It is a great pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr. Taylor. You normally sit next to me on the Back Benches, but it is nice to see you in an appropriate place. I thank Mr. Speaker for allowing us to have this important debate, which is timely given the circumstances of the past few weeks.

I wish to place on record my appreciation of the unsung heroes who did their bit to show, to use local Glasgow parlance, that the UK will not be messed with in circumstances such as those at Glasgow airport. That goes for police, on or off duty, baggage handlers and of course the obligatory taxi driver, all of whom served the occasion extremely well.

I also wish to record my appreciation of my own airport, Glasgow Prestwick. The management and staff immediately swung into action and put in place what later became the guidance given to them by the airport security directors by blocking off all the car routes into the airport and to the terminal buildings. It is only right for me to congratulate them on ensuring that that was done without any delays to scheduled flights, despite their having to put up with a number of diverted planes from Glasgow airport.

The Government need to address airport security urgently. Over a great number of years, there have been major incidents such as Lockerbie and the one that caused the most concern to the industry, that of 11 September 2001. We must be careful about what we say, because the last thing that we want to do is to give any information to anyone who is likely to use it for all the wrong reasons.

As a Member of Parliament from north of the border, I travel frequently on airlines. One could almost describe me as a seasoned traveller. By using airports twice a week, I have got to know the system pretty well, although perhaps not all of it. In addition, I have used airports regularly as a member of the Select Committee on Transport for some 14 years. We regularly examine security at airports, and as a consequence I have picked up something about the system. From that, I recognise that there are four areas of responsibility in airport security: that of the passenger, who in turn expects the airport authorities and airlines to be well versed in their areas of responsibility. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, there are the responsibilities given to the Government and, through them, to agencies such as Transec.

The passenger has been affected over the years by increased restrictions, which have been in place for a considerable time. Some of them have regularly created chaos at a substantial number of airports, and at particular airports it has become the norm to have chaos. The question for the passenger is whether they perceive the restrictions that have been imposed as being over the top. One thing that passengers certainly have to put up with, and that I have had to put up with over the years and particularly in the past few months, is the inconsistency of security. In addition, they have to watch other passengers who are travelling through airports for perhaps the first time in their lives and do not have a single clue about how to deal with security, thereby cluttering up the approaches to security areas.

One faces other problems. I do not know whether it is parliamentary to show them, but I have with me a knife and fork that were presented to me by a constituent after he had collected them airside at Glasgow airport. He had been to Spain and was refused permission to carry a set of cutlery on to the plane as a wedding present. He went through security and came out the other side, went for a meal and was presented with the knife and fork that I have with me. Now, tell me that they could not damage somebody. The inconsistencies of the system need to be examined better by the Government and their agencies.

By virtue of the fact that the airlines have had additional costs, passengers’ fares are being loaded to the extent that they are becoming out of the reach of many of my constituents and, I am sure, those of many of my colleagues. British Airways and Virgin Atlantic tell me that one issue alone is costing them millions of pounds a month: items of hand luggage, on which there is a discrepancy between the UK and the rest of Europe. That has meant that business travellers in particular, instead of coming through Heathrow to interconnect and come back to God’s country, Scotland, are going through Schipol, Charles de Gaulle or Frankfurt airports. That is nonsense, and for too long it has been left as part of the review that is taking place. It needs to be addressed more urgently.

Baggage loss in interconnections is another factor. The amount of baggage lost must have security implications. Every time I have interconnected at Heathrow in the past year, I have lost my bags for at least a day and on one occasion for a week. What concerned me on that occasion was that nobody seemed to know where my bag was. Nobody had a clue. They tell people that there is a website on which you can see where your bag is and what the state of play is, but from day one to day seven the information was exactly the same—absolutely zilch. That needs to be examined seriously, because it is clear to me that there are major security implications.

Why, at some airports, do passengers who are reconnecting have to go through a second round of security checks? I have never understood that. They come off a plane that has flown from across the Atlantic, where security is tight. They come to Heathrow to connect to a flight northwards and have to go through the security system all over again. That seems to be using unnecessary manpower and should be examined. Surely it is time to consider what is known in the industry as “reasoned selection”. It is plainly folly that passengers go through the exercise of security twice, which causes long queues and is often responsible for considerable delays in aircraft taking off. I have even had some constituents complain that they have missed flights as a result of such delays. Unless those issues are dealt with, the industry, which is already suffering, will continue to suffer.

Let me turn from passengers to the airports themselves. Airports are required properly to resource the security element, and that is right. Although at times there has been a marked improvement—I have to admit that there have been times when such queues were not normal—it is also the case that passengers can guarantee that if they hit Heathrow at a certain time of the day there will be queues out the door.

In addition, I understand from discussions about what is happening behind the scenes that, because there are still problems with giving clearance to staff, catering and baggage handling are affected. That is all down to the fact that the airports do not seem to have a grip on the situation. Those are factors that delay airlines and aircraft in doing what they are there to do, which is, of course, to fly. I believe that it was my good friend Michael O’Leary who once said that planes do not make any money when they are sitting on the tarmac. It is clear that frustrations are building up, and many of them are partly caused by airport inefficiencies.

It is perhaps unavoidable that I should cite one particular airport owner, given that it controls the great bulk of passenger miles undertaken in this country. The company is BAA. We are told by Mr. Nelson, its chief executive, that it plans to put another £40 million into security, but that it still expects long queues on occasion while it is doing that. That is not good enough. Nor is it good enough to suggest that there is to be an extra 1,400 security guards. That in itself will not help the position greatly unless and until the company starts paying its staff at appropriate rates. In my 15 years of regular plane travel—and, before that, another 15 years of travelling just within Scotland by plane—I have never seen the same security guard at Heathrow twice. That suggests that there is enormous turnover of security staff at Heathrow. The company may be training them, but it is not paying them, and as long as it does not pay them, it is not providing the security that I and, I believe, my constituents require in order to feel safe as we move through airports.

Mr. Nelson promises that he will cut queuing to five minutes or less. I cannot envisage that happening in the foreseeable future unless there is an enormous change of emphasis.

Finally, on airports, baggage is still going missing. I have already dealt with that in part. I was told that at one time 40 per cent. of the baggage was missing. That is a ridiculously high level, but that was the figure on one day. That is unacceptable. The fact that the companies do not seem to know where bags are at any given time is a clear indication that something is fundamentally wrong with the organisation as it stands.

I agree with what the hon. Gentleman says about baggage. Indeed, the newspapers are always full of stories about how many bags are still in storage because they have not been given to their owners. Does he believe that the announcement yesterday by British Airways that it is considering electronically tagging bags so that it will be able to find them more quickly may help the situation?

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is correct. It is issues such as that which the Government and their agencies should be looking at and enforcing, if need be, because, as I have already said, there is clearly a security risk if baggage is not known to be in a certain place. There must be implications for security.

My final point about baggage is that I have been on planes when the bags have been loaded but passengers have gone AWOL. In one case just last week, the plane was delayed for three hours. First, we were told that the passengers were in transit and then, because they could not be found, that their bags would be taken off the plane. However, because of the system on that plane and because the bags were at the very front—they had been the first to be loaded—all the bags would have to be removed to get the missing passengers’ bags off. Believe it or not, by that time the passengers had turned up and the whole process started all over again. The situation is absolutely nonsensical, but that is what is happening in our airports. It does nothing for passenger safety.

On the policing of airports, I have to declare an interest, in that I am a member of the British Transport police and walk the beat now and again on the streets of London. It could be said that I have a degree of responsibility in that sense, but I also have experience that is not available to other Members. Regardless, I believe that we are now required—and, given the events of a few days ago, even more so—to consider having a dedicated police service for our airports such as we have at present for our train stations. I argue that it would be sensible to have such a service for our airports.

It is clear that airports have become a terrorist target. As a consequence, we require people who have specific experience to be able to deal with terrorism. At the very least, the issue needs more attention. The chief constable of Greater Manchester police said that we can have all the new technology that we like, but, just as in this place, it will never be a substitute for a dedicated police service that knows precisely what it is about. He said that

“new technology is not a substitute for a distinct presence at airports. Officers should be used to create a hostile environment for terrorists.”

That is a fundamental point, and it needs to be addressed by the Government.

Airlines themselves also have a responsibility. A spokesman for BA, which pays BAA £360 million a year for the benefit of flying in and out of its airports, recently said that it wanted Heathrow, its landlord, to be more efficient. It has called for a supervisory committee that includes airline representation to be set up to oversee BAA’s investment. I believe that the Government should support that common-sense proposal. Perhaps we should consider including on such a committee somebody to represent passengers—I am not bidding for the job—because it is clear that many of the elements that passengers face are not taken into consideration by anyone responsible.

The US Air Line Pilots Association believes that the focus on banned objects rather than behavioural patterns or passenger profiling leaves aviation unnecessarily vulnerable to future attacks by terrorists. I agree with that. Because of terrorists’ ingenuity, it is difficult to predict accurately the form of a future attack on an airliner or, for that matter, on an airport. Such a proposal may take some work, but there is no doubt whatever that suicidal hijackers and bombers exhibit behaviour patterns that can lead to their detection prior to their arriving at the airport or boarding a plane, even if their tools are not detected. That is surely the route that the Government and their agencies should take.

I turn to the Government and their agencies. It is good to see the Minister in his place. I should have said at the outset that I welcome him to his new role as Minister in the Department for Transport. The Government have announced several reviews over the years. I was fortunate to be given a briefing by the Library on this subject a few days ago. It is obvious that there have been several reviews over a considerable number of years, but that very little action has actually taken place, other than that which frustrates passengers and for which no explanation is given. We need much greater consistency in the decision-making process; that must become a priority. Dealing with passenger fatigue with sometimes incomprehensible instructions must also be a priority.

A considerable reduction in the number of people travelling by air has resulted from the restrictions. I know Members of Parliament who now travel by train from Glasgow and Scotland in general, and more and more business men are doing the same because of the restrictions associated with air travel. Without giving ideas to the terrorists, it might well be that because of the number of people who travel by train, they will turn their attention to that mode of transport. It does not take a degree in terrorism to work out that as many people travel by train as by plane. Someone can turn up at a train station, and get straight on a train that departs in seconds, but it takes hours to get through the system at an airport. The Government need to consider that issue.

I make a special plea to the Minister: as a matter of urgency, systems for dealing with hand luggage must be harmonised across Europe. The UK must be brought into line with the rest of Europe in that respect, otherwise our airline industry will continue to lose substantial revenue. As I have already mentioned, the issue of specialised policing should be considered. The British Transport police are after all the responsibility of the Department for Transport. The Government could easily apply their mind to that subject.

More emphasis should be put on watching potential terrorist bombers. In technical terms, border security and passenger data should be seriously considered as that would enable the screening of passengers for security and immigration purposes. The advancement of technology has created far more opportunities to streamline and to enhance the passenger travel process, rather than treating passengers like cattle, as we do now. Passenger name record—known in the industry as PNR—should be employed as a matter of urgency. I am told that there are indications that the PNR might be omitted from the UK’s e-borders programme. That could seriously undermine the effectiveness of any scheme introduced in the UK and requires immediate rebuttal by the Government.

The issue of “authority to carry” also requires immediate attention. We need the relevant information to check against a “watch list” of undesirable passengers and the Government must be proactive in securing that. Some 95 per cent. of passengers create no problems at all; it is the remaining 5 per cent. who cause all the problems. However, 95 per cent. of passengers are affected by security measures, while the remaining 5 per cent. go undetected. It is obvious that we have not had much success in dealing with that 5 per cent.

The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful point. The central issue is that we will get the measures that he has talked about only when we use existing off-the-shelf technology, which focuses on the ticketing process. Instead we currently have expensive Government-led IT projects based on flight manifests that by definition are too late; the aircraft has taken off by the time the search has been done.

The Opposition spokesman is absolutely right. I have received a briefing from an organisation that is employed in that sector. Why try to invent something when we have something that can operate as a system and that has proven itself in many countries? It is clear that that is another issue that needs to be looked at.

As I have said, if the Government intend to kick into touch the passenger name record, that will affect airport trade and aircraft travel for many years to come.

Biometrics is another issue that the Government should consider. It is a technology that already exists and automatically confirms the identity of a person by comparing patterns of physical characteristics. I do not understand why we do not use it more widely. Presently, I think that biometrics are used at Heathrow in terminals 2 and 3, but not in terminals 1 and 4. I understand that it is to be used in terminal 5, but not at this stage in terminals 1 and 4—the two busiest at Heathrow.

The hon. Gentleman makes another powerful point. I went to Armenia in April to monitor its elections and on my return journey, my fingerprints were checked and a copy of my passport was made. When I got to the boarding stage, I had to put my finger in something to ensure that they knew it was definitely me getting on the plane. If I had destroyed my passport for any reason, there would have a been a link. Such a system should be rolled out widely to ensure that the level of security is heightened.

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. Again, that is something that we should seriously consider. We are adopting a number of such systems and there are other systems that we would love to adopt but cannot possibly afford. We would all like to fly in Israeli planes because they are so safe, but putting such high numbers of passengers—some 90 million—through that process on an annual basis in the UK would be virtually impossible. We must be realistic about that.

The Government must hasten the development of ways of enhancing security. It is also important to speed up clearance and to alleviate delays at airports. As a frequent flyer, I think that more could be done and I speak on behalf of a growing band of travellers, when I say that I do not accept that making our lives better would compromise safely. I am not opposed to using biometrics or any other form of individual identification, such as fingerprints, if it smoothes the frustration of getting to my work and getting my fellow business men and travellers to work. At present, what we must face is quite unreal.

Following the recent terror threats in the UK, security measures have impacted greatly on the aviation industry because of immediate costs caused by the cancellation of flights and because of the impact on consumer confidence, which has been reflected in forward bookings. We need worldwide standards not only to ensure the safety of passengers, but to provide a clear and coherent message to the travelling public.

All that passengers want is to feel safe when they travel, and to get to their destination at the scheduled time. Every individual connected to air travel believes that passengers understand the need for enhanced security, but only if measures are well communicated, efficient and consistent. That is what I need to hear from the Minister this morning. Airlines, the Government and their agencies, and airport operators need to work together to ensure that that goal is achieved. I look forward to the Minister’s response and to other contributions.

I congratulate the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Donohoe) on his success in initiating this debate; it could not come at a more appropriate time. Perhaps we should refer to him as Sergeant Donohoe now that he has declared his interest. I congratulate him on personally contributing to the safety of people who travel, and I also congratulate all those who were involved in defeating the terrorists at Glasgow recently; they did an amazing job. The public worked together with the security forces and demonstrated that we will not be cowed by those who wish to terrorise us and make our lives more difficult. I sympathise with the Ministers who have to introduce policies to ensure that everybody will be secure when they travel. However, as the hon. Gentleman pointed out, we must also remember that passengers are customers, not cattle. People should not be prodded around and made to feel that travel will be impossible or incredibly difficult for them.

I was at Heathrow airport in August following the security scare of that time and the queues were enormous. Terminal 4 was an absolute circus and people were turning up and being told that they could not even enter the airport until the flight was announced on the Tannoys. People could not hear the Tannoys in the car parks and no one seemed to know what was happening. I am sure that many people missed flights on that day and indeed over the following days. It took considerable time to sort things out. Of course, people wanted to ensure that they were travelling safely, but the way that security checks were carried out on the day that I travelled seemed to show that there could have been a little more urgency in dealing with passengers. The attitude almost seemed to be that passengers at the airport were an irritant and that the airport would perform more smoothly if they were not there. Clearly, that must not be the case.

The hon. Gentleman made an important point about airports in the United Kingdom having to compete with a number of airports throughout Europe. A lot of passengers who use Heathrow or other UK airports as hubs can choose from other hubs. If Schiphol, Frankfurt or Charles de Gaulle are more efficient, they will choose those airports, so we must get this absolutely right. Furthermore, he talked about the fact that passengers can use trains in the UK. Terrorists have shown that they look for the weakest link. We know that they do that, which is why they moved from airplanes to airports, and, of course, security around airports is now being tightened. The other day, I was at Manchester airport, where they have stopped vehicular access to terminal 1 to prevent the ram raiding tried at Glasgow. As I said, terrorists look for the weakest link.

This week, I received a letter from a constituent, Mr. Andrew Moore, who used Manchester airport. On Sunday 17, he travelled from Manchester to Faro, but it took him a considerable amount of time to get through. I know that, on 10 June, they had a problem at Heathrow terminal 4—I actually asked a parliamentary question about it. It is all right for those going through fast track, although, these days, I would call it, relatively faster track. Fast track is important because we want to win the support of business passengers; we want them to use British airports. It is important that money is spent in the United Kingdom to ensure that that happens.

I am afraid, however, that if people can get through relatively-faster track in 10 minutes, why should those travelling on economy tickets have to wait an hour and a half? That is a real issue, although Manchester had a blip on that day, and BAA was good enough to send me a graph showing that, for most of the day, people were getting through in under 10 minutes, but that then there was a four-hour period during which the queues at terminal 4 were outside the door and virtually on to the car park. Clearly, that is unacceptable and they need to ensure proper manning levels at security arches. Nothing is more frustrating for passengers who, having waited an hour, find, when they are finally searched at the security arches, that some of them are closed. They think, “Well, why are they not all open? Why are they not properly manned? And why has the delay taken so long?” That needs to be looked at.

I know that BAA and, indeed, all airports are spending an enormous amount of money on extra security and manning levels. BAA representatives were in Parliament last week telling us that they had employed an extra 1,400 people at Heathrow to increase the level of throughput. I suspect that there is a problem with predicting when planes are going to take off. We all think that the schedule is there to tell us when planes take off, but delays can result for all sorts of reasons. The hon. Gentleman mentioned passengers who do not get to their plane, but whose bags do, which results in a one hour delay, before the plane takes off, while their baggage is removed. That means that when that plane arrives back at Heathrow, it is probably one and a half, or two hours late taking off again. Congestion will result at airports, which is another reason for huge delays in getting some passengers through.

I understand that in the make-up of every ticket there is an element for security. It is a few pounds. Will the Minister assure us that all of that money is now being invested? I would like to know to whom the money goes. I know who is paying the money, but where is it going? Is it all being invested in new security measures? The hon. Gentleman talked also about ensuring a level of common sense in the measures being introduced. I agree with him on that. He mentioned the point about knives and forks. It was always ludicrous that at one stage we were using plastic cutlery, but that at the same time, if we ordered an alcoholic drink, it was served in a glass. A glass is a lethal weapon. Also, when airside, it was possible to buy a bottle of wine. Well, my goodness, a bottle of wine is a lethal weapon, I would have thought. So, there seemed to be a few inconsistencies in the security measures being introduced.

The same applies to the 100 ml limits on all liquids and gels, and all of that sort of stuff. We cannot fail to go through airport security without seeing huge supplies and bins of stuff taken off people who unwittingly, perhaps, brought it with them. Maybe they travel only once a year, and are not following the security measures, unlike those who travel more frequently, who know what they can take. I think that, now and again, extra publicity would be worthwhile to tell the public what the limits are, why they are in place and whether they are the same throughout the world. I know that Britain is a terrorist target; more so than some other European countries. We must accept it. But at the same time, we need to explain to passengers why these measures are in place.

Let us consider some of the new and old technologies. I mentioned the procedure in use in Armenia, which, quite frankly, I thought was excellent. Perhaps that could be rolled out in other countries. I suspect that it was done to ensure that those getting on the aircraft were those who had bought the ticket. It was trailed all of the way through. Also, it prevents people from saying, “I haven’t got a passport. Somehow I lost it on the plane.” We know what is happening. But if there is an electronic version of that passport, at least we have information about that person. Let us look at the technologies available to ensure that everything is done as quickly as possible.

I spoke to the chief executive of Manchester airport, Geoff Muirhead, who told me about issues that they have. A number of British airports were built in the 1960s and 1970s, when security measures were different—one could almost swan on to an aircraft without showing any identity. Now we have to show identity and be searched at regular intervals. With terminal 5 coming on, I assume that a lot of thought is being put into security at the design level. It will be a lot easier for Heathrow T5 to get people through more quickly with the new equipment.

Geoff Muirhead explained that we have some old airports and that the problem was not simply with moving some shops out of the way to make room for extra security, but with ensuring that the equipment and manning levels are available. He said that there will always be delays at certain times. That is what we must iron out as much as we can. If people are told that, when going to an aircraft, the security will take a quarter of hour, at least they can factor that into their timetables. The problem arises when they turn up at an airport and see a queue going out of the door and on to the car park. If they have a flight to catch in an hour, it becomes impossible for them.

I have every sympathy with the Minister, but we must not let the terrorists win. We must ensure the right level of security, and that people feel secure, including staff at airports and on aircrafts. For whatever reason, these terrorists despise our country and are doing all that they can to terrorise its people. Quite frankly, I wish that they would all get on an aircraft and go to a country that they would prefer, rather than stay here and terrorise us. If they want to go to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, or wherever, I am sure that, if they ask nicely, we will assist them in their passage. But we do not want them terrorising British people living in this country, which is why not only must we fight them, but we must not allow them to destroy our quality of life. Let us ensure the right level of security, and support airports and airlines to ensure that the terrorists do not win, but let us remain also on the side of the passenger to ensure that their quality of life is not diminished. I wish the Government great success in their efforts to ensure that the British travelling public can get on with their daily lives without hindrance, and be secure in doing so.

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Ribble Valley (Mr. Evans). I enjoyed his speech—especially the part in which he said that he would be happy to ship out all the terrorists who think that some other part of the world is better. People who think like that should be shipped out immediately and I will happily help in the security arrangements and in deporting them. They have made life a misery for all of us and we must not allow them to defeat what we are trying to do, so I strongly concur with the language and the spirit of the hon. Gentleman’s speech. My father’s generation fought hard to create a good society and to play their part, and such people are wrecking everything that was built in the spirit of multiculturalism. I find what they are doing offensive and I fail to understand their thinking or logic. However, I do not wish to be called to order for straying too far away from the subject of the debate.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Donohoe) on securing the debate, and I join him and others in praising the staff of Glasgow airport and all those others who were involved in tackling the terrorists for their courage in defeating them. I praise the Government for all that they have done so far in public protection. They should be credited for making public protection their first priority. I want to raise a number of issues about my own local airport, Durham Tees Valley. It is not a major league airport by the standards of Glasgow or Manchester, but as the primary airport for the north-east, with routes to key European destinations, it is an important and busy centre in its own right. Some 1 million passengers a year generally pass through it.

Although it is primarily a civil airport, the security issues that I wish to raise stem from its use by the military. It is the nearest civilian airport to the large army camp at Catterick, about 15 miles away. In consequence, it has frequently been used for military charter flights for soldiers departing for, or arriving from, operational duties in the middle east. That is hardly a military secret; the sight of troops in uniform marching through the departure lounge is a regular feature witnessed by many travellers.

There are three points that I wish to make about such use of the airport. First, there is a question as to whether the security level at the airport is sufficient for military use. It is a particularly pertinent question, given that its military use might enhance the airport’s appeal as a target for terrorist attack. The recent events in Glasgow show that such an eventuality must be considered, and the security in place around military facilities in the UK stands testament both to the heightened risk and to the necessity for enhanced measures that surround our military personnel. I should like to ask the Minister whether, given the military use of Durham Tees Valley, extra security measures have been introduced. Will he tell me also whether any reassessment of the situation has been made following the events in Glasgow?

Two security measures that I wish to propose would address the issue. First, I wonder whether the Ministry of Defence, in conjunction with both the airport management and the charter flight operators, might consider whether military flights can be made outside the airport’s normal operational hours. That would have the security benefit of allowing measures to be concentrated at certain times and, crucially, would allow them to be implemented when members of the public were not using the airport. That, in turn, would have obvious advantages both to public safety and enhanced security.

The second possible measure is to use the RAF airfields in the region for such military flights. Leeming and Church Fenton are both operational, and are less than one hour from Catterick. The airfields might be unable to handle large passenger aircraft for engineering reasons, and, if so, I will gladly stand corrected. I know, however, that Leeming was used for Tornado fighter bombers for a long time and I imagine that its runway is of adequate length. If one of those airfields was available and suitable, it would be likely to provide a far higher level of security than a civil airport. The fact that members of the public cannot access RAF facilities would clearly be advantageous in that respect. I emphasise that my remarks are intended to be constructive and I make them in a spirit of co-operation with the Minister. I believe that there are genuine security issues for members of the public and for military personnel who use the airport, and I hope that he will consider my suggestions.

My final remarks diverge somewhat in their subject matter and concern a security issue that applies generally to UK airports. Last November, in the light of intelligence that had been received, the Government altered the regulations on hand luggage and prevented passengers from taking liquids and certain items through security gates into departure lounges and on to flights. However, there seems to be a disjunction between the items that are prohibited under those regulations, which were mentioned earlier, and the items that are banned from restricted zones such as departure lounges and airport shops. The result is that cigarette lighters cannot be taken through security into a departure lounge, yet can still be purchased from shops in the restricted zones and taken on to a plane. The only ban on purchase is on cigarette lighters which are

“in the shape of a firearm”.

I know of at least three UK airports where there has been a problem with that, and it seems to present an anomaly in security.

On its own, a lighter has a certain, albeit limited, potential to cause harm or damage. The worrying point is that lighters are sold in airports alongside a range of flammable substances such as aerosols and alcohol. It is easy to imagine that, in a confined space such as an aircraft cabin, such items could be used to deadly effect, so I ask the Minister to re-examine the regulations, because inconsistencies were mentioned also by the hon. Member for Ribble Valley.

The points that I have made have all been offered in a spirit of trying to help the Government in their efforts. So far, they have done a tremendous job in tackling the terrorists and we must not let go—even by a millimetre. I hope that the Minister will take up my concerns in that spirit.

rose—

Order. I should like to tell the two Front-Bench spokesmen that I shall call the Minister no later than 10.45 am.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr. Taylor. As we are tight for time, I shall try to truncate my remarks. If I have questions, I shall direct them to the Minister in writing, because that might be easier. Before the debate, I thought that I had defeated stomach flu, but I am now less certain. I think that I will be okay, but, if I leave the room fast, I hope you will not see it as an act of discourtesy.

I join in congratulating the many people who reacted so effectively to the events at Glasgow airport. Rather than reiterate what has been said, I shall say only that I think the most important part of that reaction was the message that it gave to anyone with terrorist intentions. They will not find that the British public, airport staff, police or anybody else will shy away from them; they will be tackled and confronted. That gave great heart to all of us who know that one day could be our unlucky day and that we could draw the short straw.

Obviously, airport security must have the highest priority. In preparing for the debate, I took a quick look at an extract from the airport policing report by the right hon. Sir John Wheeler, which has been debated in Westminster Hall. Essentially, the report underscored the fact that although the Department for Transport is at the heart of aviation security arrangements, responsibility remains fragmented among DFT control authorities and airport authorities. Putting together a package of effective airport security measures is therefore extremely complex, and I hope that the Minister will address the issue and tell us how co-ordination has been significantly improved since Sir John’s original report.

The Department has accepted the report’s main recommendations, including, in particular, that the MATRA approach—the multi-agency threat and risk assessment approach—should be best practice at all airports. That approach, however, relates to risk assessment, and there is obviously also a requirement to respond—although assessment matters, so too does the co-ordination of the response. A review of legislation was to go ahead to clarify stakeholders’ responsibilities for airport security, but has it made any progress?

The report included recommendations on eliminating the system of designation. The issue of policing costs is fairly interesting, and I happen to come from the school that thinks that policing and security costs should remain with the airports and the airlines and should not fall on the taxpayer, although the United States takes a very different view. By not charging fuel duty and VAT on fuel, we effectively give the airline industry a £9 billion subsidy, and it would not go amiss if the industry spent some of that money on adequate security. The industry has not been abandoned—indeed, in comparison with other forms of transport, air travel is being supported—and one way effectively to use such money would be to spend it on security. I would be interested to know whether the Minister has discussed whether airport authorities should have more flexibility to charge the airlines additional fees for providing security. I understand that the Civil Aviation Authority has been considering the issue, but I am not sure what conclusions it has reached.

On the question of who will pay the VAT or the aviation fuel duty, it is the passenger who will pick up the bill at the end of the day. However, one airport also suggested that passengers pay an extra £3 so that they could get through the airport quickly. I do not think that we should have such fast-track measures; instead, an element should be incorporated in the ticket price to ensure that everybody pays the same and is guaranteed to be able to get through the airport as quickly and securely as possible. The costs incorporated in the ticket price should, however, be transparent.

I fully agree that costs should be transparent, and we should know whether we are in the group that is paying and not getting the service or the group that is paying and getting priority service. People would find that information very interesting. I should say, however, that the drive for ever cheaper flights to boost numbers and fill planes is somewhat countered by the need to ensure that adequate money is spent on security. Nor is turning to the taxpayer to ensure that we continue to boost ticket sales the right strategy, although that works rather well with broader environmental goals. The burden of providing security should fall on the airport authority and the airlines, not the taxpayer.

In the past couple of days, various events have caused us all to tremble slightly. No innocent individual was killed or seriously injured at Glasgow, and thank goodness for that. However, we have heard—perhaps the Minister can comment on this—that there was not a single armed policeman at the airport. That suggests that the security culture has broken down somewhere or that it has been focused only on Heathrow. If so, other airports and their vulnerabilities, which the hon. Member for Middlesbrough, South and East Cleveland (Dr. Kumar) discussed, will then become the obvious point of weakness for attack. Our approach therefore surely needs to be comprehensive.

We have heard the comments made by Mr. Ron Noble, the head of Interpol, who complained that the UK, among many other countries, does not take advantage of Interpol information when doing passport checks, and he asks that we participate in a watch list. There should be a real review of that issue. Sharing information obviously has consequences, and I would not want the Government wildly to share information with anyone who just happened to be signed up to Interpol, without being confident that there was genuine security. However, the issue must be reviewed, and it would make sense to deal with it with a greater urgency and to give it greater priority to ensure that we take full advantage of the passport checking facilities offered by Interpol, particularly where missing and stolen passports are concerned.

Last week, my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Clegg), who speaks on home affairs for my party, raised some issues with the Home Secretary. The Minister will be aware that vehicle access barriers have been under review, and there have been some pilot schemes at Victoria and Waterloo. Given the vulnerability of airports, I wonder why the scheme has not been rolled out. A report on how the technology was to be rolled out was due in April, but I have not heard any of the results. Any information that the Minister had in that regard would be important, particularly in the current circumstances.

I join the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Donohoe) in saying that it is worth looking at the comments of the US Air Line Pilots Association. As he said, it has criticised the UK for focusing on objects—sometimes these objects are rather weird, and the approach is not consistent across Europe—rather than on behavioural patterns and profiling to identify threats. I recognise that there are real risks with the proposed approach, which must be undertaken with an awareness of the fact that any kind of profiling can create real problems. Indeed, I would prefer something that looked at behavioural patterns, rather than just at some crude form of profiling. I say that in a very personal sense, because, as the Minister may know, my husband was an American, and he travelled frequently between the two continents over the 35 years that we were together. My daughter’s partner is a black American, and I have seen vividly how the way in which he is treated at Heathrow differs from the way in which my husband, who was also an American, was treated—the word “appalling” is probably not an understatement.

That brings to me to my next issue. If security is to be sustainable, and if people are to be willing to go through intrusive checks that make their journey more difficult and require increased planning, there must be a level of care and customer service that makes the process acceptable and shows genuine respect. That includes treating those coming through immigration, or other travelling passengers, well—treating them thoughtfully and with politeness and real concern.

Several people have talked about the genuine inconsistencies that frustrate everybody. People cannot take their lighters through check-in, but they can buy them at the far end—excuse me, but that is starting to get silly. British Airways has said again today that it is trying to link up 20,000 lost bags with their owners, but people do not have endless patience. Obviously, T5 will bring some benefits in terms of dealing with that set of issues, but it will not be a complete solution.

I travelled as a non-American in the US for many years—obviously, I was married to an American—and I was always treated with the greatest rudeness by every immigration officer I talked to. However, that has changed dramatically, as many more people have been caught up in the process.

Not all of them.

All that I can say is that the hon. Gentleman did not see what it was like before. However, change is genuinely achievable.

Perhaps I can close with a few comments that have been made before by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hallam: if we are really going to have security, we need a national border force, bringing together the present border control functions of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the immigration and nationality directorate, and the police, with regard to both ports and airports. I shall not expound on that, but the Minister is, I think, very aware of that need. Also, we need to carry out exit checks. Those were taken away in 1994, but the Government seem to be dragging their feet about their reintroduction. I understand that, under present plans, they will not be in place until 2014, which is another generation.

I think that my time has run out; I congratulate the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire on obtaining the debate, and I hope that we shall hear from the Minister that airport security will be given the attention and priority that it deserves.

I too congratulate the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Donohoe), both on securing the debate and on his revelation that he serves as a special constable in the British Transport police. I listened to his remarks with great interest and agreed with nearly all of them. I join everyone else who has spoken in congratulating the police, security staff and emergency services, and, indeed, the stout-hearted members of the public who intervened at Glasgow airport, reminding us what citizenship should be about.

We must start with the clarification of responsibilities. The hon. Member for Richmond Park (Susan Kramer) was quite right to pick up that point from Sir John Wheeler’s report. It must be made crystal clear exactly who is responsible for what. There has been some progress, but there is still a degree of fragmentation. I also agree with the hon. Lady’s remark about a uniformed border force, something for which the Conservative party has been calling for a long time. That, however, is more to do with people coming into the country than with the matter before the House today.

It happens that I have some background on terrorist issues from my time in special forces. Between August last year and February this year I had a series of exchanges, both written and in meetings, with the British Airports Authority about security at terminals, focusing on one central concern: that queues for security apparatus are seen as targets of choice by terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Ribble Valley (Mr. Evans), I happened to fly—to America—a week or two after the August incident, and I share the concerns of many that the hold-ups here were much worse than those in any of the busy American airports that I went through. Indeed, in November, Willie Walsh, chief executive of British Airways, was moved to remark:

“We should accept that for so many of our customers...Heathrow isn’t working...In 25 years, Heathrow could be an aviation backwater, as relevant to the world economy of the mid-21st century as London’s former East End docks.”

Of course the flow at Heathrow has improved immeasurably since Mr Walsh said that, but I share his concerns. However, those concerns go far beyond economic competitiveness. The plain fact is that large numbers of people waiting for security apparatus, concentrated in an indoor location, provide an extremely tempting target for terrorists.

For obvious reasons, I did not make my exchanges with BAA public, but I can now reveal that at the meeting in which they culminated, on 7 February, its security manager pointed out to me that as well as providing extra scanners and staff BAA had installed bollards outside the approaches to all its terminals to prevent vehicular access. That, however, is not enough. It is perfectly obvious that any bomber—it need not even be a suicide bomber—can carry or wheel a large bomb in a suitcase straight into the middle of a queue. Those queues are extremely vulnerable and such large concentrations of people in the 21st century, which is, sadly, a terrorist era, are unacceptable.

It seems that our thinking has at every stage trailed behind the reality of the terrorist threat that we face, and that each time there is an attack we must learn, although fortunately, in the most recent case, not after people have died. I am not suggesting for a moment that the Government have been wilfully negligent. I am simply trying to understand why we have not quite grasped the nettle. As far back as November 2004 my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer), who was then our homeland security spokesman, tabled a question to the Department of Transport asking for

“a statement on security inspections undertaken at British airports.”

The reply was:

“The Department carries out an extensive programme of aviation security compliance monitoring activity. This includes announced and unannounced inspections and tests of the security”. —[Official Report, 1 November 2004; Vol. 426, c. 8W.]

My hon. Friend tabled a similar question in January 2007 and the reply was:

“New aviation security measures which have been implemented at UK airports in light of August’s security alert include the controls on liquids and the limit on the number and maximum size of cabin bags. Other new measures which have been implemented since August are not visible”—

probably for very good reasons—

“to passengers.”—[Official Report, 30 January 2007; Vol. 456, c. 243W.]

I know that our excellent new homeland security spokesman, Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, takes a very close interest in all this. Curiously, to my thinking, the Secretary of State makes no mention of access. Terrorists can go wherever the public go.

BAA has recruited hundreds of extra security staff and bought extra scanners. Increasing throughput and thus reducing queues is part of the solution, but we must also examine again the issue of perimeter security. For example, at the channel tunnel and some continental seaports there are screening units that will reveal at a glance whether there are illegal immigrants in lorries. I understand that that same technology could be used to take at least a first look at people coming through the doors of security terminals, to see whether they are carrying bombs or weapons. I wonder whether the option of selective scanning of vehicles passing through the gates of airports has been considered. Such pre-scanning, even on an intelligence-led basis, would have a price, but it would materially reduce the threat.

Much of the technology that I have outlined was developed in this country. Security has become an extremely successful British industry. Companies such as Qinetiq supply hardware and British firms supply software packages and train people to handle security apparatus. Crucially, as other hon. Members have mentioned, we lead the world in the profiling packages to identify behaviour that is indicative of a terrorist mindset. Of course, no solution is cost-free, but the cost of doing nothing will be much greater, and not only in lives. The airport operators are private companies and if they reap the rewards in the good times, they must pick up the bill in the bad. The Government can help the process along. I shall come in a moment to an area in which funds could be better used.

Failure is not only risky. It will also be economically extremely costly to us, and could hand a victory of a different kind to the terrorist. If the security arrangements at our airports are not seen to be both tight and capable of processing large numbers of people without long queues developing, people will go elsewhere. London is still the world’s premier financial centre. Let our airports fall behind and we may find that we lose that edge. American friends of mine have told me that they do not want to use Heathrow again after the experiences that they had in the summer.

Technology has another role to play, which goes beyond scanning apparatus. Scanning systems do not prevent conspiracy, and they do not prevent those who are unarmed at the point of departure from going to another country from where they can mount an attack. As the recent terrorist attacks have shown, those people are highly mobile. They criss-cross the world, meeting together. As the security services get better at phone tapping and internet monitoring, the importance to the terrorist of the face-to-face meeting grows. What is needed is to pick up potential problems as early as possible in the process. To pick up on a point that the hon. Gentleman made earlier, a number of countries in the Gulf and New Zealand have a real-time analysis of data at the point of ticket purchase. Alas, the British system, Semaphore, which covers only 12 per cent. of passengers, is based on flight manifests, ensuring that the problems are likely to be identified only after the aeroplane has taken off. With that system we can only export the problem to another country, perhaps by turning the aircraft around, as the Americans do—they have a system like that in place at the moment—or hope to pick people up once they have arrived.

By using a system that is based on flight manifests, rather than one that is based on ticket purchases, we lose the opportunity to pick out associations. While an individual’s name might be on a list of suspects, the person with whom they are travelling might not be. A system that is based on checking flight manifests rather than starting with the original ticketing data, as is done in New Zealand, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain and several other countries, will not pick up the fact that those two people are travelling together, so only one of them might be stopped. We are tackling problems at the final stage, instead of looking for trouble at the earliest possible stage of each process. After all the mess-ups in the NHS and other areas, I beg the Government not to carry on down the route that they are following with Semaphore and the working party that is very light on experience in this area. We do not need another costly Government-led development of a system that is not much use anyway. Instead, we should take the ticketing software that already exists, off the shelf, which has been so skilfully developed for use in other countries, and develop it into much better systems. We need to work from the beginning of the process.

What happens in our airports is only a small part of the battle against terrorism. Thanks to the initiative of the hon. Gentleman, we are rightly focusing on that small part today, but, ultimately, the development of intelligence and many other central areas for which the Government are responsible will be the decisive factors. As I said at the outset, when considering this important issue, which terrorists have chosen as a key battle ground, we must be clear about who is responsible for what. In a free country, we will never have control over where our citizens go, and neither should we wish to. If we try to restrict or curtail basic liberties or our way of life, we hand a different kind of victory to the terrorists by default—something we must never do. However, we are not powerless, and a great deal more can be done.

It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair, Mr. Taylor. I begin by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Donohoe) on securing the debate. As he said, he has a personal interest in this matter both as a frequent flier and as a special constable. I thank other hon. Members for contributing to this important and topical discussion.

Hardly a day goes by without some media reference to airport security. The spotlight seems to be permanently fixed on security at UK airports. That is good, in a sense, because it ensures that we remain highly sensitive to the threats and challenges that face us at this time. We need to be vigilant to the serious and sustained threat, and I join hon. Members in paying tribute both to those who protect us generally and specifically to those who have protected us in the past few weeks. Aviation remains a target for international terrorists—the incident at Glasgow is a prime example of that—but, in response to my hon. Friend’s comments, I shall talk about the events of last summer and the heightened measures that were introduced thereafter, which are still evident today, before addressing more specific points.

The increase in the threat level to critical last summer meant that we needed to introduce additional security measures to protect both passengers and people working in the aviation industry from the threat from liquid explosives. The alternative would have been to cancel all flights, but the cost and disruption of doing so would have given the terrorists the success that they desire and would not have been acceptable to either the industry or the travelling public. Those measures supplemented an already robust security regime. The industry should be applauded for ensuring that flights continued and passengers should be thanked for their understanding and patience.

UK security measures draw much from our success in ensuring that the baseline European security regulations, which restricted the quantities of liquids taken through search points, were eventually amended. Those changes took effect in November. Today, passengers may take liquids through security search points provided that they are in containers not exceeding 100 ml and that they are presented in a re-sealable, transparent plastic bag. The International Civil Aviation Organisation has recommended that its members should adopt the solution of allowing passengers departing their airports to use 1 litre bags or 100 ml containers, and the procedure has been adopted in the USA, Canada, Australia, Japan and Singapore, which shows that there is discussion about harmonising arrangements internationally. Other measures introduced here and across the EU have included the removal of coats and laptops for separate screening. We also started checking passengers’ footwear and limiting cabin luggage to one bag, providing that it did not exceed the maximum size, and still do so today. The latter system is due to be incorporated into EU regulations next year and has long been recommended by the International Air Transport Association on safety grounds.

As the hon. Member for Ribble Valley (Mr. Evans) pointed out, the UK faces a higher threat from terrorism than most other countries in either the EU or the rest of the world. The evidence is there to be seen: there were attacks or attempted attacks in July 2005, August 2006 and June 2007. That is why we have and need to have measures in place that are more stringent than those in other European member states.

Surely it is a nonsense that when one gets to the comb, at security, one can get by the two-bag rule by packing one bag into the other, and can then take it out again at the other end. That does not make an awful lot of sense, and is not applied elsewhere in Europe.

I shall address that point, particularly why the one-bag screening option has been chosen for the UK. My hon. Friend also talked about the problems experienced by transfer passengers who arrive in the UK with more than one cabin bag to board another aircraft departing from a UK airport and by those carrying duty-free liquids that were bought in non-EU states. The industry has suggested that international passengers are choosing to transfer at airports outside the UK because of the difficulties they face in the UK, and airlines and airports tell us that they are suffering financial losses as a result, which is having an impact on UK plc.

The Government are acutely aware that the baggage restrictions are extremely challenging, but we are equally aware of the very good reasons behind them. Allowing only one item of cabin baggage reduces the number of X-ray images per passenger, thereby ensuring that security checks can be carried out to the highest possible standard. We have always said that we stand ready to remove the one bag limit, but it would be irresponsible to do so if the industry were not then capable of delivering the expected security standards. That offer remains, but the industry agrees that we must not rush into doing that, which is why we are assessing how well airports handle having to screen more than one cabin bag per passenger.

We must look further ahead and explore other, smarter solutions to the liquid explosives challenge. We are working closely with industry and manufacturers to progress developments in technology that are now available and we are undertaking several trials of new technology as a matter of urgency to assist the security process—the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) asked about that. We also continue to look for new technology that could reduce the burden on airports and improve the situation for passengers.

It would be remiss of me not to mention the serious events that happened earlier this month in London, and especially those in Glasgow.

The industry is concerned that the working party that the Government have asked to look into the technology is fairly light on people who are experts on that technology. The party does not appear to be focusing on technology that is already available, off the shelf, which is working very successfully in countries such as New Zealand and some of the Gulf states.

I hope that I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that the security summit convened and called for by the Secretary of State, which should be happening next week, will address those or any other apparent deficiencies. The hon. Gentleman’s comments will be taken into account in preparation for that summit.

The recent situations in London and, especially, in Glasgow demonstrated that the form of threat is not consistent—it is constantly evolving. That emphasises that we cannot be complacent in our attitude and action. Terrorism is a problem that we know we will face for the long term. Experience has also shown that the significant investment in infrastructure protection that our airports are making is well placed, and we will continue to urge airports to implement improvements where vulnerabilities are identified. I would like to place on record, as I have done before, our thanks to the police, to Glasgow airport staff and passengers, and to all the others who worked tirelessly over the past week to apprehend those involved in recent incidents.

My hon. Friend raised the issue of counter-terrorist checks for new airport staff. Operational deployment is not dependent upon completion of the whole CTC process and alleviation has been in place for some time, at the industry’s request. That allows the employer to deploy an officer—anybody who is on the appropriate security side—pending CTC clearance, providing they have passed a criminal record check and have been resident in the UK for the previous five years.

My hon. Friend asked about profiling. Passengers are selected for various security processes irrespective of their age, gender, ethnic background or religious beliefs. The purpose is to ensure that no prohibited articles are taken into the restricted zone or on to the plane. One of the basic tenets of aviation security in the UK is that each passenger is screened and has an equal chance of being selected for an additional search, irrespective of their age, ethnic background or religious belief. No one can adopt a particular profile believing that they may not be selected for additional searches.

My hon. Friend raised questions and gave us a demonstration about cutlery. As he said, passengers cannot take knives through airport security, but they are available airside at restaurants. Current security measures allow metal cutlery within certain specifications—they must have a blunt edge and a specific blade length; that was what he demonstrated—to be used as part of an airline’s in-flight catering regime or by airside catering establishments, such as restaurants or cafés. That approach does not apply to passengers, who since 9/11 have been prohibited from taking knives through UK airport security points. The aim is to avoid any additional pressure being placed on X-ray operators at those points. Metal cutlery knives are, of course, permitted in hold baggage.

I acknowledge the points that several hon. Members have made about inconsistencies in application. The fact that the additional screening for potential liquid explosives and so on is a relatively new procedure means that there are anomalies, but they are being ironed out as the procedure becomes more familiar to passengers and staff.

My hon. Friend also raised the question of immigration and border controls. As he knows, that is a matter for the Home Office, with which we work closely. I am happy to bring his comments and those of other hon. Members to the attention of our friends in the Home Office.

My hon. Friend raised the important question of a proposed advisory committee to assist in this process. We agree that airlines and airports should discuss these issues. The aim is to get security to be part of normal business, not just an add-on. I shall return to that point.

My hon. Friend raised the issue of hand luggage, to which I tried to respond in my opening comments. To reinforce the point, I should say that limiting passengers to a smaller bag enables a reasonable amount of personal items to be carried while giving the X-ray screeners a less cluttered X-ray signature, thus making the task of identifying potentially dangerous liquids and other possible threat items easier for them. That measure, together with the limit of a single bag, helps to reduce potential delays at the screening point, given that the search regime is more intensive. We are in close consultation with the industry to ensure that the new measures are capable of being delivered for as long as is necessary. As I have outlined, the measures are kept under review, including in the light of developments in training and screening techniques. The threat from liquid explosives represents a step change that will need to be taken into account on a continuing basis in the security measures of all airports.

The hon. Member for Ribble Valley raised the issue of the urgent need to get passengers through. As he was saying, there must be a balance between throughput and thoroughness to ensure security at airports and for airlines. He also asked whether the electronic tagging of bags by British Airways would help. When baggage has been screened on entry to the airport, the bag is clean, so no matter how long it is stored, it is secure and safe. In that sense, the matter is taken forward.

The hon. Gentleman asked what element of the ticketing price is earmarked for security and where the money goes. The breakdown of the cost of the ticket and where the funds go is varied. There is an element of security in the cost of the ticket. If permitted to do so, I shall write to him and to the other hon. Members who have taken part in the debate, as I am sure that they will be interested in further information on this. I acknowledge the point that he raises about designing safety and security into all public buildings, including airports. I am sure that he realises that that is very much a matter of modern architecture, particularly in respect of specific buildings.

My hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough, South and East Cleveland (Dr. Kumar) asked about matters affecting Durham Tees Valley airport. I am confident that the Ministry of Defence will have discussed these items with its management and that they can use the airport as they currently do. Again, I shall pass his comments on to the MOD and try to ensure that he receives a response on this issue.

All airports are considering the security position on approaches by car, and as we have seen on our TV screens and know from hearing about the personal experiences of colleagues, many have adopted new methods to deal with the matter.

The hon. Member for Richmond Park (Susan Kramer) raised the issue of policing costs. The independent review of policing at airports by Stephen Boys Smith was completed last year and the report was submitted to the then Secretary of State and the Home Secretary. The then Secretary of State issued a written statement at that time welcoming its broad thrust. On 14 June, he issued a further written statement reporting on progress, including constructive dialogue with stakeholders and agreement on a direction for work. It recommended continued and enhanced liaison between key stakeholders, including Departments, the police service and airport operators at both national and local level, to maintain a consistent response to the threats and risks. As the hon. Lady mentioned, it also endorsed the current multi-agency threat and risk assessment approach in place at UK airports. These matters are still under discussion and review, so I am not in a position to comment further despite their being raised by her and by the hon. Member for Canterbury.

Has the Minister addressed the question of having dedicated police?

The whole question of policing is under review and I am not in a position to say anything further on that. I am sure that the matter will also be raised at the summit to which I referred.

The hon. Lady raised questions about our review of arrangements, and I shall cover that in my conclusion. She also mentioned vehicle access barriers, and, as I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough, South and East Cleveland, since the incident at Glasgow, the Department is actively examining the best ways to mitigate against vehicle-carried devices. Barriers are not the only option, and these matters are in hand.

I am only too aware that the very necessary measures that we have in place mean that both aviation staff and passengers are being tested. We will do what we can, particularly in explaining to the travelling public why these measures are necessary. As a first step, we will host a security summit later this month. It will bring together key players across the industry to make sure that we plan effectively and in a co-ordinated way for higher volumes of passengers, especially over the summer months.

That will be backed up by a media and marketing campaign, which started yesterday, aimed at passengers, reminding them to arrive prepared when they travel to airports this summer. They should be aware that restrictions are still in place at UK airports and at a growing number of others across the world. Hon. Members asked for such an approach. We will do everything that we can to ensure that this issue gets as much exposure as possible.

The summit that we expect to take place next week will provide an opportunity for Government and senior industry representatives to look ahead to see how industry operational needs and security requirements can be handled in a holistic fashion.

I would like to express my appreciation to hon. Members for the constructive way in which this morning’s discussion has been handled and for the tone used. I know from this debate that we all want the same objective: safe and efficient travel. I assure hon. Members who have participated in this debate and, indeed, the whole House, that we are as committed as they are in wanting to ensure that that aim is secured as quickly as possible.