bodies function.

    The Brook advisory centre points out in a paper the fear that many young women have at the discovery of an unwanted pregnancy. They fear the rejection of friends, families, boy friends and even school mates, remembering that some of them are still at school. For many, that rejection can mean homelessness, poverty and isolation. Are we to turn our backs, by reducing the upper time limit from 28 to 24 weeks, on that handful of young people?

    5 pm

    I understand that the overwhelming majority of post-24 week abortions in recent years have occurred as the result of the late detection of severe foetal abnormality. We must also bear in mind in that context the categories of whom my hon. Friend has spoken, including very young girls, often having been sexually abused, who become pregnant and do not know it. Is my hon. Friend suggesting that if the Government's new clause is approved, girls as young as 11 and 12 might be forced to complete their pregnancies?

    Yes, that is my reading of the Government's proposal. I am greatly concerned that, at such a vulnerable age, young girls will not be protected.

    Women in the menopause who become pregnant come within that small number who presented themselves in 1988 for abortion after the 24th week. Many women think that irregular periods are normal in the menopause, as they are, but sometimes they find that they are pregnant. They can then be horrified because their families may be settled, they may have grown-up children or they may need the money that they earn and be unable easily to leave work. They suddenly find that instead of being in the menopause, as they thought, they are pregnant.

    I have given details of a case of a 42-year-old married woman with children aged 21 and 20. She had successfully used a diaphragm for 25 years and did not suspect that it had let her down. She missed four periods, did a test and was horrified to find that she was pregnant. She was opposed to abortion, but, because of her family circumstances—she also had aged and ailing parents for whom to care—she decided after several counselling sessions to request an abortion. Under the new clause, she and women in a similar position could not have an abortion. Many family circumstances lead people to decide to have an abortion, and the present social provision must be available.

    Let us not forget the distress that has been caused through delay in the National Health Service. It often depends on the part of the country in which one lives—[Interruption.] I am amazed to see at least a couple of hon. Ladies on the Government Benches expressing dissent, even smiling, at that remark, as though it were an old wives' tale. I assure them that it is not.

    People who live in the west midlands find it more difficult to get an abortion than those living elsewhere, in the north or in the south. Imagine finding oneself pregnant and being unable to find a doctor or hospital willing to treat one, or having little money and being unable to travel to a different part of the country to obtain an abortion.

    Even if we reduce the time limit to 24 weeks, the same problems will arise—but for more women. The British Pregnancy Advisory Service, the Pregnancy Advisory Service and other organisations in the charitable sector are not permitted to do terminations after 24 weeks. Both those advisory services have compiled an interesting and moving dossier of cases that illustrate the problems that women face through delays or obstruction in the NHS, through doctors failing to diagnose pregnancy, through failure by patients to recognise pregnancy, through failure of methods of contraception or failed pregnancy tests, as the result of menopausal problems or because the females concerned are very young. I have cited some cases, but there are many more.

    It is well known that many surgeons err on the side of caution because of the law—as they do not want to be caught by the law—and in practice allow a four-week or, at the least, a two-week margin. So in practice, 24 weeks become 20 or 22 weeks in terms of the operation that the surgeon will perform. Or a 20 or 22-week limit would become in practice an 18-week limit, and an 18-week limit—should the House agree to that tonight—could become a 14-week limit. That would greatly affect many necessitous women.

    In an ideal world, there would be no need for late abortions. This is not an ideal world, and in 1988, 84 per cent. of all abortions were performed at under 13 weeks; 14 per cent. were performed at between 13 and 20 weeks; and, as I said, 1·7 per cent. were performed at over 20 weeks.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy (Dr. Moonie) tabled an amendment which I hoped the House would discuss and approve. The hon. Member for Torridge and Devon, West (Miss Nicholson) also tabled a new clause, which allows women to have an abortion up to the end of the 12th week without seeking approval from a second doctor. Those who support the Abortion Act 1967, and who would like to see it liberalised, would strongly support it because we believe that it is the best way to reduce the number of late abortions, by allowing women to ask a doctor—one doctor—to give permission for them to have an abortion without the need to seek approval from a second doctor. That practice is followed in many European countries with beneficial results. I regret that we shall not have an opportunity tonight to discuss those matters.

    We must make provision for those women, some of whose cases I have described, including women who require an abortion after an amniocentesis test and who need time to decide whether to continue with a pregnancy. A woman will have an anmiocentesis test at 16 weeks. If it is discovered that she is carrying a mentally or physically handicapped child, she is given the offer of an abortion. If we set the limits too tightly, such a woman will not even have time to reflect on whether to have an abortion.

    Is not that problem easily solved by doing what the hon. Member for Liverpool, Mossley Hill (Mr. Alton) and myself propose, which is now incorporated in the amendments tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State, and exempting from the restrictions the severe disabilities that would be revealed by amniocentesis, so that for those women there is no change in the law?

    I shall look at that. It sounds all right, but why was it not in the new clause? The way in which the clause is presently phrased is ridiculous. We are leaving it to the lottery of whether an amendment is carried. That is the whole point. There may be some good amendments that we could carry, but will we carry them and will people know exactly what we are doing?

    We do not want women who are carrying babies who turn out to be damaged to have a pistol at their heads and to be told, "You are going to have a physically or mentally handicapped baby and you must have an abortion tomorrow or you will not be within the time limit." That could happen if our attitude is too tight and not relaxed enough. We must ensure that it will turn out for the best for those women.

    I hope that right hon. and hon. Members will think seriously about the effect of their votes tonight. Labour party policy is clearly to defend the 1967 Act. Some of my hon. Friends consider that that is a matter of conscience for them. If I were in that position, and I am not, I should also want to consider the difficulties in which many women find themselves—difficulties that are often inflicted on them by irresponsible men who do not have to face the traumatic consequences.

    If I were to exercise my conscience, I should also want to ask myself whether my conscience was more important than considerations involving the quality of women's lives. There could also be a conscience consideration for women now and in the future, which hon. Members will overlook if they vote to restrict the law. I beg them to take that into account when they vote tonight. I know that such hon. Members who exercise a conscience clause on this sensitive issue have compassion. I hope that they will extend that compassion to unlucky or unfortunate women who may be precluded from much-needed medical assistance.

    Last night there was a march through London to defend abortion rights. It was called at relatively short notice for a march. However, 2,000 to 3,000 women turned up to defend the 1967 Act. They were young, middle-aged and even older. They and their families represent the women who will be affected by our votes tonight. Their fears and anxieties must be reflected by us, as their only way of expressing their fears is through us—they cannot speak for themselves or vote in this Chamber. We must not let them down.

    I repeat that a vote for 24 weeks will effectively mean a 20 or 22-week limit in practice. A vote for a 22 or 20-week limit will mean a 20 or 18-week limit in practice. An 18-week limit will mean a 16 or 14-week limit in practice. Women will be denied an abortion if we vote for those reductions.

    On the radio this morning the hon. Member for Maidstone (Miss Widdecombe) said, "We will save 3,000 women from an abortion." Those 3,000 women who want an abortion will have to resort to the back streets. That is not to put it in too terrifying a way.

    I appeal to hon. Members to think carefully, to vote very carefully, to use the guidance that suits them and to ensure that we come out of the horrendous evening that faces us with law that we really can live with.

    I am grateful for the opportunity to participate in the debate. I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the House for the way in which he has tried to give both sides an opportunity to put their views on the amendments. Had he merely approached the votes in an ascending or descending order, as we reached some compromise mid way, one section would have said, "But our opinions were never put to the test." The fact that my right hon. and learned Friend has devised what is called the complex pendulum has at least ensured that both sides have an opportunity to put their views to the test. That is desirable and I should like to record my gratitude.

    5.15 pm

    The aspect that I find most worrying is that in the two opening speeches there was mention of the rights of women, individual hon. Members', rights of conscience and of their beliefs, but no mention of the unborn child. It is as though we are determined to conduct the debate by turning away from the main issue, which is at what point, if at all——

    It is the main issue. At what point, if at all, do the rights of the unborn child prevail over those of the mother?

    I said "if at all"—that is the main issue.

    It is distressing that we have not discussed the basis on which we can decide whether a child's rights prevail. The only test that has been mentioned, and it was mentioned largely in the context of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, is that of viability. We should look at the context in which some of us wish to move a change. There is already in our law a recognised limitation of a woman's rights over those of her child at a certain time. For example, if anything goes wrong at birth, as it did in a case of Christie Nolan, no matter how grievously handicapped the child, no matter how appalling the circumstances of the mother, no matter if the mother has recently been deserted by her partner, no matter what the awful circumstances are, at that point we recognise that the child has full human rights.

    Under our current law—the 1929 Act rather than the 1967 Act—two months before that point is reached we say that the rights of the child prevail. Some hon. Members think that that is right. Some hon. Members think that the limit is too low, and some hon. Members think that it is much too high. We already have in our law a recognised limitation of the rights of the mother over the child. We must ask whether we have drawn the line in the right place or whether it needs moving. That is what the first six amendments address.

    The line was set down in 1929, and it was a perfectly reasonable line to be imposed at that time. Before the 28th week there is a very low possibility of a child surviving. It needs considerable modern science and assistance to breathe and survive. In 1929, such aids were extremely rudimentary, so it was a reasonable limit at that time.

    Since then, however, medical science has advanced considerably and we now have situations in which children can be kept alive very much earlier and sustain permanent survival. There are other criteria on which we would judge lower limits, but the issue is between the 22nd and the 24th week if we are talking about permanent viability, which I do not necessarily accept as a definition.

    There seems to be some confusion. My hon. Friend the Minister of State has made considerable reference to 24 weeks being the point of viability. However, in a written answer to the hon. Member for Barking (Ms. Richardson) in January this year, the point of viability at which an infant could sustain survival was put at 22 weeks. Two issues are involved. First, if the Minister stands by that written answer, it makes no sense to talk about viability while in the same breath setting the limit at 24 weeks.

    Secondly, laying aside the politics of this issue for a moment, the whole House wants the principle of this issue to be resolved for some time to come. Given that we can now keep children alive at 22 weeks, and given the gradual improvements and advances in technology, is it sensible to set a level above that at which the Minister has already admitted that there can be viability? If we are looking for a piece of good law——

    Regardless of what the Minister may have said, I am sure that the hon. Lady is well aware that the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists made a statement at the end of last year that made it clear that although technical advances may enhance the survival rate above 24 weeks, it is unlikely that there would be any possibility of extra-uterine survival below 24 weeks.

    We are talking not only about probability but about what happens. The Minister would not have given an answer based on something conjured out of thin air. We know that it is possible to sustain viability——

    I should like to finish my point because I should like to answer the interventions of the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran).

    Although admittedly in a small number of cases, it is possible to sustain viability below the 24th week. However, I should like to take the matter further. First, if the Minister is talking about viability, she must stick by the answer that was given by her Department. Secondly, setting a limit above that for viability does not make any sense in long-term law. Is "permanent viability" a good method? Once again, there is a clear contradiction in our laws and in the interpretation of them. I think that the Minister will accept that until recently, the words
    "capable of being born alive"
    in the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 were interpreted by the medical profession and the law as meaning "capable of sustaining survival". However, we have recently had the ruling of Mr. Justice Brooke, who put a different interpretation on the law and said, "No, if a child is capable"—

    If I may finish my point, I shall then give way to my hon. Friend for Bolton, North-East (Mr. Thurnham), if he will remind me.

    Mr. Justice Brooke said, "No, the point at which a child is capable of being born alive is the point at which it can survive independently of its mother, even if only for a short period." If we take that as a definition, we are no longer talking about 22 weeks—we are talking about something substantially lower.

    The only point on which I agree with my hon. Friend is that there is too much abortion in this country. Where I differ from her is that she feels that the solution to that problem is to send doctors to prison. It is most important that she should not mislead herself and the House by getting her facts wrong. My hon. Friend spoke about the case to which she is now referring on 27 March—it is the case of Rance v. the Mid-Downs health authority. She told the House that Mrs. Rance had asked the doctors to abort her son and to their credit the doctors refused. That is wrong because as a result of administrative delays the doctors had not told Mrs. Rance that she had a pregnancy with a handicap in the foetus. Because it was running so close to the 28-week limit, the doctors decided not to tell Mrs. Rance. Therefore, she was not in a position even to have asked for the abortion. The hon. Lady is wrong. She should therefore withraw her allegation against Mrs. Rance and not mislead herself and the House with her argument.

    During this debate I do not think that I have mentioned the lady that the hon. Gentleman has now named. I was specifically addressing myself to the terms of Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling. The crucial issue is whether that ruling now overtakes the previously accepted definition. The particular cases to which it might be applied do not matter until we have established the principle. Furthermore, neither now nor in any previous debate can I recall talking about locking up doctors. When we have changed the law, I believe that the doctors will abide by the law and in those circumstances, I see no good reason for locking them up.

    Therefore, we have a problem with the definition of "viability", and with the definition of
    "capable of being born alive".
    We also have a problem about where to set any future limits. However, before turning to that, I should like to consider some of the problems that are occurring as a result of our present very muddled and in my view very bad abortion laws. At the moment——

    I shall not give way because I should like to finish this point.

    At the moment, a child in an incubator can be kept alive, loved and cherished with all the resources of medical science being devoted to saving it, while a child of identical age and identical gestation in the womb has no rights and can be destroyed. There is something wrong with a law which allows that degreee of inequity between two individuals who are exactly the same except that we can see one and we cannot see the other. That law has to be wrong. Therefore, we must bring about a situation in which there is at least equality. At present, we have a law which states that a child who is seen is protected but that a child at an identical stage who is not seen is not protected.

    Perhaps the issue is not whether one can or cannot see the child. Perhaps at that stage the issue is whether the child is wanted or not wanted. If there is no objective criterion for saying that two children of identical development are different, bringing the issue down to a matter of human perception and saying, " I perceive this to be a human being because I want it" or, " I perceive this not to be a human being because I do not want it" is extremely dangerous on all ethical and social grounds, whether religious or not.

    I do not want to raise the temperature of the debate by drawing difficult analogies, but there is a clear analogy to be drawn. The analogy is of racism everywhere, where one individual perceives another as less worthy of respect or less naturally possessed of rights because they are of a different colour——

    I intend to give way to the hon. Lady because I want to hear her argument. If we are defining humanity in terms of individual perceptions, wants and not wants, that is dangerous.

    The hon. Lady is aware that any baby born prematurely needs a great deal of care and attention, so why did she vote for the National Health Service and Community Care Bill, which will take resources away from such babies, and why she has never put to the House an argument for more resources for the hospitals which cannot take care of all the premature babies born at the moment?

    If I take interventions about other laws and other measures, I shall be wasting my time. I do not intend to be distracted from the major issue today, which is the rights of the unborn child, because of the defence of Health Service reforms which I have made in the House on many occasions.

    The law states that it is an offence to destroy a child who is capable of being born alive, yet in the NHS it is permitted to administer lethal injections to babies before an abortion to ensure that they are born dead. Therefore, I ask my hon. Friend the Minister of State and my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State this question. If a doctor does not believe that the child whom he is about to abort is capable of being born alive, why seek to kill it with a lethal injection in the first place? Is there any answer to that? Is it not an example of the extreme muddle of our laws? Quite apart from their ethical status, there is clearly a prize muddle.

    Is the hon. Lady insinuating that doctors deliberately give lethal injections to foetuses so as to escape the current law that a foetus capable of being born and sustaining life after birth cannot be terminated? Is she making that accusation against the medical profession?

    5.30 pm

    I am making a straightforward statement that if a doctor believes that a child is not capable of being born alive, he has no need to give it a lethal injection, so one presumes that if he gives it a lethal injection he is trying to prevent a child capable of being born alive from being so born.

    To help the hon. Lady on that point, perhaps I may inform her that today I received a letter from the Solicitor-General confirming that police investigations are being carried out into an incident described in correspondence between the Solicitor-General and us. The case involved a baby of 27½ weeks being stabbed to death through the wall of the womb with potassium chloride during so-called selective reduction. That took place in the City of London just a few weeks ago.

    I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that further information. I understand from my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Health that that case is the subject of a formal inquiry and that the House will hear more of it when that inquiry comes to a conclusion.

    I now wish to deal with a case which is established and has been the subject of affidavits, a coroner's inquiry, two debates in the House and ministerial statements. It is therefore absolutely sustainable and no detail has been left unturned. I refer to the case of the Carlisle baby.

    I shall not give way for some time. I will take interventions later.

    I wish to address myself to the case of the Carlisle baby.[Interruption.] The degree of disorder prevailing on the Opposition Benches makes me think that Opposition Members are frightened of something in the case of the Carlisle baby. There is something that they do not want to hear.

    The Carlisle baby was aborted at 21 weeks' gestation. The grounds for the abortion were handicap, even though it was not certain that handicap was present. Nevertheless, under the 1967 Act the grounds were valid. It is important that hon. Members should understand that. We are talking not about some back-street abortion or something that was done improperly in the Health Service but about a supposedly legal, safe and decent abortion carried out by the NHS in Carlisle city general hospital.

    That child of 21 weeks' gestation was born alive, so we may assume that the doctor had not given any lethal injection. When the child was born alive, the two nurses and the doctor on duty on the ward that night did not know what to do. They had not expected a live birth. Had it been a premature baby from an ordinary early birth, they would have known exactly what to do, but they were confused and distressed because they had expected what they would have termed a foetus and what they got was a baby which gasped and ran a pulse rate for three hours.

    What distresses me about that case is that during the three hours for which that little scrap lived she was not in an incubator or in her mother's arms. She was not even—spare us—wrapped up decently in a warm cot. She was on a kidney dish in a side ward for three hours, During that time one of the nurses became so grievously distressed that she carried out a rudimentary baptism. After three hours the child was incinerated. The mother was not told that her child had lived. The child was not registered for birth, nor was she registered for death. Until one of the nurses could finally stand it no longer and took steps to make sure that the issue was brought into the public eye and before a coroner, nothing was done at Carlisle city general hospital about what happened.

    I raise that case, not to introduce horror stories but to show that horror can result from our muddled laws. I repeat, had it been an ordinary birth, the doctor and nurses would have known what to do and there would have been no doubts about it. Anyone who can jeer at that case is not giving the matter the serious and humane consideration that it deserves.

    The case, and the facts to which I have confined myself, are not disputed. If the hon. Gentleman wants proof, he can go now to the Vote Office and ask for the report of the debate on the Carlisle baby on 8 June last year, to which my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Health replied. He confirmed all the facts to which I have referred. A late abortion took place and the result was to be a foetus—the language used implies that when a child is wanted it is a baby, but when it is not wanted it is a foetus—and when the result was not a foetus but a baby there was no good practice in place to cope with the situation.

    National Health Service guidance says that if abortions are carried out after 20 weeks, resuscitation equipment must be available. The Secretary of State will not license private clinics to carry out abortions after the 20th week if they cannot demonstrate that resuscitation equipment is available. In that case, the limit is 20 weeks. Does that mean that although resuscitation equipment must be available at 20 weeks, it need not be used because no rights are given until 22 or 24 weeks? At 20 weeks, the mother must be offered a funeral for the baby, so some status is given to the 20-week-old unborn child. Why must resuscitation equipment be available and a funeral be offered at 20 weeks when, if amendments allowing abortion after 20 weeks are passed, we shall not safeguard the lives to which we afford those dignities? We shall have a muddled law.

    The hon. Lady will be aware that in some terribly distressing cases foetuses much older than t hose to which she refers are killed because the mother would otherwise die. Does she think that that should be done or not? Should the woman be allowed to die? That is my first question. Secondly, will the hon. Lady be straight with the House? Does she think that any abortion should be legal, or not? We must know where her arguments are coming from.

    I am delighted to answer the hon. Lady's questions. I was coming to the exemptions that should be allowed. Where the life of the mother is at risk, an exemption should be made—not because I deny that in that case the life of the child is being removed, but in that case I must face a choice between two lives.

    I never have been. I am trying to answer the question. The hon. Lady does not seem to want to hear the answer. I have said that where two lives are at stake, one cannot say that one is pro-life if one immediately condemns one of them. If there are two lives in conflict, one cannot rule out the possibility of an abortion. I do not deny that people elsewhere may be against it, but no hon. Member is against abortion to save the life of the mother.

    In answer to the hon. Lady's second question, I have never concealed my position on abortion. I made it clear to the hon. Member for Barking in a late night Adjournment debate some months ago. I believe that abortion should be available only in the most exceptional circumstances, such as where the life of the mother is at risk and perhaps in one or two other rare cases. That would certainly include cases in which the child suffers from a condition such as anencephaly and would not survive anyway. In those circumstances, I believe that it is humane——

    I will give way in a moment. In those circumstances, I believe that it is humane to allow abortion.

    The fact that I am anti-abortion is scarcely a great discovery today. It has been known for some time. We are drawing a line and fighting only late abortions for exactly the same reasons as a teetotaller will join a moderate drinker to combat abuse. Those who share my views are joining others who do not share those views so as to combat the worst abuses, which are encapsulated in the Carlisle baby case. This is tremendously serious. If any hon. Member is thinking of voting for a limit above the 21st week, I repeat that such a limit would not have saved the Carlisle baby.

    May I ask my hon. Friend to comment on two of her points? I would not want her to mislead the House. The purpose of a funeral for a 20-week-old aborted baby, whether a natural or unnatural abortion, is to help the mother cope with her grief, not to award rights to the child. She says that she would allow abortion in cases of anencephaly where the child cannot live. I must tell her that anencephaly is not necessarily a cause of death. A baby born with no brain in my constituency is nearly two and I know of another who was born without a brain who has already reached nine years. How can she cope with that statement?

    I have to cope according to the advice that in some cases the child cannot survive either the full nine months of pregnancy or birth. All I am saying is that in such a case I am confronted not with a choice between life and no life, but between no life and no life, and I do not find that particularly difficult.

    I am sorry, but I wish to make some progress because I am aware that many hon. Members wish to speak.

    The second difficulty with the definition of viability arises from the percentage of children surviving prostaglandin abortions where no lethal injection is administered.

    I must ask my hon. Friend to resume his seat. It may be for the convenience of the House if I say that I have given way a great deal and now intend to make rapid progress.

    It is difficult to extract from the Department of Health information on the percentage of children born alive following prostaglandin abortions. When the prostaglandin tests were being done and prostaglandins were being introduced, the medical perception, as exemplified in many articles and writings, was the danger of live births. I ask the House to note the language used. The "danger" was that of live births. Tests run in the United States on prostaglandin abortions, where no lethal injection is involved, show a survival rate of up to 8 per cent.

    Will the Secretary of State come clean about the survival rate for such abortions in this country? Does he perceive it to be a problem? If there is a survival rate and if Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling is accepted—that a child capable of surviving independently of its mother for a short period is capable of being born alive—is not prostaglandin abortion in clear opposition to the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929? Could that please be taken on board when the Minister replies?

    Although there has been much discussion of absolute principles, this is a case of extremely bad law being applied and not even being policed in its own right. There is precious little will in the Department to ensure that the joint workings of the 1967 Act and of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 marry well and are implemented. It refuses to address the vital questions of lethal injections, of live births during prostaglandin abortions and of children under 24 weeks who survive, all of which need to be addressed in reaching our decisions today.

    The exemptions are important. I did not want to exempt all severe disability from the requirement. However, in the Committee on the Bill of the hon. Member for Liverpool, Mossley Hill, (Mr. Alton), we took on board what had been said on Second Reading. Many hon. Members had said that they would vote for a lower limit if and only if severe disability which could be detected by the amniocentesis test was excluded. At the end of the Second Reading debate the hon. Gentleman undertook to address the concerns of the House during further stages. On that basis he asked for, and was granted, a Second Reading. Since then we have always said that we believe in the exemption of severe handicap from whatever limits the House decides to impose, subject only to the requirements of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act.

    5.45 pm

    The hon. Member for Barking suggested that that was not covered in the new clause. I understand that paragraph (c), where the provision is:
    "if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped"
    takes that point on board. However, it does not take it on board with the safeguards that my hon. Friend the Member for Mossley Hill, my right hon. Friend the Member for Castle Point (Sir B. Braine) and I would have wished. Although we shall support the exemption because we said that we would, we want to see the nature of the disability specified on the form, and we shall raise that again on Report.

    On several occasions during the passage of his Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Mossley Hill claimed that doctors were aborting for hare-lip and club-foot. Everyone said, "Oh, nonsense—the medical profession would not do that." Not long ago there was a great to-do in the national press because Guy's hospital advertised for mothers to come forward with children suffering from hare-lips and facial deformities to have pre-natal surgery, of which we are all in favour. They asked those mothers to come forward because they were considering abortions for those reasons. Did the Department of Health inquire whether abortions for such trivial reasons were encompassed by the 1967 Act'? No—it was allowed to pass by.

    If the disability must be declared on the form, we shall be able to see the difference between spina bifida and hare-lip. That must be so. We are pledged to keep our promise to exempt severe disability, so we shall vote for that exemption today, but on Report we shall wish to return to the matter merely to ensure that the disability is severe.

    Will the hon. Lady make her position clear? She referred to new clause 4(1)(c) which provides for an abortion where it is suspected that a foetus would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped. Is she saying that she will not support amendment (j), which would reduce the time limit for serious foetal abnormality to 24 weeks, when some foetal abnormalities cannot be detected? Will she vote for or against amendment (j)?

    At present we are recommending that amendment (j) is supported. We have always said that these exemptions should be made subject to the requirements of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act. Even if the House tonight sets an 18-week limit, there will be exemptions up to that level determined by the Infant Life (Preservation) Act. We are trying to decide what that level should be. Currently it is 28 weeks, so we would say, "All right—exempt up to 28 weeks." If by any chance it comes down to 24 weeks, we would say, "Exempt up to 24 weeks." However, where there is a chance of grave permanent injury to the mother or where her life is in question, we support the emergency provisions to a much later stage.

    I agree with the hon. Member for Barking that we have a complex series of amendments and we must judge each according to what has gone before. That is why I suport amendment (j). I do not do so because we want to reduce the limit artificially as I suspect that the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 will be changed tonight. We made the pledge to accept exemptions from whatever limit we decide up to that imposed by the 1929 Act as well as exemptions regarding serious risk to the mother beyond that time limit. I gave way to the hon. Member for Peckham (Ms. Harman) as I believe that new clause 4(c) deserves further consideration, but I must now make some progress.

    We also pledged that we would make an exemption to the time limit for cases involving rape and incest. When we examined the clause produced by the Secretary of State we found no reference to rape or incest. We therefore asked the Secretary of State if rape or incest was covered by new clause 4. The Department informed us that it was, but when we looked at it we were not happy and therefore we have introduced specifically amendment (s). That makes the exemption specific beyond all doubt, as it is not encapsulated in some other phrase about grave physical injury. We have made the exemptions specific and we have kept faith with the House by introducing those concessions asked of us which we believe we should make.

    There has been a lot of misinformation, especially in the press in recent days, and it is important to stress that severe handicap is exempted beyond our limit and up to the 1929 Act limit. Rape and incest are also exempted under the specific amendment (s).

    I congratulate the hon. Lady on the clarity with which she is taking the House through this difficult series of amendments. Some Members on the Opposition Benches have recently introduced a Bill to extend abortion up to birth, but that is not the issue before the House tonight. Although many of us may have difficulties with specific exemptions and may not agree with the particular principles, the issue before the House, to which the hon. Lady has rightly drawn attention, is the upper time limit. In that respect, will she repeat her intention to seek clarification on Report about what constitutes disability, as many people outside the House will be concerned because the Carlisle baby was aborted at 21 weeks gestation with a non-inherited and in no way life-threatening skin disorder?

    I can confirm that we shall wish on Report merely to ensure that severe disability means just that. We shall not negative any clause exempting disability, but the specific agreement reached among those of us who feel strongly about this is that that disability should be specified. I do not believe that a doctor would put down the disability as spina bifida if it was a hare-lip, so we shall obtain some control of what is going on if the disability is specified.

    I have addressed myself to the complex series of amendments before the House. It is true that we may, at the end of the debate, finish up with something which needs further refinement in terms of coherence, consistency and workability.

    The hon. Lady has consistently used the word "we", and I am sure that she is not using it in the same way as the Prime Minister. It would be helpful to us to know who she means when she speaks of "we". Earlier this year the hon. Lady gave an interview to The Times on this subject and she was asked about the abortion amendment being added to the Bill. She said, "We shall go away for a while if the Government concede the debate." Who does "we" mean, and what does "for a while" mean? How long will it be before we discuss the issue again?

    Nor ever, I am afraid.

    I am sure that most hon. Members understand that, when I said "we", I meant that group of hon. Members who have pioneered Bills on this issue and who have talked to other hon. Members who broadly support their approach. They have forged out what is and is not accepable. I was referring to hon. Members including the Father of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Castle Point, the hon. Member for Mossley Hill, the hon. Member for Workington (Mr. Campbell-Savours), who regrettably is absent, the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy) and many others who share similar views.

    As to what is meant by "for a while", how long is a piece of string? A decent interval must mean just that. We, I or anyone may go to Government again to say that the House wants to take a decision on this matter and must do so, but if we simply get into the habit of coming back with a whole load of similar or different proposals, frankly we would not deserve the trust of Government, nor would I expect to receive it. Therefore, "for a while" means a decent interval.

    So far I have devoted time to the various amendments and I have spoken about 20 weeks, 22 weeks and 24 weeks. Finally I should like to consider the question of 18 weeks. That limit has not been dreamt up as some sort of arbitrary line. When the hon. Member for Mossley Hill was considering the subject of late abortions, he had to ask himself, what is a late abortion and where does it start? The figure of 18 weeks had come up in the Lane committee and it is the period beyond which growth but no further development takes place. That figure seemed to be a few weeks away from the point that medical science had reached as being able to sustain viability. Looking forward to the future, and in the desire for long-term law, 18 weeks seemed a reasonable limit.

    The Second Reading of the Bill promoted by the hon. Member for Mossley Hill was marked by excellent contributions from all sides and two arguments were presented against the 18-week limit—disability and the amniocentesis test. We have conceded the argument on disability and the amniocentesis test and they have been taken out of the debate. The other arguments against the 18-week limit related to menopausal women, young girls and rape victims. We have specifically introduced an amendment relating to rape in amendment (s) because we were not satisfied with the clause introduced by my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State. When we looked at the statistics relating to abortions carried out on menopausal women and young children we found that the percentages were so low—0·4 per cent. and 0·5 per cent., respectively—that that argument was not worth pursuing.

    It is important to remind the House of one fact. We are told that late abortions are principally due to delays in the National Health Service. Some 50 per cent. of abortions carried out after the 18th week are done on non-resident women who come here to get around the laws in their own countries.

    The hon. Lady may think that that is all right, but it is important to remember that those women have not been subject to delays in the NHS. The 8 per cent. of abortions conducted because of severe foetal abnormality will not be affected by the proposals that we have put forward. As great a variety of reasons are presented for the remainder of late abortions as there are for those at an earlier stage.

    Given that we have exempted from the limit the major consideration of disability, and given that we need a law which will last and not need to be revised on the basis of some cataclysmic advance in medical science next week or next year, I ask the House to consider seriously the 18-week limit. Beyond that, the House should go no higher than the limit of 20 weeks, at which we give the dignity of a funeral and insist that resuscitation equipment be available.

    We have all sorts of protection at the 20th week. If we go for the 22nd week, we are doing no more than accepting the Secretary of State's statement about where viability starts.

    I urge hon. Members to think hard, when they vote today, about what it is that they are talking about. We are not talking about some abstract view of women's rights, nor even about conscience or religion, but about a living mortal in the womb whom we cannot see——

    That living mortal is there in the womb. It cannot protect itself and it deserves the protection of the House.

    Order. I have a point of order from the hon. Member for Carlisle (Mr. Martlew).

    On a point of order, Miss Boothroyd. Is it right that the hon. Lady can quote a case in my constituency at great length and not give way to me?

    Whether or not she gives way is in the hands of the hon. Lady.

    6 pm

    It must be said in defence of the hon. Member for Maidstone (Miss Widdecombe)—[Interruption.]

    I am trying to say a word in defence of the hon. Member for Maidstone, who today made a more moderate speech to advance her view than those which we have listened to and read about outside the House, for which we must be grateful. I have two quarrels with her, which I shall come to later. The first is that she still tries to set herself up as a medical authority, greater than others, on the time limit that the House should accept. Secondly, I would not accuse her of telling horror stories to the House, but I accuse her of telling the same horror story over and over again.

    It is a terrible story, and it was a ghastly tragedy. But I do not believe that we should set the law based on the one ghastly tragedy of the Carlisle case. There is a raft of experience of the working of abortion law.

    That case has deliberately been used by the opponents of abortion. The case was a set-up. The doctor who refused treatment was a member of the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children. We accept that the foetus should have been put in an incubator and treated. The fact that the case has been used by the anti-abortionists is a slur on the good hospital and the good doctors in it.

    The priest involved, who was not the chaplain of that hospital, received evidence about the case in confidence, and he broke that confidentiality. The organisation has used the case time and time again, despite the agony and distress that it caused to the woman involved. Does the House know that the woman was interviewed at great length by the police after the tragedy because of the actions of those involved, who exploited the case? I agree with the right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Sir D. Steel) that it was a tragedy, but it has been used gratesquely by those opposed to abortion at any price, not at 18, 22 or 28 weeks, but altogether. They are using the same tactics again today.

    I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way in his intervention. He made a helpful point, as the local Member of Parliament, about what happened in that hospital. His intervention underlines my point that we should not base future legislation on one experience, however tragic and unhappy. We should consider the totality of experience and the working of the 1929 and 1967 legislation when coming to our decisions tonight.

    I hope that the Committee will consider it reasonably appropriate that, as the promoter of the 1966 legislation, I should address myself——

    I shall give way later, but the hon. Lady should let me get going and cover some of my points, in the hope that I can prevent unnecessary interventions.

    We should survey what has happened to the practice of abortion since we changed the law in 1967. I start by reminding the House, particularly the hon. Member for Maidstone—she was not a Member of the House when we debated issues such as rape and incest and whether they should be included or excluded from the legislation—that there is nothing new in that argument. The House went over it time and again during the passage of that legislation.

    More importantly, I should like to remind the House about the state of the law and the practice on abortion before 1967. We do not have the figures for abortion then, as we have since 1967. One of the stipulations of the 1967 Act was that every abortion had to be recorded and published. However, two surveys were done before 1967. I do not lay claim to their accuracy, but they were published in 1914 and 1940, and both estimated—I stress that it was only an estimate—that there were about 100,000 illegal abortions in this country. That compares with a figure, which many may feel is too high, of 182,000 in England and Wales last year.

    There were high numbers of illegal abortions before 1967, and there were none of today's campaigning organisations against abortion in those days. Such organisations have campaigned only against safe, legal abortions, not the illegal ones that happened then I do not have an exact figure of abortions, but I have some accurate figures from the Department of Health that give us a clue about the picture before 1967. The number of women discharged from hospital with post-abortion sepsis in 1965 was 3,050 and in 1982, just 390—10 per cent. of the pre-1967 figure. That gives an indication of the scale of abortion going on, about which we were supposed not to know.

    In the three years from 1961 to 1963, 160 women were recorded, in this country as dying as a result of abortions. In the three years from 1985 to 1987, the figure was four. How can anyone say that it has not been a major social advance to have achieved the end of the scourge of illegal abortion in Britain?

    The second argument of those who want to reduce the availability of abortion is that in this country we have an exaggeratedly high rate of abortion. I accept that some other countries have lower rates of abortions than we do, but a great many countries have high rates of abortion. I objected to an hon. Lady, who is not present, so I shall not mention her name, saying in the House some weeks ago that this country was a foetal dustbin. I resent and reject such phrases, because the figures do not bear out such claims.

    The rate of abortion is measured internationally by the number of abortions per 1,000 women of child-bearing age. Last year, in England and Wales, the figure was 14·8 per thousand women. In Scotland, it was 8·9. The last year for which we have total international figures is, sadly, back in 1983–84, for which the figure for England and Wales was 12·8. In France, in the same period, the figure was 14·9, in East Germany, it was 26·6, in Italy it was 19, in Denmark it was 18·4, in Sweden it was 17·7, in Poland it was 16·5, in Norway it was 15·9, in Czechoslovakia it was 34·5 and in Bulgaria—presumably because of the lack of any family planning policy—it was an appalling 61·9 per thousand.

    Let us set the British figures in the context of the legal abortion rate of other European countries. In this country, we are not carrying out an excessive number of abortions, judging by international standards. It is a slur on the practice of medicine in this country to go on repeating and conveying the impression that there is an outrageous level of abortion in Britain.

    I think, if I caught her words correctly, that the hon. Member for Maidstone said that 50 per cent. of late abortions were carried out on foreign women. She said that that was not due to delays in the National Health Service, and of course it is not. It stands to reason that, if people come to this country from other countries, that takes time. Presumably they have undergone processes elsewhere, and then come to this country.

    In 1983, before the Spaniards changed their law, exactly 22,000 women from Spain came to this country for illegal abortions. They could not have them in Spain, and no doubt they were among the late abortion figures. Spain then changed its law, and the last figure I have, for 1988, was that that figure of 22,000 women from Spain had come down to 3,000. Figures change as other countries change their law and as the availability of abortion becomes uniformly more accessible throughout Europe.

    I shall give way when I have finished this point, and my hon. Friend may feel even more inclined to interrupt when he hears my next point. One figure that inflates British abortion figures is the number of women who have to come over from both parts of Ireland—from the Republic, the figure is 3,000 and from Northern Ireland, it is 1,500.

    Of those women who have children in southern and Northern Ireland, those figures represent a tiny percentage. I hope that my right hon. Friend will tell the House that women came from more than 100 different countries to the United Kingdom last year, from as far away as Mongolia and South Africa. That does not suggest a uniformity of law, but that our laws are such that they come to this country because we allow later abortions than anywhere else. Does he agree that the assurance that he gave in the 1967 debates that his legislation would not lead to abortion on demand looks absurd when, at present, one in five pregnancies end in abortion?

    I shall come to that wider argument in a moment. I have never accepted that the intention of the law in Britain is to provide some sort of worldwide service. The hon. Member for Maidstone made the point that 50 per cent. of the late abortions about which people complain are performed on foreign women who come here because of the accessibility of legal abortions in this country. I do not particularly like that. I should much prefer other countries—they are doing so gradually—to reform their own abortion laws so that women there can seek redress of their difficulties in their own lands. That is a matter for those countries, not for us, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Mossley Hill knows, I have never liked the foreign trade in abortions.

    What is the state of the law in other countries? It has not been mentioned much in this debate, but in previous debates opponents of the Abortion Act 1967 have repeatedly said—my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Mossley Hill (Mr. Alton) said it again a moment ago—that we allow abortions later here than they do in other countries. That is true in some instances, but it is not the whole truth. Those who keep saying that some of our continental neighbours have upper limits of 10 or 12 weeks should quote the whole of their law. It is based on a completely different tenet: on the right of a woman to request an abortion at up to 10 or 12 weeks. If we changed our law to reflect that idea, as some hon. Members advocate, that would naturally cut out many of the delays that occur. But that is not our law; our laws are different, and we cannot compare them with those that provide obortion on request.

    Our laws attempted in 1967 to strike a balance—to make a neutral statement—between the rights of the foetus and those of the woman, and left it to two doctors to judge in any given situation and in good faith whether an abortion was necessary. Hon. Members should not take bits of other people's laws and claim that, because other countries set a figure of 10 or 12 weeks, we allow abortions later than they do. Their whole systems are different. So if hon. Members want to argue for a crippling reduction in the availability of abortion here, they ought to follow through the logic and accept that early abortions should be available on request, as some would argue—although that has never been my argument.

    It would be a great mistake—this is where I quarrel with the hon. Member for Maidstone—for the House to set aside the opinion of established medical bodies on the issue of setting a limit of 18 weeks. The survey published in The Lancet of 2 December 1989 showed that only 3 per cent. of members of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists favoured a reduction to 18 weeks; 75 per cent. favoured 24 weeks. The British Medical Associaton is also firmly against 18 weeks and says, correctly, that such a limit would have
    "an inequitable and adverse effect on those most in need of having their pregnancies terminated".
    The representative professional committee on foetal viability, to which the Minister referred, also stressed in 1985 the harmful effects of setting the limit too low. Its report stated:
    "late attenders are usually the women in greatest need of help—the very young and socially deprived".
    We are not entitled to cast aside all these opinions as though they did not matter, or to pluck out of the air a figure that we think might be better——

    Will the right hon. Gentlemen acknowledge that in 1967 he went against a considerable body of medical opinion and presumably thought it right to do so?

    6.15 pm

    Certainly not; I do not accept that for a minute. I worked with the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and the BMA throughout the passage of the legislation——

    There were differences about bits and pieces of the legislation, but fundamentally these bodies were not opposed to it——

    My hon. Friend is beginning to sound like a parrot. The fact is that they did not oppose it. They supported it throughout its passage, and they still do. That is why they study these matters and send recommendations to Members of this House. They are not asking for fundamental changes in the 1967 legislation.

    There is concern about the rise in the number of abortions, particularly in the past two years. I rather share that concern, but I do not believe that any hon. Member can suddenly arrive at some correct number of abortions. How would one do that? Each case must be assessed under the law and considered on its merits. In some cases, I or other hon. Members might not agree with the doctors that an abortion should have been allowed; in other cases, we might think that they made the wrong decision, but under the law, we leave that decision to two doctors acting in good faith.

    My worry about the rise in the number of abortions in the past two years relates not to the practice of the Abortion Act but to the declining standards of availability of family planning in this country. The "World in Action" television programme last night had done a survey of health authorities and found that a third of authorities in England and Wales had been reducing the numbers of family planning clinics for cash reasons. It was said that, in one area, there was a waiting list of 18 months to have vasectomies on the NHS, and there have been instances of local authorities under financial pressure reducing their subscriptions to the Family Planning Association and to Brook Advisory Clinics. Moreover, the new core curriculum in secondary schools leaves little time for non-statutory subjects such as sex education, so the picture is one of a rise in unnecessary abortions.

    If this were a less male-dominated House, we should have spent less time over the years debating abortion, and far more time discussing family planning facilities. I am convinced that there is a relationship between the unhappy cuts of the past couple of years and the unfortunate increase in the number of abortions. Whether we are caricatured outside this place as pro or anti-abortion—I do not accept the labels—it should be common ground in the House that Ministers and the Department of Health should pay more attention to that relationship.

    Finally, I turn to the time limit, and——

    My right hon. Friend has dealt with the two-doctor provision of the 1967 legislation. He must surely recognise that, under that provision, late abortions have taken place in circumstances that he would not have contemplated as part of that legislation; and that the provision has led to a wide range of assumptions, practised by different doctors, of what reasonable circumstances for an abortion are. If he does not recognise that, he does not recognise the significance that many hon. Members attached to the assurances that he gave in 1967.

    I go this far with my hon. Friend: I certainly accept that there have been cases—I hinted as much a few moments ago—in which doctors have taken decisions on abortion with which I or my hon. Friend would not have agreed, but the fact is that the onus was put on the medical profession to act in good faith.

    I may have said this before, but I distinctly remember going, during the passage of the 1967 Act, to see the secretary of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists perform an operation under pre-1967 legislation. When I saw the case notes in the clinic where he was operating, I told him that I had grave doubts about whether he was acting within the law.

    Of course there is room for variation in opinion. All we can say is that we have to rely on the ethics of the medical profession to act in good faith. I accept that, just as there are bad Members of Parliament and clergymen, so there are bad doctors. I regret that, and I have never denied it, but in the main the great majority of doctors are carrying out the intentions of the House as enshrined in the 1967 legislation.

    I turn now to the time limits, and I should like to deal in passing with the vexed issue of the situation in Scotland. With great respect to the Minister, I thought that she was not exactly comfortable with this part of her remarks. I stand to be corrected by the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran), who is a Scots lawyer, but time limits in Scotland are and always have been a happier subject, legally speaking, than they have been in England. The Infant Life (Preservation) Act does not apply in Scotland; the common law of Scotland makes child destruction a crime. Fortunately, because no time limit has ever appeared in a Scottish statute, there is a degree of flexibility there which has been helpful as medical science has developed.

    There has been no need for such a great debate north of the border. I looked up the figures and found that, in 1987, there were only two abortions at over 24 weeks in Scotland. In 1988, there was only one. The issue hardly arises there. This is a peculiarly English and Welsh problem. I do not wish to enter into nationalistic considerations, but I do not understand why that should be so. The problem does not exist in the law of Scotland, and we are wise to leave well alone there.

    For England and Wales, we put the provisions of the 1929 Act into the 1967 one. It is right—the Minister put the point fairly—that medical science has moved on a great deal since 1929 and it is now possible with resuscitation equipment to keep alive at least a small proportion—we should not exaggerate this—of those born between the 24th and 28th week of pregnancy. That is why there has been such deep consideration of the workings of the Abortion Act and the time limit by, among others, the Lane committee, which recommended a reduction to 24 weeks. The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, the British Medical Association, the 1985 committee to which the Minister referred and the House of Lords Select Committee all recommended 24 weeks.

    A wide section of expert opinion appears to have looked into the matter very carefully, and says that there is now a case for reducing the presumption of viability from 28 to 24 weeks. Before I finish on that matter, I again reiterate a point that is widely misunderstood. The fact that there is a presumption of viability in the law at 28 weeks does not mean the reverse. There is no presumption that a foetus is not viable before 28 weeks. That is important.

    It is precisely because of that, as the hon. Member for Barking (Ms. Richardson) said, that the medical profession usually allows a two-week safety margin in its judgment below the level that the law states. That is because the profession can be in danger of prosecution even if it is shown that the foetus was below the 28th week of pregnancy. There is no presumption that below that level viability does not exist.

    Let us be clear that, whatever decisions we reach, if we go for 24 weeks, which I will support because I think the law should now be changed, we are in practice introducing a clinical procedure in which 22 weeks will become the limit. If we go for 22 weeks the practice will be 20 weeks and so on. That is why I am wholly opposed to 18 weeks or any lower suggestion. That is nothing but a crude attempt to stop the availability of legal abortion to certain categories of women. There is no medical justification for it.

    All the expert medical bodies have told us that, whatever the advances in medical science, it will not be possible to sustain life at such a low limit, except in occasional cases such as the one that has been widely quoted, where it was suggested that a baby survived at 21 weeks. By and large, the general medical opinion is that it is not possible to get any significant number of babies to survive below the 24th week of pregnancy. That is the simple reason why I believe that that is the right term. Anything lower is simply arbitrary and designed to deny women their rights.

    It is right that we should have this debate. Hon. Members have been plagued by endless pieces of mail, to put it politely. I in particular have been the target of an extraordinary resurgence of hate mail of the type that I thought I had last seen in the late 1960s. That is life. By and large, the House wishes to come to a conclusion. I shall support the new clause—with some of the amendments, because I do not think that the clause in itself is quite right. I hope that, at the end of the confusion, we will come to a decision and stick to it. There may not be another debate on abortion in this Parliament and, if there is not, the House must turn its attention to the issues of family planning and contraception facilities.

    It is a great privilege to follow the right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Sir D. Steel). I do not agree with everything that he said, but I have always admired him and he has always sought to act from the best possible motives. Although the Act that he introduced has not been the signal success that I am sure he wished it to be, no one who has paid any attention at all to this matter could accuse him of having acted for anything other than the social good of the nation as he saw it at the time. I speak with some diffidence because the last time that the House devoted a fair amount of time to abortion, I had the difficult task of chairing the Committee that examined the Bill introduced by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Mossley Hill (Mr. Alton).

    I am grateful for that intervention because it was a difficult task and one had to be impartial. I hope that I was impartial throughout the sittings of the Committee. Because I chaired that Committee, for two years I have refused to make any public utterance on this subject. I did not think it right to give any sign of sympathy for one side or the other. When I chaired that Committee I learned a great deal from both sides. One of the things that I learned was that people felt passionately and, on occasions, spoke with some intolerance and misunderstanding, sometimes deliberate, of other people's opinions, which did not advance either case very much.

    I shall try to explain how I see the matter and how I shall vote. First, the interests of the mother are and must be paramount. If there is any question of a mother's life being at risk, then, faced with the ghastly choice of which life is to be ended, it is important to decide that the mother's life should be preserved.

    On the second matter I cannot go all the way with the Roman Catholic Church, much as I admire the courage of the statements on moral absolutes that are made frequently by the Pope. Certain categories of women must always be granted abortions. There can be no debate about cases arising from rape and incest. If a woman or a girl has been violated by a member of her own family or by anybody else and a pregnancy that was never wanted or never sought has been thrust upon her, she must have the chance to have the pregnancy terminated.

    If there is evidence of severe abnormality, the family must have the opportunity to take counsel, to consider, and, if necessary, to decide that termination is the right course. In what I would loosely call certain social categories, after careful consideration it might be in the interests of other members of the family for abortion to be contemplated.

    However, we are not considering with sufficient care the sanctity of life. I was in the Members' Post Office on Saturday morning when all the parcels arrived and my initial feeling was of great sympathy for the staff. When I opened my parcel I found a legitimate and graphic piece of campaigning, because nobody disputes that that is what a 20-week-old foetus looks like. [Interruption.] If somebody had been able to produce medical evidence that this was a grotesque mock-up that was totally inaccurate and grossly misleading, it would have been the most obscene piece of campaigning that anyone could indulge in. However, nobody has suggested that. When I was in the Post Office yesterday an hon. Member came in, took his parcel, opened it and threw it in the bin. I could not help thinking that this is what happens to many foetuses.

    Over the past 23 years, we have developed a new attitude towards the sanctity of life which accords ill with our constant talk about the need to preserve the quality of life. I do not make the ridiculous mistake of blaming the right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale for that. That would be absurd. However, I say to him and to other hon. Members that the climate that was partly—and I choose my words carefully—influenced by his Act has degenerated over the past 20 years. People who would never have contemplated abortion then, would do so now.

    6.30 pm

    If I understand the hon. Gentleman, he is suggesting that there are more abortions now because abortion is legal. Can he explain why there were 1·2 million abortions in Romania in 1989, most of them illegal? Obviously, the rich can always buy safe abortions.

    For the sake of other hon. Members, I will not be sidetracked to Romania—a country which I have just visited and which is one of the saddest places that I have ever seen. I shall not talk about the obscene antics of the Ceaucesceu regime and the actions that people were driven to during that time. I am talking about our attitude to life. I am trying to put my case with a degree of calmness and moderation—[Interruption.] I hope that the hon. Lady will accept that I understand how passionately she feels. I know that she was a member of the nursing profession and must have just as great a concern for life as I have—[Interruption.] We view these matters differently, but she must allow me to develop my speech. I hope that she will have the opportunity to make her speech later.

    I was not defending back-street abortions. I understand why the right hon. Gentleman introduced his Bill—he wanted to combat a terrible social evil. The choice to have an abortion must always be traumatic, and the right hon. Gentleman wanted to introduce a Bill that would make abortion available under proper clinical conditions for those who needed it. I am suggesting that, unwittingly, his Act has helped to create a climate in which people do not have so great a regard for the sanctity of human life.

    I do not think that it is rubbish. This is what I mean by the intolerance that these arguments sometimes provoke. The hon. Lady cannot solve the problem or salve her conscience—or, indeed, anyone else's conscience—by shouting, "Rubbish." People now have a much less serious regard for the really important decisions of life. We must recognise that, which is why——

    Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is because mothers are concerned about the quality of life for their whole families that they have abortions? Women sometimes feel that they cannot continue with another child, so they have an abortion. The law does not make much difference to them, because history shows that, when abortion was not legal, they went to the back-street abortionists. They risked their lives and the freedom of those who helped them because of their desire to maintain the quality of life for their families.

    I can count on my fingers the number of hon. Members who have carried a child to full term or who have had to face a decision on whether to have a foetus aborted. I know that it is hard for hon. Members to understand——

    Order. The hon. Lady is making a speech, not an intervention. I shall do my best to call her later in the debate.

    I gave way because I know that the hon. Member for Bow and Poplar (Ms. Gordon) has strong feelings. She was on the Committee that I chaired. However, she was not here when I began my speech——

    I was trying to be kind to the hon. Lady by suggesting that she might not have heard my earlier points. I said that there were certain social categories where abortion might be right. However, it must never be lightly entered into and the law must not make it easy for that to happen. Currently, the law makes it too easy.

    On the question of how and at what point, I refer hon. Members to the model foetus that we were all sent. It showed a well formed, recognisable human body. When I intervened in my hon. Friend the Minister's speech, the substance of my question to her might not have been immediately clear. I asked how many women miscarried after 20 weeks. She said, quite honestly, that she did not know. My point, which I hoped hon. Members had understood, was that most women who carried a child up to 20 weeks went on to deliver that child. Most 20-week foetuses develop into healthy babies. That point was alluded to, very fairly, by the right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale, and it needs emphasising.

    It is often said that we live in a throwaway society, and we do. We are always throwing things away. We do not pay sufficient regard to our environment. When we are chided and upbraided by members of the Green party, many of us deserve it, and I do not exempt myself. However, we must not allow that throwaway mentality to extend to the most important areas of life and lead to the throwing away of life itself.

    I do not deny that there is something in what the hon. Gentleman says, because the subject of abortion is now more open to discussion and, perhaps, is being treated too trivially. I hope that he will accept that there is a reverse side to the coin. It was well put to me by a friend who was a medical student at Edinburgh when I was a student there. He is now in general practice. He said that one of the effects of the 1967 legislation has been that people will come to his surgery and discuss abortion with him, whereas pre-1967 they would not have done so and he would have lost control of what was happening, and the patient might have ended up with a back-street abortion or going into a private clinic. That is the other side of the hon. Gentleman's argument.

    I entirely accept that. The right hon. Gentleman has made a fair point, and I acknowledge it. All the right is not on one side and all the wrong on the other. I know that the right hon. Gentleman is a devout and convinced Christian—so, I hope, am I. Because we are both Christians we both believe in sin and we are both sinners. Neither of us can be right all the time. I would never suggest that one must believe in no abortion if one is to be a Christian. That is nonsense. I must not refer to yesterday's debate or I shall be called to order. However, yesterday there was a tendency to polarise. In The Times yesterday there was an article by the Archbishop of York who, whatever else he might be, cannot be called anything other than a totally convinced, committed and devout Christian. He is a far better man than I am.

    My beliefs make me feel that there is a less deep regard for the sanctity of human life than I would wish. I know that many people in the House and outside do not share the Christian beliefs held by the right hon. Gentleman and myself. However, we still live in a country that has an established Church——

    The right hon. Gentleman does not, but there is an established Church in England and we still subscribe to the general Christian ethic. Many people who are not Christians also subscribe to that ethic. At the centre of that ethic must be a regard for the sanctity, the decency, the quality of human life. It is about those things that we are talking today.

    Is my hon. Friend aware that, when we debated the matter in the House 23 years ago, not even the keenest advocate of the new Bill claimed that any more than 100,000 babies, at the outside, were aborted each year? We know that the figure now is well in excess of 180,000 babies a year. Is my hon. Friend aware that those statistics back up his case?

    I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I am aware of that and that is why I have been trying to make the case, imperfectly I realise. Many of the things that most hon. Members would hold dear are held a little more tenuously than they were 23 years ago. I was not in the House then but I came shortly after. My hon. Friend was. One has to face the fact that marriage is no longer the central institution that it was. One has only to do some canvassing, as I did in Mid-Staffordshire recently—not that it did much good—to realise that for two people of different sex to live in the same house in different names is much more common that it was 20 years ago. One has only to consider the statistics for children born out of wedlock, or the increasingly powerful demands, which I shall not expand on at the moment because it would be out of order, from some sections of the community for women to be allowed to have children without any thought of marriage, to realise that there have been many changes.

    No one could have been married for 23 years as I have—[AN HON. MEMBER: "Too long."] I hope that it is not too long; I hope that I can carry on—without realising that monogamy is not always the easiest state to sustain. The old words of the old prayer book about natural instincts being directed aright show that that has always been recognised.

    We are talking about life and the quality of life and we in the House have a great duty, whatever our personal beliefs, to recognise that there is nothing more sacred than life.

    No, I shall not give way any more. You are nodding, Miss Boothroyd, and in fairness to others, I should bring my remarks to a close. My hon. Friend may then have a chance to address the Committee.

    We in the House have a great duty to sustain the concept of the sanctity of life. Whether or not we believe in the word "sanctity" is irrelevant. There is nothing more precious than a life. When two people come together and cohabit and create a third person they take on a great responsibility. The act of coming together should not be lightly entered into. The consequences of conception should not lightly be consigned to the flames, or anywhere else for that matter. Children should not be aborted, and that means killed, unless there is a paramount reason—the life of the mother, the circumstances of the conception or some overriding personal problem which can be assessed.

    This evening we should tighten up the law and reduce the time limit—I shall vote for the 18-week limit—to make abortion more difficult, but not impossible. The one thing that I could never agree to is abortion on demand. That demeans everyone, most of all the person who demands. It is with that sort of thought in mind that we should conduct our debate. I hope that at the end of our proceedings, whether it is in the small hours or not, we shall have improved the law so that those with legitimate needs will have nothing to fear and those whose attitude to life is rather a casual one will have to think more seriously about the consequences of their actions.

    6.45 pm

    My main purpose in rising is to address the House on the uniqueness of the Scottish position, which has been ignored in all the amendments before the House. That was confirmed by the Minister's response to my intervention.

    I oppose new clause 4, because I am in favour of the status quo. If the legislation were to be changed, I would want it liberalised and the Scottish position imported into the English legislation. For that reason, I shall be supporting new clause 3.

    The Scottish position tends to be ignored and I am conscious that today's debate has concentrated on specific time limits. As a Scottish lawyer, that is an aspect of the English legal system which I have always found it difficult to understand. The English adherence to precedent and strict rules makes legislation complicated and forces one into the sort of debate that we have heard today.

    The Scottish legal system is based on principle. The 1967 Act applies in Scotland, but the basic principle in the application of the Act is the medical decision on the viability of the foetus. When the 1967 Act came into force in Scotland, the limit of 28 weeks was accepted in exactly the same way as it was accepted in England and Wales, but it was accepted because that was the best medical view on the viability of the foetus. As medical technology has improved, so the limit has been lowered. Therefore, the effective limit in Scotland now is 24 weeks, but the limit progresses with medical technology and the ability of the medical profession to sustain the life of a viable foetus. It is on that basis that I present our principle to the House. It is much more flexible, it advances with the times and it would save us endless and interminable debates on the subject of abortion.

    To illustrate how flexible the Scottish system is, it is important to consider what was happening in Scotland before the introduction of the 1967 Act. Throughout the rest of the United Kingdom abortion was illegal, but in Aberdeen, the city that I am proud to represent, National Health Service abortions were introduced by the then consultant in obstetrics and gynaecology at Aberdeen royal infirmary, Dugald Baird, who had learned his medicine in the slums of the Gorbals in Glasgow. He had seen working-class women who had produced children year after year, and many of them were worn out in their mid-30s.

    With the legal authorities, Dugald Baird introduced the concept of an abortion where the pregnancy posed a risk to the health of the mother. With the procurator fiscal in Aberdeen, he devised a scheme whereby every case in which he as consultant considered that abortion was appropriate because of the risk to the health of the mother, was reported to the procurator fiscal and, if he was satisfied that an abortion was appropriate, it was carried out. The procedure was streamlined so that there were no delays, and many hundreds of abortions were carried out in Aberdeen before the introduction of the 1967 Act. That was possible because of the flexibility of the Scottish system, which declared abortion to be a crime but provided exceptions where, for example, there was a real risk to the mother's health.

    The Government amendments threaten that flexibility. No consideration has been given to the uniqueness of the Scottish situation. There is no Scottish Office Minister on the Government Front Bench now, nor has there been for any of the debate—and I do not expect to see one there. There has been inadequate consultation in respect of the Scottish position. When the Minister responded to my earlier intervention during her own speech, she said that the situation in Scotland was at a loose end and that it had to be "tidied up." I hope that she views it as something more than that, and that we can return to that aspect on Report.

    The hon. Member may be interested to learn that I discussed the matter with Sir Dugald Baird at the time of the Abortion Act 1967. He was much in favour of including Scotland in that statute, because during the time that he was carrying out the practice to which the hon. Gentleman referred, a particular Law Officer in Scotland wrote to him, warning in effect, "Watch it." Sir Dugald replied, "The next time that I have a case, will you come and tell me whether or not I can carry out an abortion?" He did not regard the law in quite the ideal light that the hon. Gentleman suggests.

    Few doctors regard the law in the same ideal light that it is regarded by Scottish lawyers, but I take the right hon. Gentleman's point. Although I never met Dugald Baird, I know from his colleagues that his views were not quite those that I would like to present. He was not totally in favour of the 1967 Act, although he was in favour of establishing a statutory position. I am sure that he would be in favour of the operation of such a law today. Sir Dugald's colleagues recently established a trust fund in memory of the work that he did. The Minister for Health indicates surprise. Perhaps I may write asking her to make a donation to that trust, if she supports its objectives.

    Although Scottish law appears to be much more liberal than that of England and Wales, as the right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Sir D. Steel) mentioned, the number of late abortions performed in Scotland is very small. In 1987, there were only two abortions involving pregnancies later than 24 weeks, and only one in 1988. In 1984, the United Nations undertook a survey of abortion rates in every European country where abortion was legal. The rate in Scotland was only eight per thousand, compared with 13 per thousand in England. That bears out the point also made by the right hon. Gentleman that National Health Service family planning services are well developed in Scotland.

    Aberdeen's extensive experience of providing abortions on the National Health Service provides many other examples of the way in which abortion law operates north of the border. My local hospital, Aberdeen royal infirmary, has a well organised and streamlined system that aims at avoiding late abortions. No one favours abortion. Every abortion that is performed is a tragedy, but the Aberdeen system ensures that cases that fulfil the legal criteria set by the 1967 Act are dealt with, according to the woman's wishes, at the earliest possible opportunity.

    When a woman visits her general practitioner for the purpose of arranging an abortion, he is instructed not to write a letter or postcard to the appropriate consultant seeking an appointment for her but to pick up the telephone and contact a named individual. An appointment is made for the woman there and then. Bureaucratic delays are avoided and the case can be dealt with at the earliest opportunity. I am not frightened by the prospect of an 18-week limit for my own constituents in Aberdeen, although I consider it undesirable for all the other reasons that have been advanced.

    In Aberdeen, the latest date effectively for an abortion to be considered is 20 weeks, because the system is streamlined and all qualifying cases are picked up at the earliest stages. Virtually all Aberdeen GPs are tuned in to the system, having worked with it for many years. Even those opposed to abortion pass cases to their partners in the same practice.

    There are exceptions to the rule, but the majority of abortions are dealt with within 18 or 20 weeks. That is an excellent example of the way that the National Health Service can restrict the number of late abortions without right hon. and hon. Members having to tug at their heart strings and being the recipients of obscene items—at least, I consider them obscene—through the mail, to persuade them to take a particular view.

    Even those who support the 18-week limit accept that abortions should be provided on the National Health Service. That may be to distort some of their views, but I am entitled to place that interpretation on their support for the 18-week amendment. They should also be looking for ways of removing the trauma and stress that is suffered by all women who have to endure an abortion, for whatever reason.

    Ways should also be found of taking the issue away from this House and interminable debate. I asked the hon. Member for Maidstone (Miss Widdecombe) what she meant by her statement of a few months ago that she and her supporters "would go away for a while". I do not believe for a minute that the issue will die once a decision has been made by this House. I certainly do not accept that the hon. Lady can guarantee that all those who share her view will stay in line.

    We need to establish a principle that is related to the best medical practices. We should not have to debate the matter year in, year out, but should place our trust in medical practitioners and give them a legal framework within which they can operate and which the public can understand. That would bring an end to the debate, except among those who are totally opposed to the concept of abortion. We could then enter into a much more honest debate on the arguments for and against abortion, rather than have to tinker with time limits and risk the dishonesty that they might engender. For all those reasons, l support new clause 3 and shall vote against new clause 4.

    We can at least all agree that it is high time to legislate on this important issue. Right hon. and hon. Members who have been in this House for many years will recall repeated attempts by private Members to seek, in some cases, quite modest reforms of abortion law, who succeeded in securing substantial majorities in favour of such measures on the Floor of the House, yet were frustrated by a comparatively small minority who knew how to use our rules and regulations to prevent the House from reaching a final decision.

    Whether or not one agrees with the views of my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone (Miss Widdecombe)—and I do—hers was a remarkable speech, showing a great command of the subject. I listened to her with profit, and I hope that other right hon. Members, whether or not they agree with my hon. Friend, will acknowledge that hers was a remarkable performance.

    Clearly, it seemed to the pro-life movement that the only way to resolve the matter once and for all was to persuade the Government of the day—in this case a Conservative Government—that embryo experimentation and abortion law reform should be incorporated in a Government Bill. The right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Sir D. Steel) will be the first to recall that the Abortion Act 1967 would not be on the statute book had the Government of the day refused time for it. I do not complain about that. I complain about subsequent Governments who did not take a similar course, although there was an overwhelming majority in the House and in the country in favour of abortion law reform. I join my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone, therefore, in congratulating the Government on facilitating this debate.

    7 pm

    The House has voted repeatedly to stop the scandal of late abortions and abortion on dmand, but we have been prevented from coming to a decision not by argument or reason or by a straight defeat in the Division Lobby, but by blatant filibustering, which is an open admission of defeat by the pro-abortionists. This debate, however, has been very different, precisely because those who used to use those practices know perfectly well that this is a Government Bill, that there is a time limit and that we are being given full facilities to express our views. I have listened with respect to the views advanced by those who fundamentally disagree with me. This has been a good debate for that reason, and we should thank the Government for making it possible.

    We have an opportunity now to decide on a reasonable upper limit for abortions. We should take decisions tonight that will be valid for years to come. We should take decisions that bear a relationship to the present situation but, having regard to the advances in medical science, to the situation that is likely to develop in the next decade. That is why I ask hon. Members to consider very carefully which way they will vote tonight. I declare straight away that I am in favour of an upper limit of 18 weeks.

    We must also recognise that we compare somewhat unfavourably in that regard, even if the Bill is enacted with the provisions that my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Health has said that he is in favour of—namely, 24 weeks—with a good many countries in Europe. We are still way behind them and the details are available for hon. Members. Thus, the position in Germany and in France, to consider two of our nearest neighbours, is quite different from the position here, and it will be different again if the Bill is enacted with the recommendations made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State.

    Let us consider the position in this country with regard to late abortions. In 1988, the last year for which I have figures, 183,798 abortions were performed under the Abortion Act 1967. The overwhelming majority were performed for social or non-medical reasons. Handicap was given as a ground for abortion in 3,817 cases, and only 486 abortions were performed because the mother's life was at risk.

    Down the ages, it has been acknowledged—it is not challenged now—that abortion is the only surgical operation involving two lives where one must die. It has been accepted down the ages by Christian societies that, where the mother's life is in danger, it is paramount. There is no argument about that.

    In 1988, only five abortions were performed to prevent grave permanent damage to the mother. Of late abortions—for the purposes of this debate, I will take those to be at 19 to 20 weeks—3,406 were performed. The total of abortions at 21 to 22 weeks was 1,983; at 23 to 24 weeks, it was 1,107; and at 25 weeks and over, there were only 23. Under the provisions of the new clause tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the House, the number of lives that would be saved on 1988 figures, if the House voted for an 18-week limit, would be 5,977. If the upper limit was set at 20 weeks, that figure would be reduced to 2,914; at 22 weeks, it would be reduced to 2,027, and at 24 weeks to nil.

    I was deeply moved by the speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire, South (Mr. Cormack). This debate is about life and death. Will we be voting to save the maximum number of lives? We must consider the figures. The pro-life movement readily concedes that there are certain tragic circumstances in which an abortion is justified. We are not absolutists on the subject. However, for God's sake let us consider the figures. When hon. Members vote, they should weigh the figures very carefully.

    My right hon. and learned Friend's new clause is different from the amendment introduced by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Mossley Hill (Mr. Alton) in his Bill, in that an upper limit would apply at the end of the week that we decide upon. The new clause refers to a pregnancy which
    "has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week".
    The Bill sponsored by the hon. Member for Mossley Hill set the limit at the beginning of the 18th week. I would like clarification from my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister for Health as to whether the words, "has not exceeded" means the end of the week in question. Perhaps that can be clarified later.

    We have clear choices before us. How many lives do we want to save? That is what the debate is about. How many unborn children do we condemn to death, and how many do we save? It is clear that 24 weeks is no decision at all. That is a fudge, because it would save hardly a single life. In a written answer to the hon. Member for Barking (Ms. Richardson), my hon. Friend the Minister for Health stated that the 22nd week is considered by doctors to be the earliest time that there is the possibility of a foetus being born alive. Wait a minute. We must remember that the Abortion Act 1967 does not have an upper limit. It refers to the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, which makes it the crime of child destruction to destroy a child capable of being born alive. The prima facie case of capability of being born alive at that time was 28 weeks.

    We should note that the 1929 Act does not require a child to be born alive and to survive, which no one can determine in advance, but only to be born alive. I recall that my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone told us that Mr. Justice Brooke defined "capable of being born alive" as surviving for only a few minutes. Twenty-eight weeks was the figure agreed in 1929, but medical science has moved fast since then, and that limit is now totally out of date.

    Does the Committee realise that, at this precise moment, an abortion carried out at 24 weeks is illegal and contrary to the 1929 Act if it turns out that the child could be born alive at 22 weeks? In short, a 24-week limit would put the clock back and legalise what at present is plainly illegal. Does the Committee realise that that would be the precise effect if we voted for a 24-week limit tonight?

    Last December, the Daily Mail featured a delighted mother holding her baby and girl, who had been born at 22 weeks. She weighed just 20 oz. She was not only born alive, but she survived. How against that can anyone defend 24 weeks and think that he is voting for reasonable upper limit? Parliament will be enacting nonsense. A vote for 24 weeks tonight is a vote for a nonsense. When the country realises that, it will not easily forgive us. Medical science will continue to advance, and more and more babies born prematurely will survive. Surely we should legislate for the future and not for the past.

    New Clause 1 does not apply a 24-week upper limit as it seems to do. I do not know whether my hon. Friends the Members for Bolton, North-East (Mr. Thurnham) and for Berkshire, East (Mr. MacKay), who tabled the new clause, are aware of that. The new clause seems to allow abortion up to birth under the exceptions stated in paragraphs (2A) (a) and (2A) (b) of the new subsections. Those exceptions could be interpreted widely and the doctors performing such exceptional abortions could stand wholly unchallenged. They would not even be subject to the 1929 Act. I therefore urge hon. Members to oppose new clause 1.

    Is my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State aware of the effect of new clause 1? I am not seeking to draw my right hon. and learned Friend to his feet, and I do not expect a snap answer. The subject is too serious for that. However, I ask him to reflect on what I am saying and on whether I am right or wrong. God knows, there are moments when one prefers to be wrong. This is the moment of truth. As I said in respect of embryo research yesterday—although the vote did not reflect my advice—the buck stops here in Parliament. I ask my right hon. and learned Friend to consider arranging for a statement to be made before we vote.

    It is now appropriate to describe the unborn child in the later stages of pregnancy. There have been several references to a package that hon. Members have received. I have not received one, and I am not especially in favour of such dramatic gestures. However, this is an adult House and hon. Members would not be here if they were not trusted by many of their fellow citizens. It is right to describe what we are discussing. Far from being an inanimate object and a mere clump of cells, the unborn child is sensitive to sound and touch. At 18 weeks, it is complete. All its organs are in place and what it needs between 18 weeks and birth is the correct environment in which to live and to grow.

    What is the difference between an 18-week baby and a 28-week baby? It is only size and weight. The unborn child will move spontaneously, it will react to bright light shining on the uterus, and it can recognise and react to its mother's voice. In January 1980, the British Medical Journal published an article entitled, "What the Fetus Feels". In describing the reactions of a nine-week unborn child, the article said:
    "the baby is well enough formed for him to bend his fingers round an object in the palm of his hand. In response to a touch on the sole of his foot he will curl his toes or bend his hips and knees to move away from the touching object. At 12 weeks he can close his fingers and thumb and he will open his mouth in response to pressure applied at the base of the thumb. At 11 weeks after conception the fetus starts to swallow the surrounding amniotic fluid and to pass it back into his urine. He can also produce complex facial expressions and even smile."
    All these movements and reactions require a high degree of sense and organisation of the various bodily functions. That is the little creature about whom we are talking—a human being not yet born, yet with all the hope and expectation of life.

    When we come to vote, let us not vote for a figure. Let us remember that we are voting for the preservation of the lives of future citizens. God knows the number of those who have been sacrificed as a result of abortion since the passage of the 1967 Act. There were, of course, abortions before that Act—I am not criticising the right hon. Member for Tweeddale Ettrick and Lauderdale (Sir D. Steel), but since its passage, 2·5 million to 3 million children have been lost, and the overwhelming majority, if they had been allowed to be born, would have been perfectly fit and healthy.

    Where would they have been today? They would have been in our schools or at universities or at work, serving their country. That should be a matter of prime concern for every man and woman inside and outside the House. When we vote, let us remember that we are not voting about figures, but about unborn children who may one day make a contribution to our national life.

    7.15 pm

    I want to put another crucial question to hon. Members. Can the foetus feel pain? I am sure that we are all conscious of the need to safeguard the welfare of animals. How many of us are members of one of the animal welfare societies, go to dog shows in our constituencies and are revolted by cruelty to animals? Let us ask ourselves a question. Tonight, we shall decide whether a foetus should be allowed to live or die after the 18th, 20th or 22nd week, or later. Does this little creature feel pain?

    The distinguished Australian, Professor Peter McCullagh who, I am glad to say, is one of the advisers to my all-party pro-life committee, state in his 1987 book entitled "The Foetus as Transplant Donor" that the brain cells essential for consciousness of pain in the adult are present in the 10-week-old unborn child. The sensory nerve fibres transmitting pain are present even before those capable of inhibiting perception of pain. Some hon. Members have had the privilege of hearing Professor McCullagh speak to us elsewhere in this building.

    A study that appeared in 1987 in Nature, a well recognised and respected journal, stated that the unborn child's sensory neurones appeared to be more sensitive than those of an adult or a new-born baby. There can be little doubt that abortion is intensely painful for the child as well as for the mother. It is a gruesome business, but I doubt whether many people outside the House—or many in the House—know exactly what is involved.

    I shall describe one of the most vivid accounts I have read of a dilatation and evacuation abortion performed at 22 weeks in a London hospial. The House should know exactly what happens before we vote tonight. I quote from the book "Abortion: The Whole Story" by the well-known journalist Mary Kenny. This is her account of what she saw:
    "First came an arm, perfectly formed, a tiny baby's hand, fingers curled. A limb was extracted. Then two limbs lay in the bowl … The intestines, brain tissue, liver, lungs came away. Last of all—the most difficult part—was the cranium. The skin was torn, and there was not much more than a skull".
    Who passed that account to me? It was passed to me by the organisation called Doctors Who Respect Human Life.

    Many things have been said about the medical profession in the course of the debate. There has been the odd tribute here and there and people have said that the vast majority of doctors are honourable people who care for their patients, and so on. Thank God many doctors, men and women, take the view that such abortions are an obscenity and a crime that should be stopped. The quotation does not come merely from a journalist or someone who wants to tell an alarmist story.

    Has the right hon. Gentleman read accounts of back-street illegal abortions or what happens when women attempt to abort

    themselves, with equally gruesome results, often resulting in the death of the women?

    Yes, I have. It has been claimed strongly since the passage of the 1967 Act that the legalisation of abortion rendered back-street abortions unnecessary. As the right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale would tell the hon. Lady if he were in his place—I hope she will not shake her head in dissent before hearing my answer to her intervention—the rate of back-street abortions was on the decline before that Act came into being.

    I am not arguing that there should not be effective control or that we do not have a responsibility, as a civilised society, to see that women who are in dire need and distress are cared for. Under French law, for example, a woman must be in a state of distress before an abortion can be granted. I am concerned about abortion on demand.

    It is a pity that my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone is not in her place. If she had been, I would have asked if she could recall the grounds on which the Carlisle baby was aborted. Hon. Members will remember the terrible story that she told. I am not absolutely sure, but I believe that the grounds were largely trivial and that, if there had been effective control——

    I thank my hon. Friend for pointing out that it was a skin disease, which is common enough among adults, some of whom do not even know that they have it.

    Is my right hon. Friend aware that 84 per cent. of all women in the United Kingdom believe that women should have the right to choose?

    In most civilised countries, there is a requirement before an abortion is permitted that the woman—who, in such circumstances, will obviously be in a state of great distress—is counselled by a doctor. There is a pause during which she is given the opportunity to consider the situation. There is at least one organisation in Britain which not only gives counselling but which, if necessary, would help a woman in that situation to bear her child.

    No, I will not give way. My hon. Friend raised a trivial point—[Interruption.]—because a woman in that situation needs help. I am not saying that she should be denied help or that there are not circumstances in which abortion is not justified. I am not saying that, and have never said it. I am simply endeavouring to bring home to hon. Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Torridge and Devon, West, what is involved in an abortion.

    We should consider who benefits from late abortions. Who performs them? I am talking not about early but about late abortions. In a survey conducted by the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists entitled, "Late Abortions", published in 1984, it was found that over 60 per cent. of very late abortions were performed, believe it or not, by just 11 private practitioners. That is killing for profit. Some would call it legalised murder.

    I trust that whoever replies to the debate will say, since I am referring to 1984 figures, whether the Department of Health has investigated those 11 doctors, whether they have ever been found to have transgressed the so-called gentlemen's agreement between the Department and the clinics performing late abortions, and, even more important, whether their activities have been found to be contrary to, or in line with, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929.

    What happens in other countries, particularly in Europe? In West Germany, abortion is only allowed up to week 13 for social reasons and up to week 22 for reasons of handicap. In France, abortion is available up to the 10th week for a woman in distress, and after that only if the unborn child is handicapped or if there is serious risk to life or health. In Greece, abortion is available up to the 12th week and thereafter in limited conditions. Spanish law allows abortion up to 12 weeks for rape and up to 22 weeks for handicap. In Denmark, abortion is allowed on demand up to 12 weeks and after that on the authorisation of a special committee. The law is similar in Norway. Swedish law provides for abortion up to 18 weeks and after that only if the foetus is below the age of viability.

    In terms of an upper limit, we in this country have one of the most permissive laws in Europe. That is a disgrace to our nation, with women travelling from other countries to have their abortions here.

    There is a major difference between yesterday's debate and the matter that we are discussing today. On embryo research, many people honestly have doubts about when life begins. I am referring not to those who are certain about their uncertainties but to those who genuinely have doubts. But today we are concerned with the living unborn child who is capable of being born alive. Abortions carried out on such babies at 24 or 22 weeks are already illegal under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, which makes it an offence to destroy a child capable of being born alive.

    We are dealing today, therefore, not with doubts or uncertainties but with the question whether the life of the unborn child is sacred or not. As I said in yesterday's debate, the buck stops here in the House of Commons. In my view, we have a solemn duty to protect those who cannot speak for themselves and to consider their interests when others manifestly will not.

    The hon. Member for Barking (Ms. Richardson) concluded her remarks by talking about the role of irresponsible men in relation to the abortion argument. Although there are areas where she and I disagree, on that issue I agree with her. I accept that men are often the cause of women being pressurised into having abortions. That is a reason why, fundamentally, men along with women are involved in this issue.

    However, abortion affects every member of the human race potentially, so this is not a question that divides men and women. It is an issue on which we are all entitled to have an opinion and about which we should show responsibility.

    Although the hon. Lady refused while she was speaking to give way to me, I happily give way to her.

    I said—I may have said it badly—that women often suffered from men who did not consider them and who made them pregnant in an irresponsible way, not necessarily pressurising them into having abortions.

    I accept that, too. Men will often use their sexuality in a way that demonstrates a greater sense of machismo than it does responsibility towards their partners. At the heart of the debate about contraception and family planning, the subject raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Sir D. Steel), is the need to recognise that when love and a sense of responsibility is removed from sexual relations, there will always be tragedy. Sometimes that can result in men trying to pressurise women into what people often perceive as the quick fix of an abortion. They believe that that will solve the problem. Rather than solving the problem, it destroys a life and has consequences for the men, women and children involved and for the medical staff.

    Actions that we take in life are bound to carry consequences for us as individuals, and as we discuss this issue, we must accept our responsibility as parliamentarians in drafting the law. We must also accept that society's attitudes must change and that the massive taking of life that has occurred in the past 23 years, with the authority of the law, can never be regarded as desirable.

    Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that another form of irresponsibility could occur? Far from pressuring a mother to have an unwanted abortion, a father could be quite happy to let her get on with it and take no responsibility for the child. What would the hon. Gentleman advise the woman to do in those circumstances?

    7.30 pm

    The hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Field) has often put forward views on that subject, which I entirely support. Indeed, the Prime Minister has put forward views about the subject with which I agree also. Many hon. Members will agree that the man who is involved in the creation of life should be forced to take far greater responsibi