Reliable data are difficult to obtain. Variations are due to differences in the definition of unemployment as well as the lack of a single, official data source.
An International Labour Organisation (ILO) mission to Iraq in April/May 2000, estimated the unemployment rate as 50-60 per cent. The ILO, which is mandated to provide international definitions of employment, only considers as unemployed, those individuals who are actively seeking work but have not been successful in finding one hour’s work in one week. The United Nations and World Bank social and economic needs assessments (carried out after the conflict in 2003) estimated that the unemployment rate before the 2003 war had been around 30 per cent.
The most recent reliable unemployment data available for Iraq comes from the Iraq Living Conditions Survey carried out in 2004 by the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation/United Nations Development Programme. There is no other more recent comparable survey. The 2004 survey found that the core unemployment rate in Iraq was just over 10 per cent. (using the ILO definition).
In 2004, Iraq had a working age population of 16.4 million, but only 6.7 million (41 per cent.) were working or actively seeking work. Six million of these were employed, leaving 700,000 (around 10 per cent.) unemployed. The majority of the 9.7 million people considered “economically inactive” (ie above 15 years but neither working nor actively seeking work) were women, who are significantly less likely to engage in paid employment than men (this is common to the region). In addition, young men constitute 15 per cent. of the economically inactive. The majority of young economically inactive men (68 per cent.) say they are studying and thus not available to work. 20 per cent. claim to be “discouraged workers” (ie believe that there are no jobs available and have therefore given up looking for work).
Achievement of the millennium development goals (MDGs) in Iraq depends crucially on achieving an end to violence. Worsening violence not only hampers progress towards the goals but also makes them difficult to measure. Ending the violence—and rebuilding Iraq's economy and public services—is dependent on action from the Iraqi Government themselves. DFID is supporting these efforts by providing expert advice on reconciliation, economic reform and governance.
Progress against the MDGs
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger—Poverty in Iraq was not measured under the regime of Saddam Hussein, and World Bank data on income and expenditure will not be available until 2008. We do, however, know that global malnutrition is roughly at the same level as in the early 1990s (after rising to much higher levels in the late 1990s).
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education—Net enrolment in primary schools has not yet returned to the levels of 1991, after severe deterioration during the 1990s.
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women—The gender ratio among primary and secondary students has not improved, and the proportion of women in parliament has decreased since the early 1990s.
Goals 4-6: Reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, and combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases—Because child mortality increased dramatically at the end of the 1990s, substantial improvements are now required if Iraqi is to meet this goal. Maternal mortality is believed to have increased in recent years. There are no data on HIV prevalence in Iraq, but levels are thought to be very low. Malaria is not a significant public health problem. TB rates are thought to be stable.
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability—Access to safe drinking water did not improve between 1990 and 2004. There are no nationally representative data on trends in improved sanitation coverage. UNICEF is expected to provide updated estimates later this year.
Significant investment in delivery of basic services is required to improve Iraq's performance against the MDGs. Iraq has the resources to fund much of this work itself (with estimated revenues for 2007 of $37.6 billion), but DFID support will help the Government to plan and deliver investment in basic services, improve oil production levels, generate jobs and manage its own resources more effectively. DFID has already provided expert support to key Iraqi Government Ministries such as the Iraqi Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, the World Bank and USAID, to mitigate the impact of economic reform on the poorest. DFID has also channelled £70 million of funds through the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) which has supported back-to-school campaigns, constructed 134 new schools, supplied 79 million new textbooks, rehabilitated 209 primary health centres (PHCs), added seven new mental health units, supported country-wide immunisation programmes, and supplied emergency medical drugs and supplies.
On gender, DFID's Civil Society Fund has worked with women's civil society organisations to help them to engage more effectively with national decision-makers on key issues. To improve water and sanitation facilities, DFID is funding repairs to water infrastructure in southern Iraq, which will double the volume of water supplied to around 100,000 homes in one of Basra's poorest areas, and boost the supply of drinking water for around half a million people. By late 2007, DFID projects will have improved access to water for around a million people in southern Iraq.
The Emergency Public Administration Programme (EPAP) ended in July 2005 and its impact was assessed in September 2005. DFID judged that it fulfilled its initial objective: to help the Iraq Government set up key institutions at the centre of government. These included the Prime Minister's Office, the Council of Ministers Secretariat, and the Government Communications Directorate. The team of technical experts advised the Iraqi government on institutional structures and staff roles and responsibilities. They also provided targeted training to help key staff manage the machinery at the heart of government.
At the same time, the programme also provided vital economic policy advice to the Ministry of Finance during a period when the international financial institutions had no formal presence in Baghdad. This focused on preparing the budget and also provided the Government of Iraq with technical advice to help then negotiate an Emergency Post-Conflict Arrangement (EPCA) with the International Monetary Fund.
In late 2005, we launched a follow-on programme to provide training and advice to the three central Government institutions. Our 2006 assessment of the support to the centre of government project showed that despite changes in Government personnel, the project has met its objectives. The organisational structures set up under the Iraqi interim Government were successfully built upon when Prime Minister Maliki took office in May 2006. In an environment beset by political and security challenges, efforts to build institutional capacity take time; now staff are more effectively trained and able to develop policy. We expect to continue our support to these institutions during the course of 2007, to consolidate the gains made in public sector management practices at the heart of government.
DFID last reviewed the Political Participation Fund (PPF) in July 2005 and is currently conducting a comprehensive project completion review. The aim of the PPF was to increase the participation of poor and marginalised Iraqis in the political process as the country underwent a major transition to a democratic political system.
Throughout 2005 and 2006, the PPF funded a range of Iraqi NGOs who have run a series of outreach activities. Grants of £5,000 to £300,000 were made to organisations for activities such as workshops to educate voters and written pamphlets to explain the functions and responsibilities of different parts of government. They also organised a series of public television debates with prominent Iraqi politicians.
Activities were timed to coincide with the two national elections in January and December 2005, as well as the national referendum on the new Iraqi constitution in October 2005. The UN reported that voter turnout increased from 60 per cent. to 70 per cent. between the two elections, including increased participation in poor localities and in Sunni areas.
The review also showed that the project successfully built the capacity of 25 Iraqi civil society organisations ranging from neighbourhood women's groups, media associations, and union organisations. Each civil society organisation received training in project development and management. Following this support, a number of the organisations have been identified by UN agencies as potential partners for future work.