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Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Volume 481: debated on Tuesday 28 October 2008

I am delighted to serve under your chairmanship, Lady Winterton, and to have the opportunity to raise this important issue in Westminster Hall.

On 4 June 1989, the tanks of the People’s Liberation Army rolled into Tiananmen square. The massacre that followed, according to official Chinese figures, resulted in 241 dead and some 7,000 injured. However, the BBC and students say that there were in the region of some 3,000 dead. At the time, the west was shocked; indeed, Lord Kinnock said that it was a crime against humanity. Ever since, there have been serious question marks against China and its human rights record. Today, China supports arms sales to the Zimbabwe regime of Robert Mugabe, and there was recently an attempt to move arms on to the African continent. It is involved in supplying Iran—up to $7 billion-worth of arms in 2004. More recently, close to the time of the Olympics, we saw a brutal suppression of the peoples of Tibet, and continued persecution of Christians and Muslims in the country.

What did the European Union and the United Kingdom do at the time of Tiananmen Square, and what have they done subsequently? At the time, EU member states got together and passed the Madrid declaration of 1989. The declaration has some important points, which I would like to place on the record. It involved a breaking of diplomatic relations and, effectively, a stronger form of trade sanctions. Included in the declaration was a clear and separate measure, which referred to

“interruption by the Member States of the Community”—

the European Community—

“of military co-operation and an embargo on trade and arms with China.”

It could not be said clearer than that. In addition to that, continued resolutions of the European Council—as recently as 2006—have kept in place those measures.

At the conclusion of the EU Council meeting in December 2006, the council reaffirmed its willingness to continue working towards lifting the arms embargo on the basis of the European Council conclusions of December 2004. However, the council continues to have serious concerns about the human rights situation in China and deeply regrets that there has been little progress in a number of areas.

I spoke to an official from the European Commission a couple of hours ago. He agrees that the measure is still in place. He said:

“The measure of interruption of military co-operation and the embargo on sale of arms are part of the same thing. It remains resolutely in place.”

For some reason, the United Kingdom has chosen unilaterally to break the embargo. In August, a member of the People’s Liberation Army passed out of Sandhurst. That is the same People’s Liberation Army that was involved in the massacre at Tiananmen square, and has been involved in suppressing the Tibetan movement. This is apparently all being done, as we saw in responses to parliamentary questions, without the knowledge of Ministers in the Ministry of Defence or the Foreign Office. According to written answers, the MOD officials did not even consult UKRep in Brussels or the Foreign Office. Apparently, the embargo was broken as part of the wider Whitehall initiative to encourage better relations with China.

In order to break the embargo and to allow members of the People’s Liberation Army to attend Sandhurst, a safeguard was put in place which said that the training will be kept under review

“and these limited engagements will stop if there is firm evidence that any skills or knowledge we provide have been misused.”—[Official Report, 17 September 2008; Vol. 479, c. 2250W.]

How they will find the individual officer cadets from Sandhurst in the huge People’s Liberation Army, in a huge country that is not renowned for its freedom of information and freedom of movement is beyond me.

After a series of parliamentary questions about what the bilateral programme was, I finally received an answer. The programme will include

“senior leadership engagement, high-level command and staff training…disaster management training, peace and support operations.” —[Official Report, 23 October 2008; Vol. 481, c. 474W.]

The total amount of funding allocated in support of the programme for financial year 2008-09 is £465,000.

I cannot understand what the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is going to teach us—or what we are going to teach it—on command and staff training. Perhaps we will teach it how to invade an island off its coast that it wants back. When we talk about “junior leadership training” or “peace and support operations”, perhaps we will be assisting it in dealing with its troublesome groups in Tibet that it finds so easy to put down. I found that objectionable. At the bottom of that answer, the Minister says:

“I am withholding a copy of the bilateral programme agreement as its release would, or would be likely, to prejudice international relations.”—[Official Report, 23 October 2008; Vol. 481, c. 474W.]

First, we have a right to know what has been signed, especially when it is in contravention of the EU arms embargo. Secondly, we have to ask, “Whose relations could be under threat?” We do not have to look far to realise that our relations with the United States, our closest military ally and trading partner when it comes to military and aerospace equipment, will come under stress.

In a number of speeches dating back to 2005, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs, John Hillen, cautioned that any action by the EU to lift its embargo on arms to China would

“raise a major obstacle to future US defense cooperation with Europe…I think we can count on it: should the EU lift its embargo, the US Congress will legislate.”

I know from representing many thousands of workers in British Aerospace, from travelling to Washington and from my previous life in the aerospace industry that the United States is serious about the steps that it would take should Britain, or the European Union, decide to engage in arms sales and military co-operation that would threaten the important relationship of trust between the United Kingdom and the United States. I have to ask why the Government are following such a line. What are they playing at? We have established through written answers that officials in the MOD did not check with the Ministers. Having spoken to a number of previous Secretaries of State for Defence, they find such an answer to be rather odd because in their experience any agreement to send personnel to military training establishments in the UK with the remotest hint of controversy would usually go via a Minister for approval. I find it incredible that the MOD did not check, or engage in discussions, with the Foreign Office—the very body of this Government that is charged with representing us in Europe and at European Council discussions. What we have done is dangerous because a number of countries in Europe have less moral regard and would be very keen to sell arms to China. Therefore, it weakens our case in the European Council that we should not engage in arms sales to China.

I suspect that the Government have been caught with their pants down. Effectively, they were not aware of the details of the Madrid declaration and were happy to play around at the edges. However, that is a dangerous game to play. It is a very silly game to play if we think that we can tinker at the edges with a country such as China. As we speak, it has intelligence operatives in this country trying to spy on our defence industry. On a number of occasions, it has successfully penetrated the US military programme.

Why will the Minister not publish the bilateral agreement and place it in the Library? Why is it that no one in his Ministry knew what was going on at the time and left it to officials? Perhaps he can tell us why he thinks that it is better to upset some of our US allies on this issue? We have a long history of trust in the intelligence and defence communities in the US. At this very moment, US officials are trying to agree a trade treaty to allow British defence firms better and preferential access to the US market at the cost of our European allies. Why pursue this silly measure that will only antagonise our relationship and do no good at all?

I congratulate the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Wallace) on securing this debate on the United Kingdom’s bilateral military engagement programme with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Judging from his 11 questions of the past six weeks, it is clearly a subject of great concern to him and his constituents, and I welcome the opportunity to put on the record the rationale for our ongoing bilateral military activities.

Following the Tiananmen square massacre in 1989, the European Union rightly registered its disapproval by issuing the Madrid declaration, which included measures such as the halting of military co-operation, an embargo on defence sales, the suspension of bilateral ministerial and high-level contacts, the postponement of new co-operation projects and reduction in cultural, scientific and technical co-operation. However, the China of 2008 is not the China of 1989. We have to take into account the significant social and economic progress that has been made over that period. Infant mortality rates are down; life expectancy is up. There are more than 5 million university graduates a year in China. People are free to choose their own employment. People can now marry whom they wish and travel abroad, and limited elections have been introduced at village and community level. Only the week before last, the temporary regulations that permitted greater media freedom during the Beijing Olympics were made permanent, although only for foreign media.

We still have great concerns about China’s human rights record, however, and we regularly raise those concerns—including some of the issues that the hon. Gentleman mentioned, such as Tibet—with the Chinese authorities. We want significant progress in areas, such as political freedom and judicial independence, and we are keen that China should ratify the international covenant on civil and political rights. I believe that we will have more success in influencing China’s emergence as a responsible global player through a policy of proactive engagement than by seeking to coerce it through isolation.

Although there has been no formal lifting of the Madrid declaration of 1989, many of the measures have outlived their usefulness, both for the United Kingdom and for other member states. However, the most significant measure, the arms embargo—the hon. Gentleman at one point tried to give the impression that we were selling, or were prepared to sell, arms to China, whereas we are not—remains in force and the United Kingdom is one of its strictest adherents.

Against that backdrop, the bilateral programme that the Ministry of Defence operates with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is coherent with Government strategy and the military programmes of other EU member states and the United States. It recognises that China is a growing regional military power, with a key role to play in the continued political stability of the region through activities such as the six-party talks with North Korea. The programme also recognises that China already makes a significant contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations and has the potential to offer much more. To put that in context, the most recent United Nations statistics show that China has more than 2,000 military personnel deployed in 10 locations, placing it 12th in global troop contributions and making it the greatest contributor among the five permanent members of the Security Council.

We conduct a programme that comprises a two-way flow of high-level visits, lower-level training events and exchanges. Such activities generate greater knowledge of each other’s capabilities, intentions, culture and ethos, which we hope will lead to increased mutual trust and a reduced risk of misunderstanding and strategic miscalculation.

We also try to encourage China to sustain and increase her contribution to peacekeeping operations. However, we recognise that there is a balance to be struck to encourage the development of a military force that is willing to make a positive contribution to global stability, rather than one that might abuse its military strength. Put simply, our engagement programme is designed so that it will not provide skills with any applicability to internal repression or that will upset the strategic balance in the region. That is achieved through our continued adherence to the EU arms embargo, by limiting the scope of the programme and by reviewing the use that the People’s Liberation Army makes of the training that we provide.

Our senior leadership engagements develop trust, but they also offer the opportunity to explore possible areas of mutual benefit face to face. The limited command and staff training offered in the United Kingdom exposes senior People’s Liberation Army officers to a military who are accountable for their actions and embrace the international law of armed conflict. Junior leadership training, such as the attendance of cadets at Sandhurst that upset the hon. Gentleman so much, achieves similar ends.

We use the principles set out in the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria to guide us in what support we offer to the Chinese. On that basis, it is appropriate to allow Chinese military personnel on to courses that have direct relevance to peacekeeping operations. Other examples include the border security programme, which facilitates co-operation in global counter-terrorism, and the peace support operations programme, which introduces students to British Army peace support operations doctrine and training. There are also areas of military co-operation that have a clear benefit for the wider global community. An example is the sharing of hydrographic survey data, which offers increased safety to international maritime traffic in the region.

The Chinese offer us reciprocal opportunities to send military personnel to China, although it is difficult to take advantage of lower-level training courses, because the majority are conducted in Mandarin and we have few military personnel with the necessary language skills. However, we send officers to the national defence university’s annual international defence symposium, which is conducted in English and includes students from around the world. I am sure the hon. Gentleman, as a former serving officer, will recognise the value of such shared international military opportunities.

The hon. Gentleman’s recent questions, which he has brought up again in his speech, highlight his concern that our military activities might be out of step with those of our European neighbours and that—this is a particular concern—we are upsetting the United States of America. That is not the case: our activities and involvement with the Chinese military are very similar in scale and scope to those offered by France, Germany and the United States—all countries with which China has a close involvement. Our defence attaché in Beijing liaises with the attachés of our allies to ensure that our practice remains coherent with theirs, and the programme is reviewed at a regular pan-Whitehall China strategy meeting. We will continue our military engagement unless there is evidence of any misuse of the skills or knowledge that we provide.

The hon. Gentleman alleged—saying that it was dangerous and silly—that we have not consulted our European partners and the United States, or even the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. None of that is true; our engagement with the Chinese Liberation Army is known to and shared with them, as is theirs with us. The suggestion that we risk a major upset with the United States authorities, or with France or Germany, all of which are doing the same thing, is palpable nonsense.

The Minister clearly has not read all the parliamentary answers that he has been given; he has been reading the questions but not the answers. What came out from the answers was that there was no discussion with the Foreign Office or with United States representatives on the issue. The record will speak for itself.

The thing that I find amazing, coming from a Government who are so European-focused about many things, concerns the Madrid declaration: right or wrong, the part of it that is absolutely clear, which specifies the

“interruption by the Member States of the Community of military cooperation and an embargo on trade in arms with China”,

is not a unilateral option that one can pull out of. If the Government wish to break it—there has been pressure to do so for many years—that must be done together. The European Commission officials to whom I spoke this morning are absolutely under the impression that military co-operation goes hand in hand with the arms embargo. If it is the Minister’s intention and the Government’s to remove that as well, they should say so.

I have made this as clear as I can: there is no intention on the Government’s part to remove the arms embargo. We are strict adherents to it. That requirement remains wholly justified in today’s scenario. We try to ensure that none of what we offer the Chinese involves any training or transfer of capability that would give them the ability to upset the regional balance, such as the kind of skills and abilities necessary to manage an invasion of Taiwan, which the hon. Gentleman mentioned. That is not within the scope of anything that we do. We do not provide the Chinese with anything that could be used for that or for internal repression.

The hon. Gentleman repeats the allegation that we do not talk to or consult the FCO, despite the fact that he has been told in writing and orally in this Chamber that a pan-Whitehall China forum meets regularly to discuss our engagement with China. Our defence attaché in Beijing is closely aligned and talks regularly with all our allies, including the United States of America, and would make certain that any misalignment of our involvement with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army was brought to our attention immediately and addressed.

The hon. Gentleman’s concerns are ill-founded. I do not know what his purpose is. If he is trying to stir up trouble between us and the United States, there is really none to be stirred up. I hope that what I have said satisfies him to some degree, although I doubt it.

I am not trying to stir up trouble; I am trying to prevent a threat to our defence industry and our long, historical relationship with the United States. Yet again, I shall read out an answer from the Minister himself. My question was:

“To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions he has had with EU counterparts on the military training of Chinese nationals within EU member states. [224109].”

The Minister’s answer was:

“My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence has had no discussions with his EU counterparts on the military training of Chinese nationals within EU member states.”—[Official Report, 29 Sept. 2008; Vol. 479, c. 2438W.]

To me, that is a clear answer.

The hon. Gentleman read out the answer. The question asked what discussions the Secretary of State has had, not what discussions the British Government have had. If he puts that into context, he will realise that his concerns are—

No, I will not give way again. I hope that my explanation reassures the hon. Gentleman that military engagement with China is properly thought through, appropriate and coherent with our allies’ efforts. The fact that a military as large as the People’s Liberation Army place such great value on the training, doctrine and experience of our much smaller armed forces reflects great credit on our military. I am sure that he will join me, if not in anything else, in acknowledging our armed forces’ deservedly high reputation for military excellence.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at six minutes to Two o’clock.