We currently have no plans to reduce the number of Future Lynx procured.
We currently have no plans to reduce the overall expenditure on Future Lynx.
(2) on what date the business case for the Future Lynx was approved by his Department's Investment Approvals Board;
(3) if he will initiate an investigation into the procedures used in reaching the decision to award the Future Lynx contract.
The correct departmental procedures were followed to reach the decision to procure the new Future Lynx helicopter. I do not therefore see a need to initiate any investigation into the procedures followed in arriving at this decision. The final decision was taken by MOD Ministers, following agreement from Her Majesty's Treasury, on 31 May 2006 on the basis of advice and recommendations from the MOD Investment Approvals Board.
The final Future Lynx Main Gate Business Case was submitted to the Department's Investment Approvals Board on 5 December 2005.
(2) what assessment he has made of the ability of Future Lynx to meet the battlefield reconnaissance helicopter capability at an equivalent cost to alternatives.
The Ministry of Defence follows a detailed approvals process for all major equipment procurement decisions. For all such decisions a range of factors are considered including acquisition cost, the ability of the equipment to meet our capability requirements, technical and programme risk and coherence with the defence industrial strategy. The approvals process is designed to ensure all these factors are considered and procurement decisions are not based on any single factor. In the case of the surface combatant maritime rotorcraft and battlefield reconnaissance helicopter capabilities, following consideration of the range of factors, Future Lynx was considered to be the best solution to meet our requirements.
(2) what consideration was given to procuring an off-the-shelf helicopter under a competitive process to meet the battlefield reconnaissance helicopter requirement; and what estimate he has made of when helicopters would have been available to the armed forces under such a procurement process.
An assessment was made by the Department in 2001 which concluded that the Future Lynx aircraft likely offered the best through-life approach to the delivery of the Army's battlefield light utility helicopter (BLUH) and Royal Navy's surface combatant maritime rotorcraft (SCMR) requirements and a sole source assessment phase was launched. We continued to benchmark the Future Lynx approach against other opportunities, including within the analysis that underpinned the future rotorcraft capability programme during 2004-05, where the Army's requirement was described as the battlefield reconnaissance helicopter (BRH).
The analysis concluded that the delivery of the BRH and the SCMR requirements through a single helicopter type (Future Lynx) provided the best combination of through-life military capability, time to deliver into service, cost and risk. As such, we decided not to launch a competition.
The Heads of Agreement signed with Agusta Westland in March 2005 and announced via a written ministerial statement on 24 March 2005, Official Report, column 83WS, committed the Department to exploring the possibility of partnering. The same statement confirmed that the potential award of a Future Lynx contract was subject to continuing negotiations to agree acceptable contract conditions and prices within clearly defined parameters. The subsequent decision to proceed with Future Lynx was taken as this represented the best through-life approach; its contribution to the sustainment of critical UK skills was a secondary consideration.