I should like to reiterate Opposition support for the Bill, which is designed to provide compensation for those unfortunate people affected by Saddam Hussein's brutal invasion of Kuwait. We hope that the Government and the United Nations Compensation Commission will give priority to dealing with the claims as speedily as possible.

The hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Mr. Hill) has been assiduously pursuing for a long time the claim of one of his constituents, Mrs. Major. I congratulate him on that. Can the Minister tell us when that case is likely to be given some priority in the compensation process?

In Committee, fundamental questions were raised. Although the Minister answered each point, a number of his replies were inadequate, perhaps because the relevant facts were not available. Perhaps the Minister can now provide us with up-to-date information on the major outstanding issues.

I expressed concern in Committee about the funding of the claims. United Nations resolution 687 called for a percentage of Iraq's oil revenue to be held back and paid into a fund from which people entitled to compensation would receive their money. As I understand it, however, no money at all has been paid into the fund, other than $21 million sequestrated by the American Government from funds that were already in the United States of America.

What new measures do the Government and the United Nations propose to introduce to enforce United Nations resolution 687 in respect of oil sales by Iraq which are in direct conflict to it? The terms of the resolution lay down that all sales of oil ought to be through, or supervised by, the United Nations, so that 30 per cent. of the revenue will go towards compensation. The issue of oil sales by Iraq was raised in Committee, and the Minister stated that there was some evidence at that time that Iraq was illegally and improperly subverting the resolution by selling oil, either directly or through other parties. Can the Minister elaborate briefly on that?

Unless some action is taken, I fear that the constituent of the hon. Member for Test is unlikely to receive any money. The Minister mentioned in Committee that $21 million had been sequestrated by American officials from Iraqi assets. Is it possible for us to do some sequestration? Certainly, when it came to the funds of the miners' union during the miners' strike, the Government were able to introduce legislation very rapidly to sequestrate the miners' assets; perhaps they could show the same assiduousness in sequestrating the assets of Saddam Hussein. The Government probably regard the miners of Great Britain as a much greater danger than Saddam Hussein. Will the Minister tell us whether we, or any other country involved in this problem, intend to take the same action as the United States?

The significance of those questions is obvious because unless adequate steps are taken to ensure the proper funding of the United Nations Compensation Commission, any debate that we have here or elsewhere on the mechanics of dealing with individual claims or claims from businesses and companies will be academic. The claimants include businesses that lost out when they were taken over in Kuwait and businesses that believe that they lost potential work when Saddam Hussein invaded.

I understand from the statistics given in Committee that, of the 3,000 United Kingdom claims—2,000 from individuals and 1,000 from companies—about 1,000 only have been processed by the United Nations Compensation Commission. I wonder whether the Minister can clarify why just one third of those claims have been forwarded by the Government.

Under the Bill, as drafted, the process for compensation was fairly slow but the Bill, as amended, now adds another dimension to the compensation process, because a claim must go through the Government to the United Nations Compensation Commission. If the process becomes even slower, it will be an awful long time before people get the money to which they are entitled.

Can the Minister provide a breakdown of the number of United Kingdom claims that are now being actively considered by the commission? That information would enable us to determine whether the Minister's strong commitment in Committee—to the effect that, if compensation were paid out, it should be paid to individuals first and then to companies and businesses—had been upheld. I understand that the United Nations resolution encapsulates that principle, but the only way in which it can be properly implemented is by monitoring the process properly. Are those expedited categories being monitored now?

The Opposition welcome the aims of the Bill, but it is important that UN resolution 687 is enforced, otherwise the structure of the UN Compensation Commission and the reason behind the Bill will be undermined. We are anxious to ensure that the commission continues to operate on the criteria it was set up to serve, namely, to compensate all those affected—physically, mentally and financially—by the brutal aggression pursued by Iraq and Saddam Hussein in the invasion of Kuwait.

The case I wish to raise has been going on for some time, and I will describe the background. An ex-sergeant in the Royal Engineers and his wife and daughter went to Iraq and stayed in Baghdad. He worked for a civil engineering firm named W. S. Atkins. When he wanted to leave, Saddam Hussein said that the would let only the wife and daughter go. The man was kept prisoner and, shortly afterwards, died of a heart attack.

Mrs. Major, the lady in question, suddenly found that, from having a very adequate income, she had none at all. The authorities foreclosed on her home in the United Kingdom. The family had a retirement home in Spain in which she intended to live, but the authorities foreclosed on that, too. The civil engineering firm acted in a very honourable way and helped as much as it could, but at the end of the day, the family was left penniless.

I have with me a letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office dated 27 August 1992. Although it made clear that the Department was processing the claim—I accept that it was helpful, and I thank the Minister for his help in the matter—it said in the last paragraph:

"Every possible pressure is being maintained by the United Nations Security Council, to ensure that Saddam Hussein fulfils all the international obligations he has brought upon himself".

We have reached the stage where the family has received every possible help from the Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Families Association and is now living in penury. That is not a good reward for a British citizen who went out to work for an engineering company. I get the impression that without a debate such as this, there would be no movement towards fulfilling what I regard as a moral obligation to help many individuals.

I agree with the hon. Member for Rhondda (Mr. Rogers) that it must be a priority that individuals and families are compensated ahead of companies, many of which had great losses. We are talking about many millions of pounds. If Saddam Hussein were the sort of person one could approach, he could be asked for, say, 10 million barrels of oil to put into the compensation fund. But he has no regard for anything other than himself.

It was the worst possible scenario for the end of the Gulf war to leave that man in charge. We are not getting anywhere with him. I am sure that the Minister will say that Hussein will in no way compensate anyone and that we can only hope that the Government who comes after him will be more amenable. I wait anxiously for the Minister's response.

It might be helpful if I reply to this short debate by bringing hon. Members up to date on the current situation in regard to claims for compensation. I shall, in particular, refer to the constituency case raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test (Mr. Hill) and the points raised by the hon. Member for Rhondda (Mr. Rogers).

I assure the House that the Government are doing their utmost, in concert with their coalition partners and through the United Nations, to ensure that compensation is paid at the earliest possible time to the claimants. As my hon. Friend the Member for Test recognises, against the obduracy of Saddam Hussein, it is not possible to say when that compensation will be available. But I can report the procedure and the up-to-date situation relating to the claims, which hon. Members will be reassured to hear are proceeding, even though there are by no means sufficient funds available at present for the payment of compensation to all the claimants.

The administrative arrangements in the United Nations Compensation Commission have progressed well since the cease fire in 1991, and particularly during the last 12 months. We have seen the establishment, first, of the claims criteria and, secondly, of the rules of procedure for assessing claims. Those two developments are significant. In the context of claims against other sovereign states for which I am responsible in the Foreign Office, the speed with which the machinery has been set up and the establishment of the rules for assessing claims has been quick in comparison with other situations.

After the establishment of the claims criteria and the rules of procedure for assessing claims, we have the commission, which is already working on a preliminary assessment of the claims it has received. In March, the commission gained approval for the appointment of a first panel of commissioners who will carry out the main assessment of claims.

We have no problems with the proposed method of assessment of claims which, in the case of individual claims, will involve the use of a comprehensive computer system. Legal officers of the commission will enter all the information on the claim forms into the computer. The commission is supported by experts, who will thus be able to deal with a large number of claims quickly, as a result of the expedited procedures. We hope that the form of assessment will commence in September and November of this year. That is when the commissioners are first due to meet to consider the assessment of claims.

We do not have sufficient funds available in the United Nations escrow account to pay all the claims. The hon. Member for Rhondda invited me to comment on how Iraq is surviving in the face of United Nations sanctions preventing the sale of oil, except through the procedures allowed by United Nations resolutions. We have no firm evidence to indicate that Iraq is exporting oil in breach of sanctions, but we have made clear to the Iranians and all Iraq's neighbours our views about the need to uphold the sanctions regime.

We are determined to keep up the pressure on Iraq to implement all the relevant Security Council resolutions in full, but Iraq continues flagrantly to deny United Nations authority across the board. We do not believe that any sanctions should be lifted until Iraq complies fully with all the relevant sanctions.

The Minister said in Standing Committee:

"Iraq has not started to sell oil in the world markets under United Nations resolutions. I believe that the Iraqi Government have sold some oil outside United Nations monitoring, but they have not started to comply with United Nations resolutions." — [Official Report, Standing Committee D, 2 March 1993; column 7.]

I gathered from that statement—the Minister would not have made it without some backing—that the Government had some evidence that Iraq was getting round the UN resolutions, under which Iraq is entitled to export $1·6 billion-worth of oil to pay for its own needs. If Iraq is selling substantial amounts of oil, the 30 per cent. due in compensation should be collected.

I answered the hon. Gentleman's question. I shall comment on the $1·6 billion-worth of oil that Iraq is entitled to export under UN resolutions to place into the escrow account so that 30 per cent. is available for compensation.

With regard to the availability of funds, as I have said, there is not enough money in the kitty to fund the compensation commission's activities. As the hon. Member for Rhondda said, there is $24 million worth of funds available for the compensation commission, largely from frozen Iraqi assets, as authorised under Security Council resolution 778. Those funds have originated from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United States and from Japan. For the moment, that will be enough to maintain the commission and to get the assessment process off to a good start which is an essential preliminary to payments being made. We expect that more funds will become available in due course via the sequestration route, although how much is not clear.

The hon. Member for Rhondda inquired about the position in Britain, and I wish to comment on the position in respect of sequestration in Britain. Under resolution 778, the United Kingdom can take similar action. To give effect to that resolution, an Order in Council was laid before the Privy Council on 12 May. That will come into force on 24 May.

That Order in Council provides powers to identify funds that represent the proceeds of oil sales and to sequestrate those unencumbered by third party claims for transfer into the United Nations escrow account. However, the difficulty is determining whether they are encumbered by third party claims. The Bank of England will have to investigate that and, under the Order in Council, it has power to ask financial institutions to identify funds. Those investigations will take a considerable time and I am afraid that we will not have the results before the end of the year.

With regard to any assets that could be sequestrated in Britain, I should say—and it would be wrong of me not to—that the judgment at the moment, although full investigation will confirm whether this is the case, is that 100 per cent. of the Iraqi assets held in the United Kingdom will be subject to prior claims. With regard to assets in Britain, claimants will have to await the payment of funds by Iraq into the compensation fund as provided under the resolutions.

The Minister's first point filled me with great joy. I was pleased that an Order in Council was finally available, although very late in the day in comparison to the Americans, to allow the sequestration of those funds. However, the Minister then said that there are claims on those funds so the money will not be collected.

If the present $21 million is not sufficient to pay any claims, but is simply money to run the commission, perhaps the Government should consider sequestering that money to pay British nationals under the Foreign Compensation Act 1950 instead of allowing the money to fund a massive commission. As I understand it, representatives of 15 different countries have set up a huge superstructure which is sucking in $21 million. That money is not enough to run the commission and the sequestrated money will not go to claimants such as the constituent of the hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Mr. Hill). Instead, it will simply be used to run the machine.

That is not true. The hon. Gentleman is aware that we are dealing for claims for the whole world. Sequestrations from the United States, Japan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are going into the fund for claimants from all over the world.

I want to consider the precise position with British claims in terms of timing. We are about to send our ninth batch of claims to Geneva. Some 2,575 claims will then have been dispatched relating to 1,900 claims. We are in correspondence with another 800 to obtain additional evidence for clarification of various points. Only preliminary processing has been carried out in Geneva as yet and that has not covered all the claims that have been sent. All the claims are being dealt with in order of receipt and there are huge numbers of them. The process is set in motion and, as I have said, from September and November, the commission will be at work and we hope that, within a few months after that, we will see its determination.

The hon. Member for Rhondda and the world are aware that determination depends on the payment by Iraq in compliance with United Nations resolutions. We must keep the pressure up to bring that payment about. There is no other way in which claims can be met save by Iraq observing the United Nations resolutions so that claimants all over the world—not just in the United Kingdom—can have their claims assessed and then met. We must keep up the pressure to that end.

The Bill is an undoubted asset in pursuing that end. When the Foreign Compensation Act was passed in 1950, it was not expected that there would be a situation in which compensation would have to flow from an international organisation or tribunal. Under the provisions of UN Security Council resolution 687 of 1991, the Security Council set up the United Nations Compensation Commission and fund to receive claims for damage or injury to individuals, Governments or corporations as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

We hope that in most cases it will be possible for the Government to pass that compensation on directly to British claimants. However, there may be circumstances in which it would be appropriate for the Foreign Compensation Commission to conduct further adjudication of the claims and to distribute compensation between British claimants. The Bill will enable the Foreign Compensation Commission to do just that.

In conclusion, I want to comment specifically on the constituent of my hon. Friend the Member for Test. He graphically described the distress of Mrs. Major and his sentiments were supported by the hon. Member for Rhondda who also raised the case of poor Mrs. Major who was bereaved as a result of her husband's death from a heart attack while being held hostage.

I am aware of that unfortunate case. It took some time, with the assistance of her husband's former employers, to establish the details of her claim. However, all her claims were sent to Geneva on 20 April. They have reached Geneva and they will be in the process which, as I have said, will take place from September. The criteria have been established for the method of approaching the claims and it is now up to the United Nations Compensation Commission to decide whether to make an award and, if so, how much, in accordance with the procedures that will take place from late summer onwards and in accordance with the procedures that will be adopted for the other cases before the UNCC.

As I have said, the United Kingdom Government have complied fully with all the necessary preliminary work and have sent Mrs. Major's case to Geneva for consideration. On that note, I recommend to the House that the Bill be read a Third time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker, you and I know that, although this debate is taking place at this early hour, and although I welcome the opportunity to speak in the Chamber, the debate is occurring at the very time when I should have been hosting the RAF parliamentary group meeting. You could not attend because you had to be in the Chair, and I am now unable to attend because I have to speak in my Adjournment debate.

I am pleased to have been fortunate enough to be successful in the ballot for this evening's debate. As my right hon. Friend the Minister is aware, I sat through the whole of the Navy debate, but was not fortunate enough to be called. I am indeed lucky tonight and I want to consider the situation of the royal naval dockyard at Rosyth in Fife.

The House will be aware that the hon. Member for Dunfermline, West (Ms Squire), in whose constituency the dockyard is located, cannot be with us this evening. As the House knows, she has been hospitalised and has undergone a serious operation. I am sure that I speak for the whole House when I say that we all wish her a speedy recovery. I know that she would have been present this evening if she had been able to attend. I also know that she would have supported everything that I have to say, because she and I and others have worked hard on what I may call the Rosyth project.

Safety, especially nuclear power, at Rosyth royal naval dockyard is important—I shall have much to say about that later in my remarks. Before doing so, I draw the attention of the House to the importance of the nuclear submarines to the Scottish economy. Vast sums of public money have been spent to create the Trident base at Faslane on the Clyde. That of itself has brought huge economic benefits to Scotland.

Together with the facilities at Coulport, the basing of the submarine flotilla at the Clyde bases has resulted in many permanent civilian posts and the purchasing and renting of a large number of private homes throughout central Scotland by the submarine crews. That means that Scotland enjoys a substantial cash flow as a result of the bases being located on the Clyde in Scotland.

There is a political dimension. A number of local authorities have nuclear-free policies. Many councillors, civic leaders and opinion formers support the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and are opposed to any nuclear facilities at all in Scotland. Indeed, it has been a continuing and difficult political problem, and I shall have more to say on that later.

I was pleased to hear the commitment given by the Government to retain two dockyards because the case for employment at Rosyth and Devonport has been well recorded and well spoken of in the past. The respective bids by each dockyard for the nuclear submarine refits may not now be substantially different. I know that the Ministry of Defence has benefited substantially from the fact that the bases have been in competition, and that has resulted in a substantial reduction in the price tendered to carry out the work.

The political case has been well argued. To that end, I simply say that it will be difficult to sustain the case for having the nuclear submarine bases in the Clyde with the crews having their permanent family homes in central Scotland if Scotland does not get the nuclear submarine refitting contract. I shall refer to that again later.

Today, I will not argue the case for Rosyth in any department on purely economic, employment or political grounds. Instead, I hope to demonstrate that Rosyth is the right dockyard to be awarded the nuclear submarine contract on strategic, cost, planning and—primarily—safety grounds. The Rosyth bid, when it is finally made public, will be seen to be keen and competitive.

What about the nuclear safety and planning problems that will arise at both bases? Because the nearest habitation is further from the nuclear trials berth, the nuclear risks at Rosyth are less for the population. Consequently, the risk to society is much less at Rosyth because far fewer people live close to the site.

The population distribution and topography of the area surrounding the sites are such that, in the event of an accident, evacuation could be accomplished more readily and with less disruption at Rosyth than Devonport. Although I must admit that nuclear accidents are extremely unlikely, the consequences are such that plans for protection of the public in the vicinity of nuclear submarine refitting sites are absolutely essential.

The naval reactor accident contingency planning arrangements now include the automatic counter-measure zone—a radius of 550 m. Within that area, all people who are not essential to the management of the accident are evacuated and supplied with potassium iodate tablets. Automatic actions commence immediately on declaration of an accident—or an accident that may be only a warning but not a real accident. One can understand that that often happens in such situations,

The pre-planned counter-measure zone has a radius of 10 km. A local pre-arranged monitoring scheme is required for that area so that appropriate emergency measures, including evacuation, can be taken in the downwind sector following a severe accident. Potentially, that affects a civilian population that is some two arid a half times greater at Devonport than at Rosyth.

At Rosyth, the automatic counter-measure zone does not contain any dwellings and is wholly contained within the base site, while at Devonport the automatic counter-measure zone extends outside the site and includes dwellings. I have some interesting aerial photographs that show that clearly. Being an airman, I have no difficulty getting hold of aerial photographs. The nearest habitation to the nuclear trial berth is substantially further away at Rosyth, making assessed individual risk less for a given radioactive release.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way on that point. I realise that he is a champion of his constituents. Does he understand that the contract that we are discussing is to maintain the Trident submarine, not the missile or weapon system itself?

It is obvious that my hon. Friend is a new boy. He does not know that, for the past 14 years, it has been my job in Scotland to deal with the peace movement. The one thing I understand is the different parts of submarines, missiles and so on. My hon. Friend will also realise that, when one is establishing a refitting base of this sort, it requires local authority approval, and approval from the nuclear bodies responsible. I shall refer to that in a moment.

There is a greater concentration of population close to the Devonport site in the downwind sectors under prevailing wind conditions. This population is part of the city of Plymouth. There would be considerable pressure on available road routes for evacuation. I shall refer to that later. The number of people living within 2 km of the proposed uprated docks at Rosyth is under 2,000, while it is well over 30,000 at Devonport. At Devonport, the automatic counter-measure zone includes civilian residences. At Rosyth, the nearest civilian population is well clear of the zone.

That is the present position, but what about the future? Should further limitations be necessary due to a continuing development of nuclear safety standards—one cannot rule that out—the operational impact is likely to be less at Rosyth than at Devonport. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Minister of State for Defence Procurement will agree that continuous improvements of nuclear safety standards is a feature of the United Kingdom nuclear industry, including the nuclear submarine programme. Indeed, we can be proud of our safety record in the United Kingdom in that area.

This can result in requirements to modify safety-related plant or introduce further restrictions in the operations to ensure safety. Examples of both such constraints have been evident in nuclear submarine refitting recently. The possibility of such additional limitations will always exist, expecially for upgraded facilities, whether at Devonport or Rosyth. However, at Roysyth, any such emergent limitations are likely to be less severe because of Rosyth's comparatively remote location.

All that will have to be taken into account in the planning process, which operates as follows. The MOD produces a notice of proposed development, which is submitted to local authorities for approval. If the proposal is rejected by the local authority, the Government can force the application through. However, in practice they never seem to do so.

As with all planning applications, local objections can be raised by private individuals or organisations. The local authorities can then rule on the objections or decide to refer the case to the Secretary of State for Scotland in the case of Rosyth, or to the Department of the Environment in the case of anything in England, such as the Devonport base. The Department of the Environment then decides whether to move to a public inquiry.

The RD57 Trident facility at Rosyth and the recently announced nuclear waste store at Rosyth have both obtained local authority approval for the MOD's notice of proposed developments. So again, Rosyth is much further down the road. That is not surprising, because, way back in the mid-1980s, a decision was taken that Rosyth should be the base at which the nuclear refitting would take place.

I have demonstrated that the safety case for carrying out nuclear submarine refitting at Rosyth is sound. I have also demonstrated that the bids by Devonport and Rosyth are competitive. I understand that the Rosyth bid is the lower of the two, but that the Devonport bid is close. Whether or not that is true, the bids appear to be in the same ball park. Therefore, the political consequences for the south-west of England and for Scotland may be a factor.

It is wise to note that political factors might influence the decision. If that is so, I draw it to the attention of the House that a 5 per cent. swing against the Government would lead to a loss of nine Conservative seats in Scotland. That would leave only two Conservative Members of Parliament north of the border. In the south-west of England, a similar swing would reduce the 16 Conservative seats by about six, leaving 10 Conservative Members of Parliament.

Consequently, adverse political reaction to the failure of Rosyth to obtain the nuclear submarine refitting contract would be much greater in Scotland than in the south-west of England. Even worse, such a failure could put the union between Scotland and England at great risk. It is not realistic to imagine that, with two Conservative Members of Parliament, a Conservative Government could handle the affairs of Scotland easily. That would create huge problems.

The nuclear safety case for Rosyth is also superior. Individual risk at Rosyth is considerably less, because the nearest habitation, as I have said, is much further away at Rosyth than at Devonport, which is situated in the middle of a large city. Rosyth is located in a sparsely populated area.

In addition, the fuel movements at Rosyth are short. That is important. At Devonport there is greater a concentration of population close to the downwind prevailing wind sector. There would be considerable pressure on the road routes of the city of Plymouth if evacuation were required.

At Devonport, nuclear fuel will be transported for 1·5 km. The fuel will pass within 200 m of a public highway and housing. I repeat that there is nothing like that at Rosyth.

rose—

So on nuclear safety, political and cost grounds, Rosyth is the best choice for the refitting work on nuclear submarines. That is probably why my right hon. Friends the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the Board of Trade, when they were at the Ministry of Defence, and my noble Friend Lord Younger, when he was responsible for defence at the Scottish Office, gave pledges that Rosyth had been selected.

Those pledges were given in the mid-1980s. They were firm pledges at the time. Those pledges, along with the retention of two dockyards, are still relevant today. To refit submarines at Rosyth and surface ships at Devonport is the best cost, political and safety solution.

Will my hon. Friend confirm that, with his kind permission, I might make a two-minute speech when he has finished?

I am afraid that I cannot confirm that. The hon. Gentleman should have asked me before the debate. We could then have had a discussion.

If a dock refurbishment proposal is selected, the RD57 facility at Rosyth—what I would describe as the massive hole in the ground—could be used to store the decommissioned nuclear submarines, pending final decisions on their disposal. That is important when one is discussing such matters. If we are to continue to locate decommissioned submarines at Rosyth before their disposal, we must consider that point. I suggest that that would be acceptable only if Rosyth were awarded the Trident refitting contract.

Rosyth provides a relatively safe lay-up and storage facility for decommissioned submarines. However, if the submarine refitting work did not come to Rosyth, there would be no site nuclear facilities, technical expertise or back-up, and the people of Fife and Scotland would demand the removal of decommissioned nuclear submarines currently stored at Rosyth. They would welcome the shipment of those submarines down to Devonport, if it could win the contract.

Studies carried out by Fife regional council have shown that about 18,000 people in Scotland are dependent, on the Rosyth complex. More than 1,000 businesses across Scotland, and in the north and the midlands of England, would be affected if the dockyards were run down. The wider community would suffer extreme dislocation as a result of unemployment., service rundown and housing problems, with the associated local and national Exchequer costs. In all, the dockyard and neighbouring base contribute about £380 million per annum to the Scottish economy.

I understand the strength of feeling in the south-west on the matter. Anyone who has made any attempt to study defence procurement facilities and expenditure understands that. I do not make the case for Rosyth purely on narrow grounds. I make it because I believe that the Government, having made a decision to retain two dockyards—a wise strategic decision—have an obligation as a result of pledges given previously by Ministers.

Unless it can be demonstrated that the Devonport bid far outweighs the Rosyth bid in terms of true costs—if that is so, it will have to be taken into account by all those affected—the decision to locate the submarine refitting in Scotland makes sense, as it did in the mid-1980s, in view of its location far from human habitation and close to the base on the Clyde from which the submarines will operate. It makes no sense to ship the crews up and down the country when their submarines are in for refitting. Their homes will be in Scotland, and it would be nonsense for them constantly to travel the length of the country to Devonport.

It makes sense for Devonport to refit the surface ships, because those crews have their homes in the south and they would not have to travel. All the arguments should be based on the firm pledge that we will retain two dockyards —I welcome that, and I am sure that everyone in Scotland welcomes it. I look forward to hearing what my hon. Friend the Minister has to say.

As is traditional on such occasions, I begin by warmly congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker) on his good fortune in the ballot, and on the characteristically skilful and all-embracing way in which he had presented his case. He is a tireless champion of his constituents and of Scotland, and he is fighting his corner on the dockyard issue, as he is fully entitled to do.

I am sorry that the debate has occurred somewhat earlier than expected and so had prevented my hon. Friend from hosting the RAF reception downstairs, but I know that he will soon be able to follow his other great interest in defence, and join his fellow pilots. However, I am afraid that I cannot say anything tonight that will lead to a celebration; I shall simply be able to set forward the case and give some of the answers to the questions that he has posed in our useful debate.

I join my hon. Friend in sending a message to the hon. Member for Dunfermline, West (Ms Squire), as I have just heard that she is having a serious operation. Certainly, hon. Members from both sides of the House wish her a speedy recovery. She has been a great contributor to debates on the dockyards; I think that the last time that I was at the Dispatch Box for an Adjournment debate, I was answering her well-deployed arguments. I know that we all hope that she will soon return to her place here.

I was grateful to my hon. Friend when he began by welcoming our commitment to keep two dockyards open—a fact which should perhaps have taken some of the sting out of then dockyard debate. However, I realise from some of the atmospherics bubbling around me tonight that there is still a great deal of passion.

Lady Eden, the wife of Sir Anthony Eden, once said that she felt that the Suez canal had been running through her drawing room at No. 10 Downing street. In my much humbler political role, there have been times during the past few months when I have felt that a dockyard has already been built in my office in the Ministry of Defence.

A great deal of material in the debate is constantly being covered and re-covered in our arguments, but my hon. Friend has done the House a service tonight by raising the nuclear safety issues. I am glad to have the opportunity to respond to some of them, and I hope that I shall set many of my hon. Friend's fears to rest.

I shall first place the debate in context by saying that I and all my Government colleagues are deeply conscious of the great importance of the royal dockyards, at both Devonport and Rosyth, to the economies of their areas. My hon. Friend spoke eloquently about the economic importance of the decision to his constituents in the region of Scotland. I can confirm that we have studied carefully the reports produced by Fife regional council last November and last month on the impact of the possible closure of Rosyth dockyard and naval base.

The closure of the dockyard and naval base are not being contemplated, but we have noted the forecasts that have been made, and we welcome the reports, which are a useful contribution to our consideration of the local economic impact of any proposal we make. We have received similar reports from the Devonport region.

The economic impact of the decision is important to both dockyards which each directly employ several thousand people and sustain employment for thousands more in companies across their regions. To their great credit, the companies are among the largest trainers of apprentices in their areas.

Therefore, we fully recognise the great significance for Fife and for Scotland of the issues which have been raised today. As my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Streeter) and the hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Mr. Jamieson) are present, I must ensure that I am even-handed by emphasising in almost every paragraph that the same applies to the Devonport and west country region.

In the ecumenical atmosphere that is prevailing at present, I pay tribute to the work forces of both dockyards for the long and devoted service that they have given over many years. We have good reason to be grateful to all who serve there.

I shall remind the House of the background to our decision-making process. There are two issues which the Government have to resolve—first, where to invest in the expensive facilities which we will need for refitting Trident and other nuclear-powered submarines by the turn of the century; secondly, how to secure the best value for money in the refitting programme as a whole in the long term.

I have to stress to the House that a failure to achieve best value for money in support activities such as refitting must inevitably increase the pressure on the resources that can be found for the front line. The inevitable result of that would be further reductions in the front line: the teeth a little blunter, the tail dragging a little more heavily. My hon. Friend mentioned that he sat through the Navy debate on 6 May, so he will know the importance of the point that I am making.

At present, nuclear-powered submarines are refitted, refuelled and decommissioned at both Devonport and Rosyth. Both yards have an excellent record in technical and safety terms in that work. As the House will be aware, the reductions in the armed forces announced in July 1990 mean that there will in future be significantly fewer nuclear-powered submarines in the fleet than had at one time been planned. That reduction, from more than 20 to 16, has opened up the possibility that all refitting work could be carried out at one site.

A comprehensive study by the Ministry of Defence, which drew on a wide range of expertise in nuclear construction matters—including the companies which manage the yards on the Government's behalf—has shown that it would be feasible, safe and cost-effective to concentrate nuclear work at either Devonport or Rosyth, as opposed to continuing with the previous plans to maintain two nuclear refitting yards. There are no strategic reasons to keep two nuclear dockyards, and we have therefore concluded that we should in future concentrate nuclear work at one site.

My hon Friend mentioned safety. Can be confirm that the nuclear installations inspectorate has given both Rosyth and Devonport a clean bill of health on the safety aspects of the proposed installations? My hon. Friend the Member for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker) spoke about local authority planning permission. Can the Minister confirm that the members of Plymouth city council were unanimous in their decision to grant planning permission for the nuclear waste store at Devonport, and in wishing the contract to come to Plymouth?

I am glad that my hon. Friend has been able to have his say. I shall say something about the nuclear safety issues and the NII's role later, so perhaps ray hon. Friend will be patient. In broad terms, I can confirm what he has said, and I am grateful to him for mentioning the unanimity of Plymouth city council on the subject.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State announced on 9 February that we would be concentrating nuclear work at one dockyard, but that further work was needed to determine which dockyard that should be, and that remains the position. I am sure that the House will agree with me that it is vital to get the answers right. The issues are of great complexity, and, as I told the House during the Navy debate on 6 May, we are continuing to receive information, and much lobbying, from the dockyard operators which we must take into account in formulating our proposals.

My hon. Friend's debate has concentrated on nuclear safety, and I know that he and the House will want to know that the Ministry of Defence attaches very high importance to nuclear safety, and is committed to meeting or exceeding civil standards of nuclear safety for comparable activities. It is a complex and multi-faceted area, and it may help the House if I explain briefly the general approach to it as it relates to the royal dockyards.

The royal dockyards attain high standards of nuclear safety. Their attainment of those standards is checked both by the Ministry of Defence and by the Health and Safety Executive's nuclear installations inspectorate—NII—which also licences the dockyard operators. It regulates all on-site activities and allows an operation to proceed only when its safety has been adequately demonstrated.

Ministers are also advised on such matters by the nuclear-powered warships safety committee, an independent organisation whose members have a broad spectrum of knowledge relating to nuclear power and are drawn from both Government and civil organisations. Its advice to me has been that public safety is not prejudiced by day-to-day operations, and that, even in the highly unlikely event of a nuclear accident, the general public would be protected by a range of countermeasures.

The royal dockyards, in common with all nuclear operators, work to the ALARP—as low as reasonably practicable—principle, and there are continuing efforts in both dockyards to reduce the exposure incurred by workers. That subject was extensively covered by the report of the Select Committee on Defence on radiological protection of service and civilian personnel published in late 1990.

The Ministry of Defence requires a site safety justification consisting of a series of nuclear safety reports to be produced by each dockyard. Those reports must cover all organisations, special controls, facilities and services whose satisfactory operation is necessary to ensure nuclear safety. Following satisfactory assessment of draft reports, the Ministry of Defence grants approval for the facilities to be used.

A crucial part of nuclear safety is concerned with the prevention of untoward incidents by equipment, facility or manpower failures. Safety standards for equipment and facilities are also extremely high. As my hon. Friend knows, safety is of key importance in the design of the new facilities that will be needed at either royal dockyard for Trident refitting. The designs and construction of the facilities will be subject to detailed approval at every stage by the nuclear installations inspectorate and the Ministry of Defence.

There is a set process for this, involving the provision of an early overall safety report, followed by more detailed reports concerning design, construction and future operation. These reports are compiled by professional engineers, and are by no means slim volumes. In fact, the more detailed reports would comprise several large tomes.

After this initial compilation, the reports must be reviewed by another group of professional engineers who have no links with the first, before being put forward to site safety committees who review the logic and content of the reports before they go forward to the NII and my Department.

I can assure my hon. Friend that neither my Department nor the NII will give approval to anything that does not give proper protection to dockyard employees, service and other MOD personnel and the general public. Equally, the NII is fully involved in approving facilities and arrangements for storing nuclear waste and used fuel within the dockyards.

The provision of new nuclear waste storage facilities to the latest safety standards is at present being taken forward at each dockyard under the oversight of MOD safety authorities and with the support and backing of the respective local authorities—a point that was brought out by my hon. Friend the Member for Sutton. I am glad to be able to confirm that the local authorities in Plymouth are just as highly supportive of DML's proposals for concentrating nuclear refitting at Devonport.

While I am mentioning local authorities, I should also point out that the local authorities in Plymouth are as highly supportive of DML's proposals for concentrating nuclear refitting at Devonport as my hon. Friend is of BTL's proposals to do the same at Rosyth.

My Department's experts on nuclear reactor and radiation safety, together with experts from other parts of the Ministry, conduct regular and detailed safety audits of naval bases and both dockyards. The audits consistently find that a strong nuclear safety culture exists and that there is a commendable and determined commitment to radiation dose reduction at both dockyards.

While we are confident that our procedures, equipment and facilities are safe, we have to prepare for the remote contingency of an accident occurring to a reactor while in a dockyard. My Department has a nuclear accident response organisation which conducts excercise5, at all MOD nuclear sites, ranging from paper exercises involving small teams to full-scale exercises involving large sections of the work force, local management, naval arid civil authorities and national response forces. These exercises test procedures at both royal dockyards. I can assure my hon. Friend that we believe that plans and procedures at both would protect the public in the very unlikely circumstances of a reactor accident.

We are therefore confident, based on our understanding of the safety assessment principles applied by the independent nuclear installation inspectorate, that any of the proposals will be able to meet the NII's requirements.

My hon. Friend asked a particular question about the operational impact of a further tightening of nuclear safety standards. I can confirm to him that we and the dockyard contractors are working to the latest NII safety assessment principles, which were issued only last year. We are confident that all the proposals can meet the NII standards prevailing at the time that approval is sought. If standards are tightened later, they would not apply retrospectively, unless there were a change of use.

In the course of informal discussions, the NII has given no indication that it believes that any of the proposals from either dockyard will be unable to meet its requirements. What the NII have not done, nor will it finally do so until the facilities are ready for operation, is guarantee approval for either proposal. So it would not be correct to say that a clean bill of health has been given, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sutton has indicated. But I believe that I have made the position perfectly clear.

The dockyard contractors' proposals take full account of the need to seek NII approval for each stage of the design and construction process, and have allowed adequate time for the NII to conduct a proper approval process.

I must emphasise that both dockyards have conducted nuclear refitting for many years with excellent safety records. To carry out all nuclear refitting in one place entails no increase in risks to safety, and the same stringent criteria, which are independent of the population density in the vicinity, will apply at whichever dockyard is chosen for the work.

My hon. Friend raised the question of nuclear accident contingency plans. Such plans are developed at each port or naval base used by nuclear-powered warships. These contain comprehensive plans for protecting the public and are drawn up in conjunction with relevant local authorities. Public safety plans set out the automatic measures which would be applied following a nuclear accident.

Because of the small size of the naval nuclear plant and the multiple safety arrangements and containment barriers, automatic counter-measures are confined to a 550-m radius around the submarine. For all but the most severe and extremely unlikely accidents, there would be no need for any counter-measures outside this area. However, as a prudent precaution, we plan with local authorities that contingency arrangements should be sufficiently flexible to allow the extension of counter-measures beyond the automatic zone, but only if required by a very severe accident of the kind that we do not believe is remotely likely to happen.

I thank the Minister for giving way, and I am grateful that he is answering this debate tonight. will he agree with me that, if there were 10 people living near this plant, whether it is in Rosyth or Devonport, the same sort of safety measures would have to be in place as if there were 1,000 or 100,000?

I am sure that he will be answering these points in a moment, but will he also answer a point made by the hon. Member for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker)? Although, like the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Streeter), I am a new Member, I can recognise half-truth and muddle in this instance. Will he also answer the point that the Minister will not be making the decision on the basis of the number of Tory seats that may be at risk?

I am certainly glad to confirm, on the last point, that, although I listened to my hon. Friend's psephological predictions of what a 5 per cent. swing might do to either the west country or Scotland, I have no way of knowing whether his calculations are correct. Whatever the hon. Member may be saying, he is perfectly entitled to voice his opinions in the House, and we listen to them carefully, and I can confirm that these political factors are not part of the Government's decision. We are making our decision on the basis of the criteria that I have announced.

While I will not deny that obviously more members of the public do dwell closer to the nuclear site at Devonport than to that at Rosyth, the key point is that we have worked with local authorities to produce a plan that would protect them at either site.

I conclude by saying once again that the Government are fully aware of the importance of the future of Rosyth dockyard to the people and economy of Fife and of Scotland as a whole, just as they are aware of the importance of Devonport dockyard to the west country. I emphasise that the most stringent standards of nuclear safety are a sine qua non for any yard where nuclear refitting is to take place.

These factors are among the many that we shall consider as we seek to balance the needs of the Royal Navy and the taxpayer against the needs of south-west England and eastern Scotland, and against the more general needs of the defence of the United Kingdom and the cost-effective use of public funds.

I can assure my hon. Friend, and all hon. Members who have taken part in this debate, that all the proposals are being assessed exhaustively and entirely even-handedly against the same criteria. Clearly, the proposals differ in detail, but our aim is to reach a position in which a like-for-like comparison is possible.

This has involved much discussion with the two dockyard companies, and detailed evaluation by my Department and its external advisers. Our aim is to ensure that they understand our requirements and how we are assessing their proposals, and that we understand precisely what the companies are offering us and what their terms and conditions are.

These are very complicated issues and many factors have to be taken into account. The amount of work involved has been very substantial. In addition, the companies continue to make representations to us by one means or another, and there are also representations by hon. Members. We must, of course, take account of the points made and of the new information supplied. None of this speeds up the decision-making process, and I regret that it has been longer than I had hoped or have indicated to the House earlier.

At the end of the day, our aim will be to make a sound comparison of the various proposals and to be able to show all concerned that we have made the comparison fairly and even-handedly. Once we have proposals to make, we shall announce them, and will then be able to discuss their wider ramifications with all interested parties. That consultation process will be immensely important in ensuring that we reach the right conclusions in the end.

I am grateful that my hon. Friend the Member for Tayside, North for the fact that we have had this debate today and that I have had the opportunity to discuss some of the issues that will lie behind the ultimate decision.