House of Commons
Tuesday 5 February 2008
The House met at half-past Two o’clock
Prayers
[Mr. Speaker in the Chair]
Private Business
Bournemouth Borough Council Bill [Lords]
Canterbury City Council Bill
Leeds City Council Bill
Orders for Second Reading read.
To be read a Second time on Tuesday 19 February.
London Local Authorities (Shopping Bags) Bill
Order for Second Reading read.
Object.
To be read a Second time on Tuesday 19 February.
Manchester City Council Bill [Lords]
Nottingham City Council Bill
Reading Borough Council Bill
Orders for Second Reading read.
To be read a Second time on Tuesday 19 February.
Oral Answers to Questions
Health
The Secretary of State was asked—
NHS Dentistry
Some 27.9 million people in England saw an NHS dentist during the two years ending on 30 June 2007. We are committed to improving further access to NHS services. We have increased central funding by 11 per cent. for 2008-09 and are requiring the NHS, through the operating framework, to increase the number of patients able to access NHS dentistry year on year. Given that prevention is better than cure, today we are launching guidance to strategic health authorities on consulting with their local populations on water fluoridation, which is known to reduce tooth decay. A central budget totalling £42 million over the next three years has been established to meet the capital costs of fluoridation.
Under the current contract, dentists are paid the same for fitting one filling as they are for fitting 10. Some are refusing to treat patients with the poorest teeth. Does the Secretary of State think the arrangement the best way to improve NHS dentistry, particularly for high-needs patients?
The new contract was the best way forward. In fact, an NHS dentist is not allowed to refuse to treat patients with the poorest health. Under the old system, there was an absolute incentive to drill and fill. If a dentist moved away from the locality, the local patient population lost out. The famous queues in Scarborough happened under the old system, not the new. Although the new contract has taken time to settle down and although it was not popular with the profession—sometimes we have to do things not popular with the profession if they are necessary to help patient care—we have made improvements in dental care.
Despite the fact that the local population is growing rapidly, Milton Keynes primary care trust has successfully used the new funding formula to fund the opening of new NHS surgeries. Today on the NHS Choices website it is possible to find access to at least half a dozen NHS surgeries in Milton Keynes. Is the Secretary of State rolling that example out across the country, given that it appears that some other PCTs seem not to know how to use the new system effectively?
My hon. Friend has seen huge advances in Milton Keynes, and we have also seen those around the country. Every PCT now has a free helpline for people to ring if they want to access dental treatment. There has been a 20 per cent. increase in the number of dentists since 1997 and there is a 25 per cent. increase in the number of training places at not only the existing dental schools, but the two new ones that we are building. Access to NHS dentistry is getting better all the time.
I doubt whether the Minister will agree with me completely—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] There is an impression that I have a small interest in this subject. The Secretary of State may not agree, but I personally believe that access should be measured according to the numbers of dentists prepared to offer national health service treatment, regardless of whether the patients accept such treatment or choose to go private. Regardless of what the Secretary of State has said about the contract, it has hurt a lot of dentists, particularly the experienced ones. Many have moved out. What could and will the Secretary of State be prepared to do to the contract to attract those highly experienced professionals back into offering national health service treatment?
I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman, not least for his work on fluoridation over the years. In response to his question, yes, there was an initial drop—this was a very controversial change; Governments have to do things that are controversial if they believe that that is in the interests of patient care. Of the disputes around the country, only 14 remain to be resolved. As regards the new dentists coming through, I find, without any inference as to the hon. Gentleman’s age—he looks to me like one of the younger crop—that there is a difference between the younger dentists and their enthusiasm for the brave new world under this contract and some of the older dentists. I would like those who have left to come back, but it is a decreasing problem given the number of new dentists coming through.
Does the Secretary of State recognise, though, that some PCTs have been slow and have given insufficient priority to commissioning dental care services? Having said that, does he agree that the single most effective way of reducing inequalities in oral health is to fluoridate the tap water in selected areas?
On the first point, my hon. Friend is right about some sluggishness in PCTs in commissioning these services. That is why we have made it a tier 2 issue in the operating framework this year and increased funding by 11 per cent. On the second point, I pay tribute to the work that she too has done on fluoridation over the years. I entirely agree, as do the British Medical Association, the British Dental Association and every reputable scientist who has considered it, that extending fluoridation is the best way to close health inequalities.
Following the comprehensive spending review, the Secretary of State announced targeted funding for additional GPs in areas where there was a shortage. Has he any proposals to do the same to recruit dentists, because in places such as Rochdale and the north-west there is a real shortage and they are not reaching people at the moment?
As I mentioned, we have a 25 per cent. increase in the number of undergraduate students coming through. We have built two new dental schools, one in Plymouth and one in Preston, which will open this year. That will do an awful lot to resolve the problems. However, I am interested in looking at any possible solutions if we have the equivalent of under-doctored areas, so I would not rule out considering such ideas.
Will my right hon. Friend join me in congratulating Durham PCT and Associated Dental Practices, which has opened the new Pelton Lane Ends surgery in my constituency, bringing dental health care to 3,600 patients, in some cases for the very first time?
I am pleased to join my hon. Friend in congratulating the new dental practice. Following the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes, South-West (Dr. Starkey), that once again shows that progress is being made right around the country.
The 3 million residents of this country who do not have access to an NHS dentist will be astonished by this complacency. The report by Citizens Advice is much more interesting than some of the comments coming out from the Minister’s office. With £2.6 billion of taxpayers’ money being spent on NHS dentistry and people pulling their teeth out with pliers and using superglue to put their caps back on, why is the Secretary of State so complacent?
Anybody pulling their teeth out with pliers needs more medical care than a dentist can provide. The hon. Gentleman may have seen the splendid letter from the Under-Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Isleworth (Ann Keen), which was sent to all Members of the House to counter this ridiculous nonsense going around about dental services—ridiculous nonsense that unfortunately Conservative Front Benchers have taken to parroting.
Family-Nurse Partnerships
The family-nurse partnership early intervention pilots target support towards the most vulnerable first-time mothers, primarily under the age of 20. For the very first time, we are starting early in pregnancy and continuing until the child is two years of age. We would be very happy to receive a good-quality bid from Nottingham and any other bidders for the next wave of pilots. We will assess the quality of all bids against the published criteria.
The health partnership and the PCT in Nottingham are well aware of this issue and are doing excellent work on intensive health visiting. OneNottingham, the local strategic partnership, regards that as key to breaking the intergenerational nature of deprivation in our city and the underachievement that goes with it. Does the Minister agree that this Government should have a long-term ambition that every young mother and child should get the level of intensive health visiting that they need as a way of breaking that cycle and reducing the massive bills of social failure that come as a consequence of not being properly parented in those first couple of years?
I welcome my hon. Friend’s support for the family-nurse partnership programme, and I congratulate him on his work to develop early intervention and prevention in Nottingham. I am aware of the interest that he has shown over the years, and he is a strong advocate. Health visiting and universal care for children, with qualified clinical nurses, is critical. I welcome the interest shown by all PCTs and local authorities in the intervention that family-nurse partnerships can offer. However, my hon. Friend will understand that as the bidding process is under way it would not be right for me to support any particular area.
Cancer Services
The national health service has seen unprecedented increases in funding for cancer services. Such spending has increased from £3.4 billion in 2003-04 to £4.35 billion in 2006-07. In 2006-07, Bedfordshire primary care trust spent £17.9 million on cancer services. As the hon. Gentleman will know, it is for individual primary care trusts to decide the level of funding that they allocate locally for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer patients in their local population.
More than three times as much is spent per cancer patient in the constituency of the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen) than is made available for my constituents. When will the Government bring in a truly fair funding formula that will mean we are no longer two Englands—a phrase that independent academics recently referred to in the Health Committee—when it comes to health care?
On spending, it has been agreed by Members of all parties that local primary care trusts know the needs of their area best. We have already extended breast screening to all women between the ages of 50 and 70; we have introduced bowel cancer screening programmes, which are the first in Europe to target both men and women; and we have seen major reductions in waiting lists.
I can tell my hon. Friend that none of my constituents has complained about access to cancer services in Bedfordshire, although there is always a wish to see improved services. Does she agree that one of the drivers that helps to underpin improvements in cancer services is an effective system of patient and public involvement? Therefore, does she share my concern that on 1 April the Bedfordshire PPI forum will be abolished with no likely replacement LINk system in place?
My hon. Friend would have a serious point if local involvement networks—LINks—were not in place. LINks will only strengthen the patient’s voice, not only in the health service but for social services. I always agree with the idea of involving patients and the public. That is why our cancer reform strategy has been so successful; all stakeholders including all the cancer charities were involved and it has been welcomed by those charities.
The Minister is right to say that decisions must be taken locally, but is she not able to see that a PCT can take decisions on spending only according to the money it is given? The issue raised by my hon. Friend the Member for South-West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous) is that the variables and differentials in certain areas have widened so much that it is not possible for an area such as Bedfordshire to compete or to give necessary treatment to its patients. That distinction in the variables in the formula has now stretched so far that is affecting access to care. This is a matter of justice.
The hon. Gentleman’s point concerns me, because there has been an increase of over 5.5 per cent. for all PCTs. I encourage him to engage more fully with his PCT to look at how certain areas are operating the very best practice. I know that results within the hon. Gentleman’s area for the incidence of cancer and its outcomes are still very good indeed.
My hon. Friend will be aware that Luton has serious health inequalities, which have persisted over many years, while at the same time receiving funding well below its fair funding target. Things are starting to improve, but will my hon. Friend ensure that Luton gets its fair funding target at least, and that its health inequalities are properly addressed?
It is my belief that no one is more than 2.5 per cent. away from their target. I urge my hon. Friend to work closely with his PCT and to keep discussing the issue. It is critical to all hon. Members to have the equity that we all want for our constituents.
Expenditure on cancer services in the UK now matches that of many other European countries. Yet despite the significant investment by British taxpayers in cancer services—an extra £693 million over three years—UK five-year survival rates have not accelerated and are among the worst in Europe. If the UK achieved the European best cancer survival rates, more than 34,000 lives would be saved every year. Why has the extra expenditure not improved survival rates?
I cannot be clear that that information is the most up to date and I urge the hon. Gentleman to check the figures. There is an increase in survival rates and improvements throughout the cancer sector, as all experts and charities have recognised. We still have some difficulty in this country with people being aware of what to look for, so that when they present at their general practice the GP can diagnose quickly. More work is being done on raising awareness. However, I urge the hon. Gentleman to check the facts.
Tanning Salons
The Department of Health is reviewing options for the regulation of tanning salons with stakeholders, including the Health and Safety Executive and Cancer Research UK. It is important to consider ways in which to strike the balance between consumer safety and choice. We will focus initially on the harm to young people who use sunbeds.
The Minister will be aware that recent research suggests that sunbeds may be responsible for 100 deaths every year from skin cancer. Is not it time that, perhaps with the support of the Health and Safety Executive, a full review is conducted of commercial salons, with a view to drawing up legally enforceable guidelines for their management and operation?
I stress the importance of striking the balance between consumer safety and choice, while ensuring that the potential harm to those who use sunbeds, including young people, is made clear. The figure that my hon. Friend cites for the increase in deaths that are attributed to sunbeds is shocking. The review will consider several matters, including the recommendations of the World Health Organisation and restricting the age of those who use the beds. We will also ensure that correct information about the dangers is available to those who use sunbeds, and we also need to consider the role of local authorities.
It appears that demand for services from the beauty industry such as tanning, Botox injections and teeth whitening is increasing—[Interruption.] I have no interest to declare. [Hon. Members: “Shame!”] I know.
When the services go wrong, it can be physically damaging and stressful for those involved. Will the Minister’s review go wider than tanning to include the whole beauty industry, including the fillers that are put into people’s faces, to ensure that it is properly regulated?
The specific review to which I referred is, following from the cancer strategy, to consider sunbeds and the connection with skin cancer.
The hon. Gentleman raises another important matter: access to treatments that are normally paid for privately and may have health consequences for the individuals involved. The MHRA—Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency—covers several of those matters, but he is right to make the point about whether fuller advice to individuals who seek such treatments is available and where it should be available.
What updates does the Minister have on any discussions between the Department and the Department for Work and Pensions about the publication of leaflet IND(G)209 on sunbeds?
I think that my hon. Friend is referring to the review that the Health and Safety Executive conducted to look specifically at guidance on controlling the health risks of using UV tanning equipment—at least I sincerely hope that that is the reference number. If that is indeed the leaflet to which she referred, it will be published shortly.
Homeopathy
The Department is investing around £3 million to build capacity for research into complementary and alternative medicine, to strengthen the evidence base. As the hon. Gentleman will know, it is for health care organisations to make informed decisions on the funding and commissioning of services for their local communities, based on evidence, safety, effectiveness and the availability of treatments from suitability qualified practitioners.
Is the right hon. Lady aware that, despite the support that she has described, one fifth of PCTs have cut services in integrated health care in the past two years? One problem in particular is the possibility of Camden PCT withdrawing support for the Royal London homeopathic hospital, despite its employing integrated services which have cut the costs of treatments for some conditions, such as irritable bowel syndrome, by between 50 and 100 per cent. Will she look carefully at the problems there and perhaps issue some guidelines?
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will agree that primary care trusts have the responsibility to commission the very best care that they can for their local populations. In considering the role of complementary and alternative therapies, PCTs need to take account of the evidence on clinical and cost-effectiveness. I am aware that a number of PCTs are reflecting on precisely those points, which is influencing the contracts that they place. However, for a member of a party that supports local decision making, it ill behoves the hon. Gentleman to question it when things do not quite go his way.
In this country we use a lot of recycled water, but I am surprised that water, which supposedly has a memory, does not have a memory of the faeces that were in it and thereby make us all sick. My right hon. Friend has referred to research, but against that background is she aware of any peer-reviewed medical research that indicates that homeopathic medicine works through anything other than a placebo effect?
I am aware that some—including, it appears, my hon. Friend—are not impressed with homeopathic medicine. However, when I referred to complementary and alternative medicines, I was referring to a much broader base of practices. The whole point of the research is to build up the capacity to make evidence-based decisions about complementary therapies.
The Minister says that the decision is for commissioning authorities. However, if the Government believe in evidence-based commissioning as they say they do, is there not a role for them in issuing guidance or at least in asking the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence to issue guidance, so that PCTs do not spend resources on treatments that have no effectiveness? If the effectiveness of treatments such as homeopathy is zero, there can be no cost-effectiveness to them.
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will be aware that the recent Select Committee on Health report on NICE made recommendations about the shortfall in good quality research evidence on the cost-effectiveness of different types of public health interventions, including complementary therapies. The Government will respond to that report in due course. The issue for the Department is to ensure that PCTs are aware of the evidence where it is available. We would certainly wish to consider where it is appropriate for NICE to consider complementary therapies alongside other treatments.
Quality and Outcomes Framework
We are seeking to reach agreement with the British Medical Association to use resources from redundant indicators in the quality and outcomes framework for improving patient satisfaction, with access as a key indicator of quality. We are also proposing to use other resources within the contract to fund extended opening by practices. The BMA has decided to poll its members on the package. We hope that GPs will support our proposals to improve services for their patients.
I wonder whether the Secretary of State has seen the recent evidence showing that only one in 10 women who have suffered a fragility fracture have been referred for a bone scan to discover whether they have osteoporosis. The figure for men is one in 50. I am sure that the Secretary of State is aware of the cost-effectiveness of early diagnosis of osteoporosis. Will he therefore ensure at an early stage that performance indicators for osteoporosis and incentives are built into the quality and outcomes framework? Does he agree that it would be foolish if money that could be available for osteoporosis was diverted into more flexible surgery hours, given the potential savings to the NHS from preventing secondary fractures?
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for his work on the all-party osteoporosis group. Let me make it absolutely clear that this is part of some of the misinformation flying around about the very complex area of the quality and outcomes framework points. There has never been any incentive within the framework to treat osteoporosis. We are dealing with a number of points in the system—and therefore money paid to GPs—that are now redundant. We all agree that they are redundant. We want to use those points for greater access. The BMA has suggested that they be put towards issues such as osteoporosis, virtually as a piece of propaganda to strengthen its position—[Hon. Members: “Ooh!”] The word propaganda is obviously an unparliamentary term.
I say to my hon. Friend—who I know takes a deep interest in this issue, as do many others—that this is not about our not putting money into these areas. We just do not believe that GPs need to be incentivised in such areas. We believe that we should put more money into the national service framework for older people in order to tackle osteoporosis; and we should fundamentally ensure that people can get to their GP, which is the first step to dealing properly with any ailments, including osteoporosis.
What consultation with patients and the public has taken place in the discussions on the GP quality and outcomes framework?
We have dealt with patient groups throughout the process. I mentioned that some points are redundant, and I do not think that there is any argument that GPs should be incentivised to do things that they should already be doing—for instance, writing out a person specification for job adverts to recruit staff to their practice. There should not be incentivisation for things that should be done as a matter of course. There is no disagreement with patient groups about that. About 6 million people in our patients survey said that they want improved access to their GP in the evenings and on Saturdays, which is why we are seeking to reach a negotiated settlement with the BMA.
Is the Secretary of State aware that no one would deny the need for the Department to ensure good value for money in the health service? It is unfortunate that a very inexact contract was prepared for general practitioners. Does he accept that, whatever developments there are, the introduction of private health care, particularly from America, where I am sorry to say the state is unable to provide adequate health care for its own people, would not only undermine the confidence of general practitioners in the national health service, but would cause grave doubts for many hon. Members who believe that this is a service worth preserving?
I do not agree with my hon. Friend that the contract was a mistake or inexact. In fact, during the period leading up to 2004, we had a crisis in GP recruitment. We could not recruit undergraduates from medical schools and we had an ageing group of GPs. A huge shortage of GPs was the big worry at that time, but our medical schools are now full—that problem has been resolved. I also do not agree that GPs who are called out at 4 o’clock in the morning should be expected to deal with patients and difficult cases at 9 o’clock when their surgery opens. The issue about working hours applies to GPs as well as others.
On my hon. Friend’s second point, we are not seeking to introduce private practice into these areas. We are seeking to negotiate with the BMA for greater patient access. We want to bring more GPs into under-doctored areas, which have been appallingly treated in the past. The basic point is that customers and patients should get the service that they deserve. I hope that that will be in our present GP practices, but, if not, we will provide those practices in some other way.
rose—
Order. May I say gently that I must be able to call Back Benchers whose names are on the Order Paper?
This is a short question, Mr. Speaker. Did the Government miscalculate the number of points that GPs would earn in the quality and outcomes framework?
What we are quantifying in this instance is about £200 million for the number of points that are being moved around the system. There is no disagreement about that; the disagreement is about where to spend the money.
Social Care (Individual Budgets)
Local authorities will receive an annual social care reform grant in addition to mainstream resources over the next three years to support the radical transformation of social care in every area. Personal budgets for the vast majority of those receiving public funding are at the heart of that vision.
On Sunday I visited the Patey day centre in my constituency, which provides help for sufferers of dementia. I welcome the Government’s announcement of the first ever national dementia plan, which I hope will stress the importance of enabling sufferers to stay in their own homes for as long as possible. Does my hon. Friend agree that individual social care budgets are vital to achieving that aim?
I entirely agree. It is important that at long last we, as a society, are bringing dementia out of the shadows by establishing the first ever national dementia strategy. It will reflect the fact that dementia affects an increasing number of families, and is a pretty horrendous disease to cope with. The purpose of family budgets is to give families maximum control, power and choice over the care that is provided. They are in the best position to decide on the best way of responding to their own needs. When family members are not there to help people exercise that control and choice, advocates will be available to ensure that a personally sensitive service is provided.
Is the Minister aware of the dilemma faced by many seriously disabled people who reject the highest level of care available because it involves a transfer from social services and direct payments, which give them control over their lives, to the national health service, where they do not have that?
The hon. Gentleman has raised an important point. We are committed to a fundamental review of the care and support system this year, to assess our ability to achieve a fairer funding settlement that redefines the respective responsibilities of state and citizen. One of the issues that we must consider is the relationship between the national health service, local government and the voluntary sector in every local community.
Will my hon. Friend consider the problems faced by disabled people who, on engaging carers, effectively become employers? When my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Thamesmead (John Austin) and I met disabled lobbyists recently at the House, they described their difficulties and the need for guidance and advice. They also pointed out that the different rates paid by local authorities can create problems of recruitment and retention. Will my hon. Friend consider providing some guidance?
I agree with my hon. Friend. One of our reasons for organising a fundamental review of eligibility criteria is the inconsistency of decisions on funding to meet people’s needs, both within and between local authorities.
My hon. Friend referred to the difficulties experienced by people receiving direct payments who employ their own staff and take responsibility for their own care. As we incorporate the new arrangements in the mainstream social care system, one of the challenges for the Government is to ensure that we take account of all the barriers and obstacles that prevent people from exercising self-determination. The belief that disabled and older people have a right to self-determination is entirely consistent with the long history of our party’s values.
If—as we all agree—the use of individual personal budgets and direct payments for social care needs to be massively expanded, they need to be widely available. What is the Minister’s response—and let us have some action, rather than yet another review such as the one that he mentioned—to last week’s report from the Commission for Social Care Inspection? The commission found that in 2005-06 alone seven out of 10 local authorities restricted their services to people with substantial or critical needs, that there was a wide disparity in the levels of care and help provided even in the same areas, and that as a result 281,000 people in need of help were receiving none while another 450,000 were receiving less than they needed.
The action that the hon. Gentleman calls for is the social care transformation that will begin in every local authority area in April; it will last three years and it is funded by half a billion pounds of social care reform grant. At the heart of the agenda will be personal budgets for the vast majority of people receiving public funding; information, advice and advocacy for everybody, irrespective of their means, including self-funders, who are all too often left on their own; and a shift to prevention and early intervention, so that we move away from current eligibility criteria, under which, for example, it appears to be nobody’s responsibility to do anything about an older person who is lonely or isolated. From 1 April there will be a three-year transformation agenda in every local authority area, and later this spring the Prime Minister will announce a new deal for carers. That is action.
Paramedics (East Lancashire)
The data are not collected for east Lancashire. However, there were 1,175 paramedics in the North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust in 2006. The figures for 2007 will be available in March but, nationally, paramedic numbers have risen steadily over recent years, from 6,245 in 1996 to 8,222 in September 2006.
It is regrettable that the figures for my area are not available because blue light accident and emergency services moved from Burnley to Blackburn on 1 November, which has prompted huge local concern that the transfer is not delivering the benefits that we were told to expect. Is my friend satisfied with how the move has gone, and will he meet me and other concerned Members from east Lancashire to discuss the problems in my area?
I am always happy to meet Members. If my hon. Friend has specific examples or evidence of where he thinks the reorganisation has not gone well, I will happily look into them even before we have a chance to meet. I do not think it makes sense, however, for Ministers in Whitehall to second-guess the way that local health services and ambulance trusts organise their services. I am sure that my hon. Friend is aware that three additional ambulances have been taken on to help with the reorganisation. The accident and emergency services were not centralised in Burnley, and I am, of course, aware that concern was expressed there in particular, on account of that fact, but, interestingly, the figures do not point to a large increase in the number of people presenting themselves in Blackburn instead; there has been only about a 5 per cent. change.
Smuggled Tobacco
My local authority health scrutiny commission met last week to discuss that issue. It is a problem in my area because much of the local smuggled tobacco is counterfeit, which means that it is full of dangerous chemicals, and much of it is targeted at young people. As a consequence, health conditions are worsening because of those poor-quality cigarettes and young children are getting health problems at an earlier age. Smoking cessation programmes have been a success story, so can my right hon. Friend give any encouragement to my area about the possibility of those programmes being extended, in particular to children—
My hon. Friend raises an important point about access to smuggled tobacco, particularly in areas of high deprivation where smoking levels among adults and young people remain high compared with the rest of the country. It is necessary to establish co-operation between the local authority, trading standards, the local health providers and local community groups—I am glad to hear that that has started in his local area—to get across a clearer message about the damage that smoking tobacco, whether contraband or not, does to health.
Maternity Services
As the birth rate continues to rise, more midwives will, of course, be needed. We are working closely with the Royal College of Midwives and the national health service to ensure that the local maternity work force are in place to deliver Maternity Matters. Extra funding totalling more than £330 million will ensure that mothers get the best possible care and a full range of choices.
Does the Minister accept that financial resources are the key to getting additional midwives in practice and delivering on the Maternity Matters strategy? She named a figure that is to be devoted to maternity provision. In order to the meet the strategy and the guarantees that the Prime Minister gave me in this House only a few days ago, will she bring forward that additional cash so that it is available very quickly?
We are working closely with the NHS and the Royal College of Midwives on the plans for how the money will be delivered. We are also working towards a conference in the spring, the aim of which is to see how we can bring about the much-needed return of experienced midwives practising out in the community. I am confident that a larger midwifery work force will be in place this year.
May I welcome my hon. Friend’s comments about the extra Government money for maternity services? The George Eliot hospital in Nuneaton, which has a very good birthing unit, has been given some excellent reports and commendations. It has got through the bureaucracy of an acute services review, so the baby unit is staying, as is the special care baby unit, but services are operating in a 1960s building, which is now very unsuitable. Will she urge that some of the extra money be invested in a new birthing unit for that hospital?
My hon. Friend raises an excellent point about the work being done in buildings that have sometimes had years of neglect. We must show our NHS midwives and doctors respect, because practitioners and clinicians have been asked to practise in these buildings, and of course mothers have been asked to give birth in them, which is why the reconfiguration is so welcome. Leadership is essential in maternity care. The UK is the safest country in the world in which to deliver babies, and we should all congratulate our NHS staff.
Topical Questions
The responsibilities of my Department embrace the whole range of NHS social care, mental health and public health service delivery, all of which are of equal importance.
The primary care trust is the important backbone of how funding and services are delivered. Will the Secretary of State tell me why a postcode lottery exists in a PCT area? One part of the PCT area in my constituency does not get incontinence pads whereas the constituency next door, which is in the same PCT area, does get them. The postcode lottery should not exist, so can he put it right?
May be I will pay a visit to Chorley and talk to my hon. Friend’s PCT, because that is where the root of that problem lies. He will know that, just in the past four years, his PCT has received a 30 per cent. funding increase. We also recently announced a 5.5 per cent. increase across the board. If that money does not buy incontinence pads for people who need them, some serious questions need to be asked of his PCT.
That is not an acceptable situation. Indeed, as part of our adult social care review we must examine the issue of the prescription of drugs. That will be part of the national conversation leading up to the Green Paper later this year. The issue concerns Members on both sides of the House, because, as the recent Commission for Social Care Inspection report and the Wanless report showed, we must take long-term measures. Medium-term and short-term measures are important too, but we must take long-term measures to ensure that our adult social care system is equal to the NHS service that we provide
I can let my hon. Friend know that the Department is working with the two agencies that he mentioned both inside the UK and in European Union discussions. Access both on the internet and through mail order is increasing, and patients cannot be assured of safety or effectiveness. I had a meeting only last week with the MHRA about further steps that could be taken to provide the necessary protection.
Last week, just two days after the extraordinary admission that the Government have been perpetuating for the last 11 years the myth that we would eradicate mixed-sex wards, the Mental Health Act Commission reported
“a truly scandalous and tragic situation”—
with vulnerable women being frightened for their safety. Last year, the “Count Me In” census reported that 58 per cent. of women in mental health units are in mixed-sex wards. In two years, there have been 19 alleged rapes and more than 100 alleged sexual assaults.
Will the Secretary of State make a renewed commitment today to eradicate that outrageous situation in our mental health units?
I will give that commitment, because I think that in some ways it is even more important to eradicate mixed-sex accommodation in mental health care than it is in the NHS. As far as the NHS is concerned, in this year’s operating framework we made it clear that we want to make progress towards eradicating mixed-sex accommodation. To be honest, we are responsible for some of the difficulties in the sense that our manifesto spoke of mixed-sex wards, whereas the guidelines—including the guidance from the previous Conservative Government—talk of mixed-sex accommodation. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that eradication is even more important in mental health care than it is in the rest of the NHS, and I am happy to give the commitment that he seeks.
If the situation is as the hon. Gentleman describes it—and I have no reason to doubt him—it is scandalous. It is clear that the local PCT should assess the health needs of its local community and ensure that cost-effective and clinically safe treatment is available. The hon. Gentleman has raised the issue several times in the House and I commend him on that. I will certainly take up his specific concern about the priority given by his PCT to this issue.
Yesterday I received some answers to written questions that I had tabled to the Department on dental fluorosis in children. Those questions were prompted by the mother of a seven-year-old child whose adult teeth were starting to come through very discoloured and with the enamel missing. The mother was distraught, because the dentist had just said casually, “Oh, that is because she was swallowing toothpaste and wasn’t rinsing her mouth.” Should we not do more to warn patients of the dangers of children swallowing toothpaste? This girl will not be able to have anything done about her teeth until she is 16.
I agree that we should do more, and we are. Fluorosis, the discolouration to which my hon. Friend referred, is caused by children eating lots of toothpaste. Guidance has gone out from the chief dental officer to the parents of very small children saying that the amount of toothpaste on the toothbrush should be about the size of a pea. That guidance contains graphic illustrations, too, to ensure that young mothers in particular are aware of the dangers of putting too much toothpaste on the brush. That is not to say that that is potentially fatal, but it does cause problems with fluorosis. My hon. Friend is right to draw attention to the need for that guidance, which went out only a couple of weeks ago.
On the GP contract, the Secretary of State must be aware that Members on both sides of the House will be disappointed that the Government and the BMA seem to be in dispute when they have shared objectives, including the objective of ensuring quality service and access for the patients. Given that under the existing contract primary care trusts can commission extended opening hours as a local enhanced service, will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House how many PCTs have commissioned those extended opening hours?
I am not sure about the number of primary care trusts, but the percentage of the population who have access to such services is about 10 per cent. I have seen primary care trusts around the country—Kingston was a recent example—which have introduced Saturday openings. Incidentally, the people who come to surgeries on Saturday mornings are the very people whom the BMA claims are happy to go to their surgeries mid-week—older people and young mothers with children. They find it very convenient to go to the surgery on a Saturday morning.
We have tried hard to reach an agreement and we are still keen to reach one. We have not torn up any contracts or gone gung-ho at it. We have made a reasonable set of proposals that are good for the patient, the health service and the GPs. I hope that GPs will accept those proposals in the individual ballot that is being sent out from the BMA.
The Secretary of State has accompanied his proposal, as he puts it, with the threat that he will impose a contract rather than complete negotiations. Does he recall the last general election, when we suggested that GPs should be commissioned with additional funds to open on Saturday mornings? The Government did not accept or endorse that proposal. Will the Secretary of State explain how he can pursue his dispute with the BMA when he does not know how many primary care trusts are already commissioning extended opening hours? Does he know how many GPs are offering extended opening hours, whether they are commissioned to do so or not? How can the Secretary of State go on the radio and accuse GPs—
Order. May I say that these are topical questions and are really for the Back Benchers? We cannot have several supplementaries from those on the Front Benches.
Let me say briefly that I have not issued any threats to anyone. We are determined to move ahead with greater access from April. If the BMA does not agree to the proposals, we will need to consult on the proposals that we will impose. To start that process, we must start the consultation now. The hon. Gentleman may want to run away from the argument, but we believe that patients deserve greater access. If we cannot achieve that by negotiation, we will have to impose a solution. To do so, we will need consultation, which must begin now in order to introduce that solution in April.
I am always happy to listen to Liberal Democrats who tell me that we ought to push down more autonomy to the local area and not interfere from the centre, yet ask me to intervene this very day. I shall find out what is happening in tribute to the hon. Gentleman, who I know is a fine constituency MP—[Interruption.] Well, I am in a good mood. I shall let him know the result.
Fact No. 1: fluoride has been in the US water system for the past 60 years, and in Birmingham’s for the past 40. Fact No. 2: Birmingham is the 360th most deprived area in the country, but the incidence of dental decay there puts it 30th in terms of good dental health among children. We have been around this course many times. On a free vote, Parliament voted overwhelmingly that water companies had to put fluoride in the water if local people required it. I want to kick-start that process, and all the facts are in favour of greater fluoridation.
Some 88 per cent. of patients do not pay for their prescriptions. If the group that my hon. Friend mentions is not among them, I shall be happy to meet a delegation to discuss the problem and see what the facts are, as a precursor to seeing whether any action is necessary.
The hon. Gentleman and most of the House will be aware that the health ombudsman and all the local health trusts in his area support the reorganisation in Bristol. He has lost the argument, and his campaign did not succeed in the judicial review. We think that it is better—and the official Liberal Democrat position is in agreement—for local communities and health trusts to make decisions, as that is in the best interests of people in the area.
The Secretary of State prayed in aid the American experience in respect of putting fluoride in the water supply, but Ministers will know that the American Dental Association has advised that fluoridated water is not safe for making up infant milk formula because it causes fluorosis. Is he not concerned about that, and what does he propose to do to keep children’s teeth safe?
May I repeat again that the science supports fluoridation? Parliament did the same, on a free vote. Whenever the public are tested on this question, they believe that there should be fluoridation. There is absolutely no clinical evidence whatsoever that links fluoridation with anything other than fluorosis. Fluorosis is a discolouration of the teeth, and there are perfectly simple ways to deal with it. The major things that we should be talking about are prevention of decay—and fluoride will be extremely helpful in that—and tackling health inequalities. One of the biggest health inequalities is in dental health, and fluoride is there, available and waiting to assist in that process.
Points of Order
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. This morning’s “Today” programme carried reports that BBC’s “File on Four” programme would broadcast details of an unpublished report by rail inspectors that reveals some very serious shortcomings in the safety inspection regime at Network Rail. The Railways Minister is in his place, and I should be very grateful if he would assure the House that hon. Members will be able to see a copy of that report at the earliest possible instance.
That is not a point of order, but I shall ask the Minister whether he has anything to say.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker, and I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving me warning of her point of order. The railway inspectorate is an independent organisation. It is part of the Office of Rail Regulation and it has produced the report that was referred to in this morning’s “Today” programme. It has not published that report: I can assure her that the Department for Transport does not have a copy, and it is entirely up to the ORR to decide whether or not to release it. However, as far as the safety regime is concerned, she will know that the rail accident investigation branch is continuing its investigation into last year’s accident at Grayrigg. The full conclusions of that organisation’s report will be made available to the House.
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Yesterday, the Opposition Front-Bench spokesperson, the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Michael Gove), used the privilege of the House to repeat allegations that the charity Interpal was linked to Hamas, despite the fact that the Charity Commission has twice found those allegations to be unfounded. The charity is well run and there is no evidence of any pro-terrorist bias. Is it in order for—
Order. The hon. Lady is using a point of order to debate a matter. That is not a proper use of the point of order system.
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. As has been widely reported, my constituent, Simon Mann, has disappeared from Zimbabwe and, allegedly, has illegally been handed over to the vicious and repressive regime in Equatorial Guinea. Has any Foreign Office Minister given you any indication that he will come to the House and make a statement and, in particular, that he will call in the ambassadors of those two countries about that blatant abuse—
Order. I am sorry for the difficulties—[Interruption.] Order. I am sorry for the severe difficulties faced by the hon. Gentleman’s constituent, but I cannot be drawn into those matters.
Union Flag
I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to define the Union flag of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; to make provision about the display and flying of the Union flag; and for connected purposes.
My Bill will affirm the Union flag, established on 1 January 1801, as the national flag of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It will define the Union flag as one that can truly represent all British people, including those from Her Majesty’s Crown dependencies and overseas territories who have shown such loyalty to the Crown over many centuries.
I seek to uphold the Union flag for everyone to honour and take pride in, and I want positively to encourage the flying of our flag from public buildings the length and breadth of these islands—not just on the rare days designated for the flying of the flag, but on every day throughout the year. It is time we discarded the outdated convention that the Union flag should fly only on certain days; we should follow the fine example of Her Majesty the Queen who displays the Union flag from Buckingham palace every day except when the royal standard is flown.
The Union flag, or the Union Jack as it is widely known, is a popular modern symbol for most Britons and those with British ancestry—a magnificent emblem representing an unshakeable common bond between all British peoples the world over. The Union flag represents each and every one of us: English, Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish, Channel Islanders, Manxmen, Falkland Islanders, Gibraltarians and all Her Majesty’s subjects in the British overseas territories—indeed, the Union flag is their flag, too.
Another reason for the Bill is to reclaim the Union flag from those who would use it for narrow or extreme political ends, and from those who ridicule our flag on grounds of political correctness or for their own nationalist ambitions. Our flag must be one that all Britons feel able to fly with pride, overriding other divisions that may exist in our nation. In many countries the national flag is a unifying symbol that flies proudly throughout the land: Australia, New Zealand and Canada are the best examples, but in the stars and stripes of the United States and the flags of countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland we see examples where the national flag is flown far and wide, strengthening national identity. The idea that it is somehow not very British to fly the flag is outdated and divisive, and it is time for that old attitude to be discarded.
My Bill will give everyone the right to fly the Union flag all year round, not just from Government buildings in Whitehall but from local town, community, civic and village halls, and from police and fire stations, hospitals, schools, clubs, businesses, offices, shops and private homes, if people choose to do so. Let us start here, today, by flying the Union flag every day from the Houses of Parliament, so that all visitors to London can see our flag proudly fluttering on the mother of Parliaments whenever they visit London. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood) has pointed out to me, we should be proud of our heritage and more forward in displaying the symbol that unites us all. That symbol can also be highly significant for tourism. Every visitor is a potential ambassador for Britain, and our flag could be better used to promote our country, our heritage and our people.
I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield (Michael Fabricant), who proposed a similar Bill in 1996 when he called for the Union flag to fly freely throughout the nation and for the removal of planning restrictions that prevented that from happening. He, too, called for schools to fly the flag every day. I would like to see that idea adopted. Perhaps a different pupil could be invited to have the honour of raising the flag at the start of each school day. There is nothing more important than instilling in our younger people pride in our flag and our nation.
Hon. Members may not be fully aware that the Union flag has never been affirmed in law. I believe it is time that it was. The first Union flag was adopted by royal proclamation by King James on 12 April 1606. It combined the flag of the cross of St. Andrew for Scotland, and the flag of the cross of St. George for England. It was principally for use at sea. The Union with Ireland in 1801 brought the cross of St. Patrick into the flag. The result was the modern Union flag, established by royal proclamation by King George III on 1 January 1801. Nevertheless, the Union flag has never been affirmed as the civil national flag of the United Kingdom. Instead, it has existed only as a Government flag or a royal banner.
In its detailed research, the Flag Institute discovered two significant references to the Union flag in Parliament. On 14 July 1908, in response to a parliamentary question regarding the status of the flag, the Earl of Crewe, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government in another place, declared that
“the Union Jack should be regarded as the National flag”.—[Official Report, 14 July 1908; Vol. 192, c. 579.]
Nearly 25 years later, the Home Secretary, Sir John Gilmour, stated:
“The Union Flag is the national flag and may properly be flown by any British subject on land.”—[Official Report, 27 June 1933; Vol. 279, c. 1324.]
Those two statements are the nearest that the Union flag has ever come to being constitutionally endorsed by Parliament in its popularly accepted role. Consequently, the status of the Union flag has been the subject of controversy and misunderstanding for many years, and there is uncertainty among some people about its constitutional position and legal standing.
My Bill will affirm once and for all that the Union flag is the official flag of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and it will proclaim it to be the flag of all British peoples. It will also formally recognise that the name, Union Jack, can be commonly used when referring to the Union flag. I am indebted to Captain Malcolm Farrow OBE RN, president of the Flag Institute, who has provided me with a wealth of information about the Union flag and its progress and evolution through the centuries, and I commend the work of the Flag Institute to hon. Members.
Some may feel that the status of our flag is unimportant and others may even misinterpret my passion as misplaced patriotism, but nothing could be further from the truth. I believe that my Bill will be the first step in wresting our national flag from the hands of extremists and giving it back to the loyal people of this country, whatever their race, colour, creed or religion. Our flag is a symbol that instils unity and loyalty throughout our nation, so let us today proclaim it as the flag that can truly represent all members of our great British family. I commend the Bill to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Andrew Rosindell, Mr. Andrew Turner, Mr. Lindsay Hoyle, Angela Watkinson, Mr. Henry Bellingham, Mr. Tobias Ellwood, Geraldine Smith, Mr. Martyn Jones, Mr. Nigel Dodds, Mr. David Jones and David Mundell.
Union Flag
Andrew Rosindell accordingly presented a Bill to define the Union flag of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; to make provision about the display and flying of the Union flag; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on Friday 17 October, and to be printed. [Bill 65].
Treaty of Lisbon (No. 3)
(3rd allotted day)
I inform the House that I have selected the amendment in the name of the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague).
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Today the Minister for Europe is publishing the Command Paper on prospects for the European Union for 2008, particularly about the Slovenian presidency and its ability to get the treaty of Lisbon ratified. It would be helpful if that document were available for this debate. Having checked in the Vote Office moments beforehand, I find that it is not. Perhaps you would look into the matter and see if it could be put right.
I think we can manage to get on with the debate. We will manage somehow or other.
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. It is, I believe, customary for the Government to put down all documents relevant to debate. Frequent reference has been made in the House to the positions that the Government took during the negotiations on the European constitutional treaty. Could you ask the Minister to put before the House those positions and the motions that the Government sought to move in the constitutional treaty Convention so that all of us, rather than just some, can refer to them? I have asked the Library; it does not possess a copy.
As I have said previously on points of order, hon. Members can sometimes call on me to do things that are the business of Government. It is up to the Government to decide what papers to lay down in the course of the debate. I thank the right hon. Gentleman for raising the matter.
I beg to move,
That this House approves the Government’s policy towards the Treaty of Lisbon in respect of provisions concerning human rights.
The United Kingdom has been at the forefront of the development of fundamental human rights, especially since the notion was first articulated by Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt in the Atlantic charter in 1941. Nine years after that charter, British lawyers—including the distinguished lawyer Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, who later became the Conservative Lord Chancellor as Lord Kilmuir—were instrumental in drafting what became the European convention on human rights. The Labour Foreign Office Minister, Kenneth Younger, described the resulting document as
“following almost word for word the actual texts proposed by the United Kingdom representatives”.
The rights contained within the convention have a long British pedigree, rooted in Magna Carta, the 1689 Bill of Rights and habeas corpus. They were a manifestation of the values already deeply imbued in the British social fabric and our common law. However, it is as much the origins as the effect of these rights that are relevant to this afternoon’s debate.
The European convention was a means by which a continent racked by the most horrific violence and violations of the most basic rights could heal its wounds. The crucial development was the way in which human rights moved from just being noble sentiments to becoming legally enforceable mechanisms by which a nation’s citizens could seek protection from the otherwise overweening power of the state.
Does the Secretary of State accept that, over the centuries, it has been this Parliament that has defined, upheld and shaped our human rights, and that it should be this Parliament that does so in future? The European charter would be too inflexible and would not reflect the will of the British people.
I do not accept that. It was this British Parliament that decided in 1971 to join the European Union. It was also this British Parliament that signed up to the Single European Act in 1986, to the Maastricht treaty and to the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. We now have the prospect of signing up to this one. It is open to any party in this country to propose in its manifesto that the United Kingdom should withdraw from its treaty obligations and leave the European Union. That is the sovereign right of this country and this Parliament, and long may that continue to be the case.
The right hon. Gentleman did not mention the controversy within the Labour Cabinet over these matters in the late 1940s. He did not mention the hesitations and reservations expressed by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Jowitt, about the European convention on human rights, because of a matter that is germane to this debate—namely, the jurisdiction of an independent non-UK court. That was the crux of the difficulty that the then Labour Government were confronted with, as we are today.
I have not mentioned those things here. However, I have only just begun my speech, so that is not surprising. There are quite a number of things that I will have mentioned by the end of it. I want to reassure the hon. Gentleman, however. I was not going to mention that part of the history today, but I mentioned it recently in a lecture that I gave to a Justice and Guardian newspaper seminar—
Put it in the Library.
It is on the website, but I would be happy to put it in the Library and lay it on the Table as well.
I am aware of the history, and of the fact that there was debate in both parties on whether it was acceptable to sign up to a convention and to be bound by the decisions of its courts. I have to say, however, that both the major parties, along with the Liberal Democrats—and their predecessor, the Liberal party—and now this Parliament have successively decided to endorse our signature of the European convention and our acceptance of the decisions of the Court at Strasbourg.
We all know about the European convention, whose history the Secretary of State is describing. What concerns us today, however, is why the Government think it appropriate for this additional charter—the charter of fundamental rights—to come into existence and to become an integral part of European Union law, as opposed to European convention law. Are we not simply duplicating?
I will refer to that matter in a moment if I am given a chance to do so, as I know I will be.
May I take the right hon. Gentleman back to something that he said a few moments ago? He stated that the British people had signed up to the European Union. He is a man of great honour; will he at least acknowledge that the British people have only ever voted to join a trading relationship? What we are getting now is a quite different sort of relationship, which is why the Government should honour their promise and give the British people their say.
The debate during the 1975 referendum roamed much wider than that; plenty of histories of it have been written. It is a matter for the hon. Gentleman to win an argument within his own party. Perhaps he wishes to propose that his party commit itself to leaving the European Union—an idea on which the hon. Gentleman is very keen—and putting the question to the British people in a referendum. That would be the appropriate way to address that absolutely fundamental issue.
Meanwhile, I shall make a little progress before provoking some more interventions. Lest the House forget, I was just saying how the ideas moved from being sentiments to legally enforceable mechanisms. The lessons of European history are conspicuous: good will and paper barriers, in and of themselves, are no protection from the perils of authoritarianism. The creation of common minimum standards, backed up by law and enforced by supranational courts—that is the heart of the argument—has turned out to be a powerful guarantee of citizens’ rights and freedoms.
Britain has played a pivotal role in developing that culture of rights and the idea of human rights across Europe. My point to the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) is that that has been of profound importance in helping to introduce across Europe shared prosperity and stability, from which our own citizens have so benefited. Without not only that culture, but the ability to enforce common standards of human rights, I doubt very much whether we would have seen the extraordinary progress made during the lifetimes of many right hon. and hon. Members, including mine. We have moved from a position in which only a handful of European states could be described as functioning democracies; there were dictatorships not only in eastern Europe but in what we now describe as western Europe. Today, almost every nation meets that description, or is working hard towards it.
When I was Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary I was very involved in the expansion of the European Union from 15 to 25 to 27. The key issue was not about bringing the economic performances of the countries joining up to a standard; the key issue for them was to ensure that their human rights provisions were raised to decent standards, in practice as well as theory. Without the bedrock of the European convention on human rights, and the other rights added to it and now described in the charter, that change—from which we have benefited and which was supported by every party in the House—could not have occurred.
I give way, as I always do in any debate on Europe, to the hon. Gentleman.
How does it advance our democracy, in the terms in which the Secretary of State has put it, to arrive at a position in which rulings by the European Court of Justice on these enormously important matters displace Acts of Parliament, which are decided by the voters of this country on the basis of manifestos in general elections?
The problem for the hon. Gentleman is this: a manifesto was put forward by the Conservative party in 1970; I do not know whether he voted Conservative in that election, but it is beyond peradventure that he was alive for it. That manifesto said that if the Conservative party was elected to government—and it was, on 18 June 1970—it would seek to negotiate our entry to the European Union. [Interruption.] Somebody said sotto voce that there was no charter of human rights; I shall come back to that. The House voted, as the other place did, in favour of membership. Four years later, the Labour Government said that they wished to renegotiate certain aspects of our membership arrangements, and that was put to a referendum. That was endorsed by the British people by a margin of two to one.
The European Court of Justice has been fundamental to the operation of the European Union ever since it was formed. That is my answer to the hon. Gentleman; I know that he disagrees with the mechanisms of the European Union, but it is for him and the hon. Member for Castle Point (Bob Spink) to have that argument in the Conservative party and commit it to what is in my judgment its most consistent position, although I disagree with it: leaving the European Union.
As regards the European court of fundamental rights, duplication has been suggested. Would it not have been better had the money that is being spent on this been put towards the European courts that already exist, which have a backlog of cases? As for the powers of the European court of fundamental rights, would the British people be able, for instance, to go to that court to complain about a governing party that promised a referendum on the European constitution but then denied it to us a year or so later?
That is a bit of a debating point, but the legal answer to the question is no.
rose—
A number of hon. Gentlemen are showing that they wish to intervene. If they will allow me to make some progress, I promise that they will all get in before I conclude.
For the future interests of Britain, and of Europe, it is right that we collectively take further steps to make the promotion of human rights integral to being part of Europe. That is the explanation for the measures within the Lisbon treaty—the charter, the accession of the European Union to the European convention on human rights, and further provisions regarding the rights of the child.
The Lord Chancellor has rapidly touched on the fundamental issue. I agree that the adherence of the European Union to the European convention on human rights is an absolutely key issue in promoting human rights within the Union. However, he needs to explain to the House why, if that adherence is to take place—it is long overdue—the charter of fundamental rights should then be imposed in the manner proposed by the treaty of Lisbon.
I have to say to the hon. Gentleman that I honestly think that the Opposition are trying to make silk purses out of sows’ ears. They have no case. Let me go through the charter and recite a series of rights that are already accepted across Europe as fundamental to the way in which our democracies operate. When the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Lidington) or the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) stand up to speak, the first thing that I would like to hear is which of these rights they object to. Are they against
“respect for…private and family life”?
Are they against
“the right to liberty and security”?
Are they against—
rose—
Okay, let us hear.
We do not disagree with individual rights—we disagree with the legal process that means that they are defined and imposed on us instead of defined and imposed from here.
The Secretary of State tried to suggest that the countries of eastern Europe have somehow benefited—
Order. I think that the Secretary of State would wish to respond to the first intervention before taking a second.
I apologise, Madam Deputy Speaker—that was my fault because I indicated that I was ready to accept the next intervention.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am sorry, but this is just a point of clarification. We are now getting into the detail of the Bill, which I understood to be for the Committee stage. Are we moving into the Committee stage or are we still going through this nonsensical motion process?
We are debating the motion; we are not yet in Committee.
I now give way to the hon. Member for Shrewsbury and Atcham (Daniel Kawczynski).
I am grateful to the Secretary of State. He stated earlier that eastern European countries have somehow benefited from these new human rights laws coming out of the European Union, and that so would we in the United Kingdom. The fact is that those countries were only temporarily isolated behind the iron curtain. They had developed their own human rights for generations—for centuries—and they reverted back to them when communism fell; they did not learn them from the European Union.
The history of states in eastern Europe—of course, I bow to the hon. Gentleman’s superior knowledge, particularly in respect of Poland—varies, as it does in western European states. Nevertheless, some of the eastern European states had not had any experience of democracy until after the Berlin wall fell—that is simply a matter of straightforward history.
rose—
I want to make some progress, but I give way to the right hon. Member for Wells (Mr. Heathcoat-Amory).
The right hon. Gentleman will recall my asking him in a Select Committee about new rights. He asserted that there are no new rights in the charter, which was repeated by the Foreign Secretary last October. However, the right in article 13, which states that
“scientific research shall be free of constraint”,
is a new right. According to the Government’s own explanation, it is derived from no existing source. I object to that provision because I support animal welfare, and I object to the concept of all scientific research being entirely free of constraint. Parliament should legislate to constrain such research. Does he agree that that is a new right, and does he agree that it is a highly controversial matter which would be much better debated in a national Parliament, rather than asserted unconditionally in a foreign jurisdiction?
I shall come on to the issue of those awful foreigners who are trying to impose their will against—[Hon. Members: “Answer the question!”] I am going to answer the question. As far as article 13 is concerned, that right is already part of EU law. It is the same as the right in article 10 in the European convention on human rights.
Will the Secretary of State give way?
I will give way later, but I am going to make some progress.
I note that the only specific right mentioned in the charter of fundamental rights to which the Conservative party now takes exception—perhaps the hon. Member for Aylesbury has a longer list—is the right concerning scientific and arts research, and that was objected to only by the right hon. Member for Wells. The right hon. Gentleman will know that these rights are balanced against other rights, including those of animals. There is a clear protocol relating to the accession of the European convention on human rights by the European Union, which makes this clear:
“The agreement referred to in Article 1 shall ensure that accession of the Union shall not affect the competences of the Union or the powers...It shall ensure that nothing therein affects the situation of Member States in relation to the European Convention, in particular in relation to the Protocols thereto”.
The right hon. Gentleman has asserted several times that nothing in the charter of fundamental rights creates new rights, and that the rights there already exist. However, in its website commentary on the treaty of Lisbon, the European Commission says that
“the Treaty of Lisbon preserves existing rights while introducing new ones.”
Is he saying that the Commission is wrong?
There is provenance for every one of the rights contained in the charter. [Hon. Members: “Provenance?”] Yes, provenance. If the hon. Gentleman is saying that he objects to a particular right, when he comes to make his speech let him say in his own way to which of the rights he objects.
I shall give way to both my hon. Friend and my right hon. Friend.
To recognise the advances that have undoubtedly been made in human rights in many parts of Europe, we need only compare the situation now to that 70 years ago. Would my right hon. Friend take the opportunity not to allow history to be rewritten? Hungary and Poland, in particular, pre-war, were deeply flawed, authoritarian states. They were disgusting states.
Outrageous!
Poland certainly was. It is unfortunate that some hon. Members refuse to accept that fact.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I give way to my right hon. Friend.
Outrageous. Pathetic.
Order. I call Secretary Jack Straw.
I will give way to my right hon. Friend.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. The Member for Walsall, or wherever he is from, stated that Poland was a fascist regime. That is absolutely scandalous. [Interruption.]
Order. I am prepared to hear the hon. Gentleman’s point of order, but I say to all hon. Members of this House that some of the common courtesies of debate should be applied.
I take great exception to what has been shouted across the Floor about Poland—a major nation of the European Union. He describes it as having been a fascist regime. I take great offence at that, Madam Deputy Speaker.
Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.
May I just reply to the other point of order first? It is not a point of order for the Chair. It is matter of debate, and I therefore repeat my request that all Members in this House accept the common courtesies of debate.
I realise that you are not directly involved, Madam Deputy Speaker, but it is rather unfortunate that some Members refuse to recognise what sort of states existed in Europe before the second world war.
I say again that that is not a point of order for the Chair. May we now continue with the debate?
I give way to my right hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Mr. MacShane).
As someone with some lineage connected to Poland, let me tell my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) that it was not a fascist state, but neither was it a perfect democracy. We in England do not have the best of records on anti-Semitism at that time.
I put it to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State that, unless we wish to revert to a Hobbesian world of a war of all against all, contract and covenant between people and nations are necessary. In the World Trade Organisation, which is a treaty organisation, we have to accept derogation of our sovereignty, and it tells us what to do. The same applies to the International Labour Organisation, the European convention on human rights, the Council of Europe and so on. The Opposition have a choice: leave the EU—
Order. Interventions must be brief.
I agree with my right hon. Friend. Any obligations to which we sign up, as long as they exist under international treaties, include duties as well as benefits. We must always balance the one against the other.
The hon. Member for Aylesbury mentioned the European Commission website. The Commission clearly set out the prime objective underlying the charter as making European Union citizens’ rights more visible. The text does not establish new rights; that was never the intention. It assembles existing rights, which were previously scattered over a range of sources and therefore not always easy to trace.
Today, we live in a different age from when the European Union was founded. It comprised six, nine and then 15 states. It has almost doubled in size, bringing together 27 politically and culturally diverse members. The time is not beyond the memory of many in the House when a trip across the channel required a feat of logistics, including having to take one’s passport to the bank to withdraw a maximum of £250-worth of European currency in one year.
Nowadays, British citizens make 55 million trips to Europe each year. Around three quarters of a million of us have homes in Spain, with a further quarter of a million with homes in France, while hundreds of thousands have settled or work elsewhere in the EU. Today, our constituents benefit from the EU and think nothing of living, working and travelling across it.
There is a damaging fallacy that human rights are something for the “other”. The old home guard is wheeled out in the name of the defence of British interests. They paint a dismal picture of some form of Napoleonic resurgence, threatening the borders and well-being of the United Kingdom. The only response as they see it—we experienced it again this afternoon—is drawing back from Europe into the comfort of narrow parochialism. They seem to miss the fact that the British interest of the British people—yes, those who fly the flag and want it to be flown more often—is best served by being in Europe so that we can influence Europe. I want my constituents to receive the same protection when on holiday or on business abroad in Europe as they are afforded at home.
rose—
Before giving way, let me first make the same argument in the House as I do in discussions in my constituency when the issue arises. I ask my constituents where they go on holiday, whether they know anyone with an apartment or home in Spain, Italy or France, or anyone who has made use of his or her right to work elsewhere in the European Union. I point out to them that they would have far fewer rights when living or working abroad without our participation in Europe.
The Government ensured through the Human Rights Act 1998 that the rights contained in the convention were brought home to become directly enforceable by British judges in British courts.
I said that I would give way to the hon. Gentleman.
The rights that the Secretary of State has described existed long before the charter of fundamental rights. May I take him back to the question that my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Lidington) asked? Since the European Union wishes to accede to the convention and the Government claim that the charter will not create any justiciable rights in this country, what practical benefit is the charter for the people of this country? Is the high point of the Government’s case that they are protecting us from the wonderful document’s having any effect?
The benefit of the charter is, as the European Commission said, that it assembles existing rights, which were previously scattered over a range of sources and therefore not always easy to trace. [Interruption.] It concerns existing rights and I am glad that the hon. Gentleman acknowledges that. Perhaps he will tell his Front-Bench colleagues.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the previous intervention demonstrates the difficulty that we on this side of the House have with the Opposition? They do not understand that membership of the European Union is a two-way street or that the rights of UK citizens when in other countries are protected through such provisions. It was the same in the debate on justice and home affairs, when they did not understand that minimum standards in criminal law could affect UK citizens beneficially when abroad. Similarly, in the debate on energy the issue for the Tories seemed to be all about people nicking our energy supplies in time of crisis, rather than energy supplies from other member states coming here. It is the same in this debate—they do not understand the protections that our citizens can enjoy abroad owing to those fundamental rights.
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. I know that he has had the privilege and benefit of attending each of these debates and hearing what has been said. Yes, the European Union is a two-way street, but my point to my constituents, which they accept, is that when they go abroad, they want better rights than they would be afforded in many non-EU foreign countries. They benefit in EU countries, but they also want to know that if, for instance, they want to enforce their property rights, they can do so better within the European Union.
I have the greatest affection for my right hon. Friend and I always enjoy the sight of him skating very fast on thin ice. I am not a lawyer and this debate is in danger of becoming an argument between lawyers, so will he identify one new right—just one—that the legislation will introduce?
The answer—[Interruption.] The answer to my hon. Friend—[Hon. Members: “She’s marvellous!”] I absolutely agree—she is marvellous, and I love her to bits. The answer to my hon. Friend, with whom I have a long and close association going back some years, is that the charter does not create new rights; rather, it brings together rights that were already there, as I have just said.
Will the Lord Chancellor confirm that every country that is a member of the European Union is also a signatory of the European convention on human rights? Indeed, I believe that every single one has incorporated it. In view of that, what is the purpose of the charter of fundamental rights? If it is innocuous, as he says it is, why have the Government negotiated a protocol that will supposedly make it ineffective?
If the hon. Gentleman bears with me, I shall answer his question in full and at tedious length.
Can the Lord Chancellor confirm that the charter applies those rights for the first time to the European Union institutions? That is a key part of the whole policy development.
Yes, I can, although many of those rights applied in any event. I can also say what the benefit is of assembling those rights together in a single document. It is that the people of Britain, among many others, can see what they are in a single document, rather than having to delve into various obscure—
Will the Lord Chancellor give way?
No, I am going to make some progress.
You have got four and a half hours.
Not all for me, for Pete’s sake! I have given way to the hon. Gentleman already. I will give way to him later, but now I must make some progress.
As the House knows, the charter was originally drafted as a declaratory document agreed at the Cologne summit in 1999. Before agreeing that the charter should have treaty status, the Government insisted that greater clarity was required to define precisely what the scope and effect of such a status would be, which is the answer to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. We pledged that nothing in the charter of fundamental rights would give national or European courts any new powers to strike down or reinterpret UK law, including with regard to labour and social legislation. That is what we have delivered.
We have also negotiated an extensive package of safeguards. Four measures in particular have been put in place: the new wording of article 6 of the Lisbon treaty; the charter’s horizontal articles, found in articles 51 and 52; the revised official explanations accompanying the charter; and the binding protocol on page 172. Individually and taken together, those measures represent a substantial degree of protection for British interests. I will deal with them in turn.
The amended article 6 states:
“The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competencies of the Union as defined in the Treaties. The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general principles…of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations…in the Charter”.
The horizontal articles contained in title VII stipulate:
“The provisions of the Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and”,
crucially,
“to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law...The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.”
In addition, the official explanations to the charter, which indicate the source of the rights and principles it contains, provide further clarification:
“The explanations drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation of the Charter shall be given due regard by the courts… and…Member States”.
The explanations demonstrate that the charter does not create any new rights, but reaffirms rights that are already recognised.
The final measure, the protocol, which we have secured along with Poland, completes the protection. The language is unusually clear for an EU instrument:
“The Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the EU, or any court or tribunal of Poland or the United Kingdom, to find that laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms. In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.”
Then there is a further limb to the protocol.
While the charter may indeed not provide for new rights, the European Court will for the first time be able to interpret that charter in countries where it is justiciable and thereby—the charter is drafted in very broad terms—effectively make major new law, as supreme courts do around the world. Does that not explain why the protocol is crucial, but only if it is watertight? Will the Secretary of State explain why it was not made clear when the terms of the protocol were negotiated that it would apply regardless of any other European treaty or other law made by the European Court? Without that, there is a real risk, notwithstanding the generally welcome protocol, that a loophole within it may negate its purpose.
I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for that helpful intervention. It is our view that the protocol—it should be taken together with the other three safeguards, but this applies even to the terms of the protocol itself—contains the safeguards that the right hon. and learned Gentleman and the British Government seek. [Interruption.] If he thinks otherwise, I look forward to hearing his speech, but that is our view. It is very clear that the safeguards that I have described mean that the charter does not introduce new justiciable rights and that the courts, domestic or European, are being given no new powers to overrule the will of the House.
I should point out for the avoidance of doubt, and since the issue is raised teasingly in the Opposition amendment, that the protocol does not operate like an opt-out, but the broad purpose is similar: opt-outs and protocols are there to provide safeguards for the UK. It does not disapply rights to UK citizens; given that the United Kingdom fully accepts the rights reaffirmed in the charter, there would be no need to do so. However, it ensures that what is in the charter is not additionally justiciable, as it might have been had it not been for the charter.
No, I am going to make some progress and deal with the issue of labour rights, which is of concern to Members on both sides of the House. Paradoxically, critics of the charter either bemoan the potential disparity in the level of workers’ rights across Europe, which they suggest will lead to legal chaos, or alternatively complain that the charter will open up our own employment laws to new legal challenges. Let me clarify the position.
UK employees and citizens in general will not have fewer rights because of the protocol. In any event, as I said, the charter does not provide any new rights. Rather, it simply makes the rights that we already have more visible, and once the treaty comes into effect, it calls on EU institutions and member states to abide by them when they are implementing EU law. I have already quoted what the European Commission sets out on its website.
It is true that, under the treaty establishing the European Community, the European Union already has power to legislate, by unanimity, for collective defence of workers’ interests in the social chapter, but it has no powers to decide what rights to strike should exist in national law. Article 137 states:
“The provisions of this article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lockouts”.
The Lisbon treaty does not change that; nor does the charter affect it. The explanation to Article 28 is explicit:
“The modalities and limits for the exercise of collective action, including strike action, come under national laws and principles”.
The existing rights and principles recorded in the charter will continue to work as they always have. The protocol serves to put that beyond doubt, but it does not create any disparity between workers across Europe.
Will the Secretary of State give way?
No; I want to make some progress.
The Government can be proud of their record in championing the rights of British workers. Perhaps the most substantial, as well as the most symbolic, difference between us in the Labour Government and Opposition Members lies in the social chapter. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham put it so aptly,
“There is only one major EU agreement Britain has signed up to that differs from all the EU rules Conservatives lived with up to 1997. That is the social chapter.”
I am proud that we signed up to it.
The social chapter was designed to create a minimum guaranteed level of social protection across Europe. It prevents countries from competing unfairly by allowing their workers to be exploited. I should have thought that, given all the concern about competition from eastern European workers, the Conservative party would now have realised the error of its ways. The last Conservative Government negotiated an opt-out, but we had a manifesto commitment, and we joined the chapter in 1997. As many Conservatives think that there are demons in it, let me mention that it includes the right to paid maternity and paternity leave—is the House opposed to that?—and the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of sexuality, religion or belief, or age.
The right hon. Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) has said that he supports flexible working, yet he told his party conference:
“I can tell you that we will get out of the European Social Chapter.”
Opting out of social chapter rights would simply make it harder for parents to balance work and their caring responsibilities, and could even remove the right to paid holidays. The Opposition have consistently opposed the basic minimum standards enshrined in the chapter and reiterated in the treaty, which have been of particular benefit to low-paid women workers. I hope that the hon. Member for Aylesbury will tell us which elements of the chapter—they have delivered real rights and benefits to our citizens—the Conservative party plans to remove.
As well as clarifying and guaranteeing the rights of men and women, the treaty means that, for the first time, the European Union establishes the rights of the child as one of the general objectives of the Union.
I look forward to hearing from my right hon. Friend about the rights of children, which the treaty fundamentally improves. However, it is clear that parts of article 137—article 153 of the consolidated treaty—will be subject to a passerelle clause. I am thinking of
“protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated…the information and consultation of workers….representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including co-determination”.
Should the passerelle be applied, those provisions might be subject to qualified majority voting rather than unanimity, and this country could lose its veto. Other countries could decide to override it if they gained a majority in the Council.
Where there is a passerelle clause, the move from unanimity to qualified majority voting can take place only if unanimity itself exists. We have an absolute veto in relation to whether we wish to move to qualified majority voting. Moreover—I know that this is not a matter to be discussed today, but I will mention it in passing—the Bill makes special provision whereby the House must vote in respect of any move from unanimity to qualified majority voting via a passerelle.
rose—
I wish to conclude now; I am sorry to disappoint—
Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Go on then.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way—although, to add a note of sourness, I feel that I must say that his performance would have been better given in Blackburn market.
Two courts are relevant to this House: the European Court of Justice sitting at Strasbourg and the European Court for this treaty arrangement. Where there is a conflict in interpretation of human rights, which court prevails?
Strasbourg.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for taking so many interventions. I share his pleasure about the directive he mentioned on workers’ rights, but may I draw his attention to title IV of the charter, for which there is the special provision that he has referred to? Will he explain why we have decided that title IV will not create any new justiciable rights that are applicable to the United Kingdom? Finally, will he say whether it is the UK’s intention to secure a majority for the agency workers directive?
That would put the issue beyond doubt. The Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, East (Bridget Prentice), will be able to go into this matter in more detail when we come to the winding-up speeches.
Will the Secretary of State give way?
No; I am going to finish, and I have already given way to the hon. Gentleman.
To conclude my previous point, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hemsworth (Jon Trickett) knows, the issue of agency workers has been the subject of considerable discussion in this country and between us and other member states. That can be, and will be—there is no reason why it should not be—resolved within existing treaty arrangements, notwithstanding the fact that we do not currently have the benefit of the treaty including the charter.
rose—
I will not give way again, as I wish to conclude—I am sorry to have to disappoint the House by saying that my speech will shortly come to an end.
I firmly believe, as do the Government, that Britain’s best interests are served by working with Europe and by being closely involved in the Union, but on our terms. The negotiations that led to the Lisbon treaty have achieved that. British interests are strengthened through a series of opt-ins and opt-outs, and in the matter of the charter, not least through the binding protocol. I hope that there is cross-party consensus that there are overwhelming benefits to the British people as a result of our honouring international commitments regarding human rights. Even those on the Opposition Front Bench, in spite of the endless inconsistencies and contradictions of their policy in this area, seem now to have realised that it would be folly of the gravest kind to do what many Opposition Members were toying with doing not long ago: withdrawing from the European convention on human rights. I welcome at least that late change.
I also issue a warning, however. I fear that those who seek to attack the treaty by attacking its human rights provisions are at risk of doing great harm to the interests of the British people, as well as being injurious to our international reputation. We brought rights home to make it easier for our citizens to access their rights, and to make human rights considerations part and parcel of policy making. It is now time that we reinforce that protection across the entire EU regardless of where British citizens happen to be. We can do that through the Lisbon treaty—through the human rights provisions linked to it and the extensive safeguards that we have secured—and I commend the motion to the House.
I beg to move, to leave out from “House” to end and add instead thereof:
“disapproves of the Government’s policy towards the Treaty of Lisbon in respect of human rights because of its incoherence and inconsistency on the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the United Kingdom; notes that after the Intergovernmental Conference was agreed the previous Prime Minister told the House that “it is absolutely clear that we have an opt-out from both the Charter and judicial and home affairs”; notes that the Minister for Europe told the House when debating the Treaty of Lisbon that “the fact is that the United Kingdom has neither sought nor achieved an opt-out on the Charter of Fundamental Rights”; and calls on the Government to adopt a clear and consistent policy whose merits Parliament may then judge.”
I am delighted that the Secretary of State opened the debate on behalf of the Government. I congratulate him on his speech, which was a masterpiece of obfuscation. Opposition Members admire the way in which he shimmies around any challenge to do with the substance of the charter of fundamental rights and the content of the treaty. To develop the image of the hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mrs. Dunwoody), we see the right hon. Gentleman as the Kyran Bracken of the Government Front Bench. It is not just his experience as Foreign Secretary that commends him to us. Conservative Members’ regard for the right hon. Gentleman is only enhanced by knowing that it was he who bounced the former Prime Minister into promising a referendum on the European constitution. After the French and Dutch votes he pledged that
“there will be no proposals made by this Government that seek to bring in this constitutional treaty, or elements of it, by the back door.”—[Official Report, 6 June 2005; Vol. 434, c. 1000.]
Let us focus on a pledge and a promise made by his party leader. Is it Conservative policy to withdraw from the social chapter if they form a Government?
The right hon. Gentleman knows what my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said about seeking to restore national Parliaments’ control of employment measures. He will have to wait with bated breath for the detailed presentation of Conservative policy, but I can promise him that his appetite will be satisfied well before the next election. [Interruption.] I am always impressed by the way in which Labour Members become increasingly excited by the prospect of what the future Conservative Government will do.
The right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr. MacShane) tried to come to the Lord Chancellor’s rescue, but Conservative Members know what the Lord Chancellor said about his commitments on consulting the people, we know what he really thinks and we still cherish the hope, even at this late stage, that he will be prepared to step up to say what he privately believes about the need to consult the people.
There is a sense of poetic justice in our debating human rights today, because yesterday’s events and the treatment meted out to the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Field), and the hon. Members for Manchester, Blackley (Graham Stringer), for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart) and for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey) remind us that the rights to free speech, due process and a fair trial need to be defended today with vigilance and determination. The Prime Minister must have set some new standard in ordering the persecution of four Members of Parliament for seeking to deliver something that not only they but he had promised the British people at the previous general election.
Let me deal with the motion, the treaty’s content and its human rights elements. Three key elements of the treaty should concern us this afternoon. Paragraph 2 of article 6 provides for the European Union to accede to the European convention on human rights, but the Secretary of State did not give us a likely timetable for that. It might help if the Minister for Europe’s response threw more light on that proposed time scale and on whether negotiating problems must still be overcome before accession.
The Secretary of State assured my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) that in the event of a clash of judgments between the two courts, the European Court of Human Rights’ decision would take precedence, but I can find nothing in the treaty text to support the Government’s assertion. Ministers have a duty to explain in much greater detail exactly how such a conflict would be reconciled.
Perhaps I may assist my hon. Friend. The Secretary of State is wholly wrong in his assertion, because article 6 clearly states:
“Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.”
Therefore, the European Court of Justice would interpret the matter and would therefore take precedence.
In the absence of any detailed argument to the contrary, I find my hon. Friend’s case persuasive. This is not an academic point, because such a clash actually happened when the ECJ ruled that the treaties did not permit Britain to allow Gibraltarians to vote in European parliamentary elections and the European Court of Human Rights declared that Britain’s failure to give such votes to Gibraltarians left this country in breach of the European convention on human rights.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the major fallacy in the Secretary of State’s argument is that all these rights, if we like them, can be granted by this Parliament and interpreted and enforced through our courts, with the advantage that if we do not like them as they evolve we can amend them here without needing the agreement of 26 other member states?
Throughout his speech, the Secretary of State carefully sidestepped the challenge posed by my right hon. Friend.
Surely the point is that the European convention on human rights provides explicitly that the European Court of Human Rights will interpret rights under the convention. Thus, in acceding to the European convention on human rights, the European Union will be bound not only by the principles of the convention, but by the decision of the Court in interpreting the convention. That is the point, and that is why the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) is wrong.
The problem with the right hon. Lady’s assertion is that we do not yet know what the text of any accession agreement between the EU and the ECHR will be. The language that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) quoted indicates that the European treaties already contain provisions that tilt the argument in the opposite direction.
The Government have done a somersault on children’s rights. In the early stages, the right hon. Member for Neath (Mr. Hain) tried hard to delete any mention of children’s rights from the text, on the grounds that its inclusion would be an extension of EU competence. Now, Ministers hail the inclusion of a reference to children’s rights as some negotiating triumph. The Government still refuse to come clean over whether the words do matter and they made a concession of some significance during negotiations, or whether they believe that the reference is innocuous and changes nothing about EU competence. In the latter case, it hardly merits the fanfares that they have been busy blowing.
The Government’s failure to be straight with Parliament and the British people on that point encapsulates what is wrong with their approach to this treaty and how, in particular, they have dealt with the impact of the charter of fundamental rights—the subject that will, rightly, be the focus of most of today’s debate, the prime purpose of which should be to probe the Government on their answers to two questions. First, does the fact that the Lisbon treaty gives legal force to the charter of fundamental rights transfer powers, either actually or potentially, from national Parliaments and Governments to the institutions of the Union, and especially to the Court of Justice? Secondly, if the treaty does have such an effect, do the words of the protocol that the Government have secured provide the safeguards for this Parliament that Ministers claim?
We know for certain that the Government fought hard to resist any incorporation of the charter in the treaty. In fact, the notes used by the right hon. Member for Neath at the time of the convention said that the objective of the British Government was to ensure that the charter was relegated from the text of the treaty into “only a protocol”. The use of the word “only” in that context should lead us to question the significance of the protocol to which the Government attach such importance today.
The Government rely on three basic arguments to defend their position.
The hon. Gentleman says that the debate has to answer the question of whether the charter of fundamental rights extends the competences of the Union. Has he read article 6.1? It states:
“The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.”
Yes. I want to deal with exactly that point in greater detail.
The Government have relied on three arguments to defend their position. First, they claim that the charter is nothing more than a declaratory statement and that it merely codifies rights that already exist. The Foreign Secretary asserted that as recently as 18 October last year, when he wrote to the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee to say that the charter
“only records existing rights; it does not create any new rights”.
Earlier this afternoon, the Secretary of State for Justice said that the charter describes rights that already exist.
Secondly, like the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey), the Government argue that the words of article 6 of the consolidated treaty, together with the so-called horizontal articles of the charter, protect all member states—not only the UK or Poland—from the creation of new rights by the institutions of the Union.
Thirdly, Ministers claim that the protocol to the treaty in respect of this country and Poland alone makes it impossible for decisions of the European Court or the Commission to overturn the definitions of rights determined by our domestic law. The trouble is that when one starts to examine those claims in any detail, one realises that the safeguards appear less than watertight, as the European Scrutiny Committee found in its most recent report.
One also has to challenge the Government on a point of basic principle. If, as Ministers say, all the rights that are included in the charter already exist in both domestic law and the European convention on human rights, what is the purpose of the charter of fundamental rights being judicable by the European Court of Justice, too?
The charter sets out a number of rights that would, as a consequence of Lisbon, become for the first time rights that are embodied in EU law and judicable by the ECJ, even if they are not new rights. Most obviously, the recreation in the Lisbon treaty of the EU as a unitary legal entity means that subjects such as policing and criminal justice laws passed after Lisbon could be interpreted by the ECJ with the Court applying the rights and principles set out in the charter.
The treaty goes beyond the EU simply signing up to the European convention on human rights. The charter also includes a number of articles derived from other international agreements that have been entered into bilaterally by one or more of the member states. Those rights, too, exist in those member states but they have not hitherto been part of EU law and subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ. In practice, when we hear the Government’s arguments and look at what Ministers are doing and saying, we find that they are not behaving as though they believe that no new rights are being created. If there were no new rights and no new interpretations permitted of existing rights, why is there a need for the protocol at all?
The same applies to the argument put by the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton. If article 6, and in particular paragraphs 1 and 2, do not under any circumstances permit the extension of EU competence or the interpretation by the court of what is meant by EU competence, it is difficult to see the justification for the protocol in which the Government place such store.
May I refer the hon. Gentleman to an article by Professor Dashwood? He asked that same question:
“What then is the purpose of the Charter Protocol?”
His ruling was that it was
“Simply, it would appear, to make assurance doubly sure for those in the United Kingdom that remain determined to see the charter as a ravening beast, when it is really a paper tiger.”
I think that the learned professor’s arguments do not match the arguments advanced by the Government to justify the contradiction in their approach. The hon. Gentleman argues that everything is safe but, if that is so, there is no need for the protocol that the Government have negotiated.
The Government point to paragraph 4 of the charter’s article 112. It requires that rights must be “interpreted in harmony” with the
“constitutional traditions common to the Member States.”
Ministers have argued that the ECJ will take clear account of what happens in individual member states before it gives a ruling. The problem, once again, is that the decision about whether a particular interpretation of rights is “in harmony” with national traditions will be made not by national Governments or Parliaments but by the ECJ.
The ECJ will not be under a duty to look separately at each country’s national traditions. Instead, the wording of the article makes it explicit that it will look at the traditions common to all member states. Where national traditions differ, ECJ judges will decide what balance they wish to strike. The president of the ECJ could not have made that clearer when he said that
“common constitutional traditions do not form a direct source of Community law and the Court of Justice is not bound by them”.
The trouble with the Government’s approach generally is that they consistently understate the importance of the debate about the ECJ’s developing jurisprudence, which introduces a dynamic into a system that the Government seem to regard as frozen, now and for all time.
Let us look at the protocol that Ministers argue will stop the Court overturning the human rights provisions in our national law. The Government have placed particular emphasis on the fact that the UK has an exemption from the normal rules governing labour law. The Opposition and some Labour Members may have differences over policy, but we share a concern to get greater certainty about what is being proposed.
Title IV—the so-called solidarity title—deals with employment and industrial relations, but it raises as many questions as it answers. The protocol says that it is needed for the avoidance of doubt, but presumably such doubts continue to exist about the Court’s power to interpret and overrule domestic law as that touches on the other 42 articles of the charter of fundamental rights. If there is not any doubt about that—if the UK’s position is safeguarded—why is paragraph 1.2 needed at all?
The fundamental question for the Government goes deeper. Let us assume that Ministers are right to say that the protocol will stop the ECJ from striking down UK laws directly. That still leaves the question of how our law will be changed over time by ECJ decisions on rights in countries that are not subject to that protocol. The Government have produced no plausible argument that we can avoid our law being changed as a result of decisions about the charter being made in respect of other countries.
The Opposition have not invented that problem. The European Scrutiny Committee focused on it very strongly in its third report of the present Session, which was a follow-up report on the intergovernmental conference.
Was my hon. Friend struck—as I was—by the fact that when our right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) put that argument to the Lord Chancellor during the right hon. Gentleman’s speech he merely asserted that it was not the case and then moved the subject rapidly on?
I thought that our right hon. and learned Friend put the point well and that the Lord Chancellor, with customary skill, avoided providing a persuasive answer, just as the Government have been unable, as far as I can see, to provide a persuasive answer to the comments of the European Scrutiny Committee.
Paragraph 38 of the Committee’s report said plainly:
“If the ECJ gives a ruling in a case arising outside the UK on a measure which also applies in the UK, the duty to interpret the measure in accordance with that ruling arises, not under the Charter, but under the UK’s other Treaty obligations. Nothing in the Protocol appears to excuse the UK from this obligation.”
In paragraph 40, the Committee said that
“we doubt if it is possible to guarantee that it”—
the charter—
“will not be developed and amplified by the ECJ. We equally doubt if it is possible to guarantee that the ECJ will not draw on the Charter as a new source for interpreting measures of Union law such as Directives”.
In paragraph 41, the Committee concluded:
“If the ECJ does interpret a measure of Union law in this way, we believe the resulting interpretation would be binding in the UK, because of the UK’s treaty obligations, notably the duty of sincere co-operation under Article 4(3) EU. These obligations are not excluded or restricted by the Protocol. On the contrary, and as the recitals make clear, the Protocol is subject to those obligations.”
Does my hon. Friend agree that if the Government had been more competent in negotiating the terms of the protocol the problem would not have arisen? It would have been easy to say that the protocol should have effect regardless of other treaties or other EU law. In that way the protocol would have been watertight.
My right hon. and learned Friend’s remarks are spot-on. As he knows, other protocols appended to European Union treaties include precisely the sort of clause he has in mind.
In fact, what the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) proposes, and I think Conservative Front Benchers accept, is that Britain should have a unilateral right to take no notice of ECJ rulings. On that basis, the single market collapses.
That is not what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea was advocating. The right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr. MacShane) ignores the fact that a clause that such and such a protocol should apply notwithstanding other treaty provisions or European Court of Justice judgments is included in a couple of protocols already agreed and appended to European Union treaties, so there is a precedent.
We confirm that point in other areas of EU law, which are not always applied uniformly; for example, in other treaties the UK has opt-outs or opt-ins on protocols and when the ECJ rules on those areas of law it is not able to apply its rulings uniformly across the EU. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that point?
The hon. Gentleman has still not grasped the fact that the Court’s indirect application to UK law of decisions based on the charter will circumvent any opt-out of the sort he described.
Is there not a simpler point? The European Court of Justice is a federalist, activist Court, which over time always makes judgments in favour of more European power, so why take the risk? We could opt out of the whole provision and not include it in the treaty.
It is not only my right hon. Friend who says that Britain should opt out of the charter of fundamental rights; it was originally the position of the Labour Government, but they have subsequently abandoned it. If we further consider the likely consequences of a European Court of Justice decision deriving from the application of charter rights, we can see that irrespective of the protocol, any company that operates in more than one EU member state will change its practices across the EU, even in the United Kingdom or Poland, once the ECJ has given a judgment on what has gone on in one particular country.
Perhaps I can help my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey), whose colleague, Liberal Democrat MEP Andrew Duff, has said in a document called “A primer on the EU’s reform treaty”:
“Regardless of the UK’s exclusion clause, the EU courts will be bound to develop jurisprudence in fundamental rights matters which steadily evolve into general principles of EU law which all member states must respect.”
That makes it clear that what my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Lidington) says is in danger of happening is exactly what will happen. Perhaps the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton ought to look at what his colleagues elsewhere are saying.
My hon. Friend is more optimistic than I am; I have long given up hoping or expecting to hear a consistent message from members of the Liberal Democrat party.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way; he is being very generous. He is eliding two things. The European Court of Justice may make a decision on an area in which the United Kingdom has rights, and that would affect us, but it also may make decisions about areas on which we do not have national rights, and that would not affect us. That is set out in paragraph 2 of article 1 of the protocol, which says:
“In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.”
If an ECJ decision is on an area where we have not provided national rights, the situation is different.
Unusually, the hon. Gentleman has failed to understand the thrust of the argument put not only by me but by the European Scrutiny Committee in its report: that even if we give the Government the benefit of the doubt and say that the protocol and the language of the treaty protect the United Kingdom from the imposition of ECJ decisions that directly override our national law, we are still left with the issue of what happens when the ECJ takes a decision in respect of a country other than the United Kingdom or Poland, and that decision has consequences for the way in which we in the United Kingdom conduct our affairs.
On that point, does my hon. Friend share the European Scrutiny Committee’s concern about the preamble to the protocol? It reaffirms
“that this Protocol is without prejudice to other obligations devolving upon…the United Kingdom under the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Union law generally”.
The Committee was concerned that that meant just what has been suggested—that the United Kingdom’s other obligations under European law include ensuring even application throughout the European Union, including in the United Kingdom, of ECJ judgments that relate to other member states where the charter does have effect. That would give effect—
Order. Interventions are getting quite long, and I have to keep my eye on the time as this is a time-restricted debate.
I shall try to make some progress and bring my remarks to a close. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr. Clappison) for making an important point and further drawing out that element of the European Scrutiny Committee’s report.
One must bear it in mind that any new legislation initiated by the European Commission, and affecting the entire European Union, is certain to follow the decisions made by the European Court of Justice on specific cases. Even if the protocol means that the United Kingdom is exempt for a time, once a decision has been made in respect of, say, Austria or Romania, subsequent legislation from the Commission on that topic will follow not the position in the United Kingdom but the situation brought about by the ECJ judgment. That legislation will then become binding on the United Kingdom.
The only way in which the protocol could insulate the United Kingdom from the impact of Court decisions based on the charter would be either for the protocol to have included the kind of clause described by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), or for the Court of Justice to permit the development of two separate systems of jurisprudence within the European Union—one for the United Kingdom and Poland, and the other for all the other member states. I see nothing in the charter, nothing in the treaty and nothing at all in the traditions of the European Court of Justice that makes that seem remotely likely.
I fear that once again on this issue, as on others in respect of Lisbon, the Government have been trying to pull the wool over our eyes. We have had from successive Ministers a series of different positions on the charter of fundamental rights. We first had the then Minister for Europe, the right hon. Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz), saying that it was of no more significance than The Beano. Then, as recently as last June, the former Prime Minister declared that
“we will not accept a treaty that allows the Charter of Fundamental Rights to change UK law in any way.”
A month later in their White Paper the Government had slithered into a position where they were committed simply to ensure
“that our existing labour and social legislation remains intact”.
Back in June, Tony Blair was insisting:
“It is absolutely clear that we have an opt-out from both the charter and judicial and home affairs”—[Official Report, 25 June 2007; Vol. 462, c. 37.]
and just weeks after that, the current Minister for Europe told the Scrutiny Committee:
“The UK specific protocol which the UK secured is not an ‘opt out’ from the Charter. Rather, the protocol clarifies the effect that the Charter will have in the UK.”
By January this year the Minister was saying that
“the United Kingdom has neither sought nor achieved an opt-out from the charter of fundamental rights”—[Official Report, 28 January 2008; Vol. 471, c. 34.]—
a fairly shameless rewriting of history, even by the standards of the present Government.
The British people deserved their Government to speak to them on these issues with both clarity and candour. Instead, again and again, we have been subjected to spin. Nothing that the Secretary of State has said this afternoon has persuaded me that we can have confidence in the Government’s assurances and promises any more than we were able to believe those that they have repeated to Parliament and the public over the past few years. For that reason, I ask the House to support the Opposition amendment tonight.
rose—
Order. Now might be the moment for me to remind hon. Members that Mr. Speaker has placed a limit of 12 minutes on Back-Bench speeches, which operates from this moment.
We have had a great deal of discussion of the charter of fundamental rights. I am not sure that I can add substantially to it, other than to say that I believe it brings existing rights together and makes them more visible, as the charter says, drawing them from a variety of different sources—civil, political, economic and social.
Although we have the protocol, there is nothing in the charter itself that we could realistically object to. Indeed, it would do a great deal to strengthen our rights in this country, and I would like to see it in force in the United Kingdom, even though the protocol ensures that it does not apply. As it is drawn, the charter applies only in relation to European Union law or action taken under the treaty. Although the charter is made legally binding by the treaty, that is only in the context of European law. It contains not just rights but aspirational principles.
The Fundamental Rights Agency has the job of monitoring compliance with the charter. The agency emerged in 2003 under the Italian presidency and was drawn from the existing Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. Much of its residual experience is drawn from that and that is reflected in the future work pattern of the Fundamental Rights Agency. The agency was negotiated under the UK presidency as a first-pillar agency under article 308 of the Nice treaty. Its duty is to enforce the charter of fundamental rights and, although other human rights instruments could inform its work, the FRA cannot actually enforce them. Its job is to monitor member states and EU institutions. It is also its job to monitor accession states but only after accession has been completed, which is a problem. I may be wrong, but I do not think that the charter and the FRA are taken into account during the negotiations for accession. This happens only after an accession agreement has been signed. That reflects a gap in the effectiveness of the agency and the charter. A much stronger lever could have been provided in the accession processes for Bulgaria and Romania, for example, where significant human rights issues needed to be addressed before the accession process was completed. That is doubly so in the case of Turkey where significant human rights issues have to be addressed before the accession process is completed.
There has been much debate about why we should have the charter—and, indeed, the FRA—when we already have the European convention on human rights and the Council of Europe, but until the EU accedes to the European convention, however, there is no monitoring of EU institutions for human rights compliance without the FRA. The agency can ultimately look at the gap in performance between the EU institutions such as the Commission and the Parliament.
The hon. Gentleman is making an important point about the need for the European Union to adhere to the European convention on human rights, and the fact that it has not been unknown for the Commission, for example, to violate human rights through its activities. Does he share my anxiety that, although it is implicit in the treaty that accession to the ECHR will take place, the mechanism and the precise text for achieving that are not before us? Such information could give us the kind of reassurance that the Lord Chancellor described when he said that the mechanism would be such that the ECHR and the Court of Human Rights would be supreme over the European Court of Justice in this area.
I have some concerns about human rights principles, but that is not one of them. I hope to develop that argument later in my speech.
At present, human rights are subject to monitoring by the Council of Europe, United Nations treaty bodies, non-governmental organisations and national institutions such as my own Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights. There is a need, however, to translate that monitoring into remedial action, if it is required, within the EU framework. The agency could fulfil that responsibility.
In respect of the potential conflict between the two jurisdictions, the hon. Gentleman might recall that the July 2007 White Paper states:
“There are complex legal issues involved in EU accession to the ECHR. These problems would have to be resolved before the Government could support it.”
We have no evidence that those matters have been resolved.
I will be coming to the question of accession later in my speech.
At the moment, I am talking about the Fundamental Rights Agency, which has an obligation to complement the Council of Europe so as to avoid duplication. The Council of Europe’s responsibility is to set the standards for human rights—such as those that we see in the convention—to monitor compliance with those standards and to provide a judicial function through the European Court. On the other hand, the European Union has a legislative function and a political function and much better enforcement capabilities. It seems to me, therefore, that the agency’s job should be to develop recommendations from the Council of Europe and to implement them in such a way as to ensure that standards are met at EU level. I am pleased that a memorandum of understanding was signed by the EU and the Council of Europe in May last year.
I have some doubts about the independence of the FRA, however, and whether it complies with the Paris principles. According to those principles, it should be independent, but, given the way in which the regulations that drew it up were framed, I doubt whether they fully comply with those requirements. Its work is to gather information, analysis and reports and to take an advisory role. It does not have investigative powers or powers of scrutiny, which is a problem. That is a major gap in the agency’s work.
Scrutiny is not among the activities set out in article 5. The lack of scrutiny of EU legislation for compliance with human rights is one of the big gaps. That process is pretty well missing. I believe that the European Scrutiny Committee made a recommendation about this, as did the Committee in the Lords in 2006. I suppose I am advocating something similar to part of the role of my own Committee, which scrutinises domestic legislation for its compliance with human rights standards. It is said that the Commission’s job is to ensure compliance, but that raises the issue of who monitors the Commission’s work, a point raised by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). Realistically, that should be the role of the Fundamental Rights Agency, although it does not yet have it. Nor, I suspect, does it have the relevant expertise. It does not have the indispensable legal advisers that my Committee has, nor a partner equivalent to ours—the Ministry of Justice—that has an overarching responsibility to ensure compliance and to co-ordinate across government. Ultimately, that should be part of the presidency’s job.
Human rights scrutiny should be done at the earliest possible stage of European legislation—long before it reaches member state Parliaments, where any such scrutiny will be cursory at most. My Committee does not have the resources to scrutinise European legislation properly for the purposes of human rights; as it stands, we are pretty stretched doing our domestic job. That important aspect should be addressed.
As I mentioned, the Fundamental Rights Agency is a first-pillar organisation, although originally it was intended to be a third-pillar one. The Lisbon treaty, of course, abolishes all references to pillars, but regulations for the agency remain first-pillar arrangements, although under article 31 there are provisions for review. It seems to me that in practice it would be impossible for the agency to do its job effectively if it were simply a first-pillar organisation. For example, to monitor and scrutinise effective action against people trafficking involves the full range of the three former pillars: not only European institutions, but police, justice and crime—and, I suppose, foreign affairs, given the issue of source countries. If we are to enforce on the issue of people trafficking, we need to recognise that.
The work programme of the Fundamental Rights Agency is interesting. Many British universities have also been involved in its work. The survey on discrimination against and victimisation of migrants is similar to the British crime survey. I am pleased to see that my old university, Warwick law school, is working on good practice in ethnic profiling by police and border forces, and I am sure it will produce an excellent report. As a result, there is analysis of how migrants are treated by the media. I wish the school luck on that; my Committee did some work on that issue and found it difficult.
Edinburgh and Glasgow universities are supporting work on pathways to violent radicalisation, although I think it potentially rather simplistic. There is also work on homophobia and the protection of children’s rights in the light of the new rights in the treaty—objective indicators are being considered to measure progress in that respect. There is also holocaust education, on which we have a good record.
Earlier, the issue of EU accession to the European convention on human rights arose. It arose because of a 1994 European Court of Justice decision that the European Union could not accede. The Lisbon treaty, of course, provides for that mechanism. The real problem at the moment is getting the Council of Europe to agree—that requires unanimity on its part. All the countries involved have now ratified, save Russia, which I hope will get around to doing so before too long.
The risk of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights developing divergent views on similar issues has been raised. It is important to recognise that those who advocate that line accept, effectively, that the charter and the European convention effectively deal with the same sort of issues—otherwise, the risk would not even be discussed. The answer is to look at the position of the ECJ as an EU institution. If the EU accedes to the European convention, it does so with all its institutions, including the ECJ. Effectively, therefore, the ECJ itself, as an EU institution, would become subordinate to the convention and the rulings of the ECHR. It would have to comply with views expressed by the European Court of Human Rights as arbiter of the convention. The circle is easily and properly squared by simply looking at the status of the different institutions that would follow from that.
I am pleased that the charter incorporates children’s rights into the treaty under chapter III, which covers equality. It is a pity that that will not apply in the UK, because that might help us to deal with the reservation that the UK has expressed about the convention on the rights of the child in relation to immigration matters, which is now under review by the Government. I hope that we do not have to rely on the charter to resolve that.
Several issues arise in relation to the protocol. Nothing in the charter creates new justiciable rights, partly because of subsidiarity and partly because the solidarity heads are not rights as such but are more by way of principles. Even if they were rights, it is possible in the long term that the ECJ might make them enforceable. The protocol therefore becomes belt-and-braces protection. Having looked at the terms of the charter, that does not particularly worry me. The charter is an excellent document that sets out a whole series of excellent rights. It should inform our own future debates on a British Bill of Rights, which would, I hope, include most of the things that are set out in the charter, including the social, political and economic rights. That would be a huge step forward for our society and our democracy. I rather regret the reservation of the UK’s position on the protocol. This is a very progressive document. We have nothing to fear from it and there would be an awful lot to be gained if it applied in the UK.
It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore), especially when it is not a Friday. He speaks with great authority on these matters, and the Committee that he chairs does an awful lot of good work. He talked about the agency for fundamental rights and the fact that we are not absolutely clear how it is going to develop. I share his concerns. It will have an important role, but we need to be clearer how it will operate and how it will check the Commission. I hope that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Lewisham, East (Bridget Prentice), will respond to the hon. Gentleman’s comments.
I want first to set the scene for the positive role played in the development of human rights by Europe and by Britain. As the Lord Chancellor said, we should be very proud of that, and it is worth reflecting on. I also want to argue that there is nothing new of substance in the charter of fundamental rights—certainly nothing to be scared of—and to deal with remarks made particularly by Conservative Members in that regard. I then want to argue that the charter has a useful role and underlying purpose.
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman recalls that the Lord Chancellor challenged Conservative Members to say which of the rights they disagreed with, and none has so far done so.
The hon. Gentleman is right, except in one regard—the right hon. Member for Wells (Mr. Heathcoat-Amory) appeared not to like academic freedom, so at least one Conservative Member has pointed to a right that they would no doubt get rid of.
The hon. Gentleman has a gift for missing the point, and he has demonstrated it again. The assertion that scientific research must be free of constraint is in the charter, and it is entirely unconditional. Those of us interested in matters such as animal welfare and animal rights believe, contrary to that assertion, that Parliament should set limits to scientific research and that that should be debated and decided in a democratic Chamber according to the preferences of our constituents, not exported to a Court over which we have no control. That has nothing to with the hon. Gentleman’s remark.
The right hon. Gentleman is the one who is missing the point. Not only is the article he refers to deduced from article 10, as the Lord Chancellor said in his answer, but it in no way fetters this Parliament in making laws in this area.
Is it now the policy of the hon. Gentleman and his party to be in favour of the unrestricted right of research scientists to carry out experiments on animals?
The question is one of process and how we establish the restrictions if there are to be any. We believe that they should be decided in this House. We are debating legislation in this area in Parliament at the moment, in the other place. I do not see the right hon. Gentleman’s concern.
The hon. Gentleman started by echoing the Lord Chancellor’s rather facile attack when he asked, “Which of these rights do you not like?” He was then forced, within about 35 seconds, to admit that it is all a matter of process. Perhaps we could now have a debate about process and whether the processes envisaged by the charter are sensible ones for this country to adopt.
It is a question of both. It is not just about rights or processes—[Hon. Members: “Both!”] Of course it is a matter of both. And I have to say that I disagree with the hon. Gentleman deeply on both issues.
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
No, I would like to make some progress. I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman later.
I believe that this country has a proud record in pushing for human rights, and I believe that the European Union has played a superb role in pushing for them in other countries. In the early part of the debate, people were saying that it is important that British citizens have their rights protected when they go to other EU member states. I also think, however, that the people of Britain would like to see higher standards of human rights and civil rights in other EU countries.
One of the great dynamics behind the accession of other countries to the Union is that they are forced to raise their standards of human rights. We saw that in Romania, in particular. A decade ago, Members of this House were concerned about the way in which orphans were treated in Romania, and because of its desire to join the European Union, standards of child care, particularly for orphans, were raised massively in that country. That is surely something we all welcome. It is just one example of the many practical things that have happened because the European Union has said, “If you want to join the club, you have to meet our high standards of human rights.”
Will the hon. Gentleman give way on that point?
I will give way to the hon. Gentleman later.
I also think that my previous point applies to democracy. The whole point of the European Union is that it has forced people to accede to the democratic values that we share, and as the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris) said from a sedentary position, that is a very important development for the long-term peace of the world.
Human rights in the EU have been a major dynamic for good, but that is not to say that we can be complacent. One only has to read the reports of Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, not just about such countries as Bulgaria or Romania, but even about this country, to learn that those who are watching EU Governments are noticing infringements of human rights. In such countries as Poland, we are seeing relatively extreme breaches of human rights. The 2007 Amnesty report states that in Poland:
“Lesbian, gay, bisexual…people were subjected to discrimination and intolerance.”
It refers to the problems faced by Romany people in Bulgaria, and with regard to Romania:
“The Council of Europe and the European Parliament expressed concern at Romania’s lack of willingness to engage in a thorough investigation into allegations of collusion with the US-led programme of renditions and secret detention centres.”
The Amnesty report says that even in the United Kingdom
“the government continued to erode fundamental human rights”—
a point that we have made continually. It is true that that the European Union has been a force for good in this area, but we cannot be complacent. That is why these debates are important, why the charter is important and why we should work with colleagues throughout the EU to go further in this area.
What extra dimension does the Lisbon treaty give human rights? It does not take us very far. Most of the big leaps in human rights occurred some time ago. Before Britain acceded to the European Union, the European Court of Justice dealt with protecting fundamental rights. That formed the basis of the principles of law that governed its rulings. Perhaps more significant is the way in which protecting human rights was developed by treaties, to which former Conservative Governments signed up. Conservative Members will have to answer that point.
It is interesting that the preamble to the Single European Act expressed the determination of European Community member states
“to work together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, notably freedom, equality and social justice.”
In other words, the debate has been going on for a long time and parties throughout the House signed up to such protections. Article F of the Maastricht treaty states:
“The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”
The background to our debate is therefore long established and was previously bipartisan. It is a shame that the Conservative party seems to be moving away from a commitment to those important human rights.
It could be argued that such bipartisanship as existed finished in about 1996 or 1997, when the Conservative Government, to their shame, would not sign up to the social chapter or allow workers in this country a statutory right to paid holidays and so on. The Conservative party, to its credit, has held a fairly consistent position since 1996 or 1997 of not wishing to extend human rights. It is the wrong position but it is consistent.
I accept the hon. Gentleman’s analysis. When Conservative Members eventually determine their position, we will see whether they change or continue with that lamentable record.
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will answer a question about Liberal Democrat policy. If there were an opportunity to do so, would Liberal Democrats withdraw from the protocol and give the European Court of Justice and the charter full effect in the United Kingdom, free from the purported restrictions of the protocol? Yes or no will do.
There is a case for what the hon. Gentleman says. The protocol does not do much. I shall argue that in due course. Lawyers to whom I have spoken say that it is a padlock on belt and braces. In other words, it is otiose. For those who have been worried—whether the CBI, those from the trade union movement or hon. Members—it may serve a purpose, but I hope that I will convince others that the protocol is an unnecessary padlock because we already have other safeguards.
When one examines the charter, some of the paranoid concerns quickly disappear. The charter records existing rights. When one reads the explanations, one finds their sources. It applies primarily to EU institutions. Conservative Members should welcome the fact that the EU institutions will be restrained and restricted and have to adhere to rights. If they believe in limited government and restricting the abuse of power, they should support that.
Some hon. Members have asked what the point of the charter is, if it does not contain much and simply assembles existing rights. The Lord Chancellor answered that question when he spoke of rights being more visible. We in this country and this House might think, “Well, we know those rights—we’ve debated them for decades.” However, there are citizens in some member states and in countries that hope to join for whom such rights are strange and new, and would be welcome. Having a charter that brings those rights together, so that they can be put up in lights to say, “If you join the European Union, these are the sorts of the benefits that you can enjoy,” is a good thing.
Given that all those rights supposedly exist already, would it not have been simpler to put them all in a book, rather than including them in a treaty that even the Commission accepts is designed to be unreadable and impenetrable?
I think that has already happened, so I am rather surprised by the hon. Gentleman’s intervention.
If one then wants to argue about the impact of the charter—I do not believe that it introduces any rights, as I have said—or one is concerned about whether there are enough safeguards and protections, one has only to read the text in the surrounding documents. The preamble to the charter is specific and clear about the ambitions in the charter being deliberately limited. If one is still worried, one should look at the treaty of Lisbon. I quoted the second paragraph of article 6.1, which is absolutely clear, in an intervention on the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Lidington), but he gave no answer. One can then look at article 51.2, in chapter VII of the charter of fundamental rights, which could not be clearer:
“This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties.”
Again and again, in all the documentation, the fears that are sometimes put forward are dealt with.
I have heard a great deal this afternoon about there being no new rights. Citizenship of the Union currently complements national citizenship, which has enormous implications for the charter, but the new arrangements are that citizenship of the Union shall be “in addition” to national citizenship. Those are two completely different matters, which have enormous implications for how we are to be treated under the European Court of Justice.
I look forward to hearing the hon. Gentleman explaining the massively significant difference in his speech, because it passes my understanding.
After all the protections that I have outlined comes the protocol, which is legally binding, which, as we have heard, could not clearer. People who are scaremongering about the impact of the charter should therefore go back to the text and see the protections that are there.
Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that the charter has already had a role in interpreting European law in this country recently? For example, BECTU—the Broadcasting Entertainment Cinematograph and Theatre Union—used it in recent litigation, while the Advocate-General referred to it when he granted holiday rights to those with less than 13 weeks’ service.
Of course people will refer to the document, but then they are forced to explain the underlying sources of the rights contained within it. People can refer either to the charter, which is an easy reference document, or to the actual source—they can take their pick. However, before the charter becomes legally binding, they can still refer to the underlying directive, national law or provision in the European convention on human rights so, again, I do not see a problem.
We should be proud of the role that Britain has played in the development of human rights in Europe and across the world. We should continue to push the EU hard to develop its role on human rights. We should not gainsay the progress that has been made, but keep arguing. My only concern about the Government’s position is that it is sometimes too defensive. I think there is a great story to tell about the EU’s role in human rights, and I hope that the Government will join us in telling it loud and clear.
Although the debate has been fairly wide-ranging, one issue that I do not think we have covered in the necessary detail is the place of working people in Europe. The Lord Chancellor devoted about five minutes of his 45-minute speech to it, and there has been only fragmentary mention of working people in the context of the rights that they can enjoy, but the issue is tremendously important. Europe cannot be a construct of the bureaucrats, no matter how much Peter Mandelson and others like him wish that it were. Unless it puts down roots among the people of Europe, as an institution it has no future.
I am interested in the drift of policy dictating the treatment of workers throughout Europe. It could be said that in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s a strong dose of Keynsian politics informed EU policy, but in my opinion and that of other Labour Back Benchers—there may be only a few of us, but that does not mean we are wrong—there is no doubt that the EU is increasingly taking a neo-liberal direction. In that connection, I want to refer to two important recent rulings from the European Court of Justice: the Laval case—nothing to do with the Vichy traitor—and the Viking Line case. I shall deal with them in some detail. At least they will then be on the record, and can form part of the debate about whether trade union rights in Europe have been undermined or are becoming stronger.
Will my hon. Friend give way?
Not at this stage.
Viking Line is a Finnish ferry company. In 2003, it decided to re-flag its vessel the Rosella in order to register it in Estonia and employ an Estonian crew on Estonian pay and conditions, thus cutting its wage costs by 60 per cent. The Finnish shipping union appealed to the International Transport Workers Federation in London, which sent a circular to all affiliates telling them not to enter into negotiations with Viking. The shipping union called for Viking to maintain existing pay and conditions, and then threatened to strike.
Once Estonia joined the EU in 2004, Viking sued the ITWF in the High Court for restricting its “freedom of establishment”. The case was referred to the European Court of Justice, which ruled that in future any strike action affecting that freedom would have to meet stringent legal tests that the Court itself could assess. At that point, a danger light went on.
Although the Court did not, on the face of it, rule against the employer, I would argue that the ruling is excellent news for corporate lawyers in the long term. They will be able to threaten trade unions with long and expensive court cases in order to discourage the unions—which do not possess the same resources as big business—from taking collective action against outsourcing or similar corporate behaviour. It also has very alarming implications for basic trade union rights and freedoms. Our right to industrial action has always come from the democratic mandate of the union through its members, according to laws determined by this Parliament. Now it will also need to meet criteria imposed and assessed by unelected European judges.
Even more serious is the Laval judgment. Although most Members will know exactly what I am talking about, one or two will not, so I shall help them out. Laval is a Latvian company which, in 2004, posted workers from Latvia to work on building sites in Sweden, including the now infamous site at Vaxholm. The Swedish construction union asked the company to agree to the existing collective agreement in the building sector. It refused, instead operating under a Latvian agreement with lower pay scales that undercut the Swedish workers’ wages. The Swedish union quite correctly went on strike, and as a consequence Laval's Swedish subsidiary went bust.
Laval then sued the union for its losses and the case was referred to the European Court of Justice. The Court ruled that the company’s freedom to provide services in any member state should not be restricted by having to comply with a non-statutory collective bargaining agreement. In a particularly alarming section of the judgment, the Court argued that, because the EU posted workers directive set out minimum rights, it was unreasonable to force the company to comply with further agreements at local or national level. So instead of EU legislation setting minimum standards of rights at work, we now seem to be in danger of those standards being seen as a maximum.
Will my hon. Friend give way?
My right hon. Friend is so persistent that I shall do so.
I think that the clock that is timing my hon. Friend’s speech has been paused. My hon. Friend is making a powerful point, especially on the Viking case. The Laval case would have been solved had there been a national minimum wage, which Sweden does not have; the company coming in would have had to abide by that. I accept the criticisms my hon. Friend is making, but does he accept that last week the ECJ gave a ruling on employees who have to look after handicapped people at home, which could help 6 million people in this country? It has also helped us with getting pensions for steelworkers and with—[Interruption.] I am sorry, but if my hon. Friend cannot take an intervention, I will sit down.
Thank you. I would welcome the chance to debate the matter; I will come to Rotherham, and we might discuss it in a closed meeting of trade unionists and Labour party members.
On the Latvia case, the Court also argued that the Swedish union had to recognise the agreement reached in Latvia. It referred the case back to the Swedish courts. One reason why it did so was that the charter of fundamental rights was not legally binding at that stage. Under the treaty, it becomes so.
I am glad that my right hon. Friend thinks that the argument we are beginning to construct is powerful. The two cases I mention show how the EU has in too many instances become a factor in accelerating a race to the bottom on labour standards across Europe. John Monks is always seen as a big supporter of Europe, but he has said the following in the light of those two cases:
“The court has ruled in effect that the right to strike is not as important as the unimpeded free flow of services and labour. As such, more ‘social dumping’—namely downward pressure on wages from cheaper sources—is now acceptable and is to be encouraged. To trade unionists around Europe it is plain that the EU, which hitherto has generally upheld workers’ rights—in contrast to the US, and sometimes, sadly, the UK—has now taken a neoliberal, anti-trade union turn.”
Coming from John Monks, that is a powerful statement.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Mr. MacShane) mentioned that, where robust legal frameworks are in place, some of this case law can be circumvented. The problem is that in our country these matters are premised on the history of autonomous collective bargaining where the state has minimal legal regulations, so the dangers my hon. Friend has outlined are even more acute for us.
That is an excellent point. These cases show that the EU is moving towards a policy of undermining workers’ terms and conditions. I am sure that other Members will make that case today.
Another aspect of the charter is also of concern to me: that the freedoms of capital seem to have become fundamental rights of the EU. Title II of the charter contains rights such as the freedom to conduct a business, the right to property, freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services in any member state. Unlike the workers’ rights under title IV, they do not appear to be covered by the provisions of article 1, paragraph 2 of the protocol, which states only that title IV cannot create new rights except in so far as they already exist in UK law. The right to provide services and freedom of establishment, which were the key points in the Laval and Viking cases, are not so restrictive. Article 15, which contains them, does not contain the proviso that they exist only in so far as they are already in law. That is one reason why the unequal status of the different titles in the protocol is of particular concern.
I hope that the Government can reassure us that this is not as significant as it appears to be, because there are concerns that the situation could be made worse still if future EU legislation or Court rulings were to apply those principles even further. For example, the services directive had at its core the principle of freedom of establishment. The directive was intended to liberalise services on free-market principles. In its original form, the directive included areas that we would consider to be public services, such as health. Even more alarmingly, it enshrined the country of origin principle. That principle provided that where services are provided by a company based in a different country, the legislation of the home country would apply, with a few minimal exceptions, such as basic health and safety standards.
Thankfully, those elements were removed from the directive as a result of pressure from some member states and, eventually, a majority in the European Parliament. The Commission has never fully accepted that, and seems to be finding imaginative ways of bringing those elements back, such as in the recent health directive. In that light, I hope that the Minister can reassure me on a few points.
First, is there any danger that by making the freedom of establishment and the right to provide services fundamental EU rights they could become even more powerful tools for big business? Can he assure us that the Court will not give them greater consideration or overrule EU legislation that does not give them sufficient weight? Secondly, will the Minister assure this House that the Government will do their utmost to resist any attempt to revive the country of origin principle or any similar measure?
Several other hon. Members are waiting to take part in this debate, so I shall simply say that if the EU’s direction of travel is increasingly market-oriented and neo-liberal, Ministers may rest assured that many Labour Members will begin to doubt the so-called construct of a social Europe, and that Europe will never engage the hearts and minds of millions of working people across the continent. That needs to be borne in mind as we discuss the European Union’s future.
The hon. Member for Elmet (Colin Burgon) made a thoughtful speech. He pointed out the significance of judge-made law, which is very relevant to some of the points that I would like to share with the House.
This debate is meant to be about human rights, but actually it is not about that, because, despite some of the political arguments that are occasionally used, there is an equal commitment to human rights on both sides of the House, from all Members of Parliament. The issue is how we decide what those human rights should be and how we are accountable to the wider electorate whom we serve both in this country and in the other countries of Europe.
The significance of the protocol that was negotiated by the Government—if it is watertight—is twofold. First, it is important because it is a further step towards the kind of à la carte Europe that I wish to see. I believe that model will enable not only Britain but many European Union countries that have concerns about excessive integration to reconcile their membership of the European Union. The protocol curbing the power of the European Court is important in that respect. Secondly, it is about the wider issue of the European Union’s accountability to the electorate.
Let me comment briefly on both those fundamental issues. If the protocol works, it will curb, for the first time, the European Court’s ability to make law in substantive areas for the United Kingdom. We should realise that this kind of à la carte Europe, which Britain has pioneered, but in which other countries have participated, has several implications. First, it is not designed just for the United Kingdom. Poland has this protocol, and other European countries, such as Sweden, Denmark and a number of other states of that kind, have also opted out in various areas.
The second implication of an à la carte Europe is that it does not just give us the right not to participate in certain kinds of integration; we should also respect the right of other member states that may wish to go further. That right should be equally important. It should not have to be haggled about or negotiated, because it should be implicit in how we operate.
The Schengen agreement, the single currency, the protocol and the justice and home affairs provisions contain opt-outs for some countries, and not only for the United Kingdom. We must also take into account the hugely long transition periods for all the new member states from central and eastern Europe. Even if they want to join the euro, they may have to wait nine or 10 years in order to do so. That is not simply a transition; it means that for a generation there will be a European Union of the kind that we in this House should be much more comfortable about. That is an important point.
The second aspect to this matter is the wider issue of accountability to the electorate in respect of how our laws are made. Most of the dispute in this area in recent years has been not about the Court, but about qualified majority voting—it has been about the ability to take decisions that are not made unanimously. That covers very important issues, because inevitably when a minority of Governments do not vote for a proposition and it nevertheless takes effect in their nation states, there is no way that the electorates of those countries can hold their Governments accountable, because those Governments themselves were opposed to the measure imposed upon them. That is an argument as to why any decision to move to QMV should be taken carefully. I hope that such a move will take place in as few cases as possible.
I come to the issue of the Court, because that is what we are really discussing today. The situation is much more dangerous and disturbing than QMV, because a decision made by the European Court is different from a judgment made by a national court. If a United Kingdom court makes a judgment that embarrasses the Government or leads to a law that Parliament never thought it intended, Parliament has the power, if a sufficient majority exists, to reverse that court’s decision by making new law. The Supreme Court of the United States has enormous power to determine new law and develop the law in a fundamental and often controversial way. If a consensus existed in Congress—it does not always—and the President and Congress agreed that the Supreme Court had created a situation with which they did not want to live, even the United States has it within its own power to reverse that situation, although that rightly involves a complicated and difficult measure.
Dealing with the European Court, rather than our national courts, represents a new situation. There is no way in which the decision of that Court can be reversed in a democratic fashion by those upon whom its judgment has an impact. The United Kingdom cannot reverse such a decision by itself, unless it has an enforceable protocol that can prevent the situation from arising in the first place. If the protocol does not apply, or it acts in other areas, a difficult situation arises. In theory, the only way in which a judgment of the European Court, however controversial, could be overturned would be if the Council of Ministers as a whole decided to reverse it. That would require not just a majority but a decision by all 27 member states, because any one state could veto such a change.
I follow the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s argument. How is this different in any way from the way in which the World Trade Organisation’s adjudication panel imposes its rulings on countries, irrespective of the will of Parliaments and sovereign Governments? Those rulings have to be accepted.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that point, because there is a fundamental distinction between the two situations. When one is dealing with the WTO or any international treaty that concerns itself with the relations between states, of course one encounters curbs of the kind that he mentions. We are increasingly seeing the European Union move into domestic law and into the rights of individual citizens in respect of their health, housing, education or personal rights in a way that has no relevance to the WTO situation.
Let us consider the case of genetically modified organisms. The WTO is moving towards insisting that those should be freely traded. For many, although not for me, that has a huge impact on health considerations. Trade cannot be divorced from the health, social and other aspects.
I do not doubt that a choice will have to be made in some areas and that occasionally, with a great lack of enthusiasm, we will have to acknowledge that an international court may need to be the body that makes law that imposes itself on us, as it does on all other countries. The right hon. Gentleman should not get carried away with enthusiasm. I am saying that the onus will be on those who want such a situation to prove that this country’s citizens have an enormous interest in sacrificing their own control over how decisions are made in order to achieve certain objectives. Sometimes that test may be met, but such occasions will rightly be relatively rare. If the European Court is able to reach judgments that cannot be overturned, however controversial, unless there is unanimity in the Council of Ministers, it in effect has the last word and is all powerful. That really is power without responsibility.
The other crucial point that has not been mentioned today is that the European Court’s position with regard to the charter of fundamental rights is quite different from its position until now. Until now its role has been one of interpreting directives and specific pieces of legislation covering relatively narrow areas. The very point of the fundamental charter is that those rights are expressed in very broad terms, and that is exactly how judge-made law can expand in a dynamic fashion. We have seen in the US how the Supreme Court has used provisions that were put in the constitution more than 200 years ago on cruel and unusual punishment to deal with the issue of capital punishment. The right to bear arms is also used to justify the right of Americans to carry guns in the most extraordinary circumstances. Those dramatic developments of law have an impact on ordinary people, and Parliaments and other accountable bodies have not been involved. Just as the US Supreme Court has that power, so the European Court would have a comparable power with the charter of fundamental rights.
The situation is worse than with qualified majority voting because even when we or another Government are outvoted in the Council of Ministers, and have to accept a judgment that we do not like, QMV is normally—although not always—applied at the end of a long negotiation in which compromises are invariably made to assist the minority Government or Governments to live with the outcome. I have taken part in such Council of Ministers discussions as part of both the minority and the majority sides. Strenuous efforts are made to help the Governments who are being outvoted to live with it and sell it to their electorates. It does not always work, but the effort is made. When laws are made by the European Court, there are no negotiations, compromises or attempt to recognise the political realities. The rules are simply pronounced in the judgment and Governments have to like it or lump it.
I accept my right hon. and learned Friend’s argument about the à la carte Europe, although I suspect that his argument is like the curate’s egg. Does he accept that although he is right in his criticisms of the way in which the European Court could function—as the European Scrutiny Committee has made clear—the heart of his argument is wrong, because the only way in which we would be able to ensure that the decisions were taken in the interests of the people whom we represent would be to override the Court, in certain circumstances, by the “notwithstanding” formula in the amendment that I have tabled?
I have never had any problem with endorsing the curate’s egg. It seems to me that the curate was being sensible, if his egg was only good in parts. That is occasionally true of my hon. Friend’s speeches, and he might like to bear that in mind. [Laughter.]
At least my speeches are not rotten eggs.
I can understand my hon. Friend’s view on that matter.
It does not matter whether we are Eurosceptics or believers in the European Union, we all believe in the democratic principle. If the European Union is to survive and prosper, it is crucial that power should only be given to institutions that are not directly or even indirectly accountable to the electorate in the rarest possible circumstances and with any constraints that are reasonable and proper in the circumstances.
I am delighted that unlike the constitution, and contrary to the Government’s original strategy, there is a protocol that states that there will not be justiciability of the role of the European Court. The question is whether that is watertight. If the Government had been more competent during the original negotiation, they would have been able to remove the residual doubt by simply saying that the protocol will apply regardless of other treaties and regardless of European law. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Lidington) said, such constraints apply elsewhere and could have applied here, if the Government had not missed the trick. It would be difficult now that the treaty has been agreed for them to go back and renegotiate it. That means that we will have to be careful in analysing the Government’s arguments to see whether, notwithstanding that omission, the protocol is something of value. If it is, it will not only help the Government and the United Kingdom, but it will be a big step forward in how to relate to the European Union for countries that want to be part of it, as long as it can show the flexibility and diversity necessary for an organisation of 27 and perhaps, one day, more than 30 countries.
The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) made, as always, an eloquent and passionate speech in support of his fundamental view of the protocol insulating the UK from the justiciable effects of the charter. I start from a very different position on the application of the charter of fundamental rights, so I shall not attempt to counter his arguments.
I regard this debate as one of the most important on the treaty, because the charter of fundamental rights, the decisions of the European Court of Justice and the tenor and direction of several EU directives are central to the issue of a social versus neo-liberal Europe, which lies at the heart of the European project.
The charter raises two immediate questions. Although I listened to both Front-Bench speeches, I am still very puzzled about why the Government are so adamantly opposed to the application of those rights in this country, especially as every one of the other 26 member states has accepted them without demur, including both right-wing and left-wing Governments. A pragmatic answer—although I am struggling to find an explanation—might be that the charter would ban excessive working hours. The British worker works more hours a week than anyone else in Europe and the CBI would like to keep it that way. It would also permit secondary action in industrial disputes, but at present British workers cannot take such action, although employers can. No doubt the CBI would like to keep it like that as well. The right to take secondary action has never been an issue in any other country in Europe, although it has had enormous implications in this country.
Does my right hon. Friend accept that the German constitution forbids some 1.5 million to 2 million civil servants and public sector employees from even going on strike? It is the Germans who insisted on many of the safeguards—the so-called lateral or horizontal safeguards—being put into the charter before the protocol question arose, to preserve their ban on strikes, which is far more draconian than anything in the UK.
I agree with my right hon. Friend. I am simply searching for an explanation and it may be that I have hit on the wrong one. I hope that I have, because none of the explanations that I can think of appears to carry much weight. If it is a matter of keeping the CBI sweet, I suggest that that is not the job of a Labour Government. Nor is it the responsibility of a Labour Government to implement what Tony Blair, the former Prime Minister, once commended to a business gathering as
“the most restrictive trade union legislation in the Western world”.
We inherited that from the Conservatives.
It is shameful that we are not proud to welcome the charter of fundamental rights into our own legislation, which every other nation in Europe has taken in its stride as the foundation of a civilised society. I cannot see what the problem is. We have continual discussions about whether it will make a difference, and I am not sure that it would, but I cannot see why we object to implementing it.
It is far from clear whether the charter will affect UK law. The Government allowed the charter to be made legally binding, but then put forward a protocol that, they argue, will prevent the charter from affecting UK law or at least will limit its impact. However, others have queried the status of the protocol. The Swedish Prime Minister said on 26 June last year that the UK had accepted that the charter was legally binding, which is certainly true, and then added:
“It should be stressed that the UK was given a clarification, not an opt-out”.
Significantly, when Tony Blair was presenting the protocol to the UK Parliament on the day before, he misread the text—[Interruption.] Well, I assume he misread it. He said that
“‘nothing in the charter creates justiciable rights applicable to the United Kingdom’”.—[Official Report, 25 June 2007; Vol. 462, c. 21.]
However, the text of the protocol actually says:
“Nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to the United Kingdom”.
The clear implication is that although one section of the charter cannot be used to create new rights, other sections almost certainly will be. In that respect, I am sympathetic to some of the arguments coming from the Opposition. But even in respect of title IV on social rights, the text of the protocol states explicitly that the charter does not create justiciable rights applicable to the UK—and several people have quoted this—
“except in so far as the UK has provided for such rights in its national law”.
It will presumably be left for the European Court of Justice to decide for itself whether the UK has attempted to provide for such rights in its national law and to decide whether the attempt to provide such rights is adequate in the light of the charter. Indeed, it is very difficult to see how this discrete carve-out, so methodically prepared, can work in practice. Firms operating in one member state will be affected, but if they operate in more than one member state, the charter will clearly apply. Migrants coming from another member state to the UK would presumably still be covered. Anyone who travelled to another member state from this country—for health services, for example—would presumably be able to use the charter. Moreover, there are 30 years of EU jurisprudence to say that there can be no two-tier system of European rights.
On the issue of title IV rights versus title II rights, is it not the case, given the protocol, that the European Court could interpret the economic rights under the latter as having precedence in this country over employment rights in the former?
That is indeed quite possible. My hon. Friend makes a very important point.
May I draw my right hon. Friend’s attention to Tony Blair’s speech to the CBI in November 2003, in which he explicitly said:
“On issues like…agency workers, Europe must think first and foremost about jobs and competition”—
namely, free markets? Is it not clear that the former Prime Minister gave primacy to competition over social protections?
I very much agree with what my hon. Friend says, and I am sure that he will pursue it at greater length later in the debate.
What I find most sad and perverse about this whole sorry saga is that, over time, this claimed uniqueness for the UK will almost certainly increasingly unravel. It will be eroded by ECJ judgments, which are quite likely to happen, and also by the interactive knock-on effects between title IV and the other parts of the protocol. It seems to me tragic that the Government are investing such enormous legal and logistical resources in resisting something on which they are all too likely to lose in the end, yet which every other country in Europe has decided is practical and desirable. I simply do not understand why the Government have got themselves into that position unless it is fear of the Eurosceptic press. That is the only other consideration that I can think of, but I hope that that is not the case.
For any Labour Government, enforcing a justiciable charter of fundamental rights should be integral to securing a social Europe to counter the neo-liberal orientations of the EU treaties. That is starkly illustrated by the Viking and Vaxholm cases, which were mentioned earlier. Two months ago, the Swedish and Finnish unions sought to prevent companies from massively undercutting pay rates by paying foreign workers up to 60 per cent. lower wage rates. However, the ruling was—this makes it so interesting and important—that although there was a fundamental right to take collective industrial action, such action represents a restriction on the employer’s right of freedom of establishment. Of course, industrial action by its very nature will be an obstacle on the activities and freedom of the company. In other words, an employer’s right to freedom of establishment trumps the union’s right to strike. That is worryingly reminiscent, if I may say so, of the infamous judgment in the Taff Vale case of 1901. The Taff Vale railway took the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants to court for having the audacity to go on strike. The crime was known then as being “in restraint of trade”. Perhaps all that has changed is the terminology, because we are now talking about exactly the same point but it is now called freedom of establishment.
Nor is that an isolated example of the neo-liberal propensities within the EU treaties. The Lisbon treaty adopted the curious word—I had never heard it before—“flexicurity” to give the wholly false impression that if workers embrace flexibility, job security will automatically follow. Some of us might regard that as a contradiction in terms.
“Flexicurity” was developed by the Danish social democratic Landsorganisation. It is a term used in the Nordic countries to describe the combination of job security protection and flexible labour markets, which has allowed Sweden and Denmark to grow. It is a wholly social democratic and progressive concept—not a neo-liberal idea at all.
It is always helpful to have an exegetist of such immense academic knowledge as my right hon. Friend and I bow to his superior knowledge. However, whether he likes it or not, I still think that the term has neo-liberal implications—irrespective of whether it started out like that. The treaty also demands the abolition of what are called
“overtly protective terms and conditions”—
a highly subjective notion, of course—in contracts that supposedly
“deter employers from hiring during economic upturns”.
Despite all the spin about flexicurity—I entirely absolve my right hon. Friend of any accusation of using spin—the detailed language in some parts of the treaty suggests, unless it is balanced by a robust and effective charter of rights, a slippery slope on which it would be easy to slide back to the sort of casualisation and insecurity that we saw in previous decades in this country. That is my central point and bottom line in the debate.
That is all too clearly revealed, to provide one further example, in an EU green paper promoting flexicurity, which says that contractor obligations to monitor employment law among sub-contractors
“may serve to restrain sub-contracting by foreign firms and present an obstacle to the free provision of services in the internal market”.
That just about says it all. The direction of travel is unmistakable.
For a final example, under article III-147 of the old constitution, which remains under the reform treaty, the EU would be given power to enforce privatisation in any area of economic activity:
“A European framework law shall establish the measures in order to achieve the liberalisation of a specific service”.
We have already seen that in action with the EU services directive, which was seeking to extend the private sector into all areas of public service, but at least health care was left out on that occasion. However, a draft EU health services directive was adopted at the end of last year by the European Commission and was designed to create a market in health care.
I conclude that this abundant evidence of the neo-liberal underpinning of the EU treaties is the overwhelming reason why we need a balance to secure a social Europe, not just a market Europe, and why a charter for fundamental human rights is crucial to achieve that balance.
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Oldham, West and Royton (Mr. Meacher). He made an important speech that exemplified the extent to which rights, or at least some rights, are essentially political and economic in their origin and their importance. It should therefore perhaps be political and economic matters that lead to their definition and implementation.
All parties and all Members in this House are in favour of basic human rights—what we normally mean by human rights, which do not extend into the sphere of certain economic rights. All parties have always supported human rights, yet successive Governments have opposed the implementation into treaty law of a charter of human rights. Why is that? Why have successive UK Governments, including this one, opposed the implementation at a European level of a justiciable charter of human rights?
The matter would be clearer if the Government would do as I asked in my point of order at the start of the debate. For the convenience of the debate, they should table information about the positions that they took during the negotiations on the European constitutional treaty and the European Convention. Only then will we be able to see clearly what is from time to time referred to by those who are more knowledgeable than the rest of us—notably my right hon. Friend the Member for Wells (Mr. Heathcoat-Amory), who participated in that Convention. I hope that either now or when she sums up, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Lewisham, East (Bridget Prentice), will promise that in future, each day, alongside all the other documents that are supplied to inform our debates, we will have on the Table the resolutions that the Government moved and the terms in which they moved them during the Convention, so that we will know what the Government’s position is or was.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that during the negotiations on the constitutional treaty—the one that the French and Dutch killed off—the Government set up a Special Standing Committee of both Houses of Parliament and invited every right hon. and hon. Member and peer to attend to hear from negotiating Ministers what was being said? Not a single Member from the right hon. Gentleman’s Front Bench turned up to one of those meetings.
I am not certain that that is true. I turned up to those meetings frequently. They were meant primarily not to allow Ministers to report back but to allow the Members of this House who were sent to the Convention to report back, as they did. Both my right hon. Friend the Member for Wells and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart) reached the conclusion that the constitution was not in the interests of the House, and that constitution was fundamentally the same as the treaty that is before us now. The right hon. Gentleman has scored an own goal by referring back to that Committee.
I am sure—I cannot believe that the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr. MacShane) does not recall this—that I attended every single one of those proceedings as shadow Attorney-General.
Game, set and match, I think, to my hon. Friend.
Must not that meeting have taken place before the meeting of the European Scrutiny Committee of 7 June last year, when the then Foreign Secretary told the Committee that nothing was happening and that there was nothing to discuss?
My hon. Friend makes an extremely pertinent point with great crispness, as he has throughout these debates.
The reason, I suggest, that successive Governments of both parties have opposed the implementation in European treaties of a charter of fundamental rights and sought, even this time, to block its effect with a protocol is because we in this country have a pragmatic approach to human rights. We recognise that rights are not absolute. Each human right has to be balanced against another. Free speech has to be balanced against the right to protect one’s reputation through the libel laws and so on. Somebody must decide the balance between those rights and, in the past, after the initial interpretations of the courts, this House has decided. Often, deciding the balance has been an intrinsically political decision. I think that that is the point that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) was making.
The rights as laid down in the charters and conventions are necessarily vague, imprecise and general, so somebody—or some body—must explicate them in accordance with the detailed circumstances in which we find ourselves; they must relate those generalities to the complexities of the life that we live. Some body must do that. In the past, this body, the Houses of Parliament, has ultimately spelled out what rights mean in detail rather than leaving such decisions to general statements from a different body of people: judges, who are unaccountable to the electorate.
Once we allow lawyers and courts to have the last say, rights will mean what the court says that they do. They will not mean what we thought when we signed up to those rights, or what the people who originally drafted them meant. They will mean what the court says. If that court is the European Court of Justice, there will ultimately be no recourse except in the extreme circumstances when all 27 members can agree to override the Court and change the rights or the constitutional treaties that govern us. That is unlikely and we cannot rely on it.
I recall an example of how important the discretion of the Court was. Normally, people would expect me to be hostile to the Court. However, on one occasion it was set to adjudicate on a claim brought against the British Government on pension law. It was an extremely important case and £5 billion of tax revenue hung on it. If the decision had gone against the British Government, we would have had to recall Parliament during the recess and bring in new taxes to replace the £5 billion of lost revenue. I had to report to Parliament during my preparations for the event and the Law Officers had to report on the likely judgment that we could expect. They reported that in their view, according to all the legal advice and in the opinion of both the prosecution and the defence, the British Government would lose the case.
I ventured, rather timidly as a non-lawyer, to suggest to my Cabinet colleagues that the Law Officers had overlooked one thing: the ECJ, although it is a court of justice, is a political court and will always put the interests of the EU first. It was in the interests of the EU not to upset the apple-cart. At that point, we had not ratified the Maastricht treaty. It would have been hugely difficult to ratify the Maastricht treaty if Europe suddenly deprived us of £5 billion in tax, and forced the Government to recall Parliament in the summer to pass £5 billion-worth of new taxes. I confidently asserted that all the lawyers were wrong and that the ECJ would take the politic decision and uphold our position. It did. After that, different Departments from Whitehall used to come and consult me about legal matters because they seemed to think that I had an inner judgment about what would happen.
We need to remember that the ECJ will have the last say on what rights are. It will make those decisions politically, but without any recourse to the electorate—unlike us.
My right hon. Friend is making an extremely effective point. I remind him that the situation will get worse under the treaty. Under article 9, paragraph 2, the ECJ will have to practise mutual sincere co-operation with the other EU institutions, which exclude member states. Any bias that he detects will be redoubled if the treaty is ever ratified.
My right hon. Friend makes an extremely good point that explains why we should look very carefully at what is happening and why, in the laughably short one and a half hours that we have to consider the amendments this evening, we should take every opportunity to amend the Bill. In that way we can try, to the extent that it is in our power, to prevent the greater dangers that lie ahead.
The other aspect of leaving the balancing and explication of different rights to the Court rather than to the parliamentary process is that we cannot amend decisions when circumstances change or if we find that they are not what we wanted or what our constituents feel to be fundamentally fair, reasonable and right. The fact that we cannot amend them means, in turn, that we cannot take risks with them.
Those hon. Members who have expressed concern about economic rights should know that I would feel far more confident about granting economic rights to workers, say, if I knew that they could be withdrawn if they did not work out to their advantage. For example, I might fear that a change might turn out to price people out of a job rather than increase their well-being. If I knew that it could be revised, I should be much more willing to be generous about trying it out in the first place. Therefore, we have a choice: we can either throw caution to the winds, leave all decisions to the ECJ and hope that everything turns out all right, or we have to be terribly cautious about granting specific economic and other rights, for fear that we cannot change them if they work out badly. Whatever one’s position in these matters—whether one sides with the Labour Members who have spoken in the debate or with the neo-liberals to whom they have referred and of whom I assume that I am one—I urge the House to say, “Yes, we believe in rights, but ultimately they should be defended, protected, developed and evolved by the parliamentary process and not by a foreign jurisdiction over which we have no control and to which there is no recourse.”
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr. Lilley), who made some telling points. I entirely accept that this House should have primacy wherever possible, but the backdrop to the debate is that our economy has escaped our national boundaries. Parliament no longer controls it, and there is no longer coterminosity between how an economy works and the nation state. That is why, as I mentioned in my contribution last week, I believe that there has to be some sort of supranational collaboration on economic matters.
However, I fear that an open and free internal market in goods, labour and capital will have consequences for social cohesion, and I want to set out the problems that can arise. The requirements of the internal market in the EU mean that labour should be able to move around the continent freely, in the same way as both capital and goods and services. That is fine, provided that there are appropriate and adequate social protections to prevent the breakdown of community cohesion, which I fear is the corollary of having a free market in labour.
Yet it seems that the Government are allowing that breakdown to happen, which is why I want to return to the problematic and anomalous title IV in the charter of fundamental rights. The protocol makes the extraordinary statement that title IV, alone of all the other titles, will give rise to no additional justiciable rights in the UK. Why is that qualification attached only to title IV and not to any of the others? For an answer to that, we need to reflect a little on the history of that red line.
I did some research on the internet earlier today, and found the item that appeared on the BBC site at 10 minutes to 1 in the morning on the Saturday of last June’s Brussels summit. The item states:
“Britain’s ‘red lines’ are guarantees that the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which could give workers extra rights to strike, will not apply to the UK.”
It was clear that Tony Blair regarded what can only be called an opt-out as a major achievement in the negotiations. In his speech to the CBI to which I referred a few moments ago he said:
“We will not allow the Charter of Fundamental Rights to open up interference with Britain’s labour laws and will not agree the new Constitution until we are sure that they are safeguarded.”
The CBI said of the fundamental human rights contained in the charter:
“The most notable of these from an industry perspective are the rights”
that the charter
“would confer on issues such as collective bargaining and the right to strike—both of which are already covered by the UK’s extensive employment legislation. These, if conferred, could have an adverse impact and threaten the flexibility of the UK’s labour market which is crucial to our continued economic success.”
Does my hon. Friend agree that the former Prime Minister probably had little to fear from the interpretation provided by the ECJ, given that institution’s previous judgments? It has made it clear that it will not allow any European provision to override British industrial relations law, but that it will interpret laws and rights that come from Europe in accordance with our domestic approach.
I should like to explore that point in a moment, as ECJ rulings tend to be complex and we need to understand them better.
The CBI said that title IV would threaten Britain’s flexible labour market, but there is an interaction between the legal processes involved and the socio-economic processes that run alongside them. I shall give three examples of the problems that can arise. Although they come from my constituency, I am sure that other hon. Members will recognise them from their own.
The first involves a company that employed what might be called indigenous workers—people who had lived in the area all their lives. They were due to acquire additional labour rights after a year’s employment, but as the deadline of 11 months, three weeks and six days approached, they were sacked. Within eight days, they were replaced: exactly the same number of employees were put into the same jobs, having been imported from Poland on agency labour contracts.
The second example involves a company that had an agency labour stand inside its factory. Two years ago, Parliament raised the minimum wage by 30p an hour, and the company immediately told its agency work force that it would accept that increase but that it would reduce the bonuses to which workers were entitled—and which were paid at a rate of £1 an hour—by precisely the same amount.
The third example from my constituency involves one of the largest firms in the UK. It is a big employer in my area, and it takes on huge numbers of migrant labourers. I assure the House that I attach no responsibility to those workers, as they are unfortunate people who are being dragged across the continent by profiteers. However, the company decided to do away with overtime payments. On new year’s day 2008, it changed its shift patterns to avoid paying the workers double pay.
Those are the kind of actions taken in the much-vaunted flexible labour market that the CBI and our right hon. Friend Tony Blair had in mind when he decided to tackle title IV, which gives workers the right to collective bargaining and to take action in cases of conflict with management. We have heard on a number of occasions that title IV will give rise to no further justiciable rights in the United Kingdom, so we are entitled to ask the Government why on earth we are not having a proper debate in Government time about those labour market issues, which are of great concern in the labour movement. Why are we dealing with them in this debate? Why do promises made to me privately appear to have been dishonoured? It is not acceptable that we have to address such matters in this way.
Will the Government explain why they have put a double lock-out on title IV—“Solidarity”—which deals with those matters? Why are they allowing other rights and freedoms under the fundamental charter and not subjecting them to the same lock-out? It seems to me that the treaty deals with rights attached to collective bargaining and collective action that the Government have decided to put at arm’s length and shove away from us, but other rights, such as the right of companies to establish themselves anywhere in the UK and to provide services anywhere in Europe, are not subject to the same lock-out. The position is anomalous and creates asymmetry; on the one hand, capital has rights to provide goods and services and to move across the continent, yet on the other hand there is a lock-down on the rights of workers to organise collectively should they be faced with oppressive management.
That leads to the point about the ECJ that my hon. Friend the Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Ms Clark) raised a few moments ago. The Court is apparently inhabited by a neo-liberal culture that attempts to give primacy to the needs of the free market and the internal market, with the open movement of labour, goods, services and capital, at the expense of collective bargaining rights. We have already heard reference to the Viking and Laval cases. I shall not go into them again, save to note that a contract made between an employer and an employee in Latvia now appears to have legal validity in the UK—this also applies elsewhere—should the company decide to bring Latvian workers to the UK. In considering the two cases in general terms, it appears to me that there is a series of rights, responsibilities and freedoms under the charter and that the Court—a non-political body—will be left to arbitrate between them. The Court will make political judgments in each case about which rights or freedoms should have priority. In the Viking and Laval cases, it is clear that the decisions taken by the Court gave primacy to the right of a company to establish itself and to provide services anywhere in the EU at the expense of the right to collective bargaining and collective action.
Arguably, other case law in the ECJ and in the UK may contest the decisions in those two cases, but the opt-out on title IV, and the particular phrase in question, seems to give a clear nudge and wink to the ECJ that it is right to interpret the hierarchy of rights and responsibilities as it has so far, and that in the minds of at least the British and Polish Governments, it is right to give primacy to the rights of companies to trade, sometimes oppressively in relation to their work force, rather than to the right of workers to take collective action. I think the ECJ will regard that wording as more than a nod and a wink to say that it should continue making decisions such as those in the Viking and Laval cases and in others.
In the absence of the proper debate I feel I was promised, I must press the Minister to address those specific points to give us some reassurance. A large number of Labour Members are concerned and every trade union in the country has endorsed the questions we are trying to ask. Without a satisfactory explanation, I fear that there is only one conclusion: the British Government, for whatever reason, have decided that the asymmetrical relationship between labour and capital that I described should continue, and that that asymmetry should work at the expense of labour and in favour of the interests of capital.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I seek your guidance about ensuring that information given to the House by Ministers is accurate.
Yesterday, at column 660 of Hansard, the Secretary of State for Justice said in his statement on the reported bugging of the meeting between the hon. Member for Tooting (Mr. Khan) and Babar Ahmad that he was made aware of the burden of the allegations on Saturday. In the last hour we have learned that the Justice Secretary had a meeting in his Department to discuss press inquiries about the meeting between the hon. Member for Tooting and Babar Ahmad last December. Given that we know that officials in the Department knew about the bugging allegations last December, are we really to believe that they did not mention them to the Justice Secretary, and how can we ensure that he comes to the House to set the matter straight?
I understand the right hon. Lady’s point of order, but she will appreciate that it is not a point of order for the Chair. However, her concerns will have been heard by Members on the Treasury Bench and her comments will be on the record.
I am mindful of the pressure on time for Members who want to contribute to the debate. I call Mr. Heathcoat-Amory.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs. May), the shadow Leader of the House, has just given us a good illustration of how it is to the House that we look to defend our rights, not to any court—still less a foreign court.
The hon. Member for Hemsworth (Jon Trickett) asked many extremely good questions about the extent to which social and employment rights will be enhanced, undermined or degraded by the operation of the charter and its associated protocol. No one in the House can give him an answer; we just do not know. All we know is that those rights will progressively cease to be a matter of contest between elected politicians but will be handed over to another jurisdiction and another court, which we do not control. That is why the debate is important.
The charter will cease to be a declaration and will become a fully binding document and because it will be part of the treaty, in full, it will be superior to national law. That is asserted in the treaty. We are thus making an extraordinarily important transfer of powers and authority in the treaty.
My right hon. Friend made an important point when he said “fully binding”. Can he confirm that that means that all the charter is justiciable in the European Court of Justice and that there can be no exceptions?
Yes, I can confirm that. If my hon. Friend glances at article 6 of the treaty he will see that the charter is incorporated in full as a fully binding legal document. It attains exactly the same status as the treaty and all EU law. That is a very important point.
This is an unhappy outcome for the Government; all the way through the Convention on the Future of Europe they tried to prevent it. They tabled amendments, which were not successful, and there was a sorry series of retreats from assertions made, and indeed from promises given to the House, about the status of the charter—that it would never be legally binding—to giving in and now trying to make the best of a bad job. Of course, the Government had a veto over the whole process. They should have made their red lines clear at the start of the negotiations, rather than come up with self-selected red lines at the end to try to show that our rights and powers had been protected.
No one has answered the question, “Why do we need the charter?” The European convention on human rights is much older, dating back to 1950, and it is already embedded in the EU, which is required to give effect to its general principles. That is in article 6 of the treaty on European Union. Of course, all member states are signed up to the ECHR. It has not been explained why we need a separate, overlapping charter, with its own case law to create more confusion. In my view, it is part of the EU’s determination always to have a monopoly on legal rights and legal order. It is contemptuous and suspicious of any other organisation, whether legal, social or political, that might be a competitor.
On the remarkable story of whether the charter contains new rights, I intervened on the Secretary of State for Justice to point out that the Government’s often repeated claim that there are no new rights is simply and flatly untrue. Just to remind the House, article 13 of the charter says that
“scientific research shall be free of constraint.”
The explanatory notes confirm that that right is not recorded in any other document to which we are a party. That is a new right. When I was criticised on that point by the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey), I pointed out to him that I opposed the right because I believe that Parliament should restrain scientific research from time to time, in the interests of animal welfare and so on. He then said that he, too, was in favour of such matters being decided in Parliament, so he contradicted himself in the space of 15 seconds. Perhaps it is no surprise that he does not understand the issue.
If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I am short of time and cannot take too many interventions. We debated the matter to exhaustion. He could conclude only, rather lamely, that the House should decide such matters, but the whole point about the charter is that we will not decide. We are talking about a bald, unconditional right in the charter, derived from no other document, which takes decision making on those subjects away from the House. It is a matter of democracy, and if the hon. Gentleman refers to Hansard, he will see just how foolish his defence was.
There is also the remarkable saga of the opt-out claim to consider. The former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, often said that we had an opt-out, which was completely untrue. That was later corrected, but none of the well-paid officials who helped him issued a correction at the time. The fact is that we do not have an opt-out from the protocol. The European Scrutiny Committee shows, certainly to my satisfaction, that the protocol gives no defence against rights finding their way back into UK law indirectly as a result of our overriding obligation to abide by European Union law. That obligation is asserted elsewhere in the treaty that we are considering, and indeed in existing treaties. The European Scrutiny Committee shows that the protocol on which the Government constantly rely is threadbare. It is certainly fatally weakened.
The rights are incredibly general. Human dignity and physical integrity are again supported, and, in general terms, who could be against those concepts? However, they have great relevance to the debate on abortion. Whatever one’s views on abortion, I think that we all agree that decisions on the subject should be made by representative Parliaments. We can contrast that with the situation in the United States, where such issues are a matter for judicial decision. That is one of the reasons why people there shoot doctors and try to blow up abortion clinics. Decisions on whether abortion should be restricted or available on demand are, as a constitutional right, made by the Supreme Court, and cannot be changed by Congress; that would require an amendment to the constitution, which is incredibly difficult and cumbersome to achieve. Removing decision making on that subject from the congressional sphere creates more frustration, and less democracy.
Exactly the same is true of respect for family life and the right to found a family; they sound fine, but they could easily be applied to issues that the House spends a great deal of time debating, such as the rights of asylum seekers and the extent to which they can be reunited with family members in other countries. At present, they generally cannot be so reunited. Would we like it if debates in the House became irrelevant because such issues were decided for us? The same is true of social rights—the so-called chapter IV rights—which are constantly, and rightly, raised by Labour Members. Those issues should be a matter of contest between ourselves. It is quite wrong that a decision about whether they are adjudicated on in the European Court of Justice depends on whether the protocol is strong, weak, or threadbare, or can be relied on.
We know that the European Court of Justice is an activist, interventionist court with its own dynamic. As I pointed out in an intervention, it is not neutral in any dispute between a member state and the European Union institutions. If the treaty is ratified, the ECJ will be required by treaty law to practise mutual sincere co-operation. I would never go to court if I knew that the court had to practise mutual sincere co-operation with my legal opponent, but that is the situation in Europe. If our protocol is under attack from the European Union, the arbitrating court has a duty to co-operate not with the member state but with the Commission, or whatever the European Union constitution involved.
The fact is that human rights are incredibly complex. They often involve conflicts and trade-offs. A balance has to be struck between competing rights, and that should be done here in Parliament. Of course we sign up to overriding international rights to moderate the behaviour of states internationally; that is what the European convention on human rights did, which we signed in 1950.
The charter, however, does something quite different: it drills down into member states’ law-making processes. It will interfere with and replace decisions that we should make here. It is a further massive transfer of power and authority from the House to another jurisdiction, and people know that. They will cease to come and lobby us about their rights—about whether those rights should be extended, or whether the competing rights of, say, employers and employees should be removed or strengthened. They will not bother to do that. They will not vote for us if they know that those essential decisions are not made by us in Parliament. There is evidence that that already happens. There is disillusionment with the political process.
Let us not pretend that the loss of democracy here somehow creates democracy in the European Union, because turnout has declined in every single European Parliament election since 1979. The disillusionment is continent wide. The public are simply losing faith in the ability of elected people to influence decisions and outcomes affecting their lives. Again, in the section of the treaty that we are discussing, we are being invited to transfer more powers from the House. The Government were well aware of that danger, and that is precisely why they fought the proposals all the way through the Convention process. The Convention became the constitution, and when that was turned down, the Government fought the proposals in the new treaty. The safeguards and reassurances given are almost worthless; that is the conclusion of the European Scrutiny Committee’s report. That is why I invite the House to support the amendment this evening.
Like the right hon. Member for Wells (Mr. Heathcoat-Amory), I shall focus on the charter of fundamental rights, pose some questions about how effective the protocol will be and highlight key labour market issues that a number of Members on both sides of the House have raised in the debate.
Four key issues appear to be relevant to a discussion of the labour market elements of the charter. First, to what extent will British workers be denied the opportunity to rely on the charter to interpret and expand existing rights derived from Community law? If British workers are unable to rely on the charter, is it conceivable that EU rights will have a diluted status in the UK? Secondly, to what extent are British workers protected when they take industrial action that an employer claims violates his or her right to freedom of establishment? Is it enough that the workers have complied with domestic law, or is their action vulnerable to legal restraint?
Thirdly, to what extent are British workers at a disadvantage compared with workers in other member states by virtue of the fact that they are unable to rely on the charter as a defence in legal proceedings against them by an employer who claims that their action violates EU law? In effect, does the opt-out prioritise business rights over UK workers’ rights, as a number of my colleagues mentioned earlier?
Fourthly, we must assume that the charter is designed to add value to existing rights and principles in European law. If it does not, what is the point of it? What do the Government believe has been added and what do they believe will not be applicable in the United Kingdom?
To pursue those topics, I shall go back to the Laval and Viking cases—important European case law that emerged only at the end of last year, after the signing of what was initially the opt-out and subsequently became the protocol. They have profound implications for European labour law and specifically for this country, with its history of legal abstention, in respect of the role of the law in industrial relations.
Viking Line is a Finnish ferry company that decided in 2003 to reflag its vessel and employ an Estonian crew on Estonian pay and conditions, cutting its wage costs by some 60 per cent. The case was referred to the European Court of Justice, which ruled that in future any strike action affecting this freedom would have to meet stringent legal tests that the Court itself would assess. The key issue, which I find unprecedented, is that no longer does the legitimacy of industrial action rest upon the democratic mandate of the Union derived from its members and regulated through laws determined by the Parliaments of member states. Now it will also need to meet the criteria imposed and assessed by European judges. I see no precedent in domestic strike law in the UK.
The Laval case is central. As my hon. Friend the Member for Elmet (Colin Burgon) mentioned, Laval is a Latvian company, which in 2004 posted workers from Latvia to work on building sites in Sweden. The Swedish construction union asked the company to agree to the existing collective agreement within the building sector. The company refused, operating instead under the Latvian agreement, including a lower pay scale that undercut the Swedish workers’ wages.
Subsequently the Court ruled, essentially, that the company’s freedom to provide services in any member state should not be restricted by compliance with non-statutory collective bargaining agreements in one member state. Again, that has huge implications for an industrial relations system that is built on legal abstention and free collective bargaining, as in the British case.
Critically, the Court argued that because the EU posted workers directive set out minimum rights, it was unreasonable to force the company to comply with further non-statutory agreements at local or national level. So, instead of EU legislation setting minimum standards, which has been the argument over the past 20 years, going back to 1988 and Jacques Delors coming to the TUC, we now face the threat of those standards being seen as maximum criteria across the EU.
All of us on the Labour Benches should be acutely aware of the implications for further labour market deregulation. Those two cases, among others, give rise to widespread concern that in recent case law the EU has been engaged in a race to the bottom in terms of labour market standards. Indeed, it could be argued that the very notion of a social dimension to the European project, a cornerstone of the Labour party’s strategy over the past 20 years, is under threat. That deserves profound discussion in this place, not least because of the centrality of that concept in redirecting our party’s approach to Europe more generally.
Let me deal specifically with the protocol and workers’ rights. The first concern is that the protocol could restrict the protection of workers’ rights. However, I understand the Minister’s position that this is not an opt-out, and I hope that she will make it clear in her reply that it will not affect the way that the title IV rights are applied to EU law. That has been the approach throughout the Committee stage, but we need to hear a far broader outline of the Government’s position as there is confusion about that on all sides.
I note that many of the articles contained in title IV specify that the rights that they set down are defined as they exist in
“Community law and national laws and practices”.
The Minister may argue that therefore the protocol is simply a truism. That would raise the question why the protocol was negotiated in the first place. Leaving that aside, I notice that article 31 does not contain such limited language. That article deals with maximum working hours. I hope that the Minister will clarify that the protocol was not negotiated with a view to evading the article 31 rights.
A particularly important question for the labour movement is the purpose of paragraph 2 of article 1 of the protocol, which has been quoted extensively during the debate. It states:
“In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to the United Kingdom except in so far as the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.”
In short, title IV is singled out for a unique provision within the protocol. Title IV, as we know, is the section of the charter entitled “Solidarity” and it contains what we would call workers’ rights, such as the right to information and consultation at work, the right to collective bargaining and collective action, protection from unjustified dismissal, fair and just working conditions, the prohibition of child labour, and so on. This provision has never been fully explained in the House. In fact, when the former Prime Minister reported back in his statement of 25 June last year he mysteriously omitted the words “Title IV of” when reading out the protocol to hon. Members. Perhaps he simply made an inexplicable error of fact, but we need to explore the Government’s reasoning more fully.
As I understand it, the existing charter was referred to by the Advocate-General in recent BECTU litigation extending paid holidays to people with less than 13 weeks’ service. It is unclear whether this will be possible in future in the British context, or whether any attempts to use the charter in this way would breach the provisions of the protocol stating that charter rights are not
“justiciable rights applicable to the United Kingdom except in so far as the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.”
It might otherwise be possible to use charter rights to strengthen existing rights in various areas, including information and consultation. The charter provides that workers or their representatives must be
“guaranteed information and consultation in good time”.
On protection in the event of unfair dismissal, the charter provides:
“Every worker has the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with Community law and national laws”.
On fair and just working conditions, the charter provides:
“Every worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours”.
The information and consultation regulations, the redundancy consultation procedures and the TUPE regulations do not guarantee that workers will be consulted in good time, the TUPE regulations do not protect every worker from dismissal, and the working time regulations do not ensure that every worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours. The last point was raised by the European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons, and according to the Committee, the charter could be used to challenge the implementation of the working time directive, as in the BECTU case.
That might also happen in one of the other member states, but because of the opt-out it may not be possible to mount such a challenge from the United Kingdom, where arguably the need is most acute, given the long hours culture. This gives rise to the possibility that established rights under EC law could have diluted content in the United Kingdom—a view reinforced by the Committee’s apparent concern that ECJ decisions on social policy in cases involving other countries could creep into UK law.
Perhaps the fundamental question is whether it is acceptable, especially for a Labour Government, to put workers’ rights on a different footing from the freedoms of employers, which are contained in title II and are thus not covered by paragraph 2. I would like to think that the Government will not in future seek to celebrate the way in which they have excluded British workers from protections afforded to European workers, and that they will not make a virtue of this to the CBI and the press. We need to be sure that title IV does not have some kind of separate status from the rest of the charter. I am worried that a clever corporate lawyer might try to argue that, as the protocol states only that title IV cannot create new justiciable rights, by implication title II can therefore do so.
This is an important matter for the Minister to clarify. Many of the counter-arguments that I have heard so far seem to amount to saying that the provision makes no difference whatever. Either way, many of us would also like to hear why such an apparently specific proviso was ever negotiated in the first place and, perhaps more importantly, that workers’ rights will not be treated in that way in future.
It is a pleasure to follow the sincere remarks of the hon. Member for Dagenham (Jon Cruddas), just as it is to follow the outstanding speech made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wells (Mr. Heathcoat-Amory). May I also congratulate the Lord Chancellor on a vintage performance, as he drew on his years of parliamentary skill to move seamlessly from one proposition to a hopelessly irreconcilable and contradictory one? He told us that the charter was a wonderful document, and that British interests lay in being fully protected from it. He also told us that we needed the charter because the European Union had not acceded to the convention on human rights, and that, when it did, we would need the charter all the more.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Wells posed an extremely apt question when he asked why we needed the charter at all. We have a sneaking suspicion that concern for human rights is only a secondary motive, and that the primary motive is for the European Union to put itself in the position of a state. Like a state, it would then have a constitution accompanied by a list of fundamental rights with itself as the guarantor of those rights for its citizens and, again like a state, it would sign up to the European convention on human rights alongside the 47 states that have already signed up to it.
If that is not the European Union’s motive, why is the EU framing such a sweeping statement of rights in the charter? Let us remember that the charter will be directly and legally binding for European institutions and member states when implementing Union law. That being the case, why, under chapter I of the charter, do we need to be protected against slavery, torture and execution? Opposition Members sometimes question the activities of the European institutions, but I have yet to hear anyone suggest that we need to be protected against the risk of the European Union imposing inhuman or degrading treatment on us or putting us into forced labour or servitude. The hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey) told me that the Liberal Democrats were interested in the charter having full effect in this country, unconstrained by the protocol—perhaps they know something about it that we do not.
Could these proposals also be a pointer towards the day when the EU seeks a more active foreign and security policy? Could the statement of rights serve as a rationale for the foreign policy initiatives that the European Union might wish to take? We need only look at the clauses on foreign and security policy to see the extent of the EU’s ambitions in this direction. Could we be looking at the foundation for gradual moves in the direction of a European defence policy and of incipient policing, criminal law and anti-terrorism policies directed towards other states and based on these sweeping assertions of human rights?
My hon. Friend is making some valuable points. Does he agree that the creation of the charter and the Fundamental Rights Agency represents a clear attempt by the European Union to remove competition by trying to squeeze the Council of Europe out of business?
It would be a sad day if that were to happen, because the Council of Europe goes much further into Europe and has a much better provenance and a much better history, but who knows just how far the ambitions of the European Union extend in that direction? As far as our Government are concerned, the question is where we stand in relation to all this. As we have heard, the Prime Minister has stated that we were going to have an opt-out or that, if there were no opt-out, the treaty would not extend our laws any further.
There are three points that I would like the Minister to address. First, will the charter be used by the Commission as a basis for proposing legislation in new areas? Will the protocol take effect against new rights in legislative proposals derived from the charter by the Commission? We apprehend that the Commission will take the charter as an inspiration for its policies, because it has said as much in setting out its fundamental principles in the charter. So could the charter indirectly import new rights into United Kingdom law through new legislation derived from it?
Secondly, we are told that the protocol will not allow the charter to extend rights beyond those already recognised in the UK. Let us look at this matter from the opposite point of view from the one rightly adopted by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wells, however, and ask how easy it would be to decide exactly what rights were already recognised here. If a right were already deemed to be in existence here, the European Court of Justice would have full scope to interpret the charter in the United Kingdom. And who would make all the decisions on these matters? It would of course be the European Court of Justice itself.
May I give the Minister an example? Article 49 of the charter sets out a right in respect of the proportionality of criminal offences and penalties. It states:
“The severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence.”
Can the Minister tell us whether this is already recognised in United Kingdom law? Do we have the right not to have a disproportionate penalty applied to a criminal offence? If so, will not the European Court of Justice be able to rule on these matters in the United Kingdom in the relevant circumstances when dealing with Union law? Will the Minister tell us whether this right is already recognised in the United Kingdom?
Thirdly, there is an equally important point about the interpretation of decisions taken by the European Court of Justice in member states in which the charter has full effect, and about whether those decisions will have effect in the United Kingdom. We have already heard arguments on this point, but I want to put it to the Minister again because the Government have yet to deny that that will be the case. They certainly did not go that far in their response to the European Scrutiny Committee. Will the Minister tell us whether decisions taken by the European Court in the countries where the charter has full force will be effective in United Kingdom law as part of the acquis of the European Court of Justice—yes or no?
Who has the final right of decision on whether a right already exists in United Kingdom law and how far such a right goes, and on whether decisions relating to other member states will affect this country? The answer is the European Court of Justice, and there is no appeal beyond the Court. Its decision is final on these matters. The House must face up to the fact that we are locking ourselves into a situation in which the final decision will be taken by the European Court of Justice. My right hon. Friends the Members for Wells and for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr. Lilley) have made extremely valuable points on these matters. Given the breadth of the charter and the rights that it contains, the ambit of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice could run very far into matters that we are used to deciding for ourselves in this House.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Wells raised the very apt example of abortion. Article 3 of the charter sets out the right to the integrity of the person. If the European Court of Justice were to interpret such matters that far, they could be decided by that provision. Some constituents came to see me the other day about the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill. They asked me how I was going to vote on it, and went through the arguments with me. In future, are we to say to our constituents, “It’s all very well you coming to see me, but at the end of the day, these decisions will be taken by the European Court of Justice, not as a result of arguments or votes in the House of Commons but as a result of arguments and decisions put forward by lawyers and judges in the European Court of Justice”? What effect would that have on the standing of this House?
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said that he was confident about the health of the European Union and the democratic principle. I have no doubts about the resilience of the European Union, but I am afraid that I do have fears for the health of the democratic principle, both in the European Union and in this country. Let no one in this House be under any illusion about the extent of the authority, power and decision making that they are about to cede to European Union institutions—particularly the European Court of Justice—as a result of the decisions that we are taking this day. We are abdicating an important part of our historical role as the guardian of the rights of the people of this country. We are handing those rights over to another institution over which our voters and the people of this country have very limited, if any, accountability.
Let us be in no doubt about the seriousness of the steps that we are taking today. We cannot know with any great certainty where this will end, but given the history of what has happened to safeguards in the European Union, we have every ground for legitimate fear. We can be certain of one thing, beyond peradventure. I agree with what Commission President Barroso said to the German press shortly after the signing of the outline agreement that we are debating today:
“Lawyers have a beautiful future.”
This has been a good and clarifying debate—Members here are few in number, but there have been high-quality contributions from all sides.
Anybody from another country or platform reading this debate tomorrow will understand clearly that, for the Conservative party, only one absolute cast-iron guarantee would ensure that in no wit would the traditional British sovereignty of this House of Commons be placed under threat by anybody outside our island borders: withdrawal from the European Union. I particularly hope that the Conservative winding-up speech will answer the question that I asked about whether the party wants to withdraw from the social chapter. At his annual conference, the leader of the Conservative party made such a statement; the workers and employees of Britain need to know whether that is the policy or not.
Would that much more distinguished forefathers of ours, who sat here, were alive at this hour. I thought that the whole history of the House of Commons was about the extension of rights not only to all citizens of this country, but to people around the world. Wilberforce, Shaftesbury, Emmeline Pankhurst, the people who set up the International Labour Organisation, Harold Macmillan and Duncan Sandys—
I am extremely glad that the right hon. Gentleman is going on a historical journey, because I should like to make this point. What was the most important question raised in the 19th century? It was about the right to vote and democracy, for which people such as John Bright, a member of my family, fought. It is precisely because the arrangements that we are discussing go in exactly the opposite direction, and give power to the European Court of Justice, that I completely reject them.
If the hon. Gentleman cares to examine what John Bright and his great friend Cobden did, he will find that they were huge supporters of free trade and rightly argued for international institutions that would open countries up to it. However, we cannot have good words and nice policies unless we have a mechanism of enforcement, and since day one of the European Economic Community, the European Court of Justice has been that enforcement mechanism. I fully accept the points made by my hon. Friends about the Laval and Viking cases, but on balance the Court has been good for workers and for Europe. If we adopted the Opposition amendment, we would throw out the proverbial European Court of Justice baby with the bathwater of the whole European Union.
We have heard some remarkable language in this debate. The right hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr. Lilley) talked about a foreign jurisdiction; actually, a British judge serves on the Court. Furthermore, the World Trade Organisation is a foreign jurisdiction—any treaty organisation into which we freely enter and whose adjudicating panel’s or Court’s binding rulings we accept is a foreign jurisdiction. For heaven’s sake, I thought that Britain wanted to extend the concept of the rule of law globally and internationally into as many different areas as possible.
Of course I give way to a distinguished former colleague in European affairs.
In saying that we should be bound by the rulings of the European Court of Justice, is not the right hon. Gentleman making it clear that the protocol is worthless?
I shall come to the protocol.
The Conservative party refuses to come to terms with a fundamental issue: the rights in the fundamental charter of rights are those for which Britain has fought and struggled to lay down in different binding conventions. Many are in Council of Europe conventions, into which we freely enter. It is preposterous to say that we accept legal rulings from the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights, but that we do not want them to be applied in the European Union through the European Court of Justice.
As the right hon. Gentleman knows, there has been a lot of debate about whether we should have a home-grown Bill of Rights; indeed, his Government are interested in the idea. I have heard Ministers say repeatedly how undesirable it would be to have a rewording of the European convention on human rights in our own Bill of Rights, because that might lead to future conflict. However, is not exactly that proposed by the adoption of the charter of fundamental rights? It does very much the same thing.
The hon. Gentleman has a fair theoretical point. In all these debates, I feel at times like William Blake when he wrote:
“Both read the Bible day and night
But thou read’st black where I read white.”
We all take our different interpretations from the common text in front of us. For example, we had some discussion about the relationship between the ECJ and the Strasbourg Court—I shall call it that for the sake of shorthand—on the question of Gibraltar. This sovereign House of Commons denied the people of Gibraltar their right to vote in European Parliament elections. When they fought and struggled for it, it was the Spanish Government who took the issue up with the European Court of Justice. However, the Gibraltarians had already gone to the European Court of Human Rights and the ECJ accepted the superiority of the ECHR on that matter. We then legislated to allow Gibraltarians to vote in the Spanish regional constituency of the European Parliament. There will be that tension; of course there will.
The right hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden gave a marvellous example of the Court backing away from an alarming ruling that would have damaged Europe’s standing in Britain before the Bill on the Maastricht treaty—I would have thought that how that Bill was handled did quite enough damage to Europe’s standing in Britain, but no matter. Such dynamisms exist. To take an example, each country has highly specific national sets of labour rights. In Germany, 1.5 million Beämtern—full-time public employees—have no right to strike under the German constitution. That cannot be changed by reference to the right to strike in the European charter of fundamental rights because the horizontal national protection language written into it was put in at the behest of Germany.
France has a completely different approach on issues such as minimum service in the event of strikes. In France, only five trade unions are recognised to sign contracts. Even if a 500,000-strong union went on strike every day, it would have no legal existence under French law. That will not be altered. To that extent, I agree with the points made about the protocol. It is a strengthening of the horizontal provisions in the charter of fundamental rights, but it is not an opt-out. The decision was made to go down that road for political reasons.
I am happy to say in the House of Commons—I have said it to colleagues—that the political price paid was very high, given how alarming and upsetting it was to trade union friends. I have exchanged correspondence with Mr. Lambert, the director general of the CBI, on the issue and I think that having extracted that, the CBI had a duty to reciprocate and campaign for the ratification of the treaty in Parliament. It has not done that; it was given the works, but has not put much back on the table. That is just a private point—the CBI behaves as it behaves.
Several Labour Members have spoken about their fears and concerns. My right hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West and Royton (Mr. Meacher) is not here, but he described the European Union as a neo-liberal project. I do a little speaking here and there at international economic conferences in Europe and elsewhere. At meetings in America, and at some of the more business-focused meetings in Europe, the European Union is regarded as a bunch of communist, lefty social-welfarists. It is thought that we in the EU, far from being neo-liberals, are far too soft on social matters. Perhaps my right hon. Friend should read article 2 of the new treaty, which says:
“The Union shall establish an internal market…aiming at full employment and social progress…It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination…shall promote social justice and protection.”
Article 8B states:
“The institutions shall…give…Representative associations”—
that is, trade unions—
“the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action.”
No other arrangement in the world writes into the language at the very top of its articles of association—in this case, the treaty—the commitment to promoting social justice and protection.
As an ex-trade union official, I fully agree that much of what I see is not entirely to my liking. The European Court of Justice has, on the whole, been positive for workers and employees. Only last week, it gave a ruling—not a full decision—on the rights of employees in Britain to be able to look after handicapped children. Some vicious, ugly firm refused a mother the right to go and look after a handicapped child, and the case went up to the European Court of Justice, which has said that employers should behave properly. We can look at provisions under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 and some of the rulings on working hours. We can look at—this is a matter of deep concern to me and my constituents—the rulings on the pensions stolen from steel and engineering workers, where, again, a ruling from the ECJ has forced our Government, rather late in the day, to step up to the mark and provide justice for those workers.
The Swedish case could be solved if Sweden had a statutory minimum wage. The German Social Democratic party is now dropping its opposition and going in that direction. This is not a nirvana of high wages, but it writes into a national legal obligation what the ECJ then cannot rule against. We should be careful about objections to the country of origin principle. When I was Minister for Europe, one of my most pressing problems was trying to get European law applied to British citizens working in different countries who found all sorts of little social protectionist rackets that stopped them having full title, full salary, full pensions and the rest of it. I want to see an open European market, a socially just market in which British citizens have full rights. We must be careful that what is sauce for the British gander in terms of social protection is not used against it.
I must finish by dealing with the absurd complaint that judges are not accountable to electorates. They are not so in this country; they are not so anywhere. The very concept of justice is based on separation of powers. The Conservatives want a European Union from which it can pick and choose the bits that it wants to support. The gist of the speech by the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) was, “Let others go further forward, but we can stop where we are.” I do not particularly dissent from that, but believe me, if we want to pick and choose what we like, then other countries can say, “We don’t like Ryanair and easyJet landing”, or “We don’t want the environmental rules that Britain is fighting for to be applied to our nation.” If we want Britain to have an effect and a voice in the European Union, we have to accept that in relation to other countries.
I have taken two interventions and that is my maximum.
I sincerely invite my right hon. and hon. Friends who have spoken critically—I understand where some of that comes from—to reflect carefully. There is a global neo-liberal agenda to destroy Europe, to remove such protections as currently exist, to talk down the right of social protection, and to say that rights are not universal but defined simply by the employer and capital against the human being. That is why I hope that the Government will be supported tonight, and that is why the world, reading this debate, will realise how deeply reactionary and regressive today’s Conservative party is in turning its back on its history of supporting international rights.
The debate and the detailed arguments on both sides once again prove exactly how constrained we are in having to fit our deliberations into the straitjacket of the timetable motion that the House passed last week. Moreover, later on, the detailed discussion in Committee will be shoehorned into just one and a half hours.
I listened carefully to the Lord Chancellor’s opening remarks and to other contributions, but I must confess that I remain confused about exactly what the charter of fundamental rights brings to the table. The Government seem keen to argue that it brings nothing new and that there are no new rights, which is in line with their negotiating position when they argued against the charter having legal force. However, as we have heard, the European Commission makes it clear that new rights will be in force. If that is not the case, I hope that when the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Lewisham, East (Bridget Prentice), winds up the debate she will confirm that tomorrow a letter will be winging its way from the Lord Chancellor to the European Commission to point out that the information on its website is incorrect and there are no new rights. If that letter does not find its way there, with a placed copy in the Library, we will know that the Minister agrees that there are indeed new rights. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Wells (Mr. Heathcoat-Amory) said, there is at least one new right—an unlimited freedom for scientific discovery. During that discussion, we discovered that the Liberal Democrats are very keen on unrestricted scientific experimentation, which will disappoint those who care about animal welfare.
During the negotiations on this part of the European treaty, the Government made it clear that they were unhappy with it, and it is worth putting one or two of those comments on the record. Baroness Scotland, speaking for the Government, said that making the charter binding was
“not desirable because a text incorporated into the treaties”—
my right hon. Friend the Member for Wells made it clear that the charter is an integral part of the treaty with exactly the same legal force as the rest of it—“requires legal precision.” She continued:
“The charter uses a breadth of language well suited for a political declaration”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 29 November 2000; Vol. 619, c. WA142.]
The right hon. Member for Neath (Mr. Hain) said, when speaking on this matter,
“the people who say that it is a great idea to have a charter of rights do not seriously appreciate what the implications would be if it were incorporated wholesale in the treaty…My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has made it absolutely clear that we shall not do that…people want a charter of motherhood and apple pie at one level, but are not willing to recognise what full incorporation would signify.”—[Official Report, 18 June 2002; Vol. 387, c. 244.]
That is important. The scope of the charter means that several articles are very broad and have potentially significant effects on the rights of this House and of our democratic structure.
One or two Members have drawn attention to article 3 on the right to integrity of the person, which could affect abortion law. My hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr. Clappison) referred to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, which will be debated in this House when it has finished its passage in the other place. We know that many of the votes on that legislation will be free votes for Members of this House because they are on conscience matters, and we know about the passions that will be engaged in our constituents on several of those important issues. My hon. Friend made it clear that it will not be a forward step if decisions on issues such as abortion are taken out of the hands of this House and given to unelected judges.
The hon. Gentleman should read the past declarations and protocols from Ireland, Poland and other very Catholic countries. Of course, abortion is a sensitive issue, and the European Court of Justice will not try to overturn national constitutional abortion law.
In that case, what is the purpose of having this article in the charter? If it will have no effect and the Court will not use it to change reality on the ground in any of these countries, what on earth is the point of it, and if there is no point to it, why on earth are we effectively putting it into British law?
Some other incredibly important articles could have a huge impact on our domestic policy. Article 21 of the charter states that there should be no discrimination on the grounds of nationality. That is not limited to European states, as I read it; it means that there should be no discrimination on the grounds of nationality at all. That will have a huge impact on and wide-ranging consequences for our benefit system and our tax system. Again, it might transfer huge amounts of power from this House—people accountable to our electors—to judges. What the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr. MacShane) said about all judges not being accountable is not entirely true. Many judges in the United States are accountable because they are elected, so they have to listen; that is not a very good idea. I do not want people who have to worry about what electors think to make decisions in criminal cases. The right hon. Gentleman made that point about judges and it is not true.
I do not want us to give rights and powers to take important decisions that should rest with this House to people who are not elected and are unaccountable. The right hon. Gentleman raises his eyebrows, but that is what the charter does. If it does not, it has no effect at all, in which case there is no point in bringing it into law. The Lord Chancellor seemed to be trying to have it both ways, as was ably pointed out by my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere.
I draw hon. Members’ attention to article 50, which is the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings—the double jeopardy principle. The UK Government have already amended the rules on that, and one can take one’s own view on it—it would allow the killers of Damilola Taylor to be brought to justice—but such a decision would not be possible if that article were enforced. Such decisions are matters for this House, and for Ministers who are accountable, but we will be handing those decisions over to people who are not accountable.
Finally, I would like to pick up the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere finished on. From discussions over the past few weeks we have seen the regard in which hon. Members are held. People will only turn out in elections when they think that there is something significant at stake. We saw that in the French presidential elections, where there was a clear choice between the two candidates and turnout reached 80 per cent. I suspect we will see something similar—perhaps not as high as 80 per cent.—in the US presidential election this year. There will be a clear choice. We have already seen a significant number of voters turning out in the Democratic primaries who have not turned out before. The people they are electing can make a real difference and there is a real choice to be had.
In this country, we have seen turnout decline. I hope that voters will think that there is real choice at the next general election and that there will be a competitive election in which turnout goes up. But if electors think that the decisions they take in those elections and that the people—and the Ministers—they send here are increasingly unable to alter either the way in which our laws are made or the direction of our country, they will become even more disillusioned. They will not come and talk to us, they will not vote in elections and they will increasingly turn their attention to hiring lawyers and fighting cases in front of the European Court of Justice. That would be not a welcome step but a retrograde one. It is exactly what will happen if we cede these powers, which is why I want the House to support the amendment standing in the name of my right hon. and hon. Friends.
I am very happy to follow the hon. Member for Forest of Dean (Mr. Harper), whom I have not caught speaking in the House before; nor have followed a speech of his. I will read his other speeches with some attention to see whether his views are as consistently right-wing as they have been this evening.
I have no problem in supporting the Government in the debate about this aspect of the treaty. I have no fear of the European Union. I respect the views of those who also serve on the European Scrutiny Committee, but sometimes I worry about the tenor of the contributions of the right hon. Member for Wells (Mr. Heathcoat-Amory). They show a paranoia about the institution of the EU, which, despite the views we may have about these elements of the treaty, or the future position of the European Court of Justice, has not done any damage to the good people of this country. That is the truth of it. Nor has it done damage to the place where we live. We live in a Union of half a billion people.
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
No, I am not going to take interventions, because I hope to leave more time for the winding-up speeches than I would if I took my full 12 minutes.
What does the charter of fundamental rights say to anyone? Who is interested in it, and who is afraid of it? I will tell hon. Members who is afraid of it: the person who stood as the presidential candidate in Serbia, who would have taken that country back under the influence of Russia. It was what the charter of fundamental rights and the European Union stood for that won the election in Serbia for those who want to get closer to the EU and, we hope, join it, alongside other former parts of the fractured former nation of the Republic of Yugoslavia. I have no fear of what the EU holds out to our citizens, as well as to others.
I would like to talk about what the treaty does, with reference to the consolidated texts of the EU treaties as amended by the treaty of Lisbon. For example, article 3 has been referred to by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children as representing a fundamental move forward. Paragraph 3 of article 3 says that there will be
“solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.”
Paragraph 5 refers to
“eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child”.
That is the first time such a provision has been put down in the laws of the EU. It is an important matter because we saw in Romania the terrible sight of children chained to potties on stools in the so-called children’s homes that existed there before that country entered the EU. If such conditions alone are ended by the treaty, it is one worth signing.
Article 6 refers to the charter of fundamental rights, which is important because it shows that it is central to what the European Union will be about. Paragraph 3 of article 6 says
“Fundamental rights…shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.”
How can we be afraid of that? Articles 145 to 150, under title IX, “Employment”, deal with employment rights. I cannot see how anyone can object to a treaty that includes such provisions which will be binding on all nations. My hon. Friend the Member for Dagenham (Jon Cruddas) spoke about the difficulties of Latvia and Sweden, which did not have an understanding with regard to how people have common rights that transfer across the Union.
I come to article 153—the original article 137 of the treaty—under title X, “Social Policy”. For the benefit of those who want to read our debates, and I hope that many will, I want to put on the record what that article says. It refers to
“(a) improvement in particular of the working environment to protect workers’ health and safety;
(b) working conditions;
(c) social security and social protection of workers;
(d) protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated…;
(f) representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including co-determination…;
(g) conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory
(h) the integration of persons excluded from the labour market”—
we are always talking about integration, and wondering about the 2.7 million people who are on incapacity benefit, and why that figure has grown from several hundred thousand—
“(i) equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work;
(j) the combating of social exclusion;
(k) the modernisation of social protection systems without prejudice”.
Those points are not just in the charter of fundamental rights, but in the treaty. They are things worth voting for, and I hope that we will do so.
Everyone says that it is all about the European Court of Justice—this big bad organisation that will somehow take decisions from a malicious point of view. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Mr. MacShane) pointed out earlier, its judgments normally are on the fair side of the equation and are not made in a malicious way that is disadvantageous to the people. The hon. Member for Hertsmere (Mr. Clappison), my colleague on the European Scrutiny Committee, says that there is no right of appeal. We know of a case that came before the Committee, concerning a journalist from Belgium. His house was raided and his equipment taken because he had put out a story about corruption in the fraud office of the EU. He went to the European Court of Justice and lost. He then went to the European Court of Human Rights and won. He got €30,000 in compensation and his costs paid. The court found against OLAF, so there are places to which one can go in the European Union if the European Court of Justice denies one’s human rights. That is why human rights are so important and central to the Bill.
The charter of fundamental rights is an important document. Somebody asked why it was not a single document—it is. Here it is—I am holding up the charter. Anyone can get a copy—it is readable, accessible and says some things that we should be proud to state about the European Union of which we wish to be part. Those things will be law once the treaty is passed.
Ministers have said that the charter contains nothing additional, but it does. According to the Law Society, which analysed it purely from a legal point of view, it
“contains many rights similar to those set out in the ECHR, in addition to further rights and principles already recognised in EU law.”
The rights will be additional but they are already in EU law. However, the article continues:
“Until now the Charter has had no binding effect, but this will change as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon.”
The charter will be binding, and I find that attractive for reasons that I will outline. Article 4 of chapter I is entitled, “Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. Such a prohibition may not exist in some countries that might be considering joining the European Union. Holding up as a flagship guarantee a provision that people cannot be abused, tortured or punished inhumanely by their Governments will attract people to share our view of Europe, rather than that which some other regimes currently hold.
Article 5 of chapter I prohibits forced labour and people traffickers. Article 10 of chapter II is entitled, “Freedom of thought, conscience and religion”. That is very important. Article 23 of chapter III deals with gender inequality and article 24 is entitled, “The rights of the child”. Those are fundamental matters in a charter of which we should be proud. Surely hon. Members approve of article 25, about the rights of the elderly and article 26, about the “Integration of persons with disabilities”.
In chapter IV, articles 27 to 33 deal with employment rights, including family and maternity rights, and the rights that my colleagues who spoke about employment law discussed.
Chapter VI contains articles 47 to 50 and includes article 48, “Presumption of innocence and right of defence”. That seems to me to be an anti-sharia law article because people are not presumed innocent under sharia law. People are presumed innocent under our law in the EU and that is fundamental, especially when considering some of the jurisdictions that want to join the Union, which take a different view about whether sharia or EU law should apply.
In chapter VII, article 53 protects fundamental freedoms and article 54 deals with the prohibition of abuse of those rights. We should include all such provisions in anything that we wish to become the law of the EU. Indeed, they are a part of EU law.
Some hon. Members have asked why we should have a protocol when, in the European Scrutiny Committee’s judgment, it did not have any of the opt-out powers that were originally discussed. As early as July, the Government began to admit that we were right and that the protocol did not constitute the opt-out that was originally intended. Paragraph 28 of our third report of the 2007-08 Session, which was published after taking evidence from Ministers, states:
“It seems to us that a judgment of the ECJ interpreting a measure of Union law in a case brought in another Member State would form part of the body of Union law which the UK courts would be obliged to follow in the UK so as to ensure the consistent application of Union law throughout the Union.”
We believe that that is the correct interpretation. If there were such judgments on the working time directive, that on agency workers and others that were mentioned, which are part of EU law and in the charter, I believe that they would be binding in this country as well as in others.
The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) was correct when he said that we kept emphasising to the Minister—the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) especially pressed the matter—that the only way in which the charter would not apply would be to pass a protocol, which would take effect, “notwithstanding the treaties or Union law generally”. If Union law generally and the treaties are binding, the charter is also binding.
I believe that that is a good thing. I repeat that I am worried that the trade union movement has reacted so badly to what appeared to be a signal—a flourish—to the CBI that somehow we would not grant the same rights in employment law to everyone. If we rejected the treaty, we would deny the charter to every other country and trade unionist in Europe. Some need it much more desperately than our unions. It is a question of solidarity. The trade union movement should not be afraid of the impact on human rights or workers’ rights through accepting the treaty, for which I shall vote.
I shall speak briefly, partly because I do not have much time. I will have an opportunity to say more later. Following the speech of the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee allows me to say that my concern is that he is right, because the Committee has examined the position and been through an enormous number of other legal authorities. There is no doubt that the advice that the European Scrutiny Committee has given Parliament is valid. If matters continue the way they are, the Government, who believe—probably not sincerely because they did not want the charter in the first place—that they are managing to put a roadblock in the charter’s way, will end up having to accept it.
Conservative Members take a different view, which is that the charter should not apply in any event. When we consider amendments in Committee later, I will explain the way in which my amendments can help the Government to achieve their objectives. I may comment on other amendments, too. However, the bottom line is that Conservative Members are united on one central principle: we do not believe the Government’s line that their actions can prevent what we fear from happening. We all agree that our argument stands up in the interests of the people whom we represent. There is unity among Conservative Members about that, but we have a slight problem that we must resolve in the next one and a half hours.
I do not need to add any more until I get to the nub of the issue, and the nuts and bolts, which I will explain when we discuss amendments. I am extremely grateful for a marvellous opportunity to speak for one minute more than I did on the previous occasion.
The brevity of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) always comes when he makes those points with which I most agree. He is right in his analysis of the debate. It is extraordinary that the quality of the debate rose dramatically when the Lord Chancellor sat down. Until then, we were treated to a characteristic campaign of explanation that the charter was a wonderful, innocuous document and that those who could not appreciate its merits suffered from the usual Conservative paranoid delusions about its content.
We had to wait until the end of the debate to hear the hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty), who correctly analysed the pros and cons of the changes that the Lisbon treaty will effect. I am only too eager to debate that. We know from listening to the debate between hon. Members in the same political parties that the subject can provoke interesting discussion on a topic of great importance for this country’s future. The Lord Chancellor—and Government Front Benchers generally—does not want anyone to realise that that discussion is happening. If I have a complaint about the process of these debates, whether today’s debate or last week’s debate on criminal justice, it is that those on the Treasury Bench reduce the issues to a series of facile soundbites and show an unwillingness to engage, but then complain when the public exhibit what they describe as “signs of paranoia”. I have to say that I might start to become a bit paranoid if I saw individuals systematically attempting to obfuscate and missing the point so much.
We had a good debate once the Secretary of State had sat down, first with a speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Lidington). Then the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) made an important contribution on the role of the charter, which in his view is innocuous. I disagree with him about that. The reason, which I mentioned in my intervention on the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr. MacShane), to whom I shall return, is that we have to ask ourselves what the charter’s purpose is. Let us forget about our protocol for a moment, and ask why the charter is there and what it is designed to achieve.
To respond to the hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk, my problem with the charter is, first, that it has been placed at the heart of an institution whose primary purpose is not the promotion of human rights. That was picked up in a series of comments, including those of the hon. Members for Elmet (Colin Burgon) and for Hemsworth (Jon Trickett), and the right hon. Member for Oldham, West and Royton (Mr. Meacher), all of whom raised their deep concern about the extent to which the European Union’s agenda might be harmful to some of the social policy issues that they want to promote. I do not want to get involved in the detail of that debate, but they were right to highlight the potential impact of European Union laws and policies in areas of concern to them. Again, the Government’s unwillingness to engage with the issue troubles me very much, because it is plainly relevant to how the European Union develops.
I return to the point that we have in the European convention on human rights a document that commands total acceptance in all parts of the House, to which all European countries that are members of the EU are adherents and which provides a well established formula for defining human rights, in wording that is different from the charter of fundamental rights. The point is not just that the charter has extra text covering rights that are not covered by the ECHR—that might be an interesting topic of debate—but that the wording is different. If the Government are so insistent, in their project to introduce a new Bill of Rights, that they are going to keep the ECHR text within the Human Rights Act 1998 because they do not wish to differ from it, that prompts the question, which remains unanswered: why are they so comfortable with the European Union doing the very thing that they do not wish to see done domestically? I hope very much that the Minister will rise to the occasion and deal with that point.
Do I understand from what the hon. Gentleman is saying that he now agrees with the point that I have made repeatedly, which is that it is unhelpful to have two forms of human rights legislation and wording that are independently justiciable?
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. The situation raises difficulties of interpretation. I am not saying that there are no arguments to the contrary; what I am saying is that the Government should say why the arguments that they have put forward in the context of a potential domestic Bill of Rights, which they have indicated they wish to introduce, apparently do not need to be considered in the context of the charter of fundamental rights. As yet we have received no answer whatever to that question, because the debate has, I am afraid, so frequently been reduced to such facile levels.
The second issue is the protocol and the impact of the charter of fundamental rights on our national legal and parliamentary processes. The Government negotiated the protocol for some purpose. However, having listened to what those on the Treasury Bench have said on the matter, one begins to think that the protocol is merely a fig leaf, whereas it was originally sold as a protection. The protection that the Government wanted concerned their anxiety to persuade the public in the UK that the charter could not be used to have an impact on, effectively, domestic legal areas.
As European law is expanding—one of the purposes of the treaty of Lisbon is for that to happen—and moving into, for example, areas of crime and justice, which we debated last week and on which I disagree most profoundly with what the Government are allowing to happen, it must be inevitable that the charter of fundamental rights will apply even in crime and justice areas that fall within the European Union’s remit, if the Government opt into any of them. Again, we have yet to hear any explanation from the Lord Chancellor or the Minister of how the Government think that will operate in practice. If the protocol is in fact worthless—as in my view it is—there will be instances where the European Union and the European Court of Justice will use the charter of fundamental rights to affect the development of UK domestic law in areas such as criminal justice to which we have opted in. It may be argued that that is a good thing; indeed, some Government Members, and certainly Liberal Democrat Members, seem to think that that would be a good development. However, the issue at least merits some debate, which is the very thing that we have not had from the Government.
Does my hon. Friend agree that one of the problems that the Government will face is in respect of the question of 28 or 42 days, and does he think that that would be a judgment for the European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights?
I am concerned about the operation of European Court of Justice in this context. It is difficult to know exactly how that will develop, but in view of the architecture of the treaty of Lisbon, it is certain that the potential for decisions of the European Court of Justice, based on the charter, to intrude on our domestic law is real and cannot be ignored.
I want to hear the Minister’s answers to those questions. I am sorry that this debate is so characteristically short. I simply say this to the Government: they have failed to make the case. Once again, the House and the country are being asked to accept a series of major changes that have not been properly debated, analysed or thought through.
This has been a fascinating debate, although facile in parts; the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) perhaps ought to look on the Benches behind him for that adjective. I commend the passion that has been expressed in all parts of the House and thank the Chairmen of the European Scrutiny Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights for their contributions. I should like immediately to apologise to the House for being unable to answer all the questions thrown up in this four-and-a-half-hour debate, but I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister for Europe will address some of them in the following debate on amendments to the Bill.
I start by asserting our pride in our provisions on human rights and stressing again that the human rights provision contained in the Lisbon treaty, particularly the charter of fundamental rights, will ensure that the European Union is committed to the protection of human rights without infringing on the sovereignty of member states. The charter is not, and was never intended to be, a source of new enforceable rights. The 1999 Cologne European Council, which started the work of the charter, was very clear in its conclusions:
“The European Council takes the view that, at the present stage of development of the European Union, the fundamental rights applicable at Union level should be consolidated in a Charter and thereby made more evident.”
The aim of the charter in 1999, as in 2008, was to make the fundamental rights and principles shared by member states more visible by condensing them in a single document. The level of protection of fundamental rights across the Union was never intended to be, and cannot be, changed by the charter, for the simple reason that the charter reflects only existing rights already recognised in the Union, which in some circumstances do no more than restate—and are subject to—domestic legislation.
During the negotiations, the Government successfully agreed a package of safeguards clarifying the scope and interpretation of the charter. Four measures in particular have been established: the new wording of article 6 of the treaty on European Union, the charter’s horizontal articles, the official explanations accompanying the charter and the binding protocol on the charter.
I shall deal with some of those items in detail, but first let me reassure my hon. Friends the Members for Elmet (Colin Burgon), for Dagenham (Jon Cruddas) and for Hemsworth (Jon Trickett), and my right hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West and Royton (Mr. Meacher), who raised important issues about the Laval and Viking judgments. The legally binding charter and the protocol will not affect the European Court of Justice case law in those cases, in which the ECJ held that the right to take collective action was already part of EU law, as reflected in article 28 of the charter. That right, however, is subject to national laws and practices. The protocol does not reduce or limit charter rights; it simply makes clear how they apply.
The amended article 6 of the treaty on European Union, new article 6(1), clearly states:
“The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.”
That was raised by a number of Opposition Members, notably the hon. Members for Hertsmere (Mr. Clappison) and for Aylesbury (Mr. Lidington). Article 51(2) of the charter states—[Interruption.]
Order. Conversations are breaking out throughout the Chamber. The House ought to do the Minister the courtesy of listening to what she is saying.
I am grateful to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. As I was saying, article 51(2) of the charter states:
“The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined by the Treaties.”
The horizontal articles in title VII of the charter, especially articles 51 and 52, define the field of application, scope and interpretation of the charter. They clearly state that the charter is aimed at EU institutions and member states only as they are implementing EU law. In addition, the official explanations, which indicate the source of the rights and principles contained in the charter, have been published together with the charter in the Official Journal of the European Union. I have already mentioned article 6, which states that due regard must be given to those explanations. By setting out the sources of and limits of the provisions in the charter, the explanations show that it does not create any new rights, but simply reaffirms rights that are already recognised in the law of the Union and in member states’ own national laws.
The combination of those three measures—the wording of article 6, the horizontal articles and the official explanations—makes the charter’s scope and interpretation absolutely clear. However, we listened to concerns expressed about, in particular, the charter’s alleged interference with United Kingdom labour and social laws, and for the avoidance of any doubt we negotiated a fourth safeguard. It consists of a binding protocol, originally proposed by and for the United Kingdom but later extended to Poland. My right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor went into some detail about the content of the protocol, and I shall not repeat what he said.
Perhaps the Minister will answer a question put to the Lord Chancellor that he did not really address. If a country that does not have the benefit of the protocol takes a case to the European Court of Justice, which, on the basis of the charter, makes a decision, why will that decision not become part of EU law, and therefore applicable to the United Kingdom under our general EU treaty obligations?
That issue was raised a number of times by Opposition Members, which surprised me, given that the ECJ’s decisions have been binding since 1957 and the original treaty. They will continue to be binding in the same way.
Will the Minister give way?
Very briefly.
If I may say so, the Minister has not answered the question that she has just been asked. It was a very specific question, to which, surely, the only answer can be that in such circumstances the protocol provides no protection whatsoever, because the charter will have been applied in this country through its incorporation in European Union law in a decision concerning another country.
Again, the hon. Gentleman’s premise is false. No new rights have been created. Let me say to him, and also to the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) and the hon. Member for Aylesbury, that the protocol’s meaning and wording are very clear and that it is legally binding. It puts beyond doubt the fact that the charter simply cannot extend the powers of the courts to strike down UK laws, and that it does not introduce new justiciable rights.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) said that the ECJ would be subservient to the European Court of Human Rights, and he is absolutely right. The Court’s primacy in setting European rights and standards remains. The hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey) said that we had a great story to tell on human rights, and that we should tell it loud and clear. I agree, and on that basis I commend the motion to the House.
Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The House divided: Ayes 170, Noes 362.
It being more than four and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on the motion, Mr. Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Main Question, pursuant to Order [28 January]:—
Resolved,
That this House approves the Government’s policy towards the Treaty of Lisbon in respect of provisions concerning human rights.
On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Colleagues and I have come back at this stage in the proceedings in the hope that at some stage you or your colleague in the Chair might select motion 46 on the Order Paper, which is the instruction to the Committee. I would be grateful to know whether there is any way in which, were you minded to do so, we could be given notice earlier than now so that the House was aware that the motion was coming down the track, as it were. Can you confirm that Standing Order No. 66, which the Speaker and your colleagues have determined governs this situation uniquely, not only would allow the selection of such an instruction at this stage, but would not prevent earlier notice that it was in the mind of the Speaker to select it?
That is the sort of point of order that the hon. Gentleman has made on previous occasions, although it is not precisely the same. The proceedings for today have already been decided and there is nothing that the Chair can do at this point in time to alter them.
Orders of the Day
European Union (Amendment) Bill
[3rd Allotted Day]
Further considered in Committee.
(Any selected amendments to clause 2 relating to human rights)
[Sir Michael Lord in the Chair.]
Clause 2
Addition to list of treaties
I beg to move amendment No. 84, page 1, line 12, after ‘excluding’, insert—
‘(i) Article 1, paragraph 8, replacement Article 6 TEU relating to rights, freedoms and principles; and
(ii) ’.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 217, page 1, line 12, after ‘excluding’, insert—
‘(i) Article 1, paragraph 8, replacement Article 6 TEU, paragraph 1, concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights; and
(ii) ’.
Amendment No. 85, line 12, after ‘excluding’, insert—
‘(i) Article 1, paragraph 9, amendments to Article 7 TEU relating to breach of principles; and
(ii) ’.
Amendment No. 125, line 12, after ‘excluding’, insert—
‘(i) Article 2, paragraph 18, inserted Article 5b TEC (TFEU) relating to the combating of discrimination; and
(ii) ’.
Amendment No. 129, line 12, after ‘excluding’, insert—
‘(i) Article 2, paragraph 34(b) to (d), amendments to Article 17 TEC (TFEU) relating to the rights and duties of citizens of the European Union; and
(ii) ’.
Amendment No. 194, line 12, after ‘excluding’, insert—
‘(i) the Protocol relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the Accession of the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; and
(ii) ’.
Amendment No. 196, line 12, after ‘excluding’, insert—
‘(i) the Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom; and
(ii) ’.
Amendment No. 228, line 12, after ‘excluding’, insert—
‘(i) the Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and the United Kingdom—
(a) Preamble, tenth paragraph stating that references in the Protocol to the operation of specific provisions of the Charter are strictly without prejudice to the operation of other provisions of the Charter; and
(b) Preamble, twelfth paragraph stating that the Protocol is without prejudice to other obligations devolving upon Poland and the United Kingdom under the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Union law generally; and
(ii) ’.
Amendment No. 229, line 12, after ‘excluding’, insert—
‘(i) the Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and the United Kingdom, Preamble, eleventh paragraph stating that the Protocol is without prejudice to the application of the Charter to other Member States; and
(ii) ’.
Amendment No. 203, line 12, after ‘excluding’, insert—
‘(i) the words “Title IV of” in paragraph 2, Article 1 of the Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom; and
(ii) ’.
Amendment No. 27, line 13, after second ‘to,’ insert—
‘(i) the Charter of Fundamental Rights; and
(ii) ’.
New clause 6—Disapplication of the Charter of Fundamental Rights—
‘Notwithstanding any provision of the European Communities Act 1972, nothing in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of December 7th 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg on December 12th 2007, shall be binding in any legal proceedings in the United Kingdom and shall not form part of the law applicable in any part of the United Kingdom.’.
New clause 12—Charter of fundamental rights—
‘For the avoidance of doubt, no decision of the European Court of Justice which is based on any application of the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to interpreting or applying the law of the European Union shall have any force of law or effect in the United Kingdom.’.
I am extremely grateful and honoured to be able to lead the debate on this subject. In the previous debate, we demonstrated the enormous gulf between us and the Government and, furthermore, the gulf between the Government and reality. Last night, I watched a fascinating programme on the history of the atom. It contained things that I almost could not understand, but one thing I grasped was that according to those enormous brains—Mr. Feynman, Mr. Gell-Mann, Mr. Dirac, Mr. Einstein and all the others—there is a notion of virtual reality.
The Government have that notion in respect of the charter of fundamental rights. It is absolutely clear from the European Scrutiny Committee report and from other eminent analyses by significant and interesting lawyers that there is no doubt that the charter of fundamental rights will be made applicable in the UK sooner or later by the European Court of Justice. It will catch up with the Government, just as the working time directive caught up with us despite my attempts to get my Government to understand in the 1980s that that would happen. Why was I right? It was not because of any stroke of genius, but simply because I know the ways of the ECJ.
It is interesting to remember that the Government were opposed to the provisions in the charter of fundamental rights being applied through the treaty and the protocols, and it is equally true that they have tried to put up various roadblocks. I do not think that they have succeeded. Thanks to the European Scrutiny Committee, their cover has been blown.
I fully support my hon. Friend’s amendment, but will he expand on why it is so important? Many of my constituents despise the Human Rights Act 1998, but we could repeal it. If the charter of fundamental rights is incorporated into our law, does he agree that it will be binding and that Parliament will be able to do nothing to alter its provisions?
One of the wonderful things about this House is that one can almost guarantee that another hon. Member will intervene to make the point that one was about to make. In this instance, however, I am glad that it happened. These are very important matters and, although almost no one outside is interested in our debates, there is no doubt that, in due course, people will complain bitterly about the Government’s approach. It will become the conventional wisdom that the Opposition were right and the Government wrong. We are trying to keep ahead of the curve on these matters: in the national interest, we are trying to stand up for the people of this country, and their rights.
I always listen to the hon. Gentleman carefully, as what he says is important. However, although the Opposition have made clear their unhappiness with the Government’s policy, they have not said what they would do differently or how much further they would go. It is sad that people outside are still not being told what the alternative is to Government policy, or what could happen instead.
I accept what the hon. Lady says but, if I may be allowed to say so, I do not put myself in the category of those who have not been persistent in these matters. I have made completely clear my desire to achieve clarity about the treaty.
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
In a moment, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me. I was just about to mention the origin of the human rights legislation, a subject in which I know he has a great interest.
The legislation began with the universal declaration of human rights in 1949, which I have studied in depth. The distinguished Lebanese jurist Mr. Malik was the rapporteur, and his reports placed enormous significance on the rights of the individual. There was a huge battle between him and Mr. Topialeck and the other Soviet representatives, who were trying to put their version of the declaration.
There is no time to go into the details, but the four freedoms that were agreed did not include democracy. In contrast, I believe that democracy is the first freedom, because all else follows from it. That is what I am concerned to insist on in these debates, because democracy means that my constituents have the right to decide in a general election what sort of Government they want and what laws are applied to them.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way, but I seek clarification about where the Opposition stands on these matters. In earlier debates, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) made it clear that the Conservative party, along with the rest of the House, supports the European convention on human rights. However, the hon. Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) said in an earlier intervention that he despises the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporated the ECHR into UK law. Will the hon. Gentleman clarify where he stands on that issue?
It is very simple: when I was shadow Attorney-General, I proposed the repeal of the 1998 Act. I am glad to be able to say that that is now my party’s policy, and I trust that it will remain so. I shall go further and say that I have the gravest reservations about how the ECHR has impinged on the essential question. I would fight to the death to defend the rights themselves—and my own father died for that cause in the last war—and the proposition that decisions about the rights enjoyed by people in this country should be made by this Parliament. However, I would also fight to the death to ensure that they are not made in the abstract, according to principles put forward and adjudicated by an unelected European Court of Justice.
Will the hon. Gentleman confirm that it is his policy, and perhaps that of his party, that Britain should withdraw from the convention on human rights? If that is not his policy, will he confirm that repeal of the Human Rights Act would simply mean that any UK citizen who wanted to enforce the convention on human rights would have to go to the European Court of Human Rights—the situation that existed until the Human Rights Act repatriated the law so that British citizens could go to British courts to enforce their rights under the European convention? Where does the hon. Gentleman stand on those questions?
I am happy to commend the right hon. Lady to people on her side of the equation; as in the earlier debate, she put the arguments from her point of view as well as they could be put—which is not very much. I really believe that the point I have just made, and which my right hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr. Lilley) made in his speech on the motion, is very important: we operate, and have always operated, not on the basis of a written constitution or the abstract principles so beloved of—if I dare say it—the Socialist International and all that goes with it, but on the pragmatic assumption that there is a need to adapt and evolve according to the requirements of the time, as Edmund Burke would have said of his time. There are principles we believe in, such as human rights, freedom, democracy and liberty, but we apply them periodically according to the circumstances of the time, not according to a fixed order of the kind prescribed in the arrangements we are debating.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the arguments put by the right hon. Member for Leicester, West (Ms Hewitt) were holed below the water line by the Labour Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, who said that the Government’s red lines on the charter would “leak like a sieve”?
Indeed. The red lines have already leaked like a sieve. I am reminded of the story of the hunting of the Snark; in the pursuit of an abstract and completely unknowable objective the colander leaked like a sieve and sank. That is exactly what will happen in this case.
I am concerned about the overlap between the European convention on human rights and the charter of fundamental rights as set out in article 6, which is the subject of the amendment. I referred to the article earlier in an intervention on a Minister. For all the weasel words and questions about opt-out—whether we really face legislation that we could avoid by some mechanism, trickery or cunning—and all the legal verbiage that we shall have to deal with in due course, we are discussing amendments about whether the provisions before us should apply. I am open to challenge, but I merely repeat the words in article 6(3):
“Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.”
That means that the European Court of Justice will apply the general principles of the Union’s law. I have heard many arguments suggesting that that will not be the case, and that the European Court of Human Rights will be able to retain its independent status and continue to operate as if the provision had not been passed, but I think that that is pure Walter Mitty.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for putting together and tabling so many excellent amendments, which, if we had the time to discuss them, would indeed provide us with the line-by-line scrutiny that we are being denied. Does he agree that the Government do not seem to grasp that the simple question is: “Do you wish to be governed by elected people in Parliament, whom you can sack, and from whom you can get a different answer following a general election, or do you wish to be governed by unelected people on the continent whom you cannot sack, and from whom you will never get a different answer?” Is not that the issue?
It is the issue, and the point needs to be repeated over and over. I believe that there are Members on the Labour and Liberal Democrat Benches who believe in that, because their own parties evolved from, or came from, the fight in the 19th century for the very rights that we are now taking away from them. It is astonishing that a vague application of general principles, through the European Court of Justice, should be allowed to be a substitute for people’s right to choose who they want to vote for, and to choose the Government under whom they want to live.
We are always being told that we have to listen to what that European Court says. Opinion 2/94 of 28 March 1996 says that accession to the ECHR would
“entail a substantial change in the present Community system for the protection of human rights in that it would entail the entry of the Community into a distinct international institutional system as well as integration of all the provisions of the Convention into the Community legal order”—
end of story. That relates to a European Court of Justice case. There is no argument about that. As many Conservative Members have rightly said in their extremely good contributions, the European Court of Justice has the last say—and the last laugh.
I give way to the Liberal Democrat, because he always amuses me.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I cannot tell him how much fun I have listening to him. Has he considered the European Court of Justice’s Internationale Handelsgesellschaft ruling of 1970, in which it was decided that fundamental rights formed part of the general principles of Community law that the ECJ was obliged to uphold? That is basically exactly what is written in article 6(3).
The only reason Handelsgesellschaft, together with Costa and a series of other cases that I could quote to the hon. Gentleman, who obviously does not have all his cases in front of him, has any applicability whatever to this House and to the people of the country, including my voters, is because of sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act 1972. I address that issue in my new clause 6. The Government have said that they do not want the charter to apply to this country. Although they go in for a lot of weasel words about opt-outs and the rest of it, that is their bottom line, and they said as much during the Convention. The reality is that there is only one way to extract oneself from the labyrinth, or leviathan, of the European Court of Justice, from which there is no appeal, which is not elected, and which lays down principles through the acquis communautaire, with which we have to comply because of sections 2 and 3: to use the formula,
“Notwithstanding . . . the European Communities Act 1972”.
I would like to press on to other matters, and then I should like to come back to the issue of how the unity found among Conservative Members could best be achieved by others.
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
I shall certainly give way to my friend—my hon. Friend.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who is very generous and knowledgeable, as ever. He decries the European Court of Justice for not being elected. I understand that point. Does he accept that the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords of the United Kingdom is not elected, either?
Indeed, but the difference is that there is a way of dealing with the judgments that come out of the House of Lords—enacting legislation and putting matters right. I am delighted that the hon. Gentleman walked into that bear trap. The proposition that I put to the Committee is that we should insist on the supremacy of Parliament to rectify decisions that are taken on behalf of our electors. He is the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West. I doubt very much whether the debate will be reported in any of his local newspapers, which is a great pity, but if his electors knew that the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, who is the successor of my old friend Nick Budgen, would prefer to have decisions taken on their behalf by the Court of Justice rather than by themselves, he might not be in his present position very long. However, he can rest assured that, as I have said on a previous occasion, the best way to keep a secret is to make a speech in the House of Commons. The hon. Gentleman, my good friend, will therefore understand that he is trespassing on sensitive territory.
The Government were explicit and clear about the Human Rights Act 1998. The Lord Chancellor at the time made it clear in his speeches that the sovereignty of the United Kingdom was not affected by the Human Rights Act and that we could legislate inconsistently with it if we wanted to do so. Lord Hoffmann, in a famous case called Simms v. O’Brien, made it crystal clear in a House of Lords decision that if Parliament decided to do so it could in every material respect amend or repeal that Act. The Lord Chancellor of the time made that clear as well.
That is not the same as the question that applies to the European Court of Justice, which is why I was so keen to get on the record my concern that the European Court of Justice will effectively subsume—as it was expressed in the decision of the Court of Justice—the legal order of the European convention on human rights. It may apply the principles, but that is typical of the doublespeak of a kind that I came across in a very interesting book, which some people will recall: “Nineteen Eighty-Four” by George Orwell.
In the book Orwell deals with the biggest problem of all. He writes:
“In Oldspeak it is called, quite frankly, ‘reality control’.”
I started my speech by saying that I thought we were moving into virtual reality. We are going back to “Nineteen Eighty-Four” in the field of reality control. Orwell goes on:
“In Newspeak it is called doublethink, though doublethink comprises much else as well.
Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them.”
We are dealing with the concept that there are fundamental principles that are part and parcel of the European convention on human rights, but the doublethink comes from saying, “Those are the principles, but that is not the way that they are going to be applied.” They will be applied another way, under the aegis of the treaty of Lisbon and the general principles of the Union’s law, as set out in article 6(3). All the abstruse debate, none of which will get into the press or be discussed in the media, is about one simple problem—that is, that the people of this country are being profoundly deceived by the idea that this Bill is innocuous and will not have a dramatic effect on their daily lives, but it will.
I listened to the earlier debate, in which the Government claimed that, although these proposals would make no difference at all, they were still bringing them in because they had to do both. Is that ability to hold two ideas at the same time an example of doublethink?
It is not only doublethink, but—if I may, somewhat presumptuously, add a little bit to George Orwell—double cross. That is all part of the problem. There is an assumption that, because nobody is going to listen to any of these debates and because the Benches are so empty, this does not matter. It matters very much indeed, however. The European Scrutiny Committee—on which I have the honour to sit with my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr. Clappison) and others who are in the Chamber tonight—has done this country a service by revealing the truth, which the Government cannot dispute. I shall be fascinated to hear how the Minister for Europe responds to the debate, because he knows that as this process progresses, and as the curve begins to come back to reality, this will catch up with the Government, just as the working time directive did under our own Government.
My hon. Friend is making an extremely convincing case. On his point about the increasing effects of the treaty on our everyday lives, should we not see the operation of the charter and the European Court of Justice in conjunction with the increasing competence of the European Union? For example, the treaty will enable such increases to happen in the fields of judicial and home affairs and in many other areas as well. As the reach of European Union law and European Union action are increased, by the same token will not the reach of the European Court of Justice be extended, as well as its effect on people’s everyday lives?
My hon. Friend is completely right; this is an evolving dynamic. New rights are being created by these provisions, although that is denied by the Government. Every time the European Union accumulates functions, it claims that this does not involve the creation of new rights. In 1972, we agreed to go into a thing called the European Community, but the accumulation of functions since then has changed the dynamic. Similarly, if one were to have spoken about the need for democratic reform in 1848, it would not have been the same as talking about democracy in 1888, 1928 or 1948. To go back to my earlier analogy about the atom, we have now started to move into a quark-like environment in which we are actually going backwards. Our democracy is being devoured in this new virtual reality that is being created. People need to think hard about this.
In our earlier debate, the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr. MacShane) was talking about the great 19th century reformers. I do not want to make a big issue of it, but it so happens that one member of my family, John Bright, fought tenaciously and successfully for the right of the man in the street to have the vote. Every single person in the country would support that now, but there was huge resistance to it in those days. Those rights were established within the then Liberal party—not this completely vacuous, insipid abstraction called the Liberal Democrat party today—which, in those days, actually fought for people’s rights. People now talk about rights but they do not act to achieve them. That is the problem.
I suggest that the hon. Gentleman is demonstrating the doublethink that he earlier decried, and I will explain that. He quite rightly said that democracy evolves over time, and he gave the examples of 1848 and the achievement of universal adult male suffrage. The achievement of the vote for women happened in my mother’s lifetime. However, he then said that he wanted to wind democracy back to 31 December 1971. He is absolutely right to say that it is an evolving dynamic. Democracy changes, and the European Court of Justice is subject to a democratic process, just as the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords is. It is simply a different democratic process. These things are evolving.
I am sorry, but the hon. Gentleman fails to understand the point of principle that I am making, which is, very simply, that elections matter more than judicial judgments. That is my main point.
I should get ahead a little, because others definitely want to speak.
I should like to touch on how the European Court of Justice has operated, on the interaction in our constitution between the decisions taken in the House and those of the Court itself, and on what we can do about it. There is a world of difference between saying that we want to be able to legislate for ourselves and facing up to the fact that that presents certain constitutional problems in the light of the European Communities Act 1972. However, before I get to that, and because my main concern is about the rights of the people of this country to have the vote and to be able to use it properly, I should like to refer to chapter 5 of the charter. It talks about citizens’ rights, and mentions the
“Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament”,
the
“Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections”,
and so on. There is no reference to the right to vote to uphold the democracy of the individual member states according to their constitutional orders; this is to do with the European Union’s citizenship. In an intervention, I made a point about the Lisbon treaty. Whereas at the moment, citizens’ rights complement the rights of the citizens in the individual member states, the treaty says that those former rights will be in addition to the latter ones, not complementary to them. That makes a substantial difference. I do not want to labour the point, but a new citizenship is being created. It fills in the gaps about which I remember complaining to my Government during the proceedings on the Maastricht treaty. I vividly remember that that treaty said that, as has been developed by the dynamics of other treaties since, the citizens’ rights will be subject to such rights, powers and duties as shall be developed in due course.
Given that the hon. Gentleman is introducing this debate and speaking as if from the Front Bench, and given the references that he keeps making to the Maastricht treaty, can he say whether he—and therefore his party—regrets the Maastricht treaty?
As I voted against it more often than any other Member of Parliament, my answer is yes, I certainly do. It was a fundamental and dreadful mistake. I also happen to believe that we have moved on since then and that the Conservative party is united in opposition to the Lisbon treaty. As far as I am concerned, everything is moving extremely well in the right direction. The hon. Gentleman will find that the problems he has just identified in this treaty—he did that by referring to the Maastricht treaty, which is part of it—will hit his party very hard on the head in due course. However, we will leave that one until later.
In the United Kingdom courts, case law is extremely important in respect of whether we are able to exclude ourselves, as the Government claim they want us to be able to do, from the charter of fundamental rights. There are Labour Members who would like the charter to apply, but we Conservatives do not want it to apply to the United Kingdom. I should like to touch on a number of important cases that need to be taken into account. The first is Macarthys Ltd v. Smith, on which the famous Lord Denning sat. He said:
“Thus far I have assumed that our Parliament, whenever it passes legislation, intends to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty. If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act—with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision in it—or intentionally of acting inconsistently with it—and says so in express terms—then I should have thought that it would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament.”
That could not be clearer. According to that case and that of Garland v. British Rail Engineering, which were both House of Lords cases, and the case of the metric martyrs—Thoburn v. Sunderland city council—the only way we could exclude ourselves from the application of the law of the European Union, which would include this charter on the basis of the analysis of the European Scrutiny Committee and my own and many other legal authorities’ assertions and judgments, would be by putting in a provision with the phrase:
“Notwithstanding…the European Communities Act 1972”.
I understand the problem that some people have with the fact that those words appear to invade the acquis communautaire, but I also know that we are committed to the idea of maintaining economic competitiveness, and we have statements to the effect that we will exclude ourselves, once again, from the provisions generally described as the social chapter or the social charter. The bottom line is that there are many provisions, including the working time directive, from which we would want to exclude the United Kingdom in our vital national interests.
It is important to bear in mind the fact that there is only one way of achieving this, on all the analyses that have ever been put forward with any serious purpose. In the famous Factortame case, we got stuck, in relation to the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, by not including the words:
“Notwithstanding…the European Communities Act 1972”.
As Lord Bridge said in his judgment, the British Government decided in 1972 that they would agree voluntarily to accept the arrangements for the European Union under sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, and therefore, because they had agreed to it voluntarily, unless and until they were either to repeal or amend it, it was for all practical purposes the duty of the senior court in the United Kingdom, the House of Lords, to strike down that Act. So in the pursuance of a European Union policy and a judgment of the European Court of Justice, they struck down an Act of Parliament that had been passed by this House. That is a very serious matter. If we and the Government were properly and truly united on not wanting the charter of fundamental rights to apply to the United Kingdom, we would have to apply the same formula in order to achieve it.
We have reached a very important moment. We have an opportunity to take the steps, without weasel words and by being direct, to sort this matter out as the Bill progresses. We have this stage now and a further stage to come, and the House of Lords in due course. However, there is a problem, which I do not want to exaggerate but just to mention. I hope that the European Scrutiny Committee in the House of Lords—I say this with great respect to some very eminent people—in no way ends up, in the report that is coming out quite soon, disagreeing with what the European Scrutiny Committee has said in the House of Commons. I could go into this at greater length, but my concerns are considerable. There is by convention in this House a doctrine of comity, and it would be a great shame if we were to find that a serious disagreement emerged on the application of the principle that I have just enunciated.
All the material dealt with by other Members in the earlier debate about the way in which the European Scrutiny Committee handled the matter so expertly boils down to this matter, which is why it is essential that we remove the application of the charter by the effective words in my new clause. The conclusion of the European Scrutiny report states:
“It is clear that the Government accepts that the Charter will be legally binding, and it has stated that the Protocol is not an opt-out. Since the Protocol is to operate subject to the UK’s obligations under the Treaties, it still seems”—
we have been through this before—
“doubtful to us that the Protocol has the effect that the courts of this country will not be bound by interpretations of measures of Union law given by the ECJ and based on the Charter. If the ECJ gives a ruling in a case arising outside the UK on a measure which also applies in the UK, the duty to interpret the measure in accordance with that ruling arises, not under the Charter, but under the UK’s other Treaty obligations. Nothing in the Protocol appears to excuse the UK from this obligation.”
The report goes on to say:
“In our view, the only way of ensuring that the Charter does not affect UK law in any way is to make clear, as we have already suggested, that the Protocol takes effect ‘notwithstanding the Treaties or Union law generally’.”
It then says that that has been done in the context of the acquisition of property in Denmark and in respect of the Irish constitution, but
“it has not been made in respect of the Charter.”
The Government, therefore, stand condemned for not doing their job properly. In reality, the only way in which the Government can achieve their objectives of excluding this charter from the law of the United Kingdom is by adopting the wording in my new clause 6. It says, in a nutshell, that notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972, nothing in the charter shall have effect in UK law, and it effectively also says that that provision should be binding on our judiciary. I say that because I believe absolutely and implicitly in this House. The only way we can deal with the essential question of maintaining its supremacy in relation to the charter, let alone the national obligations that would arise later, would be by doing what I suggest. As a final point, during the course of discussion, we may be able to find a means of wrapping up all my points on the way the treaty operates in relation to the UK. This is a hugely important issue. We are at a watershed—a point of no return. This is the Rubicon for the United Kingdom.
I have not quite made up my mind what I am going to do at this juncture. If I had the privilege of being able to move my new clause, I would do so. I am conscious of the fact that these are hugely important questions, and I look to those on my Front Bench to consider them because I have no faith in new clause 12. We may be able to come to some understanding about that in due course, but at this juncture the most important thing is that we retain the supremacy of this Parliament not only over national parliamentary matters and the Bill of Rights, but over the charter of fundamental rights. We should do something about that definitively during the course of these proceedings.
I follow the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) with some trepidation. I have sympathy with some of his points. He has made almost a lifetime’s study of European institutions and I respect that amount of learning.
I do not agree with the hon. Gentlemen’s reflections on the state of the national Parliament and the national Government. Decisions that affect the daily lives of our co-citizens cannot be controlled totally by a national Parliament, given the way in which economic and social powers are subject to global, certainly multinational, forces. With some reluctance but also realism, I accept that there must be a European transnational dimension to our politics. Without that, we cannot attempt to control the forces that are now at play, or prevent them from being further unleashed. Those forces can contribute to the general welfare of mankind if properly controlled, and for those reasons, one accepts that there must be transnational co-operation between Parliaments and Governments.
Does not the hon. Gentleman accept that 13 articles of the charter derive at least partly from interpretations of ECJ case law, which it establishes and can control in future? Does he believe that we should hand over to European institutions such as the ECJ that amount of control over law making in this country? Does he believe that his constituents want that?
If the hon. Gentleman has listened to any of the points I have made on previous days, he knows perfectly well that that is not my position. I shall deal with the ECJ shortly.
I have found the experience of our discussions on Europe frustrating because many of my hon. Friends and perhaps others want a proper debate about the way in which the labour market will be regulated and our response to the economic forces that are now at play and appear to escape democracy’s power to control them. There is a sane Labour voice to be expressed and heard on that matter, but it has failed to be properly expressed and the Government have failed to respond to it.
As I said during our discussions on the programme motion, the Government tabled a series of debates on generic issues, which favour their slightly rose-tinted view of the treaty. I asked for—and I believed that I had been given an assurance—a proper debate. With no disrespect to you, Sir Alan, we have not yet secured it. I believe that that is down to the business managers. We therefore have to attempt obliquely to raise the issues that we want to discuss. We did so earlier today in the debate on human rights and now we are doing so through the amendments.
I want to consider amendment No. 203 briefly before reverting to the knotty problem of the ECJ. I shall tackle the latter by referring to the charter. It will be no surprise to anyone who has listened to my comments and those of my hon. Friends that I want to concentrate on chapter IV of the charter of fundamental rights. The Government are in an unusual, even extraordinary position of saying, on the one hand, that there is no opt-out—my hon. Friend the Minister for Europe said that in the previous debate when we exchanged ideas—and, on the other, claiming that, according to their interpretation, the charter will not extend to UK law. On the other hand, there is the anomalous position of title IV, which is entitled “Solidarity”, but which for some reason a clause in the protocol says,
“for the avoidance of doubt”,
will create no new justiciable rights in the United Kingdom beyond those Acts of Parliament that are already agreed or which will be agreed in future.
The phrase “for the avoidance of doubt” strikes me as anomalous, given that the Government’s position is that there is no doubt about the rest of the charter. The charter is not meant to create any further justiciable rights in the United Kingdom beyond those enacted by Parliament. We have heard the Government say that on a number of occasions. If there was no doubt about that, why was it necessary to include the phrase “for the avoidance of doubt”? There must be some doubt about the rest. Having listened to comments by hon. Members from all parts of the House, I have some doubts about whether the rest of the charter could create additional justiciable rights.
However, I want to focus on title IV and the signal that it sends the European Court of Justice. We are in an anomalous position, whereby the rights contained in title IV have been distinguished, by the phrase to which I have referred, from all the other rights in the charter of fundamental rights. We have to ask why that clause was added to title IV. If that was not done simply to appease the business lobby, which was extremely vigorous and close to the former Prime Minister, one has to ask how title IV is substantially distinct from the other titles in the charter.
I suggest that the inclusion of that provision creates an asymmetry, because when the charter and its implications come to be analysed and judged upon by the European Court, it will frequently have to strike a balance among the various rights contained within the charter. In striking those balances, legal minds will obviously be brought into play, but it is hard to escape the conclusion that some extremely fine judgments will be made that will stray from the purely legal and into the political. Indeed, the ECJ has already strayed into that area in making political judgments—it is not for me to ask about the political control through which the legislative processes of the EU can exercise some influence upon the ECJ, save to say it seems to be extremely limited.
In striking a balance among the various rights contained in the charter as a whole, the Court might be minded to reflect on the fact that the United Kingdom and Polish Governments have chosen to point a finger at title IV, which contains a series of fundamental rights that I would have thought few in the House would deny, including the right of workers to collective representation and, if necessary, the right to take strike action. There are many others, too, which are there for everybody to see. When the ECJ makes judgments in industrial or other disputes, it will be somewhere in the minds of the justices that the UK and Polish Governments have pointed a finger directly at the rights under title IV and said that they are not the same as any of the others, since those Governments have taken the step of indicating that the rights under that title will not create any additional justiciable rights in their countries.
Why was that done? As has been said, when the then Prime Minister came to the House and mentioned all the other achievements that he had gained, many of which were very welcome, he totally omitted to mention title IV.
In subsequent debates in the House, including today’s debate, the Government have failed to articulate any reason for title IV and all the rights contained in it to be treated differently from all the other rights in the charter. I asked the Secretary of State why that should be. He is currently collecting his papers: he is probably about to leave the Chamber very quickly, but that does not matter, because his reply is in Hansard for all to see. He said that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, our hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, East (Bridget Prentice), would give the explanation. I sat on the edge of my seat, as did my hon. Friends and, probably, Members in all parts of the Chamber. I listened very carefully to what was said by the Under-Secretary, but no explanation was forthcoming.
My hon. Friend the Minister for Europe, who is now in his place, told me that he would give an account of why the exemption was made, but when I asked him to summarise what he would say, he developed a very sound critique of amendment No. 203, tabled by me and signed by a number of my right hon. and hon. Friends. I must tell him that that is not what we are looking for. We are simple souls, and we want an explanation of why the Government decided to treat title IV and the articles therein differently from all the others. The ECJ has already created a legal precedent: it has already decided to prioritise some rights over others. My hon. Friends and I referred to them earlier.
The right of any EU company to establish itself anywhere in the EU is clearly one of the fundamental rights. It is in title II, as is the right of any company in the EU to provide services anywhere else in the EU. The ECJ has already determined that those two rights have priority over the rights of workers to collective representation. That was before the Government did what they did, but I can only imagine that what they have done will accelerate, exaggerate and possibly exacerbate any future decisions when the Court makes finely balanced and, I would argue, ultimately political judgments about the various rights in the treaty. That will often be at the expense of the ordinary people whom we seek to represent—increasingly so, because companies increasingly operate in a multinational framework.
I have looked carefully at the amendment which stands in my name and that of many of my colleagues—and which, incidentally, is supported by every trade union affiliated to our distinguished party—and I have no doubt that the issues I have raised resonate far beyond this place. Certainly they will affect the Minister’s constituency and his constituents as much as mine. Having looked carefully at the amendment, however, I do not think it achieves exactly what I wanted to achieve. I have discussed the matter with colleagues, and when the time is appropriate I shall not press the amendment to a vote. However, I hope that the Minister will be able finally to unlock the secret closet containing the notes that explain the curious and anomalous situation in which we now find ourselves.
Tonight’s debate, like many of these debates, is about where power should rest. It is about democracy itself, especially in the context of the excellent amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr. Cash). I should like the amendment to go a little further, because I should like to see the sovereignty of a Parliament clearly reaffirmed and re-established in the laws that we enact when trying to tackle this rather difficult and refractory treaty.
This Parliament made itself great over many centuries because campaigners of all parties and of none—Whig and Tory, Labour and Liberal and Conservative—came together so often to assert the right of elected representatives in this House of Commons to make the laws and take the right decisions, and to face their electors in turn on the hustings so that their work could be adjudged good or bad and the necessary decisions could be made about the futures of MPs individually and of Governments who had exercised the powers of this House.
There have been two great movements. There has been a great movement over many decades to ensure that we reach the point where all adults have the precious advantage of the vote, so that they can choose those elected representatives and decide whether to remove them when they fail to do their jobs in the imagined way. The other great movement was to ensure that the powers were in this Chamber and in Parliament as a whole, so that here the laws could be chosen, here they could be amended, and here they could be struck down. What the Government are asking us to do tonight is suspend that right, in perpetuity perhaps, and certainly for a very long time—there is no fixed time for this treaty—so that in future such decisions may in many areas be made by unelected people in a European court. They may, as far as the British people are concerned, in future be made by unelected people sitting in Council chambers, often meeting in private and reaching decisions in private.
I am following the right hon. Gentleman’s points with great care, but I am puzzled that he seems to ignore the fact that, ever since this country joined what was then the Common Market all those years ago, there has been primacy of European Union law as decided by the collective institutions of the EU and as interpreted by the European Court. The point he is making is simply an argument for the United Kingdom to withdraw from the EU. That is a perfectly respectable point of view, although I profoundly disagree with it. Is that what he is asking this House to decide, and is that the official policy of the Opposition?
The right hon. Lady is a little cleverer than that: she knows that that is not the official position of the Opposition party, and nor is it the case that I happen to be making at present. Her history is wrong, of course: we did not give all those powers away at the beginning when we joined something called the Common Market in common parlance, or the European Economic Community as set out in the original treaty. That was not the deal offered to the British people when they last had a vote on this issue in 1975. It so happens that I voted “no”. I have always since accepted the verdict of the British people. I am sure that they voted for a common market, and that is what I would like them to have. They voted for co-operation and collaboration while our country retained its veto. What I dislike about the deal under discussion—the clauses before us tonight highlight this—is that our veto has been given away needlessly, when the Government had the veto to veto surrendering the veto; the Government just had to say “no”, and they would not have had so many law-making powers brought in by the back door by this treaty and this proposed legislation.
I, like my party, say that this deal is many steps too far—it gives away far too much of the power rightly accumulated by Parliament over the centuries to do good for the British people and to respond to their will and their wishes. The right hon. Lady has in a previous intervention in our debates today come up with a clever argument. She says that the magic of this particular block of work is that at last the EU will have to submit itself to the human rights Court and the human rights convention that many states in Europe have signed. What she omits, however, to tell the House in that very partial interpretation is that that in no way detracts from the power of the European Court of Justice to keep on advancing its power at the expense of the British people and their elected representatives in this Parliament assembled.
The logic of the argument we have heard from the Labour Benches is as follows: as we have given some power away already, we might as well give the rest of the power away. Does my right hon. Friend agree that that is the Government’s position?
That is clearly the Government’s position. They have shown total surrender in the negotiations over the treaty as a whole. The Government have told us again tonight that they wish the large number of principles and rights set out in the document before us to be adopted as part of our law code. Worse still, they will accept not one but two European Courts standing in judgment over us. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr. Cash), I am more worried about the European Court of Justice, because it has a long tradition of furthering a federal agenda. In case after case that Court is determining that there should be more power for law-making and decision in the European Union and less in the member states.
Is that not why this House and the British people should approach this treaty with the greatest scepticism? They will recall the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986, which I voted against. Our right hon. and noble Friend Baroness Thatcher was assured that employment and the social contract would be outside the ECJ’s remit, but the ECJ took that area into its own power. Therefore, we should resist any Government attempt to hoodwink the British people into thinking that we should accept these assurances.
That is exactly right. The facts are stark. This Government have surrendered 10 times more vetoes than previous Governments. Some of us had reservations about surrendering some of those other vetoes, but they were at least surrendered in furtherance of the Common Market, for which people had voted in a referendum. That was why Baroness Thatcher decided to make those modest surrenders of power in the 1980s. Since then, this Government have given away massive rights, duties and powers that have nothing to do with the Common Market for which the British people voted.
Surely the right hon. Gentleman cannot believe that the modest changes in this treaty or in the Amsterdam and Nice treaties are comparable with the massive expansion of European competence in Baroness Thatcher’s Single European Act?
I suggest that the hon. Gentleman tries reading the different treaties. The Single European Act was, as its name describes, about market measures to try to promote a common market. I believe that a common market is created by having buyers and sellers and does not need nearly as much law as the European Union subsequently developed. The SEA was a very narrow area of work compared with a common foreign policy, a common army, a common defence policy, a common criminal justice policy, a common immigration policy, a president of Europe and a much-expanded Parliament, all of which have come under this Government’s watch.
At each point, the Government have claimed that they were not giving any real power away, that we would not notice the difference, that they had protected our interest and that the famous red lines were in place. We have heard all that nonsense, but we can see from the huge amount of work embedded in this revised treaty that massive powers were surrendered at Nice and Amsterdam, and that such a surrender is being proposed tonight in this crucial area of fundamental human rights.
We have been told by some Opposition and Labour Members that we do not value human rights or the very good principles embodied in parts of this text—but of course we value those things. We fight, and our predecessors fought, for those rights for the British people just as surely as the Labour party has often done in the past. We believe that those rights are best expressed in British law, in the English language and in a way that is answerable to the British people. We believe they have to stay like that, so that the British people can, through their elected representatives, change, amend and improve them as circumstances and time require.
This treaty is an inflexible, unaccountable and thoroughly undemocratic way of legislating. We are being asked to embody at one point in the long evolution of our national and European history, a set of principles that might make sense to some people now, but which are going to be extremely difficult to change. It will be impossible to change them in a democratic way in this Parliament, because the agreement of so many of other member states will be needed, as will a treaty amendment. As we can see, such an amendment is a complicated and difficult process.
We must amend these clauses and retain these powers that the Government wish to give away. We must restore the position that this Parliament makes these crucial decisions, so that we answer to our electors. We should live or die as politicians by how well we do and by whether we answer to our electors in the correct way.
It is a pleasure to follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr. Redwood) and I also congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) on introducing the debate and speaking so knowledgeably on the topic. As I have five minutes to speak, I hope that they will forgive me for concentrating on amendments Nos. 217, 228 and 229.
Amendment No. 217 would strike the charter of fundamental rights out of the treaty. I remind Labour Members that that would be in accordance with the Government’s policy until a few years ago. Tony Blair told the House after the Nice treaty was agreed:
“Our case is that it should not have legal status, and we do not intend it to. We will have to fight that case.”—[Official Report, 11 December 2000; Vol. 359, c. 354.]
The Government have now given up on that fight, and that was a mistake. As the European Scrutiny Committee has explained in its reports, the Government’s vaunted protocol would not stop the charter coming in through the back door as the European Court of Justice applies it to cases that come before it from other EU member states, with judgments that then become binding precedents for the whole EU, the United Kingdom included.
The right hon. Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz), in his glory days as the Minister for Europe, famously said that
“people will be able to bring it”—
the charter—
“up in the European Court of Justice just as if it was the Beano if they like. Nobody will be able to litigate with it”.
He failed to foresee that the Government’s policy would evolve into the complete opposite of that position.
Indeed, history teaches us that the more vehemently Ministers state their position, the likelier it is that the Government are about to undertake a U-turn. For example, the right hon. Member for Neath (Mr. Hain), as the Government’s lead negotiator on the EU constitution, asserted that
“there are real legal and practical problems linked to incorporation”—
of the charter into the constitution—
“which might lead to the European Court overturning UK law. There is absolutely no possibility of us agreeing to this”.
When he said that, it should have been a sign that in time the Government were set to do exactly that.
Paragraph 1 of new article 6 of the treaty would give the charter full legal force as it would have
“the same legal value as the Treaties”.
The rights listed in the charter cover everything from asylum to data protection to the right not to be tried twice for the same offence. Much of it, as a general statement of the kind of rights people ought to enjoy, is motherhood and apple pie. However, there is a world of legal difference between a general statement of political goals and a legally binding text. As I have said, the European Court of Justice would apply the charter to cases that come before it, and that would allow it a far wider degree of discretion in its judgments, in effect leading to yet more judge-made law. That is why the Government rightly spent so long opposing giving the charter legal force, and that is why those who are federally inclined see the charter as so important.
Talking of the federally inclined, I turn to the subject of the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrat MEP Andrew Duff, with whose views I strongly disagree but whose expertise on these matters I respect, has said that the charter
“is part of the process of federalising the EU. The consequence of the Charter installing a fundamental rights regime within the treaties is part of the federalising process, and I think everyone apart from the Brits seems to be quite clear about that.”
As Mr. Duff is the Liberal Democrat spokesman on constitutional affairs in the European Parliament, we must presume that that comment represents the official position of the Liberal Democrats. I am pleased, therefore, to put that on the record tonight.
The Government pray in aid their protocol, but as I said earlier, the European Scrutiny Committee has said that it is doubtful that the protocol will in the end stop EU judges enforcing the charter on cases that come to it from Britain. Amendment No. 228 is intended to remedy that failure by limiting the charter’s application, in other words to stop it coming in through the back door. If the opportunity arises, I wish to divide the House on that amendment.
For years, the Government opposed the suggestion that the charter should have any legal force. Then they admitted that it would have legal force, but Tony Blair assured us that we would have an opt-out. Then, under pressure, the Government admitted that they did not have an opt-out, only a clarification. Now, incredibly, Ministers are claiming that they never actually asked for an opt-out at all. The Government are, frankly, all over the place on this issue, yet the liberties of the British people are at stake. They should be honest with the people and with the House, and should not seek to press this matter. If they do, we will gladly vote against them.
I am delighted to have the opportunity to respond to this evening’s debate, albeit relatively briefly. I think that we have had a fascinating debate earlier this afternoon and on the amendments before us now.
We have had the chance to hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Hemsworth (Jon Trickett), and I will seek to find the key to unlock the hidden door a little later in my comments. We also heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, West (Ms Hewitt), who have been assiduous in their attendance and intervention in our proceedings on each and every day on which we have considered the Bill.
We also heard from, among others, the hon. Member for Rayleigh (Mr. Francois), with whom I am enjoying our daily—or nightly—debates. He made a good case in arguing for his amendments in his own terms, but what was missing from his comments was any discussion of what a Conservative Government would do. Once again, he has remained silent on the social chapter. He had the opportunity to put his views on the record, but he chose not to do so. His silence on withdrawal from the social chapter speaks volumes. Of course, he could intervene now to put the record straight. The hon. Gentleman also refused to say whether, in the event of a Conservative victory, a Conservative Government would seek to renegotiate the treaty and remove the charter from it—
I happily give way to the hon. Gentleman; I look forward to hearing what he has to say on the social chapter as well.
Very briefly, the Minister has been repeatedly asked by his own Back Benchers this evening to give answers on social policy, so will he satisfy them by providing an answer?
Simply refusing to respond to such points is not an approach that will get us through the rest of Committee proceedings.
We also heard a wide-ranging and passionate speech by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash), who spoke from his great experience on Europe gained over many decades. He also referred to the experience of 1848, and spoke passionately about the Soviet era. Let me gently say to him that he has always reminded me of a Conservative version of Leon Trotsky, a man of whom it was often said that he was so far-sighted in his predictions that none of them had yet come true. On Europe, that is indeed the case—[Interruption.] I happily give way.
There is also a very famous poet by the name of T. S. Eliot who said:
“Human kind
Cannot bear very much reality.”
That is also the problem of the Minister.
I would not wish to test your patience too much, Sir Alan, but it is absolutely certain that the hon. Gentleman will not be and would not be allowed to be airbrushed out of history in the way that others have in the past.
On amendment No. 84, the Government are clearly committed to the protection of human rights both in the EU and by the EU, but what is proposed would undermine that commitment. Removing the charter of fundamental rights from the scope of the Bill would not undermine the rights and principles as they already exist as a result of the European Court of Human Rights, the EU treaties, European Court of Justice case law or the traditions common to all member states. The principle that fundamental rights form part of Community law and apply to states when implementing that law is long established and reflects ECJ case law dating from 1970.
References to fundamental rights in the treaties are not new. The first reference to fundamental rights appeared in the preamble to the Single European Act, which the former Chancellor, the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke), previously described as the single greatest transfer of sovereignty in this nation’s history. That Single European Act provided that member states would
“work together to promote democracy on the basis of...fundamental rights recognised in the laws and constitutions of the Member States, in the ECHR and the European Social Charter”.
The Maastricht treaty included the first explicit reference to fundamental rights in the text of the treaties. That reference became article 6(2) of the treaty on European Union.
Removing the charter from the scope of the Bill would prevent UK citizens from using the charter as an accessible record of the rights that they enjoy as EU citizens, and which the citizens of all other member states would enjoy. The rights and principles in the charter are not new; it records rights, rather than creates them.
The Minister is now getting to something interesting. Is he not ashamed that there is so little time because of the ridiculous guillotine motion? Many Members cannot tease out these important points and have a proper debate on them. Will he give us more time?
That does not fall within the scope of the amendment. The matter has already been resolved by the House.
Will the Minister give way?
Not at the moment; I shall make some progress.
If the charter were removed from the scope of the Bill, someone in Ireland, France or any other member state would look to the charter as an accessible statement of their rights, while a UK citizen would have to trawl through a plethora of treaties, judgments, cases and agreements. Surely that would be an absurd position for us to place our citizens in.
Will the Minister give way?
Of course.
I will give way to the hon. Member for Hertsmere (Mr. Clappison). Then, if the hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Bone) is willing to be brief, I shall happily give way to him.
Is not the Minister advocating a recipe for frustration? When the UK citizen has gone through the rights, he will find that under the Government’s protocol he is unable to rely on them.
We have made it clear that the charter does not create new rights, but simply records existing rights. It is an amalgamation of existing rights from different sources.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, as our time is limited because of what the Government have done. At the beginning of our proceedings on the Bill, the Minister said that he would be flexible. Will he be flexible about tomorrow’s debate?
That is a matter for the usual channels. I will look forward to tomorrow’s debate to see how that is resolved.
Let me turn briefly to amendment No. 203. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Hemsworth that over the past seven years the conversation about Europe has been trapped in a vocabulary about red lines and protocol. We have often missed the human and social dimension of what it means to be British and European.
Across the European Union, 92 million citizens are economically inactive. That is the big economic and social challenge facing Europe today. As we pay such close attention to the treaty of Lisbon, we must also pay increasing attention to the agenda of Lisbon: providing jobs, restarting social mobility across the EU and moving increasing numbers of those 92 million people into work. Once we have resolved the treaties, red lines, protocols and all those issues, we must have a detailed, thorough discussion about the dynamic of what it means to be involved in a social Europe.
If we had sought on purpose to design a system over the past seven years that would disconnect the citizens of Europe from European structures, we could not have done a better job than we have. We did not choose to go through that process, but we have gone through it. The disconnection has undermined contemporary consent for what Europe can seek to achieve and the great deal of good that it can do on the international stage.
I accept the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hemsworth about the concerns of the trade union movement, which are regularly put to me and others. We have agreed with the TUC and others to continue the dialogue about the specific UK social dimension of Europe. That dialogue is only just beginning. We look forward to being involved in that with my hon. Friend and with other hon. Friends.
Arguments and debates about the treaty, the charter of fundamental rights and the direction of Europe are swirling around between parties and countries, but is not the real problem on Europe, and the real tragedy, that we have the only mainstream centre-right party in Europe that refuses to connect or debate and talks only the language of withdrawal?
My right hon. Friend is absolutely correct.
Will the Minister give way?
The hon. Gentleman will be allowed three or four minutes at the end to make his points. I hope that he accepts that that is a fair division of the limited time that we have left, and I shall make sure that I allow him that time.
Amendment No. 125 would remove the provision that the EU should aim to combat discrimination when it acts. Article 2 does not give the EU any new powers to legislate, but it complements the current specific powers of the Council, introduced at Amsterdam, to legislate to combat
“discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.”
If we were to accept the amendment, all that would be left of anti-discrimination measures would be article 8, which promotes equality between men and women only. That is important, but amendment No. 125 would remove all the efforts to combat discrimination that I set out a moment ago. That is a ridiculous and reactionary attitude to Europe, and the Government want nothing to do with it.
Amendment 129 would remove a simple restatement of the specific citizenship rights accorded to nationals of EU member states that have been part of the treaty since Maastricht. Opposition Members are resiling from that treaty in ever increasing numbers, but the treaty under consideration tonight would not affect the specific articles on the rights of citizens. I therefore encourage the hon. Member for Stone to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
I wish to allow the hon. Member for Stone time to sum up his arguments. He claimed that things were moving in the right direction for Conservative party policy on Europe, but as my right hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Mr. MacShane) noted, the Opposition are more obsessed about, and more isolated in, Europe than at any time in their history. If we were to accept the Opposition amendments, the direction in which we were moving would be towards the EU’s exit door.
In the concluding moments of the debate, I should like to say that the Conservative party is completely united on these matters—[Interruption.] I listened to the speeches from the Government Back Benches—they were extremely well delivered—and I was struck by how divided Labour Members are in comparison with us. We insist on democracy and on the right of this country’s voters rather than the right of the ECJ to make decisions. That remains paramount, and we shall pursue our proposals. Although I shall not press amendment No. 84 to a vote, I shall seek to vote on amendment No. 228.
Finally, Sir Francis Jacobs, a member of the ECJ, made a seminal speech about the interaction between the European convention and the charter. He said that the rights in the treaty were said to be based on the rights guaranteed on the convention, but that there were intriguing differences of wording. He also said that the treaty’s scope was considerably wider than the rights protected in the European convention.
The reality is that there is overlap between the treaty and the convention. They are different, and new rights are being proposed. The Government stand condemned for what they have said today.
Do I understand that the hon. Gentleman wishes to seek leave to withdraw amendment No. 84?
I thought that I said so, Sir Alan. In the circumstances, the answer is yes.
It is customary to use those as the last words in these circumstances. I take it that they are the hon. Gentleman’s last words?
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: No. 228, page 1, line 12, after ‘excluding’, insert—
‘(i) the Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and the United Kingdom—
(a) Preamble, tenth paragraph stating that references in the Protocol to the operation of specific provisions of the Charter are strictly without prejudice to the operation of other provisions of the Charter; and
(b) Preamble, twelfth paragraph stating that the Protocol is without prejudice to other obligations devolving upon Poland and the United Kingdom under the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Union law generally; and (ii) ’.—[Mr. Francois.]
Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee proceeded to a Division.
I ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate the delay in the Aye Lobby.
To report progress and ask leave to sit again. —[Mr. Roy.]
Committee report progress; to sit again tomorrow.
On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Earlier this evening, on a point of order, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs. May) intervened in the debate on the European Union treaty to claim that, in December, I had held a meeting in my Department to discuss press inquiries about the meetings between my hon. Friend the Member for Tooting (Mr. Khan) and Babar Ahmed in Woodhill prison. That is not correct. I was aware, in December, of press inquiries from a newspaper concerning visits by my hon. Friend the Member for Tooting to Babar Ahmed, but at no stage before last Saturday was I aware of any information that the press inquiries concerned any covert recording or anything like that. I confirm what I told the House. There are of course a wide range of other questions about this matter. That is the purpose of the inquiry that I announced to this House yesterday, when I also said that a statement would be made to the House once the report of the inquiry had been received and considered.
rose—
Order. There cannot be further points of order. The right hon. Gentleman asked leave to raise a point of order in response to one raised earlier by the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs. May). If this matter were to go any further, it would become a statement upon which there could be wider questions. I do not believe that it is for the convenience of the House that that be done now. These matters can be pursued on another occasion.
Order. I have said that there should be no further points of order. May I ask all hon. Members who are not staying for the debate on local government in Wiltshire to leave the Chamber as quickly and quietly as possible? There should be no disturbing conversations.
Local Government
I beg to move,
That the draft Wiltshire (Structural Change) Order 2008, which was laid before this House on 8th January, be approved.
We are tonight considering the draft order for the establishment of the new unitary Wiltshire council. The order implements the unitary proposal that Wiltshire county council itself has made. This is a proposal that the democratically elected, democratically led and locally accountable council has drawn up. It is a proposal on which the council sought the views of local people and the agencies that it deals with in the area, and one that the council has chosen to put forward to the Secretary of State as the form of local governance that best meets the needs of Wiltshire today.
The Minister has just made an assertion that the county council consulted local people. Will he give us an indication of how that consultation took place? Local people do not believe that they were consulted at all.
When we launched the process in October 2006, we made it clear that whether councils submitted proposals was a matter for them. Having been clear about the five criteria that we would use to test any proposal, we rightly left it to the councils to decide how best to seek the views in their local areas. That is what Wiltshire county council and other councils that submitted proposals did. The important and distinctive—
May I finish this sentence? The distinctive and different thing about this process is that, unlike previous restructurings of local government, it is not prescribed from the centre, nor was its blueprint drawn up or designed from the centre. I say again that the starting point for the order before us was a proposal prepared and submitted by Wiltshire county council because it believes that it represents the best form of governance for the county in the future.
I want to press the point about consultation a little; after all, this is the first of a number of such orders that we must consider, and a principle is involved. As the five criteria are described conjunctively—the word “and” is used, so we must assume that all five must be satisfied—what, if any, minimum evidential standard is there for any authority in such a position to demonstrate that the criterion of commanding broad support is met in respect of the public and stakeholders?
The question of broad support is a judgment that we made on the evidence submitted to us. Originally, for each of the 16 proposals—some of which we did not believe met the criteria—the question was not whether there was a majority of this or that set of views in favour or not. The purpose of the criterion was to allow us to come to a judgment about whether we could be reasonably confident that, should the proposal go ahead, there would be sufficiently broad support for it to be successful. That was the essence of the criterion of broad support—and, indeed, of the other criteria.
Has the Minister taken any account of the MORI poll conducted among Wiltshire residents in 2006? I suspect not, as there is no reference to it in his summary of consultations published in November last year. Does he not think that he should have taken account of that fairly objective assessment of opinion in Wiltshire?
There was indeed a MORI survey—it was an opinion survey, not a poll. That was an element of the evidence and information that we took, and to which we had regard, to come to a judgment about the level of support. Some thought it important and placed great store by it, but others had concerns about the nature of the supporting information and the nature of the questions asked.
From memory, what was clear was that 78 per cent. of those who responded in that particular sample wanted the councils to work much more closely together; they clearly saw the weaknesses that often exist in two-tier areas. The balance of opinion in respect of a unitary Wiltshire was about 62 per cent. against and 30 per cent. in favour. However, in the end it was an opinion survey—an element of the evidence that we took into account when we considered whether support was sufficiently broad for us to be confident that, were we to move ahead with the proposal, we could make it work.
I have a factual question, to which I hope the Minister can give me a factual answer. He will remember that a paper called “Invitation to all councils in England to submit proposals for unitary status” was sent out. Paragraph 3.5 of that original document states:
“it will be necessary for any proposal to have support from a range of key partners, stakeholders and service users/citizens.”
When the results were published, the words “service users/citizens” had disappeared. Furthermore, the notes provided by the Minister’s Department for this debate refer to the invitation process and say that one of the criteria was supported by
“a broad cross section of partners and stakeholders”.
Once again, the citizens have disappeared. Why did they disappear when he realised that they were going to vote against him?
The citizens did not disappear. Our approach was to look at the range of support that might be expressed for the proposal that was submitted by Wiltshire. There was indeed a response from the public, the majority of it in campaign form. That was part of the representations that we took into account, and we published the summary of responses back in July. There were probably more people in favour of maintaining district councils and not moving to a unitary council than there were in favour of a unitary council. Nevertheless, about a third of the public who offered a view could see the merit of a unitary Wiltshire and would like that to happen.
Let me return to a point that I made earlier. The question about broad support did not relate simply to whether there was a majority view in favour—that was not the judgment that we were trying to come to. We were trying to assess the strength, credibility and potential value of a proposal that the council itself submitted to us in response to the invitation that we issued more generally.
I have listened carefully to what the Minister has said about assessing opinion. Can he tell us, so that it is on the record, whether, on balance, the view represented to him as collected by the county council and the four affected district councils was clearly in favour of or against the proposition? Can he also put on the record whether the Government took any steps to authenticate that view so as to form any view of their own on the balance of opinion of the residents and council tax payers of Wiltshire?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for taking such an interest in what has been going on in Wiltshire. I said a moment ago that it was a matter for the proposing local authority how it chose to seek views and to represent them as part of its proposal. To answer his question directly, we as a Government Department did not undertake any direct opinion polling or checking of residents’ views on the proposal. It was never our intention to do so, and I do not think that anyone believed that we would.
The Minister appears to be waving this off as if the Government are not supposed to be taking any view on it and are just blithely accepting the say-so of the county council, yet they set the criteria against which these applications should be judged, and clearly criterion No. 2 falls almost by his own admission. He cannot wash his hands of this. At the end of the day, he is making the decision and needs to be responsible for it.
I am not quite sure what point the hon. Gentleman is trying to make. I have clearly stated that from the outset of this process we had five tests that we required any proposal to meet and to pass. Wiltshire’s proposal was one of those that we received. We gave an indication of that in March and confirmed it in July. One of the tests involved a broad range of support sufficient to give us the confidence that were we to give this the go-ahead it would have a reasonable chance of succeeding.
I am sorry to trouble the Minister again, and I am grateful to him for his patience in giving way, but this is an important principle and it will recur. As five criteria are proposed, can he give us an indication of on whom the onus of meeting those criteria rests? Secondly, what are the criteria for saying whether or not the test is passed? Are the same criteria used in relation to every such proposal, or do they vary? What standard must be met by a proposing authority to show that its proposal passes the test?
I have been getting used to the hon. Gentleman in the short time he has been in his shadow role. He brings a lawyerly turn of phrase to the debate. The criteria were set as a test that would help us and others come to a judgment about whether the proposal could succeed, whether it has a reasonable chance of doing so and whether we should give it the go-ahead. The extent and the nature of the evidence that any proposing authority submitted in order to meet those tests clearly varied. Some failed; others that passed would have gone about their task by meeting those five tests and demonstrating that they could meet them in different ways, and they did so.
With the exception of some of the financial analysis that we did, where it was possible to subject numbers to a test, a matter of judgment was inevitably involved. That is the judgment that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and I, as elected politicians charged with this job, made. We made that judgment on the back of consistent evidence, clearly set out in published criteria, and we made it in a process that gave all interested parties, particularly councils, ample opportunity to submit their views, to know the views of those arguing for an alternative, and to offer a counter-argument or counter-evidence if they wished to do so. We weighed all that together with any other representations that we received during the process in coming to our final decision.
I presume that there is some underpinning evidence that unitary authorities perform better than two-tier systems. As someone who has always felt that two-tier systems—in my case, three-tier—are completely misunderstood by the general public, I do not see why the Government do not realise that there is a need for consistency throughout the country. They should encourage all areas to seek sensible and rational provision of local government. Then we would not need debates like this because there would be clarity, which I am sure the general public would welcome.
My hon. Friend is right, and because he follows such matters closely he will be able to track this back not just to the invitation we issued in October 2006, which reflected our belief that unitary local government was a way of removing many of the weaknesses he mentions in two-tier areas, but to the White Paper that we published on local government, which set out clearly the general case for unitary local government. He is right about the weaknesses: people are often confused about what different councils at different levels do. Often, services can be fragmented, leadership can be in competition and confused, and there is a degree of duplication, inefficiency and a lack of co-ordination.
Come to Gloucestershire.
My hon. Friend no doubt speaks from his own experience. Our approach has been set out for some time, and it was reflected in the invitation to those authorities that wanted unitary status.
Before I move on, two or three Members have said, “The county council submitted the proposal. Surely you didn’t just take the evidence that the county council submitted to support its proposal.”
The answer is that of course we did not. That is why we invited a wide range of consultees to give their views, especially about the way in which the county council’s proposal stood up to the criteria that we established.
Despite what the right hon. and learned Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) said earlier, paragraph 5.10 of the consultation did not include the question of citizens. It dealt with the broad range of support that we sought and made it clear that it was up to each proposing council to consult local people when they felt that that was an important part of their case.
I intervene diffidently because I am halfway towards supporting the Minister’s position and I perhaps take a different view from my Wiltshire colleagues on the subject. I am puzzled by one part of his argument. If he wants to show that the people of Wiltshire, as demonstrated by any body, are strongly in favour of the proposal, will he explain why the MORI poll showed that approximately 71 per cent. opposed it? All four district councils also opposed it. If someone supported it, will the Minister oblige the House by identifying them?
There was wide support from business in the area. The association of local councils expressed a range of support, as well as concerns, and that also applies to the parish councils.
Will the Minister clarify that? I happen to be president of the Wiltshire association of local councils and I do not believe that that body has said any such thing. Perhaps he will be a little clearer.
I thought that I had been clear. A range of views was expressed—some were supportive and others were concerned. Several important agencies and bodies, with which the council needs to work increasingly closely in developing and providing better services, were strongly in favour of a county council because they perceived the ability to work closely with the local authority as more likely in those circumstances.
Annexe B of the Department’s impact assessment lists 53 organisations, which are described as “stakeholders” and were consulted. They include Sport England, the Highways Agency and the Audit Commission. In its victorious proclamation that it would go ahead, Wiltshire county council listed only the primary care trust and the chambers of commerce as in favour. In other words, 51 organisations did not agree.
If the hon. Gentleman wants more detail, I shall provide it later.
I have dealt at some length with hon. Members’ questions about support and I want to move on because it is important to explain one or two points in setting the scene, not least the contents of the order, what staff who may be affected can expect and the financial case.
We made the decision that we wanted Wiltshire county council’s proposal to go ahead with reference to the five criteria that we set out at the start. We also had to consider not only whether there was a sufficiently broad cross-section of support that could make the proposal work but whether the change was affordable.
Our judgment, as I told the House on 5 December, is that if the proposal in the order is implemented, there is a reasonable likelihood that it will achieve the outcome specified by the five criteria. In short, our clear judgment is that the proposal meets all the criteria. On affordability, first, the estimated transitional costs are more than offset by the savings that the proposal is estimated to generate, which can be expected to be achieved well within the five-year limit that we imposed at the outset. Secondly, implementation does not involve any capitalisation to deal with revenue costs. Thirdly, implementation does not impose any costs that would have to be met by increasing the council tax. Fourthly, to the extent that in any one year the costs of transition are not covered by savings, they will be met by councils’ reserves, which are adequate.
We subjected the figures that the councils provided to independent financial advice, in order to assess both what the county council was telling us and, in light of what I said earlier, the flaws that others felt were present in those figures. On the basis of those figures, the advice that we were given by independent financial experts suggested both that the council’s figures and the expectation that the proposal might lead to savings of more than £18 million a year were sound and that the overall financial case was a low-risk one that imposed no barrier to proceeding.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. I want to raise a point that is not unique to the situation that we are debating. As far as I can see, no account is taken in the assumptions from the county council of any potential loss of grant. All local authorities receive £325,000 by way of grant for the costs of being in business. There are currently five local authorities in Wiltshire that receive such grant. What assurances can the Minister give that there will not be just one payment of £325,000 for the costs of being in business when we move to one council in Wiltshire? On the face of it, there appears to be a risk that we will lose those four elements of grant, which go to the existing authorities. Is there to be a different level of grant? That does not appear to be permissible under the rules, so how is it to be achieved and how will that shortfall be made up?
Order. Interventions need to be short if some hon. Members from Wiltshire are to be heard.
I will take your advice to the House as applying to my responses, too, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I apologise if I am going on, but I am trying to answer questions as they are put to me.
We consulted on the issue of grant and the allocation of resources to the authorities last year, in preparation for the financial settlement. If the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) is particularly interested in the detail, I can let him have it. In essence, when we move to create the new authority in Wiltshire, all being well in 2009, the allocation of budgets, set out for the next three years under the formula settlement that the House debated and approved last night, would automatically be pooled with that of the county council’s budget, to create the total budget for the new authority to carry out its new range of functions and responsibilities.
Let me turn to the order. Rather like the process that we conducted for encouraging proposals, we tried to take an approach in the order that will allow each area to adopt the arrangements that are best suited to it. We therefore prepared the order following consultation and full discussion with the councils concerned, not just the county council. Our aim was to ensure that the arrangements were those that the local people most directly involved would consider best suited to their circumstances.
First, the order provides that from 1 April 2009 there will be a single tier of local government in Wiltshire. Secondly, it provides for the existing district councils to be dissolved. The county council will be transformed into a new unitary authority with both district and county functions. However, we have made clear from the outset, and will make clear in the way in which we require the implementation plan to be produced and pursued, that this is not a case of the county council either continuing as it is or mounting a takeover of the district councils. This is a new start. We expect a new sense of leadership and direction in the authority, and we expect it to implement the proposals set out in its plan.
Will the Minister explain why the county council will, in fact, continue in a legal sense, even if it is to metamorphose in the way that he has described?
I am perfectly open about this. Essentially, it was a toss-up. There was an argument for saying “Let us, at the point of creating the new authority, dissolve all the existing authorities and create what will be legally a new entity.” On balance, however, we felt that the advantages of that were outweighed by the complexities involved in transferring assets and staff, and the legal complexities. We decided that by allowing the county council formally to be a continuing authority—while making clear that it would be run differently and would constitute a new authority—we could achieve a much smoother transition and still achieve our aim of creating a new authority rather than allowing a takeover, which I have been extremely keen to avoid.
Thirdly, there will be a fresh senior management team, and once elections are held there will potentially be an element of new political leadership as well. The process of change is not a simple transfer of functions; this is a more radical, far-reaching change in the governance, leadership and service delivery arrangements in Wiltshire. The right hon. and learned Member for Devizes shakes his head. The order requires an implementation plan. We will monitor that plan, and staging posts along the way will ensure that we can create the fresh governance, leadership and service delivery arrangements that I mentioned, including scope for the community involvement set out in the proposals. The plan will cover budget, structure, staffing, transfer of assets and neighbourhood arrangements.
Fourthly, the order provides for some of the key transitional arrangements. Principally, it provides for the setting up of an implementation executive whose role will be to develop the necessary plans and budgets to drive the development of the new council. It will be led by the county council, and its membership will be drawn from members of the county council and all the district councils. Its composition is specified in the order. It was discussed in detail with all the affected councils, and it is based on consensus. To provide the necessary support for the executive, the order provides for a team of officers, again drawn from the county and all the districts.
The order sets out exactly how many people should be on the implementation executive and from which local authorities they should derive, but it also says that the nominations
“shall, to the extent that it is practicable to do so, secure that…the Conservative Party, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats are each represented”.
Will all the main parties be represented as set out?
That is certainly the intention, and it is clear in the order that that should be the case.
The order specifies that elections will take place in Wiltshire in line with the usual county cycle, in May 2009. There was complete agreement between the county and the districts in Wiltshire that the elections should be held in 2009, not 2008, principally because, by that time, we expect the Electoral Commission to have been able to undertake an electoral review, so that the arrangements for that 2009 election can be based on new wards that better reflect the community and neighbourhood pattern of the county. The order creates the new unitary Wiltshire council, and it puts in place the key elements of the transition.
I said earlier that I am keen to say a few words about the position of the employees. We all recognise that this is inevitably an unsettling time for employees of the affected authorities, and while the detailed arrangements are for local councils as employers to consider, they will be developed within a set of national principles that we will put in place to ensure that all staff are treated fairly. We have made it clear that all staff who are employed immediately prior to 1 April 2009 by the authorities that are to be abolished will become employees of the new unitary authority. We have also made it clear that those employees will be protected in line with the principles of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006, as if those regulations applied. I made that commitment when I announced our final decisions on 5 December, and I am happy to reconfirm it to the House. This means that all staff who transfer to a new unitary authority will enjoy transfer on their current terms and conditions, and it will then be for the new unitary council to decide its new staffing structures in accordance with employment legislation generally and the TUPE regulations.
Our approach provides for an effective transition that is as efficient as possible, and one that avoids as far as it can disruption to services, gives a good deal to citizens and service users, is fair and equitable to council staff, and, above all, opens the door to creating what in Wiltshire could be one of the future flagship local authorities of our country. I commend the order to the House.
The Minister is certainly right to observe that restructurings of this kind are naturally unsettling. They naturally bring with them risk—in both financial and organisational terms. My party therefore takes the view that such restructuring should not be undertaken unless compelling evidence of significant advantage is demonstrated. To restructure on the basis of a hope and a wing and a prayer is simply not good enough. Important practical, technical and constitutional issues arise.
Does the hon. Gentleman not believe that the system of 20 community forums and the strength of the strategic leadership set out in the proposal, and for local taxpayers not least the £18 million a year in annual efficiency savings, are grounds enough for going ahead?
Because there is regrettably a dearth of specific evidence to back up those assertions, I must say that there is a lack of objective evidence to support them. The key point is that because of the implications, such a change should be undertaken only if there is compelling objective evidence. What we managed to get from the Minister was the fact that there are no objective tests to see whether the five criteria are met in any given place. An entirely subjective exercise is being carried out. That is unsatisfactory, and it sets an extremely dangerous precedent.
The hon. Gentleman is clearly setting out his party’s cynicism about the proposed unitary reform across the country. Will he just remind me which party is in control of Wiltshire county council and who put forward this proposal?
I am sorry that the hon. Lady uncharacteristically seeks to take a cheap shot on that issue. The principle that I am discussing would apply regardless, because parties of an entirely different complexion are in control in other parts of the country, so it does not apply to any one place.
May I just aim off a little when the hon. Lady speaks like that? I should point out that Salisbury district council is deeply opposed to this approach, and it is controlled by the Liberal Democrats.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point. It may engender a modicum of silence from further down the Chamber, and it proves the virtue of doing one’s local homework. It also sits rather ill with the Government’s contradictions on this issue, because this is part of a process of reorganisation that will involve a number of areas. Back in 2006, the previous Secretary of State, who is still in the Cabinet as Secretary of State for Transport, described the whole question of local government reorganisation as a great distraction. I suspect that she was nearer the mark than her successor and the current ministerial team, for the reasons that we have set out.
May I return to the real concern? If one is going to make changes, there must be strong evidence to support them. Such evidence has not been set out in respect of this order. The suggestion that it will bring significant financial advantage depends on a particular case that has been put together, and it is challenged by a number of the other parties. When one examines the detail of that case, one sees that it rests on a number of assumptions about how the transitional costs work out and what the savings will be. Those are not borne out by close examination of the evidence.
I was interested to hear the Minister say that there will be a particular treatment of grant. I assume it will apply across the piece, but that was the first time that we had heard about it. That grant treatment was not taken into account in the proposal in setting out the savings. The districts have put forward their own contention, which would tend significantly to undermine the one put forward by the county council—the point being that there is conflicting evidence and, to return to my principal point, there are no objective criteria by which to judge it. It is thus difficult to see how the case for change can possibly be made against that background. We will return to that issue throughout this process, because the same principle seems to apply across all the orders that the House will have to consider in due course.
One final thing worries me about the Minister’s stance, although I appreciate that he may have inherited this situation. He said that there must be consistent evidence, but a few breaths before, he said that the evidence will vary from authority to authority; so it is difficult to have any great faith in the process.
I should also ask some questions about the order itself, because it concerns me. The Minister hits on a point about this not being a takeover. He has been at pains to stress that, and it is set out in the explanatory memorandum. The reality is that if he looks at it fairly, he will see that it is difficult to say to anyone outside this process that it is anything other than a takeover, given the construction of the implementation executive whereby the chairman, who has the casting vote, shall be the leader of one particular authority—of the county council, as opposed to anything else—whether or not there is consensus. There is no obligation to seek consensus. The fact that there has been willingness on the part of the members of all the district councils to try to work together to make the best of the bad job that has been foisted on them is to their credit, rather than to the credit of the Government, who have set forward this unsatisfactory proposition. It is difficult to sell a built-in working majority in favour of one partner as a collaboration of equals, rather than a takeover.
I am also concerned that the work of the implementation executive will not be adequately scrutinised. That is important because it is at the time of the transition that the hoped-for savings are most likely to be lost and costs are most likely to overrun. Scrutiny at that stage is therefore especially important. There is, interestingly, a duty on the districts to co-operate on implementation of the transition plan in both paragraph 6.7 and paragraph 11, but surprisingly there is only an option for collaboration on scrutiny. I do not understand why the scrutiny provision—in paragraph 8.6—is not also an obligation. The provision on scrutiny is not as rigorous as that on the duty to take executive action, but both are important. From all that I know of what happens in Wiltshire, the districts will ensure that there is proper scrutiny, but the orders do not guarantee that—and they should. That is a technical concern about the nature of the orders.
The political composition of the implementation executive also raises concerns. It is an odd creature, because it does not follow the normal requirements of proportionality. It provides certain guaranteed places, but there seems to be no precedent for that, and I would be interested to know why it has been set up in that way. It is perhaps significant that the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments says, of an identical provision in one of the other orders:
“The use of the powers in the manner proposed is an unexpected use of the powers conferred by section 13(1) of the 2007 Act”.
It is an odd departure, and I would like to know the justification for it. On the face of it, it appears to be an arbitrary use of the procedure.
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will make that point in subsequent debates, but I hope that he will make it clear that the comment from the Joint Committee that he quoted was not made about this order and this restructuring.
Order. Before the hon. Gentleman responds, may I just say that while it is obviously important that the Front Benchers set out their position on the matter, this is a short debate and I am sure that several hon. Members from the county concerned wish to make their contributions.
I made that caveat, but the provisions are very similar and run through all the orders. I wished to flag the issue up for the future.
There is a dearth of supporting material to make a compelling case for the need for change. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) asked the Minister to detail those who support the proposition, and he was unable to do so. Against that background, it seems that the case is not made. The evidence base is too thin to embark on this proposal on its own merits or on a course of action more generally in relation to the orders, which potentially set significant precedents. For that reason, at the appropriate time, we will oppose the order.
I shall keep my remarks brief as I know that many hon. Members wish to speak on matters that are of great importance to their constituents.
The statutory instrument is the beginning of a process to outline the move to local government reform. In this case, we are seeing the replacement of two-tier authorities with a single unitary structure. I would like to emphasise that the Liberal Democrats have no dogmatic opposition, as we believe that it is very much up to local authorities to decide what is best for their areas. Liberal Democrats in district and county councils have been absolutely right to emphasise that point.
Both my predecessor spokesperson and I have been clear that the process should be driven at the local level, not from the Minister’s desk, but we were not convinced when we considered the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill that that was being achieved. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove (Andrew Stunell) said, the processes discussed were only a small improvement on what the Conservatives had left on the statute book. He raised concerns about not having the right provisions to protect local democracy. That raises the key question that has to be asked of all such statutory instruments that we will have to consider—how do they measure up to protecting local democracy? As we know from some of the interventions, these are controversial proposals, raising real issues about proper consultation and the Minister taking it properly into consideration.
The hon. Lady is making some general points, which are no doubt very interesting to her listeners, but will she clarify a very simple matter for us this evening: are the Liberal Democrats, for whom she is a spokesman, in favour of a unitary authority in Wiltshire or opposed to it?
As I said, that is a matter to be decided at the local level. I have absolutely no intention of prescribing from here what should or should not happen—[Interruption.] I am asked again from a sedentary position what we would do. We would not have had this process in the first place, but we think it absolutely right that local areas should have a say on how they would best like to be governed. We should celebrate diversity in how that is achieved, because Wiltshire is very different from Cornwall, for example.
I would like to follow up some of the issues that the Minister raised. He was careful to be very clear that the order is not simply a takeover by the county council. However, with this and other orders, real concerns remain that that is what will happen. Unfortunately, the way in which the order is set out will only underline some of those concerns. I am grateful for the Minister’s clarity about the legal reasons, but I wonder whether he can do anything further to counter the perception that, as a result of the order, we will be left with a takeover.
I also want to follow up the issue of the duty of co-operation between district councils and county councils in the implementation executive. The hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) has already raised the issue of the lack of parity and an equal duty to co-operate in the implementation executive and in the scrutiny process, but there is also a wider issue. Why is there no duty on the Secretary of State to co-operate to help local authorities to achieve their aims of reorganisation? That lies at the heart of the matter. Perhaps with the authority we are considering and certainly in other cases that will be discussed in the days ahead, there is real frustration because the orders will not help local authorities to achieve all they would want from the reorganisation process. There needs to be a duty to co-operate on Ministers so that they cannot stand in the way of authorities trying to achieve higher ambitions.
This is only the beginning of the process. The position is difficult because we do not really know what will be in the detail of transitional orders further down the line. We do not know what vision the implementation executive will seek to deliver; there is no sense of what the implementation team will be asked to do; and there is no idea of what the scrutiny process will be or what will be considered. The Secretary of State must give the sense that the process will not be directed from the Minister’s desk—there must be a duty to deliver what the proposals want to achieve.
Another key area that flags up the kind of barriers that could arise is parish elections. Parish elections took place in 2007. My understanding is that the order will delay any further elections until 2013, after the new body is in place. Given that a new authority is likely to seek to give greater control to parish authorities in taking on new roles and responsibilities, I am concerned that parish councillors elected with an entirely different remit will be asked to take on those new powers. Given that there will be a boundary review and all-out elections to the new authority in 2009, will the Minister comment on what scope there might be to enable parish elections to happen at the same time as those unitary authority elections to allow people to seek election knowing what their terms will be?
On the boundary review, will the Minister tell us the time scale under which the Electoral Commission wants to operate? My concern is that we are debating the order close to the deadline that the boundary committee for England has set to be able fully to undertake a boundary review process in time for the 2009 elections.
I hope that the Minister will also respond to the concern about the capacity of the boundary committee to undertake other boundary reviews in areas where there are likely to be other unitary elections in 2009. Will it have the capacity to deliver that number of reviews within the necessary time scale? For a lot of authorities, that will be important in demonstrating that a new authority will be elected. With the existing boundaries, if the change does not take place, that will be a real hurdle.
Fundamental issues need to be resolved. Otherwise, it will be difficult for the process to have a successful outcome. Locally, many people are disputing whether the changes will bring improvements. If they are correct in disputing that point, either the Government have not assessed the proposals properly or the potential lack of success might be down to failings in the process that we are debating. As we have heard, members of the district authorities are participating in the process to try to make the best of a bad job. The Government have a responsibility to ensure that they are doing their best to make something that is practicable and workable, too.
Wiltshire never has been, is not now and never will be an easy county to administer. We are proud of our county, but we are not quite sure why. There are as many reasons as the county has areas, districts and river valleys. That pride is very real—we even have a new county flag after all these centuries.
Wiltshire is a disparate county. It is described as chalk and cheese, with sheep farming in the south and dairy in the north. It is the home of moonrakers: the sort of characters who are anti-establishment, or certainly anti-taxman. Salisbury plain is the great divide in Wiltshire, occupied by the Army for 100 years—some say to keep apart the people from north Wiltshire and south Wiltshire.
Wiltshire has no natural boundaries, unlike Cornwall. It has no natural county town, unlike Devon, which has Exeter. It has no homogenous identity, unlike, for example, Kent. None of the boundaries of the different authorities seem to coincide and they have not for a very long time—even the ecclesiastical one. The county of Wiltshire is not in the south-east and not really in the south-west either. It may be in what could be described as central southern England, which is pretty unromantic. Wiltshire is an edge county and Salisbury is an edge city. If we are anything, people in Wiltshire still belong to Wessex, the ancient kingdom that is a romantic idea as well as a fact. Interestingly, the recent creation of an Earl and Countess of Wessex showed a deep understanding by the royal family of the nature of the county and of how we feel about where we are.
I believe that unitary authorities can work well, in the right place. I used to be a Local Government Minister, so I have fairly wide experience, at least across England. I know that it was right for Swindon, for example, to become a unitary authority. The structure might have worked in Wiltshire when it was proposed, some 12 years ago, that we should have two unitary authorities—one for north Wiltshire and one for south Wiltshire. However, when we look at the context of the order and the proposed revolution, it is important to remember that, before the 1974 local government reorganisation and in what is now Salisbury district council, we had a Salisbury city council, and rural district councils for Salisbury and Wilton, Amesbury, and Mere and Tisbury.
That was localism, and local decision making. All four authorities had planning powers, although they did not include the county council’s reserve powers on highways and minerals, for example. Back in 1974, we saw the beginning of the end of true local democracy when those four councils became one. Now, Wiltshire’s four district councils are to become one, and using the same sort of dodgy maths that the Government are using to support the order, some might say that the people of south Wiltshire were 16 times better represented in 1974 than they will be by the new Wiltshire council.
The point about stakeholders has been argued about quite a lot, and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) and my hon. Friend the Member for Westbury (Dr. Murrison) will expand on it. However, it is terribly important to remember that only 53 per cent. of county councillors voted in favour of the unitary authority proposal. None of the district councils voted for it, and most of the district councillors voted strongly against it, unless they happened to be the double-hatted councillors who served on both local authorities—a practice of which I disapprove very strongly. One of the few benefits of the proposed system will be that we will no longer have double-hatted councillors.
The Minister said that part of the enterprise was a “toss-up”, and he is right, although some people might also describe it as a gamble. The explanatory memorandum states that one of the proposal’s criteria is “strategic leadership” and it talks about a “reinvigorated strategic partnership”. That means that the existing Wiltshire strategic partnership will be broken up into a public service board and a Wiltshire assembly of 20 area boards. The Minister said that he believed that the new 20 area boards would be the answer to local participation in the democratic process. It is true that local people will be able to influence local events and to help shape their communities. The police and the primary care trust will be able to join in, along with the parish and town councils, but will they be able to decide anything? No: they will be barred from making decisions. That power will reside exclusively with the 98 Wiltshire councillors, who will take all the decisions.
For the time being, the councillors will be stuck with existing local plans and development frameworks, so the planning function will remain within the existing district council boundaries. However, the area planning committees that have given decision making to local regional bodies will go; as a result, decisions will be taken by the smaller number of Wiltshire councillors who will represent the district council areas that we have now.
The memorandum states:
“The strong link to place, through the establishment of 20 “Community Area Boards”, provided compelling evidence that a unitary authority would not be too remote from all of its communities.”
Well, I do not know whom that evidence compelled, but it does not compel me or my constituents. It is likely that the unitary council will save back-office costs such as human resources costs. If it saves the forecast £75 million a year, however, it will be the first time in recorded history that a local government reorganisation has saved anyone a penny.
I oppose this order in principle. I think that it is wrong for Wiltshire, but I expect that the Government will get their way and so it is my duty to make the proposal work to the advantage of my constituents. If anyone can make this extraordinary idea work, it is Councillor Jane Scott, the leader of Wiltshire county council, who is a hugely talented person. If the order goes through I shall support her and wish her well in the enterprise. I shall do my best to minimise the pain and realise any gain.
In Wiltshire we take the long view. The first MP for Salisbury arrived in this place in 1265. I have been the holder of that office only since 1983, so I shall try to remember the old political adage: “Things are never as good and never as bad as they seem at the time”.
I am glad to follow my neighbour, my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (Robert Key), who strongly set out why we should oppose the order. He has been a Wiltshire Member of Parliament for rather longer than I have, so I bow to his superior knowledge of the history of Wiltshire, even if neither he nor I quite go back to 1265.
I congratulate the Minister. If he loses his seat at the next election he will have a fine career as a stand-up comic; never have I seen anyone deliver such rubbish with such a straight face. I shall not repeat arguments that have already been made, but I want to explain the situation for the following reason. I went to see the Minister’s predecessor, as did my colleagues, and we also went to see the Minister himself. We told him about the state of public opinion in the county and he listened, as did his predecessor. Neither of them gave any indication that they would contradict what we were saying, yet suddenly, out of the blue, we received what I can only describe as a perverse decision in relation to the evidence we had given them.
I remind the Minister of what we said. We told him about the Ipsos MORI poll, which is worth looking at again, because he has created the impression that it was not definitive. In fact, 78 per cent. of people said that they wanted the status quo, but with a bit more co-operation; 71 per cent. felt that a single council for Wiltshire would be remote and less in touch with local people and local issues; 64 per cent. saw Wiltshire as too big to be served by only one authority; and two thirds of the respondents said that the current system of local government worked well for them. If that is not a clear indication of public opinion against the proposal, I do not know what is.
We all received many letters and I received a petition, too. I did not receive a single letter in favour of the unitary council proposal, but I received dozens of letters against it, so I do not know where the impression of popular support has come from. At our meeting with the Minister, we told him that our understanding was that only two parish councils of all the 80 parish and town councils in the county were positively in favour of the proposal—only two, yet the Minister tried to give the impression this evening that local communities were in favour.
All the district councils were originally against the proposal. There has been a little movement since, but although they are co-operating now they basically believe that it would be bad for local government in Wiltshire. Three of Wiltshire’s MPs have opposed the unitary order throughout; my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) will have to decide how he will vote tomorrow, but three of us have made our position clear.
The Minister said that the county council wanted a unitary authority, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury has just said, only 25 of the 49 county councillors voted for the proposal—hardly a massive majority in favour, yet that is the piece of opinion on which the Minister founds his case.
My hon. Friend correctly indicated that I did not go to see the Minister and that throughout I have taken a different stance on the matter from my three Wiltshire colleagues. I believe that there are strong arguments in favour of a unitary authority in Wiltshire but there are also strong arguments against, and for that good, rather Liberal Democrat, reason I shall abstain in the vote tomorrow.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making his position clear—[Laughter.]—and I said it with a straight face.
I twice wrote to the Secretary of State asking whether stakeholders and key partners actually included people, but I never received a straight answer. I then began to inquire about the stakeholders who were apparently so important in the consultation. As my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury said, we know of only one stakeholder who has positively supported the proposal. It was the primary care trust. Do you know why it did so, Mr. Deputy Speaker? A year ago, the primary care trust was created from four others, which led to a disastrous diminution of medical provision in our area, so the only way it could justify its position was by supporting a similarly disastrous proposal for local government. All the other stakeholders, including the fire and police authorities and the local housing association in my constituency, refuse to take a position, because they do not believe that a strong enough case has been made for the change. Again, I ask the Minister: where is that support? Where does it come from? When the Prime Minister took office in June, he said that he would be a listening Prime Minister. Who have the Prime Minister and the Minister listened to on the subject?
I do not want to take up much more time, but I want to raise one technical point. The order states that the implementation executive is to set
“such budgets and plans as it considers necessary or desirable to facilitate the economic, effective, efficient and timely discharge of the Wiltshire council’s functions on or after 1st April 2009.”
My local district authority informs me that, under the order, it will not have the authority to do that; it will have no locus to take such action. I want the Minister to look into that, because if the order is passed I do not want there to be a complete muddle and mess as a result of its not being properly thought out.
I want to ask the Minister what the difference is between Wiltshire county council and “the Wiltshire council” mentioned in the order. The first page of the order says:
“That proposal was made by Wiltshire County Council.”
In the rest of the order, the reference is to “the Wiltshire council”. The definition says that
“‘the Wiltshire council’ means the council of the county of Wiltshire”.
It does not say “Wiltshire County Council”, as it does on the first page. That is another issue on which there could be massive confusion.
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury, I have probably been in politics far too long. We have experienced a number of local government reorganisations, and I have seen a number of similar centralisations. We are told over and again that money will be saved, that things will be far more efficient, and there will be all sorts of benefits. In every single case costs have gone up, empires have been built, and people whom we thought would lose their jobs got a new title and remained in office. Ultimately, it has always cost the local taxpayer more. I predict that that is exactly what will happen now. The Government’s majority will probably ensure that the order is passed. We will go through all the rigmarole and have a unitary council, but I predict that in 10 or 15 years we will revisit the issue because the unitary council does not work.
The proposals will not work because the Minister has not listened to the people, who have told him that they do not want a remote council in our big county, as they will not be able to get to their council as easily. They do not want services to be inaccessible and at a great distance. They want local government that represents them where they are, and for all the Minister’s semantics and rhetoric the proposition before us will not achieve that. I ask him seriously to think again. Very few people in Wiltshire want the change. What is driving him to give my constituents, and the constituents of my hon. Friends, what they have clearly said they do not want?
It is a great pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (Robert Key) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram). I cannot compete with 1265, but the battlefield site of Ethandune, near Edington, is in my constituency. That is where King Alfred defeated the Danes in 878 and set up the kingdom of Wessex. If anybody knew about local government reorganisation, it was King Alfred.
Let us be clear: there is no support worthy of the name for the proposal in the county of Wiltshire. There are no grounds for the Minister’s opinion, which was given in his letter of 25 July 2007 to Wiltshire county council’s chief executive, that the proposals would
“command a broad cross section of support from a range of stakeholders”.
Furthermore, the breezy assertion that there would be
“some support from the general public”
is true only in the most literal sense, with “some support” meaning more than no support.
The November summary document continues in the same creative vein. Any reasonable comparison of the document with the raw data would reveal that there has been considerable licence in the interpretation and collation of material.
I do not know whether the Minister has been through all the responses. The Department was good enough to allow me not only to read them, but to photocopy them, and I have been through them all. They confirm my belief, from what my constituents have been telling me for many months, that there is no significant body of support, however he defines it, for the proposals before us. May I challenge the Minister to say how he is able to draw the inferences presented in the November summary document from the responses that he received and I photocopied? If he cannot do so, the second criterion in the October 2006 invitation for unitary bids is not met.
For a more reliable litmus test of public opinion, we must turn to the MORI polling data collected in June 2006. In his letter of 22 November 2007, the leader of West Wiltshire district council, Councillor Graham Payne, says:
“I can see no reference in your report about the MORI poll that was undertaken to assess the views of the public in Wiltshire.”
That is the case. I asked the Minister specifically about that and he seemed to be under the impression that in some way that poll was reflected, but in fact it is not.
Wiltshire county council misused the information in the same way as the Department for Communities and Local Government appears to have been creative in its interpretation. West Wiltshire district council referred the matter to the district auditor. On 30 July 2007 the district auditor stated in response:
“I agree with you that it”—
a press release issued by the county council—
“represents a misinterpretation of the MORI findings. It is highly selective in its use of information from the poll and excludes information that would provide a more accurate representation. As such, I consider that it fails to comply with the Publicity Code in that it is not objective or balanced”,
yet that is the body on which the Minister is relying almost wholly in making his assertions.
The matter of consultation is by no means trivial. It is especially important in Wiltshire. Over the past months and years, and certainly since 2001 when I was elected, we have become accustomed to what might be called sham consultations. We have had them particularly in relation to local health care, where it appears that the results of the opinion survey have been more or less determined before the exercise started. That has led to the most disastrous consequences in respect of the scorched earth policy being conducted by Wiltshire primary care trust and, before that, by its predecessor bodies.
This has taken place at a time when we are all trying to establish public confidence in democracy and engage people with politics and with the formulation of public policy in important areas such as local government, health care and practically every other arena. Instead, a climate of cynicism has been engendered among the public, and who can blame them if they put a great deal of time and effort into responding to consultations in good faith, in the belief that those who make a decision at the end of the day will pay close attention to what they say and act upon it? Unfortunately, in the local government consultation, like others in Wiltshire, those who are entrusted with making policy sadly seem to bat away all the time any effort put in by our constituents. They should hang their heads in shame.
Understandably, there has been considerable judicial interest in the matter. Will the Minister outline the possible outcomes of the Congleton and Shrewsbury judicial review and what implications various possible outcomes may have on the local government review process? Will the Minister say why the estimates of costs and benefits have differed structurally from one unitary proposal to another, thus disallowing meaningful comparison? That is particularly important in the present context because Somerset, just across the border—a county that is in many ways similar to Wiltshire—has had a very different outcome from its unitary bid.
Will the Minister tell us why the transition costs, recurrent costs and savings, pension liabilities and extra costs for area governance and pay harmonisation have not been included in the cost appraisal for Wiltshire? Given the absence of a budget for area governance, what did the Secretary of State have in mind when talking in July 2007 of a “real opportunity” for people to “shape their communities”? Will the Minister confirm that area governance under the proposals will be no more than an unfunded “selectocracy” with very little accountability?
In July 2006, the former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government called local reorganisation “a great distraction”, and in March 2007, in the Government’s own review, Sir Michael Lyons criticised restructuring and recommended more joint working. That is precisely the solution that Wiltshire residents have said they want, and precisely what the MORI polling data confirmed that they wanted. The Local Government Chronicle in May 2007 reported the Treasury fear that unitary bids were a “waste of time” and that it
“simply cannot afford to bear”
the financial risks involved. In 1974, local government was paralysed by reorganisation for up to three years, and I have to say to the Minister that there is good evidence that we are seeing a repeat performance right now in Wiltshire.
My constituents want local government to deliver quality services—which, by and large, it does. However, residents and council after council have responded to the Minister’s consultation by saying that they do not want this expensive, remote, self-licking lollipop that is threatening 1974-style paralysis for months on end. Even at this late stage, I urge the Minister to think again.
I rise briefly to explain why, unlike my three hon. Friends who have spoken convincingly of their reasons for being strongly opposed to the order, I shall take a position of principled abstentionism when we vote on this matter tomorrow. The position that I have held throughout the discussions on local government reorganisation in Wiltshire is that there are strong arguments in favour of single-tier unitary authorities. Those are the arguments that we advanced when we were in government and in precisely the Minister’s position. When I was special adviser to the Secretary of State for the Environment, as the post was then known, we brought in unitary status for Swindon. It is nice to see the hon. Member for South Swindon (Anne Snelgrove) in her place this evening. We also abolished the country of Berkshire in the same way, and brought in a variety of unitary authorities across England. They were very much welcomed by the people when we did so. We also abolished the county councils in the whole of Scotland.
The powerful argument for doing that, which we advanced from the Bench on which the Minister is now sitting, was that it was a fundamentally good Conservative principle to have less government and fewer civil servants servicing it, with lower council tax as a result. There are clearly strong Conservative arguments in favour of single-tier unitary authorities. There is no question about that at all, and in some respects I support what the Government have been saying in that regard.
Wiltshire plainly has good local government at the moment, however; I differ entirely from the Government in that regard. Our district councils do a very good job. They are close to the people, and they make good decisions, by and large, although there are some exceptions. I am glad to say that North Wiltshire district council had the good sense recently to throw out the Liberal Democrats who had run the council very badly for the past 10 years, and the council is now doing an absolutely first-class job.
So we have good local government at local level provided by the district councils, as well as by the town and parish councils, which provide a strong service across North Wiltshire. Localism is terribly important. As my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (Robert Key) commented, Wiltshire is an astonishing county geographically, split by Salisbury plain. There is no real homogeneity in the county, and it is therefore vital to have local government, which is provided at the moment by the district councils.
Given the Government’s majority, it is extremely likely that the order will go through. Now is not necessarily the time to make strong, principled arguments on either side; we should be doing precisely what the Conservative-controlled North Wiltshire district council has done and Wiltshire county council is doing. We should say, “This thing is going to happen. The Labour Government have created it. There is no question but that there will be a single-tier unitary authority in Wiltshire. We should not fall out with each other over it or battle over who will be councillors in a particular place or how functions will be carried out. We should set in place structures so that the localism that currently exists through district councils is continued in one way or another.”
County Councillor Jane Scott, to whom my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury paid such warm tribute a moment ago, has that very much in mind. She realises that it is vital that there should not be a centralised structure, based in Trowbridge, that ignores local authorities, and that the structure should take real account of very local concerns by setting up appropriate other structures across the county. That is why I am ready to accept what the Government propose. I cannot bring myself to go into the Labour Lobby and support them—there are strong arguments against the proposal—but I will abstain during the deferred Division tomorrow.
The Minister might like to refer to one matter in his response. The boundary committee will examine local government boundaries in the run-up to the elections for the single-tier unitary authority. There is one boundary in Wiltshire that to me is more important than all others—the eastern boundary that borders Swindon. We love Swindon, a first-class town in many ways, but we do not want it to move into North Wiltshire in any shape, size or form. Will the Minister please reconfirm in his response that when the boundary committee considers the borders, it will be specifically tasked with doing that within the current rural county of Wiltshire, excluding Swindon? Will he confirm that the border between Swindon and North Wiltshire will remain the same? I think that that will be the case, but I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed it.
Leaving party politics and strong statements aside, we need to find the best means of delivering good, first-class services at a local level in Wiltshire and a lower council tax. I say to Councillor Jane Scott, and the new-look local authority when it is set up, that the reason why I do not oppose what she proposes is that I look to her to provide better services for my people in North Wiltshire—above all, at a lower rate of council tax.
I hope that my colleagues from Wiltshire will forgive me for speaking for a minute before the Minister responds. I am a former leader of North Wiltshire district council and I served 12 years on the county council. My hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (Robert Key) mentioned the winding-up of the rural districts and boroughs. There are many proud towns in Wiltshire that still have the sign of when they were boroughs in the middle ages. It is a pity that the winding-up occurred; it took local government away from people.
As leader of North Wiltshire district council, I was always aware that it was an administrative area without any natural affinity, apart from being in Wiltshire. However, it had one big advantage: we discussed areas that we travelled to and knew. Wiltshire county council was a great, strategic council but those of us from the north of the county would often talk about areas in the south that we rarely visited. It can take one hour 20 minutes to get from Cricklade to the south of Salisbury and we did not go to the south often. I fear that the new arrangements will be unwieldy. It is a long way from Tidworth to the Somerset boundary, and I do not think that we will be close enough to the people. I am suspicious of the savings figures; I do not think that we will make savings. I hope that things work out well. I am sure that there are some very good councils in Wiltshire, but I fear that we are moving local government too far from the people.
I shall attempt to deal with the points that have been raised. First, I should like to pay tribute to the fact that all who have spoken have done so with strong feeling about their areas and a remarkable pride in their county—its history, richness and royal and military connections. The hon. Member for Salisbury (Robert Key) and, although I had not realised it, the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray), speak with experience of local government reorganisation and recognise that it is not easy. Sometimes one has to believe that the prize in going through the process will indeed deliver the gain that is worth some of the pain that is necessary.
Let me say to the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) that he answered his own question as regards scrutiny. He said that districts will ensure that there is proper scrutiny, and they have done. A joint scrutiny and overview board has been set up, with nine members from across all five councils, and they will do the job that we need them to do.
The hon. Member for Falmouth and Camborne (Julia Goldsworthy) asked about the boundary committee. It aims to complete the work to set the new wards in the county by February 2009, which means that they can be in place for elections in May 2009.
I will check the point that the right hon. and learned Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) raised about the district councils’ concern about the order and write to him if there if is any cause for concern. I appreciate that he has some scepticism about this process. However, we made the general case for unitaries in the White Paper, and there are some very good unitaries as a result of reorganisations, including Stockton-on-Tees, Hartlepool and the East Riding of Yorkshire. We used the term “Wiltshire council” in the order deliberately to exemplify the fact that we were not creating Wiltshire county council but an authority for the county of Wiltshire.
The hon. Member for Westbury (Dr. Murrison) asked about the judicial review brought by Shrewsbury, Atcham and Congleton, which was dismissed by the court in September. They have appealed, the hearing took place last week, and we await the judgment. However, nothing that they have done in the judicial review process so far has delayed us or deflected us from our process, and I do not expect that to happen again, although that will of course depend on the court’s judgment. All the costs were taken into account in the independent financial advice that we received.
In reply to the hon. Member for North Wiltshire, the work of the boundary committee will be within the county of Wiltshire and will not stray over the boundary into Swindon.
Area boards may be the answer to the concern expressed by the hon. Member for Salisbury, as they are set up in the proposal as forums for local decision making. Perhaps he and the scrutiny board may wish to ensure that the new council delivers on that. Finally, the savings in Wiltshire are destined to be £18 million a year, not £75 million a year, as was suggested.
I hope that all Members will fall in behind this and support those who, once this House passes the order, will look to lead the change and put in place a new council that can better serve and well serve the people of Wiltshire for the future.
Question put:—
I think the Ayes have it.
No.
Division deferred till half past Twelve o’clock tomorrow, pursuant to Standing Order No. 41A (Deferred divisions).
delegated legislation
I propose to put together the Questions on the four motions.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 118(6) (Delegated Legislation Committees),
Education
That the draft Regional Learning and Skills Councils Regulations 2007, which were laid before the House on 14th November, be approved.
Companies
That the draft Companies (Late Filing Penalties) and Limited Liability Partnerships (Filing Periods and Late Filing Penalties) Regulations 2008, which were laid before this House on 17th December, be approved.
Representation of the People
That the draft Representation of the People (Scotland) (Amendment) Regulations 2008, which were laid before this House on 23rd January, be approved.
Constitutional Law
That the draft Scottish Parliament (Elections etc.) (Amendment) Order 2008, which was laid before this House on 23rd January, be approved.—[Mr. Blizzard.]
Question agreed to.
EUROPEAN UNION DOCUMENTS
Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 119(9) (European Standing Committees).
Freight Transport Agenda
That this House takes note of European Union Documents No. 14277/07 and Addenda 1 and 2, Commission Communication, The EU’s freight transport agenda—Boosting the efficiency, integration and sustainability of freight transport in Europe, 14165/07 and Addendum 3, Commission Communication, Towards a rail network giving priority to freight, 14175/07 and Addenda 1 and 2, Commission Communication on a European ports policy, and 14266/07 and Addenda 1 and 2, Commission Communication, Freight transport logistics action plan; and endorses the Government’s approach to discussions on these documents.—[Mr. Blizzard.]
Question agreed to.
business of the House
Ordered,
That, at the sitting on Thursday 7th February, the Speaker shall put the Questions necessary to dispose of proceedings on the Motion in the name of Ms Harriet Harman relating to European Scrutiny (Standing Orders) not later than Six o’clock; such Questions shall include the Questions on any Amendments selected by the Speaker which may then be moved; proceedings may continue, though opposed, after the moment of interruption; and Standing Order No. 41A (Deferred divisions) shall not apply.—[Mr. Blizzard.]
Petition
HM Valuation Office Agency (Newport)
I present this petition on behalf of employees and constituents who are concerned about the proposed closure of Newport Valuation Office and the possible relocation of staff to Cardiff and Merthyr Tydfil. At a time when the city of Newport is undergoing huge regeneration, the closure of that office would have a negative impact on the local economy at a time when the work load locally is increasing, would have a detrimental impact on the lives of staff, who would face a lengthy journey to work, and would be contrary to the Welsh Assembly Government policy of moving jobs out of Cardiff. The staff in Newport have provided a loyal and excellent service over many years.
Following is the full text of the petition:
[The Petition of employees and supporters of Her Majesty's Valuation Office Agency in Newport,
Declares that Her Majesty's Valuation Office Agency in Newport provides vital services in addition to providing important employment opportunities in Newport. Staff who work in this office have provided loyal and dedicated service to VOA over many years with a significant number of staff having served for a considerable period of time. That the threatened relocation of services from VOA Newport and the closure of this office will have a negative impact on the local economy, an environmental impact from additional travel and a devastating effect on the lives of the staff who currently work there.
The Petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons calls upon Her Majesty's Government to fully consider the case for retaining the VOA Newport Office and the possibility of co-locating with HMRC Newport.
And the Petitioners remain, etc.]
[P000118]
Solicitors Regulation Authority
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Blizzard.]
I am most grateful for the opportunity to raise some very important issues concerning the Solicitors Regulation Authority, known as the SRA. I am pleased to see the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, East (Bridget Prentice), on the Front Bench this evening—I say evening; of course I mean this morning, at such a very early time. I wish to make a declaration of my interests. I am a non-practising barrister and I am married to a solicitor who is also a part-time judge. My wife also formerly served on the Law Society Council.
The SRA was established two years ago last month and operates with a budget of £55 million each year. It is therefore timely that we should explore its work so far, and assess its achievements. I also want to raise some concerns regarding the issue of race and ethnicity. Previously, the regulation of solicitors was dealt with by the Law Society itself, which is the trade union for solicitors. It was rightly suggested in the Clementi report that the Law Society lacked the independence, and therefore the necessary legitimacy, to regulate properly. It found fault with the principle of one lawyer examining the work of another, and so the SRA was born. The SRA remains part of the Law Society but operates completely separately from it.
There are 16 members of the board, nine of whom are solicitors. I have serious concerns about the representative nature of the board’s membership, while not casting any aspersions on those appointed. Only one is from an ethnic minority background; the rest, I have to say, consist of the great and the good. However, I am worried that in this day and age, with a board so recently created, it is no way near a representation of the race and gender of the legal profession today, and I understand that it cannot be changed until December 2009.
The SRA should act in the public interest as both a regulatory and preventive body, examining accusations of fault, writing regulations and ensuring resolutions. It should be fair to both the public and solicitors, and should ensure that all firms are treated equally and in the same way. A number of issues have been brought to my attention concerning the cases that the SRA intervened in. In such circumstances, an intervention essentially means that firms are closed down.
An independent consultant, funded by the SRA, prepared a detailed report as long ago as July 2006, which concluded that a disproportionate number of black minority ethnic firms were investigated by the SRA. In 2006, 62.8 per cent. of the 59 interventions made by the SRA were against subjects who were Asian, Asian British, black or black British, mixed or unknown, whereas only 37.3 per cent. were made against white or white European solicitors, despite the fact that that group makes up 78.6 per cent. of the solicitor population. The SRA has accepted that there is a serious problem; it has also accepted that it has not done enough to address it. I congratulate it on that candid admission.
In a letter to me on 28 September last year, Andrew Garbutt, a quality consultant at the SRA said that
“you will note from these reports that Black and Minority Ethnic solicitors are disproportionably represented in regulatory decisions compared to their overall representation in the profession, and the SRA is exploring the reasons for this disparity.”
Firms contacted me asking why they found themselves constantly under lengthy investigations with no end in sight. The figures are quite stark. I wrote to the SRA on a number of occasions but was unable to receive a satisfactory explanation for the figures that I had been given. On 10 October 2007, I was told by Antony Townsend, the chief executive of the SRA:
“We share your concern about the disproportionate representation of BME solicitors in regulatory matters over several years…It is for that very reason that the SRA is addressing the matters as one of its early priorities.”
I worried about what it deemed to be a priority when it became clear to me that the SRA produced report after report stating that there was a problem without taking any action.
As the Under-Secretary will no doubt know, I called a meeting on 16 October 2007 in the House. It was attended by Mr. Townsend, several different and well regarded groups, from the Black Lawyers Association to the Society of Asian Lawyers, and several solicitors’ firms, that had concerns about the way in which the SRA disproportionately affected the work of BME firms. Although the meeting was useful in showing the SRA the extent of concern that many organisations and firms felt, I was unimpressed with what Mr. Townsend promised. It was clear that, although the issue was brought to the SRA’s attention in July, nothing of substance had been done to try to tackle that serious problem by October 2007, when we held the meeting. The idea of a working group, to be chaired by the president of the National Black Police Association, was proposed by those attending the meeting but not acted upon.
I wrote to the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, requesting a round table discussion with the Department and the SRA to take the matter further. Subsequently, the Under-Secretary chaired a meeting during which SRA board chairman Peter Williamson accepted that the SRA had failed to do enough to deal with that major concern. His admission was most welcome. I also want to thank the Under-Secretary for attending the meeting. She did not interfere with the proceedings, but acted as an honest and effective broker. She chaired the meeting with skill and a clear understanding of the issue of race and ethnicity, doubtless drawn from her experience and the concerns expressed about other issues by her constituents. The SRA’s previous hesitation in the matter may have unwittingly contributed to racism and discrimination towards BME solicitors.
Since the meeting with the Under-Secretary, we have made some progress, which is very positive. The working group met for the first time on 17 January 2008. At that meeting, it was agreed that Anesta Weekes QC, one of the country’s few black silks, should be invited to be the independent chair of the working group for future meetings, and that Ali Dizaei, a distinguished police officer from London and president of the National Black Police Association, would be the vice-chair. In addition, it was agreed that Lord Herman Ouseley, whose record of achievement on race is second to none, would be invited to act as an independent reviewer of the group’s work.
Among other things, the working group will be responsible for drawing up and agreeing terms of reference for an independent review, which will carry out statistical analysis; re-examining the details of SRA interventions into BME firms or cold casing; examining the composition of the SRA board, which currently has only one BME member; considering the composition and training given to SRA casework staff, and trying to build trust between the SRA and BME solicitors.
I propose tonight that we go a step further. In my view, the Under-Secretary should appoint an independent monitor to oversee the work of the SRA, so that if any discrimination is found, it is acted upon immediately. It cannot be right that investigations continue into firms if racism or discrimination is found. Let us be clear. There was an important step forward: a clear recognition by the SRA that there was a need to tackle that serious problem.
There are other issues of concern that go beyond race. I have been told by those who have dealt with the SRA that it is slow to deal with correspondence and cases. I can tell the House from my experiences that, until the Under-Secretary’s intervention, I had tremendous difficulty in obtaining responses to my letters, and I expect the correspondence of an MP to be a high priority for any organisation and confidentiality to be maintained.
After writing to the SRA about a specific firm, the confidentiality of the letter was breached as it became clear that caseworkers other than those involved in the case were aware of the details. When a firm is being investigated, it clearly impedes their work and costs a huge amount of money. It is only fair that a solution is found as quickly and simply as possible.
Decisions must be swift, and the actions and advice must be consistent and professional. Some firms have been advised that they have no right of appeal after an SRA adjudicator has made a decision. However, it appears that others have been told differently and that consumers have also been told a different story. I should be grateful if the Minister could confirm whether solicitors or consumers have a right of appeal after SRA adjudication. The livelihoods of solicitors can be at stake in such matters, and the questions raised by the public must be answered.
The SRA feels that one of the reasons BME firms experience a higher number of interventions than white European firms—its classification, not mine—is that they are in general smaller and that smaller firms are investigated more. That cannot be viewed as a satisfactory explanation. Why should small firms be at a higher risk of being shut down than big firms? In this context small is not beautiful, if small firms as opposed to large firms are immediately put at risk and small BME firms face a double whammy.
Legal Week published an article examining the work of the SRA one year after its creation, in which Chris Carroll, a managing partner of the large City firm Travers Smith, commented:
“although I think separating the bodies is important, it has not had much impact other than having to announce to our clients that we are now regulated by the SRA. I just do not come across them, and I certainly do not regard them as any more fearsome.”
It is obvious from that statement that large City firms do not feel the bite of the SRA; and yet smaller BME firms have told me that they feel hounded by it, with investigations continuing for years.
It should be incumbent upon the regulatory body to investigate all accusations and all firms to the same extent, and not to ignore the work of large City firms because they are too powerful and difficult to get results from. The SRA has accepted that it does not approach the “magic circle” firms in the same way, but has said that that is because it does not have the budget necessary to do the job. Yet surely it is just as costly to investigate a BME firm, sometimes for up to four years, as it would be to investigate a City firm for a couple of months.
It seems that the only explanation for the situation is the one that was given to me during a meeting in my office in December with Peter Williamson, the chairman of the SRA board, who told me honestly that the reason large firms do not get investigated in the same way is that they will often give in to complainants in order to keep them as clients, which is something that smaller firms are less likely to do. In other words, money talks. If the issue is also one of resources, I ask the Minister to look into it and provide more funds if necessary; if it is not, there are more serious questions that must be asked.
Finally, I want to mention diversity in judicial appointments. It is clear that the issue is no longer that BMEs are not entering the profession; rather, there is an issue of progression. The Government set up the Judicial Appointments Commission in 2006 to reform the system for choosing judges. Yet since those reforms, all the judges who have been appointed have been white, male and, on the whole, privately educated. The situation was in fact much better under the Lord Chancellors Irving and Falconer.
The Society of Asian Lawyers has passed me a report that claims that in many of the recent appointments the winning candidate still fits the establishment profile, and in one case does not fit the guidelines issued for that position. If that is the case, how can that person be said to be appointed on merit? In this day and age, I am surprised that only 10 of the 108 High Court judges are women and that only one is from an ethnic minority. Why has the Ministry of Justice not dealt with the issue, which has been raised year after year and which it recognises to be important? After all it is dealt with in statute, in provisions under part 4 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005—I know that to be the case, because I and others put them in there.
We are posed with the age old question: quis custodiet ipsos custodes, or who guards the guardians themselves? I know that the Minister will be keenly watching the progress of the SRA over the coming months. I sincerely hope that it will not be necessary for her to intervene again. It is surely right that we ensure that the public and solicitors get the regulation body that they deserve. For that body to work, the solicitors and the consumers have to trust it. This trust must now be earned.
I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz) on securing this important debate. He is, and has been, assiduous in pursuing his concerns about black and ethnic minorities both in and outside the legal profession, and his measured approach tonight reflected that.
As my right hon. Friend said, the SRA was established by the Law Society as an independent body to regulate solicitors in England and Wales in preparation for the new regime that we will introduce under the Legal Services Act 2007. As he said, the Act built on the recommendations of Sir David Clementi, including the requirement for legal regulators to separate their regulatory and representative functions. That is a central principle of the new framework. It is vital to both consumers and the professions that it is clear when a body is acting as a trade union and when it is acting as a regulator, when it should be seen to be separate and independent of that function.
We are encouraged by the fact that both the Law Society and the Bar have taken steps to establish independent regulatory bodies before the Act comes into force. The Law Society has delegated all its regulatory powers to the SRA apart from rule-making, which it cannot lawfully delegate at present. It has also ensured that it retains no concurrent jurisdiction on regulatory issues. The Law Society has no power to direct the SRA’s board to take a particular approach, either in individual cases or in respect of policies and procedures.
The ethos behind the Legal Services Act was to put the consumer first, and to improve the way in which legal services are provided for the public. I am pleased that the SRA is embracing that ethos by giving the public information to help them make better decisions when choosing solicitors. However, I also recognise that, as my right hon. Friend said, the SRA has a real responsibility to the professions that it regulates to ensure that it acts effectively and fairly. As my right hon. Friend acknowledged, it is a relatively young body, and part of its future role will be to review the current procedures and identify areas in need of improvement. I am sure that it will be interested in the views of the solicitors whom it regulates, and will engage with them fully.
The Law Society requires the SRA to respect the principles of good regulation—of consistency, transparency, proportionality, targeting and accountability—but those principles must also be translated into the way in which the SRA regulates on a day-to-day basis.
Let me now deal with the issue of race and the SRA. I am well aware of my right hon. Friend’s anxiety about the way in which the SRA has handled the concerns of black and minority ethnic solicitors in regulatory matters, and I was pleased to be able to facilitate the discussions shortly before Christmas to which my right hon. Friend referred.
Although the SRA has taken some action following the 2006 report, I agree with my right hon. Friend that it has taken far longer than anyone would want for it to draw up a structured plan with clear objectives and deadlines. However, I am glad that the work has begun to gather some impetus, and that the working group given the task of dealing with it has met and agreed on a way forward. I am also glad that the independent review will examine many of the issues raised by BME stakeholders at the meeting before Christmas, including membership of the SRA board. As my right hon. Friend will know, the board was appointed after open competition in accordance with the Nolan principles.
I believe that the working group will make real progress. It is important for BME stakeholders who feel strongly about the way in which the SRA has handled investigations to play an active role, and for everyone to work together to ensure that conduct matters are investigated in an open and transparent way. Going forward, this work will ensure that the SRA is trusted by solicitors and consumers alike. As my right hon. Friend knows, I cannot comment on individual cases or alleged breaches of confidentiality, but I know that he has written to Antony Townsend, the chief executive, about the length of time it has taken to receive replies to correspondence and I hope that he is getting a better service as a result.
The time taken to resolve intervention cases and to respond to queries are issues the review might want to consider. In particular, it might want to examine the types of firms that are investigated and whether there is a link to the resources available to the SRA. The resourcing of the SRA is, however, a matter for the Law Society not the Government, because those bodies are funded by the profession itself.
As my right hon. Friend has stated, the actions of the SRA should be consistent. He has raised the issue of conflicting advice given to firms on appeals. I have also raised that issue with the SRA, and there is no yes or no answer. Whether there is an appeal depends on the circumstances. For example, the SRA has told me that there is no internal right of appeal against a decision to refer a solicitor’s conduct to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal because those decisions are not adjudications, but decisions to prosecute. The SDT must itself decide whether there is a prima facie case before a prosecution proceeds. Findings and orders of the SDT are subject to appeal to the High Court, of course. Nor is there an internal right of appeal against a decision to exercise statutory powers of intervention into a solicitor’s practice. Challenges to intervention decisions must be brought in the High Court in accordance with the provisions of the Solicitors Act 1974. However, there is an internal right of appeal against a decision to impose a condition on a solicitor’s practising certificate and there is also a statutory right of appeal to the Master of the Rolls. I know that my right hon. Friend has written to the Lord Chancellor on this issue and he will respond to him more fully as soon as possible.
I do not think that it is necessary for an independent monitor to be appointed to oversee the work of the SRA. The chair and vice-chair of the working group—two splendid people, as my right hon. Friend said—will be independent and they will be able to review the processes. That will also be carried out by the independent reviewer, Sir Herman Ouseley—an excellent advocate in this area, as my right hon. Friend said. I will, of course, monitor progress and outcomes of the work being undertaken by the SRA because I believe that that work is essential, and I will look with interest at the conclusions of the review, and at how the SRA tackles the issues that come out of that.
My right hon. Friend has raised the point that investigations should be suspended, particularly if the review finds evidence of discrimination. I believe that doing so would raise serious consumer protection issues, and we would need to consider that very carefully. In the longer term, oversight will pass to the legal services board and I will ensure that the new board, once it is established, is aware of the progress and outcomes of the review.
I wish to turn briefly to legal diversity, an area that I consider to be of great importance as my right hon. Friend is aware. The key to a diverse judiciary is a diverse legal profession. There are still huge barriers, as my right hon. Friend pointed out. We are committed to working with, and challenging, the professions where we can to deliver improvements in diversity. That is why I wrote to the top 100 law firms and top 30 chambers in November 2005, and then to the next 100 firms and next 30 chambers in April 2006, asking them to publish their diversity policies and statistics on their websites. I was not hugely impressed by the response. Changes take time and they will not be achieved overnight. The fact that there was some reluctance will not prevent us from continuing to press on these measures.
Has either the Minister or the Lord Chancellor called in the chair of the Judicial Appointments Commission to register disappointment at the first tranche of appointments that has been made? Those appointments do not seem to be in keeping with the vision set out by the previous and present Lord Chancellors and by the Government.
We have not called in the chair of the JAC on that issue, but I had a meeting with her about two weeks ago and she is aware of my concerns. She, too, is very committed to ensuring that the judiciary is more diverse. She suggests that we examine other ideas of how we might make progress. I shall keep my right hon. Friend informed as to how we hope to make real progress in ensuring that we have a judiciary who reflect the community that they serve.
Progress has been made on a number of projects as part of the trilateral judicial diversity strategy published jointly by the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice and the JAC in 2006. Those include eligibility changes under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which for the first time will allow members of a wider range of legal professionals, including fellows of the Institute of Legal Executives, registered patent agents and registered trademark attorneys, to apply for judicial appointment.
We are also undertaking a solicitors’ initiative. The Department is working with a number of regional and London-based law firms that have signed up to a five-point action plan designed to encourage and promote judicial service within their firms. A solicitors forum has also been established. The Ministry of Justice, the JAC, the Law Society and the Judicial Office meet quarterly to identify and address real and perceived barriers to judicial office.
We are also doing promotional and outreach work with the JAC, the Judicial Office and the professional legal bodies aimed at promoting judicial office and raising awareness among under-represented eligible groups. Further wide-ranging publicity is planned to coincide with the widening of eligibility this year.
Diversity and community relations judges are working with the Department and the judiciary on ways to enhance and support that network. Those judges act as an interface between courts and local communities, with a view to increasing communities’ confidence in the justice system and improving judges’ understanding of local issues. A conference will take place in May, when the new best practice guidance will be launched.
I can tell my right hon. Friend that this is a work in progress. I sympathise with and understand his frustration at the lack of speed of some of these successes. I hope that he will realise that we have put in place a number of things that I hope will start to bear fruit in the coming months and years. I can promise him that I shall keep a very close eye on the work of the working group and the SRA. I hope that before long, he and I, the black and ethnic minority communities, the profession and consumers can have confidence that the judiciary are as diverse as the country that they serve.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at twenty-seven minutes to One o’clock.