I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Animals Act 1971 to limit strict liability for damage done by animals.

My Bill would amend the Animals Act 1971 by limiting its scope to dangerous species and, particularly, to dangerous individual animals, and for connected purposes. There are many Members on both sides of the House who enjoy, or whose families enjoy, horse riding. I am always delighted to be told by colleagues of their excellent holidays on the beautiful Pembrokeshire coast, and I know of several who have enjoyed riding in the county of Pembrokeshire, which is home to many good stables and livery yards.

In the past 12 months, an estimated 4.3 million people throughout the United Kingdom from all social backgrounds will have ridden on at least one occasion, and more than £730 million will have been spent on riding lessons. The British equine industry is now worth around £4 billion each year to our economy, yet it is facing huge pressures as a result of the enormous increase in insurance costs which now make running an equestrian centre a very challenging proposition. The Association of British Riding Schools tells me that, in the past four years alone, 650 riding schools have closed down as a result of insurance costs. Some riding centres have been refused insurance cover altogether.

At the heart of this problem of soaring costs is an unfair liability regime brought about by a badly drafted Act of Parliament, and there is an urgent need for clarification of the law if more businesses are not to fail. Horse riding is under threat from the pernicious reach of the compensation culture, and it is the purpose of my Bill to seek to tackle this problem. In introducing the Bill, I seek to clarify the scope of the Animals Act 1971 in respect of liability for harm caused by non-dangerous animals. A House of Lords legal judgment in the 2003 case of Mirhavedy v. Henley widened the scope of that Act so that strict, non-fault-based liability can be faced by keepers of any animal which can display dangerous behaviour at particular times or in particular circumstances.

The Act originally intended that this strict liability regime should apply only to the owners of dangerous animals—dangerous animals being wild animals such as lions, tigers, deadly snakes or insects, or a specific psychotic domestic animal. However, the effect of the 2003 judgment is that strict liability now applies to the keeper of non-dangerous animals behaving in a normal way where a pure accident occurs. This is why stable owners can now be held liable for a horse that bolts when it is spooked. The impact of the 2003 judgment will not stop at the equine sector; it could affect owners of all livestock. Farmers, for example, could be held liable if a cow acts aggressively to protect a calf and injures a dog walker.

It might be helpful if I take a moment to explain in more detail the legal background to this matter. Section 2(2) of the 1971 Act addresses damage caused by non-dangerous animals and is at the heart of the problem. That section has been repeatedly criticised for its opaque language, and there is widespread agreement that the wording is unclear and needs to be changed. Section 2(2) places strict liability on the keeper of non-dangerous animals that cause harm where the following points are satisfied: first, the damage is of a kind that the animal, unless restrained, was likely to cause, or that, if caused by the animal, was likely to be severe; secondly, and crucially, the likelihood of the damage or of its being severe was due to characteristics of the animal that are not normally found in animals of the same species, or are not normally so found except at particular times or in particular circumstances; and thirdly, those characteristics were known to the keeper.

In the case of Mirhavedy v. Henley the court was deciding the meaning of the second condition and whether it referred just to a particularly dangerous individual animal or, in addition, to a perfectly normal animal that was displaying dangerous characteristics typical of the species at particular times or in particular circumstances. Clearly, the latter interpretation is of much broader scope, and that interpretation was ultimately favoured by the House of Lords by a majority decision. In that case, the Henleys were found not to have been negligent in an accident in which their horses had been spooked and had escaped on to a road causing serious injury to Mr. Mirhavedy, who had been driving on that road; but they were found to be liable to pay for the harm caused.

That judgment, and that interpretation of the Act, is now having a negative impact on the equine sector. For example, Mrs. Ingrid Evans in my constituency, who runs a riding school at Llanwnda stables near Fishguard, has seen her insurance premium rise from £858 in 2001 to more than £7,000 a year today. She has had to increase her charges to try to cover the costs, but is concerned that she is now pricing out many low-income people from enjoying the sport and recreation.

The Country Land and Business Association, whose lawyers have drafted my Bill, and to which I pay tribute for its tireless campaign for a change in the law, has a member who runs a riding school and faced a claim under the Act. That resulted from an accident during a riding lesson when a third party frightened the horse accidentally. Again, there was no fault, but there was liability. That has created enormous problems for that riding school in obtaining insurance at a premium that could be afforded. It is now clear that insurance is getting more expensive and harder to obtain right across the equine sector, even for those who have not had an actual claim against them.

Hon. Members may be aware that my hon. Friend the Member for Tewkesbury (Mr. Robertson) introduced a similar Bill under the ten-minute rule last year: the Accidents Involving Animals (Strict Liability) Bill. That Bill also sought to amend the 1971 Act following the 2003 judgment. It failed to get the necessary time, but I am pleased that my hon. Friend has expressed his support for my Bill. My Bill is different from his, however, in that it does not seek to make it a defence in law for the owner of an animal involved in an accident to show that he took all reasonable steps to keep the animal in a secure enclosure. Instead, it seeks to refocus the scope of the Act by clarifying the language of section 2(2)(b). The reasons for that are twofold.

First, the 1971 Act is about strict liability and, quite rightly, there should be no reasonable defence to strict liability. If a person owns a dangerous animal such as a poisonous snake that harms a third party, it is right that that person should be strictly liable and have no defence of reasonable care. That was the intention behind the 1971 Act. Secondly, with a defence of reasonable care, no insurer will risk going to court and the defence not being accepted. Insurers will continue to settle out of court, keeping insurance premiums as high as they are now.

Under my Bill, however, riding schools, farmers and pet owners will be subject to the usual common law negligence and health and safety laws, meaning that if an owner or business has taken all possible safeguards they are unlikely to be blamed for an accident. That would encourage owners to take out third-party insurance but would remove liability for genuine accidents. Owners of dangerous animals would, quite rightly, continue to be liable.

I am delighted that the Government have signalled their support for the principles of my Bill. I am also encouraged that an early-day motion that I tabled on the matter during the 2005-06 Session attracted more than 150 signatures, and that that same early-day motion, which has been re-tabled this Session by my hon. Friend the Member for South-East Cambridgeshire (Mr. Paice), is also attracting wide cross-party support. I am grateful to all those Members who have told me in the past few days that they are very supportive of what I am seeking to do, and to those hon. Members on both sides of the House who are co-sponsoring the Bill. As well as the support of the Country Land and Business Association, the Bill has the support of the Thoroughbred Breeders Association, the British Equine Veterinary Association, the National Farmers Union and the Countryside Alliance.

The Government are right to state their support for the equine sector in this country. That sector is not only an important and growing part of the rural economy and an avenue of potential diversification for farmers, but it plays a vital part in ensuring health and recreation is enjoyed by the nation, particularly younger people. The House will be aware of the many excellent schemes that provide riding opportunities for disabled people and children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Such initiatives may be at risk unless action is taken soon.

The unintended result of the 1971 Act has been unfair damage to rural businesses, recreation and tourism. My Bill would redress that injustice while ensuring that those whose non-dangerous animals caused harm due to their negligence could still be held to account. I commend this Bill to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Stephen Crabb, Daniel Kawczynski, Mr. Richard Benyon, Peter Luff, Mr. James Gray, Mr. David Drew, Mr. John Grogan, Mr. Edward O’Hara, Martin Salter, Mr. Roger Williams, Nick Harvey and Mr. Elfyn Llwyd.

Animals Act (amendment)

Mr. Stephen Crabb accordingly presented a Bill to amend the Animals Act 1971 to limit strict liability for damage done by animals: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on Friday 19 October, and to be printed [Bill 132].

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 8—Appointment of temporary assistant to Judge Advocate General.

Government new clause 9—Appointment of deputy Circuit judge.

Government new clause 10—Appointment as Chairman of Law Commission.

Government new clause 13—Continuation of judicial office after normal retirement date.

Government amendments Nos. 43 to 51, 71, 66, 52 to 63 and 67.

New clauses 7 and 9 and amendments Nos. 43 to 63 deal with a single topic, which is that those who have served in judicial office on a salaried basis should be facilitated to continue to do so on a fee-paid basis, offering as they do an important additional resource for the peaks and troughs of court and tribunal business, and to preserve their tried and tested specialist skills. Where someone has served successfully in salaried office, it would be a waste of resources if he had to go through a Judicial Appointments Commission selection process in order to become, as it were, part-time, but every case must be carefully considered. A business case will be required in each instance, and the individual must of course be guaranteed to be up to the job.

Originally, in clauses 53 and 54 the provision was available for deputy district judges and deputy and temporary additional masters and registrars of the Supreme Court. The Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice have agreed that it would be better if the provisions were amended and extended. Such a use of staff was regarded as deployments appropriately carried out by the Lord Chief Justice, but the two men have agreed that it is more appropriate to call them appointments and to say that they will be done by the Lord Chancellor, although he will be required to obtain the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice in relation to appointments in the ordinary courts, and of the senior president of tribunals in relation to tribunal appointments. The provisions will in addition apply to all the judicial offices at the level of circuit judge and below in the ordinary courts and to all tribunal appointments made by the Lord Chancellor.

I should be happy to take the House through the details of how all the amendments culminate in what I have set out, but essentially I have outlined their import. They will facilitate the use of a formerly salaried chairman, judge or master to work on a part-time paid basis, either on retirement or when they have held office in the previous two years. The provisions contain all the checks and balances to which I have referred, but if more amplification is needed, I shall of course respond to any comments that are made.

New clause 8 sets out amendments to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951. It arises from an unforeseen interaction between the 2005 Act and the anticipated Armed Forces Act 2006. The effect of this interaction, if not remedied, would mean that certain judicial office holders and lawyers who sit as judge advocates would no longer be eligible to do so without having to apply afresh for their posts.

Currently, the Judge Advocate General can appoint judge advocates from a pool of 12 judicial office holders or lawyers to individual courts martial. That will change once the new Armed Forces Act comes into force, as all appointments will require selection by the Judicial Appointments Commission. That could cause difficulty for the current band of 12 people from whom court martial officials are drawn. If they were to require selection by the JAC, we could lose a good deal of specialist expertise, as the people involved have worked in this field for many years, and are regarded with esteem.

The problem has been discussed with the Ministry of Defence and with the Office of the Judge Advocate General. To achieve our purpose, it is necessary to amend the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951. New clause 8 does that by adding three new subsections to the 1951 Act. It requires that the Lord Chancellor, who will be in charge of the appointments, seek the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice before making any such appointment. I assure the House that new clause 8 is necessary for the continued smooth running of the courts martial system, and I trust that hon. Members will be able to support it.

New clause 10 relates to the appointment of the chairman of the Law Commission. As hon. Members know, the Law Commission is a statutory body set up in 1965, and it comprises a chairman and four other commissioners. All are appointed by the Lord Chancellor from persons who appear to be suitably qualified by the holding of judicial office or by practical or academic experience of the law.

The first chairman was the then Sir Leslie Scarman, who was appointed in 1965, and the present chairman is the delightful and extremely effective Sir Terence Etherton, who was appointed in 2006. In practice, the policy of all the successive Lord Chancellors has been to appoint a candidate from among the judges of the High Court. That has brought significant advantages of independence, expertise and prestige to the Law Commission, and has helped to make it the internationally well regarded law reform body that it is today.

We propose to amend the Law Commissions Act 1965 so that in future the Lord Chancellor can appoint only a senior judge as chairman of the Law Commission. The change is necessary because the code of practice on ministerial appointments of the Commissioner for Public Appointments requires that an appointment should be open to all those who are qualified to be appointed. Therefore, the fact that the chairmanship of the Law Commission would have to be open to judges, barristers, solicitors and legal academics could deter applications from judges and could deny the Law Commission the very important benefits that flow from the appointment of a senior High Court judge. There are also consequential amendments, but I hope that I need spend no more time persuading hon. Members that the proposed change is wholly desirable.

Finally, new clause 13 rectifies a technical lacuna in a section of the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 that resulted inadvertently from its modification by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The 1993 Act prescribes a normal compulsory retirement age of 70 for judicial office holders, subject to transitional provisions for later retirement dates for those already sitting at the date of commencement. Section 26 of the 1993 Act makes further provision to enable the service of judicial office holders to be extended, on a year-to-year basis, up to the age of 75—that is, beyond what is otherwise their compulsory retirement date. That is an example of flexibility in the interests of justice, in exceptional cases. It means, for instance, that an office holder should be retained if his or her specialist knowledge causes particular difficulty in finding a replacement.

Paragraph 228 of schedule 4 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 modifies the Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 to reflect the new division of functions between the Executive and the judiciary. By reassigning the power for the extension of service of judicial office holders, it catered for the exercise of that power in relation to judicial office holders exercising jurisdiction exclusively in England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland. However, it has latterly come to light that there is a lacuna, because the changes did not cater for those who exercise cross-border jurisdiction. Consequently, we have sought to close that lacuna, and again I hope that I need persuade the House no further that that is an entirely desirable development.

I begin by thanking the Minister for her courtesy in writing to the Opposition Front-Bench team—and I presume also to our Liberal Democrat counterparts—to inform us about these changes. We support them because, as she explained, they tidy up various problems. We certainly support the amendments relating to the appointment of the chairman of the Law Commission, and to the appointment of retired judges.

In Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch (James Brokenshire) suggested that retired High Courts judges should be able to sit as deputy judges in the upper tribunal. The Minister said that she would follow up his suggestion, and I am especially pleased that she has done so. I am also keen about what she is doing in respect of the appointment of existing part-time judge advocates. She explained clearly that the 12 lawyers in the pool from which the Advocate General makes appointments to sit on courts martial will have to go through a formal appointment process, under the auspices of the JAC. Obviously, quite a few of them will not feel able to put themselves through that selection procedure, and that is why the proposal is pragmatic and sensible. The Opposition are the last people who would want to lose experienced post holders, as that would have an impact on the smooth running of the courts martial system.

There are a lot of amendments and new clauses in the group, which makes it look rather intimidating. We support the Government’s proposals, some of which flow from our discussions in Committee, but I am concerned that the Government should have introduced so many new clauses at this stage. The Minister was correct to inform us about her plans, and I appreciate entirely that it is important to get things right. We had a lengthy debate in the other place and in the Joint Committee, but the Bill has taken a long time to come to fruition.

Various reports were followed by a draft Bill, and there has been a great deal of discussion for many years. I hope that the Minister will say why so many amendments have been left to the last moment. Why could she and her Department not get all of it right from the word go? With those few critical remarks, however, I assure the Minister that we support these amendments. They make a great deal of sense, and I commend her on bringing them to the House.

I too thank the Minister for writing to us in good time for today’s debate. She indicated the Government’s intentions and the nature of their amendments in a way that was both clear and sensible. I understand the value of allowing people to be available for work on a part-time basis, as that will extend the range of those who are able to assist in the tribunal service. That is completely logical. It is right to deal with the point about the courts martial and with the technical issue in the Bill, as it is a perfectly proper Bill in which to sort out the structure of the courts and tribunals. The proposals are welcomed by the Liberal Democrats.

I am immensely grateful to the hon. Members for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) and for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes). As the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk suggested, the lacuna regarding cross-border jurisdiction and pensions emerged only when we tried to draft appropriate provisions for the matter that we discussed in Committee of extending tenure of office and transferring people from salaried to part-time posts. The issue was late to arrive.

The issue of the Law Commission chairman was raised by the current chairman himself. We have taken some time to ascertain that no adverse consequences would result from complying with his wishes. It seems to us that the steps are only advantageous, and I am grateful for the support for them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 8

Appointment of temporary assistant to Judge Advocate General

‘After section 30(2) of the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951 (c. 46) (temporary assistants to Judge Advocate General) insert—

“(3) The Lord Chancellor may not appoint a holder of relevant office under subsection (2) without the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.

(4) Section 85 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (selection of certain office holders) does not apply to an appointment to which subsection (3) applies.

(5) In subsection (3) “holder of relevant office” means a person who has, within the two years ending with the day on which this subsection comes into force, been appointed as judge advocate to a court-martial under—

(a) section 84B of the Army Act 1955,

(b) section 84B of the Air Force Act 1955, or

(c) section 53B of the Naval Discipline Act 1957.”’.—[Vera Baird.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 9

Appointment of deputy Circuit judge

‘In section 24(1) of the Courts Act 1971 (c. 23) (appointment of deputy Circuit judges and assistant recorders) for paragraph (a) substitute—

“(a) the Lord Chancellor may, with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice, appoint to be a deputy Circuit judge, during such period or on such occasions as the Lord Chancellor thinks fit, any person who has held office as a judge of the Court of Appeal or of the High Court or as a Circuit judge;”.’.—[Vera Baird.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 10

Appointment as Chairman of Law Commission

‘(1) Section 1 of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (c. 22) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) The person appointed to be the Chairman shall be a person who holds office as a judge of the High Court or Court of Appeal in England and Wales.”

(3) In subsection (2) before “Commissioners” insert “the other”.—[Vera Baird.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 13

Continuation of judicial office after normal retirement date

‘(1) Section 26 of the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 (c. 8) (retirement date for holders of certain judicial offices etc.) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (12), in the definition of “the appropriate person”, after paragraph (c) insert “;

(d) the Senior President of Tribunals in the case of a person who holds a judicial office that—

(i) is specified in subsection (12A) below, and

(ii) is not in the person’s case an office to which any of paragraphs (a) to (c) above applies;

(e) the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales in the case of a person who holds a judicial office that is not in the person’s case an office to which any of paragraphs (a) to (d) applies;”.

(3) After subsection (12) insert—

“(12A) The judicial offices mentioned in paragraph (d) of the definition of “appropriate person” in subsection (12) above are—

(a) Chamber President, or Deputy Chamber President, of a chamber of the First-tier Tribunal or of a chamber of the Upper Tribunal;

(b) judge, or other member, of the First-tier Tribunal or of the Upper Tribunal appointed under paragraph 1(1) or 2(1) of Schedule 2 or 3 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“the 2007 Act”);

(c) deputy judge of the Upper Tribunal appointed under paragraph 7(1) of Schedule 3 to the 2007 Act, except in a case where the holding of the office by the person in question falls within subsection (7)(ga) above;

(d) transferred-in judge, or transferred-in other member, of the First-tier Tribunal or of the Upper Tribunal (see section 31(2) of the 2007 Act);

(e) deputy judge of the Upper Tribunal by virtue of an order under section 31(2) of the 2007 Act;

(f) an office held by a person if the person’s holding of the office results in the person being a member of, or person who is, a tribunal in a list in Schedule 6 to the 2007 Act that has effect for the purposes of section 30 of that Act (but only if the office is specified in Schedule 5 to this Act);

(g) President or other member of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal;

(h) member of the Employment Appeal Tribunal appointed under section 22(1)(c) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996;

(i) member of a panel of chairmen of employment tribunals.

(12B) Neither paragraph (d) nor paragraph (e) of the definition of “appropriate person” in subsection (12) above applies to an office held by a person if provision about that person’s continuation in the office after the compulsory retirement date for the office—

(a) would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament if it were included in an Act of that Parliament, or

(b) would be within the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly if it were included in an Act of that Assembly.”

(4) In subsection (13) (Lord Chief Justices to exercise functions under section with concurrence of Lord Chancellor), after “Northern Ireland” insert “or the Senior President of Tribunals”.’.—[Vera Baird.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 2

Commencement of Chapter 1 of Part 3

‘The provisions of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of this Act shall not come into force until a registration scheme for bailiffs and enforcement agents, enforcement agency businesses and enforcement trade associations has been set up and implemented in accordance with the Private Security Industry Act 2001 or this Act.’.—[Simon Hughes.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 4—Uniforms

‘All enforcement agents, both private and Crown-employed, must at all times wear such uniform or other means of identification as shall be prescribed.’.

New clause 5—Enforcement by taking control of goods

‘(1) There shall be a form of enforcement against corporeal moveable property for recovery of money owed that it is to be known as taking control of goods.

(2) Taking control of goods shall include selling them to recover a sum of money.

(3) Schedule 12 applies where an enactment, writ or warrant confers power to take control of goods.

(4) Regulations may make provision about taking control of goods, including provision determining the time when control is taken.

(5) Any liability of an enforcement agent (including criminal liability) arising out of his securing goods on a highway is excluded to the extent that he acted in accordance with Schedule 12 and with reasonable care.’.

New clause 6—Independent regulatory authority for bailiffs and enforcement agents

‘(1) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations establish an independent regulatory authority for bailiffs and enforcement agents.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must make provision for—

(a) the licensing of enforcement agents;

(b) the approval of the businesses and organisations which employ them;

(c) the accreditation of the professional bodies which represent them;

(d) the setting of standards of conduct;

(e) the monitoring of performance;

(f) the investigation of complaints;

(g) the punishment of failure to comply with standards of conduct; and

(h) the provision of redress where appropriate.’.

Amendment No. 37, page 43, line 21, leave out clause 57.

Amendment No. 21, in clause 58, page 44, line 4, leave out paragraph (c).

Amendment No. 33, page 44, line 6 , leave out from ‘as’ to end of line 10 and insert ‘a constable’.

Amendment No. 34, page 44, line 11, leave out subsections (4) and (5).

Amendment No. 35, in clause 59, page 44, line 29 , at end insert—

‘(ba) for certificates to be issued to—

(i) officers of a Government department, and

(ii) persons appointed under section 2(1) of the Courts Act 2003 who are directly employed by a Government department or an executive agency;’.

Amendment No. 5, in clause 143, page 110, line 3 , at end insert—

‘(4A) No order may be made under this section to bring Chapter 1 of Part 3 into force unless the provisions of section [Commencement of Chapter 1 of Part 3] have been complied with.’.

Amendment No. 42, page 110, line 3 , at end insert—

‘(4A) No order may be made under this section to bring Chapter 1 of Part 3 into force unless the provisions of section [Independent regulatory authority for bailiffs and enforcement agents] have been complied with.’.

Amendment No. 24, in schedule 12, page 205, line 21, leave out sub-paragraph (3).

My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, Central (Jenny Willott) and I tabled new clauses 2 and 4 and amendment No. 5, but I am conscious that other new clauses and amendments were tabled by the hon. Member for Great Grimsby (Mr. Mitchell). [Interruption.] I beg his pardon—that was an aberration; I was looking for him in the wrong place. We have all been a bit thrown by the events of the past 24 hours, so I apologise. I am also conscious that for the next hour or two, great attention will be probably paid to the activities of the state elsewhere, and not here. None the less, these are important matters, and I am grateful for the opportunity to come back to them.

Our new clauses relate to the important part of the Bill about the enforcement of court orders that was much discussed on Second Reading and in Committee. In particular, I refer to the enforcement of control orders by taking control of goods, and to the activities of bailiffs. They have a perfectly proper job to do, but they can become tyrants to the poor and the dispossessed. A regular theme of our debates has been to try to ensure that that this set of provisions in the Bill does not come into force until there is a registration scheme for bailiffs. That is the burden of new clause 2.

The Minister has been helpful in this respect, and I pay tribute to her for that. In Committee, she confirmed that the application of the Bill will be delayed until it can be placed in the context of the system for proper registration that exists under earlier legislation dating from the Private Security Industry Act 2001. I am grateful to her for that. To be honest, I must explain that the new clause is the rerunning of the argument about whether what she said should appear on the face of the Bill. The proposal is to put such a provision into the Bill, to lock into place the undertakings that she gave without equivocation or qualification earlier in the Bill’s passage.

I do not want to be confrontational, because there has been a coming together and the Bill has made significant progress on a matter that was controversial. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, Central and I expressed concerns in different ways that reflected our constituency experience and the wider knowledge that we need to make sure that the bailiff and enforcement agency industries are properly regulated. New clause 2 was tabled to that end.

New clause 4 is a specific proposal that would require those who do enforcement work to be identifiable by wearing some form of uniform or having other identifying characteristics. Again, this is not new territory and the new clause is self-explanatory. It says:

“All enforcement agents, both private and Crown-employed, must at all times wear such uniforms or other means of identification as shall be prescribed.”

It does not goes into detail—one would not expect it to—as to what the uniform should be, but it would make it clear that people must be able to recognise the enforcement agents. Many agencies do such work, so if we are not careful, people will appear at people’s doors and they will not be obviously identifiable. They do not appear in police uniform or, necessarily, in any other recognisable uniform. Therefore, someone on the receiving end may not know that a document, letter, card or pass signifies with any authority what the person is there for.

We are trying to find a way of making sure that the citizen can understand that when people have particular powers to enter a property to take possessions—the sort of powers that are regarded as powers of the state or powers that the state gives to other people—those powers cannot be abused. Citizens should understand their rights in the real world, in which the poorest are often those who face the most oppressive debt. They are most harassed by such activity and find it troubling, and it can lead to the most severe consequences. Personal debt has gone through the roof, and many more people have hire purchase agreements, get into terrible trouble with their credit cards and finances and face huge interest rates. In the end, people may come to enforce the agreement, which legally in contract they may be entitled to do, but without the citizen knowing about it.

The Minister has been sympathetic to the concerns that have been expressed, and I am glad that this is not an issue of fundamental controversy. There are many people at the bottom of the income scale in her constituency and mine, and in that of the hon. Member for Great Grimsby. The new clause says that there should be a means by which the enforcer can be identified.

Amendment No. 5 deals with the commencement date for chapter 1 of part 3. It is linked to the new clause and would defer the commencement date until we know that we have the other security in place. It is tied to the first point that I made, and I think that it is covered by what the Minister has said. The provision would be locked into statute, because we are keen that we should come out of Report and Third Reading with everyone clear that no additional powers will be given to those doing enforcement work, unless there is a proper regulatory system.

Before I sit down, Mr. Deputy Speaker, it may be helpful to you, the Clerk, and my colleagues if I say that I do not think that there is now much disagreement on new clause 2. There may still be an issue with new clause 4. If so, I would be grateful if we could press new clause 4 to a Division, although I am conscious that that may come at a different stage in the proceedings.

It a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend across the tramlines, or rather, across the tracks—if I may call him that. He has put a lot of effort and thought into the measure and speaks with a good knowledge of the background. I was not on the Public Bill Committee because of the habit of not putting Government party critics of Bills on those Committees, so I am catching up from behind and cannot speak with his wealth of experience. I want to echo the concerns that he has expressed.

The bailiff provisions are one of the worst parts of the Bill. I have no great quarrel with the rest of the Bill. It would be better to omit part 3 and start again, but as the Government are determined to press on with it, it is important that the provisions fit into the social background. Society is being engulfed by a rising tide of debt. The problem is that the poor, who are struggling against debt and trying to rise above it, are in danger of being pushed down by over-harsh debt recovery provisions.

Debts abound. We are a society built on debt. Not only do we have student debt, which will have to be recovered at some stage, we have mortgage debt and the possibility of negative equity, which I hope does not arise again. More and more people have bigger and bigger mortgages. We have fines and fixed penalties, which will have to be recovered at some stage, local government fines and charges for council tax, bank charges, credit card debt, hire purchase debt, and tax credit recovery. All that will pose an increasing problem—a problem that will press on the poor, in particular. We do not want that section of society to be threatened by a massive and brutal recovery process. But, unless the new clauses and amendments are accepted, the Bill will do exactly that.

Bailiffs are a big business, and the reputation of the sector is not high. There are instances all over the country of brutal, and in many cases misguided, enforcements of debts. Sometimes those debts were never owing. People report their bad experiences with bailiffs. The situation is largely unregulated. Councils and courts have contracts with firms of bailiffs, but the contracts are weak. Many of them are not published, and it is difficult to get at them. They do not set a fair basis for charges and they do not set the fees, which can escalate. We have a system in which there is an onus on bailiffs not to recover the debt or trace the person, because they make their money by enforcement—by distraint on goods or by clamping cars, and by charging for that service. The whole system is slanted towards charges of that nature.

A regulatory framework is needed. My hon. and learned Friend the Minister, who has listened to the complaints with care and consideration, unfortunately still persists in saying that the regulatory framework will be provided through the Security Industry Authority. My new clauses would create an independent regulator for the industry, because the Security Industry Authority, to which, under regulations, the Minister proposes to give the powers, is not adequate. We are not talking about people who are bouncers at nightclubs. Some of them may behave like thugs and brutes, but they do not fall into that category. In many cases, they are acting as agents of the state, the court or the council—particularly in respect of road traffic fines. We need more effective regulation than the Security Industry Authority can provide. We need registration. We need that kind of structure to impose discipline.

I listened carefully to what the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes)—my hon. Friend, in this context—said. We would certainly support him on new clause 4. The hon. Member for Great Grimsby (Mr. Mitchell) obviously carried out a good deal of research before preparing his new clauses and amendments, to which he spoke with eloquence. When I saw the amendment paper, I was amazed that so many of his proposals were similar to those tabled by the official Opposition in Committee. We devoted a substantial time to debating this subject in Committee. The Minister was able to explain that some of our fears were unfounded, and we were comfortable on some fronts after hearing what she said. However, there are many aspects of the Bill that still cause us great concern. That is why Conservative Members will be minded to support the Lib Dems on new clause 4, which would require bailiffs to wear uniforms—we tabled such an amendment in Committee—and the hon. Member for Great Grimsby on new clause 6, which would provide for regulation by an outside body.

The Bill gives bailiffs a substantial number of extra powers, such as increased powers to enter homes. It also takes away existing constraints. As the hon. Member for Great Grimsby pointed out, that is happening at a time when the amount of debt in our society is increasing, as is the pressure on individuals throughout our constituencies. More and more people are being persuaded to take out debt, or bamboozled into doing so.

The Government have created an additional 2,900 criminal offences and there are many new fines and penalties. To some extent, the Government have warped our sense of what is criminal. Many bailiff actions stem from crimes that resulted in fixed penalty notices. There has been a huge proliferation in the use of such notices. There is great concern in the enforcement industry that many Government Departments have created a situation in which more people will get into debt, which will have to be enforced.

I should make it clear that people who run up debts should of course pay those debts, whether they are owed to companies or to other individuals. There should be a mechanism by which debts may be enforced. If people owe money to government-related organisations for council tax or because of fines, including parking fines, those debts should be paid, because if they are not paid, other taxpayers suffer. However, at the same time, there must be a proper system for protecting the vulnerable. We have tabled amendments in a later group that would specifically protect the vulnerable.

Everyone who has examined this issue will know that the vast majority of bailiffs behave responsibly. There is no doubt that the industry prides itself on high standards. However, as the hon. Member for Great Grimsby pointed out, and as we discussed at length in Committee, a small minority of bailiffs bring the industry into disrepute by going completely over the top. We have all come across examples in our constituencies of bailiffs acting in an intimidating way.

Various examples have been cited by citizens advice bureaux, including my local citizens advice bureau. A CAB in Somerset was looking after a 44-year-old woman who had been visited by a bailiff collecting council tax arrears. The bailiff said that he wanted immediate payment for the full sum owing. He tried to enter and stated that he would go to all the rooms and remove children’s possessions, white goods—including the cooker—and all furniture. The bailiff stated that for every half an hour he sat outside the house he would charge £50, which he did after sitting there for exactly 30 minutes. Owing to the bailiff’s threatening behaviour, the woman’s partner made a payment, but only by using the rent money, which moved the debt problem elsewhere.

A CAB in Bedfordshire told me about a woman whom it was looking after. Sadly, her husband died relatively young, and the next day a bailiff called at her house about council tax arrears. The woman explained that her husband had just died and that because he had not made a will, and she would therefore have to go through probate, there would not be enough money in the estate to pay the council tax. She thus asked the bailiff to wait for a while, but he refused and said that unless she paid at least £150 then and there, he would seize her goods. He also threatened her with arrest. The behaviour of that bailiff was completely contrary to the Government’s guidelines for the enforcement industry, which make it clear that people in vulnerable situations should be protected.

While a minority of bailiffs behave in such a way, there is a need for proper outside regulation, which brings us to the two key amendments in the group. New clause 2 relates to the Security Industry Authority. For those who have not been following our debates carefully, I should explain that the SIA is a private sector organisation approved by the Government that regulates various private sector organisations. Under the Government’s plans, private bailiffs, rather than court and Government-employed bailiffs, will be regulated by the SIA. We support those proposals because, as we said in Committee, if the Government will not introduce full independent regulation not just for private bailiffs but for the whole industry, we will reluctantly accept the second-best option of the SIA, because a step in the right direction is better than no step at all.

In essence, new clause 2 provides that the greater powers for bailiffs under the Bill, especially powers to enter people’s homes, should not come into effect until SIA regulation is implemented. We have various concerns that are relevant to new clause 2. Can the Minister tell the House when the new SIA system will be in place? I am concerned that it may not be for quite a while, which means that it is even more important to include in the Bill the provisions proposed by the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey. The Bill may be in its final stages—it will have its Third Reading this afternoon and will in due course receive Royal Assent—but we need to hear from the Minister exactly when the regulation under the SIA will be in place.

In Committee, we discussed how bailiffs work with business people and how they enter business premises. I raised the case of one of my constituents who runs a fish and chip shop and was threatened with the removal of his frying equipment—not that he could work out how that would be done, as the bailiff had only a car. None the less, the threat was a real one. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that we need to ensure that enforcement must be circumspect so that people are not prevented from carrying on their trade so that they can earn the money to pay their debts? Perhaps the Minister could refer to that issue when she sums up.

I entirely agree. We may cover such matters when we move on to the fourth group, where our amendments Nos. 19 and 12 relate to tools of the trade, so the hon. Gentleman may like to support us in the Lobby to reinforce his point, if the Government have not listened. However, I do not want to push your patience, Mr. Deputy Speaker, because we shall come to enforcement by taking control of goods, and the procedures involved, under a later group. At present, we are talking specifically about uniforms, regulation and control of enforcement agents, but I agree with the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Drew) that all these concerns are linked and there is a significant overlap.

To sum up, society is changing, as the hon. Member for Great Grimsby pointed out. People are becoming far more indebted. When the Committee was dealing with provisions covering individual voluntary arrangements and other methods of sorting out debt, one of the things that concerned us was the sheer scale of debt being built up in the UK. When that is combined with the number of extra offences, the extra powers being given to bailiffs and the small minority of those bailiffs who are a disgrace to their profession, we can see that we need more than a system of voluntary regulation. It is not just a matter of regulating private sector bailiffs; we need a better system of regulation for the whole industry, which is why we shall support new clause 5.

First, may I tell my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby (Mr. Mitchell) how much I would have welcomed him to the Committee? He brings to the issue the particular strength of feeling he derives from the personal experience suffered by his daughter, which he set out in the Chamber at a lamentably late hour of the night some months ago. He brings to it, too, his usual characteristic concern for the poor and underprivileged sectors of his constituency. I, too, have poor and underprivileged sectors in my constituency, and I would have welcomed his work in Committee.

Both my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) contextualised the changes we have to make when they spoke of the rising tide of debt. It is the Government’s view that whether one, 10 or however many people are misused by bailiffs who exercise their powers excessively it is too many, and we will stop that happening. I assure my hon. Friend he is wrong to say that this part of the legislation is the worst part. In my view, it is one of the most important parts, and perhaps the best.

I reject the assertion of the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk that the Government have not listened. We have been most consultative. We consulted as we put together the documents that preceded the Bill, we consulted before its publication and we have consulted throughout its progress through the House. I do not accept that vigorous criticisms can be levelled at the use of penalty notices and so on for lower-level crimes. They seem to me to be appropriate, proportionate and speedy ways of remedying minor abuses and misbehaviour. The legislation on the power to enter premises to impose penalties or to ensure that they are paid is not in the present Bill, but was passed more than two years ago, richly supported by the Conservatives.

The SIA is not a private industry body; it is a non-departmental public body. Let me make that clear, lest I forget to emphasise the point in the course of the debate.

I shall now deal systematically with the amendments in the group. On the question of certification running alongside the SIA’s jurisdiction, it is intended that the certification process should endure only until the authority takes over responsibility for licensing.

I apologise if the Minister was about to tell us this, but we were hoping that she will update us regarding the time scale for the new authority taking over control.

It is likely to be at least two years before the SIA is in that position. I cannot be any more specific than that. However, we are reassured that, in the meantime, the strength of the county court certification process that we will introduce in a renewed and increasingly powerful way will ensure that there is rigorous control.

To give due courtesy to those who have contributed to the debate, I shall deal with the points they made one at a time, but first let me say to the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk, who says that good bailiffs are anxious to have regulation because they do not want their reputation to be diminished by bad bailiffs, that he is obviously correct. I pay tribute to the excellent service done by a very large proportion of the enforcement agent industry and agree with him that it is not the majority who behave in the appalling way described by many agencies in the course of the Bill’s passage through the House. I can say—with no fear of contradiction, I hope—that they do want proper regulation, and that is exactly what they are going to get under the Bill. We are determined about that.

The Minister mentioned complaints against private bailiffs, but what would happen if one wanted to complain about a court bailiff—an employee of the court? One would presumably go through either her Department, or the organisation involved with the day-to-day running of the court. Presumably one could not go through the SIA.

No, and if I may, I shall come on to Crown public employees in a minute, because as the hon. Gentleman knows, they have a different status, and we intend them to keep it. However, there will be an effective complaints procedure relating to them, too.

In relation to the interim period and the certification by county court judges, the Minister will know well from her experiences, as the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) and I do from ours, that county court judges vary in style, tradition and reputation. Some appear to be very much the friend of the landlord, and others seem to be much more the friend of the citizen. What guarantee is there that the process of certification will be a hands-on process, and that the county court judges will be accountable, through that system, to the Ministry of Justice, so that they do their job properly if there are real concerns?

The hon. Gentleman appositely points out that this is a sort of barrister-fest, given the background of the three Front-Bench spokespeople. I had not really digested that point, but I assert that our proceedings are none the worse for that. I have never come across partisanship in a judge; let me make that totally clear. Not every county court judge will have the responsibility that we are discussing, and there are county court judges who have those responsibilities now. It makes obvious sense that if there is a major firm of bailiffs in an area, the local county court judge becomes much more experienced. They are exposed to the risks and difficulties of the process, and therefore become masters, or mistresses, of dealing with them. I say mistresses, as one or two of the county courts judges are women. It is our intention to build on that expertise. We intend the county court regime to be imposed with considerable rigour. As I say, we intend to put the requirements of schedule 12 forward as part of the certification process.

As hon. Members will remember from Committee, bailiffs will have to be trained before they qualify for the certification process. They will also have to put up a bond, and the judge can order the forfeiture of that bond, or part of it, if the bailiff is in breach of the terms of their certification. As hon. Members will remember, there is a regime in schedule 12 for bringing actions, whether for damages and related loss, or abuse of power. Pretty well every remedy that one could wish for against an enforcement agent is listed in schedule 12. As I have said, we intend those remedies to carry across the enforcement industry, but they can be applied to the county court.

I hope that we have a reasonably foolproof framework, because that is certainly our intention, notwithstanding the slightly uncomfortable transitional phase that must take place. I hope that we have a satisfactory framework in place. The SIA supports the penalties principle and the characteristics for enforcing regulations that are featured in Professor Macrory’s work. Over the next few months, the SIA will consider how the Macrory toolkit of new regulatory sanctions can be integrated with its existing approach, which is largely based on compliance. In partnership with the Home Office, the SIA will consider what steps it needs to take to access those new tools. In particular, the SIA will look at how the additional sanctions could help to support its compliance activity and its overall aim of protecting the public.

Paragraph 66 of schedule 12, to which I have already made free reference, sets out new remedies that will be available to the debtor against an enforcement agent who breaches the provisions of the new law. As I have said, the remedies include damages for loss. There is a procedure that will enable the court to deal with complaints such as those relating to the overcharging of fees. The enforcement agent would be liable if anyone whom he takes on to premises to assist him breaches any of the provisions in schedule 12. The assistant, and of course the enforcement agent, will be personally liable if they commit an offence under ordinary criminal law.

Under clause 58, an offence is committed if a person purports to act as an enforcement agent without being authorised to do so. The maximum penalty—and it is not a penny too much, in my view—is £5,000. Additionally, there are other avenues of redress, for example through the local authority ombudsman, if the enforcement agent is sent by the local authority. Obviously, we will have to develop appropriate complaints handling procedures with the SIA, the Home Office and all stakeholders, so that the SIA is always informed of complaints that require targeted intervention and investigation, however they fit into the framework. It is primarily through regulation that we will drive up standards across the industry. In particular, as I have said, strict competences and conditions will be set for individuals who apply for a licence.

That is all that I wanted to say about new clause 6, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby. I hope that I have allayed his concerns through my best endeavours. My officials have worked very hard to make sure that I am in a position to use those best endeavours to try to deal with his complaints. I have said, and will say again, that the will of the Government is that there should be proper licensing, proper regulation and proper complaints procedures to ensure that the enforcement agency sector no longer produces the kind of horrors of which we have heard.

Amendments Nos. 33 to 35 concern certification, and as the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk said, they effectively replicate amendments tabled by the Conservatives in Committee in the Commons, and in Grand Committee in the other place. Our position on the certification of Crown employees has already been made clear, but let me restate it: I do not believe that it is necessary for them to fall within the new regime. The Government have little or no control over the training, conduct and discipline of enforcement agents. In contrast, Her Majesty’s Courts Service has a large degree of control over agents such as county court bailiffs. Other departments, such as Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, have similarly high levels of control over their own enforcement staff.

County court bailiffs and civilian enforcement officers in the magistrates courts are subject to civil service recruitment procedures, and the civil service code governs their behaviour. They are subject to strict controls relating to conduct and discipline under civil service disciplinary procedures, and complaints against them can be made to the appropriate court manager. They are also subject to continuous training and development, which is provided by their departments, and of course they are subject to compulsory criminal record checks. Although we can insist that such standards be adhered to within our own departments, we have no such power outside our departments, hence the need for certification. However, it is not needed for our own employees. It is widely acknowledged that the problem is private sector bailiffs; they are the source of most of the complaints about the activities of enforcement agents. Figures provided by Citizens Advice show that well over 90 per cent. of the complaints that it receives on the subject relate to that sector. It is at that sector that we must target the comprehensive system of regulation.

I want to reiterate what my noble Friend Baroness Ashton said on Third Reading in the other place, and what I said in Committee about Crown employees: the Government are committed to ensuring a common set of standards and a common appearance—that gives an indication of the subject that I shall move on to next—across the enforcement industry, built around a high standard of training and professionalism across the public and private sectors. We are considering what we can do on the subject of common information and a central register of enforcement agents, so that debtors can verify that the person on the doorstep has the necessary authority.

Amendments Nos. 21 and 24 are unnecessary. Amendment No. 21 would mean that enforcement functions could not be carried out by those who assist the enforcement agent in his presence and under his direction. Enforcement agents need to take other persons on to premises with them for practical reasons, for example when they are dealing with large-scale business or industrial premises. They may need assistance in taking an inventory or removing goods that need packaging and safeguarding; for those tasks, expertise is essential. Frequently, of course, they require the assistance of a locksmith. If we insist that those functions cannot be carried out by someone assisting the enforcement officer under his direction and in his presence—that is what is required—it will make the whole process of taking control of goods so lengthy and complex that it is virtually unworkable.

Amendment No. 24 would have far-reaching consequences which, I guess, were not intended. For many statutory debts, such as debts owed to national or local government bodies, the statutory power to enforce, using certain methods, is placed in the hands of the relevant Secretary of State. The Secretary of State then confers that power on another person working on his behalf. He may confer it on a member of staff in the relevant organisation, or on a company that provides the relevant services, by means of a contract. If the amendment were made, the effect would be that only those on whom the relevant statutory enforcement power was conferred could carry out the function of enforcement. I am sure that is not what my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby intends, and I shall go on to explain how catastrophic it would be if the Secretary of State alone could carry out those functions.

I am interested to hear that. My hon. and learned Friend is almost certainly right, as she usually is. However, those contracts whether with local authorities or courts, could be made publicly available, and we should use more power to regulate the enforcement officer’s behaviour and the charges. Most of those contracts are not clear or adequate, and they are not known.

My hon. Friend makes a good point. At the moment, that is an important omission for public purposes, but once the network is in place the problem will diminish immensely. May I therefore return to my argument? Obviously, my hon. Friend did not intend that only the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions could carry out the enforcement of child support legislation, so I assume that he will not persevere with his proposal. By smiling happily at me, he appears to indicate that I am correct.

May I turn to the question of uniforms? As I said in Committee and on Second Reading, I well understand the sentiments that underpin the proposal that all enforcement agents should wear a uniform or carry a means of compulsory identification. I was initially attracted to the notion of a uniform, but I thought that I had persuaded the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey in Committee to agree that it was not such a good idea as it appeared. Perhaps I have done so, as new clause 4 includes the words,

“or other means of identification”.

Although the hon. Gentleman has suggested that he intends to press the new clause to a Division, I hope that he will be satisfied by my reply. I think that we all recall the touching account by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) in Committee of bailiffs coming to her home as a child. Not only did they take away goods, as they were empowered to do, but they wore what she described as the unfailingly identifiable uniform from those long-ago days of a bowler hat. Everyone knew that the bailiffs had come, so it was extra humiliating for her and her family.

The enforcement industry says with considerable force that uniforms make such a person identifiable not merely to the person whose home they have approached but to everyone else. It points out that from time to time, lamentably, even fire service personnel are attacked when they go into the community, so it fears that if its members were obliged to wear a recognisable uniform they would be more subject to attack. It is therefore a thornier issue than anyone first appreciated, but the reference in new clause 4 to “other means of identification” is the crux of the matter. I agree entirely that an enforcement agent must be clearly and easily identifiable to a debtor and readily accountable for his actions. Paragraph 26 of schedule 12 requires an enforcement agent to show the debtor and any person who appears to be in charge of the premises evidence of his identity and his authority to enter those premises. We are considering what form that evidence might take but, as I said in Committee, I am keen to introduce a single form of identification for all agents, with a unique identifying number—a photograph is probably important, too—so that a debtor approached by such a person at their front door knows exactly who they are, what their status is, precisely what authority they have to be there and, where appropriate, how to complain about an agent’s actions.

I respectfully suggest to the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey that, once again, I am in a position to demonstrate the political will to ensure that there is compliance with all of that in the regime that we have set up under the Bill. I invite him to consider the fact that there is no need to press his new clause to a vote. It is not apposite in our view to include all that detail in the Bill, as we will ensure that the issue is properly covered. Indeed, we would be very happy to consult and negotiate with him, or those people whom he nominates for consultation, to try to advance the matter powerfully. The exact form of identification will be determined after consultation with all the relevant stakeholders. In passing, the new clause appears to contain a flaw that was part of the proposal tabled in Committee, too, as it appears to suggest that enforcement agents would have to wear their uniform all the time. They might find it a little oppressive at the enforcement agents’ annual ball if they were required to wear their epaulettes—that might be an unintended imposition. As I said before, I think with characteristic wit, would the agent have to wear his uniform in bed? That is not the reason why we oppose the new clause: on a serious note, it is just unnecessary.

I appreciate the sentiments behind new clause 2 and amendments Nos. 5 and 42, and I restate the commitment that I gave in Committee. We will not allow enforcement agents to apply for a warrant to use reasonable force to enter domestic premises until we have full regulation of enforcement agents under the SIA. However, as I explained in Committee, chapter 1 of part 3, which the proposals would amend, is about much more than forced entry. It will introduce a great deal of valuable protection for debtors, including fixed dates and times at which enforcement agents can come to a premises; limits to methods of entry; exemption of goods from seizure; a single fee structure; and new remedies when enforcement agents break the law. There is no reason whatsoever to wait to implement all those protections until the SIA procedure is in place. New clause 2 and amendments Nos. 5 and 42 would prevent us from doing everything that we intend to do, and would mean that we would have to wait months and probably years before we could protect the public in the way in which all hon. Members intend.

Hon. Members will recall that a clause identical to new clause 5 was debated in Committee, and I remain of the view that the provision is not necessary. Clause 57 and paragraph 13 of schedule 12 already make provision for what the new clause is seeking to achieve. In particular, the provisions in new clause 5(1), (2) and (3) are very similar to those in clause 57. New clause 5(4), which deals with regulations governing procedures for taking control of goods, is nearly the same as paragraph 13(3) of schedule 12. I remain unconvinced of the merits of new clause 5(5), which seeks to exclude liabilities when securing goods on the highway, but does not cover goods secured on premises. Bailiffs would therefore have to take a different approach when taking control of goods depending whether they did so on the highway or on premises. That is likely to result in confusion, and it would go completely against our efforts to clarify and simplify procedures in the Bill.

Finally, amendment No. 37 would remove clause 57 from the Bill, and would prevent schedule 13 from taking effect. That would mean that the important consequential amendments in that schedule would not take effect, leaving enforcement agent law scattered across the statute book. It would do nothing to address the confusion and scope for abuse allowed by the law as a result of that scattering and of the differentiation between various pieces of legislation enacted at various times. I am sure that no one intends that, so I hope and predict that amendment No. 37 will not be pressed any further.

My hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby spoke, in passing perhaps, about fees. I know that that was an important part of what worried him in the Adjournment debate. Because, as he would say, bailiffs make money out of enforcement, it is possible for them to carry on enforcing in order to make more money. Paragraph 62 to schedule 12 allows the Secretary of State, the Lord Chancellor, to make regulations about costs and fees. It is our intention to use that power to ensure that the fees are front-loaded so that there is much less incentive for an enforcement agent to carry on, as my hon. Friend put it, in order to make money. Enforcement agents will get an up-front payment to do the job. I hope that will give the right kind of incentive and a powerful signal that those people are not working on a partisan basis for creditors, but that they work also as agents of the state.

I hope that what I have said across all these issues has reassured my hon. Friend and hon. Gentlemen, and that they now feel able to withdraw the proposals.

I thank the Minister for her full and careful response to the debate. It was extremely helpful that she dealt with all four new clauses and eight amendments in the group, which were tabled from different parts of the House and deal with several different but interrelated issues.

The Minister made the point and we all accept—there is a huge amount of common ground—that the Bill seeks to address the concerns of those who are old, those with learning difficulties, and those who are inadequate, poor, incapacitated, ill and vulnerable, who find at some stage in their lives that at their door—usually the door of their home, but occasionally the door of their business—somebody has come to enforce the consequence of some financial arrangement that they have got themselves into. As the hon. Member for Great Grimsby (Mr. Mitchell) said, it can start with something as inconsequential as a parking ticket, and often does, or with a clamp on their vehicle, if they have one. It can start with a very small fine for dropping litter on the street.

There was a story in the Evening Standard yesterday about some well known star or starlet—I forget who it was—who faces a huge fine for congestion charge non-payment because she thought that her vehicle was an eco-friendly vehicle that qualified for exemption, and therefore had never paid. She now discovers that she has been liable all the time. I am not defending her. I am merely pointing out that the bright, the intelligent and the well connected can get into trouble, and if they can, then people not in those categories are even more likely to do so.

People may have got into trouble with the local authority about council tax, or with child support liabilities, judgment debts at their local court, or credit cards. We could all quote statistics: 20 per cent. of people with credit cards are behind with their payments. Repossessions are running at 10,000 a year, and applications for repossessions at 100,000 a year. As we all agree, the number of such liabilities goes up all the time.

Does the hon. Gentleman accept also that it is not just people who are in financial trouble who will have someone knocking at their door? I am sure he has come across cases where a false address has been given or someone has moved, and the person in the property has great difficulty dealing with bailiffs who refuse to believe that they are not liable and continue to pester and harass them.

Indeed. I have a constituent who works in the building where our constituency office is, a relatively young and competent widow, who is in exactly that position, and I have taken up the case to try to deal with the people who are chasing her for debts that are not her liability at all. She finds it extremely oppressive.

Anything to do with a financial liability is so important that I find that I put it at the top of the cases that I deal with. Colleagues may do the same. Even if only a small sum is involved, I deal with the matter more urgently than with other cases because I know that often, if it is not dealt with quickly, it may escalate and become a much bigger problem. The penalty charge notice for non-payment of the congestion charge can suddenly get out of control.

I seek your guidance, Mr. Deputy Speaker, on when to move new clause 6.

The hon. Gentleman is slightly ahead of himself. All good things, or perhaps some good things, come to those who wait. We have to proceed now with new clause 3 and we will come later to new clauses 4 and 6.

I am grateful for that, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I have spent much of my life in that condition.

New Clause 3

Applications for relief under section 15: legal aid

‘The Lord Chancellor must by regulations make provision for legal aid for applicants for relief under section 15.’.—[Simon Hughes.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: new clause 11—Enforcement of Mobile Homes Act 1983—

‘(1) The Mobile Homes Act 1983 (c. 34) is amended as follows.

(2) In sections 1(5), 2(2), 2(3), and 2(4), for “the court”, substitute “the tribunal”.

(3) After section 3 insert—

“3A The tribunal

(1) The local authority for the district in which the protected site is situated must establish a tribunal to perform functions under this Act if the occupier or the owner so requests.

(2) The Secretary of State may make regulations about tribunals under this Act.

(3) Regulations under this section shall be made by statutory instrument.”.

(4) In section 4, and in the heading to that section, for “the court”, substitute “the tribunal”.

(5) In section 5(1)—

(a) omit the definition of “the court”, and

(b) at the appropriate place insert—

““the tribunal” means—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, the tribunal established under section 3A or, where the parties have agreed in writing to submit any question arising under this Act or, as the case may be, any agreement to which it applies to arbitration, the arbitrator;

(b) in relation to Scotland, the sheriff having jurisdiction where the protected site is situated or, where the parties have so agreed, the arbiter.”.

(6) After section 6(4) insert—

“(5) Section 3A extends to England and Wales only.”’.

Amendment No. 4, in clause 22, page 20, line 4,  at end insert—

‘(4A) The Tribunal Procedure Rules shall make provision for the granting by a judge of the First-tier Tribunal of legal aid for appropriate advice and representation in relation to any decision within the jurisdiction of the tribunal systems.’.

Amendment No. 72, in clause 31, page 26, line 43,  at end insert—

‘(11) The Lord Chancellor may be regulations provide for the payment of pensions, allowances or gratuities by way of compensation to or in respect of such persons who suffer loss of office as a result of the abolition of a tribunal by virtue of this section as may be so specified or so determined.

(12) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (11), regulations under this section may make provision—

(a) as to the circumstances in which compensation is payable;

(b) as to the amounts which are to be payable by way of compensation;

(c) as to the manner in which and the person to whom any claim for compensation is to be made; and

(d) for the determination of all questions arising under the regulations.’.

Amendment No. 9, page 141, schedule 6, leave out lines 18 and 19.

New clause 3 and amendment No. 4 relate to legal aid and amendment No. 72 is on an entirely different matter, with which amendment No. 9, tabled by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) also deals, and that is the specific matter of the future of the general commissioners of the Revenue and their staff, which is a matter of concern on both sides of the House.

New clause 3 contains the simple but hugely important proposal that the Lord Chancellor, the Minister of Justice, as he now is—or, as the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk commented, whoever he or his successor is soon to be—must by regulations make provision for legal aid for applicants for relief under clause 15.

The Minister rightly brings to the House a Bill that sets up a new structure for our tribunals, and that is welcome. In that system there is the ability under clause 16 for the upper tribunal to have a judicial review jurisdiction. At the moment, there is provision for legal aid in some tribunals and on some occasions. We accept and believe that in general terms tribunals should not have lots of lawyers doing legally aided work, but there are exceptions when legal aid should be available because a matter is particularly significant, important or difficult. At the moment, that is possible by obtaining ministerial agreement, but we think that that is over-centralist, and that it should be possible for legal aid to be granted through arrangements made by the Minister of Justice in a much more routine and matter-of-fact way.

Courts do important and significant work, but so do tribunals. We all know that, whether it is the social security tribunals dealing with people’s benefits, whether it is the industrial tribunals dealing with people’s employment rights, whether it is the race relations tribunals dealing with equality at work, or whether it is the asylum and immigration tribunals dealing with people’s status, they can determine people’s wealth, or their future in this country, and so on. We therefore believe that, exceptionally, there should be the ability to have legal aid in those places. New clause 3 would allow that, and we hope that the House will agree to it. Amendment No. 4 is a complementary proposal and I hope that it will commend itself to the House.

The last matter is a ring-fenced one that is of concern to only a small number of people, but it is important enough to deal with here, a view shared by Conservative Members. The clerks to the commissioners who have looked after adjudications on tax matters are remunerated by the Ministry of Justice on a salaried basis. They are dealt with by tax management legislation. The clerks to the general commissioners for taxes may work in a profession that is not terribly popular, but they do an extremely good, competent and valuable job.

Earlier in the year, the treasurer and secretary of the Association of Clerks to the General Commissioners of Income Tax wrote to Members of Parliament expressing a concern that because the general commissioners of income tax are currently a tribunal dealing with income tax and corporation tax matters, as they have been for 210 years, but are to be abolished and disappear with the general tribunal system, they need to be looked after as a group of people who will have no automatic continuing career. The role of the clerk will effectively disappear completely when the Bill becomes law and is implemented.

There are 244 clerks—or there were when we were first approached—mostly part-time, and many are retired professionals from other walks of life, business, the law or the Revenue, employed by the general commissioners of tax, paid for by the Ministry of Justice. There is no compensation for loss of office for these people. Therefore we tabled amendment No. 72 to allow the Lord Chancellor, by regulations, to

“provide for the payment of pensions, allowances or gratuities by way of compensation to or in respect of such persons who suffer loss of office as a result of the abolition of a tribunal by virtue of this section”.

It gives a general permissive power which we hope would allow the Lord Chancellor to treat these people justly when their jobs end.

I had hoped, as the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk and others had, that by now this matter would have been resolved amicably. I know that these people and their representatives went to see Ministers and have had many communications. I had a letter dated 24 April—colleagues will have received a similar letter—from Baroness Ashton of Upholland, the Under-Secretary of State who looked after the Bill in the other place. She tells me that she has carefully considered the issues and merits of including a provision for compensation, but that on balance she does not believe that the Bill should be amended to allow for that, because—I summarise for the sake of brevity—the legal advice is that these people are fee-paid office holders, which is a status creating no expectation in law of compensation. That was the confirmed ministerial view in April. Since then, even as recently as in the last week, there has been a further meeting with Ministers, but as I understand it, there is still no resolution that is satisfactory to the clerks.

This is a plea that those people, who have been public servants in the most important of jobs, done hugely professionally, should not be left out in the cold as a by-product of the legislation. I hope that at this last hour we can persuade Ministers either to accept amendment No. 72 or amendment No. 9.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, Central (Jenny Willott) represents a city where a large number of people are employed by the Revenue and look after Revenue matters for Member of Parliament. I think that all Members’ tax matters are dealt with in Cardiff, so my hon. Friend has a particular constituency interest, and we also have a general interest. These are people who have served us specifically and the country at large, and I hope that we can look after them, at their request, and treat them decently.

New clause 11 refers to park homes, the legislation behind which can be found in the Mobile Homes Act 1983, as amended. The Government were genuine in the amendments they made to park homes legislation in the Housing Act 2004. I am the first to admit that the new clause is very broad in its attempt to resolve a serious problem and I hope the Minister can help me in finding the best way forward.

I have 11 park home sites in my constituency, the largest of which has over 150 units. Bizarrely, these are not dwellings under the law, but chattels. They have many of the rights of properties, but they cannot be considered as such under the law. Most park home sites are well managed and I am a great supporter of this type of living, which affords the occupants an excellent life choice; an affordable home and a way of maintaining savings while living in a social environment.

All is not well in park homes across the country, however. This week I attended a meeting of the all-party group on mobile homes, chaired by the excellent hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Olner). We heard from the National Association of Park Home Residents that despite all the recent legislation and genuine attempts from both sides of the House to address the problems, dwellers in mobile homes are worse off than ever.

Under the provisions of the Housing Act 2004, unscrupulous site owners have been free to charge huge additional sums for the extra administration caused by legislation. Under the new legislation, park home owners may require the site owner to give notice of 14 days before entering their buildings. Site owners are now asking residents to put electricity meters outside their homes and to pay for that. All these costs resulting from legislation, along with changes to the RPI and other matters, are piling pressure on to some of the most financially challenged people in our communities.

The majority of park home sites are well managed. Residents get on well with the site owner and they can enjoy their lives. But in too many sites, unscrupulous owners behave in a way that sometimes defies belief. I have used terms like “Dickensian” and “robber baron” perhaps too freely, to the point where I am exaggerating a little, but there is great misery and concern.

The clause concerns the resolving of disputes. One problem area is the sale of properties. Let us say that an elderly park home owner has to move into residential care and puts her home on the market. Under the terms of legislation and her agreement, she can sell to anyone, but the site owner has to agree that that person can take over. He cannot take an unreasonable attitude to the new purchaser and has 28 days to approve. However, he can comply with the legislation precisely by saying, “I am delighted that you have bought this park home and that you will be living on my site. I think you should know that I’m going to make your life hell. I am going to try to increase pitch fees to the maximum, put more units on the site and not resurface the roads.” Pretty soon, the purchaser realises that this is not where they want to spend the more leisurely years of their life and pulls out of the deal. After that has happened two or three times, the vendor is so desperate that she agrees to sell at a knock-down price to the park site owner. To add insult to injury, he then takes 10 per cent. of the sale fee.

I am seeking to allow park home owners to raise such horrendous matters in a more appropriate form of tribunal than currently exists. It takes great courage for individuals to follow due process, be it through the courts or a tribunal, to achieve redress. There is the added problem that local authorities, who have huge responsibilities for park homes sites, are not exercising their full powers. I am not blaming my local authority—it is reasonably assiduous—but there are many stories of local authorities not exercising their powers within licensing agreements to improve the quality of life for park home dwellers.

I want to raise the issue of park home owners who wish to have a residents’ association. On well-run sites, enlightened site owners welcome residents’ associations. It can be a mutually beneficial experience, as the site owner can have a direct link, through one group of people, to all the park home owners. Conversely, people feel that they have a conduit for their concerns on a regulated basis through an organisation with a constitution.

The unscrupulous site owner finds such associations a threat, however. In one site in my constituency, the owner has written to residents to set out his reasons why he does not want a residents’ association on the site. He said in his letter that those who are pushing for an association have a “hidden agenda” and that such schemes often cause ill-feeling between residents and park owners. He is really saying that he does not want the residents of that park home to be empowered, as they are entitled to be under the law, to represent their concerns in a properly constituted body.

The standard trick by the unscrupulous site owner is to divide and rule. I have witnessed many cases where the owner has asked people to withdraw their names from petitions calling for a residents’ association, with the proposed association then falling. There have been even worse cases where owners have passed out private information about the circumstances of individuals who are trying to set up residents’ associations.

What options exist for an aggrieved park home dweller to resolve a dispute? Really, the only option is the county court, which is a laborious and expensive process. By and large, the people concerned have reached the stage of their lives where they do not want or need the hassle of going to a county court to resolve a dispute. There must be a better way of doing it. I have discovered that local authorities can, if they wish, set up tribunals to carry out their functions in settling disputes or dealing with local authority matters. Basically, local authorities can do what they like when exercising their own powers, but they may not set up a tribunal to deal with something that is out of their jurisdiction. They can, for example, deal with licensing measures, but they cannot act when residents are trying to set up a residents association but are unable to do so. That is the problem that I seek to resolve through the new clause. In some circumstances, it is in people’s interests to go to the county court, because if they get a bad judgment they can at least appeal. That route remains attractive in dealing with several kinds of disputes, but for a great many people the county court remains a daunting prospect, to the point where they are not prepared to go down that path.

I hope that the way in which the Mobile Homes Act 1983 was amended by statutory instrument last year may offer a way forward. If the Minister is willing to meet me, and perhaps members of interested bodies on both sides, to discuss that option, I will be prepared to consider withdrawing the new clause to find a better method of resolving the situation. In any event, I hope that she will take from this debate the serious concerns that exist among thousands of people, many of whom have reached a point in their lives where they simply do not want the overbearing responsibility, difficulty, expense and process of going to a county court when there must be a better and more local tribunal system that can deal with their concerns.

I would like first to address my remarks to new clause 11, which was so ably discussed by my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Mr. Benyon), who put the case very well and made his points extremely eloquently.

We all have experiences of mobile home parks in our constituencies. The vast majority are well run, well managed and enjoy a happy state of affairs, as in the case of the 10 or 11 in my constituency. That is endorsed by what I have heard from the National Association of Park Home Residents. There is none the less the danger that unscrupulous site managers or owners may want to adopt a particular course of action. As my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury said, many of them are opposed to the idea of residents associations. Sometimes their agenda is to remove existing tenants who have sub-standard vans. There have been several examples of that around the country, including a case in Oxfordshire and one in Cambridgeshire, where a site changed hands and the new owners wanted to replace the existing vans with a much more upmarket type for which they could charge much more rent. They use every tactic in the book to try to frighten people off. There are examples of straightforward intimidation, noise harassment and blackmail, where people were told that if they did not sell their van and move on they would have services cut off and pitch fees increased. It was a catalogue of the most unscrupulous behaviour that I have ever seen.

When such an example occurred in my constituency, on the Hardwick road site, I am pleased to say that some of the worst excesses of behaviour did not take place, but there were still grounds for concern. It belongs to the local authority, which had let it to a site owner. There was nothing in the lease to prevent the tenant from sub-letting it, so they sub-let it to a new site manager, who decided that he wanted to change the whole character and complexion of the site and move from fairly middle-of-the-range types of vans to smart, upmarket vans, each of which cost in excess of £60,000 or £70,000, and sometimes much more. As a result, we have a well managed, smart site, but at the expense of some of the tenants who wanted to stay there.

I am a non-practising solicitor. Do the hon. Gentleman and the Conservative party support legal aid for employment tribunal cases?

That is a good question. I believe that employment tribunal cases should come under the same system as other tribunals. We must consider cost, and I am keen to bear down on the cost of legal aid. We have held a lengthy debate on the matter and I do not support the Government’s changes. However, we could bear down heavily on, for example, the cost of expert witnesses in parts of the legal system, and more heavily on the cost of highly complex criminal cases. We could examine what some of the top criminal QCs earn—parliamentary questions on that were answered this week, showing some extraordinary figures. There is a world of haves and have-nots. Top QCs earn a vast amount of money while junior barristers earn little and can hardly make a living. I would therefore include employment tribunals in the entire tribunal system.

Let me consider amendment No. 9. My hon. Friends and I believe it is one of the most important amendments that we will consider this afternoon. It would remove the general commissioners for tax from the new unified structure, which sets up the new tribunal system. Conservative Members support the new unified tribunal structure, which is the result of a huge amount of preparation and work, flowing from the Leggatt report, Green Papers, much debate and a great deal of pressure from the different Departments that sponsor tribunals. It makes sense to try to bring the tribunals together into a unified system and have cross-referencing of infrastructure. Judges will also be able to be more versatile.

However, I should like the Minister to reflect on what the general commissioners do. There are roughly 2,000, with 214 clerks. The hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey said that there were 244, but I believe that the figure is 214; perhaps we both misread the letter from Susan Balchin, who is secretary of the Association of Clerks to the General Commissioners of Income Tax.

The general commissioners do a superb job. They are lay people and volunteers, who sit in the nearest town to where the taxpayer who will have a hearing lives. The appellant—the taxpayer—can therefore go to the local town and appear before general commissioners who are local, lay, unremunerated people with common sense. The system is based on informality and an understanding that the appellants’ problems will be sorted out by lay people who understand the community. It could be a farming community, an industrial community, a community that consists mainly of retired people or one that is part of an inner city. The essence of the current system is that lay commissioners understand the community from which the appellants come and sit in judgment in an informal, unintimidating atmosphere on the appeals of those who have problems with their tax affairs.

I am fortunate, because so far I have never had a tax appeal, touch wood. I do not know whether any of my hon. Friends have had a tax appeal, but we all have constituents who experience problems with their taxes. We have all experienced constituents coming to our surgeries with a pile of papers probably 4 ft high, and extraordinarily complex tax problems. If they want to appeal against Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, they can take the case to the general commissioners, who are local people.

That process will be replaced by a tribunal system, chaired by a judge with a professional clerk. It will be much more intimidating and far more formal. Furthermore, it will be much more remote because the new tribunals will sit at regional centres. Those presiding will not have the local knowledge, which is now so important.

Let us not forget that the lay commissioners give their services on a pro bono basis; they get only some expenses. They have local knowledge and their positions have existed for 200 or 300 years. The current system builds on the best in localism—choice and flexibility. That is what my party stands for.

Especially flexibility.

I shall not go down the route that the hon. Gentleman suggests, except to say that I am sure his party is relieved not to be the recipient of the recent defection.

The system is quaint and old-fashioned but it works. We feel strongly that if something works well, we should retain it. Why build a system on the basis of one size fits all? Why not have some flexibility? If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. The cost of trying to fix it will be considerable.

The current system costs approximately £5 million. Getting rid of the general commissioners and the clerks, setting up the new system with judges and bringing it into the tribunal system, with professional clerks who have no local knowledge and sit in regional centres, will cost perhaps two and a half times as much as the current system. A cost of roughly £5 million could increase to £12.5 million unnecessarily. Will that result in the taxpayer and consumer getting a better service? The answer is manifestly no. The consumer will have to take a tax appeal to a system that is far more formal and much more remote and costly.

Schedule 6 contains a list almost a mile long of all the different tribunals that the Bill affects. One sort of tribunal should not be included. We make a plea to the Minister, even at this late stage, to listen to the general commissioners. They say that their system works extraordinarily well and that they do a superb job for our constituents. We ask the Minister to listen to them and exempt them, even at this late stage.

If my party is elected to government in the next couple of years—

When.

I do not want to take anything for granted. If one takes too much for granted, one loses trust and credibility. However, I make a commitment that, if the amendment is not accepted and if we are elected at the next election, we will reverse the proposals and ensure that the general commissioners are kept out of the unified tribunal system.

I shall take the items in the same order in which they were proposed, if that is acceptable to all the parties who have spoken. First, I shall deal with amendment No. 4, which deals with legal aid—

New clause 3?

New clause 3 was indeed first; the hon. Gentleman is right. I hope that he will not mind if I deal with legal aid generally first, then come to his specific proposal on legal aid afterwards.

indicated assent.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman.

Amendment No. 4, which was also tabled by the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes), deals with legal aid. Many points have been raised about legal aid, and in particular about bearing down on the costs involved. The proposals that we have introduced following the Carter review are intended to do that.

The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) has talked about the cost of expert witnesses, and we are already bearing down on that. We are looking at how expert witnesses are remunerated, and at how they should be remunerated in the future, under legal aid. He mentioned a recent parliamentary question in which the earnings of what he called “top QCs” from legal aid were set out. It is true that those earnings are considerable, but it is only fair to point out that the figures are not necessarily the earnings of those individuals for the year in question alone. They can run back to earlier years, because some cases are very long. At the same time, figures have also been published, although not in answer to that particular question, showing the legal aid fees of what I am sure the hon. Gentleman would call “top solicitors”—they are certainly the top-earning solicitors—and they, too, were very sizeable indeed. I do not believe that there is a clash between the two sides of the profession in this regard.

The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk referred to the junior Bar, about which I also have concerns. The real problem for junior members of the Bar is not the level of legal aid payment, however; it is more to do with their not being fully occupied.

I salute what my hon. and learned Friend has done in trying to bear down on legal aid costs. There is a huge disparity in the system involving the moneys paid to top criminal barristers. I speak as a solicitor with no brief for barristers, but I understand that the figures for barristers’ pay that were recently quoted included VAT, which does not go into the barrister’s pocket, and the office costs that they have to pay to run their business. That is like ascribing the turnover of a business to the owner of the business as earnings. The figures are still very high, and they should be borne down on, but we must bear in mind that the netted-down figures are not quiet as alarming as the gross figures that are now in circulation.

rose—

I will deal with my hon. Friend’s point, then I will gladly give way to the hon. Gentleman.

As I have already said, I do not think that VAT is applied in those circumstances, but I might be wrong. Let me emphasise that this information was disclosed as a consequence of a parliamentary question put to me by an hon. Gentleman from the main Opposition party. My hon. Friend is right, however. We must also take into consideration what we, in our rarefied atmosphere, call chambers expenses. Those include the cost of running the business, and they are shared among all the barristers who share secretarial assistants, clerking and so on. I have already made probably the biggest point about this, which is that the fees—particularly of barristers, but probably of solicitors, too—often relate to cases that have gone on across more than one tax year. We must therefore not get too carried away, but there is none the less a need to bear down on excessive legal aid costs, as my hon. Friend happily acknowledges, and which, on an earlier occasion, the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk has also acknowledged.

On Second Reading, I spoke of an experience that I had had when a vexatious claim was made against me as a small businessman, and of the effect that it had on my time and my business. Legal aid obviously provides access to justice in many cases, but does the Minister agree that it must also be measured in the context of taking action against those who use the system for vexatious cases? A provision exists that allows for tribunals to impose a bond whereby a cost can be imposed on an individual who brings a vexatious case; this is strongly supported by organisations such as the CBI. That system is not being used enough, however. Is there anything that the Minister can do to assure us that where provision exists for bonds to be put in place, it will be used?

I am more familiar with the procedure in the legal aid system in which another party to a case has the option of writing to the Legal Services Commission to say that in their view the legal aid is being misused, and to set out a case. That is a tool that can be used as part and parcel of the dispute, and it sometimes is, but if it is well grounded, the Legal Services Commission will be obliged to look at it. That is a step that ought to be taken in the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman has outlined.

The amendment is similar to amendments tabled in Committee, and in the Grand Committee and on Report in the other place. In both Houses, the amendments were pressed to a vote, and in both Houses they were defeated. One of the greatest assets of tribunals is that people do not usually need a lawyer to pursue their point. As the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk puts it, “Let’s keep lawyers out of it if we can.” Tribunals are not courts. Unlike courts, most tribunals do not rely on strict rules of evidence; they adopt a much more inquisitorial approach. They question the user to find out the relevant information, and do not therefore place the burden entirely on him to present his argument. The majority of tribunal users can relay their evidence by answering questions, without the need for legal representation.

For those who qualify financially, however, legal aid is available in the form of a legal help scheme. Although that does not provide representation, it does provide advice and assistance and can pay for counsel’s advice within its fee structure. For example, in the situation conjured up by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk, in which someone’s case is adjourned mid-tribunal for a complicated point of law to be tackled, resort to legal help would make available solicitor’s or counsel’s advice on the point in question.

The Government understand that the tribunal experience can be daunting for some. As the new tribunals come on stream, there will be a wave of effort to ensure that users of tribunals receive good information. We will improve information and provide the opportunity for the case to be informally evaluated before the hearing process gets under way, which will be hugely helpful and give pointers to people seeking to represent themselves at tribunal.

We acknowledge, however, that legal aid for representation has a role in tribunals. It is available for the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Mental Health Review Tribunal. It is also available, in cases of special difficulty, for all tribunals where the exceptional funding criteria are met. I think that the hon. Members for North-West Norfolk and for Newbury (Mr. Benyon) both referred to that.

We would like to do more. As I said on Second Reading and in Committee, we are reforming the legal aid system. We are putting lawyers on fixed fees for standard cases, but with exceptional cases being paid for by the hour, which will help control the legal aid budget. The reasons for those changes are partly so that we can rebalance the legal aid budget towards the civil side, including social welfare law. That is imperative, and it is our purpose. Those are my comments about the broad issue of legal aid.

New clause 3 would require the Lord Chancellor to provide legal aid for judicial review hearings transferred to the upper tribunal. I understand the point, and have immense sympathy with it. Were there a judicial review in the court, legal aid would follow. Were the judicial review moved across to the upper tribunal, however, legal aid would follow only if the exceptional funding criteria were brought into use. I understand that that difference is unacceptable. We intend to change the funding code, which does not require an amendment, so that legal aid for judicial review in the High Court is available if a judicial review is transferred to the upper tribunal. Consequently, the scope of legal aid will be amended.

I hope that that meets the nub of what the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey was getting at with new clause 3. It seems to me that we should go further and monitor the transfer of cases to the upper tribunal, which we will do. We should also monitor the change that will inevitably come as a result of the implementation of the Bill and the existence of the upper tribunal: what would now have to go to judicial review would instead be able to go as a statutory appeal to the tribunal. If, in due course, that started to happen, we would not want people to be disadvantaged by the non-availability of legal aid. For the time being—I hope that this meets the need that the hon. Gentleman has identified—we intend to ensure that the scope of legal aid is extended, so that if a case is transferred to the upper tribunal, legal aid will be available if it is a judicial review.

The Minister is being very helpful. If she clarifies one point, I will be happy to respond to her invitation in relation to new clause 3. As I understand it, the Government intend to achieve, through the proposal that she sets out, exactly what we propose in new clause 3—that there should be legal aid for applicants for relief under section 15, which is the judicial review provision. If it is confirmed that all section 15 applicants will be covered, I shall respond positively to her suggestion.

Those who are eligible for legal aid for a judicial review in the High Court will not be put at a disadvantage if the case is transferred to the upper tribunal. We will therefore extend the scope of legal aid so that they get legal aid. I hope that that answer is satisfactory to the hon. Gentleman. An amendment is not required.

On new clause 11, I congratulate and compliment the hon. Member for Newbury on taking the opportunity to draw public attention to such issues. I, too, think that to live in an affordable park home sounds like quite an agreeable lifestyle choice. The stories that we have heard about blackmail, bullying and people behaving badly and abusing their power are appalling. I am sorry that that goes on. I hope that I can bring forward a positive suggestion in relation to his constituents’ difficulties with the fact that the only place for the resolution of disputes is the county court.

The hon. Gentleman has 11 mobile home sites within his constituency—I think that I have two—and he is an active member of the all-party group on the welfare of park home owners. He probably also knows that the Department for Communities and Local Government is working closely with representatives of both site providers and residents to try to develop proposals for alternative forms of resolution. If he did not know that, let me make clear that that is going on, and if wishes to get involved on behalf of the 11 mobile home sites in his constituency, I shall make sure that he has sufficient information.

Alternative ways of resolution other than the courts are being considered. Currently, disputes go to the county court under the mobile homes legislation. I understand that negotiations have thrown up some issues that both sides of the park home sector agree should remain in the county court. If that is so, those issues will no doubt stay in the county court. For the benefit of the hon. Gentleman’s constituents, let me say that the county court has a small claims track, which is likely to be a route that can be taken by people in some of the predicaments that he has described. Its procedures are very much simplified, and the district judges who operate that track are proactive and immensely helpful to those who are unrepresented and not well versed in matters of law.

Many county courts also increasingly have mediation officers, to whom district judges can send cases that they think are appropriate for mediation. It sounds possible that some of the issues raised would be appropriate for mediation. Whether or not that is the case, if it is agreed at the end of negotiations that some issues should remain in the county court, that should not put off constituents who have a real cause for complaint, because the small claims track is not a fully bewigged, begowned, formal, “my learned friend” sort of experience. It is much more informal than that.

Once there is overall agreement on the best routes for dispute resolution, the Government can, and will be happy to, use the provisions in the Housing Act 2004 to transfer those disputes that it is agreed should be transferred to a tribunal setting. The tribunal will be the residential property tribunal service, which is an existing national tribunal service that already deals with issues such as rent and leasehold, so should be well versed in the kind of territory over which some of the disputes arise. Transfer can be achieved by an affirmative statutory instrument under the 2004 Act, making the amendment unnecessary. Of course, if that process is used there will be a debate allowing scrutiny of the proposed transfer.

The hon. Gentleman did not intend his amendment to be perfection incarnate, and it would be very expensive to set up individual tribunals for each of the 269 local authorities that have park homes, so the proposition I have described is much better. I hope that I have set the hon. Gentleman’s mind at rest and that he will participate, on behalf of his constituents, in the discussions that are going on, so that in due course park home owners can have ready access to recourse when they are treated in the appalling way that he described.

I turn now to the general commissioners for income tax. I should make it clear that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, South (Mr. Sutcliffe), will have responsibility for tribunals—at least for another couple of hours— and that is why he has discussed the issue with the commissioners. Amendment No. 9, tabled by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk, would remove the reference to the general commissioners, while amendment No. 72 would enable compensation to be paid for loss of office as a result of this Bill.

The primary concern of both amendments is the question of compensation to clerks following the abolition of their office. I was impressed by the impassioned plea for the retention of the status quo made by the hon. Gentleman, but I believe that he generally supports the streamlining process in this Bill. It is a thin case to suggest that the issue of compensation means that the tax commissioners should be left out entirely.

I assure the Minister that amendment No. 9 is not driven exclusively by the concerns about compensation for loss of office, but by real concerns about the new system for the general commissioners’ work. We are concerned about the structure.

I accept that entirely and I am grateful for that intervention. The hon. Gentleman made the point that costs of appeals would increase, but we do not accept that. There should be no increase in cost and the unified and, we would say, more expert system that will begin when the commissioners are put into the tribunal system will be more efficient and consequently, if anything, cheaper.

The Minister has touched on a point that struck me when the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) was talking. He mentioned the £5 million cost of the general commissioners, but he did not include—the figures may not have been available—the potential cost of the appeals from lay general commissioners who through no fault of their own make the wrong decision. Did it also strike the Minister that the hon. Gentleman made a contradictory argument when he claimed that the new system would be more expensive because of the staff involved, but then suggested that there would be loss of office? Is it not possible that some of those 200 or so general commissioners’ clerks could be transferred into the new system with no loss of office?

My hon. Friend makes a good point about the potential cost of appeals if the persons hearing the cases in the first instance are less expert. That is a truism across the board.

I acknowledge the statement by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk that his amendment is concerned with the structure. We are confident that tax appeal modernisation is an important part of the tribunal reforms. We intend such appeals to fall within the new tribunal system.

The Liberal Democrat amendment is about compensation. My hon. Friend the Under Secretary met with the clerks yesterday to listen to their arguments. It has been the view of the Government that no compensation is appropriate, and nothing was put forward in those discussions that changed the Government’s mind on the matter. The clerks are not salaried, as the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey suggested: they are fee-paid office holders—[Interruption.] I must have misheard the hon. Gentleman. There is no expectation attached to that status of compensation if the office is abolished.

Clerks handle their work load in their own way: they are not directed by the Department. Some clerks do a lot of work and either manage that work alongside being a practicing solicitor or as their sole activity. But most clerks earn very little. The average remuneration is under £5,000. Only 10 out of 356 divisions generate more than £20,000 in fees for the clerk. The exact breakdown of that fee will vary from clerk to clerk, but a fee of £20,000 equates to approximately 60 hours of hearing time a year. For the vast majority, our reforms represent not a loss of their livelihood, but merely the loss of one source of income for their firm.

Reform of the tax appeals system has been on the agenda for many years. The clerks have known for two years that the present system was likely to be abolished. It will not be abolished until April 2009 and they have had, and continue to have, ample time to look for alternative sources of income. Firms have to do this all the time, of course.

Furthermore and importantly, appeal numbers have been declining since self-assessment for income tax was introduced. It is unreasonable to suggest that there can be a legitimate expectation that the present level of income from that work would have continued had the system not been abolished. The existing compensation scheme is in the context of a continuing general commissioner system and not its abolition. If the system were continuing and there were to be a merger of divisions and a choice had to be made as to which of a number of clerks would be clerk of the merged division, it would be reasonable to compensate those who lost the opportunity to carry on. But where the whole system is to be abolished it would be an inappropriate use of public money to compensate all those individuals who happen to be earning fees from the scheme at the time. We have looked carefully at the examples of compensation schemes cited by the clerks in support of their case, but we are advised that none of them constitutes a legal precedent. Nor is there any breach of the Human Rights Act, although no one has today suggested that that is the case.

The Government have already agreed to top up fees if the work load in the final year is higher than the preceding year. It now looks likely that the nature of the work in the last year will require some additional duties of the clerks, to assist in transition from old to new system. My officials are considering the details of a final-year scheme that will take full account of those additional duties and ensure that clerks are fully and properly remunerated for all that they do up to the end of the scheme.

The Government cannot accept an amendment that would set back our plans for tax appeal modernisation, which is what the Conservatives’ amendment would do. We also remain unconvinced by the arguments put in favour of compensation.

I hope my few words about looking at the final year will have cheered the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey a little. The Under-Secretary of State for Justice has said that he hopes to recover the good will of the clerks, but we remain unconvinced about the amendments and cannot accept them.

If you will allow me, Madam Deputy Speaker, I shall start my response by saying that we began the debate under one regime, and will finish under a new Prime Minister. On behalf of all those in the House when he was elected, and of everyone else, I extend our congratulations and best wishes to him and his family. I am sure that we will support everything that he does in the national interest. The Minister and I are of the same generation as the new Prime Minister, and so have a particular cause for rejoicing.

With his new clause 11, the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. Benyon) rightfully put on record an important and significant matter of concern. The Minister was not able to accede to his request, but I hope that the fact that his argument was heard will mean that the people who live in park homes around the country get a better response to their concerns in future.

The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) and I then sought to persuade the Minister about the general commissioners of taxes and their clerks. I meant to say that they were fee earners and not salaried, but stand corrected if I did not. I incorrectly said that Lisvane, where our taxes are processed, was in Cardiff rather than Llanishen, but the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk rightly said that general commissioners and their clerks meet and serve locally. Unlike the Revenue as a whole, therefore, they offer very much a local face and presence. The hon. Gentleman said that he had never appeared before the commissioners: I have, at a hearing in London, and found them very courteous and helpful.

I met the Under-Secretary yesterday. He is currently responsible for these matters, but I have not yet had the full feedback from the meeting. I hear what the Minister has said today and, although we still want to support the commissioners and clerks, we will defer to the Conservative amendment that I understand will be moved later.

I am grateful to the Minister for accepting exactly our proposals on legal aid in new clause 3. Amendment No. 4 also deals with legal aid, and we still believe that having a more express permission for the granting of legal aid in the Bill would be of benefit. When the time comes, we will put that amendment to the will of the House. I shall ask to withdraw new clause 3, then move new clause 4 formally. I know that the hon. Member for Great Grimsby (Mr. Mitchell) wants to press new clause 6 to a Division, and then we shall do the same for amendment No. 4.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 4

Uniforms

‘All enforcement agents, both private and Crown-employed, must at all times wear such uniform or other means of identification as shall be prescribed.’.—[Simon Hughes.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Motion made, and Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—