I am grateful for the opportunity to speak on this important subject. Given the current impasse in Kosovo, tonight's debate is timely. First, however, I think it only right to put on the record our remembrance of those people across the ethnic divide in former Yugoslavia who suffered for such a long time, with many thousands losing their lives in the conflict.

The debate on Kosovo's future status has reached a crucial point. United Nations special envoy Martti Ahtisaari's final comprehensive proposal for a Kosovo status settlement still does not have universal agreement, and it is that lack of consensus which is causing the current road-block to progress. The United States, backed by the UK, although understandably eager to see a Kosovo settlement, is perhaps in danger of being a little too eager in calling for a new UN resolution to be adopted “as soon as possible”. At this sensitive juncture, such a resolution might be unhelpful and awkwardly premature. It was not over-constructive of President Bush to declare in Tirana two weeks ago that “Kosovo is independent”. The comments might have played well in Albania, but they did little to advance a consensus-based settlement. A unilateral declaration by the United States and the United Kingdom would also serve to undermine an already weakened United Nations.

Clearly, an early settlement to the Kosovo question is desirable to all players. Failure to make progress would set back the timetable for Kosovo’s and Serbia’s applications to become members of the European Union, and would also impact on other candidate countries in the region.

It is in the interests of Europe and the region that a settlement be agreed, but it needs to be a lasting settlement that stands the test of time—and tests will surely come. German Chancellor Merkel was right to say at the G8 summit that Europe’s leaders want a consensus-based solution, but that consensus should be based on agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, not agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States. The US and the UK should not underestimate the resolve of the Serbian people on that matter, and should not overestimate the attraction of future EU membership for Serbia. Yes, jobs are important, but long-term jobs and investment in both Kosovo and Serbia can be sustained in the long-term only if there is long-term peace.

The United States has impressive insight into and knowledge of geopolitics, but to suggest that the US has a greater knowledge of the Balkans than Kosovo’s near neighbours, such as Slovakia, Romania and Russia, is misguided. I do not wish to be unnecessarily critical of the UK Government, but once again it appears that they are falling in behind the position of the American State Department and, more importantly, the White House, rather than trying to realign the US’s position, which would be more helpful to all those involved in the process.

There is still time for the UK Government to adopt a “candid friend” approach, but time is running out. I reiterate that there are great dangers in trying to force through a plan without consensus. If consensus cannot be achieved, we should try to make progress, with fewer areas of disagreement; there is a distinction between the two. The Minister for the Middle East will know that peace—true peace that lasts—is not written on scrolls and treaties, but on the hearts and minds of peoples and populations.

That brings me on to Russia. As the record suggests, I have been critical of Russia on many occasions, but on the issue of Kosovo I think that Russia is right in saying that there needs to be a negotiated solution, rather than an imposed solution. Notwithstanding that, Russia should not wittingly or unwittingly allow its view on the status settlement to be entangled by wider fears about European expansion. It is not just in Europe’s interests, but in Russia’s own strategic interest, for there to be peace in the Balkans.

What can be done to make progress? First, there should be full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244, as regards the conditions in which Kosovo’s Serbs live. Secondly, Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Mr. Çeku, needs fully to recognise how far Serbia has come, and he should not make unreasonable demands of President Tadic. He also needs to ensure that Kosovo’s expectations are managed appropriately internally. That, of course, should be done through peaceful means. Mr. Çeku’s Government need to agree on multi-ethnic symbols for the future of the Kosovo state. They should also ensure that more robust measures, and not just measures for the protection of Serbian religious sites, are put in place to protect the Serb minority.

The United States Administration should allow some modifications to the Ahtisaari plan, such as the creation of the post of special envoy for minorities, and the setting of a five-year moratorium—I am flexible about the length of the moratorium—before Kosovo can apply for UN membership. Washington, London, Berlin and Pristina need to avoid using the pretext of pro-Kosovo independence violence on the streets of Pristina to try to rush through a settlement. Such a policy could fuel further genuine and/or orchestrated violent protests in Pristina, and further such protests in response in Belgrade.

I should like to ask the Minister why the UK Government dismissed so quickly the proposal to split the Ahtisaari plan. First, we could consider ensuring that Kosovo’s Government improved the lives of the 100,000 Serbs still living in Kosovo, as I said earlier, but robust measures should be taken. Perhaps it could be implicit that after that, there would be a process leading towards statehood at a later agreed date. Perhaps the Government need to revisit that possibility. Does the Minister agree that both the letter and spirit of resolution 1244 on the protection of minority rights should remain a precondition of the status issue? Sustainable social, economic and political equilibrium is clearly needed if peace is to be maintained in the region.

I am conscious of Kosovo’s status post-settlement, and I hope that in trying to ensure a peaceful future for the Balkans—perhaps intervention through NATO should only have ever been a temporary military measure, not a long-term political intervention—the United States, the UK and their partners should ensure they do all they can to make sure that Kosovo does not become, over time, a base camp for the radicalisation of the Balkans.

I thank my hon. Friend for his generosity in giving way. May I take him back to his comments about NATO and invite him to join me in congratulating the NATO and British troops who helped to secure the peace in Kosovo? We would not be able to discuss peace and Kosovo’s future were it not for the brave personnel in our armed forces, especially the British armed forces.

Absolutely. My hon. Friend, as ever, makes a pertinent and well put point, and I pay tribute to all the members of Her Majesty’s armed services who served, or are serving, in the Balkans. He will know that more than 200 members of the intelligence corps and signal regiment are serving in Kosovo today, and the former Prime Minister was right to refer to that in the House today.

May I touch on common foreign policy? In his recent European Council statement to the House, former Prime Minister Blair said that it was

“important that Europe has a common foreign and security policy”.

I fundamentally disagree with the breadth of the statement. In the same reply, Mr. Blair unwittingly underlined the very reason why such a policy is unworkable. He said that

“in relation to Iran, Kosovo or how we make progress in the middle east…it should allow us to have a European position.”—[Official Report, 25 June 2007; Vol. 462, c. 28.]

Perhaps the Minister can remind the new Prime Minister that there is no common European position on Kosovo. Slovakia, Romania and Greece all have major reservations about taking the Ahtisaari plan en bloc. If Europe cannot agree a common foreign policy position in its own backyard, how can it agree a common position on the many global challenges that will face us and unravel over the coming years and decades?

In conclusion, if the American Administration make a unilateral declaration on Kosovo’s independence, that could precipitate exactly the same action from the Assembly of Kosovo and Prime Minister Çeku. That would be a huge and dangerous step backwards, which is why a new timetable for a new settlement agreement would be helpful to everyone involved. Negotiations cannot continue in perpetuity—I accept that eight years working towards a settlement is long enough—and the limbo should end. Further clarity and reassurance are needed, not alarm and threats. There is a great deal of difference between a timetable towards a new consensus resolution and the imposition of a resolution. Yes, progress needs to be made, but it must be proportionate to the extant good will within the process, not disproportionate. I hope that our new Prime Minister will start his premiership by encouraging the United States to listen more and first rather than after the damage is done. Diplomatic short cuts seldom provide long-term solutions for peace, and the price of getting a Kosovo settlement wrong would be very costly indeed.

First, may I congratulate the hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard), who initiated the debate, on his sensible, prudent assessment of where we are in relation to Kosovo? I thank him, too, for allowing me to trespass on his debate. I wholeheartedly agree with almost everything that he said, but I should like to complement his speech with my own examination, having visited Kosovo and having worked on the issue as a member of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs.

I believe that each and every one of us in the House supports the notion of people having self-determination. I take that principle into consideration when examining the future of Kosovo, Serbia and the former Yugoslav region. I am conscious of the fact that the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, can justifiably take pride—

Order. I appreciate that there have been many changes today—[Interruption.] I am sorry. I am told that Mr. Blair has resigned.

Not at all, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I understood that Tony Blair had resigned from the House and gone.

Tony Blair is entitled to take pride in the intervention that occurred a number of years ago to put some arms around the people of Kosovo and protect them from a potential genocide and ethnic cleansing exercise. Nevertheless, the present situation in Kosovo is fragile. I say with unusual respect and courtesy to Ministers and, through them, to the Foreign Office that I think they are still reading the tea leaves slightly wrong.

If one goes to other parts of Europe and speaks to members of other diplomatic services and international agencies that have some involvement in Kosovo, one will find that a number of them will say spontaneously that the Ahtisaari plan is dead. That might be wrong, but I am reflecting in the House what they say. There is always a danger of the Foreign Office thinking that it can still pursue the plan. I have heard members of the Foreign Office and administrators say, “Eventually Russia will come round.” That is a big mistake.

One always hopes that one can persuade, but sometimes one has to recognise people’s red lines. On Kosovo, Russia made it clear that it is not prepared to sign up to Kosovan independence along the lines of the Ahtisaari plan. However, it is prepared to negotiate some way of moving forward in that fragile region. Russia is entitled to be listened to. Like the hon. Member for The Wrekin, I was concerned about George Bush going to the region and almost bouncing the international community into saying that the Ahtisaari plan and Kosovan independence were as good as delivered. That is extremely dangerous. I hope the Government will use their best offices to counsel restraint on the part of the United States, and that they will pause and reflect whether there is a way round the differences that exist.

Ever since tsarist times, Russia has seen itself as having some responsibility towards the other Slavonic nations. That was reflected during the time of the monarchy, during the communist period and in the Russian Federation today. That is imbued in Russians, and they inevitably have a desire to support the Serbian Government. Russia says that it has adhered to the Helsinki Final Act of the late 1970s, which provided that there should be no arbitrary alteration of the boundaries of the states of Europe. Of course there have been alterations, but the Russians say that they have never fostered or encouraged that. That is true, and they say it with some common sense and prudence.

The Russians argue that if we arbitrarily alter the boundaries of Europe and create an independent Kosovo because of the views of the people in that area, there are other parts of Europe, much more fragile, where the same principle could be applied.

It could apply to Transnistria, which wishes to break away from Moldova. There are parts of Georgia where there are Russian enclaves that would like to join the Russian Federation. There are parts of Armenia and Azerbaijan where such minorities exist, and the principles that Ahtisaari is advocating for Kosovo could also apply there. That is an extremely dangerous position, but one need not go to those areas to support the notion that this could be a dangerous precedent. The Basques in Spain and France could have argued this. There are Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania who would probably argue along those lines. So we must tread cautiously and not be dismissive of the logical, prudent and well-rehearsed case of Russia, which says, “Hang on a moment. Let’s be cautious about breaching the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.”

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that although there is a lot of good in the Ahtisaari plan, it should be seen not as a table-d’hôte menu but as an à la carte menu, and that we need to work around that?

I wholeheartedly agree with the hon. Gentleman, and I want to come on to what I think is the way forward. I am not dismissing Ahtisaari, I am simply saying that Ahtisaari with Kosovan independence, a seat at the United Nations and an internationally recognised personality as a sovereign independent state would at this stage be foolhardy. But there is a way forward, and I notice that the hon. Gentleman pleaded with the British Government to consider splitting the Ahtisaari plan, using it as a basis for negotiations, which I wholeheartedly support.

A phrase is being used in the international community that I would like the Minister to examine and consider, both during this debate and subsequently, and that phrase is Hong Kong-plus. Basically, it means that just as Hong Kong, which is de jure part of the People’s Republic of China, is not a state of the United Nations, yet has its own currency, its own offices in the big cities of the world, and in essence its own foreign service—although it cannot deal with matters relating to defence and wide foreign policy—and in so many respects, such as commerce, is a separate political unit, technically part of China, but with this independence, so Hong Kong-plus seems to be the way forward to overcome the difficulty of Kosovo and Serbia, with their two quite legitimate positions.

One can have sympathy for both sides, but one could create a situation where, at least for a score of years, or perhaps 25, Kosovo remained de jure part of Serbia. That would satisfy many moderate Serbians, who see it as a principle that Kosovo should not be separated from Serbia. It would satisfy the moderate mainstream people of Serbia who see Kosovo in the context of all its attachments to their religious and cultural background, with its many critical religious and cultural sites. Kosovo would stay de jure part of that country, and its title could be negotiated—Serbia-Kosovo, or perhaps a new title. Although that would not satisfy people in Kosovo who demand independence, it could avoid conflict. They would live with it if they knew that the business and running of Kosovo was to be done by a democratically elected Government based in Pristina. That is the way forward, and could avoid conflict, and it would give some assurance.

Things do not stand still. I hesitate to use the term “buy more time” because it seems rather clumsy, but if the international community had another score of years to spend on this matter, things would not stand still. One would hope that the other constituent parts of the former Yugoslavia would have acceded to the European Union, and one would hope that Serbia and Kosovo, as a unit, would have come into the EU. That is the way forward in terms of conflict resolution. After all, we would have reconstituted within Europe the states that made up Yugoslavia. People would be able to feel comfortable, living in the areas where their communities and their religious and ethnic friends and relations were. They could commute and work in Belgrade, or vice versa, and they could visit the religious orthodox sites in what is currently the area of Kosovo. Those within Europe have free mobility of labour, and this is possibly a way forward.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who has been very generous in my debate.

It being Seven o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Watts.]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that Albania has a major role in ensuring that its dialogue with Kosovo is restrained and measured, certainly in the context of its wanting to accede to the EU? It needs to be a responsible player in the region.

Yes, and Tirana is doing that. Sometimes—out of either ignorance or malevolence—some people exaggerate the desire of Albania and try to imply that there is strong irredentist movement there. That is not proven; in fact, a resolution of this matter will probably guarantee that that does not happen. Albania is on board for the kind of scenario and solution that, rather inadequately, I fear, I am outlining. Albania aspires to EU membership and has no desire to take Kosovo into its territory.

We must advance the carrot of EU membership simultaneously for Kosovo-Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the other states of the former Yugoslavia that are outside the EU. If we can bring them in more or less simultaneously, many of the ingredients that create anxieties, jealousies and problems involving property rights will be minimised. I would have thought that the Hong Kong-plus scenario is the way in which Her Majesty’s Government should proceed. They could say, “We broadly accept the Ahtisaari plan, but we don’t think that we should be talking at present, or in the foreseeable future, about a seat at the United Nations or a single legal personality as a sovereign independent state. Let’s proceed according to the precedent of what happened with Hong Kong and China.”

I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will reflect on that and will take my word that, outside the UK, there is a view that the Ahtisaari plan, which provides independence fairly immediately, will not succeed and will not get through the UN Security Council. The great danger of President Bush’s action is that if the plan is vetoed at the Security Council—that would be disastrous, so I would prefer it not to be put there—there will be people in the United States who will encourage a unilateral declaration of independence in Pristina. That would be catastrophic, in my view.

The United States would then probably recognise Kosovo unilaterally, and there would be a major split in the EU which, whatever our views of the EU, none of us wants. It would send all the wrong signals around the world about the solidarity of Europe. Countries such as Spain, Hungary, Slovakia and others would be very unhappy about breaking the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, given all the ethnic minorities in their countries. It would be disastrous if a unilateral declaration of independence were to be coaxed or encouraged by the United States, or by the clumsy handling of other European states.

We tend to think, wrongly, that Kosovo is a territory where overwhelmingly there are Kosovan Albanians. Of course, even today there are in the territory significant numbers of Serbs in enclaves, who are feeling quite frightened. There are precious cultural and, mainly Orthodox, religious sites in Kosovo, which are very important to people and are guarded by troops from NATO, the European Union and other countries who have contributed, very helpfully, over the years. There are also people who have fled their homes in Kosovo and are living on the north bank of the city of Mitrovica.

It would be careless to grant independence to Kosovo without recognising those people, who have a moral right of return to their properties and their cultural and religious sites. If they were ignored, some people would find that unacceptable and could resort to guerrilla warfare. There are extreme nationalists in Serbian politics who would exploit that situation. We would hang out to dry the sensible and brave people in Serbian political life who want to bring their country and the other countries of the former Yugoslavia into the wider European family. We have an obligation to those brave people, who have come a long way, particularly over the past two or three years. There is a fragile parliamentary-based Government in Belgrade to whom we need to give as much support as we can. I counsel the Minister—I hope that he will continue in office next week, but this might have to be in his final hours as a Minister—to do what he can, or to leave on the file his desire at least to reflect on the idea of Hong Kong-plus.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) on securing the debate and articulating so much knowledge about a very complicated subject. I also congratulate the hon. Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay), who, I am sure, understands the subject far better than I do.

Without delaying the House for too long, I want to join other Members in trying to encourage the Minister to slow down. We have heard a lot about big-tent politics in the past few days, and if there is one part of the world where we need big-tent politics, it is the Balkans. It is absolutely crucial that we do not assume that, as a Library paper said recently, the only main players are those that were there in 1994—America, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia. The picture is much bigger than that. Sadly, so much blood was shed to get to the position where we are now, both before NATO got involved and subsequently. We must not forget the desperate situation in Kosovo before the NATO troops were there. I pay tribute from the Conservative Back Benches to the former Prime Minister for the work that he did to help to secure peace in Kosovo.

We must not do anything that jeopardises the extraordinarily delicate situation in the Balkans. If we push ahead, perhaps for the sake of our American colleagues and their political situation, and ignore that delicate situation, we will imperil not only the people of the Balkans but, again, our own troops. That part of the world has a very delicate history. We should not forge ahead with an outcome that the majority of people in Serbia and in Kosovo are not on board with, so that they feel that it is being imposed on them by the Contact group, and nor should we ignore the views of the other countries involved, including Greece and Albania.

I am not a great lover of the European Union, but it has its uses. If we can create peace in Europe, especially in the Balkans where it has been so difficult to achieve over the centuries, by encouraging these countries to join the EU—to see the bigger picture and be part of the European movement—that is one aspect of the EU that I am sure that British taxpayers would be happy to pay for.

As I said, I do not want to detain the House. The Minister has heard the message this evening that we should not push forward too fast. If more hon. Members were present, I am sure that he would have heard the same sentiments from them. Eight years is a short time in the history of the Balkans. We have a golden opportunity, for which British and NATO soldiers have paid with their lives, to have lasting peace in that part of the world. I urge the Minister—or whoever will be in post—the new Foreign Secretary and the new Prime Minister to say, when they visit their American counterparts, “Slow down. Give these people a chance to be involved. Don’t exclude them or impose anything on them.” Excluding them or imposing a solution could put the rest of Europe in jeopardy.

I thank the hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) for securing the debate and for his interest in Kosovo—he has great expertise in that important subject. May I join him in praising our armed forces in the Balkans? The hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mike Penning) drew our attention to the bloodshed that has occurred there. I saw that, and the bravery of our troops in action, at first hand in Bosnia in 1993.

I also witnessed something about which the hon. Member for The Wrekin was calm and restrained: the bloodthirsty jihadists who flocked into Bosnia to murder and kill in the name of some perverted translation of religion. We are keenly aware of the danger of slipping back into a bloodbath, which is why we must get matters right.

I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay). I have been accused of many things, but never of reading the tea leaves wrongly.

The froth on the beer, then.

And certainly not the froth on the beer.

I always reflect carefully on my hon. Friend’s words and observations. He is a skilled member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and I greatly respect his opinion on such matters.

I also share your confusion, Mr. Deputy Speaker, about the status of the debate. When the hon. Member for The Wrekin rose to speak, I wondered whether it was the last timetabled debate of the Blair era or the first of the Brown era.

The first of the new era.

My hon. Friend is probably right and it is a great honour to participate in it.

There have been many international challenges in my time in Parliament. I clearly remember the difficult days of 1998 and 1999 in Kosovo. In June 1999, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1244, which, by providing for a UN mission and a NATO military presence, drew the war in Kosovo to a close. We have come a long way since then. In many ways and for most people, Kosovo today is a much better place than it was in 1999. However, as the hon. Member for The Wrekin, my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock and the hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead said, the position remains fragile and we must be aware of that.

Although resolution 1244 tackled the immediate post-conflict challenges, it left the key issue of status unresolved. In November 2005, Ambassador Kai Eide reported to the UN Security Council that the status quo was unsustainable and that the time had come to find a solution to the Kosovo status issue.

Earlier this year, after 14 months of intensive negotiations between the parties, and, as the hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead reminded us, almost eight years on from 1999, UN special envoy Ahtisaari concluded:

“The current uncertainty has become a major obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic reconciliation.”

I firmly agree with that analysis. Persisting with the status quo in Kosovo is certainly no recipe for stability, and nothing that I have heard tonight seeks to claim that. Nor is it a recipe for reconciliation between Kosovo’s Albanian and Serb communities, or for much-needed economic regeneration. Nor is it morally right. It would consign the 2 million people in Kosovo to continuing political and economic stagnation.

President Ahtisaari negotiated tirelessly, holding 15 rounds of direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina while experts from the special envoy’s office met the parties separately on no fewer than 26 occasions. He also took sensitive account of the situation in Serbia, and twice accepted delays to his timetable to accommodate political developments in Belgrade. My hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock was right to draw attention to the fact that the situation in Belgrade is constantly shifting; I have drawn a lot of encouragement from that.

President Ahtisaari submitted his proposals, which he described as independence for Kosovo,

“supervised by the international community”,

to the UN Security Council on 26 March. I believe that his proposals strike the right balance for Kosovo and the region. They recognise the aspirations of the majority of Kosovo’s population while providing extensive reassurance and protection to non-Albanian communities, particularly the Kosovo Serbs. The settlement provides for assured minority participation in central Government and for far-reaching decentralisation, including through the creation of new Serb-majority municipalities. It provides for continued links and funding between Serbia and Serb municipalities in Kosovo, and it would also create protection zones around more than 40 key Serb cultural and religious sites in Kosovo, as mentioned by the hon. Member for The Wrekin.

I recognise that the Ahtisaari plan will be challenging to implement, and I warmly welcome the Kosovo Assembly’s prompt undertaking to implement it in its entirety. That will require real commitment from Kosovo’s leadership and support from the wider public. It will also require the Kosovo Serb leadership to recognise the opportunities that the settlement presents for its communities, and to begin to engage with that. It will also require a sustained commitment from the international community. Substantial planning is already under way for that international presence.

I want to address some of the issues relating to that which were raised by the hon. Members for The Wrekin and for Hemel Hempstead. On implementation of the Ahtisaari proposals, it is envisaged that NATO will continue to provide the international military presence in Kosovo. Separately, there will be a robust international civilian presence. A European security and defence policy mission will be responsible for working with the Kosovo institutions related to policing and the rule of law, and an international civilian office will be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the settlement. I understand perfectly the point raised by the hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead that the response from EU members to that proposal will range from enthusiasm to hostility. There is no question about that. The hon. Gentleman described a need for big-tent politics, and we have to understand the need for that in Kosovo, just as we do in the EU. It was a good description.

Two teams—an EU planning team and an international civilian office preparation team—are in place in Kosovo, carrying out the necessary planning and preparation for the arrival of the international civilian presence. Those institutions will take over from the UN mission in Kosovo during a 120-day transition period. NATO and KFOR—the Kosovo peace implementation force—remain strongly focused on planning, too. During that period, the Kosovo Government will continue to carry out their responsibilities, including the day-to-day running of government, as well as the passing of legislation to facilitate the new arrangements for the territory. There is no question of a vacuum in Kosovo under the Ahtisaari proposals.

While Kosovo is a sensitive issue for some EU member states, the EU as a whole has consistently given clear messages in support of Ahtisaari and his efforts. On 18 June, the General Affairs and External Relations Council,

“confirmed its support to UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and reiterated its view that his comprehensive proposal…provides the basis for the settlement of the Kosovo issue”.

The council also,

“underlined the necessity of rapidly finding a solution to the Kosovo status issue.”

The Ahtisaari proposals are now in New York, and the UK remains committed to achieving a Security Council resolution, even if that is not an easy task.

My hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock asked what would happen if Russia rejected the proposal. I certainly do not want to engage in a hypothetical discussion of what might happen—we could do that until this time next week. Russia may not come along with a plan. At this moment, however, we are focused on achieving a resolution in New York. There is no realistic alternative to supervised independence. Drift is emphatically not a safe option, although I am grateful to him for raising the model, as he put it, of Hong Kong-plus. The Ahtisaari proposal, as I shall try to explain, is a better model.

Does the Minister agree, however, that the alternative is perhaps to split the Ahtisaari plan into two, so that the status settlement runs alongside delivery on other key issues, such as more protection for minorities—clearly, mostly Serbs?

Such a split would lose the careful balance that, we believe, runs through the Ahtisaari proposals. It would simply not work on the ground. Two thirds of the Ahtisaari proposals set out safeguards and benefits for the Kosovo Serbs. It would be difficult to convince the Kosovo Albanians to implement those elements of the proposals if the issue of status were left unresolved.

In addition, I firmly believe that NATO and the EU would not be prepared to invest the necessary resources in trying to implement an unworkable arrangement. Both those international bodies stand ready to implement the Ahtisaari settlement. We need a sustainable outcome that will generate stability. Proposals for, say, a phased settlement will lead to the opposite unless it is clear that the end destination is supervised independence, as recommended by Ahtisaari. As the hon. Gentleman will know, the special envoy concluded, and all observers of the status process agreed, that over the course of the negotiations the positions of the parties on the crucial issue of status diverged. We should not be under any illusion that further negotiations would lead to a negotiated outcome.

The hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead drew attention to the fact that, in terms of the history of the Balkans, eight years is not a long time. As someone who has always been passionately interested in history, I suppose that, relatively, it is not a long time. But for the minorities within the former Yugoslavia who have been suffering, it is a long time. They are looking forward to giving their children the opportunity of a better education and a better life within their country, instead of having to move away from the western Balkans, as so many have done, to find work, the dignity of a paid job and some semblance of a sustainable future.

My background is that of a military historian, and the history of the Balkans is especially long and detailed. The Minister referred to drift, which is an important issue. Some parts of the world do not have railway stations, but the train goes through at a speed at which people can get on it without it stopping. If the process goes forward too fast, the other parties will not be able to join it. Rather than drift, the pace must not be that of a race: the other participants must be able to get involved rather than being left behind.

It is a good analogy, but I would rather see the train stop—

It might never start again.

That is true, although I am confident that it would. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point. The Security Council now needs to face up to its responsibilities. It will be a tough period and require tough decisions, but it has no choice but to make them. The time has come to do that.

I do not deny that there will be serious differences of opinion. The hon. Member for The Wrekin warned us of some of the possible consequences of that. There will particularly be disagreements with Russia, but all sides accept the need for a solution that will enhance regional stability. The UK remains convinced of the need to find a way forward. It is our clear preference to secure a Security Council resolution paving the way for the implementation of the Ahtisaari proposals. We will continue to work with Russia and other Contact group members to adopt such a resolution. I made a point of asking the powers that be in the Foreign Office what part Russia plays in the Contact group, and I was told that it is a vigorous part. The Russians are strong and vigorous interlocutors and they take a particular view of the situation. That dialogue has been very important, and it continues. The decisions will not be made in a vacuum, but in the light of a real dialogue.

Is the position of the UK Government exactly the same in relation to the timing of any new UN resolution coming forward or not?

Yes. We want to see a UN resolution come forward, and we want to see it sooner rather than later. I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the dates of the Security Council deliberation on the subject, but I will try to find out for him when it might be timetabled. We are determined that the time has come for the Security Council to make this decision and we will discuss that with Russia, which is an extremely important player, for the reasons that my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock—among others—described.

In the interests of showing that no stone has been left unturned in the search for a solution, I welcome the idea from President Sarkozy for a further period for a final round of talks between the parties. But it must be clear that if they fail to agree, we must move forward on the basis of Ahtisaari’s proposals.

We can either bring the process to completion or consign it to the “too difficult” tray. For the reasons that the hon. Members for The Wrekin and for Hemel Hempstead have given, that would be a very risky move. It would remind me too much of the mistakes that were made early on, when Yugoslavia broke up. The latter course carries real risks for the stability of the region. The situation will not stand still. The lesson from the 1990s in the Balkans is that drift leads to instability. The choice is to tackle Kosovo in a smooth and orderly way on the basis of a UN process endorsed by the Security Council, or to find ourselves reacting to future events in a way that could involve far greater challenges.

What of Serbia in all this? It is important to say something about it. I want to be clear that bringing the Kosovo status process through to completion is not and should not be seen as punishing Serbia. We understand the strong emotions that this issue can arouse, but this process is about putting in place the right outcome—the only realistic outcome from our point of view—for Kosovo. I want to see both countries and both Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian communities prospering and moving forward towards EU and NATO membership, if that is what they want.

There has been some progress by Serbia in recent weeks. The chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia told the UN Security Council on 18 June that the Serb authorities had

“expressed a clear commitment to provide all necessary assistance to locate and arrest the remaining fugitives”.

That has started to deliver results, with the arrest of two fugitive indictees in recent weeks. Against that background, the European Commission restarted—

The motion having been made at Seven o’clock, and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. Deputy Speaker adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at half-past Seven o'clock.