On 7 December, representatives of the Contact Group submitted to the UN Secretary-General the report by the EU-Russia-US troika on their work aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement for Kosovo’s future status.

The troika correctly set themselves the objective of “leaving no stone unturned” in the search for an outcome mutually acceptable to both Belgrade and Pristina. During the four months of their mandate, the troika undertook an intense schedule of meetings with the parties. Over ten rounds of negotiations—including six sets of direct talks, one of them in extended conference format—the parties considered options covering the spectrum from independence, autonomy, confederation, partition and a status-neutral approach. One or other of the parties rejected all these options.

The troika have therefore reported that the parties have been unable to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s status.

I pay tribute to the troika’s work. They have worked tirelessly and imaginatively. Although they did not secure an agreement between the parties, their work generated sustained and intensive high-level dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. The troika have also been able to extract important commitments from the parties, including pledges to refrain from actions that might jeopardise the security situation in Kosovo or elsewhere and not to use violence, threats or intimidation. These are important commitments to which we shall expect both sides to adhere strictly in the period ahead.

The troika’s efforts followed those of UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari who laboured heroically for 14 months to reach agreement between the parties before concluding that this was out of reach. He therefore drew up his own proposal for how to move forward based around the concept of supervised independence. That recommendation was supported by the EU, US and UN Secretary-General. It was rejected by Serbia and Russia.

It is hard to argue now that there is any value in further negotiations or that serious options have yet to be fully explored. The failure to reach agreement is not because of lack of time, energy or imagination on the part of the international community. It is because the positions of the parties are irreconcilable. Kosovo insists on independence. Serbia insists on a settlement that locks the door on any prospect of independence. The UK shares the firm view of the EU representative on the troika, Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, that the parties would not be capable of reaching agreement on this issue if negotiations were to be continued, whether in the troika format, or in some other form.

The Kosovo status process has now reached a decisive moment, presenting the international community with difficult but important decisions.

One point on which almost all in the international community are agreed is that the status quo is unsustainable. This was stated in clear terms by the UN Secretary-General when he addressed the Contact Group Ministerial meeting in September in New York. The Contact Group, including Russia, subsequently expressed their agreement in a joint Ministerial statement.

The international community cannot therefore allow the status process to grind to a halt or to be shuffled off into a siding by convening further fruitless negotiations. We learned to our cost in the 1990s the heavy human and political price attached to an indecisive international response to looming problems in the Western Balkans. The stability and security of part of Europe is at stake. It is essential that we respond in a decisive and far-sighted manner.

The UK’s preference would be for a settlement to be supported by the passage of a resolution of the UN Security Council. We believe there should be further rapid consultations in New York to this end before the end of 2007. However in the absence of agreement between the parties, we need to be realistic about the slim prospects of securing the necessary level of consensus in the Security Council.

Against this background it is important that the EU demonstrates its readiness to meet its responsibilities and objectives in respect of stability and security in Europe. Securing a viable and sustainable future for Kosovo is a major responsibility for the EU. The effectiveness and cohesiveness of the EU’s common foreign and security policy will be judged against our ability to deliver on this responsibility. The EU must demonstrate firm resolve to bring the status process through to completion and play a leading role subsequently in implementing a settlement. I welcome the fact that the EU is already intensively engaged in the necessary preparations to meet these responsibilities.

In moving towards a Kosovo settlement, it will be necessary for the EU and others to take a strategic approach answering to a series of key challenges. There will be a need to ensure Kosovo’s security. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is already deployed in strength in Kosovo to maintain a safe and secure environment. The EU has indicated a readiness to provide a European Security and Defence Policy policing/rule of law mission. The EU should deliver on this commitment.

There will be a need to ensure good governance in Kosovo. The proposal of the UN Special Envoy provides a good basis for this. The provisions it set out for the internal governance of Kosovo, and the allocation of responsibilities it contains, must be the foundation for how we deliver security and help Kosovo improve its ability to meet European standards. The EU should be ready to play a major part in settlement implementation including through the appointment of an EU Special Representative and through contributing to an International Civilian Office in Kosovo.

There will be a need to achieve certainty and permanence in respect of Kosovo’s future status. Again, the UK believes that the proposal of the UN Special Envoy for supervised independence provides a good basis.

There will be a need to look beyond the immediate challenge of resolving Kosovo’s future status. Following a settlement, Kosovo will face formidable economic and state-building challenges. The international community—with the EU to the fore—will need to be ready to meet this challenge, including through the swift convening of a donors’ conference.

Finally, there will be a need to address the regional dimension. The UK recognises that moving through this phase will be difficult for Serbia, as well as for other countries in the region. The EU must be clear and far-sighted in its commitment to helping them meet European standards and so move farther towards eventual accession. There is a compelling strategic case for enlargement to the Western Balkans so that this troubled region can share in the security, stability and prosperity that the EU offers. The EU needs to take forward this agenda vigorously in the months ahead.