On 1 February, I announced the forthcoming rotation of our troops in Afghanistan. At that time, I undertook, once I had spoken with my fellow NATO Defence Ministers at Seville, to update the House on any further changes to our force structure. That is what I am here to do today.

I want begin by highlighting the progress and achievements in Afghanistan during 2006. NATO has continued its expansion of responsibility for this vital campaign into the more challenging south and east of the country. We have faced down the Taliban in their own back yard, delivering security and bringing the reach of the Afghan Government to places that have hardly seen it before. We have unified the military mission under the leadership of General Richards and the British-led allied rapid reaction corps. Across Afghanistan, we have built schools, mosques, roads, wells and markets. We have defended and reinforced five years of progress, including the first elections in decades, remarkable improvements in education, and the return of 5 million refugees.

I say this because, before we talk about what more we must do, we should understand what is at risk if we do not continue to live up to the collective commitment we have made to Afghanistan and its people. I am not here to herald this as a job done. I am not painting a glossy picture; our mission in Afghanistan faces serious challenges and the country faces serious problems. But I am here to explain why we must keep working to meet these challenges and to secure Afghanistan’s future.

I have said many times from this Dispatch Box that there is no purely military solution to Afghanistan’s problems. What military forces can do, as has been shown right across the country, is increase security. But unless we can help the Afghan Government to bring security to all their people, and convince them that they and NATO are going to defeat the Taliban and others who try to block or destroy progress, everything else that we have achieved in Afghanistan will remain at risk.

At Seville, NATO’s senior military commander— the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—reminded NATO members that it is in the south and east that the security challenge is most acute. He identified a further need for robust, flexible, manoeuvrable combat forces to strengthen NATO commanders’ ability to tackle the challenge across those regions.

We believe that every NATO partner should be prepared to do more to meet that need. At Seville, some announced that they would do so. America promised an additional 3,000 troops. France has offered more close air support. Germany has pledged six reconnaissance Tornadoes. Lithuania has pledged additional troops. All those contributions are welcome. They build on earlier commitments made at Riga in the autumn, principally by Poland, which committed a battalion to the east, but we must be realistic about how many nations have the ability to take on the tasks facing NATO in the south and the east.

I have lobbied our partners consistently for more help in those regions and I will continue to do so, but it is increasingly clear that at present, when it comes to the most demanding tasks in the more challenging parts of Afghanistan, only we and a small number of key allies are prepared to step forward. That is why we have decided to commit additional forces to Afghanistan. Put simply, the alternative is unacceptable—it would place too great a risk on the progress we have made so far. That is a risk we simply cannot afford to take, for the sake of Afghanistan and of our own security. We may be shouldering a greater share of the burden than we might like, but so are others, and we do so in the knowledge that this is a vital mission and one that is directly in our national interest.

I turn now to the details of what this decision means in practice. The UK has decided to fill one of SACEUR’s most pressing requirements—a manoeuvre battalion for Regional Command (South), which is an area that covers Helmand—the base and responsibility of the existing UK taskforce—but also the strategically vital neighbouring provinces of Kandahar, Oruzgan, Zabul, Nimruz and Daykondi.

We propose to deploy a battlegroup comprising elements of an infantry battalion, the 1st Battalion, the Royal Welsh, which will be augmented with a company of Warrior infantry fighting vehicles from the 1st Battalion, the Scots Guards. It will include additional artillery, including a regimental HQ and a battery of light guns from the 19th Regiment, Royal Artillery; a brigade surveillance group drawn from the 5th Regiment, Royal Artillery; and a troop of guided multiple launch rocket systems from the 39th Regiment, Royal Artillery.

We shall also deploy additional reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, four more Harrier GR9s to provide close air support, four Sea King helicopters from 846 Naval Air Squadron to increase our support helicopter capacity, and another C-130 Hercules. Some of the forces deployed will be reservists, although I am not yet in a position to inform the House of how many. I will write to confirm that.

In terms of overall numbers, that adds up to nearly 1,400 additional personnel. Some will deploy from the roulement in May, but the majority will deploy over the summer. They will be based mostly in Helmand, with some at Kandahar airfield, although they will provide NATO commanders in RC (South) with a flexible capability for use across the southern region. In total, our forces in Afghanistan will increase from around 6,300 to settle at about 7,700 personnel. The current planning assumption remains that those forces are committed until 2009.

I am well aware of the pressure that this will continue to put our armed forces under. I have made it clear in the past that this Government fully recognise how much we are asking of them. I want to take this opportunity to say again on behalf of the Government how much we admire the professionalism, skill and bravery with which they do the hard and dangerous work that we ask of them. I repeat that ensuring that they have the support and equipment that they need remains my highest priority, but I also want to make it clear that we would not make this decision to commit extra forces unless it was in accordance with unequivocal military advice. I and the chiefs of staff agree that this additional commitment is manageable.

Before closing, I want to address some misconceptions about this decision which have circulated over recent days. The first is that our recent decisions on Iraq were driven by our desire to do more in Afghanistan. That gets things the wrong way round. Our planned draw-down in Iraq, announced by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister last week, is driven by the conditions on the ground. It is the situation in Iraq that determines what we do there, not the situation in Afghanistan, but of course our plans for Iraq and for other operational theatres, including the Balkans, affect our ability to do more in support of NATO in Afghanistan. In that context, our decision last week on Iraq makes today’s decision that much easier.

The second misconception is that the enhancement reflects poor planning in the first place. That is simply not true. As a general point, it is wrong to suggest that any enhancement must reflect poor planning. Inevitably, much is learned during a deployment, especially in the early stages, and the force structure should adapt. That was reflected in the enhancements that we announced last July and in some aspects of the roulement announced on 1 February.

It is however a straightforward error to interpret today’s decision as implying anything about the adequacy of the Helmand taskforce. That force is clearly up to the job; it overmatched the Taliban in every engagement last summer, and during the winter it has been able to take the fight to the Taliban on our terms, while securing the area around the provincial capital and vital reconstruction projects such as the Kajaki dam.

Today’s decision is a commitment to the southern region as a whole. The additional forces will meet NATO’s requirement for troops who can work across the region, in Kandahar and elsewhere. They provide commanders with greater flexibility and greater capacity to support the Afghan military while they develop the skills and confidence to do the vital work for themselves. As I have said before, that remains our long-term exit strategy.

In announcing this significant additional commitment, I assure the House that my resolve to secure contributions from others remains undiminished. However, I put it to the House that we must protect the progress that we have made so far, and protect the Afghans’ own hope and determination. That is the Government's intention. We believe in this mission; we believe in the international community’s aims in Afghanistan and are proud to play our full part in achieving them.

I begin by thanking the Secretary of State for his statement and prior notice of it.

Yet again, it is to be greatly regretted that we read about the announcement of extra British troop deployments in the press at the weekend before hearing it in the House of Commons. I fully accept Ministers’ assurances that they did not intend the information to come out; on this occasion, incompetence is probably preferable to contempt of the House.

The Conservative party has always fully supported the aims of the Afghan mission, and the Secretary of State has frequently been generous in accepting and acknowledging that. We believe that it is essential that we be successful in Afghanistan for the future of global security, the future of NATO and the future of the Afghan people themselves.

Those of us who have visited Afghanistan have marvelled at the courage and commitment, in the most difficult circumstances, of our armed forces. If our commanders in the field tell us that they need more troops to make the mission successful, clearly those troops must be supplied.

A number of issues result from the Secretary of State’s statement, however. An extra 1,400 troops are being sent, equivalent to about 20 per cent. of the current total. Is the Secretary of State satisfied that the extra equipment being sent will match that increase? In particular, does he believe that the increased number of helicopters and the requisite number of armoured vehicles will be made available sufficiently to provide fully for the security of the increased number of troops being sent?

What will it all mean for the harmony guidelines? It is welcome that troops are coming back from Iraq, but almost exactly the same number are going to Afghanistan. Already the increased tempo and the length of separation for families are causing a retention problem, particularly in the Army. The pressure of overstretch is bearing down hard on service families. What is being done and what will be done to help them in potentially worsening circumstances? Unhappy service families are a clear recipe for unhappy servicemen and women.

The Secretary of State was right to say that there cannot be a military solution alone in Afghanistan. Military success is dependent on political success. What is being done now to tackle the almost endemic problem of corruption in Afghanistan, including at the highest levels of the Government in Kabul? That corruption threatens to undermine the cohesion of the state of Afghanistan, and the acceptance of the authority of the Kabul Government. Corruption in the police makes progress especially difficult. Can he update the House on that problem, and tell us who is in charge of improving the situation?

Do the Government believe that the new troop deployment is likely to be the peak United Kingdom troop level? As the House well knows, previous rumours about extra troop deployments have almost always turned out to be true. Currently, it is rumoured that the Government are already considering a further increase in troop numbers later in the year. Is that correct?

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Secretary of State’s statement today related to NATO. He said:

“it is increasingly clear…when it comes to the most demanding tasks in the more challenging parts of Afghanistan, only we and a small number of key allies are prepared to step forward.”

That ought to give food for thought to those who want a bigger EU role in the defence of our country; it makes my blood run cold.

The cohesion and credibility of NATO is on the line in Afghanistan. Common security must mean common burden sharing. The number of caveats at present is unacceptable. For example, German forces are not able to operate at night or be involved in counter-narcotics operations, which is not acceptable in the longer term. At the Riga summit, all the major decisions—on the longer-term role of NATO, its decision-making structure and financing—were avoided. It is a scandal that only four NATO nations now contribute more than 2 per cent. of their GDP to defence.

The bottom line is that the United Kingdom, the United States, the Canadians and the Dutch—surprise, surprise—contribute by far the greatest to security in the southern and most dangerous part of Afghanistan. Of our 7,700 troops, 7,200 will be in Helmand—few, if any, other nations come close to that proportion. We are taking a disproportionate burden. UK taxpayers and the UK military are taking a much bigger share of the burden than we should in what is supposedly a communal operation. Our NATO partners need to recognise that if NATO is to exist and flourish in the future, that position is not tenable.

I, too, regret that the information leaked as it did. The hon. Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox) knows—as I spoke to him on Friday and expressed my regret—that in my view the leak was in the interests neither of the Government nor of the work that we were continuing to do in preparation for the announcement. To some degree, however, I am surprised that his words did not turn to dust in his mouth as he was saying them, because information that has been leaked to members of the Conservative party about things going on in my Department is repeatedly communicated to me at the Dispatch Box. I welcome the fact that he has committed himself to ensuring that that stops; I look forward to discussing with him how to do that, and how to ensure that members of his party do not encourage such leaking. Sometimes the information put into the public domain—he knows that I have expressed this view previously—reduces the security of our troops and operation, and is not in the interests of those troops whom some people affect to support.

The hon. Gentleman asked about equipment, and specifically helicopters. We are increasing both our helicopter and fixed-wing airlift with the increased force levels and tasks. On helicopters, we are deploying enhanced Sea Kings to fill the medical role, which will free up more Chinooks for the transport role. We judge that we have the necessary assets to meet the requirement, but we keep that under review. On all other equipment, including Warrior armoured vehicles, I am advised that the additional equipment is exactly what is needed to support the deployment.

The hon. Gentleman is right to say that we shall continue to operate at a high operational tempo for the foreseeable future. I am hopeful that, in at least one other theatre of operation, we shall, in the comparatively near future, be able to announce a draw-down of our troops and that, in the medium term, the pressure that those troops are under will diminish. That, however, will be a function of our ability to take forward that and other operations which I know he and his party support. We have to keep such matters under review, but it is not our intention to maintain the tempo beyond a point that is manageable for our troops.

The hon. Gentleman is perfectly right to identify corruption as an important problem. I said in my statement that the support of the Afghan people for their Government and for our ability to deliver security is crucial, but it is also crucial that the Afghan people see that corruption is being challenged by the Government. Responsibility for seeing that through lies with President Karzai and we remind him of that on every occasion we engage with him. He has recently appointed an Attorney-General who has shown a specific commitment to that aspect of his work, and it is reported back to me that he is doing brave and good work.

On training for the police and the armed forces, the hon. Gentleman can rest assured that those of us in NATO who have responsibility for that training, and the Americans, focus continually on corruption, but I think that the problem would be better tackled if we started to draw some of those forces from the communities that they serve rather than continuing to do as we have done, which is draw them from other parts of Afghanistan and, to some degree, impose them on communities. Our ability to get people to behave appropriately in their community depends on the community accepting them and seeing them as coming from the community, rather than as imposed on the community.

The hon. Gentleman repeated in his own words the points that I made about the need for the burden to be shared across NATO. The House knows my view on caveats: they are restricting the commanders’ ability to deploy troops appropriately where they are needed across the whole Afghanistan theatre. The sooner people remove those caveats and allow their troops to be deployed where they are most needed, the better it will be for all of us.

I am sure that my right hon. Friend has considered this decision carefully, knowing the pressure that it will put on our forces. I believe that the decision is the right one, because it is important that we respond to the requests from our men on the ground and the chiefs and give our servicemen in Afghanistan every help and support they need in fighting the terrorism of the Taliban. However, will he take an early opportunity to engage in a bit of plain speaking with some of our European NATO partners? Their forces are deployed in Afghanistan to defeat terrorism, not to sit in their barracks and leave the fighting to us.

My right hon. Friend may well have been present at some of the conversations that I have had with some of our allies. I take every opportunity to make clear our view that the burdens and the risks should be shared across all of NATO, but the fact is that we have had a request from SACEUR. To respond to an earlier question, we were asked to provide two battlegroups for the south, but we had to balance our assessment of the need against our capacity and our belief that in the NATO mission others must also bear some of the extra burden. Our judgment, on balance and based on the advice of the chiefs, was that we should send one battlegroup and the force enhancements that I announced today and earlier this month.

I thank the Secretary of State for his statement. I begin by reaffirming the Liberal Democrats’ support for our operation in Afghanistan.

I recognise the logic that has led to the extra deployment, although I share the frustration of others at the fact that other NATO members have not been able to pick up more of the burden. Will the Secretary of State keep up the pressure on NATO allies, given that the operation could prove to be quite a long haul?

How does today’s statement square with the Ministry’s commitment to end the situation in which we are operating beyond defence planning assumptions by the end of this year? Given the announcement last week of the beginning of the draw-down of troops from Iraq, will this statement not effectively undo that in one fell swoop? If we are to keep up the operation in Afghanistan over a period of years, is it not essential that we complete the draw-down from Iraq as quickly as possible, so that we do not continue operations on two fronts? The Secretary of State described the role that the four Sea Kings will play, but surely there will be a need for a great deal more than that. Has he made any progress in procuring further helicopter capacity?

As I said in answer to a question during Defence questions, we continue to press our allies, as appropriate and where they have the capability to deploy helicopters, to do so in a way that will support ISAF. Of course, helicopter lift is crucial to the campaign that we are involved in, as is all air lift. The hon. Gentleman, by a simple process of arithmetic, seems to relate these figures to those announced last week on Iraq, and he presses upon me the draw-down of our troops in Iraq. His party’s policy is that, no matter what the circumstances, we should withdraw from Iraq. I think that he understands the Government’s position—in my view, it is a more appropriate one—regarding our commitment to the Iraqi people, not to mention to the security of our own troops, which is that we will continue to look at our commitments in Iraq in relation to the conditions there. If we continue to make progress in improving the Iraqi security forces and their ability to serve the security of their own people, we can make progress—as I hope we will—in drawing down from there. However, troops are of course deployed in other theatres, and as I have said, and without wishing to be more specific than this, it is our hope that some time later this week we can announce a draw-down of troops from other theatres, which will relieve the pressure—to some small degree, I accept—on the operational tempo issue. However, it is not our intention over the medium term to be in the position that we are currently in. The situation is manageable, but I have conceded at the Dispatch Box that we cannot sustain it in the long term without doing damage to the core of our troops.

Apart from reinforcing troop numbers against the expected Taliban spring offensive in Helmand and around Kandahar, what is the precise mission objective of this newly enlarged force, what are the exact conditions that have to be met for that objective to be achieved, and within what time scale is it expected to be achieved?

The mission objective has not changed. It—combined with our exit strategy, which, as my right hon. Friend will be aware, is shared by at least 36 other countries and is in the context of the United Nations resolution—is to ensure that the Government of Afghanistan, elected by their own people, can deliver government, security and economic prosperity to those people. When we will achieve that I am not in position to say here, but I can tell my right hon. Friend that, as he knows, we have made significant progress in the north and west of the country toward that objective. However, given that it is one coherent country, if we do not make progress in the south and east, we will be unable to sustain the progress that we have made in the north and west. I am certain, given the fundamental logic of that, that he supports all such efforts. If so, he should ask himself whether he supports in the first place the mission to allow the people of Afghanistan to proceed toward that objective themselves, having lost 2 million of their own people in securing their freedom. If so, he should support today’s announcement, because it is manifestly the right thing to do in order to achieve that objective.

I support today’s announcement, but we have been asked to provide two battlegroups and we have said that we are providing only one, so does the Secretary of State have any idea where the other battlegroup will come from? Will the further deployment place additional pressure on the training schedule, which is what makes our troops so good?

In my statement to the House, I said, advisedly—I cannot find the exact words—that the deployment was being made on unequivocal military advice. Those are not just words. In preparation, and in responding to the request, having been encouraged to do so by the military, I tested that advice significantly and raised the issue of pressure on our troops, because that matter is at the forefront of my mind, as I have said repeatedly at the Dispatch Box. Until I was satisfied that the deployment was manageable in relation to the troops that we have available, I was not prepared to agree that we would do it, but I am satisfied that it is right.

There may well be a consequence for the training of some troops, because our operational tempo is higher than our planning assumptions set out. The question is whether that will damage our troops in the long term, and the advice I have is that if we are able to see it through and we do not sustain it over an extended period, we will be able to deal with the issue. However, I do not seek to present the position to the House as anything other than it is, and it would be entirely wrong of me to do so. The deployment generates a challenge in relation to training, which as a country and as a Government we need to be prepared to address in the near future.

Does my right hon. Friend never ask himself the question: what is the point of a NATO of that number of nations if it is not prepared to commit itself 100 per cent., without caveats, in a conflict such as that in Afghanistan? Is not it already the case that there are two types of NATO partner—those who are in it for the greater good and those who are in it for themselves?

I ask myself all sorts of questions but I cannot, with hand on heart, say that I have asked myself that question, or repeatedly asked it. However, I get my hon. Friend’s point. With one or two exceptions—there are perhaps two parties represented in the House that wish us to withdraw from NATO—there is support for the NATO alliance on both sides of the House. There is certainly support in the official Opposition, there is support on the Liberal Democrat Benches and there is support on our Benches. Why? Because that alliance, despite all the criticisms that we may make of it, has proved to be the most enduring and effective political and military alliance the world has ever seen.

Until now.

NATO has never before been posed a challenge of this nature. Progress is being made. It is not being made, in my view, at the same pace as the challenges from the environment that we are dealing with are being generated, but progress is being made. I do not propose to talk about specific countries at the Dispatch Box, no matter how much I am encouraged to do so, but there are countries that have come a long way in a comparatively short period in terms of what they are able to do and what they are prepared politically to allow their troops to do.

We need to consider another issue. There was evidence of that last week. The Italian Government fell because of, among other things, their commitment to Afghanistan. They may well stand up again and may be able to deal with that. In my view, they will be able to do so, but they fell and we have to recognise that when troops are deployed in such circumstances, they are subject to political developments in other countries and the rhythm of their elections. That is one of the challenges that we need to learn to recognise in these alliances, but at the end of the day I support NATO and I will continue to support and challenge the members of NATO not to be an alliance in which the burden is not shared appropriately. However, there is no alternative, in my view, to NATO and it has proved to be the most enduring and effective political and military alliance that the world has ever seen.

To ask a question that is repeatedly asked each time we get an admission of mission creep, why are we yet again sending a small and under-supported contingent of our finest young men to risk their lives in a war in Afghanistan that even a NATO army of 100,000 could not permanently win, as the Russian commitment of 300,000 troops in the 1980s clearly demonstrated? To reverse Fouché’s aphorism, it is worse than a folly; it is a crime.

The hon. Gentleman has the merit of consistency and he speaks regularly on this issue and challenges me in exactly the same way. I respond to him, I hope, consistently by saying that there is no comparison between what we—the world, by and large—are seeking to do in Afghanistan and what the Soviets tried to do when they invaded and took on the whole country. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman knows this, but the evidence not only from polling—whatever fragility that has—but from our troops on the ground and from our communication with the Afghan people suggests that the vast majority of the Afghan people want us to be there. They are subject in parts of Afghanistan to the most horrific violence perpetrated by a comparatively small number of people who have been practising it on them for decades. I say to the hon. Gentleman that there is significant evidence of progress and he cannot deny that. Some 5 million people who have connections with that community have gone back to live there since the world released the country from the terror of the Taliban. Those 5 million people cannot be wrong; there must be some reason for them to believe that they were going back to an improved set of circumstances.

Of course, there are difficulties and challenges, but I spoke today to our commander on the ground and he gave me—I will repeat it to the House if it wants me to—a litany that went on for about five minutes of the progress that has been made just over the winter. He was very keen that I should make the point in the House that the ability of the Taliban has been overestimated, because they appear to be much more successful in their information operations than we and NATO have been. In his view, the Taliban in Helmand province are becoming increasingly desperate about their ability to engage with and overcome our troops. That may not continue, but there is, in his view, no sign of the expected spring offensive. That does not mean that it may not develop.

We need to be ready for the worst possible assessment so that we are able to deal with and match the Taliban, as we have been able to do. At the same time, however, we need to bring development and economic prosperity to the people, so that they can in the long term face down the Taliban. We are making progress on that; it is not the same challenge that the Soviets took on.

I am concerned that those nations who are prepared to put their servicemen and women in the most dangerous situations could find support within their home communities undermined by the failure of NATO allies to get involved. Could my right hon. Friend give an assessment of how robust and for how long the existing support will continue? If there is not support for the commitment across the alliance, there is a danger that, country by country, those that are pulling their weight now may find that their Governments no longer have the support of their populations.

My hon. Friend puts his finger on an important point. The Taliban seek to do two things. The first is to undermine the faith of the Afghan people in the international security assistance force and the ability of their own troops to deliver security for them. Equally, the Taliban seek to undermine support in the countries that support the Afghan Government. By explaining what is actually going on and explaining in an honest and straightforward way the challenges and difficulties that we face, I hope to continue the support of the British people for what I consider to be a noble cause and, more important, an absolute necessity for our security.

Today’s statement confirms the point that I put to the Prime Minister back in October: the majority of EU and NATO countries are refusing to deploy their troops to Helmand province. Does the Secretary of State agree that, if those countries are refusing to help to rid the world of terrorism and are adding to the overstretch of the British armed forces, they should at least fund the operations that we are putting forward?

Where countries are unable, as some of them are, to provide troops that can engage in the sort of tasks that are needed in Helmand province, or where they are unwilling to do so, we suggest that they ought to find some other way of supporting the challenge that needs to be supported. That said, almost all the countries have already committed themselves, through the Afghan compact, to making contributions to the development of Afghanistan. I would not want it to be thought that I said that they were not providing money to support the Afghan Government, because most of them are.

I think that my right hon. Friend will have the full support of the House in pressing our allies in Europe and elsewhere into supporting the intervention and the effort in Afghanistan, but does he share some of my concern that if many of those nations were going to make a bigger contribution, they would already have done so? Taking his earlier point that there is no military solution, alone, to this issue, does he agree that there needs to be a rethink politically if we find that militarily we are not getting the necessary reinforcement? Does he accept that there is nothing worse that being bogged down in something over which one has little control and which one cannot win?

If I did not think that we could make progress in increasing security to allow the complementary elements of the appropriate comprehensive approach, which will deliver exactly what we are looking for in Afghanistan, I would not commit one further member of the British armed forces, or supporting civilians from other departments, to Afghanistan. On the contrary, I would argue for the withdrawal of our troops. I believe that we can make progress. We might not be able to make it at the pace that, ideally, we would be able to make it at if we had access to more troops, but we will be able to make progress. It is necessary for us to reinforce the progress that we have already made and to move on to the next stage, by doing what I am announcing today.

Provincial reconstruction teams remain the cornerstone of our progress in Afghanistan. In today’s statement it is significant that, for the first time, our troops will be operating in two provinces—Nimruz to the west of Helmand and Daykondi to the north of Kandahar—where no provincial reconstruction teams currently exist. What plans are there to put PRTs in those provinces, bearing in mind that six months ago scoping reports were set out? The Danes, for example, were going to go to Nimruz. However, as far as I know, there are currently no PRTs there and no nations offering to put PRTs there.

The hon. Gentleman is right to identify those gaps, but, of course, he will appreciate that there is a progression across Afghanistan. All that I can say to him is that my hope is that that situation is temporary and that, as we generate greater and better security in the south, we will be able to identify countries that will be willing to deploy those resources into those provinces.

May I ask the Secretary of State to clarify part of his statement? Speaking just among ourselves, when he said that we must be realistic about how many nations have the ability to take on the tasks facing NATO in the south and the east, would he put the greatest emphasis on their lack of military capability or their lack of political will? Which is the biggest deterrent?

Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, Denmark, Estonia, Romania and the United States have both the capability—in differing measures—and the political will, as the evidence of their presence in their south, where they are carrying out difficult tasks, indicates. I am not in a position—and I am not inclined, in any event—to go through other nations and to categorise them one way or another. We must continue to work with our allies and to encourage them along the road that some of them have made progress along in order to be able, in an appropriate period of time, to do what we have all set out to do in Afghanistan.

Is not one of our problems in Afghanistan the fact that we have conflicting objectives? We seek to support the Government and defeat the Taliban militarily on the one hand, but, on the other, we seek to destroy the poppy crop. May I suggest that we will never get the local political support that we need to defeat the Taliban while we continue to try to destroy what is virtually people’s only source of livelihood? If we lay off the poppies, we might have a little more chance with the Taliban.

I am well aware of the need to balance the two objectives. The fact of the matter is that they are not unconnected. The Taliban and others prey on the population in relation to the production of poppy. Progressively, as we are able to generate the security that allows the economic development that generates alternative livelihoods, we ought to be able to address eradication. That is happening in other parts of Afghanistan, and the sooner we are able to do it in the south and the east, the sooner we will be able to make quick progress.

As I said to the hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis) earlier, I have spoken about this issue from the Dispatch Box on numerous occasions. If the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Mr. Maples) would care to read what is recorded in Hansard, he would not need to give me any lessons on the requirement to balance our desire to reduce poppy cultivation in Afghanistan with the need to maintain security and our ability to move forward.

We heard about endemic corruption in the police earlier, but may I ask about the Afghan army, because I do not think that my friend addressed it during his statement? What progress are we making? Is there a problem with retaining Afghan soldiers, and how well equipped are they?

There is a problem with the retention of soldiers in the Afghan army and a challenge regarding equipment. However, my hon. Friend must realise how young the force actually is. For the assessment of the force as it is built up and progresses, I rely on those who know and understand all these things, and they tell me that the Afghan soldiers are enormously brave and capable. Given that the army has been in existence for a comparatively short time, it attracts the admiration of the British forces.

Of course, there are significant challenges. However, I am sure that my hon. Friend will applaud the announcement by the United States of America of significant investment for the development of the Afghan security forces. However, that does not mean that there will not be setbacks to the development. As I said earlier, there is a growing realisation throughout the alliance that we will have a better prospect of developing and sustaining the Afghan security forces if we let them grow more organically from the communities with which they are involved, rather than recruiting all the members from the north and thus deploying people in the south who are ethnically different from those whom they are policing, which has been the tendency in the past.

Given the reported incursion of some 700 Taliban fighters over the Pakistan border to attack the Kajaki dam, does the Secretary of State understand the reasons behind President Karzai’s recent statement that Pakistan was effectively operating as a sanctuary for the Taliban with the consent of the Pakistani authorities? If we cannot be assured of the full and active co-operation of Pakistan, will the deployment allow us to raise border security in the Canadian and British zones to the level already achieved in the American sector in the south-east, or will our troops, because of an open border, remain more vulnerable to attack?

If the hon. Gentleman has not visited the border, I am sure that he can contemplate what it looks like: it is a mountainous and rugged part of the world. Given the nature of the challenge, the history of the two countries and the movement of people back and forth over the border, it would be entirely inappropriate to seek assurances. We need the Pakistan Government and the Afghanistan Government to work together, because they have sovereignty on either side of the border, to ensure that there is not this influx of fighters, such as from among the significant number of Afghan refugees who still remain in refugee camps in Pakistan. We cannot wish that away, and we cannot separate the two countries, but NATO and the United Kingdom regularly support the Governments in working together to solve the problem, which will be with them for a significant time. We should never underestimate the contribution that Pakistan’s Government have made. They have lost 700 members of their security forces in seeking to police and control the border. That is not an insignificant contribution, and we should not test their commitment to the issue against the fact that a centuries-old problem has not been solved in a comparatively small number of years.

We entered Afghanistan because it was in the British interest to do so, and I commend my right hon. Friend for having the strength of character to restate the case that we should never again allow the country to become a breeding ground for terrorism. Does he agree that many Members of the House thought that the long-term test for NATO would be how it rose to the challenge of Afghanistan, and although many Members will still give the alliance their unequivocal support, as a result of his statement they will feel that its long-term future is in greater jeopardy?

Most challenges offer opportunities, as well as show weaknesses, and I think that over time NATO will be capable of taking the opportunities that the challenge generates. The fact is that most people who assess the strategic situation that we and the world will be in for the foreseeable future identify the fact that that we will need to be part of an alliance that is capable of doing the sort of work that we are doing in Afghanistan, capable of deploying forces in situations of conflict, and capable of supporting conflict resolution. The developed world—indeed, the world—does not have any alternative but to stand up those capabilities and develop them, as well as the political will to do that work. I am satisfied that, despite the problems faced by me, the UK Government and the alliance, the alliance will, over time, prove to be up to the challenges.

Will the Secretary of State concede that article 5 of the north Atlantic treaty is based on mutual risk? Germany has aspirations to sit on the UN Security Council this week, and as my hon. Friend the Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox) said, it has defence and foreign policy aspirations in relation to the European Union, too. Is it possible for the Secretary of State to ask the Germans whether they would be good enough to move some of their 3,000 troops in the north down to the south?

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely correct in his shortened definition of article 5, in terms of mutual risk, and I agree with the words that he used. He can rest assured that I have asked the Governments of all the forces in Afghanistan that are capable of being deployed in the south whether they are prepared to deploy them there.

I am sure that my right hon. Friend will join me in recognising the role that thousands of servicemen and women play in Afghanistan. They will welcome the extra flexibility that will come from the additional manoeuvre, reconnaissance and surveillance capability that he today announced will be deployed. I welcome the increase of 7 per cent. in the manning requirement of the Marines, but what is my right hon. Friend doing to ensure that we can recruit the necessary number of Marines—always acknowledging, of course, that the requirement is at a higher level than it was in 2000, before the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq developed?

My hon. Friend knows that recruitment is increasing. There are two challenges to sustaining the number of forces that we need: we have to recruit, and we have to retain. Retention is as much of a challenge as recruitment, as was implied in the questions asked about operational tempo. There is no question but that the effect of the sustained operational tempo on families and those who support our troops generates part of the challenge, in respect of retention. In addition, sometimes once people have experienced the operational theatres, they are satisfied, in terms of their military career, and are happy to move on, for personal development reasons—and, of course, they are free to do that. What we seek to do, as my hon. Friend knows, is identify particular challenges and deploy enhancements or encouragements in the way in which we remunerate those people so that we can hold on to them, and that is exactly what we are trying to do for the Marines.

The Secretary of State said that the mission was in our national interest, but that is no more or less true for us than it is for our partners. What is definitively in the British national interest is allowing the Army to recover from the overstretch arising from all the missions that it has undertaken in recent years, many of which have not enjoyed enormous public support, to put it mildly, which caused greater anxiety in the Army, as there are difficulties in retention. There are ways of achieving our objectives in Afghanistan other than a military occupation in support of the Government of our choice, so if our international partners are not prepared to help us with our current strategy, will the Secretary of State keep those under review?

This is not a military occupation. It is support for a Government who have been properly elected on a democratic basis. Despite all the criticisms that we may make of some people who serve in that Government and of their past, they are democratically elected. More importantly, NATO, with others, is carrying out the request of the United Nations in a United Nations Security Council resolution, so it is entirely inappropriate to describe it as the hon. Gentleman did. However, on the initial part of his question, I have already recognised that operational tempo generates challenges, and I have spelt out on more than one occasion exactly what we seek to do to address that. May I just tell him that politically his party must make up its mind about where it stands? It cannot have it both ways. The Shadow Chancellor cannot suggest—

Order. I call Mr. Hoyle.

I wonder whether my right hon. Friend has considered requests to deploy the Gibraltar regiment to Afghanistan to ease the pressure on troops from the UK who have been deployed as a matter of course as a result of the revolving door situation. As he did not mention it in his announcement, will extra personnel be deployed from the medical regiment to ease the situation in Afghanistan, too?

I am afraid that I cannot give my hon. Friend answers to such specific questions, but I will write to him with the particulars that he seeks, and ensure that the letter is placed in the Library of the House for everyone to read. I am advised that members of the Gibraltar regiment have served with distinction in our operational theatres, but I cannot answer the very specific question that he asked because I do not have any recollection of such a request being made.

In answer to an earlier question, the Secretary of State said that although the request was for two battlegroups to be deployed, he is deploying only one. Will he confirm where the other battlegroup is coming from, and what assessment has he made of the risk implications for the deployment, given that we have not been able to employ the two battlegroups that were requested?

This question has been asked before, and I think that the answer was implied in the information that I gave. I repeat that we were asked to provide two battlegroups for the south. We had to balance that request and our assessment of the need against our capacity and the belief that, as it was a NATO mission, others must bear some of the extra burden. Our judgment was that we could send one battlegroup to complement the force enhancements that I announced earlier this month. The request is still in place, as are other unfulfilled parts of the CJSOR—the combined joint statement of requirement—which, in my view, are responsibilities for others to pick up.

Does my right hon. Friend understand the frustration and anger of British defence workers who have no option but to compete for contracts from companies based in NATO countries which, at a time of need, have refused to support our troops?

I thank my hon. Friend for that question. I always try, particularly when speaking to those who work in our very important defence industries, to understand their frustrations if they express them to me. I am sure that, throughout the country, there is no shortage of them in the state of mind that my hon. Friend suggests.

Some elements of the battlegroup that the right hon. Gentleman announced today were to be deployed to Afghanistan in the normal course of events. My son is a young officer in the 19th Royal Artillery. What extra arms and men will be available in order to hold ground and villages that are taken by the Army, which has not had the necessary resources to maintain its presence there, and what extra resources can be used to win the hearts and minds of people, in Helmand province particularly?

I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman’s son, although I do not know him personally, and to all the others who work with him or are deployed with him—indeed, all our armed forces, who are prepared, as I am sure his son is, to accept the challenge and to carry it out, as he no doubt will, with great distinction, professionalism and courage.

The deployment that I am announcing today is an additional deployment to enhance the ability of ISAF across Regional Command (South) to make progress on what has already been achieved. How those forces are deployed—whether they are deployed to hold ground once it has been secured, or whether operational commanders on the ground take the view that the local politicians and the Afghan forces in those communities are capable of holding that ground once it has been secured—is of course an operational matter, but the hon. Gentleman is right to suggest that this is an extremely complex environment and that, community by community, there are no simple solutions. As we have seen in the north of Helmand in Musa Qala, Sangin, Nawzad and other communities, and indeed in the Kajaki area, it is more likely that a combination of local politics and local security forces will maintain the security that we generate than that we will be able to do it in the long term.

With permission, Mr. Speaker, I shall make a statement on the train derailment which occurred near Grayrigg in Cumbria on Friday evening.

The House will be aware that at approximately 8.15 on Friday night, 23 February, the 5.15 pm Virgin west coast service from London to Glasgow derailed just beyond the points at Lambrigg near Grayrigg. The train was travelling at around 95 mph. At the time, there were 111 passengers and four crew on board. One passenger, Margaret Masson, from Glasgow, sadly died shortly after the accident. Twenty-two people were taken to hospital, including the driver. Five people remain in hospital and three remain in a critical condition. Hon. Members in all parts of the House will wish to join me in expressing our deepest sympathy to those who have been bereaved or seriously injured, and to friends and relatives.

I would like to praise the work of the Cumbria police, fire and rescue and ambulance services, and indeed the RAF, who worked closely together to respond with well-prepared contingency plans in very difficult circumstances. We must also thank the staff of the national health service for their care and dedication, as well as the local people who came out to help those involved at the scene of the accident.

The rail accident investigation branch arrived at the scene at 11.35 pm and immediately began an investigation to identify the causes of the accident. The RAIB investigation is running independently and in parallel with the investigations of the British Transport police and Her Majesty’s railway inspectorate. The inspectorate as safety regulator will continue to check that the network is safe and to enforce any breaches of safety legislation. The British Transport police will be investigating whether there are any breaches of criminal law. I have been in close contact over the weekend with the RAIB’s chief inspector, Carolyn Griffiths, and I shall now update the House on its interim report following the first 48 hours of its investigation. Copies of that report have been placed in the Library and are publicly available. The report states that the scope of the RAIB investigation into the accident at Grayrigg includes both the design, performance, inspection and maintenance of points at Lambrigg and the behaviour of the vehicles, including interior fittings after they derailed until they came to rest.

I will deal first with the behaviour of the vehicles, where the report states that there is no evidence available to indicate that the journey prior to the derailment had been other than normal. It goes on to state that there was substantial damage to the train. However, all carriages retained the basic structural integrity of the passenger compartment. The RAIB has yet to carry out its inspection of any of the carriage interiors.

I will now turn to where the report deals with the points. The report states that the current focus of the RAIB’s investigation relates to the condition of the Lambrigg 2B points at the site of the derailment. Indications are that these points were the immediate cause of the derailment. No evidence has been found to date that indicates that the driving of the train, the condition of the train or the signalling control system contributed to the accident.

The report then goes on to give a detailed description of the design and condition of the facing points at Lambrigg, and concludes that the immediate cause of the accident was the condition of the stretcher bar arrangement at points 2B at the Lambrigg crossover, which resulted in the loss of gauge separation at the point of switch blades. Let me read to the House what the RAIB has to say about the points:

“Investigation of the locking and stretcher bars in the facing points at Lambrigg crossover showed that one of three stretcher bars was missing, and bolts that secured the lock bar and another stretcher bar were not in place—some of these bolts and the associated nuts and washers were found in the ballast, but others were not. There is no evidence that the bolts had been wrenched free. Two of the stretcher bars were fractured; in one case the nature of the fracture surface indicates that it may have been consequential to the derailment. In the other case the fracture surface indicates that it may have pre-dated the derailment. The latter will be confirmed by further analysis”.

Having come to those initial findings, the RAIB is able to give urgent safety advice to the industry and make recommendations as appropriate. It has not taken such action at this stage of the investigation. However, on Saturday, Network Rail decided to complete an inspection of more than 900 similar points on other high-speed lines around the country.

Following the derailment, the Office of Rail Regulation, as safety regulator, has been monitoring the situation and is satisfied with the actions taken by Network Rail to ensure that the railway is safe to operate. In particular, the ORR supports Network Rail’s precautionary inspection of the 900 points across the network that are similar to the ones that form part of the investigation.

The RAIB will now continue its investigation on all aspects of the derailment and its consequences, in order to produce a final report. As it says in its interim report, it will continue to investigate the immediate and underlying reasons for the condition of the stretcher bars and the behaviour of the rolling stock in the extreme conditions of a high-speed derailment.

The RAIB final report will take some months to prepare. In light of its interim report we know how the accident happened. Now, we and the travelling public need to know why. Let me assure the House that if in the course of their investigations the investigators discover something that needs to be done to improve safety, it will be done immediately.

I start by thanking the Secretary of State for giving me early sight of the statement.

I know that the whole House will want to join the right hon. Gentleman in his expression of condolence to the family of Margaret Masson, the lady who died in the accident on Friday. We join him in sending our best wishes to all those who were injured, including two members of Mrs. Masson’s family, and we hope that they make a speedy recovery. I would also like to associate myself and my colleagues with the tributes to the driver of the train, Iain Black, who clearly demonstrated great personal courage at the time of the accident. We hope that he makes a full recovery from his injuries.

It is at times like this that we appreciate how well served we are by our emergency services in this country. This was an extremely difficult incident to deal with in a remote location, set away from major roads, but clearly the police, fire and ambulance services, the RAF and the local NHS in Cumbria responded quickly and effectively to the accident and we have every reason to be grateful to them.

We should also be grateful to the other group that tends to do so much when major accidents take place and whose contribution can sometimes be overlooked: members of the public and local residents. Local voluntary groups swing into action. The doors of homes, pubs, schools and community centres are quickly opened to those involved in the accident. We send our thanks to the local community in Cumbria, which responded so quickly and so well. It is also a tribute to rail staff that they moved so quickly to deal with the consequences of the accident for other rail passengers and to restore services on the remainder of the west coast main line.

It is clearly a matter of serious concern that such an accident could take place on one of our most important rail routes. Moreover, it appears that there may have been an operational failure within Network Rail, and that must be addressed as a matter of urgency. I am grateful for the Secretary of State’s reassurance that any recommendations for urgent safety improvements during the RAIB investigation will be acted on promptly.

Although every fatal accident on our railways is a tragedy, it is a credit to the rail industry that statements such as today’s are so rare. Safety standards on our railways are now higher than they have ever been. Inevitably, and partly because it is now so rare, an accident such as this commands extensive media attention. Clearly, it is absolutely vital that there be a full and proper investigation of Friday’s events. We owe that to the people who have suffered as a result of what took place. Does the Secretary of State agree, however, that the worst possible outcome of the past few days would be if the accident served to undermine confidence generally in rail travel in this country? I hope that Members on both sides of the House will reinforce the message that rail remains an extremely safe way to travel, even though it is vital that the lessons from Friday’s accident be learned and acted upon.

I am sure that the relatives of the victims of the accident on Friday evening will be very grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s remarks. I very much appreciate the measured response taken by him and by several colleagues in the House since the tragic events on Friday evening. Let me also thank him for the general tenor of his remarks, which reflects the reality that, notwithstanding the tragedy and the lessons that will need to be learned, a general message should go out from this House today that we have seen significant improvements in rail safety in recent years, and we must be cautious in our language, to ensure that we do not undermine the rightful degree of confidence that people feel in rail travel. At the same time, of course, given the tragedy that occurred on Friday evening and the inevitable public concern that has arisen as a consequence, it is important that the public realise that this investigation will be most thorough, and that, as I say, we shall take forward the recommendations of the inquiry.

I thank the Minister for his expressions of condolence following the death of my constituent, Margaret Masson. I am heartened, as are many of my constituents, by the speed at which the investigation has progressed. Can he give me an assurance that as much information will be produced as quickly as possible in order that the family of my dead constituent and those who were injured can put this matter behind them as soon as possible in the full knowledge that everything has been revealed?

I am of course happy to give the undertaking that, in a manner consistent with the work that has already been undertaken, whereby an interim report has been published on the Monday following the accident on the Friday evening, the inquiry will be taken forward expeditiously. That said, it is important to place on record the fact that that we must allow the investigators the opportunity to carry out a very thorough inquiry. They have made it clear that if in the course of that inquiry they uncover evidence that suggests that action needs to be taken ahead of the publication of the final report, they will have no hesitation in bringing that information to our attention, and in turn we would have no hesitation in acting in response to their recommendations.

I, too, thank the Secretary of State for allowing me early sight of the statement and of the interim report by the rail accident investigation branch. I associate myself and my right hon. and hon. Friends with the expressions of sympathy to the family of Margaret Masson and to all those who suffered serious injury in the accident. Let me also say, as did the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling), that the conduct of the driver of the train seems to have been particularly courageous and professional, and that should be properly recognised. I also welcome the Secretary of State’s commitment that, should the investigation highlight any such need, all necessary action will be taken. It is important that we maintain confidence in our railways as a safe way to travel.

It is early days, but it seems apparent from the interim report that the circumstances of the accident are very similar to those at Potters Bar. The Secretary of State will be aware that the Health and Safety Executive produced an extensive and very helpful report at the conclusion of the incident. Will he confirm that all the HSE’s recommendations and conclusions produced on that occasion have been fully implemented? Will he ensure that the ongoing investigation will look into the use of emergency hammers on these trains? Will he establish whether they were used on this occasion and, if so, how they were found to perform? I have received representations that led me recently to seek a meeting with the Rail Safety and Standards Board. I have not yet had that meeting, but I believe that there could be lessons to learn.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his remarks and, indeed, for the tributes that he paid to the driver and other railway staff who were working on Friday evening. He is right to characterise this as early days. I appreciate that the focus of the investigation is the points at Lambrigg—clearly, the prior investigation into the incident at Potters Bar identified the issue of the points—but I would be cautious at this stage about drawing too direct a parallel, in the sense that we need to allow the investigators of the latest accident to take their work forward. We know that the centre of their efforts relates to the points, but it is important to understand better the circumstances explaining how the points were in this condition. On the hon. Gentleman’s more general point, we have taken forward recommendations in the light of the HSE report on Potters Bar.

On the hon. Gentleman’s final question about hammers, I would make a couple of points. First, I fully expect the investigators to look at all the relevant issues, including the ability to leave the train after the derailment. However, I would certainly point out that one of the features that many people have commented on, even in the past 48 hours, is the extent to which both the Pendolino structure and, in particular, the laminated glass on the train withstood what was inevitably a very high-impact crash. It is a great tribute to the engineering of the Pendolino that there were not multiple fatalities as a result of a very high-speed impact on Friday evening.

No one who saw the derailment of those carriages and the engine could do anything other than marvel at the miracle that saved so many lives. That was a tribute not just to the engineers for the original design, but to the speed of response by the emergency services, as well as the courage and efficiency of the driver. Will my right hon. Friend assure us that, when the RAIB looks closely at the design of the existing carriages, it will also pass on the information to those working in the industry to ensure that it is taken up? Over and above that, can we be certain that, in the event of our being faced with something even vaguely like this happening again in some other field, the lessons of having to bring in emergency services in extremely difficult circumstances over difficult terrain will have been passed to other areas and will have been learned?

Let me address both those points. First, I am able to offer my hon. Friend the assurance that she seeks on sharing widely with the industry the results of the RAIB’s work. On her second point about the co-operation of the emergency services on Friday evening and what lessons can be shared more widely, as one of the Ministers responsible for the Civil Contingencies Bill, I am glad to say that there is now a framework whereby such lessons can be effectively shared. I am sure that, in the normal course of events, the emergency services will want to review the action that was taken on Friday evening. Certainly, the initial indications from a number of people who have spoken to me who were present at the scene were that there was a very effective degree of co-ordination among the emergency services in, as my hon. Friend acknowledged, extremely difficult circumstances—not simply the location, but the weather and the time on Friday evening at which the crash occurred. I am sure that there will be opportunities for whatever lessons can be learned—notwithstanding the success achieved by the emergency services on Friday evening—to be distributed widely across the emergency services throughout the country.

I thank the Secretary of State for his statement. I spent this morning at the crash site near Grayrigg in my constituency, and while I was there I spoke to residents who told me of their horror at the occurrences on Friday evening. Given that the site is accessible only across farmland, will the right hon. Gentleman acknowledge that the wholehearted efforts of the local community were invaluable, and that their support and assistance now is worthy of the highest tribute? Does he also recognise that the whole community of Grayrigg has emerged with unsought-after but none the less heroic credit as a result of its support?

May I also join the Secretary of State in acknowledging that the local emergency services and hospitals deserve high commendation? All performed their roles with the sensitivity and effectiveness that we have come to expect in our part of Cumbria. I also wish to join him in extending my sincere sympathy to the family of Mrs. Margaret Masson, who tragically lost her life, and to all the other victims of this horrific crash. We and they will want answers as to how and why this disaster occurred. I understand that these are early days, but given that today’s interim report suggests that, as with Potters Bar, points failure seems to be the most likely cause of the accident, will the Secretary of State consider holding a public inquiry so that the full facts of this terrible tragedy can be revealed in full and in public, in order to reinforce confidence in our rail network?

I find myself in support of the overwhelming majority of the hon. Gentleman’s points. First, on behalf not only of the Government but, I am sure, of the whole House, I would wish him to pass on directly to his constituents our gratitude and admiration for the action that they took in what he described as “unsought-after” circumstances. He is right to acknowledge that there was a degree of heroism shown by the community on Friday evening. That heroism has been matched in recent hours and days by a degree of forbearance, given, for example, the fact that to move the heavy lifting equipment to the site in order to remove the carriages, significant disturbance to the adjacent farmland will be necessary. I am sure that all hon. Members are grateful to his constituents for their forbearance and understanding in what are inevitably very difficult circumstances.

Similarly, I associate myself with the hon. Gentleman’s comments on the NHS staff in Cumbria. I place on record the fact that it was an operation of such significance that NHS staff from far beyond Cumbria were also involved. It brings great credit to our national health service that all those resources were deployed in such difficult circumstances.

On the hon. Gentleman’s final substantive point about a public inquiry, I do not believe that today is the day on which to make such a judgment. We have had an interim report after only 48 hours, and the right and appropriate response of the Government is to allow the investigators to take forward their work. We will draw the appropriate conclusions when that work has been concluded.

As has just been mentioned, this is a difficult site, and it is obviously important that the repairs are carried out properly and that the investigators are able to carry out all the investigations that they need to carry out. Can my right hon. Friend give us any idea of when services might return to normal on that line? Will he also tell us what arrangements are being made in the meantime for alternative services and diversions of trains?

I should perhaps express an interest at this point. I travelled on the west coast main line on Friday afternoon. I was actually due to take the overnight sleeper north from Euston to Glasgow on Friday evening. It is a service that I use most weeks, and it has seen significant improvements in recent years. The best indications that we have had from Network Rail and those working at the site are that it will take between 10 days and two weeks for normal services to be established once again. Services are operating, however, with a bus service running from Lancaster to Carlisle and, given the existence of the Carlisle-Settle railway, it will be possible for services to run directly from Euston to Glasgow notwithstanding the ongoing work that will be necessary at the site of the crash.

Will the Secretary of State put this tragedy into context by informing the House how many people were killed in rail crashes last year and how many in road crashes? Assuming that the daily carnage on our roads has been repeated in the three days since this rail tragedy, will he confirm that something like 30 people will have been killed in road crashes in that time? How many road deaths does it take to get him to come to the Dispatch Box to talk about road crashes?

It is appropriate to take a responsible and measured approach to the challenge of safety on our roads and on our railways. To the extent that the hon. Gentleman points out that a great deal more work has still to be done on road safety, of course I agree with him. On an average weekend, about 21 people are killed in road accidents. I do think, however, that it is appropriate to have made a statement to the House at the earliest opportunity, given the public concern that inevitably and understandably has arisen as a result of Friday evening’s significant derailment.

Of course, I and my colleague Ministers are available to the House on a monthly basis to answer questions on transport policy, including road safety policies. I also suggest to the hon. Gentleman that he take the opportunity to look at the road safety review that my Department is due to publish, which shows its ongoing commitment to continue to drive down the number of those who are killed and seriously injured on our roads.

As a regular user of the west coast main line, I, too, pay tribute to the driver of the train involved in Friday’s accident, Iain Black. It is reassuring to know that drivers of his calibre are in charge of the many thousands of passengers who use our railways each day. The investigation of the accident will be vital. Will my right hon. Friend assure the House that if any recommendation requires further overseeing of maintenance or work carried out on the tracks, we shall ensure that it, and every other recommendation, is met in full?

I associate myself with the tributes paid by my hon. Friend. I want to make a couple of points. First, as I have already intimated to the House, if recommendations result from the ongoing work of the investigators ahead of the publication of the final report, of course we will have no hesitation in ensuring that they are implemented. It will be for the rail accident investigation branch to make any recommendations when it concludes its report. Of course, we will give those serious consideration and seek to implement recommendations that will improve the safety of the travelling public.

My friend told us that Network Rail checked 900 sets of points. How often are those points routinely checked? Is that a matter of visual examination or do points suffer from metal fatigue? When were the points at Grayrigg last inspected?

On the general regime, that is a matter of which the chief executive of Network Rail has been speaking in the last 48 hours. It has a regime that involves weekly and monthly inspection, as well as, as I recall, 13-weekly inspection. There is also now a train, which moves across the UK network, that can continually videotape the track to provide a visual record of its condition. However, given that we are only at the interim report stage and that these matters are subject to ongoing inquiries by the investigators, it would not be appropriate for me to give undertakings on behalf of Network Rail. Ultimately, it is for Network Rail to account to the rail accident investigation branch as to the particular circumstances that gave rise to these events.

I share the sentiments of condolence expressed by my right hon. Friend. Early indications show that the rolling stock on the Pendolino train displayed a robustness never seen before on the rail network. Does he agree that that is a testament to the dedication and skill of the engineers and technicians of the west midlands, many of whom designed and produced the safety features on the Pendolino train? Given that Alstom has chosen to close the plant in the midlands, does he not think it vital that we do everything we can to retain the skills of those people in the service of the UK rail industry?

I certainly associate myself with the tributes that have been paid to the engineers and to the workers who helped to manufacture those trains. Sir Richard Branson described the Pendolino when he visited the site of the incident as “built like a tank”. All the indications that we will all have seen on our television screens suggest that the carriages were able to withstand Friday evening’s high-impact crash with far better consequences for those on board than would have been the case with more traditional rolling stock, where the structural integrity of the carriages might well have been compromised.

My hon. Friend is right to acknowledge that Alstom manufactured those carriages in Birmingham in the west midlands. I pay tribute to the work that those people have done. As is the case not simply in Birmingham, but in Derby and elsewhere, the Government are keen to ensure that those skills continue to be available to the British rail industry, because, as we have seen in recent days, they produce a prime product.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the question of how rail is maintained leads one to support what Sir Richard Branson said in the aftermath of the incident, which is that some vertical reintegration must be reintroduced so that the train operating company has a say on the level of maintenance on that particular railway? Does my right hon. Friend also accept that there is a need to monitor the reuse of those coaches to ensure that they are fit for purpose?

I am not convinced by my hon. Friend’s argument. First, as part of a measured response to the terrible accidents and events that occurred on Friday evening, it is right to recognise that there has been significant investment in the network in recent years and a consequential improvement in safety.

At this stage, I do not want to prejudge the ongoing investigation of the rail accident investigation branch, but I cannot say that it is obvious that rail safety on the west coast main line would be improved by breaking up the ownership of that railway into any number of different train operating companies that would have responsibility for the maintenance and safety of individual pieces of the track.

Real progress has been made in recent years, and it would be appropriate at this stage to leave it to the rail accident investigation branch to find out why we encountered those terrible circumstances on Friday evening.

I associate myself with the tributes to Iain Black, a member of ASLEF. Will my right hon. Friend join me in congratulating that organisation on its mature and measured responses since the accident, led by its general secretary and also its Scottish secretary, Kevin Lindsay, who is a constituent of mine? In the light of that mature approach to industrial relations, and to encourage partnership working in the railway industry, will my right hon. Friend consider allocating seats on the RAIB to the trade unions?

It is fair to acknowledge that trade unions play an important role in the rail industry, and I am happy to confirm that at the Dispatch Box today.

On the ongoing work of the rail accident investigation branch, I should say that its remit stretches widely. If any organisation—be it ASLEF or any other trade union—or any individual has information relevant to the circumstances of the Grayrigg crash, I strongly encourage them to bring that information to the RAIB’s attention; I am sure that it would lend a willing ear to it.

Mr. Speaker has selected the amendment in the name of the Prime Minister. I remind the House that Back-Benchers’ speeches are limited to eight minutes. That, of course, does not apply to Front Benchers, although they might bear in mind the time available when making their comments.

I beg to move,

That this House notes the assessment of the Government’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review that two Future Aircraft Carriers are needed in the post-Cold War world to provide a seaborne base from which British military power can be projected and that a destroyer and frigate fleet of more than 30 ships would be needed to maintain two concurrent medium-scale deployments; views with concern the view expressed by Admiral Sir Alan West, when First Sea Lord in 2004, that the reduction of the destroyer and frigate total from 35 to 25, instead of the 32 promised in the Strategic Defence Review, meant that the country was taking risk on risk; notes with dismay persistent suggestions that six more will be mothballed, leaving an effective destroyer and frigate force of only 19; demands urgent clarification from the Government about its proposal to close Portsmouth or Devonport naval bases and calls upon the Government to provide an assessment of the implications for the long-term strategic vulnerability of the remnants of the surface fleet; sympathises with Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, the current First Sea Lord, that a failure to proceed with the Future Aircraft Carriers, which have still not been ordered though scheduled in 1998 for deployment by 2012 and 2015, would make his position untenable; and calls on the Government to clarify its intention on naval procurement in the forthcoming Comprehensive Spending Review.

This is the first time during my 15 years in the House that I have managed the treble: questions, a statement and the debate in the one day. It is a pity that I did not secure the Adjournment debate and get a full house.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis), who has consistently championed the Royal Navy and done a great deal of research on that front as part of the shadow Defence team.

In a recent debate, I put on record my party’s support for the strategic defence review undertaken in 1998. It was a good review, which came to sensible conclusions about the sort of threats that the United Kingdom was likely to face. The review was reasonable in its expectation that the United Kingdom should be able to carry out one medium-sized and one small operation simultaneously, plus an occasional additional small operation. However, the defence planning assumptions that flowed from that have been exceeded in each of the past four years. In July 1998, the SDR promised the replacement of

“our current carriers from around 2012 by two larger, more versatile, carriers capable of carrying a more powerful force”.

At the same time, it was decided to reduce the number of attack submarines

“over the next few years from 12 to 10”

and the destroyer and frigate fleet from 35 to 32. It was also decided that

“22 modern Sandown and Hunt class mine-hunters would be sufficient rather than 25 as previously planned”.

The then First Sea Lord reluctantly accepted those reductions, given the promise of new carriers.

The case for the carriers was simple: the ability to deploy offensive air power was central to future force projection operations. However, we could not be certain that we would always have access to suitable air bases. The two proposed new carriers would constitute a seaborne base from which a combined force of Royal Navy and RAF aircraft would be able to operate.

At the time, the reduction in the destroyer and frigate total to 32 was based on the numbers needed for “two concurrent medium-scale deployments”, and the loss of two submarines from the 12-strong attack force was excused on the basis that all 10 attack submarines would be equipped to fire Tomahawk land attack missiles. At the same time, the Government undertook to remedy long-standing undermanning in the Royal Navy. They claimed that personnel released by the changes set out would be redeployed across the service to meet shortfalls. Once manpower problems had been solved, they said, the net effect of the review on the Navy’s regular manpower requirement would be a reduction of some 1,400. Of course, the actual reduction since 1997, when the Government came to power, has been 10,000.

In December 2003, another defence White Paper entitled, “Delivering Security in a Changing World”, again stressed the role of the Royal Navy in projecting force from the “sea onto the land”. However, a hint of what was to come was clear:

“Some of our older vessels contribute less well to the pattern of operations that we envisage and reductions in their numbers will be necessary.”

A supporting essay to the White Paper stated:

“Since SDR our Armed Forces have conducted operations that have been more complex and greater in number than we had envisaged. We have effectively been conducting continual concurrent operations, deploying further afield, to more places, more frequently and with a greater variety of missions than set out in the SDR planning assumptions. We expect to see a similar pattern of operations in the future, with the emphasis on multiple, concurrent Medium and Small Scale deployments. A major lesson of the last five years is that the Department and the Armed Forces as a whole have to be structured and organised to support a fairly high level of operational activity at all times.”

Despite the White Paper’s admission that operations had been more numerous and varied than the SDR had expected, on 21 July 2004 a supplement to the White Paper was published that proposed cutting the size of the fleet. Once again, the praises were sung of the yet-to-be-ordered future carriers and joint combat aircraft, as well as the new assault ships, HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, and the forthcoming Bay-class landing ships. The logic of the Government’s treatment of the Royal Navy up to this point runs as follows: all the armed forces were scaled down at the end of the cold war, but adjustments were needed to reflect the strategic shift from a defensive role in Europe to the mounting of far-flung operations from a sea base. That required large strike carriers as a centrepiece, and a loss of five frigates and submarines was apparently a price worth paying in 1998.

Instead of being cut from 35 to 32, however, the frigate and destroyer force has been cut from 35 to 25. Instead of being reduced from 12 to 10, the submarine force has been cut from 12 to a maximum of eight. The carriers—one of which was supposed to be in service by 2012—have not yet been firmly ordered, and the Government are now giving no target in-service dates, despite their previous willingness to do so. The projected 12 Type 45 destroyers, which have a key role in the air defence of the sea base, have been reduced to a programme of eight, but only six have been ordered, and ships seven and eight may never be built.

It is interesting to hear the hon. Gentleman’s comments about reductions to 25. Would he care to comment on the report for the Economic Research Council—which I understand is chaired by Lord Biffen, who was a Minister in Mrs. Thatcher’s Conservative Government—which calls for the Royal Navy’s fleet of frigates and destroyers to be slashed from 25 to 14 and for investment in unmanned aerial drones? Will that be the future Conservative policy?

I am not responsible for the policies of all sorts of groups outside the House, as the hon. Lady well knows. Perhaps she might want to think of a more pertinent point next time.

On the subject of ship reductions, such massive reductions might have been expected if events since the publication of the SDR had shown the world to be a safer and more secure place—but it is not. The escalation of the conflict in Afghanistan, leading to the increased deployment that we have heard about recently, the continuing threat of Islamist terror, the Iranian nuclear programme, the North Korean bomb and Russia’s rearmament are all testament to that. The number and variety of operational deployments have consistently exceeded the assumptions of SDR, but what has the Government’s response been? It has been to weaken the Royal Navy drastically by reducing the total of its major warships, while disingenuously arguing that their replacements need be fewer in number because each will be more powerful than its predecessor.

I hope to offer a more sensible intervention than the last one. Does my hon. Friend agree that the importance of the Type 45 is that it has a radar system that makes up for the inadequacies caused by the removal of the Sea Harriers? Unless we have the full selection of 12 Type 45s, we will not be able to provide the umbrella of protection that we need for our fleet when it is at sea.

My hon. Friend is correct about the capability. The worry about decreasing from 12 to 10 to eight to perhaps six Type 45s is that the level of cover would be far too low, given the potential operational requirements.

I have a problem with the whole concept of “capability rather than platforms” that the Government advance. Their argument that they were able to reduce numbers because they did not previously understand the capability of what was coming is untenable, because the capability of the new generation destroyers, submarines and surveillance aircraft were perfectly well known to the MOD when the original totals were agreed in the SDR in 1998—before the Kosovo campaign, before 9/11, before the invasion of Afghanistan and before the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

In the case of the Type 45 destroyers, not only may the total be as low as half a dozen, but the repeated requests of the Royal Navy for them to be fitted with Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles have been flatly refused by the Government.

My hon. Friend is making a powerful case. Does he agree that there is an additional argument if increased capability is used as an excuse for reducing numbers? What about the other side? Presumably, any potential enemy’s capability is increasing in the same way.

Indeed, although I caution my hon. Friend against applying logic too closely to MOD policy, as he might find it lacking.

The dubious rationale for the policy advanced by the Government is that what matters is capability, not platform numbers. That argument was elevated to the status of a doctrine by the then Secretary of State for Defence, the right hon. Member for Ashfield (Mr. Hoon), in a lecture at the Royal United Services Institute on 26 June 2003. He concluded that “advances in technology” and

“the astonishing speed with which we can increasingly operate”

meant that

“Measuring the capability of our Armed Forces by the number of units or platforms in their possession will no longer be significant”.

Perhaps we cannot disregard increases in capability, but to say that measuring the number of units or platforms in the possession of our armed forces will no longer be significant strikes me as completely irresponsible.

In response to that statement, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Alan West, told the magazine Warships International Fleet Review, in an “emperor’s new clothes” moment, that

“no matter how good a ship is, it can only be in so many places at any one time.”

That was a specific rebuttal of the then Secretary of State’s argument that the number of units or platforms would no longer be significant in measuring the capability of the armed forces. Admiral Sir Alan West also pointed out that

“You need a lot of Type 45s to give the same coverage as a naval air-defence fighter.”—

a reference to the calculated risk taken in phasing out the FA2 Sea Harrier six years before the joint combat aircraft was expected to come into service with the first of the new carriers in 2012.

As a very short-lived former member of the Admiralty Board, I came to today’s debate to voice some sympathy with the sentiments expressed to the House. I understand the list of criticisms that the hon. Gentleman has made, but we will put those right only with extra investment. Is he bringing new money to the Navy today, or is he going to give us his usual list of uncosted whinges?

There will probably come a point in the not-too-distant future when I will be on the Government Benches answering the questions and taking responsibility for policy. In the meantime, it is this Minister and this Government who need to answer for one basic fact. They set out the defence planning assumptions that came from the SDR, and they are responsible for the overstretch. Either they need to reduce those assumptions or they must increase the resources to match them. What they cannot do is to continue with those assumptions in the light of the current force strength. Doing so produces continual overstretch, the results of which we see daily. As is customary for the Opposition—and as Labour did when in opposition—we will produce our own review of what we believe to be this country’s foreign policy imperatives, and from that we will conduct a full review when we take office, as the Government did in 1998. In the meantime, it is up to the Government to defend their stewardship of our armed forces, which I am afraid has been lacking up to now.

rose—

rose—

I shall give way again in a moment; I am aware of your strictures about time, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

On the decision to dispose of three Type 42 destroyers and three Type 23 frigates, the First Sea Lord said:

“My gut feeling is that we need a destroyer/frigate force of about 30 ships…I would still much rather not be losing those three Type 23s. It is a painful cut, and I believe we are taking a risk. We shouldn’t delude ourselves.”

Referring to the Type 45s, he added:

“To put Tactical Tomahawk in a Type 45 destroyer requires a relatively insignificant amount of money, and exploits the virtues of a platform you’ve already paid for. The problem is there is no money. I had hoped, I have to say, that we might have had a nod in that direction. But we haven’t, and it will have to fight its way through the equipment programme in the normal way.”

His conclusion was chilling:

“What people do need to be aware of is that there is a risk with these reductions…my concern overall is that we are taking risk on risk”—

a risk for which the Government are answerable.

I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. There might be an argument as to whether the required number of ships is the number that he says is necessary, or the number that the Government are introducing. Setting that aside, if his figures are correct—and in the light of the question from my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich, East (Mr. Watson)—where would the money come from? If he is not prepared to say, that is very unfair. Would it come from another part of the defence budget, and if so, which part? If not, from which other public expenditure budget would it come?

These are not my figures but those that the Government produced as a result of the SDR. This is the number of ships that the Government said that they required in the armed forces to carry out their policy, as a result of their own defence review. My question is: what has changed? According to the defence planning assumptions arising from the SDR analysis, the Government required a certain number of ships. They did not change those assumptions, and I imagine that that they are not changing now. Why, therefore, has the number of ships required to carry out those assumptions gone down? It is not me who has said that we are taking “risk on risk”; rather, it was the former First Sea Lord. I am simply putting it to the Government that those carrying out the policy described by the Government in the SDR believe that they are not being given the tools to do the job that they need to do.

When we take office, we will look at the defence planning assumptions and we might conclude that a different foreign policy would require a different shape of defence, and if so, we will set it out. However, discussing that is not the purpose of today’s debate; its purpose is to hold the Government to account for their stewardship of the Royal Navy, which, in the words of those in it, seems to be failing very badly.

rose—

rose—

I will continue, if I may.

When the First Sea Lord talked about the Government taking risks, what did he mean? We live in a hugely interdependent global trade environment in which none of us will be immune to potential damage inflicted on partner economies. Much of this trade is maritime trade. Seaborne terrorism could cripple global trade, and we already know, for example, of al-Qaeda’s plans to blow up ships as they sail through maritime “choke points” such as Suez, Panama and the straits of Malacca. Admiral West continued to spell out his concerns both up to and after his retirement. At the beginning of 2006, he drew an unfavourable comparison between the 65 destroyers and frigates available at the time of the Falklands war and the 25 available now. He said:

“Whenever the UK has got to the stage when it is spending too little on defence, the nation has suffered, due to some unforeseen event not long afterwards…Maybe I’m just a silly old b****** but I’ve got 41 years experience of these things and I can tell you we need 30 destroyers and frigates for what the Government wants us to do.”

The following month, the Public Accounts Committee found that about a third of the armed forces were not ready to go to war, with the situation facing the Navy being of particular concern. The report followed a study by the National Audit Office in 2005, which found that 60 per cent. of the fleet was in a good state of readiness, with 24 ships placed on reduced support status and a sixfold increase in the practice of cannibalisation, whereby some ships are stripped of vital components, such as sonar equipment and missile systems, to keep others in operation.

rose—

I give way to the hon. Lady in the hope, perhaps vain, that we will hear a better point this time.

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is extremely knowledgeable about naval matters, but he persists in quoting the previous First Sea Lord and has twice mentioned the term “overstretch”. I was at a briefing last Monday with the current First Sea Lord when one of the hon. Gentleman’s Conservative colleagues asked the same question as him, saying that the Navy was overstretched. The First Sea Lord emphatically denied that, saying, “Stretched, certainly—given current commitments that is inevitable—but overstretched, certainly not.”

The hon. Lady will be delighted when I come to what the current First Sea Lord said before pressure for a correction was applied by the Ministry of Defence.

It was only to be expected that, having devastated the size of the fleet, the Government would turn their attention to the infrastructure that supports it. Consequently, a review of the three existing naval bases—Devonport, Portsmouth and Faslane—has begun, generating widespread fear that either Devonport or Portsmouth will be closed. The strategic folly of forcing the Royal Navy to depend on a single south-coast naval base is too obvious to require elucidation, yet some naval staff officers are contemplating it if the alternative is to lose even more warships from the front line.

In a debate in Westminster Hall on 5 December, a junior Defence Minister, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Halton (Derek Twigg), who is in the Chamber today, said:

“We also need to look at our support capacity at the naval bases, to ensure that it is matched appropriately to the future needs of the Royal Navy. We need to ensure that every penny counts and that resources are rightly focused on the front line. We must not lose sight of the fact that the number of ships requiring maintenance and repair has been steadily reducing.”—[Official Report, Westminster Hall, 5 December 2006; Vol. 454, c. 73WH.]

It was pointed out to the Minister that the situation was simply a result of the Government’s decision to cut the size of the fleet but, despite promising to return to that point later in his speech, he did not do so. Perhaps the Minister of State will deal with it when he speaks in a moment.

Worse was to follow when, only three days later, a tabloid newspaper reported that under a plan to help to pay for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, a further six destroyers and frigates

“would be tied up in harbour on a ‘reduced state of readiness’ leaving just 19 fully-operational escort ships”

compared with the 55 destroyers and frigates in the Japanese navy. Far from denying that that was under consideration, an MOD source was quoted as saying:

“Just because a proposal is looked at by officials does not mean that it will be implemented.”

Those of us who have served in ministerial office can understand the well-hidden code in that sentence.

It thus appears that the Royal Navy is threatened not just with a choice between losing more warships and closing a major base but, quite possibly, with the loss of both. How much longer can or will the process be allowed to continue on the back of the promise—yet to be carried out—of a firm order for the two aircraft carriers? How secure is the carrier project itself?

My hon. Friend and I were elected to this place in 1992. Can he remember a time since then when the world was more dangerous and uncertain than it is today? Is not it utter folly to continue to salami-slice our Navy? Now there is the ludicrous proposal that we might go down to having one base on the southern coast, either at Portsmouth or at Plymouth, so will he give me a firm assurance that we will strongly oppose the continuing salami-slicing of our Navy and that we will not accept a reduction to only one naval base on the southern coast?

There are times when the Government of the day decide that it is appropriate to reduce the size of the defence budget or to reduce the size of the armed forces. Indeed, after “Options for Change”, we ourselves decided that, with the end of the cold war, it was reasonable to see a reduction in the size of our armed forces. However, against a backdrop of increasing international tension and of increasing deployment of our forces, it is not reasonable to cut the size of the forces themselves. I cannot recall a time when we asked our forces to do more while we were cutting their size. That is what is unprecedented.

On the issue of the carriers, the former First Sea Lord, having ring-fenced £3.5 billion for their construction, said:

“The carrier programme is the jewel in the crown of the Strategic Defence Review. Yet there are officials within the MoD casting lascivious looks at it. There is no doubt the rats are out there having a nibble. If Britain wants to remain a world power and to operate with a deal of freedom around the world, these two carriers are vital.”

I share that view.

Does my hon. Friend agree that the policy of freezing promotion for lieutenants in the Royal Navy will have an adverse effect on recruitment because new recruits at Dartmouth will not be able to see a clear career path? Furthermore, officers who have already served as lieutenants for a considerable time and who would normally expect to be promoted will now find that their career has hit the buffers so they may even consider retiring from the Navy. The policy will therefore affect retention as well. What does my hon. Friend think about that?

Many of us have received representations on this issue from those serving in the Royal Navy. There are of course inevitable consequences for manpower if we keep reducing the number of ships in the surface fleet. The Minister of State is vigorously shaking his head, so it is clearly an issue that he wants to address in his speech. I hope that my hon. Friend will get a suitable answer from him on the future plan for career paths in the Royal Navy.

There is a growing view that we are in danger of sacrificing long-term investment in properly balanced armed forces, behaving instead like “tin-pot countries” that exhaust their defence budgets on running rather than developing services. Abandoning major equipment programmes because of short-term campaign pressures ignores the fact that the United Kingdom could be facing even greater threats in the future than we are facing today. When one considers the catalogue of cuts inflicted on the Royal Navy—first, five major warships, then a sixth, then eight more and now the threat of yet another half dozen, with the incentive of the two giant carriers used to buy compliance at every stage—one sees that the feeling of betrayal at the top of the service is palpable. If, after all this pain and humiliation, one or both of the carriers fails to be ordered, that feeling of betrayal will rightly become absolute. Today we require specific answers from the Minister. When will we see the new carriers in operation? How many destroyers will we have? Will they have the ground-attack Tomahawk capability that the Navy wants? How many more ships will be mothballed? How many frigates will we have left?

The United Kingdom has embarked under this Government on high-intensity military operations with its defence budget languishing at a lower percentage of GDP than at any time since the disastrous era between the two world wars. Typically, the Prime Minister claimed that the figure had remained constant since 1997, at about 2.5 per cent. of GDP, when he added:

“If we add in the extra funding for Iraq and Afghanistan”.

In reality, the infrastructure and front line of the Royal Navy are being sacrificed to finance the waging of current campaigns—an act of folly for which future generations will pay.

The current First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, said recently:

“We are at a scale of operations that requires a certain amount of investment to stay at this level. If we drop down a scale, then we may throw the baby out with the bathwater. We could turn into a Belgian navy. If we do, I’m gone”.

He would not be alone.

I beg to move, To leave out from “House” to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:

“notes with approval the Government’s very considerable investment in new warship building, including the new Type 45 destroyers, of which two have already been launched, the new Astute class nuclear submarines, the first of which will be launched later this year, and the two Future Aircraft Carriers, which will be the largest ships ever to serve with the Royal Navy; notes that 28 new ships have entered service with the Royal Navy since 1997; views with concern ill-informed and inaccurate suggestions that warships will be ‘mothballed’; and congratulates the Government for its responsible stewardship of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines during a period of extremely high operational tempo.’.

I am grateful to the Opposition for having raised this importance issue for defence at this time. It is just a pity we do not have an Adjournment debate on defence today, because I might have had the benefit of participating in that as well. However, this debate provides us with an opportunity to acknowledge the breadth of the Navy’s contribution and to clear up some of the confusion that evidently exists about its capability.

The contribution of the hon. Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox) was a solid one, but he set some hares running that do not quite add up. He also carefully avoided the crunch question, which all Oppositions face as they scent what they believe to be power: are they going to make the spending commitments necessary to live up to their rhetoric and analysis? We wait with interest to see how that approach is going to develop over the months and years ahead.

I note in passing that the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) is in his place. I look forward to his contribution, if he catches your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker. He can tell us about the importance of the Royal Navy to Scotland—not just in Faslane and Rosyth, but elsewhere in the country—and how small that contribution would be with an independent Scottish navy.

In his opening comments, the hon. Member for Woodspring made a lot of play of the contribution of the previous First Sea Lord, which was forceful. He argued his corner well, but in his comments he also disparaged the existing First Sea Lord. [Interruption.] He made two references. The second was a quote and the first was a diminution of the role played by the existing First Sea Lord. Let me tell hon. Members—

rose—

No, I will not give way. Let me make my point. Let me tell hon. Members what the current First Sea Lord said on 16 February. I think that the implication was that he was forced to say what he said. That was the point that I was making when I referred to disparagement. The implication was that he was not prepared to come to his own conclusions. It is a matter of regret that that was said. It does not accord with my understanding of the integrity of Admiral Band, who said:

“I do not think, and have not said, that the Royal Navy needs a £1 billion-a-year extra to do its job or to keep ships at sea.”

That was the charge that had been made about what he said. He went on to say:

“Today’s Royal Navy is funded to do what is asked of it—not least thanks to a current investment programme of £14 billion, and the delivery of 28 new ships in the last decade alone.”

rose—

No, I will not give way, because I am conscious that we have to make progress. I will take one or two interventions later, but I am not going to be harried in the way that the hon. Gentleman quite likes. He will get the opportunity to make his point later.

I want to make a final point about budgets. When the hon. Gentleman’s party is considering what it is going to do about budgets for defence, it should bear in mind the fact that the defence budget today is 20 per cent. higher than it was in 1997, and 7.5 per cent. higher in real terms. That is a considerable investment in the military element of our overall budget approach in this country. I will deal more with that as I go on.

A key principle of the strategic defence review was that, in reshaping our forces, we would give them a real utility for dealing with the problems of the future, and not just an appearance of strength. There were arguments in the past that said that if one ship went, one other ship should come in. That was not what the SDR was about. The issue is about meeting the evolving situation and the analysis that was laid out in the strategic defence review. That is precisely what we have done and continue to do in respect of the Royal Navy. We knew that we had moved away from the risk of large-scale maritime warfare. We believed that future tasks would require a mix of capabilities—capabilities that would enable us to conduct tasks ranging from evacuation operations through to major war fighting as part of a joint force. So it has proved to be.

The Minister praises the strategic defence review, as do we on this side. Will he therefore endorse the strategic defence review’s conclusion that we require 32 destroyers and frigates to carry out the tasks set for us?

I referred to the evolving analysis that then has to take place. [Interruption.] If right hon. and hon. Members think that things stand still in defence planning and response, they will find it difficult to come to conclusions on a budget that makes any sense, because flexibility has to be included in the approach.

During the cold war, the role of the Navy seemed clear to us all: to protect our nuclear missile submarines and to keep the north Atlantic shipping lanes open to enable the re-supply of Europe in case of a war with the Soviet Union. Our capabilities were focused on anti-submarine warfare in oceanic environments, and large numbers of frigates and destroyers, long-range patrol aircraft and attack submarines were required. We were prepared to fight a large-scale symmetrical war against an enemy with similar equipment to ours, operating in a similar manner to ours.

That picture has changed dramatically. The Soviet Union has disappeared, and no other comparable threat has emerged to take its place, be that on land, in the air or at sea. However, as the House is very much aware, we now live in a much more unstable world. Terrorism, religious extremism, increased competition for resources, the impact of climate change and demographic shifts can lead—and have led—to crisis, confrontation and conflict. We have seen the consequence of that in recent years, be that in the Balkans, the Gulf, Afghanistan or Sierra Leone. Increasingly, we are facing asymmetric threats and our enemies are not operating with similar technologies, tactics, or constraints. That forms part of the evolving scenario that we must address. What does that mean for the Royal Navy?

The Minister is quite right that the response to the end of the cold war and the diminishing Soviet threat was that which came from “Options for Change”. However, the logic of that needs to be extended. If he thinks that the size of the Royal Navy should somehow reflect the size of the surface-fleet threat posed by other countries, and if Russia goes ahead with its rearmament programme and funds that through to 2015 with an increase in its surface fleet, what does he believe that the correct response should be?

The hon. Gentleman almost seems to be concluding—in part, he is totally concluding—that that would be a hostile posture. He seems to forget that at all times, through NATO and other points of contact, we try to bring Russia into some of our joint planning and joint responses. I think that the implication of what the hon. Gentleman says is that what Russia is doing—it is expanding—will be hostile, but the reality is that anything that is happening anywhere in the world could prove to be of a hostile nature, or less hostile, or even benign. These are evolving situations. We must try to plan and understand and then execute as best we can to address evolving threats. That will never be easy because of the lead times that must be adopted for any procurement stream, which has always been an ongoing consideration in defence planning and defence response.

Over recent years, the Royal Navy has transformed itself to meet the new global challenges that we have discussed. The range of capabilities that the Royal Navy deploys meets its requirement for adaptable, resilient and battle-winning equipment that is manned by well- trained and highly motivated people. That requires an investment in new capabilities, which involve new equipment, training, and an experience of joint operations. The Government have invested heavily in new platforms for the naval service. As I pointed out when I quoted the First Sea Lord, we have introduced 28 vessels to service since 1997, which is not an inconsiderable contribution to naval strength.