Skip to main content

Commons Chamber

Volume 490: debated on Monday 23 March 2009

House of Commons

Monday 23 March 2009

The House met at half-past Two o’clock

Prayers

[Mr. Speaker in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions

Home Department

The Secretary of State was asked—

Drugs Strategy

1. What progress has been made in the implementation of the Government’s strategy to tackle drugs. (264795)

Drug use is now down to its lowest level in more than a decade, and we continue to see reductions in the harms caused by drugs. Enforcement action is reducing drug-related crime, more effective drug treatment is being delivered, and effective communications and information campaigns are getting across the message that drugs harm.

I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. It is clear that children who live with drug-addicted parents face a specific set of risks, including emotional or physical neglect and abuse, and ingesting the drugs or substitute drugs that their parents take. After Lord Laming’s report, which was published on 12 March and detailed what went wrong after the death of baby P, what further steps will my hon. Friend take to ensure that the best practice that exists in some places becomes standard practice across the country?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that question, because it raises an important issue. The first family intervention programmes targeting substance misuse are under way, and they are particularly important for chaotic families whose lives are affected by substance misuse. They help misusing parents to improve their parenting skills, and also offer protection to their children. We hope that up to 20,000 families will be able to access this support.

Given the Government’s treatment of Professor David Nutt, the independent adviser whom the Government appointed, in haranguing him after he had published an academic paper in his own right as an academic, do the Government fear that they will no longer be able to get good quality, independent advice on their drugs policy because scientists will be fearful of getting a morning call from the Home Secretary demanding that they apologise for disagreeing with her?

The simple answer to that is no. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that we take the advice of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs very seriously. We agreed with much of its advice on cannabis and on ecstasy, but we have to take a judgment based on a wider picture, including the harm that drugs do. It is up to the advisers to advise, but it is up to the Government to take the decisions.

We welcome what the Government have done and their proposals for the future, but does the Minister not agree that we also have to deal with the dealers? We need a hard-line policy to extend the amount of time that they spend in prison. Previously, people who ended up on drugs and went to prison could voluntarily go and get cleaned up, but that has now been taken away. What can we do to ensure that people who are on drugs get the support that they need, and that, more importantly, we take a hard line against the dealers?

I agree entirely with my hon. Friend that enforcement is a key part of the Government’s drugs strategy, but it is also important that we do not have a revolving door policy in relation to drug misusers and prison. That is why we must ensure that misusers have appropriate treatments before they get caught up in prison, as well during any time spent in prison, and that there is a seamless transition on coming back out into the community.

This set of Ministers has done more than any other I can recall to fight the problem of drug abuse in this country. Will the Minister tell the House what action he can take to implement as soon as possible the control of gamma butyrolactone, the date rape drug that is becoming a real problem?

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s support, and I should like to pay tribute to the work that he has been doing on this issue. He will be aware that the chemical to which he refers is widely used in industry, and we are looking at how alternatives can be provided to allow legitimate practices in industry to continue. He should be under no illusion, however; we do intend to take the action that he is calling for.

I understand that my hon. Friend was in Vienna recently, at the United Nations General Assembly special session on the misuse of drugs. Will he tell us what position Britain took at that assembly, and what the general outcome of it was?

We made no secret of the fact that the UK Government were disappointed by the political declaration that came out of the long deliberations, and also the conference itself. We did not support views on difficulties concerning use of the term “harm reduction” in the declaration. It is inconsistent to refer to millennium goals that talk about tackling HIV and AIDS, but to do and say nothing about clean needles. We signed up to the declaration reluctantly, but we will continue the process to ensure that harm reduction gets a fair hearing.

If the Government think that their drugs strategy is working so well, will the Minister explain why heroin and cocaine are trading on British streets at prices that are at an 11-year low?

I am not sure that we would agree with the hon. Gentleman’s figures, but let me tell him something about cocaine. There is no evidence that its use has risen in recent years. Its wholesale price is rising, as are seizures of the drug, and the purity of cocaine on the streets is falling. Taken together, those factors suggest that the action that we are taking on cocaine has been successful.

Violent Crime

The British crime survey is the best guide to trends in violent crime. The latest figures, for the BCS year ending September 2008, showed that 2.2 million incidents were experienced by adults in England and Wales. Since 1997, violent crime is down by 40 per cent., which is equivalent to 1.5 million fewer incidents.

I am grateful to the Minister for that answer. He will know that many of our constituents are concerned about knife crime, given that the number of people being stabbed to death is at a record high. My constituent Mr. Roger Lambert, of Lydney, watched the BBC 1 programme “Stabbed: The Truth about Knife Crime”, and contacted me about the matter. He is so concerned about what happens to those who go out with a knife and take someone’s life that he wants—I said to him that I did not agree—the Government to consider bringing back the death penalty to deal with the problem. What can the Minister say to make Mr. Lambert comfortable about safety on our streets and the risk of being stabbed to death by a knife?

What I cannot say to the hon. Gentleman’s constituent is that I am in favour of the death penalty or that it will be brought back, but I can tell him and other people throughout the country what we are doing to tackle knife crime issues, which are very particular in some parts of our communities. The hon. Gentleman could mention to his constituent that people found in possession of a knife are now far more likely to be charged, and on being charged they are far more likely to be imprisoned. That applies to possession offences, of course, but if somebody is caught using a knife, they can expect much stricter penalties. The hon. Gentleman could also use some of the latest statistics, which were published on 4 March. The Department of Health figures show that among those aged 13 to 19, there were 31 per cent. fewer admissions to NHS hospitals for stab wounds in the nine English TKAP—tackling knives action programme—regions from June to November 2008, compared with the same period in the previous year. That compares with an 18 per cent. reduction in non-TKAP areas over the same period, and it is extremely encouraging, although there is clearly much more to be done.

The Minister will be aware that almost half the victims of violent crime have stated that their perpetrators were under the influence of alcohol. Why have the Government not accepted in full the very sensible proposals of Sir Liam Donaldson to try to put a floor price on alcohol? Does he not accept that it is the cheapness of alcohol that has caused the binge drinking culture in our Committee—[Laughter]—in our city centres. Will he look carefully at these proposals and reconsider the Government’s approach?

I must admit, Mr. Speaker, that I have never noticed binge drinking in the Home Affairs Select Committee, particularly as I often attend it at half-past 10 in the morning. Seriously, however, my right hon. Friend raises a serious point. The Government’s view is that the matter is of serious concern, but we do not believe that the introduction of a minimum floor price is the right way forward at this time. We do believe that the establishment of a mandatory code for alcohol, which will tackle some of the irresponsible promotions in our streets and city centres—the likes of happy hours and “Drink as much you can” offers—is one of the steps that we need to take if we are to tackle the binge drinking culture. We should also remind everybody that binge drinking is not acceptable and that using the influence of drink as an excuse for doing something is unacceptable to all hon. Members and indeed to the vast majority of people who drink responsibly.

Sadly, my student intern was mugged in Hemel Hempstead on Sunday. She is a very outgoing and gregarious young lady who is now very frightened about going back into the town centre. The town centre is covered by CCTV cameras, but she is worried, quite rightly, that the person who mugged her was not concerned about those cameras or about the punishment—he just wanted to get her money. What are we going to do about that?

I am sorry about the horrific incident that happened to the hon. Gentleman’s intern. Such an incident would trouble us all and I am sure it is of great worry to her. The fact that the CCTV is there, however, will hopefully provide evidence, which can be used. One of the best deterrents for people who conduct such awful crime is the knowledge that they will be caught, put before the courts and—obviously, the evidence is needed—given the sentence that they deserve. For the sort of attack that the hon. Gentleman has described, the sentence should be a severe one.

Will my hon. Friend consider the issues surrounding incitement to violence? As he will be aware, many of my constituents and people across the UK were extremely angry at the attack made on our troops in Luton last week by a small al-Muhajiroun-related group with a history of attempting to incite violence and racial division in our town. Will he review the specific circumstances of what happened so that such an incident never happens to our troops again?

It is fair to say that we were all appalled by the incident in Luton to which my hon. Friend refers. In many instances, incitement to hatred is against the law, and one would expect the incident to be investigated and prosecuted. Whatever else we can say, we all utterly condemn the sort of demonstration that took place on the streets of Luton a few days ago. It should not, and must not, happen, and those who break the law should be prosecuted.

The Minister will be aware that the use of dogs in violent crime and antisocial behaviour is becoming an increasing problem in many areas of the country, particularly the inner cities. Will the Government carry out a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of current legislation and consider how boroughs such as Wandsworth have utilised mandatory micro-chipping as a means of controlling this increasing problem?

Of course we will consider any measure that needs to be taken to tackle the sort of phenomena to which the hon. Gentleman refers. The use of dogs not only as a status symbol for some people in gangs but as an offensive weapon is of increasing concern, as he rightly points out. We are trying to find out the extent of the problem. As for what we are doing, the hon. Member for Hornchurch (James Brokenshire), who is also sitting on the Opposition Front Bench, will tell the hon. Gentleman that the Policing and Crime Bill contains gang injunctions, which can be used, subject to their being passed by Parliament. It can be part of such an injunction to ban a gang member from having or using a dog in the ways to which the hon. Gentleman refers.

Serious Convictions (DNA Evidence)

3. How many convictions for serious crimes were secured on the basis of evidence from DNA samples in the last 12 months. (264797)

6. What estimate she has made of the number of convictions for serious crimes which relied on evidence from DNA samples retained on the national DNA database in the last 12 months. (264800)

The national DNA database plays a key role in catching criminals, including many years after they might think that they have got away with their crime, eliminating the innocent from investigations, and focusing the direction of inquiries. In 2007-08, 17,614 crimes were detected in which a DNA match was available. Those included 83 homicides and 184 rapes. In addition, there were a further 15,420 detections resulting from the original case involving the DNA match. Those occur when, for example, a suspect, on being presented with DNA evidence linking him to one offence, confesses to further offences.

I thank my right hon. Friend for that answer. The high figures that she quotes show how valuable DNA can be in both solving crimes and ensuring that the innocent do not suffer. I have been contacted by a number of my constituents who are concerned that cleared suspects’ DNA evidence is still held on police databases, however, despite that having been ruled unlawful by the European Court of Human Rights. What action does she plan on that matter?

The specific ruling was on a blanket policy of retention of the fingerprints and DNA of those who had been arrested but not convicted, or against whom no further action was being taken. The Court also indicated that it agreed with the Government that the retention of fingerprint and DNA data

“pursues the legitimate purpose of the detection, and therefore, prevention of crime”.

We are, however, looking at the key point in the judgment, and drawing up proposals that will remove the blanket retention policy. We will bring forward those proposals for consultation soon.

Although I am sure that my right hon. Friend agrees that the database is a breakthrough in modern policing in the country, does she also agree that young people, and particularly children, need to be dealt with sensitively?

My hon. Friend raises an important point, and that is why I announced in December our intention to remove all those aged under 10 from the database. That has now been carried out. When we bring forward proposals to change the blanket approach to retention, we will give particular consideration to those aged under 18, and to how the protection of the public can be balanced with fairness to the individual.

There will be considerable relief about the fact that the Home Secretary is going to end this blanket policy, but can she assure the House that there will not be so many exceptions to the rule as to make the change worthless?

I can, I hope, assure the House that that is the case, and we will ensure that we discuss the details of our proposals with colleagues in all parts of the House.

The report published today by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust on the proliferation of 46 Government databases, including the DNA database, makes alarming reading. It suggests that a quarter of those databases are illegal under human rights or data protection law. What assessment has the Home Secretary made of the legality of the databases, and will she undertake a full review to ensure that they are proportionate and protect privacy?

I believe that the databases referred to which are my responsibility are fully legal. I have repeated today that, notwithstanding the case of S and Marper, the courts found that the function of the DNA database in those circumstances was legal and important. Of course we need to maintain a proportionate approach to the way in which we use data to safeguard and protect the British public. That is what I spelt out very clearly that I would do in a speech that I made before Christmas, that is what we are doing, and that is what we are in the process of ensuring that we do through our proposals and consultation.

When compiling my recent parliamentary report, I issued a questionnaire asking people in Bridgend whether they supported the development of a national database. Of those who responded, 89 per cent. supported it. However, the questionnaire also asked whether the details of people who had been found innocent should be kept on the database. In this instance, 59 per cent. thought that those details should be removed, while 41 per cent. felt that they should be retained. There seems to be a lack of clarity in regard to the implications of the retaining of databases—

I am, Mr. Speaker. Does my right hon. Friend agree that there needs to be a clear dialogue with the public about the use of the national database in solving not just current crimes, but old crimes?

I agree that we need to be open about how we proceed with our proposals. I have been very clear about that. However, I am sure that people in my hon. Friend’s constituency would be interested to hear of cases such as that of Abdul Azad, who was arrested for violent disorder at his Birmingham home in February 2005. A DNA sample was taken, and he was subsequently released without charge. In July that year, a stranger rape occurred in Stafford, 25 miles away. There were no clues until skin from beneath the victim’s fingernails was profiled and found to match the DNA taken from Azad. The senior investigating officer commented that

“we would never have caught him had his DNA not already been on the database—he didn’t even live locally so we had no intelligence leads either”.

Azad was jailed for six years for sexual assault.

What does the Secretary of State say to Mr. Daniel Baker, a constituent of mine who was a victim of mistaken identity? He was never charged with any crime and is entirely innocent, but the police are retaining his DNA against his wishes. When will the Secretary of State start recognising the liberties of the individual, and stop regarding everyone in the country as a suspect?

I think that the case study that I cited a minute ago identified some of the important benefits of DNA retention. There are real-life cases in which people have been made safer by the retention of DNA post-arrest. Of course, the right hon. Gentleman’s constituent can apply to the police force, in exceptional circumstances. That is why I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will look closely at our proposals for a more proportionate way of dealing with the retention policy.

While I recognise the merit of what has been said by the right hon. Member for Wells (Mr. Heathcoat-Amory), was it not DNA evidence that led to the release last week of someone who had been wrongly convicted of murder, and who had served 27 years in prison? So much for the point made at the beginning of Question Time by the hon. Member for Forest of Dean (Mr. Harper).

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The case of Mr. Hodgson last week demonstrates how the DNA database and the use of DNA can prove people innocent after a period of time, and also how it can ensure both that innocent people are removed from an investigation at an early stage so that they receive justice, and that important police resources are not used up on false investigations or investigations that will not come to a conclusion. Those hon. Members—they are largely on the Opposition Benches—who throw up their hands in outrage at the idea of the DNA database need to have a sensible answer as to how we will make up for the difference made each month when more than 3,000 matches on the database provide the police with the ability to investigate and bring to justice criminals, including some who are convicted of the most serious offences in this country. Opposition Members may for political reasons want to throw that opportunity away, but I do not think the British people want to see that protection done away with.

This is a very straightforward and simple issue. It is, right now, illegal to store the DNA of innocent people over long periods on the DNA database, but as of today, the Government are still doing that. Why?

I have made it very clear to the hon. Gentleman that we have looked in detail at the judgment in the case of S and Marper and we will bring forward proposals very soon—and when we do so, I hope that Opposition Members will engage with them with slightly more sophistication than they have done today.

But this is illegal now, today. Furthermore, it is a principle in our society that people are innocent until proven guilty. This Government have a habit of throwing away many principles in this society, but that is one that should be sacrosanct. In the case of the DNA database, however, they appear happy to abandon the principle. They are also happy to store the data of babies and children. Their actions are clearly morally and legally wrong. Why will they not just stop keeping this data illegally, right now, today? Why will they not stop now?

As the hon. Gentleman knows, there is a period of time during which, quite rightly and reasonably—not least given that the Government’s approach to the retention of data was upheld in the UK courts—there is consideration and proposals are brought forward. That is what the Government are doing, and he obviously was not listening when I said that no DNA of children under the age of 10 is kept on DNA databases now.

Does not the Home Secretary agree that there is a distinction to be drawn between people who have come under reasonable suspicion but for one reason or another are not prosecuted, and instances such as the one we heard about earlier from the Opposition Benches, in which there is a clear case of mistaken identity? Nobody suggests that the other police records of suspects, such as interviews and evidence, should be destroyed just because the suspect is not charged. Does she not agree that a reasonable course of action would be to have an independent body—not the police—that can be appealed to and which can see whether there is a clear case of mistaken identity and whether the person’s DNA ought to be removed?

My hon. Friend is engaging seriously with the difficult issues involved in this debate. It is important to put it on record that the entry of a profile on the DNA database does not cause any detriment to an individual in seeking to do a particular job or looking for clearance for anything, for example. In that way, it is very different from having a police record. I think people are sometimes unclear about that distinction. My hon. Friend makes an important point about the blanket approach taken to retention. That is why in the consultation and proposals we will bring forward, we will look at a system of stepping down individuals over time in terms of the retention of their profile, and a differentiated approach, possibly based on age, risk or the nature of the offence involved.

Illegal Immigrants

4. What recent estimate she has made of the number of illegal immigrants resident in the United Kingdom. (264798)

Since the phasing out of embarkation controls from 1994, no Government have ever been able to produce an accurate figure for the number of people who are in the country illegally. However, with the implementation of our new e-borders system, which the Opposition oppose, by 2010 more than 95 per cent. of non-European economic area foreign nationals will be counted in and out of the country, and that will rise to 100 per cent. by 2014. This is part of the programme of border protection that also includes the global roll-out of fingerprint visas, watch-list checks for all travellers before they arrive or depart from the UK, and identity cards for foreign nationals.

Ministers will recall that many thousands of illegal migrants were found to be working in the security industry, yet last month it was revealed that a mere 35 had been removed. Will the Minister specifically update the House on how many more have been removed since?

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on repeating that question. The answer is on the record—if he wants further details, I shall, of course, write to him.

The Minister will be aware that there are a number of people who have been in this country for a long time without papers, but who nevertheless make a huge contribution to our society, have children and families here and, under article 8 of the European convention on human rights, have a right to family life. Will he look sympathetically at these cases, so that those people, who are making a good contribution to our society, can be brought completely into the fold, as opposed to having to live a semi-legal existence?

Of course, if a person remains in the country illegally and has not been removed, but through no fault of their own, they are in a different situation. I note that my hon. Friend supports the ideas of the Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, in calling for an amnesty in such cases. Our objections to that are first that it is unfair to those who are here legally and are contributing, and secondly that we fear it would act as a further pull factor for even more attempts at illegal immigration.

Two years ago, the Select Committee on Home Affairs took evidence, as part of its immigration services inquiry, from a number of people concerned about the large number of private adoptions, mainly from west African states, many of which never appear on immigration data. What steps have the Government taken since to follow up the recommendations of that report, which recognised the severe concerns of places such as the London borough of Southwark, where a large number of child welfare issues relating to this issue are starting to manifest themselves? What may appear culturally okay to some communities is certainly not okay when it is causing serious child welfare problems in this country.

The hon. Gentleman raises a very important issue, which all Members of the House would recognise, and, as ever, we are grateful to the Home Affairs Committee. A number of policy measures have been put in place on the treatment of children in such a situation, including the identification of parents and of guardians; the work with the local authorities that stemmed from the policy issue; and country-by-country plans—he referred to cultural differences—on which there has been particular co-operation with the Nigerian Government, as Nigeria is one of the main countries we deal with.

Surely the real problem the Minister needs to address is the gross incompetence of Lunar house in dealing with people who have been here so long that they are now parents—they are married to United Kingdom citizens and have English children—yet still cannot get their status regularised. We all know that they are not going to be put out of the country, so why cannot we just address the problem? I encounter hundreds of such cases every year, and I believe my constituency ranks 60th on this issue. Clearly, there is chaos out there and he ought to go down to Lunar house this afternoon to sort it out.

All Members of the House will have recognised frustration over these processes in the past. Together with the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Meg Hillier), to whom I am sure we would all want to send our best wishes for her pregnancy, we have seen an improvement in the processing—the backlog is being dealt with better and more quickly, which is what my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay) is requesting. We will update the Home Affairs Committee with the latest figures very soon.

In answer to the first question the Minister noticeably did not give an estimate of the number of illegal immigrants here. Can he help us with other figures? How many of the people, in one category or another, who are here illegally have been here for more than 10 years, and how many other people’s cases are being dealt with by the Home Office but have not been finally resolved?

The hon. Gentleman pushes and probes me about how many illegal immigrants there are. The answer to that question, as Ministers through the decades have said, is that by definition one does not know. If one did, one would be able to deal with it—

My hon. Friend suggests a job swap, but I am not going down that road.

The Government’s successful attempts to reintroduce counting in and counting out—border controls—mean that, for the first time in decades, we will be able to answer that question. We will therefore be able to deal better with the hon. Gentleman’s second question, the answer to which is not straightforward, because one does not know until one does the cases how many duplicates exist both within our system and with other European Union countries. I note that the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling) opposes our border control measures, and I just ask him how he would control immigration in that respect.

UK Human Trafficking Centre

5. If she will take steps to ensure that the UK Human Trafficking Centre provides training courses on human trafficking for all police forces. (264799)

The UKHTC, in conjunction with the National Policing Improvement Agency, has developed a training programme on human trafficking for all new police recruits, police community support officers, special constables and community officers as part of their core training. In addition, the UKHTC will provide continuous development for the current single points of contact in each force.

In view of the number of trafficked women who have been found outside city centres following police raids under Pentameter 2 and the fact that only one police officer out of 3,500 in Devon and Cornwall constabulary has been on a training course and understands anything about trafficking, can the Minister explain why that force was told recently that the UKHTC will no longer do any training? What are the police supposed to do?

Representing the constituency that he does, the hon. Gentleman is right to make the general point that the victims of human trafficking are not concentrated only in city centres. The evidence from Pentameter 2 was that they can be found in any area of the country, urban or rural. The hon. Gentleman says that only one police officer in his local force has been trained, but he might be referring to the single point of contact. Every police force in the country has a single point of contact, but numerous police officers receive training in human trafficking. For example, every police officer in the country has been sent a DVD produced by UKHTC to raise awareness of the issue. Training in human trafficking is given in the initial police learning and development programme, the special constable initial programme and the PCSO programme. That will be fully in place by the end of this month, and by the end of the year it will be extended to initial training for detectives, domestic violence training, public protection officer training, road policing training and the National Policing Improvement Agency trafficking and senior investigating officer training. That will all be overseen by the UKHTC, and plenty of work is being done to ensure that police officers are aware of that horrible crime, should they come across it.

Will my hon. Friend have a discussion with the Association of Chief Police Officers to try to ensure that police are trained to implement the new prostitution offences in the current Bill in a way that encourages men to report trafficking? The police will need to be trained to do that properly. Will he discuss with Tim Brain or the relevant chief constable how to ensure that that happens?

I thank my hon. Friend for that extremely important question. I shall speak to Tim Brain, chief constable of Gloucestershire, about this matter should the new strict liability offence in the Policing and Crime Bill go through. As the hon. Member for Totnes (Mr. Steen) said, it is one thing to have laws in place, but it is another to ensure that police officers have the training and the confidence to use them.

Although the new strict liability offence is controversial, by changing the way we look at such things and by putting the onus in most circumstances on the man, for the first time, to consider whether the person whom he is paying for sex is being exploited or has been trafficked, we will get a lot further with tackling this crime than we have before. I shall certainly talk to the relevant police officers.

Will the Minister kindly update the House on his conversations with his counterparts in the countries from which many of these people are trafficked? Will he comment in particular on whether any progress has been made in ensuring that those countries take this crime as seriously as it ought to be taken?

In the EU—as we know, some trafficking occurs within the EU—there has certainly been a lot of discussion. The EU trafficking action plan was published just over a year ago. There have been other discussions. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Campbell), attended a conference in Brazil recently where all the countries came together to discuss child exploitation and trafficking. We are supporting numerous charities as they try to highlight the fact that in some countries some offers that seem too good to be true are too good to be true. I expect and hope to go to China and Vietnam in the not-too-distant future to raise the issues there. This is a huge problem that needs global action, not just at EU level but at United Nations level, so that we can ensure that we raise awareness not only in this country but across the globe.

Points-based Immigration System

The points-based system is the most radical reworking of the immigration system in a generation, consolidating approximately 80 work and study routes into five simple tiers. Tiers for highly skilled, skilled and temporary workers have been implemented. The student tier will be introduced later this month. The tier for low-skilled workers is suspended indefinitely.

Many of my constituents enjoy performances by artists who come over under tier 5, yet they have noticed in recent months that there has been a discrepancy in the application of the criterion that states that they should be employed on national minimum wage minimum rates. Sometimes, higher rates are being demanded in order for them to obtain the necessary visas. Will she look into this and ensure that the criteria are applied rigorously and that too much discretion is not being applied?

The relevant codes of practice for performers who come in under the tier 5 criteria indicate that the salary paid should meet the industry minimums, rather than the national minimum wage. They are the standard payment rates set out in the collective agreements of Equity and the Musicians Union, negotiated with other industry bodies. I am sure that notwithstanding the pleasure gained by my hon. Friend’s constituents from performers who come here from overseas, he would not want such performers to be exploited or for high-quality UK performers to be undercut in their opportunities to provide entertainment for his constituents.

The Government have allowed 750,000 work permits over the past five years, four times the previous rate. What steps are being taken to ensure that those from outside the EU who have completed some of those 750,000 visas have returned home before we accept further overseas workers during this recession?

On work permits and the tier 2 situation, I have been very clear that the points-based system would have resulted in 12 per cent. fewer people coming in through that route. I have also been clear that that we will see a fall in the number of people coming in from outside the European economic area over the next year, not least because of the changes that we are making to the points-based system and the way in which we are raising the bar, particularly in terms of the level of skills that we expect from those coming into this country.

One of the core concepts of the points-based system is linking admission to acknowledged and accepted skills shortages in certain categories of job. As the economy tracks downwards, the shortages in some areas will shrink accordingly. How can the Home Secretary reassure the House that the system is sufficiently flexible to respond to rapidly changing economic circumstances?

My hon. Friend raises a very important point about the precise flexibility that we have built into the system. We asked the Migration Advisory Committee, which determines which occupations are shortage occupations, to review the list. It will shortly report to us again on its current assessment of which occupations have shortages. Secondly, we have been clear that if an occupation is in shortage, it does not mean that the only approach should be for us to fill the shortage by bringing in migrant labour. That is why, working with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills, we have already determined that we will use the publication of the shortage occupation list every six months to trigger skills reviews for the jobs listed under those shortage occupations. We will focus on upskilling workers in the UK, making the UK less dependent, even for filling shortages, on migration in the future.

This is a good opportunity for the Home Secretary to be honest about the points-based system. She tends to refer to it as the “Australian-style” points-based system, because we all admire the way in which the Australians deal with immigration. Did she notice that last week, the Australians, who put an annual limit on work permits, reduced that limit? They said that it was prudent to do so in a recession. Will she admit that a Conservative Government could follow that policy, because we will introduce an annual limit, but that she cannot? Will she therefore stop trying to fool people into thinking that we have an Australian-style system? Only under a Conservative Government will we have Australian-style control over immigration numbers.

On the contrary, I have already announced—I reiterated this today—that we have the ability, through the points-based system, to raise the bar. We will do that. The impact of that, alongside the economic circumstances that we face, will be fewer migrants coming to the UK from outside the EEA. We will successfully reduce the number of migrants coming in during these difficult economic times. If we are talking about honesty, as the hon. Gentleman favours a cap, although I do not know what sort of a cap it is—a UK Tory cap—perhaps he would like to give us some background. Perhaps he could say how many people he thinks the cap should cover, what its level should be, and how it could be made more effective, given that it would cover only one in four migrants to this country, whereas the points-based system covers half of them.

Topical Questions

We are on track to introduce identity cards this autumn, and we have already started to issue ID cards for foreign nationals. Next month, we plan to award two contracts for the national identity scheme: one to upgrade our passport application systems, and one for the biometric database to deliver the next generation of passports and ID cards. Later this year, we will award the ID contract itself. As is normal, the contracts have been written to protect the public purse, with standard clauses on what would happen in the event of termination. Cancellation of the ID cards contract, and partial termination of the application and database contracts, would cost about £40 million in the early years. Therefore, as I have made clear on many occasions, scrapping ID cards and the identity database will not free up a large fund of money to spend on other priorities.

I thank the Home Secretary for that answer. She will be aware, because I have written to her Department, that Devon and Cornwall police force has decided not to discipline a police officer who used police cars for his own personal use. Does she share my concern, and the concern of my constituents, that that is an entirely inappropriate use of police property, and does she agree that action should be taken?

I am aware of the case that my hon. Friend refers to, and I have written to her about it as I know it is a matter of concern to her. Perhaps I could meet her so that we may discuss it in more detail.

As the Secretary of State knows, Scotland is experiencing long-term population decline, which might well be made more difficult with the points-based system. Why does she not seriously consider the positive suggestion that skilled migrant workers be given extra points if they opt to go to Scotland, as opposed to one of the pressure points in England? That is what happens under the points-based system in Australia, where some states have had the same difficulties as Scotland.

Some of the skills shortages on the skills shortage list that Professor Metcalf identified apply in Scotland, but without the introduction of internal border controls—perhaps the hon. Gentleman would like to see that—

T4. Will my right hon. Friend look into wheel clamping companies, particularly those that have been abusing the system? There are some reputable companies and some that are not. (264823)

Yes, which is why I asked the Security Industry Authority to carry out a feasibility study into the regulation of wheel clamping companies. Although I know that there are legitimate companies operating in this area, there are, as many Members have seen, too many companies that operate to the detriment of our constituents, that are roguish, to say the least, and that should be regulated. We will introduce proposals for regulation in the near future.

T2. Although some aspects of the new e-Borders system, such as reinstating exit checks, are welcome, there is widespread concern about the extent of the data that will be collected, so will the Secretary of State clarify exactly what information will need to be provided by innocent citizens travelling abroad, and for how long it will be held? (264821)

I thank the hon. Lady for giving me the opportunity to answer that question. The e-Borders programme has been running for four years, and the data collected and the use to which they are put is and has been available for some time on the Home Office website and in agency information. I can reassure the hon. Lady that the data are not misused, as some have rather mischievously alleged, but I come back to my point in answer to the spokesman for the Opposition, the hon. Member for Ashford (Damian Green), that immigration controls and management are possible only if there is counting in and counting out, which requires a data base.

T6. As a result of the great efforts of the police, the crime and drugs partnership, and the local strategic partnership, One Nottingham, the number of crimes in Nottingham over the past three years has fallen by 26,000, saving the taxpayer £52 million. Will my hon. Friends have a word with their Treasury colleagues and ask whether we can incentivise cities such as Nottingham and enable them to borrow against that saving, and perhaps create a Nottingham investment bond, to push crime down further and give people some tangible reward when they do a good job of reducing crime? (264825)

That is an interesting idea from my hon. Friend, and I will talk to Treasury colleagues. I am not sure—or perhaps I am sure—what the answer will be, but I will speak to my colleagues in the Treasury about it. Obviously, I know Nottingham well, as that is where my constituency is. I congratulate my hon. Friend on the work that he has done with One Nottingham, and Alan Given and everyone else on their work running it. Crime has dropped significantly in Nottingham as a result of the work that my hon. Friend and others associated with One Nottingham have done. One of the most important things to which my hon. Friend draws attention and to which One Nottingham has drawn attention, is that not only is enforcing the law important, but that if we are to bring about change over time, the early intervention that my hon. Friend has pioneered and passionately argued for time and again is crucial. Breaking the cycle of crime and deprivation is surely one of the great social challenges that we all face.

T3. Will the Home Secretary or the Minister take a careful look at the case of the Rizk family, who face the prospect of being deported to an uncertain future in Egypt? Their son Marin has autistic spectrum disorder, for which there is no specialist provision in that country; the family fear discrimination as a result. The family run a successful supermarket in my constituency, and because of their hard work they have mobilised community support. More than 900 people have signed a petition supporting them. Will the Home Secretary or the Minister meet me to discuss the case, and particularly the family’s fear of discrimination? (264822)

Of course I will meet the hon. Gentleman if he wishes to push the case of his constituents; it is right that he should ask, and right that I should meet him. From his campaign, I have become personally familiar with some of the details of the case. I simply say, although not directly in relation to this case, that when such concerns are raised by hon. Members, they come after the independent judicial tribunal system has looked at the relevant situations. However, I will make arrangements to meet the hon. Gentleman.

T5. Does the Home Secretary think it appropriate for MPs to intervene to stop judicial proceedings before the High Court? In particular, did she think it appropriate for the Chairman of her departmental Select Committee to intervene in the case of— (264824)

Order. I must stop the hon. Gentleman. The purpose of Question Time is to question Ministers on their actions, not to criticise a right hon. Member of the House. That is not what Ministers are here for, and it is wrong of the hon. Gentleman to make such comments.

T8. Will my right hon. Friend look carefully at the statements made by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary about the possibility of genocide and human rights abuses in Sri Lanka when she next considers the status of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on the list of proscribed organisations in the UK? (264827)

The proscription of every proscribed organisation is reviewed annually. Those reviews seek to establish whether the organisation remains concerned with terrorism according to the definitions set out in the Terrorism Act 2000, and therefore whether the proscription should be maintained. The status of the LTTE has been reviewed in the past six months as part of that process. It is open to anybody affected by an organisation’s proscription to apply to me for the removal of the organisation from the proscribed list.

There are now nearly 100 special constables in Colchester. The number has been boosted significantly in the past year under a system whereby the local business community releases staff in company time to train quickly to become special constables. May I ask the Home Secretary about what measures the Government are taking to roll out that successful programme across the country?

The hon. Gentleman is right; the specials do a really important job in policing our country. He is also right to point out the existence of employer-supported policing programmes as a further development. The Home Office has funded nine regional co-ordinators across the country, based in each police region. It will be their responsibility to ensure that we recruit not only more specials but more employers to the cause, so that they release people to become specials in their communities. As the hon. Gentleman will know, the commitment is to pay those employees at their normal wage for at least two days a month, so that they can conduct special policing. I should also say that the Home Office has also taken part in the scheme; 12 Home Office staff work as special constables. I hope that that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question.

T10. Dealing with antisocial behaviour in Mitcham town centre is a top priority for the Figges Marsh safer neighbourhood team. Can my right hon. Friend understand why Merton council officials and police officers, none of whom lives in the area, decided not to renew the dispersal zone—and without consulting local residents, local councillors or me, the local MP? (264829)

As my hon. Friend will know, dispersal orders are time-limited and their renewal depends very much on the effect that they have had on the problem concerned. Our view is that such decisions are best resolved locally by police, working with local agencies and residents.

In an interdependent world economy, a regular, though limited, flow of migrant workers is inevitable, necessary and desirable. Given that immigration policy should be driven at least in part by considerations of economic need, and certainly not by the worst prejudices of the tabloids, can the Home Secretary confirm that the advisory report submitted to her by the Migration Advisory Committee, the better to inform public policy, will always be published?

We set up the independent Migration Advisory Committee precisely to provide the evidence to enable the flexibility within the points-based system that allows it to be used as we designed it to be used—for the benefit of the UK. Yes, we do publish the committee’s reports.

I welcome the long overdue reintroduction of embarkation controls. Can the Minister tell me for how long those data will be kept?

The programme has been running for four years; following its pilot project, we are now rolling it out. There are two sources of data within that, and they are kept for 10 years.

Returning to the DNA database, the Secretary of State will know that West Midlands police took a DNA sample from me after the death of my uncle, Leslie Ince, in February 2007. After a two-year-long murder inquiry, the police now maintain that he died accidentally. Why, despite three written requests over the past 18 months, am I still being refused the return of my DNA sample? Does she agree that, like hundreds of thousands of others, my connection to any crime is extremely remote? Indeed, I am now told that there was no crime. Does she not understand why hundreds of thousands of innocent people are led to the inexorable conclusion that she is building a national DNA database by stealth?

No, I am building a national DNA database that enabled us, last year alone, to solve 17,614 crimes, with a further 15,000 detections. On more than 3,000 occasions every month, the police are enabled to help to solve crimes, to clear the innocent, to pursue investigations effectively, and to keep this country safe.

Spring European Council

With permission, Mr. Speaker, I shall make a statement on the European Council held in Brussels last Thursday and Friday, which I attended with the Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary, and which once again emphasised the importance of European and international co-operation to address this financial crisis.

In October and November, all European and then G20 countries agreed to recapitalise the banks. In November, both the European Union and the G20 agreed on co-ordinated fiscal action to support employment and growth. Just as in the previous summit in December, Europe led the way towards a global climate change deal, which we hope to secure in Copenhagen later this year. Europe has now made proposals in advance of the G20 meeting in London to reshape the global financial and trading system and to do what is necessary to build economic recovery across the world.

First, we agreed that the global challenges we face today cannot be met if nations turn inwards to a protectionism that—history tells us—in the end protects no one. Our agreement to

“avoid all forms of protectionist measures”

will require careful monitoring by the World Trade Organisation. The Council agreed to encourage international trade by facilitating more trade credits, and the Council called for a

“swift conclusion of bilateral trade negotiations and of the…Doha Development Agenda.”

Secondly, we agreed measures to put to the G20 for global agreements to reshape the regulation of banks and financial services. We agreed that all systemically important institutions should be subject to appropriate regulation and oversight, and that this would extend to include hedge funds and the shadow banking sector. We pledged to protect the world’s financial system from non-transparent, non-co-operative and loosely regulated jurisdictions, including offshore centres and tax havens. We welcome the progress that has already been made by Switzerland, Austria, Andorra, Lichtenstein and other countries, and look forward to seeing them implement the international standard—[Interruption.]

Order. The way we do things is that we hear the statement that the Prime Minister has to make, and then questions are asked of him.

We call on all countries yet to endorse the OECD standard to do so urgently.

The Council also agreed to improve supervisory co-operation by pushing forward with colleges of supervisors for all major cross-border financial institutions. We also agreed to adopt international principles on remuneration in the financial sector, based on an approach that rewards long-term success rather than excessive risk-taking. We called on the Council and the European Parliament

“to rapidly reach agreement on the legislative acts relating to credit rating agencies, the solvency of insurance companies, the capital requirements for banks, and cross-border payments and electronic money”.

At its next meeting in June, the Council will take its first decisions on regulation and supervision following the de Larosière report. Our policy is that regulatory rules should be set at an international level but that direct supervision is a matter for our national authorities.

The Council was clear that by acting together, the European Union can

“put its financial sector on a sound footing, get credit flowing to the real economy and protect its citizens from the worst impacts of the crisis”,

as well as helping to build a stronger economy for the future. The Council welcomed the Commission’s proposal to double, to €50 billion, balance of payments assistance so that those within the European Union have the support they need to deliver the fiscal stimulus required to ensure their recovery. But with global capital flows in 2008 down by more than 80 per cent. compared with 2007, and with the financing gap for emerging economies this year up to $800 billion, this is not just an issue for central European, eastern European and emerging economies. Because of the continuing risk of contagion, it is an issue for every country in the world. It is vital that we increase the resources available to the International Monetary Fund to ensure that it can intervene to stabilise economies, stop the crisis spreading, and return the global economy to growth.

The Council called for a very substantial increase in resources available to the IMF, and agreed that, for their contribution to this increase, EU member states should as a first step provide on a voluntary basis a fast temporary support of IMF lending capacity in the form of a loan of over $100 billion. The Council called for continued

“international coordination of fiscal stimulus measures.”

It agreed that:

“Good progress has been made in implementing the…Economic Recovery Plan”,

and that while we must ensure fiscal sustainability in the medium term,

“the size of the fiscal effort (around 3.3 per cent. of EU GDP or over €400 billion) will generate new investments, boost demand, create jobs and help the EU move to a low-carbon economy.”

We agreed a further €5 billion to be invested in stimulus projects in energy security, renewable energy and broadband. The agreement provides for at least €220 million of additional investment in UK carbon capture and storage and offshore wind projects.

We have seen an unprecedented fiscal injection in almost every major economy: in France, a package worth €26 billion with further recent measures worth €2.6 billion; in Spain, an infrastructure package worth €11 billion alongside other measures, with the IMF estimating a total stimulus of 2.3 per cent. of GDP; and in Germany, not one but two fiscal stimulus packages totalling €82 billion—1.5 per cent. of its GDP this year and 2 per cent. of GDP in 2010. As the Council concluded, Europe’s determination is

“to do what is necessary to restore jobs and growth.”

The Council also reached important conclusions on energy security and climate change, on the eastern partnership and the relationship with the United States. The Council remains committed to working for a worldwide and comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen. Following the December council, Europe became the first continent in history to make legally binding the detailed policies required to set itself on a path to a low-carbon economy. There is a commitment to a 30 per cent. reduction in emissions, provided that other countries make comparable commitments according to their capabilities. But our success in Copenhagen will depend on unlocking negotiations with developing countries. The Council therefore agreed that within the framework of a future comprehensive climate agreement, the European Union will take on its fair share of financing for green technologies, reducing deforestation and protecting the poorest from the impacts of climate change.

The global economic downturn is no time to walk away from our commitments to the developing world. The Council agreed that Europe should continue to play a leading role in supporting developing countries in order to avoid jeopardising the progress achieved in recent years and undermining their economic and political stability. The Council agreed that commitments to increase development assistance and to deliver on the millennium development goals must be honoured. The Council also emphasised the importance of promoting stability, good governance and economic development in the eastern neighbourhood.

Finally, in looking ahead to the informal EU-US summit to be held in Prague next month, the Council welcomed the inauguration of President Obama and reaffirmed the strategic importance of transatlantic relations. At this moment of international economic crisis, we are showing that Europe and the world can work together to achieve co-ordinated interest rate cuts, substantial fiscal stimulus, banking reform, new rules for tax havens and new rules for remuneration. I commend this statement to the House.

Before asking the Prime Minister about his statement today, may I ask him about reporting back to the House on the outcome of next week’s G20? Given that it is taking place on the day when the House rises, will he consider making a statement that evening?

Before turning to the economy, I welcome what the Prime Minister says in the communiqué about the climate change agreement in Copenhagen. I also agree with what he says about the importance of not walking away from developing countries at this time.

On the economy, I want to ask about trade, financial reform and the recession in Europe. First, on trade, this communiqué talks about the importance of the Doha round, but frankly, so did the last one and the one before that. Since then we have seen “Buy America” programmes from the US Congress, higher agricultural tariffs in India, French Ministers boasting of repatriating jobs from Slovenia back to France and the Prime Minister talking about “British jobs for British workers”. The task of the London summit should be urgently to agree the key issues of the Doha round. That should be the key aim. Will the Prime Minister confirm that the existing trade rules in fact allow countries to double their revenues from tariffs? Is freezing existing tariffs not a pretty minimum acceptable outcome for the London summit?

Secondly, on financial rules and financial reform, we need rules that force banks to hold more capital when the economy is strong. We have been pressing for such counter-cyclical capital requirements for more than a year now. Will this communiqué mean that that actually happens, and do we not need the same sense of urgency when it comes to the supervisory colleges of regulators? The Prime Minister’s office announced that they would be established by the summer, but the communiqué is now talking about it happening by the end of 2009. Can the Prime Minister tell us whether the deadline has slipped?

I agree with the Prime Minister that it is better to have co-ordination than a single European regulator that overrides national regulation, but would it not be easier to resist such a European regulator if he would accept that the tripartite system that he put in place in 1997 simply has not worked and needs reform? Does he not need to admit that clearly and frankly today?

Next, on recession in Europe, the Prime Minister repeatedly lectures everyone in this House and beyond that he is uniquely forging a consensus in Europe on how to deal with recession. Does not that claim now look completely ridiculous? Are there not three examples of that? The first is whether we in Britain can afford a fiscal stimulus, the second what that stimulus should consist of, and the third whether he is any good at actually implementing the measures that he has announced. Let me take each in turn.

There will be a question if you are patient.

Is it not remarkable—that is a question—that today the CBI, which is the organisation responsible for representing businesses large and small, said—[Interruption.] Labour Members should perhaps spend a bit less time filling out their expenses and listen to the CBI. The CBI said that

“a further significant fiscal stimulus is unaffordable and would lead to businesses and households retrenching”.

Instead, the CBI says, the Chancellor needs to

“deliver a clear and credible”—[Interruption.]

Order. Mr. Austin, for a few months you have been quiet, and now you have begun to shout again. You just cannot do that. I keep telling you that you cannot do it. By the way, Ms Thornberry, the right hon. Gentleman is in order. If he were out of order, I would be the first to tell him. It would not be you telling him, it would be me. How is that?

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I thought the hon. Gentleman was getting better, too, but I am an optimist.

The CBI says that the Chancellor

“needs to… deliver a clear and credible plan for restoring the public finances to health”.

Is not the CBI right and the Prime Minister wrong?

Last week, we had the worst set of public finance figures in our peacetime history. We are forecast to have the largest budget deficit of any G20 economy next year—almost twice as large as for the G20 as a whole. Is the view in Europe not clear? As the German Chancellor says:

“We should not be competing for the most unrealistic fiscal stimulus”.

Is she not right?

Let me put it another way. This week, the Prime Minister goes to south America. Will he confirm that only one country in the whole of south America entered recession with a higher deficit than Britain—not Argentina, not Paraguay, not Uruguay and not Ecuador, which all managed to balance the books better than the Prime Minister? Is it not something when the British Prime Minister has to go to a conference in Latin America to get a lecture on fiscal responsibility and prudence?

The Prime Minister is criticised in Europe for not only affordability, but the make-up of his stimulus. No one else is copying his policy of cutting VAT. Indeed, the consensus in Europe is that it made things worse. The French President said:

“We won’t be repeating Gordon Brown’s mistakes”

and that the VAT cut had “absolutely not worked”. The German Finance Minister said that the debt will take a generation to pay off.

The Prime Minister is not only wrong about affordability and VAT; everyone thinks that he is getting implementation wrong, too. Can he not see that, when his various schemes exist only in a press release, they do not help build confidence and instead destroy it? The home owners mortgage support scheme and the recruitment subsidies for the unemployed were announced months ago, but are still not available. Should he not listen to the German Chancellor, who said that

“if we want to make a real impact, you really must implement the package first before you talk about the next step”?

Instead of listening to his lectures, we should all be clear about what the Prime Minister is delivering—a longer recession than the United States or the eurozone, the fastest rise in unemployment since records began and the worst public sector deficit in British peacetime history. When will the Prime Minister understand the need for change? Should that change not start with his acknowledging properly and apologising for the mistakes that have led this country to that position? Is it not time to start now, with “Sorry”?

I will deal with each point in turn, but is the central point not that, in the face of a global recession, unemployment and a loss of output, alone in Europe and alone in the rest of the world, isolated even from the Conservative party in Europe, the Conservatives’ only response to the recession is to cut public services and public spending, except for the £200,000 that 3,000 people will get in inheritance tax?

Our priorities are to raise the pension for everyone, which we are doing; to raise child benefit for everyone, which we have done; and to ensure a VAT cut for everyone. The Conservative party’s policy is a £2 billion tax cut for the smallest number of people in Britain—the 3,000 people who will benefit from an inheritance tax cut. Is it not time for the Conservatives to face up to the fact that their policy is a 6p a week cut in the licence fee for the many and a £200,000 cut in inheritance tax for the few? Usually in times of difficulty, the few who have money help the many; only the Conservative party says that, in times of difficulty, the many should come to the aid of the few. [Interruption.] What am I on about? I am on about the Conservative policy, which Conservative Members say is a priority. At a time of crisis, they say that there is nothing for pensions, nothing for child benefit, nothing for public services except cuts, but tell us today that they are going ahead with an inheritance tax cut, which will help 3,000 people and give them £200,000 each. At least the shadow shadow Chancellor spotted that that was a difficulty, but he is not here because he is so out of synch with the Conservative party. He disagrees on VAT, the married couple’s allowance, Europe, and now the inheritance tax cut. The Conservative party is out of touch with the rest of the country. [Interruption.] They will have to face up to that one day—their priority is an inheritance tax cut for the few, whereas ours is to help the many.

As to trade—[Hon. Members: “Hooray.”] I know that the Conservatives are grateful that we have moved off what I will be coming back to in a minute. As to trade, we are working with the developing countries to see whether we can get a trade deal, but I have to tell the right hon. Gentleman that the problem is not Britain or Europe. The problem on the trade deal—as he would see, if the Conservatives were serious about it and if they wanted to face up to it—is that we have to get an agreement between America and India on very difficult and sensitive negotiations, which we are trying to move forward.

As for the colleges of supervisors, which the right hon. Gentleman mentioned, I have to tell him that instead of none having been established, as he said, 25 colleges of supervisors have been established to cover the financial institutions right across the world.

As far as delivery of policies is concerned, the right hon. Gentleman might want to notice that 90,000 companies are already benefiting from the schemes that we have put in place. He might want to know also that large numbers of people are benefiting from the greater support that we are giving in income support to those who are unemployed and who need help with their mortgages. None of those policies is supported by the Conservative party.

As for the right hon. Gentleman’s quotations of Chancellor Merkel, President Sarkozy and other European leaders, is it not remarkable that he is trying to quote them in evidence the week after he walked away from the European People’s party and linked up with the Czech forum, which says that there is no problem with climate change, and the Polish party of law and order—[Interruption.] I have to say to the Conservatives that they are isolated from the German Christian Democrats, that they are isolated from the French Conservative party of President Sarkozy and that they are now isolated from the party of Mr. Berlusconi in Italy. The Conservatives are out of touch with the European mainstream—so much so that the President of the Commission has criticised them, as has the President of the Parliament, and the chambers of commerce have said that it is a matter of regret that they are moving to the fringes in this country.

As for the delivery of policies, let me be absolutely clear that in every area in which we are working, we are trying to move forward, but that requires money. The only party that is refusing to support a fiscal stimulus is the Conservative party. It is the Conservatives who are out of step with Europe; it is they who are out of touch with public opinion; and it is they who are out of their depth when it comes to dealing with the economy.

I thank the Prime Minister for his statement, in which there is much to welcome. The principle of a common European framework of regulation in financial services is a significant step forward, and one that we have been advocating for many years. There will continue to be differences in detail—he alluded to them himself—but the principle of cross-border regulation of cross-border finance will be welcomed by all but the most small-minded Eurosceptics. The eastern partnership with countries such as Georgia and Ukraine is also welcome, not least because of Russia’s sometimes belligerent attitude towards its neighbours.

I remember in years gone by that the whole of Europe would groan every time the Prime Minister made another tub-thumping speech about how superior his policies were to everybody else’s, so it is good that the idea finally appears to have dawned on him that he does not have all the answers and that he might even have a thing or two to learn from our European Union neighbours. Is the problem not now that, even with a touch of new-found humility, it is hard for him to lead at the G20 summit and in the European Union, because he does not practise at home what he preaches to them abroad? Would his rhetoric about stopping protectionism not pack more of a punch if he had not indulged in populist rhetoric about “British jobs for British workers”? Would his words about cracking down on tax havens not be more compelling if he had not presided for 12 years over industrial scale tax avoidance by British banks and big businesses here in Britain?

When the Prime Minister tries to act as President Obama’s agent in Europe and persuade his European counterparts to issue another fiscal stimulus, would those leaders not listen to him more if he had not blown £12.5 billion on his wasteful VAT cut? Would those leaders not be more likely to listen to his recommendation that economic recovery must be driven by green investment if he was actually making those investments at home, rather than talking—as he did the other week—about 400,000 fantasy green jobs, which he has no idea how to create? If he had used the VAT money, as we proposed, to invest in public transport and in a transformation of our housing stock, he could have created 100,000 new jobs starting right now.

It is becoming increasingly clear that it will be difficult for Britain to afford a sustained, major new fiscal stimulus to boost our economy. Is it not therefore clear that we must take drastic action to ensure that we stop wasting any more money on things that do not create jobs? Will the Prime Minister commit immediately to cancelling the VAT cut and investing what money there is left in green transport, in the insulation of our homes, schools and hospitals, and in jobs? Did he not wonder, as he looked round the table at the other EU leaders at the summit, why not one of them had copied his cut in sales tax? Will he admit that they were right to choose to invest money in jobs instead?

The right hon. Gentleman wants us to spend money on insulating homes, and we are doing that. He wants us to spend money on investing in schools, and we are investing more than in any previous year. He wants us to invest money in hospitals, and we are doing more than we have done. I thought that he would support the £44 billion of public investment that is being put into the economy, instead of failing to support it today.

As far as tax havens are concerned, in every Budget since 1997 we have tried to crack down on the use of tax havens. We have taken action that, since 2005, has secured £14 billion of funds that would otherwise have been lost in tax avoidance. We know that we have to get a global agreement, however, and that is why we are pressing other countries to sign up to the international standards that are necessary. That means that Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Hong Kong and Singapore—areas that have been regarded as tax havens in the past—have got to come within the net. [Interruption.] And, yes, other parts of the world have got to come in, and I hope that the Opposition will join us in demanding that.

As far as the low-carbon recovery is concerned, the right hon. Gentleman should know that we are investing, and ready to invest, as I announced today, in major projects of energy infrastructure—[Interruption.]

Order. Mr. Mackay, you are another regular who seems to want to shout across the Chamber, particularly at the Prime Minister. You are down to ask a question, but you cannot keep shouting and then expect to be called.

As I was saying, the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Clegg) can be sure that we are investing in low-carbon projects, and that we want to continue to do so. On the fiscal stimulus, I am not surprised that he is opposing it now. The reason for that is that he is committed to £20 billion of public spending cuts.

Is it not appropriate that the Prime Minister should seek consensus within the European Union, within the group of 20 and with the United States of America at the meeting in Prague next month in relation to the first global recession, and that he should link it with climate change proposals and, not forgetting the less developed world, with the millennium development goals? Is it not a pity, or even a tragedy, that the whole House cannot support that consensus?

This is a global problem that requires global solutions. I do not think that anybody in our country is in any doubt about that. There are four problems that must be solved if the global economy and our global society are to work better in the future. The first is financial instability, and that is why we are proposing the measures that we are proposing. The second is climate change and the need for energy that must be met in the future, which is why we are looking forward to a Copenhagen agreement. The third is security for people in a world of greater mobility and yet greater terrorism, and we have to deal with that as a global problem as well. The fourth is the poverty and inequality that led us to propose the millennium development goals in the first place. Everybody knows that those problems cannot be solved by Britain, America or any other country alone; they can be solved only by the world working together.

I saw pictures at the weekend of the Prime Minister engaging in a lot of back-slapping and bonhomie with President Sarkozy of France. Does he think that, as a result of his conversations, President Sarkozy will implement a VAT cut, as we have here?

The right hon. Gentleman is the first to say that we should not all do everything in exactly the same way in Europe. It is important to get a fiscal stimulus, but it is also important that countries choose the way in which they want to do that, as he will always acknowledge. We have chosen to do certain things, as have the French and the Germans. What is common, however, is that they are in favour of a fiscal stimulus and not, like the Conservatives, in favour of public spending cuts.

Is it not time that the whole House, including the Opposition parties, recognised that the Government have been absolutely right to attach the highest priority to stabilising the banking system? Is it not the case that the more we learn about the Royal Bank of Scotland, the more we realise that its shareholders and customers are entitled to become angrier and angrier? In view of the reports in certain newspapers, it is really no excuse for independent directors to say that they might have lost their jobs if they had stood up to the senior officers; surely that is the purpose of having independent directors.

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. Independent directors are there not to rubber stamp decisions made by management, but to question them and to hold management accountable. I think that the Walker review, which is looking at the role of directors and people who sit on the boards of financial institutions, will conclude that a change of behaviour in the boardrooms is necessary. I think the whole country is angry at the practices we have seen in the Royal Bank of Scotland, and we condemn them.

On Second Reading of the Bank of England Bill in November 1997, the Prime Minister may remember that I strongly opposed the triangular regulation of our banks, which has proved such a disaster. In today’s circumstances, facing as we are the danger of mass unemployment for years to come in this country and throughout Europe, may I repeat what I indicated before the pre-Budget report—that I am a strong believer in fiscal stimuli, well chosen in every advanced country in the world, together with quantitative easing to maintain consumer demand, if we are to avoid the terrible mistakes made in Germany 80 years ago by Chancellor Bruning, from whom the present German Chancellor has mercifully learned the right lessons?

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his comments. When the private sector fails, and when banks fail and falter, it is the Government’s duty to step in. If we are to have the level of economic activity in the economy that we want, there needs to be monetary activism, as the hon. Gentleman proposed, and also fiscal activism. I cannot see how the Conservative party can continue to resist the idea that we should have, as we are having, a fiscal stimulus in the economy. The CBI supported our fiscal stimulus and wanted it to happen in November when we announced it. It has supported the measures we have taken.

I welcome the fact that the European Council has adopted many of the ideas that the Prime Minister has advocated consistently now for months—a co-ordinated response on regulation and, yes, on a huge fiscal stimulus. Is it not extraordinary to get the same vacuous and juvenile posturing from the Leader of the Opposition when unemployment is 7.6 per cent. across the European Union and expected to rise to more than 10 per cent., with about 5 million jobs still to be lost across the EU? What we need in that context is huge public investment: the Tories simply will not learn the lessons of the 1930s and, yes, their own failure in the 1980s to tackle these problems through the power of government, using a fiscal stimulus to do so.

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. It is right at this time to use the Government’s powers to help people who are unemployed, to help mortgage holders with their mortgages and to help small businesses get the funds that they need. Of all the parties I know across Europe, only this Conservative party is saying that there should be public spending cuts: the German, the French and other conservative, right-wing Governments have supported fiscal stimuli. The Tories cannot walk away from the fact that they are the only party calling for public spending cuts.

During the course of the Council, was there any discussion of the impact of the present financial crisis on defence budgets? Was there any discussion of the extent to which the countries of Europe are not fulfilling their obligations to NATO? In that regard, was there any discussion of increased defence co-operation and, in particular, the need to embrace the principles of force specialisation, interoperability and common procurement?

These matters are more appropriate for the NATO summit on 2 and 3 April. I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will understand that there will be a big discussion of all those issues at that summit. I think he will find that we are meeting our obligations; I think he will find that our defence budget has continued to rise; and I think he will find that other countries of Europe are aware of their responsibilities.

The Prime Minister is right that the restoration of confidence in the financial sector and reforms depends very much on increasing transparency, oversight and regulation. With that in mind, will he turn the minds of his colleagues to the least transparent and least regulated part: credit default swaps? In that area at least, will he attempt to get as much unity as possible for a clearing-house mechanism that can introduce transparency and regulation, rather than the current free-for-all with over-the-counter dealings?

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who has taken an interest in the matter and written to me about the issues. We have looked at credit default swaps, and will continue to look at the risks and dangers that they pose. Obviously, the best way of dealing with such a problem is international action. We will consult with our colleagues at the time of the G20.

Does the Prime Minister recognise that his financial stimuli and counter-cyclical investments have helped some parts of the UK, particularly the financial sector in the south-east of England, unfortunately without much benefit outside that area? When he next talks about public, taxpayers’ investment, will he consider the effects on the rest of the UK? Precious little is filtering through to other parts of the UK, as we saw in last week’s unemployment and job creation figures.

Every pensioner in the United Kingdom got the benefit of the pension rise, every family got the benefit of the child benefit rise that started from the beginning of January, and every family has got the benefit of the cut in VAT, which extends to the whole of the United Kingdom. Also, every community is getting the benefit of further public investment, which we have instructed to be advanced to help keep jobs in our economy. So I disagree with the hon. Gentleman: the benefits that we are trying to spread to the whole of the country to deal with the crisis include benefits to Wales.

In his statement, the Prime Minister rightly highlighted the need to have economic stability, good governance and economic development in the eastern neighbourhood. Were there any discussions on some countries, particularly Romania, which, although they are in the European Union, still have considerable internal problems with good governance, about how they can be helped with not only their economic problems but their internal governance problems?

As you know, Mr. Speaker, some changes have taken place in Romania, and it is important to remind it of its responsibilities. If it signs up, as it is doing, to the European Union, it must meet the test of democracy. The European Union has that explicit test to enable members to join, and Romania is not excluded from that test.

In discussing the financial crisis with his colleagues at the Council, did the Prime Minister draw to their attention the important report of the National Audit Office on the nationalisation of Northern Rock? Did he consider with them the lessons that can be learned from the report’s finding that in 2004 the Treasury over which he presided was specifically warned that we were ill-equipped to deal with a systemic banking crisis, but decided that the issue was not a high priority? Does he now regret his failure to take that warning seriously?

Long after 2004, we did a number of exercises with the American authorities about what we would do in situations in which individual banks collapsed and about whether there was a systemic crisis as a result. Far from not taking action, we did take action and looked at what the global repercussions of individual bank failures would be. We talked to the United States Treasury and Federal Reserve and the regulators. The right hon. and learned Gentleman must recognise that Northern Rock, among other companies in the United Kingdom, was buying assets, from the United States of America, which were at that time labelled triple A but which turned out to be absolutely worthless. So there is also a failure in international regulation, which must be dealt with. I hope that he will agree that the measures that we are taking at the G20 are the right ones to take.

Forty per cent. of the jobless in the United Kingdom are under 25, and we face the prospect of rapidly rising unemployment this year, especially as young people leave education. What did my Friend learn from his counterparts across the European Union about what can be done specifically to help young people into work?

I can tell my hon. Friend what we are doing. We are determined to ensure that school leavers who leave in the summer are given the best possible chance to obtain training or jobs, or to stay on in further education if that is what they wish to do. We will be introducing measures to ensure that as many young people as possible are given that benefit, and I am sure that the same will be happening in other parts of Europe.

Did the Prime Minister have a chance to discuss with his colleagues at the Council the five European Union directives that are in the pipeline, all of which could impose considerable costs on employers? I am sure he agrees that at a time of high and rising unemployment, the last thing that we ought to be doing is imposing additional costs on employers, whether they are in the public or the private sector. Would he consider giving a lead in Europe in calling for a moratorium on regulation that imposes costs on employers until the recession is over?

Environmental and other regulations have been put forward by the European Union. Part of our promise of a low-carbon recovery is that we will be able to make progress on the environment. I will of course look at what the hon. Gentleman called the five regulations—although he did not name them—and will write to him.

The European Council’s pledge to protect the world’s financial systems from opaque and unco-operative tax havens is naturally good news, but will the Prime Minister tell us how he intends to implement that in our own country? We have four major banking groups. Two are effectively under national ownership and might be expected to respond to leverage on co-operation, but the other two—HSBC and Barclays—have long promoted tax evasion and avoidance schemes using offshore tax havens. How will the Prime Minister secure their co-operation?

Tax evasion is illegal, and we are dealing with it in the ways in which we can. If anyone has evidence of tax evasion, they should supply it to the prosecuting authorities. As for tax avoidance schemes, every Budget attempts to deal with the problems that arise from tax avoidance. We introduced new rules in 2005, and, as I have said, about £14 billion in revenues has been saved as a result. However, anyone who has any evidence of tax evasion should tell us.

Whatever people’s degree of enthusiasm for the European Union, it is commonly accepted that the free movement of people, goods, services and capital is a huge achievement, and that anything that undermined it would be very destructive of prosperity. In the light of that, when we reach the G20 may we have not just another mantra about the evils of protectionism, but a promise of some action to promote free trade and combat protectionism? Will we see an agreement among our leaders that they will stop this competitive playing to the protectionist gallery, which simply encourages sentiments that will destroy jobs, and to which the Prime Minister himself is not immune?

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. At the G20 we will receive a report from Mr. Lamy, the head of the World Trade Organisation, about any protectionist measures that have been taken by individual countries over the last few months. The WTO will continue to monitor that protection, and will report to us regularly. As for the promotion of trade, we are anxious to facilitate trade by making available what has been missing for many months: the level of export credits and trade support that is necessary for world trade to resume, and for us to secure the growth in world trade that is necessary for recovery.

Will my right hon. Friend help the House by answering this question? How many jobs would be secured by a cut in inheritance tax?

If we were looking for job creation measures, that would not be at the top of the agenda. I remind Members that while the Conservatives are proposing public spending cuts in every other area, they are proposing to spend £2 billion on the estates of a very small number of people. I believe that they should think again.

What reassurance and hope can be offered to those who, 20 years ago, were citizens of the Warsaw pact and placed their hope and their trust in responsible capitalism, but who now feel that their world is falling about them, and feel totally disillusioned?

The hon. Gentleman is right. We have a huge problem in parts of eastern and central Europe, because German banks, Austrian banks, Italian banks, Belgian banks and even British banks are having to withdraw, or are withdrawing, to their own home bases. What we therefore need is an international effort to help individual countries that do not have resources of their own with which to rebuild their banking systems. That is why the European Union has raised its balance of payments assistance to those countries, and that is why when we meet at the G20 we will want the International Monetary Fund to have the additional resources that are necessary to deal with crises. But we do not want just to deal with crises; we want to prevent crises, so we will have to look at better mechanisms by which we can help those countries of central and eastern Europe that are being let down by the current financial crisis.

I strongly welcome the Prime Minister’s belief in more transparency. In that spirit, can he now tell us how much taxpayers’ money is at risk in bank support and bank guarantees and in all the off-balance-sheet devices this Government have gone in for? The British public have a right to know how much of their money is at risk.

This is the man who told us:

“We see no need to continue to regulate the provision of mortgage finance”.

This is the man who kept pressing us to deregulate more and more. The problem we have to face is that we have to intervene to save both the banks and the financial institutions so that people’s savings are safe, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will agree that one thing is that, despite all the difficulties we have seen, people’s savings have been safe.

The Prime Minister may know that today the hapless Lord Myners has signed off the European Commission’s endorsement of the de Larosière report for the creation of a Europe-wide banking and financial rules framework, which—contrary to the statement the Prime Minister has just made—involves in practice majority voting and European Court jurisdiction, thus eliminating national control and jurisdiction. The Government have welcomed this report; Lord Turner has welcomed this report. Will the Prime Minister come clean and ensure that Parliament, and not the European Union, controls our banking and financial services?

I have with me a copy of the letter that the Chancellor sent to the Czech Republic, which has the presidency of the EU at present. It says that, under our proposals,

“it would not have powers over national supervisors, for example to change supervisory decisions, and it would not prescribe detailed supervisory practices.”

That is our position.

The published conclusions of the Council differ hardly at all from the conclusions circulated prior to the meeting, which were available on the Danish Parliament website, before the Prime Minister ever got to the meeting, but there is one matter that did change: the size of the bail-out to other EU economies, which has now risen to €50 billion. What is the potential exposure of the British Treasury and taxpayer to this size of bail-out?

First of all, I have a copy of the conclusions of the European summit and they did change substantially from the original draft provided by the Czech presidency, and I think the right hon. Gentleman must recognise that, even on the de Larosière report, the conclusions are different from what was originally put into the text. The balance of payments facility is a European Union loan of €50 billion that is to be made available. As far as the IMF loan is concerned, we will make up our mind what our contribution will be once we analyse what other countries are doing and what Europe as a whole will do, and we will make that known before the G20.

But with such enormous debt chasing a finite capacity to lend, some commentators are now talking about what Steve Bundred of the Audit Commission has called the Armageddon scenario in which there is simply not enough money to provide for the borrowing that is being sought. Did the European Council consider this to be a serious possibility, and if so, what is Britain’s strategy to deal with it?

I have never heard an Opposition who want to talk the country down as much as this Opposition. During this whole exchange, we have had anti-European after anti-European speaking. Now, on this occasion, we have a pro-European who is now becoming anti-European as a result of things that are happening. When markets fail and banks are unable to do their job, Governments have got to step in. That is the philosophy under which we are working, and I wish it was the philosophy of the Conservative party, too.

The Prime Minister has congratulated Switzerland and others on moving towards OECD standards of transparency. Will he confirm that British Crown dependencies and overseas territories already meet those standards?

We must all welcome the Prime Minister’s positive programme of action to tackle the global economic crisis, but will he do more to reduce the subsidy that Britain gives other EU countries through the net cost of our EU membership and the £40 billion trade deficit between this country and other EU countries, which costs this country many jobs?

It is in the interests of the whole world that these imbalances—they are imbalances not only within Europe, but around the world—are corrected. Originally, in the 1940s, when Keynes was involved in setting up the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, he wanted a situation to develop where people were under an obligation to correct imbalances that arose in one continent or in one country. These are matters that I think he would agree have got to be looked at, not only at a European level, but internationally. We are trying, as the hon. Gentleman knows, to persuade China to take more exports from the United Kingdom, and that would be one way in which the imbalances could be reduced.

The European Council deserves our support in putting pressure on unco-operative tax havens. Why did the Prime Minister not mention Bermuda when naming the various countries that are tax havens? Has it anything to do with representations from Lord Myners?

All tax havens are now under pressure. People will not see their money as safe in these havens after the experience that people have had over these past few months. [Interruption.]

This is a matter on which the world can now come together for the first time; never before have we had the will to take action to bring unco-operative tax havens under proper jurisdiction. That is something that I believe should happen, and we should be crediting this Government with the decision to push that it should.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) asked right at the beginning about the forthcoming G20 summit; why has the Prime Minister arranged Parliament so that he cannot report back to it? Is it not a fact that he is running scared?

I think the timings of the parliamentary recess were agreed far before those of the G20. I worked very hard to get a date that was suitable to the American President and to other world leaders, and we finally agreed that the date was the date that we chose. I think I am fair in saying that the date for this summit has to be set with a view towards bringing together the whole of the world, and that is what we have done.

Rights and Responsibilities

With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement on the Green Paper “Rights and Responsibilities: developing our constitutional framework”, which was laid before Parliament today. It is the next stage in what has been described as a quiet revolution in our constitutional arrangements, which, since 1997, has included: independence for the Bank of England; devolution for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; independence for National Statistics; the Human Rights Act 1998; the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Data Protection Act 1998; and reforms to the House of Lords and of party funding.

This Green Paper deals with some of the most fundamental questions we face as individuals and as a society: how we live together; what rights and freedoms we enjoy, and from whom; and what duties and obligations we owe, and to whom. Those issues are not abstractions, removed from the practical politics of jobs and housing, health care, education, crime and disorder, because these constitutional arrangements determine how power is distributed, and therefore the conditions in which every other question in our public life will be answered.

It is because of the centrality of these issues that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister chose to make his first major policy statement, within days of taking office, on exactly this matter of constitutional change. He told this House that it was right to involve the public

“in a sustained debate about whether there is a case for the United Kingdom developing a full British Bill of Rights and duties”.—[Official Report, 3 July 2007; Vol. 462, c. 819.]

This was to be as a step towards a written constitution. The Green Paper presents the arguments for such a Bill. It does not reach final conclusions—that is for the end of the process of national discussion—rather, it sets the framework for this debate. Indeed, if by the end of the process the Bill is perceived to provide protection to rights and freedoms, it will become effective in defining common values so that people in Britain of different backgrounds may feel ownership of it.

From the Magna Carta and the declaration of Arbroath, the 1689 Bill of Rights and the Scottish Claim of Rights, to the great Reform Acts of last two centuries, our history illustrates the proud traditions of liberty on which our nation is built. Though the profound changes that those great texts initiated were the subject of intense struggle at the time, the United Kingdom’s experience of constitutional development has been unlike that of almost any other democracy in the world.

The constitutional arrangements of most other nations have emerged from rebellion, revolution, civil war, occupation or oppression. The United States, France, India, South Africa and nations across Europe and the world, have had to set down their arrangements in a single text—a constitution, underpinned by declarations of rights. Whether legally enforceable or not, they have become abiding points of reference as to how their citizens should relate to each other and to the state, and help to define the kind of nation they wish to be. This Green Paper sets out the case for how a Bill could become a similar unifying force for the United Kingdom, not least because our own society is much more diverse, in race, religion and ethnicity than at any point in our history.

We are, self-evidently, launching this Green Paper at a time of great uncertainty and anxiety. Tackling the global recession must be our immediate priority. But acting, at the same time, to strengthen communities’ and individuals’ sense of a stake in society—by better articulating the responsibilities we owe and the rights we have—is not an alternative to decisive measures on the economic front but an essential complement to them.

One of the most significant constitutional changes in the past dozen years is the Human Rights Act 1998. I worked hard as sponsoring Minister to achieve a consensus behind it: and I commend the official Opposition for the support that they gave the Act in its final form. Prior to that Act, accessing convention rights via the Strasbourg court was a time-consuming, expensive and difficult process, and, as such, prohibitive for many. Now, those rights can be accessed in UK courts, with cases heard by UK judges.

The Act better protects the family. It has benefited all sections of society; from the elderly couple wanting to live in the same care home, to the loftiest of newspaper magnates. In providing a more practical mechanism to access rights, as well as a positive obligation on the state to protect them, countless thousands of people have benefited from the law, without necessarily having to resort to the law.

Despite that, the Act has its detractors, primarily because the atrocities of 11 September 2001 occurred less than a year after it came into force. Had those tragic events not occurred, I suggest that the HRA would have slipped comfortably into the fabric of our lives without controversy. As it was, those terrible events threw into acute relief the tensions between liberty and security. We recognise these tensions but the Government are proud of the Human Rights Act. We will neither resile from it, nor repeal it.

The principles and rights set down in the European convention—now in the HRA—are timeless. They are the mark and measure of any civilised society at any time, but in the intervening 60 years since the convention was drawn up, the rights in it have been added to by a great extension of social and economic rights—of health care, dignity in old age, education, housing and social security. But as our rights have become so much wider and stronger, one question is whether their claim is balanced properly by an equally strong sense of the responsibilities we each owe. We believe that there is a case for drawing out more clearly and explicitly the responsibilities that go with rights.

Duties and responsibilities are to be found in the convention, in statute, in common law and woven deeply into our social and moral fabric. We have a latent understanding and acceptance of our duties to one another and to the state. That said, responsibilities have been a poor cousin to rights. The Green Paper proposes that responsibilities are given greater prominence in our constitutional arrangements, better to articulate what we owe, as much as what we expect. That is how we can move away from a “rights culture” to a “rights and responsibilities culture”.

Some responsibilities are obvious, such as obeying the law, paying taxes and undertaking jury service. Others are less obviously recalled at the moment they should be exercised, such as a responsibility towards future generations to live within environmental limits, the duty we have to protect the well-being of children in our care, a civic duty to vote, responsibilities towards our neighbours, respect for those public sector workers who care for us and a responsibility towards the taxpayer—for example, not claiming benefits if one is able to work.

If we are to fulfil our responsibilities, we must have a clear understanding of what they are. As the Green Paper sets out, an accessible Bill of rights and responsibilities could be emblematic of the fair society in which we want to live, where awareness of our rights is matched with a greater understanding of our responsibilities to each other. Most of the social and economic rights to which I have referred are already embedded in law, but they are scattered across myriad legal texts. The Government believe that we should encapsulate those rights in a single document, bringing together the “new” post-war rights of social justice and the welfare state, victims’ rights, rights of equality and good administration.

A key question set out in the Green Paper is whether any Bill should have, directly or indirectly, the force of law. Bills of Rights from around the world are a combination of symbolism, aspiration and law across a spectrum of legal effect. There need not be a binary choice between the justiciable and the declaratory. As the Green Paper points out, the Government do not necessarily consider a model of directly legally enforceable rights or responsibilities to be the most appropriate.

But even without full legal enforcement, words can have great power. The universal declaration of human rights contained no legally enforceable rights, but was rather the global expression of a shared commitment and a recognition of humanity’s common dignity—what Eleanor Roosevelt described as the Magna Carta for all mankind. A Bill of rights and responsibilities for the United Kingdom could be such a declaration and could set down the values we cherish.

I have had the rare privilege of taking through this House many of the constitutional changes of the past 12 years. Throughout that time I have looked to secure the broadest political consensus behind those changes, as reform of such importance to our democracy requires nothing less.

Constitutional change should take place only on the basis of full and proper deliberation. The Green Paper has been through such a process within Government and now it is time to take the debate out to the people whom we all serve. The deliberation must not be rushed and so the Green Paper will not precede any legislation this side of a general election. We are dealing with the fundamental building blocks of our democracy, and as the Prime Minister made clear:

“Constitutional change will not be the work of just one Bill or one year or one Parliament”.—[Official Report, 3 July 2007; Vol. 462, c. 815.]

A Bill of rights and responsibilities could form the next natural and necessary step in a process that began 60 years ago with the universal declaration. It is an opportunity to bring together existing rights and responsibilities in one statute and better to define the relationship between citizen and state in a new and unifying constitutional document for this century. I commend the statement to the House.

I thank the Secretary of State for advance sight of his statement. It was not in fact needed, as it was all in The Sunday Times. Yet again, even on serious matters of constitutional reform, this Government demonstrate their disdain for this House by first announcing policy to the media. Am I correct in recalling that the Justice Secretary told the House last Tuesday:

“I might be old-fashioned, but I take the view that the place to make announcements is in the House of Commons”? —[Official Report, 17 March 2009; Vol. 489, c. 762.]

What has changed since then? Was this a decision taken by the Prime Minister?

We have had a decade of botched constitutional reform from this Government. The Justice Secretary was there from the start, and now he has been instructed by the Prime Minister to clear up the mess. In truth, there can be only two reasons for this Green Paper, which he says sets the framework of debate. Has he come to the House because he accepts that the Human Rights Act, which has been in force for less than nine years, has proved badly flawed, and that new thought is needed? Or is the statement just the latest exercise in pure spin, designed to make absolutely no difference in practice?

I have to correct the Justice Secretary: the Opposition voted against the Human Rights Act, and experience has proved that we were correct about many of the concerns that we expressed. The Act has singularly failed to protect our core freedoms. The heavy-handed abuse of the right to peaceful protest is documented in today’s report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. As for intrusions into personal privacy, the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust today referred to Britain as the

“most invasive surveillance state…of any Western democracy”,

and this evening, the House will again resist the Government’s latest attack on juries.

The Human Rights Act has fuelled a rights inflation; it requires UK judges to take a maximalist approach to the interpretation of convention rights that is not, in fact, required by membership of the European convention on human rights, and that has created confusion and uncertainty in practice. Does the Justice Secretary now accept that the Act has often left police and probation services unclear of where the legal boundaries are as they strive to discharge their duty to protect the public, as was shown in the tragic case of Naomi Bryant? Does he accept that the Act has saddled public service providers with heavy liabilities and has what the Audit Commission describes as

“a universal and costly impact on the way that public bodies operate”?

Will he take responsibility for the Act’s role in undermining social responsibility, as the Government oversell human rights as all things to all people? If so, how exactly will his proposals make a difference to all that?

On the contrary, the Green Paper is, it seems, destined to make each of those problems worse. Take legal confusion. Writing in The Sunday Times, the Minister of State, the right hon. Member for North Swindon (Mr. Wills), explains that

“There may well be a case for not creating new rights outside the scope of the courts”,

but he urges us none the less to

“celebrate…the rights we enjoy…through…constitutional expression”,

because

“Words have power in their own right.”

Can the Secretary of State, who is after all a lawyer, please explain what on earth his junior Minister is talking about? The question is pretty straightforward: does he favour the creation of new economic and social rights with legal force, or are we talking about an entirely cosmetic exercise? If he does want to create new economic and social rights, he needs to say so, and he needs to explain why we in this House should abdicate to unaccountable judges our responsibility, as democratic law-makers, to set the nation’s economic and social priorities, and decide how finite public resources should be allocated to meet them.

Take rights to health care. Does the Justice Secretary accept that the reality of any new human rights to health care is that they will feed the claims culture? Just this week, the NHS Litigation Authority lambasted the existing regime. Would not the new rights mean more money for lawyers and less for patients—the last thing that the taxpayer will welcome in a recession? If he does not intend to create justiciable rights, can he explain how the standing of law is not undermined by the process on which he has embarked? What are we to make of his Minister of State comparing the proposals to the Bill of Rights of 1689? Was that document merely “aspirational”? Given their track record, I begin to think that the Government might well wish that the Bill of Rights, too, was merely the pap that is being served up here.

The Justice Secretary could not put off coming to the House for ever. We have waited more than 14 months for this announcement, which has been put back time and again, scuppered each time, we are told, by his colleagues. In a vain effort to say something—anything—on how to reform the Human Rights Act, he has produced a Green Paper that can only make matters worse. May I suggest to him that on the evidence of the Green Paper, he really would be well advised to heed colleagues’ warnings? That would be better than trying to create more confusion, and undermining yet again the democratic prerogatives of this House and, above all, the clarity of the law. The Green Paper has just one saving grace: it will not result in any legislation this side of a general election—in other words, it is for the birds.

I think the hon. and learned Gentleman protests too much. He makes much of his discontent with the Human Rights Act and how that has fuelled a compensation culture.

Let me read the House a quotation:

“The Human Rights Act has many benefits which it has conferred. The Human Rights Act is dynamic. . . I don’t think the Human Rights Act has anything to do with fuelling a compensation culture at all.”

That was the shadow Attorney-General speaking to lawyers at the Stationers’ Hall, City of London, on 30 March 2005—the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), the same hon. and learned Gentleman who told the House when the Human Rights Bill was going through the House,

“As is probably well known to my colleagues and possibly to other hon. Members, I have long been a supporter of the incorporation of a human rights Bill into our law. . . I would be denying my own conscience and feelings in the matter if I did not say that I believe that incorporation is a sensible step forward.” —[Official Report, 16 February 1998; Vol. 306, c. 831-3.]

I remind the hon. and learned Gentleman that when the Bill was before the House, it was indeed the case that the Conservatives voted against it on Second Reading, but they did not vote against it on Third Reading, as the hon. and learned Gentleman has now had the grace to nod in agreement. Why? Because the Bill was much improved as a result of parliamentary scrutiny, not least from himself as an ardent supporter of the measure. When we came to Third Reading, the then shadow Attorney-General, now the noble and learned Lord Lyell, stood at the Opposition Dispatch Box and “wished the Bill well”. The Conservatives, or some tendency of the Conservative party, supports the Human Rights Act.

We were entertained at the weekend by the shadow Business Secretary, the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke), putting a torpedo through the Conservatives’ tax policy. He has also put a torpedo through the Conservatives’ failure to come up with any significant alternative to the Human Rights Act, describing his own leaders’ proposals as “xenophobic and legal nonsense”.

As I read his speeches, the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield must agree with most of that which is in the document, and is simply posturing to who knows whom on the Opposition Benches behind him. He is in favour of the Human Rights Act. When I read his speeches I see that he is in favour of almost everything that is in the document, as I am in favour of much that he has written, particularly recently.

To what is the hon. and learned Gentleman objecting? Is he objecting to us setting down in summary form the economic and social rights that we all enjoy? What is the problem about that? What is the problem with setting down, as we have done in slightly longer form, the rights to health care or to education? While we set down those rights, which we all enjoy and which not even the Conservative party proposes we take away—yet—is it not also sensible to set down the balancing responsibilities?

The hon. and learned Gentleman suggests that by setting in a single declaration those rights and responsibilities, we will somehow encourage the compensation culture. He has already answered that. It is nonsense. But if in the same text, along with the right to health care, we set down the responsibilities of patients, and if in the same text, along with the right to education, we set down the responsibilities of parents in respect of the education and upbringing of their children, does our society lose from that exercise or gain? I suggest that our society can only gain from such an exercise, and I invite the Opposition to join us in a serious exercise better to set out for the society that we have today the rights and responsibilities that we owe and we should enjoy.

I, too, thank the Secretary of State for early sight of the Green Paper and of his statement.

With all due respect to the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), I do not understand the position that the Conservatives are taking. They seem on some days to want the plaudits of populists for calling for the abolition of the Human Rights Act, but also to crave the respect of civil libertarians. They simply cannot have both. However, does the Secretary of State not recognise that he, too, seems to want it both ways, in how he attempts to link rights to responsibilities? He seems to want not only to satisfy those who rightly say that human rights set up a minimum standard of which no civilised Government—no matter whom they are dealing with—can fall short, but to please those who say that some people do not deserve human rights; that latter position is simply a watered down version of the position of those who want to get rid of the Human Rights Act altogether.

More fundamentally, does the Secretary of State recognise the fundamental distinction between human rights on the one hand, and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship on the other? They are not the same. Human rights set up obligations owed to all humans, and cannot be conditional. The rights of citizens, on the other hand, are not universal, and there are far fewer problems in saying that responsibilities are attached to citizenship.

Does the Secretary of State not also agree that there is a crisis of citizenship in the simple sense of people taking part in the government of their own communities? He is a great supporter of first past the post, but does he not at least accept that one of its effects is to narrow electoral politics to a few swing voters in a few marginal constituencies to the exclusion of everyone else? Is there not an irony in calling for greater commitment to citizenship just before a debate in which, as the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield said, the Government seek to restrict one of the best traditions of our citizenship—namely, the jury system?

The statement also seemed confused and vague on the relationship between constitutional texts and a sense of national unity. Does the Secretary of State not agree that it is not a text in itself but the experience of acting together to govern one’s own community that creates a sense of democratic identity? National identity itself very rarely creates democracies—in fact, things might be the other way round: too strong a sense of national identity might have been destructive of democratic ideals in the past century.

The Government are right to be cautious on economic and social rights. It would be a mistake, I believe, to constitutionalise too many essentially political decisions about taxing and spending. At the same time, it is already a human right not to be left in destitution and it is a plausible extension of the rights of citizens that they should have an entitlement to sufficient access to health, education and welfare services for them to be able to take part in a practical way in governing their own communities.

However, I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield that such rights as are included have to be properly enforceable in the courts. I am disturbed by what the Secretary of State has said about a range of rights—rights that are enforceable on the one hand, and rights that are purely declaratory or symbolic on the other. Does he agree that there is a grave danger that in creating rights that are not enforceable, he might end up diluting the whole idea of rights themselves? We have had enough of government by press release; the last thing that we need is a constitution by press release as well.

Let me deal with the hon. Gentleman’s last point. Essentially, he said that if we have a Bill, anything in it has to be justiciable; that, at least, is what I took him to say. I understand his point. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman has read the Green Paper, but I commend it to him some more. In chapter 4, we bring out the fact that if we look at equivalent documents and texts around the world, we see that not every part of a declaration, Bill of Rights or preamble to a constitution is enforceable in the same way as every other part. On page 54, we cite what is set out in article 45 of the Irish constitution. The article is declaratory, but by all accounts the Irish believe that setting out important economic and social rights in a declaratory form in their constitution meets important imperatives within their society. My view is that it is sensible for there to be rights and responsibilities across the piece in a single document. If those could be agreed between the parties in terms of education for citizenship, it would be enormously valuable, when we talk to our constituents, to be able to say, “This is what has been agreed. Whatever else the British political parties and the British people disagree about, these are the sets of basic values—rights and responsibilities—that we all agree about.” This is a good starting point. There are certain things that we agree about, but at the moment they are less articulated than they should be, particularly as regards responsibilities, and we should set them out. In its important report last summer, the Joint Committee on Human Rights said that it would be unwise to make economic and social rights directly justiciable because that would pre-empt the role of this Parliament. Of course, I accept that. However, there is greater value in having such a document than in not having it.

I am always ready to rise to the bait of discussing electoral reform, but I will not on this occasion, if the hon. Gentleman will excuse me. I will just say that there is greater concern in Norway and in the Czech Republic about the state of their democracy than there is here, notwithstanding their proportional representation systems. The whole House will have noted that I did not mention, among the major constitutional changes that this House has agreed in the past 12 years, the list system for European Parliament elections. [Interruption.] It was a manifesto commitment, your honour.

The hon. Gentleman is right to ask what the Conservatives want. I think that they want different things. In February this year, the shadow Home Secretary said that what we want is “fewer rights, more wrongs”. That was an extraordinary statement—so extraordinary that the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) had to say that he was not completely clear about what it meant. [Interruption.] As a matter of fact, I am completely clear about what “fewer rights, more wrongs” means: it means fewer rights and more wrongs. That produced complete chaos at the heart of the Tory party.

Order. Before I call the next hon. Member, I say to the House that there is enormous pressure on business today, so could I please ask for single, brief questions and, if possible, brief replies?

I welcome what my right hon. Friend said about the Human Rights Act, which stands in stark contrast to the intellectually incoherent position of the Opposition. His remarks about social and economic rights are particularly important. I agree that direct enforceability is not appropriate, but such rights need to be more than just aspirational or declamatory. Will he consider some of the options that we advanced in our report as to forms of justiciability—for example, interpretive powers for the courts, an annual report to Parliament on progress, and a bottom line that nobody should fall below in terms of their social and economic rights?

As Chairman of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, my hon. Friend has played a very important role in developing our thinking and that of the House. The answer to his question is yes. For example, we will take careful account of what is shown in recommendation 39 of his report of last July.

Given that one of the most important rights of all is freedom of religion and freedom to express one’s belief, what does this document offer in the way of hope to the British Airways stewardess who was suspended for wearing a cross, to the nurse who was suspended for saying prayers for one of her patients, to the school secretary who was suspended because her child talked about Jesus, and to the pantomime dame who believes that his rights are threatened by what we will do tonight?

I am as appalled as the hon. Gentleman by those cases. They have nothing whatever to do with the Human Rights Act, and they are absolutely shameful. I made that clear at the time, and I do so again. The right to freedom of religion is guaranteed by the European convention on human rights and the Human Rights Act. However, I hope that he will contribute to the debate that we are starting off today about whether one can better protect the rights of faith so that the kind of appalling nonsense that has taken place, to which he refers, is not repeated in future.

The Lord Chancellor quotes Britain’s constitutional history, but is not one of the prizes painfully won in that history that a British citizen’s human rights are enforceable by the courts and do not depend on a person behaving as the Government want them to behave, as long as they obey the law? If people cannot enforce their rights under the proposed Bill, and if the duties are unenforceable, is it not just a Bill of hopes and aspirations—or Straw’s sermon on the mount? I think that I prefer the original.

So do I.

I should have said to the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) that basic human rights do not depend on responsibilities. We all understand that. It is a mark of a civilised society that we are ready to give to the least worthy in our society—the people accused of the worst kinds of crimes—rights that they would never accord to us. There is no argument about that. None the less, the way in which people behave towards others is taken into account by the courts and is part of our overall moral code, and we need to articulate that better. If the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) considers what happens in other countries, he will see that Bills of Rights and declarations cover a range from aspiration to direct enforcement. I believe that our Bill of Rights could do the same.

Does the right hon. Gentleman understand that many of us who have listened to his statement will come to the following conclusion? Either the proposal means nothing at all, and is an attempt to give apparent substance to the empty mouthings of the Prime Minister, or alternatively the Justice Secretary intends to create enforceable rights—that is, enforceable at law—in which case, he will give to unelected judges huge influence over matters that are the proper responsibility of this place.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman has not, understandably, had a chance to read the document, but I ask him to do so. I hope and believe that when he has done so, he will see that it is neither of the things that he describes. It is a serious contribution to an important debate, which was initiated, among others, by the leader of the Conservative party. His party has also promised a paper on rights and responsibilities. The only difference is that it promised it three years ago, and so far it has not produced anything at all.

The Justice Secretary quite rightly made reference to our constitutional heritage, such as the Magna Carta. But the Bill of Rights of 1689 was composed and arrived at within simply months, but the gestation period that the present Government have embarked upon confuses one. All the inalienable rights that we have always assumed as a free and democratic people are available in the constitutional instruments at our disposal, including the Human Rights Act. They protect the relationship of the citizen to the state and they define it. What the Justice Secretary proposes—this confusion and mishmash—is clearly just a diversionary tactic. I agree with my right hon. and hon. Friends: the proposal is going nowhere, and the Justice Secretary knows it. We are wasting time.

I disagree with the hon. Gentleman. On the drafting of the Bill of Rights of 1689, I am not sure how long it took to transcribe, but it was certainly the subject of huge debate over many decades, including during our own civil war. It reflected a long period of gestation.

Well, we can have a separate debate about that; we could have it in Government time. I invite the hon. Gentleman to read the document.

As well as some dodgy history that seems to claim the Declaration of Arbroath as British history, this curious and extravagant document hints at further devolution. Will the right hon. Gentleman accept that Scotland, as a distinct legislature and community, should go its own way in terms of rights and responsibilities, and will he assure me that he will not be too prescriptive in how he applies measures across the nations of the United Kingdom?

The inclusion of the Declaration of Arbroath was a mark of respect to Scotland. As to the future, we are a Union. We are a United Kingdom of four nations in one, and there are clear competences for the sovereign Parliament of that Union, as there are for the devolved Administrations.

Does the Justice Secretary agree that when people avail themselves of their right to demonstrate, they should also be held responsible for any offences that they happen to commit in the execution of that right, and that the law should be applied consistently no matter who the demonstrators happen to be?

I welcome the fact that there seems to be an emphasis on social and economic responsibilities. Many people would say that those include saving for a pension, and nobody will take the emphasis seriously if the Equitable Life pensioners do not have their rights restored through the ombudsman and get the pension that is due to them.

The hon. Lady will excuse me if I do not get drawn into the issue of Equitable Life, except to say that the Human Rights Act, which the Conservatives supported and which the shadow Justice Secretary was supporting until, I think, 1 o’clock this afternoon, has given individuals, including those in a similar position to pensioners of Equitable Life, far greater rights than ever they had before.

I hope that we are going to be spared Gordon’s little red book on responsible citizens, but can we have our right to a referendum on big constitutional change at Lisbon properly observed?

The right hon. Gentleman will know that we set out in our manifesto provisions and proposals in respect of referendums, and they were also set out in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.

The right hon. Gentleman might recognise this question from the sessions of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. His statement mentioned responsibilities including obeying the law, but may I ask him why paying taxes, jury service and not claiming benefits if able to work are not obeying the law? Are not all the responsibilities that he lists simply obeying the law, and therefore is it not just a gesture to the tabloids to call this a Bill of rights and responsibilities?

No, it is not. My guess is that, notwithstanding the fact that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make a partisan point, he often talks in his constituency about people who are claiming rights and the responsibilities that they owe. It is a good idea for Government and Parliament, on a consensual basis, to put in better relief the balance between rights and responsibilities, which is what we seek to do in this document.

Surely one of the fundamental rights of the British people is to a Parliament that has the freedom independently to scrutinise the Executive. On the assumption that the Secretary of State can agree to that rather prosaic proposition, when will the Executive stop appointing the members of the Select Committees that scrutinise them and instead allow right hon. and hon. Members to elect the members of those Committees for themselves?

The process of the Committee of Selection is subject to the endorsement of the House. We thought about this when I was Chairman of the Modernisation Committee, and the honest truth is that the only other possible system would almost certainly produce the same results. There are plenty of individual Members who have particularly strong views and still sit on Select Committees.

Point of Order

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I wish to draw attention to the fact that when I left the sitting of Parliament on Friday and passed through Parliament square and into Birdcage walk, I was detained by the police on a stop and search on the basis of the use of anti-terrorism legislation. That follows on from what happened only a few weeks ago during our campaign against the third runway. One of our campaigners, who was simply taking photographs of the properties that will be demolished if the proposed third runway goes ahead, was also detained, stopped and searched under anti-terrorism legislation.

I make this point of order to draw attention to the fact that the use of that power is becoming random and affecting Members and our constituents in a way that I believe is in complete contradiction to the way in which we legislated, which was for the selective use of the powers to prevent terrorism rather than to harass MPs and the overall community.

The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that that is not immediately a matter for the Chair, but his points are firmly on record and I am sure that Mr. Speaker will want to take note of them.

Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust

Application for emergency debate (Standing Order No. 24)

I seek leave to move the Adjournment of the House to discuss a specific and important matter, which I believe should have urgent consideration, namely Parliament’s response to the Healthcare Commission’s report on Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust.

Last Wednesday, the Health Secretary made a statement to the House in response to the report and answered hon. Members’ questions for an hour. That was the right thing to do. He proposed several actions, which were the appropriate responses to the report. However, two things have happened since then, which make me ask the House for an urgent debate.

First, I returned to my constituency on Thursday evening, and since then further accounts have been given to me and others of poor care at the hospital. Given that the Healthcare Commission’s report states that improvements have been made and that the trust is safe, it is important to do everything possible to reinforce that statement straight away. In a debate, I would call for Professor Sir George Alberti’s review, which is due to start this week, to be expanded to cover all parts of the hospital, not only emergency care, and, therefore, for him to head a multidisciplinary team to support the current interim leadership, the senior managers and the hospital staff as they ensure that all the improvements for which the commission’s report calls are carried out and maintained.

Secondly, there are growing calls for a public inquiry, which I support for four reasons: to help the new regulator, who is about to replace the Healthcare Commission, to understand how one trust kept its failures from being discovered for so long; to anchor the work that has been promised concerning an independent assessment of medical records; to ascertain what lessons can be learned for the future about how the hospital conducted nurse training, patient-staff ratios, supervision and monitoring of hospital services, and to ascertain what lessons can be learned for the future about the arrangements in the past at the hospital for public and patient involvement in decision making, supervision and monitoring, and whether those lessons can apply to systems throughout the NHS.

To me, the question of a public inquiry is big enough to merit a debate in the House, but the two issues together make the matter urgent and worthy of debate now.

I have listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman and I have to give my decision without stating any reasons. I am afraid that I do not consider the matter that he has raised appropriate for discussion under Standing Order No. 24 and I cannot, therefore, submit the application to the House.

Bill presented

Short Selling and Bank Accounts Bill

Presentation and First Reading (Standing Order No. 57)

Mr. Frank Field, supported by Ms Sally Keeble, Mark Fisher, Mr. Graham Allen, Mr. Jim Hood, Mr. Gordon Prentice, John Mann, Mr. Peter Kilfoyle, David Taylor, Dr. Tony Wright, Jim Sheridan and Mr. Peter Hain presented a Bill to prohibit short selling; to require disclosure by pension funds and their trustees of records of loans of their shares for the purpose of short selling, and of the fees received in such cases; to require banks and building societies to offer their retail customers current and savings accounts free of any charge for holding the accounts when such accounts are in credit; and for connected purposes.

Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time on Friday 19 June, and to be printed (Bill 79).

Coroners and Justice Bill (Programme) (No. 3)

I must tell the House that Mr. Speaker has not selected the amendment.

I beg to move,

That the Order of 26 January 2009 (Coroners and Justice Bill (Programme)), as varied by the Order of 4 March 2009 (Coroners and Justice Bill (Programme) (No. 2)), be further varied as follows:

1. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Order shall be omitted.

2. Proceedings on consideration and Third Reading shall be concluded in two days.

3. Proceedings on consideration shall be taken on each of those days as shown in the following Table and in the order so shown.

4. Each part of the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the time specified in relation to it in the second column of the Table.

TABLE

First day

Proceedings

Time for conclusion of proceedings

New Clauses, New Schedules and amendments relating to inquests into a person’s death that may be conducted without a jury; remaining

New Clauses, New Schedules and amendments relating to Part 1; New Clauses, New Schedules and amendments relating to Part 2 except those relating to hatred on grounds of sexual orientation.

The moment of interruption.

Second day

Remaining New Clauses, New

Schedules and amendments relating to Part 2.

New Clauses, New Schedules and amendments relating to Part 8; New Clauses, New Schedules and amendments relating to Chapter 1 of Part 4; remaining proceedings on consideration.

One hour after the commencement of proceedings on the Bill.

One hour before the moment of interruption.

5. Proceedings on Third Reading hsall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on the second day

I hope that we can agree the motion quickly so that we can consider the Bill’s provisions. It seeks to ensure that they get the scrutiny that they deserve. First, we have provided for the Bill to be considered over two days and, secondly, the motion orders the proceedings for the two days so that the provisions for private inquests, incitement to hatred on the ground of sexual orientation, data protection, data sharing and the sentencing council receive adequate time for debate. I hope that there will also be an opportunity to consider the other issues that Bill covers.

The Under-Secretary charmingly and disarmingly introduced the motion, but I am afraid that it does not attract the House. It is outrageous that, in the two days set aside for Report, the Government have already spoiled the afternoon by making not only one statement, but two. We accept that it is entirely proper for the Prime Minister to make a statement at the first available opportunity following the spring European Council, even though it took an hour or so out of the parliamentary day. However, it is wholly unacceptable for the Secretary of State for Justice, whose business the Bill is, voluntarily to insert his statement on rights and responsibilities into an already overcrowded first day of the Report stage.

Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that many of us suspect that the insertion of the statement was done simply for the personal convenience of the Justice Secretary, so that he did not have to be in the House on two separate occasions?

I have absolutely no idea whether that is the case, but it is a wholly improper constriction of the time of this House for the Secretary of State to make a statement today that he could have made on any day last week, any day the week before or any day in the remainder of this week. It was not time-precious—that is to say, time-urgent—for him to make the statement today.

I would suggest that it is an entirely cynical, albeit typical, Government business manager move to compress the debates on the Bill. The Bill, which is about the size of the mid-Suffolk telephone book, is yet another plum duff of a Bill—plenty of duff and very few plums. It deals with about 15 discrete areas of law reform. We had inadequate time in Committee to debate the Bill, and we can see from today’s amendment paper, which is about the size of the Rutland telephone book, that plenty needs to be discussed on Report. We can also see that there are nine groups of amendments and new clauses that have to be dealt with in today’s business alone.

It could be suggested—no doubt the Minister will confess to this in winding up the debate—that the whole purpose of the way the programme motion has been constructed and the way the Government have so organised this afternoon’s business was to prevent things that need to be discussed and scrutinised from being discussed and scrutinised. We will probably see many hon. Members wishing to discuss inquests into a person’s death that may be conducted without a jury, which is a highly controversial aspect of the Bill. However, there are other subjects equally worthy of discussion, such as: the death of service personnel abroad; coroner’s duties and powers; inquest juries; medical examiners; the governance of the coronial system; some new material on sedition and seditious and criminal libel; the reform of the law of murder; and finally, the subject of assisting suicide.

As ever, my hon. and learned Friend is making a powerful case. Does he agree that the subject of assisting suicide has aroused considerable interest among many of our constituents, who expect such issues to be debated in Parliament? Wherever one might come down on the subject, surely our constituents are entitled to see such subjects debated, rather than seeing them prevented from being debated, which is what the Government have in effect done.

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. Each of those subjects—for example, the reform of the law of homicide, the reform of the law on assisting suicide and the reform of the coronial system—should have been detailed in separate Bills. Then the House would have had proper time to deal with each Bill separately, as would the other place, but the Government are not content with that. They rush round their Departments, just tipping stuff into their shopping trolley in the hope that it can make a useful compendium Bill, but it does not: it leads to chaos, cynicism and a total lack of confidence in the Government’s ability to order their affairs.

What we are seeing from the Government is not just indifference; it is a reckless disregard for the House of Commons and the proper parliamentary scrutiny of legislation. This Government are now beyond shame. I have yet to see a Minister who can look the House in the face and say that what they are doing this afternoon would be worthy of any Government. I regret to say that this programme motion is a shameful motion. It needs to be treated with the House’s utter contempt, and I hope that the House will show that contempt in a few moments’ time.

I do not think this is a shameful programme motion, but I do think there is a serious problem with it, which is why we tabled an amendment to it. The problem lies in the balance between the two days. The first day jams together amendments on juryless inquests with five other groups of amendments on coroners, including new material from the Government, on the new topics of sedition and seditious and criminal libel, as well as on the whole of the law of murder and assisted suicide.

The problem with the programme motion is that anything on that list that we do not reach by 10 o’clock tonight will fall. We will then start again tomorrow with a reserved hour for the law on homophobic hatred, followed by a fairly leisurely stroll through the rest of this Christmas tree Bill. We have just had two statements, which have taken up 90 minutes, as well as other matters, and it will now be very difficult to reach the amendments on the law of murder today. That would be a disgrace. Murder is the most serious crime in the law, and the Government’s proposals seriously distorted a Law Commission proposal. The Committee stage demonstrated that there were real difficulties with those proposals.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the programme motion demonstrates a strange order of priorities by giving the law of homophobic hatred an hour, when its likely use in any given year, if implemented, will probably be tiny, while the law of murder is applied every week in our courts?

I completely agree. I have tabled the lead new clauses in the groups on murder and on homophobic hatred. If asked which I would want to give reserved time to, I would say the murder group, not the homophobic hatred group. I put it to the Government that there should have been a two-day debate without any internal knives at all. In such circumstances, I am sure that the House would have paced itself through those two days properly. I urge the Government to withdraw the programme motion.

Not for the first time, I rise to oppose a timetable motion. I strongly object to the timetabling of this Bill on Report. The consequences of timetabling, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) and the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) have said, is that important sections of the Bill will go to the other place wholly undiscussed. What is more, a number of hon. Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies), will not have the opportunity to discuss new clause 42. Whether or not one supports the new clause, it is quite plainly a matter that ought to be discussed by this House. It is urgent and topical, and people want to discuss it, but we are simply not going to reach it. Indeed, I have a strong suspicion that we shall not go beyond the first of the nine groups of amendments.

It is not just that people in the House want to discuss new clause 42; the public outside the House expect us to discuss it.

My hon. and learned Friend makes an important point. Consent for legislation depends on a belief that this House does its duty properly, and the truth is that we are being prevented from doing our duty by this timetable motion. Moreover, on a related point, the Report stage is the only occasion on which right hon. and hon. Members who are not on the Committee have the opportunity to discuss the detail of the Bill. This Bill contains some extraordinarily important clauses. For example, the whole of the first group of amendments and new clauses deals with jury-free inquests. The important thing to keep in mind is that these provisions represent a concession—I concede that it is a concession—announced by the Government last week, on which there has been precious little public discussion and whose details we have a right to discuss. We are not going to be able to do so in sufficient detail, however.

On a different point, the draft changes on murder are extremely important. I agree with what has already been said about that. As the Secretary of State for Justice knows, I have often appeared in murder cases. Provocation has been an extremely difficult area of the law, and we have a right to have the opportunity properly to debate it on this occasion, but we are not going to be able to do so. The definition of an inquest in respect of which a jury should be required seems to me to be a matter of very considerable moment, but we are not going to reach that provision; it will go to the other place without our having had proper discussion. That is also true of the matter of assisted suicide, to which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough has referred.

There is another vice about this—if the time allowed for Report is constrained, we can be quite sure that Mr. Speaker will be unable to select as many amendments as we would wish him to select. As we know from the Order Paper, I tabled scores of amendments—I make no complaint about the fact that only a few have been selected—but if debate is unnaturally and too tightly constrained, right hon. and hon. Members are shut out and a Bill is not properly discussed at all.

I suggest that any feeling of outrage should be compounded by two further considerations. We all know that the business of the House has been extraordinarily light for the last few weeks. We need only look at the Order Paper to know that. It would have been quite easy to provide two, three or more days to allow proper debate of this Bill, but we are not permitted to do so, which is an outrage.

In supporting the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s argument, may I respectfully remind him that there is a one-liner throughout next week, so there would be plenty of time to deal with these very important issues? Murder and jury-free inquests are vital issues that we should all be able to discuss at length.

I do not know about the nationalist Whip, but I know that other parties have an extraordinarily light Whip and we have had extraordinarily light business for weeks and weeks and weeks. We could well have given this Bill much more time than is being allowed.

Does this not serve to bring this House into disrepute in the eyes of our constituents, who feel that issues that occupy and concern them are not being discussed even for a moment in this place?

I agree and I find it impossible when I go to schools and other places to explain why it is that whole chunks of legislation are going through this place undiscussed. The Criminal Justice Bill in 2003 was the worst example that readily comes to mind, but there are countless other examples, of which this Bill is going to be another.

Then we come to the perverse fact that we have had two statements today—a day of tight business. I understand that the Prime Minister felt obliged to make a statement and it was a remarkable performance. The poor fellow, I fear he is getting very tired, so I suppose one ought to feel sorry for him. However, there was no need for the Justice Secretary to come here today. I entirely agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough that, assuming it was not for the personal convenience of the Justice Secretary, it was certainly to take up time—and that stinks as a practice.

I was not going to divide the House because I knew that the Division would take up time from our substantive debate, but now that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough proposes to divide the House, I am going to join him in the Division Lobby with enthusiasm.

I have an obvious interest in the programme motion because I have new clauses in one of the later groups to deal with freedom of speech—a matter that should be of interest to all Members. I am also a sponsor of the new clause dealing with assisted suicide. I think it is fair to say that I raised my concerns with the Government before I saw the groupings. I put some questions to the Leader of the House just last Thursday. I said:

“Mr. Speaker, you will be selecting the amendments”

for the Coroners and Justice Bill

“and, as there are so many parts to the Bill, they will inevitably fall into at least eight substantive groups.”

Well, there are 14. I continued:

“We are grateful to the Leader of the House for providing two days’ debate”—

which was not the case in respect of the Criminal Justice Act 2008 when, as with so many others, we had just one day—

“but does she recognise that the ability of the House to scrutinise the legislation will be measured”—

by our constituents and the media—

“in part, by whether we have time to debate all those groups?”

I then asked her a simple question:

“Will she take steps to ensure that there is adequate consultation between the parties so that those two days are used effectively to scrutinise all the parts of this important piece of legislation?”—[Official Report, 19 March 2009; Vol. 489, c. 1065-66.]

As my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) said, there is not enough time to do more than we are doing because of the mismatch between the two days. He was available all last week to debate such matters, and the same applies to those on the Conservative Front Bench.

When the Prime Minister was first selected as the new Prime Minister, he said it was his priority to ensure that the House improved the scrutiny that it delivered. At the time, I asked him whether that would include scrutiny of all legislation—particularly criminal justice legislation—by the elected House. I asked whether he agreed that it was unacceptable for huge tranches of legislation to go through the House, and sometimes even Committee, unscrutinised. As the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) said, this is the only chance that those of us who are not on Public Bill Committees have. Surely the Government accept that the House is not doing its job of scrutiny unless it can debate all groups of amendments.

There is an option other than a third day: consulting on the programme motion. I have been told by those who know more about the matter that whichever Committee of the House suggested programme motions never intended them simply to be imposed and to have the consequences, by design or accident, that we see today. They were always intended to be a vehicle for the House to arrange its business so that we could debate such matters. Does the Minister recognise that it must be sensible to negotiate the programme motion so that we do not have such a half-hour debate, Divisions and unpleasantness? I am assured that there was no negotiation—

I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be cautious about negotiation, because the implication is that it takes place between Front Benchers, but Back Benchers have a view about the matter. When the Conservatives are elected to office, I shall be hard to persuade to support any timetable motion.

Politics is the art of the possible, and regardless of how much trust Back Benchers have in Front Benchers, consultation is possible. We ask our Front Benchers to take into account the interests of the whole House. I would rather argue with them over their failure to negotiate a good position than have such frustration. At least my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge tabled an amendment, which was not selected, that would have addressed the matter.

It is amazing that the elected House will not get to debate murder law reform, and that we will probably not get to debate free speech, which has not been debated in this House for centuries—not since the days of the Star Chamber—in the terms on the Order Paper. It would be unacceptable if the House discussed only one group today. We must show self-restraint. No programme motion will ever deliver proper scrutiny if we spend a whole day on the first group, important though it is. With self-restraint, the House of Lords managed to get through its business. In that spirit, I will finish.

The House knows that this is a compendium Bill and that it touches on fundamental issues that affect the nature of our society. I want to draw attention to a conclusion of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which comprises Members of the House of Lords and Members of this House. Few people will have had the opportunity to read the Joint Committee’s report. It states:

“The breadth and size of the Bill and the legal complexity and diversity of the topics it covers have been the subject of concern during the Bill’s passage through the House of Commons given the limited time provided for scrutiny. We add our voice to those concerns. Large, multi-purpose bills of this sort are almost impossible to scrutinise effectively within the limited timescale provided by the Government. Given the range and significance of the human rights issues raised in this bill, the Government should have introduced two or three separate bills, each of which would have been substantial pieces of legislation in their own right or ensured that there was sufficient time for full pre-legislative and Committee stage scrutiny in the House of Commons. We welcome the fact that two days have been given over for Report stage in the House of Commons, a step not taken in relation to previous Bills of similar size, including the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill”.

It does not take much wit or imagination to appreciate that a Bill that covers certified or secret inquests, data protection, consumer reforms, witness anonymity, changes in the criminal law and procedural changes deals with big, big issues which the House should take seriously. What the Government are consistently doing is denigrating this Chamber—my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham (John Bercow) raised that point during questions on the statement by the Justice Secretary earlier this afternoon—rubbishing us, in one sense, and pushing the whole duty of legislative scrutiny down to the other end.

There are matters in this Bill that we simply cannot reach. As was pointed out by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris), we shall not be able to discuss contentions that affect every one of our citizens. What is the purpose of the House of Commons if the Government persist in introducing guillotine motions with timetabling that does not enable us to discuss the business involved? This is a denial even of the Justice Secretary’s Bill of rights and responsibilities. What about the responsibilities of a Government to ensure that Parliament—the elected House of Commons—can discuss matters such as secret coroners’ courts?

I do not intend to delay the House for long, but I want to express my support for what has been said by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier), my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) and, of course, my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd).

This is happening far too regularly. It is not a case of the Government’s having made a genuine mistake; week in week out, there is not enough time to debate Bills in Parliament. One would have thought that, given that it is happening week in week out, the Government would have done something about it if they genuinely believed that the House was supposed to debate important matters. The fact that they do not do anything about it can only lead people to the conclusion that they do not want matters to be debated in the House: that they do not like being scrutinised, and do not want a proper debate to take place. If they allowed a proper debate, they might find that there were differing views among those on their own Benches, and they do not want to tolerate such a situation, so they filibuster by tabling needless statements such as that made earlier by the Justice Secretary—which did not need to be made today—in order to restrict the time available for debate on Bills such as this.

Numerous constituents have raised with me such issues as assisted suicide, which has attracted a great deal of interest. Constituents on both sides of the argument have urged me to support their views. They expect these matters to be debated.

My hon. Friend is making a very good case. That is exactly the point: our constituents expect us to be debating the issues, and they do not understand why we do not get around to doing so because of some incompetence on the Government’s part, and some procedural motion that prohibits proper discussion.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. It is either incompetence on the Government’s part, or a deliberate attempt to prevent a debate from taking place. The Government can choose which it is. I am quite relaxed about allowing them to choose whether it is incompetence or a deliberate attempt to stifle debate, but it is one of those two things.

What am I supposed to say to my constituents who contact me about these matters, ask that these matters be debated, and urge that their own views be heard? Am I supposed to say, “I’m sorry; this is the House of Commons, this is an important issue and the Bill was meant to deal with it, but the Government have ensured that there is not enough time for it to be debated, and so the view of the House has not been tested”?

The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) is perfectly entitled to a debate on the new clause that he supports. I might well take a different view from the hon. Gentleman, but the people in the country—our constituents—are entitled to know where we stand on these issues, and to know that they are being debated.

Is not a bad situation made worse by the fact that debate on the timetable motion is taken out of the time for debate on the Bill? It would have been a little better if the 45 minutes for this debate had been ring-fenced, so that after that we could get on with the Bill.

My hon. Friend is entirely right, and he was entirely right when he said in an earlier intervention that this type of thing was bringing the House into disrepute. The standing of the House of Commons is falling as every day goes by. We should be trying to do something about that. We should be trying to arrest the slide in public support for what goes on in this place. We should not be helping it to fall into further disrepute by not debating matters that are of great importance to our constituents. We are already considered an irrelevance by many people; we are making ourselves irrelevant by not debating particular issues because it might be inconvenient for the Government to have them debated. As we have heard, the business has been fairly light in recent weeks, and it will be so next week in particular, when it seems that the Government are scrabbling around trying to find business to put on in order to allow the House to sit. That would have provided a perfect opportunity to have proper debate of these issues.

My constituents have raised these important issues and they expected them to be debated. I could not allow this debate to go by without making the point that the Government have prevented their being debated through their programme motion. We have two days set aside on the Order Paper. Given the way things have been arranged, it is entirely possible that we may reach almost none of the key amendments today and finish early tomorrow because the business ends particularly early, when we could have allowed time for some more of these issues to be debated. That would have been entirely possible.

This business has been organised in such a way as to prevent debate on matters that are important to Members and our constituents. The Government should be ashamed of themselves. I am delighted that my Front-Bench colleagues have said that they will oppose this programme motion, and I will support them enthusiastically.

I have heard a lot of nonsense spoken in this House on many an occasion, but not quite as much as I have heard from the hon. Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) today.

No, because I want us to get on to the main substance of the debate.

Let me address a couple of points. First, we spent 43 hours and 32 minutes in Committee, so the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), who is very concerned about process in this House, will know that proper scrutiny took place in Committee over several days, including an extra day. We have also allowed two days on Report. I will not take any lessons from the nationalists, who did not bother turning up to the Committee stage of the Bill. However, I will say to the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth), who was concerned about the balance between amendments to the law of homicide and to incitement, that there were more names down in support of the amendment to the incitement provisions than in support of any of the amendments to the homicide law, which might indicate that people do want to have a proper debate on the incitement provisions.

Finally, I say to the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris), who rightly tabled new clauses to the Bill, that if a disciplined approach were taken by the Opposition—which I doubt, however—we might well get on to his proposals tonight, and he might hear some positive responses from the Government.

Whether we reach all the parts of the Bill that are down for debate tonight is entirely in the hands of Opposition Members.

I will not give way, as I want us to get on to the substance of the Bill. If the Opposition could exercise a little discipline, we might well reach all those clauses. It is entirely up to them.

Question put.

Coroners and Justice Bill

[1st Allocated Day]

[Relevant Documents: The Second Report from the Justice Committee, Session 2008-09, The Coroners and Justice Bill, HC 185, and the Government’s response, HC 322, and the Eighth Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Session 2008-09, Legislative Scrutiny: Coroners and Justice Bill, HC 362.]

Consideration of Bill, as amended in the Public Bill Committee.

New Clause 14

Inquests in camera

‘(1) The Secretary of State may apply to the High Court for a certificate ordering that an inquest be held in camera.

(2) The Secretary of State may only apply for a certificate if he is satisfied that it would be necessary to prevent material or information being disclosed whose disclosure would be seriously detrimental to national security.

(3) The court may only grant the certificate if it is satisfied—

(a) that granting the certificate is necessary to prevent material or information being disclosed whose disclosure would be seriously detrimental to national security; and

(b) that other measures short of granting a certificate would not be adequate to prevent such disclosure.

(4) Where the court grants a certificate, the following provisions apply—

(a) the Lord Chief Justice may appoint a judge of the High Court to act as coroner for the case, and a judge so appointed shall have the same functions and powers in relation to the body and the investigation as would be the case if he or she were the senior coroner in whose area the body was situated;

(b) the jury may be subject to checking in accordance with the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Jury Checks.

(5) The Attorney General must, on the coming of this section into force, consider revising the Guidelines on Jury Checks to meet the particular requirements of inquests in camera.

(6) If a jury has already been summoned when a certificate is issued, that jury must be discharged and a new jury summoned.

(7) The powers of coroners to protect the identity of witnesses shall apply to inquests in camera to the same extent that they apply to other inquests.

(8) The certificate may require that part of the inquest be held in camera and part in public, and the court must only issue a certificate requiring the whole of an inquest to be held in camera if the disclosure of material or information whose disclosure would be seriously detrimental to national security cannot be prevented in any other way.

(9) Where a certificate has been issued under this section, the coroner or judge may at any time, taking into account any other measures that the coroner or judge may have taken, including measures to protect the identity of witnesses, admit to the proceedings any interested person he may specify, provided that he is satisfied that doing so will not lead to material or information being disclosed whose disclosure would be seriously detrimental to national security.

(10) Where a decision made by a judge conducting an investigation by virtue of this section gives rise to an appeal under section 30, and the Lord Chief Justice has exercised the power in subsection (4)(a), that section has effect as if references in it to the Chief Coroner were references to a judge of the Court of Appeal nominated by the Lord Chief Justice.

(11) A reference in this section or section [Discontinuance or variance of certificate for inquest in camera] to conducting an investigation, in the case of an investigation that has already begun, is to be read as a reference to continuing to conduct it.’.—(David Howarth.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 15—Discontinuation or variance of certificate for inquest in camera—

‘(1) A certificate under section [Inquests in camera] has effect in relation to an investigation until it is discontinued or varied.

(2) A certification may (but need not) be discontinued or varied by the Lord Chief Justice at any time on application from the Secretary of State, the investigating coroner or judge of the High Court, or any interested person.

(3) Where a certificate has been discontinued or varied, and a jury has been summoned, the inquest is to continue with the same jury.’.

New clause 16—Intercept evidence—

‘(1) Section 18 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c. 23) (exclusion of matter from legal proceedings: exceptions) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (7), after paragraph (c) insert—

“(d) a disclosure to an inquest for which a relevant certificate exists under section [Inquests in camera], and where the coroner or judge is satisfied that the exceptional circumstances of the case make the disclosure essential to enable the matters that are required to be ascertained by the investigation to be ascertained.”.’.

Amendment 2, page 6, line 2, leave out clause 11.

Government amendment 94.

Amendments (a) to (c), (e) to (g), (d), (i) and (h) thereto.

Amendment 4, clause 11, page 6, line 4, after ‘if’, insert

‘the matter has been referred to the Lord Chief Justice and he or she is’.

Amendment 47, page 6, line 4, leave out ‘of the opinion’ and insert

‘he is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt’.

Amendment 5, page 6, line 6, leave out ‘any of the reasons’ and insert ‘the reason’.

Amendment 6, page 6, line 9,  leave out ‘reasons are’ and insert ‘reason is’.

Amendment 48, page 6, line 12, leave out sub-paragraph (ii).

Amendment 7, page 6, leave out lines 12 to 16.

Amendment 49, page 6, line 14, after ‘detecting’, insert ‘serious’.

Amendment 52, page 6, line 16, leave out paragraph (c).

Government amendment 95.

Amendment 50, page 6, leave out lines 31 to 34 and insert

‘until it has been confirmed by a judge of the High Court.’.

Government amendment 96.

Amendment 51, page 6, line 34, at end insert—

‘(5A) On an application by the Secretary of State for the confirmation of a certification under subsections (1) and (2), the court may confirm the certification only if it is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that—

(a) the investigation will concern or involve a matter that should not be made public for any of the reasons that are set out in subsection (2), and

(b) that no other measures would be adequate to prevent the matters being made public.’.

Government amendment 97.

Amendments (b), (a), (c) and (d) thereto.

Government amendments 98, 99 and 3.

Amendment 30, page 7, line 18, leave out clause 13.

Government amendments 101, 102, 109 and 110.

Amendment 16, page 23, line 26, leave out clause 38.

Government amendment 111.

Amendment 29, clause 38, page 23, line 28,  leave out ‘and in sections 11 and 12’.

Government amendments 112 and 113.

Amendment 17, page 139, line 1, leave out schedule 9.

Amendment 28, page 141, line 18, leave out from beginning to end of line 23 on page 142.

Government amendment 120.

Amendments (a) to (e) thereto.

Government amendments 127 and 128.

We now turn, at last, to the issue of inquests without a jury. I use that term advisedly, because the central issue is not whether proceedings on inquests should sometimes have to be held in private—in some national security cases, there are certainly times when that should happen—but whether when somebody has died at the hands of the state, a jury that has been summoned should, at the behest of the Secretary of State or through some other procedure, afterwards be dismissed and removed from the case, so that the case in the inquest continues without a jury.

Originally in this Bill—of course, there were proposals in a previous Bill—the Government proposed a procedure whereby the Secretary of State would simply certify that the inquest would involve a risk of releasing information that might harm national security, relations with a foreign power, the prevention of crime or the protection of witnesses, or that might involve “other real harm” to the public interest. That certificate would mean that the coroner would be instantly removed from the case and replaced by a High Court judge, and that any jury that had been summoned would be removed, too. The case would continue without a jury and, presumably, in private, excluding everybody from the proceedings, including the family of the deceased.

There were protests from all sides about that proposal. It was wrong, first of all, because the Secretary of State decided everything himself on the certificate. Secondly, the grounds on which the Secretary of State could issue a certificate were far too wide. The real harm clause, for example, was very broad and it was confusing, because the Bill contains the exact same phrase later on which the Government admitted meant something different. Protecting witnesses sounded plausible as a reason for excluding the public, at least, from the full inquest, until in Committee the Government admitted under pressure from amendments that proposed giving a power to coroners to give anonymity to witnesses that coroners already have extensive powers to protect the identity of witnesses by the equivalent of anonymity orders and to impose all the special measures that are open to criminal courts when it comes to protecting identity and protecting witnesses. The broad grounds therefore made no sense.

Thirdly, the removal of the jury raises a fundamental point. Juries do not come into inquests in many cases, but when they do, it is because the case is a crucial one—when someone has died at the hands of the police or in custody, and where there are serious questions about the responsibility of the state for the death. It is unquestionably a crucial part of public confidence in the state, the police and the Prison Service that there are ordinary people in the jury to make the judgments in such cases.

Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that a crucial part of this issue is that juries can be a flipping nuisance to the Government in such circumstances? Does he agree that the real fear is that the Government are trying to make the change because they do not like to be embarrassed by 12 good men and women and true?

I am afraid that the conclusion that I have come to is that that is right. I will come back to that point later, when I address how the Government have changed their proposals, because the changes have not dealt with that precise point.

The fourth reason why the Government’s original proposals were objectionable was that the family were excluded. A situation in which the family hear only the bare verdict and no explanation of what has gone on, after having been removed from the proceedings, is completely unsatisfactory. The family will not feel that any explanation of what happened was available to them, and are sure to have very little confidence in what happened.

The Government have changed their proposals to some extent. The Secretary of State will still decide on the matter of the certificate. When the certificate is issued, it will still have the effect of removing the coroner—it is interesting to ask why Governments do not trust coroners, to come back to the point made by the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer)—but it will replace the coroner with the supposedly more trustworthy High Court judge. The Government have made a concession, which means that at that point, instead of the jury being removed automatically, the High Court judge will consider whether to remove the jury. That is the first change.

Secondly, the grounds on which a certificate can be issued by a Secretary of State have changed slightly. The catch-all

“real harm to the public interest”

provision has been scrapped, but the other four grounds are still there.

Has my hon. Friend received any satisfactory explanation from the Lord Chancellor, or indeed anyone else, on why it is necessary to include the second ground—

“the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country”—

outwith the grounds of “national security” and “preventing or detecting crime”? Why should we be in the extraordinary situation of including a novel procedure to protect the agents of another country from, it appears, embarrassment?

My hon. Friend is right; the second ground, as a free-standing ground, cannot have anything to do with national security, because that is covered by the first ground. The second ground can only be about embarrassment.

May I suggest to the hon. Gentleman the kind of embarrassment that the Government have in mind? A victim of extraordinary rendition being killed during that process, or somebody who is questioned in Guantanamo Bay dying under interrogation—that is what the Government are worried about.

Yes, I agree with that, although I suppose that the Government might argue that those are national security grounds.

Is clause 11 not almost lifted from the Official Secrets Act, and does that not tell us a lot about the Coroners and Justice Bill?

The hon. Gentleman is probably right. One can always tell quite a lot about legislation by the templates that are used, and where they are from.

I take the view, on reading the clause, that the application must be intended to be much wider than national security, because all the examples that we have just heard might conceivably be caught by national security. It seems to me that embarrassment, in this context, means exactly that. I find it troubling that the Government should consider the embarrassment of their relations with another country, when that falls short of being a matter of national security, to come into the criteria at all.

That is correct. It is of course possible that what is envisaged is not so much the rather more shameful sort of case to which the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) referred, but the still embarrassing matter of death through friendly fire.

Is not the truth that there is a quid pro quo between the United Kingdom and some of its friends, particularly—but not exclusively—the United States? Our Intelligence Services Act 1994 makes lawful in English law any activities that our agents undertake abroad, and vice versa. Basically, in United States law, and in some other countries, it would be possible for someone to bump off a person in the United Kingdom, but those countries do not want to go there because we have reciprocal arrangements. That is the truth; it is the scandalous UK Intelligence Services Act 1994, and comparable Acts in other countries, that are covered by the provision about not causing embarrassment to other states.

The hon. Gentleman gets to the heart of the reality of the special relationship. There are later amendments on foreign conspiracies, and he will be able to raise that point directly in debate on them.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way; he is being very generous. I say this as a citizen of Canada, one of our closest allies: the passage to which he refers could relate not to embarrassment—I quite take his point on that—but to the national security of another country.

The central point is that national security is taken as a separate ground; it is the first ground. Separate from that, there is the ground of relations with a foreign power. Separate from that are matters to do with protecting witnesses, and separate from that is the issue of the prevention and detection of crime. Those are separate grounds. As I said right at the start of my remarks, no one questions the need for certain proceedings at certain times to be held behind closed doors for national security reasons, but that is different from what is covered in the second ground.

Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the two words in the new clause—“national security”—encompass the national security not only of the United Kingdom, but of another country?

If the hon. Gentleman is referring to new clause 14, the answer is no; in the new clause, “national security” is the national security of our country, and our country alone.

So far as I am aware, no coroners involved in certain military operations have made complaints about the existing arrangements for inquests. If the existing arrangements seem to work well, why is it necessary to add an extra element, when the existing element relating to national security appears to cover everything?

My hon. Friend is right: the complaints about the system do not, in this case, come from the coroner service, but from outside it. We are talking about a political matter, rather than just a legal or technical one within the service.

My hon. Friend has said more than once that he agrees that there are occasions when, for national security reasons, juries might be excluded. I certainly do not believe that that should be the case. Does he concede that there are times when the family have no right at all to be represented in the courts? Once again, I certainly do not share that view. Can he conceive of any circumstances in which a family should not be present when an inquest is being carried out on a family member?

My hon. Friend should be clear that our new clause 14 never allows a jury to be excluded, no matter what the circumstances. That is where we fundamentally differ from the Government. In fact, the Government’s concessions are insufficient precisely because they still allow the jury to be entirely removed. My hon. Friend mentions the question of the family. Our new clause allows the family back in—well, technically, it gives the coroner the discretion, in every case, to allow the family back in. Under the Government’s proposal, the family are still excluded in all circumstances. The Secretary of State, and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Lewisham, East (Bridget Prentice), are shaking their heads—perhaps they want to intervene—but there is no provision in the Government’s proposals to allow families back in once they have been excluded.

May I take the hon. Gentleman back to what he said about friendly fire? Was there not a rather famous case, about two years ago, involving the deputy coroner of Oxfordshire, in which American fighters had killed some British servicemen, and the videotapes were not released? Is not that a case in which it might be useful to use such a provision?

That is entirely possible. There is interesting speculation, let us say, about the origin of the sub-paragraphs of clause 11(2)(a). One explanation is that they have to do with relations with the United States and friendly fire cases. However, another historical explanation has been given, and should perhaps be put on record. It is that objections came from the Metropolitan police because of what happened in the Rodney case, in which a young man was shot by the police. The inquest was not able to continue because of the problem—it was at least seen as such at the time—of wire-tap evidence not being admissible. There might have been other problems to do with the legality of intrusive surveillance. That is another possibility for the origins of the provisions.

Under the existing system there is already the opportunity for the coroner to take into account issues of national security. If the Government are concerned about the security of other nations—I can understand that being a concern—could they not make that more specific in the Bill instead of the rather broad concept of a relationship with another country?

That is absolutely right. Throughout the passage of the Bill I have been trying to pin the Government down to putting into the Bill what they really mean, as opposed to making the clauses as broad as they can, either to obscure what they really mean or just in case they need something else later. The central problem still relates to the jury and the family. Why exclude the jury in the circumstances under discussion?

In my remarks I will deal with the jury issue, which is central. To reassure the hon. Gentleman in respect of the family, there is no suggestion that the family should be excluded, even were there to be an inquest conducted by a High Court judge rather than with a jury, except from the protected material. The rest would be as before.

The trouble with that is that in many cases the protected material seems to be implicated in everything that happens in the case—[Interruption.] The Secretary of State says that that might be only a tiny part, but these cases are all of a piece. All the bits of evidence come together to build up a picture, and if one has only part of the picture, how does one explain the difference? One can explain it only if there is some means of finding out what was in the protected material. In practice, once the family had been excluded from the protected material, I do not think that it would be possible to let them into the rest of the case. That is a serious problem.

I take the hon. Gentleman back to the Azelle Rodney case which, as he rightly pointed out, ground to a halt because of problems over intercept evidence. He will be aware that clause 13 allows intercept material to be admissible in inquiries in certified investigations, but if it were allowed in all inquests, surely that would easily sort out the Azelle Rodney case. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is extraordinary that the Government originally based their entire case in support of clause 11 on two inquests? One is now back on track; the other is that of Azelle Rodney, which could easily be resolved by allowing intercept evidence.

I believe that the hon. Gentleman is correct. The whole issue could be resolved by generalising the principle that the Government have already conceded—the principle of allowing intercept evidence into inquests. The problem from the Government’s point of view is that they will concede that point only when the jury has gone. That seems quite wrong and it comes back to the central problem. For some reason, the Government have concluded that juries are dangerous outsiders, which brings us directly back to the point made by the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal. It is as if the world could be divided into the reliable and the unreliable, and the easiest way, according to the Government, of finding out whether somebody is reliable or unreliable is to ask whether they are a servant of the state. If they are a servant of the state they are presumed to be reliable, and if they are an ordinary member of the public, they are presumed to be unreliable. That has only to be stated to demonstrate how ridiculous the position is.

The hon. Gentleman will recollect that the Government’s current position is that they are working towards allowing intercept evidence to be available in criminal trials with juries. We may never get there, but that is the stated intention. If they ever reached that point, it would be difficult to see how the argument in relation to inquest juries could be tenable any longer.

That is entirely correct. I do not understand why the Government see this as the thin end of the wedge, when in the end they are in favour of hammering in the wedge completely.

There might be other problems in the Rodney case mentioned by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham), but those problems have to do with the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, which could be dealt with in a completely different way, not by removing the jury.

May I return to the issue of the family and the protected information? Can my hon. Friend conceive of a situation where it is possible for the family to be excluded because the information presented was protected yet the subject of that information was the cause of their loved one’s death? How can that be right in any court in any circumstance?

The Government seem to think there is some way in which the family could understand the whole case except for the most important part. That cannot be satisfactory.

What can be done instead is for the coroner to take measures to protect the identity of police undercover agents and informers, for example, to make sure that those people are not endangered by the information’s coming out, and when that has been done, to allow the family back into the proceedings. They will then find out the nature of the events that led to the death of their relative. They do not need to know the exact identity of police informers or of undercover officers to understand that.

The Government’s attempt to change their proposals should to some extent be welcomed, because they are moving on the issue, but like many other hon. Members I do not believe that they have moved far enough, especially on the crucial question of the jury and on families. What will happen when the Secretary of State says to the court, “Judge, the following information is protected. Remove the jury in this case on the basis of what we tell you.” What other information, at that point, will the judge have? The judge will have only the information from the Government. Given the nature of the proceedings, they will have to be held in camera, and will be practically unchallengeable.

Even if the Government come up with a variety of reasons why the House should not accept our new clause 14, which is our attempt to put forward an alternative to the Government’s proposal, it is entirely fair to expect them to justify their new proposals. For that reason, I shall seek at the appropriate time to divide the House at least on amendment 2, which has the effect of removing clause 11.

It may assist the House if I try to respond to the points made by the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) and explain the changes that we have made in the amendments before the House, which are intended to meet the understandable criticisms that were raised on both sides of the House about the original proposals.

I note that the hon. Gentleman said that he welcomed the proposals but that they did not go far enough. In their parliamentary briefing the Bar Council and the Criminal Bar Association did not qualify the welcome that they gave, as the hon. Gentleman did. Since the Criminal Bar Association and the Bar Council are no mean critics, quite properly, of proposals from this Government and from previous Governments, I ask the House to take account of what they said. I shall read it out in full:

“The Bar Council welcomes the Government’s amendments which fundamentally recast the proposals for certified investigations in three important respects: first, the criterion for the Secretary of State’s certification is to be significantly tightened. Secondly, the Secretary of State’s certificate will trigger consideration by a High Court judge sitting as a coroner. Thirdly, it will then be for the judge, not the Secretary of State, to decide whether it is necessary to hold an inquest without a jury or whether special measures with a jury would be adequate to protect the sensitive information concerned (with a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal.)”

The briefing repeats:

“The Bar Council welcomes the change in Government policy.”

Has my right hon. Friend looked at the comments made by the Royal British Legion in respect of the families affected by the case that has been mentioned? What answer can he give the legion and the bereaved families, who see the inquest system as their opportunity to get a final answer about the death of their loved ones? Will my right hon. Friend’s mechanism allow them to get that final answer?

Absolutely. The whole purpose of the Bill’s provisions on coroners is to strengthen and improve how the coronial system operates—not least in respect of military inquests investigating cases in which relatives have lost loved ones who were serving the country. There will be a chief coroner, who will be a High Court judge, and a deputy coroner, and there will be much greater co-ordination between coroners; we will be able to provide a better service than what has been possible until now. Furthermore, there will be proper rights of appeal when there are concerns. It will no longer be necessary judicially to review coroners’ decisions, because proper rights of appeal are embedded in the Bill.

I fully understand the important points of principle raised by the issue—which is narrow, as I shall explain—of whether there will be circumstances in which the court might decide that the only way forward would be without a jury. There are two excellent examples, both of which have been raised by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham). Neither example—although there is now only one—involved the death of a military serviceperson.

On the question of military inquests, the curiosity of the right hon. Gentleman’s proposed changes is that the vast bulk of such inquests are already heard with no jury. The coroners handle perfectly well the issue of what must and must not be secret, and the families are always there. Why should that perfectly good system be changed into a certification procedure involving the High Court?

There is not a good reason in respect of the inquests to which the hon. Gentleman has referred.

I shall detain the House without taking interventions to go through the changes that have been made. In respect of the system being set up, it is my wish that the occasions when the court—not Ministers—comes to the view that an inquest without a jury is necessary will be very few and far between, and we do not anticipate that military service inquests will be involved.

I want to pick up the wording of the Bar Council and go through the fundamental recasting of the proposals. First, the criteria in the amendments have been significantly tightened. I shall come to the issue of the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country, but first I ask Members to look at amendment 94. Three criteria are set out. Paragraph (d) states that the Secretary of State has to be

“of the opinion that it is necessary for the inquest to be held without a jury in order to avoid protected matters being made public or unlawfully disclosed.”

Not only were the criteria wider before, but the Secretary of State had simply to be “of the opinion”; now he or she would have to be

“of the opinion that it is necessary”.

We have greatly reduced and tightened the criteria; what were generally regarded, including by me, as catch-all criteria have been removed altogether.

There does not seem to be any argument in the House about the interests of national security or the prevention or detection of crime. As far as the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country is concerned, there is no suggestion whatever that such conditions should be used to cover up embarrassment on the part of the United Kingdom; that would be not only a preposterous but a worthless exercise for any Secretary of State, as I shall explain.

In evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, East (Bridget Prentice), set out in detail an example in which we had co-operated with a foreign country over the detection and interception of drug dealers; for the reasons given, that would not necessarily come under national security or the detection or prevention of a crime. If the circumstances of our involvement were to be disclosed, that could not only seriously disrupt our relations with that foreign country, but lead to a lack of co-operation on central issues relating to our and that country’s interests.

Was not the case to which the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) referred, which came in front of the Oxford coroner about two years ago, exactly that—somewhat embarrassing to both the American Government and ours? It involved friendly fire that had killed our service personnel. Was not what the Secretary of State has mentioned behind the suppression of those inquests? How are such issues being resolved? I do not see that they are.

I shall explain that in a moment. The decision will not be made by the Secretary of State; we are strengthening the law in this respect.

Unlike my party’s Front Benchers, I am prepared to accept that there are a number of cases for which jury-free inquests can properly take place. However, the bar has been set too low. We have been told that the Secretary of State would have to be “of the opinion”; that is a low standard. If we look at the certification process when the coroner is making the determination, we see that the High Court judge has only to be satisfied—on the balance of probabilities, I suspect. If the right hon. Gentleman increased the test so that it involved satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt, I would be with him.

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his acknowledgement that there is a problem with which we must deal. There is, and that view is widely shared. We have made a fundamental change with these proposals, and to those who say that the parliamentary process does not work, I simply say that it does. Bluntly, these proposals are a million miles from how they started out in the original Counter-Terrorism Bill. Under the original proposals, the Secretary of State was to be of the opinion that there should be no jury, and his or her decision was to have been final—subject only to the possibility of judicial review. Furthermore, he or she would then have appointed the coroner. This Bill is completely different. I am certainly open to further consideration in the other place about how we should further tighten the criteria without losing the whole purpose of the measures.

I turn to the second, really important limb. Even under the proposals originally presented by this Bill on publication, the Secretary of State was to have triggered the decision on whether there should be no jury—although the inquest was to have been held by a High Court judge rather than by an ordinary coroner; that was an improvement. I invite the House to turn to amendment 97 to see how these proposals differ. The Secretary of State makes a certification. There have been suggestions that the certification should be made by the court. However, the courts have always been reluctant to stand in the shoes of the Executive when it comes to judgments about national security. They do not want to make those decisions, as was made clear in a series of judgments, including by Lord Hoffman in the Rehman case.

To the extent that the right hon. Gentleman is right, that still does not explain why the other criteria are still in the Bill—the criteria about relations with a foreign state or, especially, the prevention and detection of crime and protection of witnesses. Especially on the last two, the Secretary of State has no comparative advantage over the rest of the legal system.

I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is making. One could argue that those decisions should be made ab initio by the court, although I do not. The court will make the decision, but someone has to trigger the process—the court cannot start it of its own volition—by saying that there is a real problem; it could be the prosecution. There comes a point where an application is made to the court for it to make a decision about whether it is really essential—necessary—to dispense with a jury or to have other measures. At that point, the process set out in amendment 97 operates. As hon. Members on both sides of the House will see, it says:

“The judge holding an inquest as part of a certified investigation must hold it without a jury if…there is a protected matter that would need to be revealed to the jury…in order for the jury to be able properly to discharge its duty”

or

“to avoid a breach of…Convention rights”

and, under limb 2,

“the judge is satisfied that it is necessary to hold the inquest without a jury in order to avoid the matter being made public or unlawfully disclosed.”

It is the judge who has to be satisfied. The next limb talks about circumstances in which the judge operates with a jury. The Bill plainly anticipates that it is for the judge to determine whether this is necessary.

There is no way that any sane Secretary of State would, for trivial reasons—or for reasons of embarrassment to the Government, to pick up on the point made by the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd)—sign an application and make a certificate only to have his head scrubbed by the learned judge for coming forward with an application that was trivial and unfounded. Applications will be made by the Secretary of State where he or she believes that it is necessary not to have a jury but the court comes to a different decision. I very much hope that that will happen, and the Secretary of State is put to proof. The court will anxiously examine whether there are any other measures short of dispensing with a jury that could meet the requirements of the law.

One of the options that the court could consider is the so-called gisting of secret evidence to be put before the jury. Gisting, whereby the gist of secret evidence is summarised, has been used on several occasions; I understand that it was used in the de Menezes case. Some argue that if the de Menezes case proceeded satisfactorily without dispensing with a jury, that could apply in all cases. There may be cases—we think that there is one at the moment—where it is likely to be the judgment, on application to the court by the Secretary of State, that dispensing with a jury is necessary. The de Menezes case shows that the courts have been ingenious and imaginative in setting down certain conditions by which highly sensitive information is protected and, none the less, the jury is able to get to the full facts. One of the processes for that is the gisting of such protected matters.

Under this measure, there is no question but that a certificate would be signed and there would then be an application to the court. It is the Secretary of State who is put to proof to make his or her case. I understand all the arguments made in favour of juries being used in these cases. The judge would, quite properly, lean over backwards to see whether it is possible to meet the concerns of the Secretary of State without having to dispense with a jury. Only in very exceptional cases—they would be few and far between, but they may arise—would the judge come to the view that a jury should be dispensed with.

I have always appreciated that this is a difficult issue for the Government. The right hon. Gentleman seems to be making a compelling argument for the maintenance of the status quo, because there appear already to be several ways through these problems to enable inquests where juries are required to take place with juries. Does not that rather weaken the new framework that he is trying to put in place? I have always accepted that the amendments that he has tabled are a considerable improvement, but they are insufficient.

What the hon. and learned Gentleman suggests is likely to be so in the vast majority of cases. I anticipate that the phrasing of the amendment means that applications will be few and far between, still more so the granting of those applications. That is a good thing, not a bad thing. I can envisage what may happen from my own experience of being responsible first for the Security Service and then for the Secret Intelligence Service and GCHQ, when some intercept or intercept-related evidence was so sensitive that one could not risk its going beyond a High Court judge. Any Secretary of State faced with that situation may decide to resort to not proceeding with an inquest but instead going down the route of an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005, which would have the effect of dispensing with a jury. That would be article 2 compliant, because there is no provision for juries in the European convention on human rights. This debate may be slightly uncomfortable, but I do not want to achieve that—I want to achieve a situation whereby the Secretary of State is never faced with that decision but always has to go to the court.

I wonder if the Secretary of State is correct about this. The reason for having an inquest—one of the main criteria, as defined in the case of Amin—is to satisfy the families, not to provide an explanation for the benefit of the state alone, yet the system that is to be set up will never satisfy families. In those circumstances, it would be better to take the inquiry route, which would of course lead to a great deal of condemnation but would at least be clear that there is no attempt to skew the coronial system in a way that was never intended. I feel strongly that what he is trying to do, doubtless for good reasons, will undermine the system, not enhance it.

The hon. and learned Gentleman has made an interesting choice. I commend him for doing so, but it is a much less acceptable choice than the one that I have made and commend to the House. Let us be clear about this. He is saying that there could be circumstances where it would not be possible to hold an inquest with a jury, and therefore it should be for the Secretary of State to decide to hold an inquiry under the Inquiries Act, with as much accommodation for the family as possible. I am powerfully committed to the use of juries in such cases, as in others, but it does not follow that an inquiry without a jury will never satisfy the family. The decision will be made by the Secretary of State and it cannot be tested except under judicial review. In this system, however, scrutiny by the court will be much more intense than it would be under judicial review, because it will be for the judge to make the decision not to review others’ decisions.

The problem with the planned system is that once it is on the statute book, it will be used far more frequently than any resort to inquiries under section 2 of the Inquiries Act. Once the system is an established procedure, it will be quite easy for Secretaries of State to make applications and, in a sense, to exonerate themselves from the onerous aspects of the responsibility. They will say, “The procedure is there. Parliament has set it up. There are instances in which coroners inquests can take place without a jury, even though they ought to be one.” If I may say so, the Government have approached this process from the wrong direction. Because of that—although I have some sympathy with the Government’s position—we will support amendment 2 to delete clause 11. The Government have not made the case that the proposals are the right way forward. Other means already available, which do not require quite so much soul-searching on our part, may be used, but only in the most extreme circumstances. However, I fear that the provisions in the Bill will be used more often.

I simply disagree with the hon. and learned Gentleman. It is of note to the House that the position of the official Opposition is—

With great respect, I have not even finished my sentence. Their position is very different from that taken by most of those who signed the amendment to delete the existing clause 11. The hon. and learned Gentleman accepts that there can be non-jury inquests, but he also says that their use should be determined by a Secretary of State under the Inquiries Act 2005 procedure, and not by an independent judge. His substantive argument is that the measures in the Bill would encourage applications, and that there would be more of them, but I do not accept that. I would be perfectly happy to have a small wager on it with the hon. and learned Gentleman. If he follows the approach of the courts, common law principles about open justice and the quite proper attitude taken by the High Court and the Court of Appeal—and ultimately by the Law Lords—he will understand that the idea that they will act as a patsy, or putty in the hands of a Secretary of State who thinks, “Oh, there is a tiny embarrassment here. Let’s go for a non-jury inquest”, is frankly nonsense.

I wonder whether the Lord Chancellor overstates a judge’s latitude for determination in this matter. From my reading of amendment 97, the judge does not have the capacity to determine more than whether a protected matter would need to be revealed in order for the inquest to take place, and that it would therefore be necessary to hold an inquest without a jury in order to prevent it from being revealed. The judge does not appear to enjoy the clear latitude to determine whether the certification process that the Secretary of State undertook is, of necessity, correct. Perhaps I am misreading the amendment.

I think that the hon. Gentleman is misreading it. The judge has to decide that it is necessary to hold an inquest without a jury to avoid the given matter being made public or being unlawfully disclosed. As the de Menezes case made clear, plenty of other measures can be used, including gisting, which is an important consideration, to ensure that those disclosure criteria are met.

The concerns that we have all expressed about there being an open door on this matter are similar to those we expressed about surveillance issues. In that context, the Government assured us that such surveillance would be conducted only in narrow circumstances, but the door was then opened to a far greater use of surveillance. My right hon. Friend is dwelling upon a contradiction. He has argued that the court is loth to interfere and judge on matters of national security, but decisions in such matters will be dependent on the Government’s interpretation of national security. Several of us are anxious that the jury system will be lost in such cases purely on the basis that the High Court will always allow the Government’s argument in such instances.

I understand my hon. Friend’s point, but I would just say this: it will be for the Secretary of State to make a judgment on national security grounds, or the other grounds set out, but doing so does not determine whether a jury is dispensed with. The Secretary of State will have to go to the court, and it is for the court to say, “We do not necessarily disagree with your judgment on national security”—it may do, because it may think that it is unreasonable—“but we disagree with your view. It is up to us to make the judgment, which is clearly spelt out in amendment 97, about whether or not a jury should be dispensed with.” That is the difference. A crucial distinction is being made between the Secretary of State essentially initiating the application and the learned judge dispensing with it.

The Secretary of State’s defence would be easier to follow if he had not turned through 180 degrees. At the moment, he is telling us that the terms are all right because they are terribly narrow, but he has just told us that the amendment is light years away from what he wanted in the first place. He must accept that most of us approach his present explanation with a certain amount of suspicion. He started off wanting a huge opportunity to do what he wished; now he says that the remit will be very narrow. I put it to him again: would it not be better to have a system where, in such important circumstances, one would have to go down the potentially embarrassing route of having an inquiry? No Home Secretary would do that without considerable thought. That must be true, and the Secretary of State has made it true by starting off by asking for powers that were manifestly unacceptable.

My point about the measures before us being light years away related to the Counter-Terrorism Bill, which was a Government Bill, and the measures in it were very different. The right hon. Gentleman must accept that the House cannot have it both ways. It cannot say that it wants Ministers to listen to the arguments, then criticise them for so doing. People need to make up their minds.

My right hon. Friend is right when he says that article 2 does not require a jury, but it is fair to say that the jury trial is one of the principal features of common law. He is also right to say that the Government have made a lot of progress, but that raises the question whether the changes were needed in the first place. The key point about article 2 is the need to involve families throughout. My right hon. Friend referred to gisting, and I put to him what happened in the Rodney case in which gisting featured and which the coroner ruled was inadequate. When I read the coroner’s judgment, I questioned whether he took the right approach to that issue. If we analyse the Rodney case properly, rather than just looking at it as a piece of hard law, we may find that there may have been a different conclusion if the matter had been tested in the courts. Has my right hon. Friend looked at the judgment of Mr. Justice Weatherup in the Northern Ireland case of McCaughey, which sets out simply and straightforwardly the public interest immunity process, and which would solve my right hon. Friend’s problems?

In the light of the overall changes being made, there will be a far greater opportunity for appeals against decisions by coroners than under the existing system. Such inquests will, in any event, be handled by the chief coroner or by another High Court judge on his or her behalf. Forgive me, what was my hon. Friend’s second point?

Public interest immunity is used in inquests, and the process worked successfully in the de Menezes case. The only problem is that it cannot be the only measure used to protect material in inquests because if a PII application is rejected, unusually, by the court in a criminal trial and there is a risk that protected material would be put into the open court, it is open to the prosecution to withdraw altogether. That option does not exist in inquests.

I will give way to the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), followed by my hon. Friend, and then I need to bring my remarks to a close.

I am slightly embarrassed because I seem to be the right hon. Gentleman’s only friend in this place on this occasion. It is important that the House should know what is meant by the phrase, “the court is satisfied”. I cannot help feeling that the House would be much happier if it thought that the court had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. If he would include that provision in the Bill, I suspect that he might get a lot more consent and support than he is getting at the moment.

The court must be satisfied that it is necessary, which is a high test. It will be for the courts to decide what the burden of proof is. People may disagree with the criteria, but it is a high test.

Like Opposition Members, I recognise that the Government have moved a long way on the matter, but they have sought to replace a provision that Members of all parties felt was dangerous and unreasonable with an extremely complicated paraphernalia of protections and clauses.

I recognise that the Secretary of State has substantially removed himself from the process, and that is to be welcomed. However, is it not the case that despite the amendments that he has tabled, families, particularly of armed service personnel who have been killed, will still not be able to know in what circumstances their son or daughter was killed? That surely cannot be satisfactory. Would it not be simpler to delete clause 11 altogether?

I do not accept that. We are talking about exceptional and difficult cases in which there is material that everybody agrees has to be protected. The family will not be excluded from an inquest save when the protected material is being dealt with. One can anticipate circumstances such as in the de Menezes case, when PII applications were accepted and some evidence was gisted, so neither the family nor the jury heard the full evidence. I am clear that in those circumstances, whether or not a jury is present, the coroner will lean over backwards to ensure that the family and jury are given the maximum information. There will also be special counsel in those circumstances to act on behalf of the family, although I know that that is not an adequate alternative. There is no requirement in convention rights for there to be a jury.

I do not criticise people who make the judgment that there should be an inquiry under the Inquiries Act, but I believe that it is the wrong judgment. Exactly the same issues would arise, such as what evidence the family could hear. Deleting clause 11 would not deal with the problem that occasionally, inquests will be held without a jury and information will have to be gisted or summarised to the family. The difference is that the decision will be made by a judge under the Bill and would be made by the Secretary of State under the Opposition’s proposals.

The Secretary of State spoke about the conditions under which special counsel would be appointed, and I thought that I heard him say that if protected evidence was withheld from the family, for example, special counsel would automatically be available to that family. Can he confirm that that is the case?

I have given notice twice in the House that I wished to raise the question of the inclusion of Northern Ireland in schedule 9, a matter that is covered in this group of amendments. I notice that clause 5(2) includes a provision to ensure that the definition of the purpose of an inquest complies with convention rights. If I may have the Secretary of State’s attention, may I ask him whether he has noticed that that does not extend to Northern Ireland? If it was considered right that that definition should comply with the European convention, why was it not extended to Northern Ireland?

Schedule 9 amends the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959, but clause 5 relates only to the 1953 England and Wales legislation. If I catch your eye later, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I wish to say that the whole of the Northern Ireland provisions should be taken out of the Bill, because they have been sloppily drafted, quite apart from political considerations. I urge the Secretary of State to address the fact that clause 5 does not extend to Northern Ireland. He and his colleagues and civil servants should recognise that and at least indicate that it will be amended in another place.

Amendment 120, to schedule 9, will amend the relevant Northern Ireland legislation, but I am certainly happy to consider my hon. Friend’s points. The arrangements have to be slightly different for Northern Ireland, for reasons that I think everyone accepts. I shall come back to that later.

I have made my point and discussed a number of amendments. We have considered the proposals carefully, and I do not believe that the scheme is overly complicated. It provides for Secretary of State certification according to strict criteria, an application to a High Court judge and a decision by that judge one way or the other, and a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal. It is my judgment that that process is fair, above all to the families, and better than what we have now established the Opposition believe is the only alternative—an inquiry established under the Inquiries Act by fiat of the Secretary of State.

I am grateful to the Secretary of State for the time that he has spent at the Dispatch Box dealing with the matters that have been raised. As I disagree with him and will, I believe, vote differently from him a little later, I shall start by saying that I am mindful of the extent to which the Government have moved on this matter. We are considering a very different set of proposals from those that were first presented to me in the summer, in my previous guise as shadow Home Secretary, when they were to be part of the Counter-Terrorism Bill.

I am also mindful of the fact that when the issues were discussed then, in the briefings that the Government provided me with they succeeded in making a case, if not a completely persuasive one, that there was a problem that had to be addressed. Although I believe that their latest proposals could be pushed further, particularly the extraordinary sub-paragraph about

“the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country”,

which causes me serious problems, I accept that they have tried to move yet further on the matter.

The problem for the Opposition is that the Government have produced a beguiling proposal and said, “We have moved as far as we can, and we think that this is the fairest system we can devise”, and are asking for our support. However, another voice makes itself felt within me, saying that there is absolutely no point in setting up a process to bypass the ordinary principle of the coroner system—that there will be a jury, particularly in cases of death at the hands of the state—if the result is that it will not command public confidence and support. It seems to me that nothing in the proposals that the Secretary of State has brought forward solves that problem.

If families are deprived of juries in coroners’ inquests, those inquests will be devalued to the point that they effectively cease to be of any real use. I remind myself of what Lord Bingham said about the criteria by which coroners’ inquests should normally take place, which bears repeating. He described those criteria as being

“to ensure so far as possible that the full facts are brought to light; that culpable and discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice; that suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing (if unjustified) is allayed; that dangerous practices and procedures are rectified; and that those who have lost their relative may at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learnt from his death may save the lives of others.”

The principle is well established that “brought to light” means that the facts require public scrutiny.

I am sorry to disagree with my hon. and learned Friend, but High Court judges often have to rule on matters between the state and the individual—for example, in fatal accident cases and public inquiries. I have not heard the general proposition that the public are not willing to accept the verdict of a High Court judge—generally, I am and, generally, so are the public.

I take my right hon. and learned Friend’s point. Speaking as a lawyer and a barrister practising in the courts, I have rarely had difficulty accepting High Court judges’ verdicts and judgments. However, the sort of inquest that we are considering will be highly emotive, give rise to serious public concern and be surrounded by a great deal of polemic, and the moderating influence of a jury, which I have extolled in other contexts in the criminal justice system—it also applies to libel cases—seems to be highly effective in reassuring the public that what is happening is not a procedure that is merely for the convenience of state authorities.

I say to my right hon. and learned Friend that the Hutton inquiry into the death of Dr. David Kelly is a classic example of an inquiry that may have been impeccably conducted, but I know from my mailbag that it has never succeeded in answering or resolving some of the basic questions that arose from the case.

I am doing my best to follow the hon. and learned Gentleman, but he has got himself into a cul-de-sac. His argument would be pukka, acceptable and internally consistent if he maintained that there were no circumstances in which it was acceptable to hold an inquest without a jury. However, that is not his position. His comments about Lord Hutton and an inquiry makes my point, not his, because exactly the sort of non-jury inquest that he supports is a one-off inquiry by a High Court judge, without all the procedural protections for which the Bill provides.

I fear that the Secretary of State is not listening to me develop my argument. From the moment I mentioned “inquiry”, he seized on the word and played around with it rather despairingly to try to persuade me and the House that there is a serious flaw in my argument. I do not believe that there is.

The inquiry route currently exists, but has hardly been used. When we considered 42-day pre-charge detention, we pointed out that the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 provided a mechanism in extremis for resolving an issue and extending detention, and that that was a better route than extension to 42 days. Although I have no desire for an inquiry to substitute for an inquest, if the problem is reduced, in the final analysis, to the one or two cases over a long period that the Government say they cannot take before a jury in an inquest—I still hope that ways to enable that to happen could be found, especially if we ever reach the point when intercept is admissible for all juries, and having vetted juries, if necessary—let the Government at that point come to the House, make a statement, after which there would doubtless be questions from hon. Members of all parties and polemic, and end up with the second best option. Although an inquiry may answer the Government’s questions, I doubt whether it answers those of the public.

The Secretary of State’s model is unsatisfactory because the way such things work suggests that every time an inquest presents a difficulty, instead of trying to find every means of resolving it in the existing system—the onus and pressure being on the Government to act in that way—there will be a temptation to say, “Well, we have a procedure voted on by Parliament, and we should go and see the judge, who’ll make decisions and we may end up with an inquest without a jury.” In my view, that is no better—and cannot be any better—than an inquiry, which will involve the polemic of the Secretary of State’s coming here.

My hon. and learned Friend will be aware of the crisis in the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, which is next to my constituency and in which many of my constituents were involved. He also knows that many complaints have been made. I have called for a public inquiry because, under the Inquiries Act 2005, it is necessary to compel witnesses and call for evidence on oath. Does he accept that that, in those circumstances, as with the Legionnaire’s inquiry for which I called in 1984 in different circumstances, an inquiry can provide a suitable method of getting at the truth? That is what we need to do.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, but we must be careful not to conflate two things. In circumstances in which, for example, many people may have died through lack of care in a hospital, there may be powerful arguments for holding an inquiry in any event, and different criteria apply. I want to concentrate on the individual inquest; otherwise we are in danger of being diverted from the main issue.

Is not my hon. and learned Friend saying that, if the Government had started with a narrowly defined point to cover one case, it would be easier for the public to have confidence when they used that narrowly defined power, but given that they started with a much wider provision, the public must believe that the Government want a great deal more occasion for using their non-jury alternative? The Justice Secretary complains that the House cannot have it both ways, but we are not trying to: we are pleased that the Government have narrowed their case. However, the Justice Secretary cannot say that we should not be suspicious, given his starting point. Is not my hon. and learned Friend’s solution therefore much safer?

I agree entirely with my right hon. Friend. We cannot escape the starting point and we should not try to escape from the wording of clause 11(2) and the remaining wide criteria for making applications.

I was struck by the comments and questions of the hon. Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay) because anxiety has been expressed about how the provisions would apply in a Northern Ireland context. When the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office, was taxed with the matter on 27 January on BBC Radio Ulster, he said:

“The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has indicated that he does not wish to use these provisions in respect of historic Northern Ireland cases. The MoJ and the NIO will work together to sort out the practical arrangements required to sort out this approach.”

The impression conveyed at an earlier stage was that the Government would use the provisions in Northern Ireland because it suited their interests. However, I believe the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office. The nature of such inquests in Northern Ireland is sensitive for a series of political reasons, and I have no doubt that the procedure that we are considering will never be used there because it is not deemed politically expedient that that should happen. However, that raises in my mind precisely the question why, if that can be done in Northern Ireland, where I have no doubt that public interest immunity matters will play a difficult part, we are apparently still being asked to enact the power in the wider context here. I am afraid that, for me, the matter comes back to the words in the wretched clause 11(2)(a)(ii) about

“the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country,”

which probably played a major role in the decision to introduce the provision in the first place.

I may not have been in government over the past 12 years, but my experience of such legislation while I have been in opposition is that civil servants get very excited when it comes in, because they see it as a way of resolving all sorts of problems and getting them off hooks that they previously found difficult. They come along and put in a cornucopia of proposals, which then get transformed into something that completely overturns established principle and then, bit by bit, this House starts to ratchet them back.

I am grateful to the Secretary of State for entering into the spirit of this evening’s debate, which has proved to be very useful. My conclusion, which I invite my hon. Friends to consider, is that the provision simply is not necessary. Although there may be inconvenience, although problems will remain and although Secretaries of State may not enjoy coming to the House and, in extremis, having to announce that they are going down the inquiry route, the truth is that if the provision is not necessary, there are ways through the problem that do not do what I consider to be the genuine mischief, which is to undermine confidence in the coroner’s court system.

Does the hon. and learned Gentleman recognise that not all of us are as confident as he is that the Bill will not be used in respect of what are called legacy cases in Northern Ireland? There are more than a couple of dozen inquests still outstanding from the troubles. We have received assurances and promises in the past from Ministers about what would or would not happen, only to see them set aside. Does he accept the point, which my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay) made earlier, that clause 11 will extend to Northern Ireland by virtue of clause 38, but that the mitigating effects—for instance, in clause 5(2) or in clause 30, in respect of the right of appeal—will not extend to Northern Ireland, so that we will potentially end up in an even worse situation than anywhere else?

The hon. Gentleman makes some important points about other provisions in the Bill, which I was not going to look at. Nor can I give him a categorical assurance—I am not in a position to do so—about what might or might not happen, but I found the words of the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office, very interesting, because I am sure that he made them advisedly. He made them in the knowledge that although the power would be going to his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, there would clearly be a political imperative for him that they not be used, even if it might be convenient for them to be used, because, I suspect, of the disastrous political consequences of that happening.

I simply use that as an illustration of how there are other ways forward through the problem. For those reasons, and because I wish to bring my remarks to a close, as I know that many others wish to participate, we will—I hope with your leave, Mr. Deputy Speaker—seek to vote on amendment 2 and delete clause 11 in its totality.

It is fair to say that the Government have been listening. The concessions that they have made are welcome, even if they have come somewhat late in the day and are not accompanied by explanatory notes or a human rights memorandum, which we would have liked. If it were necessary to have a special sort of secret inquest, the process advanced this evening would go a long way towards developing a model. It is not perfect, as has been said, but it could be improved. However, that prompts the question whether the provision is necessary in the first place. The Bar Council has fallen into error on that, because it has looked at the process, but not at whether the provision is necessary in the first place.

So far we have heard about only one case, the Azelle Rodney case, which, coincidentally and unhappily for the Government, occurred in my constituency and in which I have therefore taken a particular interest. Mr. Rodney was shot by the police in Hale lane, outside a pub where a lot of bemused clientele watched a hail of gunfire, and a few rounds going astray. It was rather surprising that the police were quite happy to talk to the local press about what had been happening—it was all in the Hendon Times and the Edgware and Mill Hill Times—but now things have clammed up for inquest purposes. My constituents are, not unnaturally, interested to find out what is going on given that somebody was shot on our doorstep.

As I said in an intervention, however, the real question is whether what is proposed meets the requirements of article 2. The jury is important for common-law reasons—not for article 2 reasons—but the most fundamental issue is the right of the family to be involved and to know what is happening. That is potentially lacking from the process. The Royal British Legion put the matter quite clearly in evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, by saying, on the point about foreign Governments:

“The objection of another country and/or diplomatic relations will be placed above the need for a grieving family to find the truth.”

That is basically the problem.

We are also getting bogged down with the need for certainty in the way in which the issue is approached. An inquest does not proceed on the basis of something being beyond all reasonable doubt; it is not a criminal trial. The reason for holding an inquest is to find out what happened, what the circumstances were and what lessons can be learned, as has been said. An inquest is not a criminal process. Indeed, the Bill makes it clear that any inquest should not make judgments on criminal or civil liability. That is not what it is about.

Can my hon. Friend explain the need for clause 5(2), which, to avoid doubt, says:

“subsection (1)(b) is to be read as including the purpose of ascertaining in what circumstances the deceased came by his or her death”?

With his human rights and lawyer’s background, can he explain to us why it is imperative to include that provision and how deficient it will be if it does not extend to Northern Ireland?

My hon. Friend makes an important point. In fact, I have tabled some amendments to clause 5, so perhaps he might want to wait to hear those arguments later. Otherwise, I might set off on a train of thought that would not be relevant to the point under discussion.

The test for certification is still too broad. We are talking about not just intercept evidence but a wide range of intelligence material—and, indeed, other material altogether. There is the question of wider national security, but the real question is about relations with another country. The Azelle Rodney case, which is the only one that has been prayed in aid, did not concern relations with another country. The relations involved were those among the individual who was shot, his family, my constituents and Scotland Yard—pure and simple. We are told that the provision is about the protection of witnesses, yet the Bill includes a process for protecting witnesses in criminal trials that, if necessary, could easily be translated into a process for inquests. We are told also that the provision is about the prevention of crime, but again, similar processes in the Bill, in relation to the evidential basis for investigation, could have been transferred.

The question we need to ask is this: if the scheme had been in operation five or 10 years ago, would any of the controversial inquests that have taken place in the past five or 10 years not have been allowed to proceed, even though they were able to proceed under the existing regime perfectly satisfactorily, to produce a verdict one way or another and to give the families closure? My concern is that if the process had been in place in, for example, the de Menezes case or the Corporal Matty Hull case, it would have been all too easy for the Secretary of State to make a declaration or a certification and then we would have been none the wiser about what happened in either case.

My hon. Friend is arguing about what was in the Bill, not what the Government are now proposing. Given the experience of the de Menezes case, it seems to me that no judge faced with a similar set of circumstances will agree to dispensing with a jury, because plainly a satisfactory inquest was conducted with a jury in the de Menezes case. I would ask my hon. Friend to take account of what is now proposed, not what was in the Bill.

My right hon. Friend is right about that, but there is still the question of how the judge may decide the case. We did not have that problem in the de Menezes case to start with. The problem is that certification can be challenged only by way of judicial review of whether the Secretary of State was right in his decision to certify something as being against relations with another country. The judicial review test is, of course, an awful lot higher than a simple appeal, which would have been an option. [Interruption.] The burden is more difficult for the people making a challenge. One option might be to say that the High Court judge could look at the certification under the normal appeal process and decide whether it was justified, without its having to satisfy the judicial review test, which would require a much higher standard.

My hon. Friend is arguing, in a slightly convoluted way, against going down the inquiry route proposed by the Opposition. The Bill, as amended by the amendments before the House, would provide for the court to make such decisions without a judicial review, which would certainly present a higher bar for the families. The Bill will enable the families to go before a High Court judge who is considering whether to grant a non-jury inquest on the basis of the trigger of the certificate. Because it will be for the judge, not the Secretary of State, to decide, it will be an issue not of judicial review principles but of the merits of the case. The bar would therefore be set much lower for the family than it would be under what my hon. Friend seems to be arguing for, or under what the Opposition are arguing for.

I am not arguing for the Opposition’s case; I am arguing for my own case. I think that my right hon. Friend has misunderstood my point. The decision that is challengeable only by judicial review is the decision to put the case into the special process in the first place. Once it is in the special process, other appeal arrangements might well apply. However, the decision to certify it as being required to follow this process—and therefore to run the risk of all the other consequences for the families—is subject to the judicial review test. If my right hon. Friend were to say that the threshold that the families had to meet if they wanted to challenge the decision to certify in the first place involved the normal appeal route, that would be different. However, that is not what is proposed in the amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend. That is a key issue.

We can look at this question from a slightly different angle—in the context of the Binyam Mohamed case. The judges in that case would not go behind the Foreign Secretary’s certificate over the material that came from the United States, even though they were clearly not happy with what they were being asked to do, because of the security considerations as certified.

There is no need for the families judicially to review the certificate of the Secretary of State, because they can go one better than that. They can have whatever the Secretary of State is seeking to request as a result of his or her certificate examined on its merits by the court. They could not do that under judicial review.

I am sorry—I do not want to get into a legal argument with my right hon. Friend. I am happy to engage with him, but it might be a sterile debate, because I think that he is looking at this through the wrong end of the telescope. I fully accept that, once a case is in the special process, there are other options for the family to challenge various decisions that the High Court judge might make, through the normal appeal process—the Court of Appeal and so on. However, that raises the question of why the case is in the special process in the first place. The family cannot go behind the decision to certify it on grounds of national security or relations with a foreign country except by judicial review. The problem lies in the original decision to put the case into the process. If the family wants an ordinary, bog-standard inquest, the only way they can challenge that decision is through the judicial review process. That illustrates the difference between my right hon. Friend and me on this issue.

The term “judicial review” is being tossed around the Chamber here, there and everywhere. Does my hon. Friend agree that, for some families, there will be cost implications? It is all very well for the Government to say, “You can have a judicial review” or “You can challenge this in court”, but there will be cost implications for the families. It could be very expensive for them.

My hon. Friend is right. There is a little twist to the cost issue, and that is the availability of legal aid for representation at the inquest, although that subject has not been selected for debate. If someone wanted to apply for legal aid for a judicial review case, they might well have to go to the Legal Services Commission and ask for special permission. Such a request would ultimately come back to the Ministry of Justice to decide whether legal aid should be granted for such a special kind of case. So, in the end, the Secretary of State or one of his Ministers would make the decision about whether legal aid should be granted to challenge a decision by the Secretary of State in the courts, by way of a judicial review, on the original certification. That seems a little unfair.

Moving on to the new process, the real issue is the involvement of the bereaved families. If we accept the proposed process, one issue that arises is the representation of those families if they are to be excluded from hearing part of the evidence. Would the judge coroner—for want of a better term—be able to appoint a special advocate to represent them? We know that the judge or coroner can appoint counsel to the inquest; that has always been the case. However, the purpose of that advocate will be to serve the inquest, rather than an individual party. In a complicated case, there could be half a dozen different parties, all fully represented by lawyers, yet the family might not be represented. One solution could be to have a special advocate process, but such a process would go beyond what is presently permitted by the system of appointing a counsel to the inquest. There should be a special advocate process in the Bill, to ensure that the article 2 requirement that the families be properly involved is met.

There is considerable merit in what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but what it amounts to is that, if the process were sufficiently safeguarded, he would accept that there were circumstances in which there could be a jury-free inquest.

As I have said, article 2 does not require a jury. The only basis on which one could argue that a jury is required is through the long traditions of the common law as it relates to the coronial process. We should not get too hung up on the jury issue. We should be much more worried by the fact that the key requirement of article 2 is the involvement of the family. I think that families would be a lot happier if there were juries in these cases, and the new process provides for a jury.

However, my main argument with the Government is the potential for the exclusion of the family from hearing certain aspects of the evidence. The existing system provides ways round that problem. My right hon. Friend has already mentioned gisting, and we know that the coroner in the Azelle Rodney case looked at the possibility of using that process. We are all getting hung up on that one case, but there is an old saying that hard cases make bad law. The Rodney case is a very hard case, and I think that it could result in our making very bad law indeed. That case did not go to appeal; all we had was the judgment of the coroner—in fact, I think it was the deputy coroner—of Hornsey, Coroner Walker, who was given the gist of certain redacted material but not given the rest. There was no question of his challenging that decision.

In the Northern Ireland case of McCaughey and Grew to which I referred, Mr. Justice Weatherup had to decide on that exact point. He stated very simply that the coroner was entitled to see the redacted material, and to decide whether it was of relevance to the inquest and whether it should be put before the inquest. That decision is then subject to judicial review by either side. The Government can challenge the coroner, but so can the family, depending on the ruling. That is not the only option. There is also the public interest immunity certificate process, which worked perfectly adequately in the de Menezes case, and countless others in Northern Ireland and elsewhere.

The eighth report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights deals with the Bill. Paragraph 1.38 sets out a whole series of options available to the coroner. It states that the law

“allows the Coroner to sit in camera on the grounds of national security (a very rare occurrence…), to rule on a claim of Public Interest Immunity…(a more frequent occurrence), to seek… undertakings of confidentiality from interested persons, to order reporting restrictions, and to order special measures for witnesses (including anonymity and provision to give evidence by video link)”.

There is a whole series of possibilities, and they have been used in many highly difficult, contentious, sensitive inquests, including the de Menezes case, the friendly fire cases and the inquests into the Nimrod deaths. It has been possible to deal with all those under the existing system.

My main concern is that we are constructing a huge sledgehammer to crack a very small nut: one case—the Azelle Rodney case—which was probably wrongly decided by the coroner in the first place and not subject to testing through the appeal courts. If it had been tested in that way, the appeal courts might well have come up with a different ruling on how it should be processed, as we saw in the Northern Ireland case.

Gisting might well be the answer to the problem. If the gist of the material were made available to a coroner’s court, whether there was a jury or not, no state secrets would be given away about how the material had been collected. As we do not need to have a decision beyond all reasonable doubt, that might well be satisfactory for the purposes of article 2.

Let me summarise my main argument. I am grateful to the Secretary of State for what he has done. He has moved a mountain in changing his proposals, but that still raises the question why we have to go through the process in the first place.

It is not my primary intention to address the main question that has occupied the House so far in the course of this debate. That is not because I do not sympathise with the arguments put forward by my Front-Bench colleagues—I do, but they are able to deploy them effectively, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) has demonstrated, and I feel no need to add to them.

I would make two exceptions to that self-denying ordinance, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The first arises out of an answer that the Lord Chancellor gave—I was very surprised to hear it—to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), when they were engaged in debating the meaning of the phrase, “the court is satisfied”. My right hon. and learned Friend sought to place directly into the Bill the burden of proof required for the court to be satisfied, and the Lord Chancellor, to my very considerable surprise, said that it should be a “matter for the court”. Surely that should be a matter for Parliament; it is for Parliament to lay down the burden of proof, particularly on an issue as important as this one. It would then be for the court to decide whether that burden of proof has been satisfied. This point was reinforced by an answer the Lord Chancellor gave to the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore). The main thrust of the Lord Chancellor’s answer in that argument was that he was “lowering the bar” for the families, but how can we know whether the bar is being lowered if we do not know what burden of proof has to be met? There seemed to be a complete lack of consistency or, if I may say so, even logic, in that part of the Lord Chancellor’s argument.

I do not wish to be picky, but I think it is probably the standard of proof rather than the burden of proof that we are concerned with.

My hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right; I entirely and happily accept his correction. Perhaps that was the same point that the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris) wanted to make. No.

Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that the phrasing in amendment 94, where it says

“the Secretary of State is satisfied”

is, in fact, a subjective test? If it said “beyond a reasonable doubt” or “reasonably satisfied”, it would make it an objective test, which would make it harder. A judge looking at the certification could say, “Well the Secretary of State is satisfied—goodness knows why he was, but he was genuinely satisfied.”

Whatever the answer to that conundrum, it seems to me that it should be specified on the face of the Bill.

The second exception to my self-denying ordinance arises, I am afraid to say, out of something said by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield during the course of his speech—or, at least, something that I thought I heard him say, but I was so surprised by what he said that I would be perfectly happy to be told that I misheard it. What he seemed to suggest, as I understood it, in relation to certain parts of the Bill, was that the provenance is to be ascribed to civil servants. I do not believe that we should blame civil servants for the provenance of legislation of this kind; it is Ministers who are responsible for the provisions of this Bill, and it is Ministers who should be held accountable in our debates in this Chamber.

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. Perhaps I did not choose my words as well as I should have, but my experience—having had some briefing on this matter last summer—was that there was a considerable amount of civil service involvement in promoting the need for change. As my right hon. and learned Friend will know, it is also the duty of Ministers to look at proposals that come their way—and the buck stops with them, nowhere else, and I would not wish it to be suggested otherwise.

I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend.

I am afraid that much of the rest of what I have to say this evening will be a repeat of what I said on Second Reading of the Counter-Terrorism Bill on 10 June last year, as that Bill contained similar provisions to those I now wish to address, particularly those dealing with the proposed admissibility of intercept evidence at coroners’ inquests from which the jury has been excluded.

Now I have for quite a long time been in favour in principle of the proposition that intercept evidence should be admissible in proceedings before our courts, particularly our criminal courts. I set out my reasons in the debate on the Gracious Address in November 2007. I was delighted when, after the deliberations of the Chilcot committee, the Government finally accepted in principle that the case for admitting such evidence had been made.

However, the Chilcot committee proposed a very rigorous series of safeguards, which it said had to be put in place before intercept evidence could be admitted in such proceedings without giving rise to significant risks to national security—and the Government accepted that when they accepted the Chilcot committee’s recommendations. I recognise the need for those safeguards—a recognition reinforced by my role as a member of the advisory group of Privy Councillors appointed by the Home Secretary to monitor the implementation of the Government’s decision and the Chilcot committee’s recommendations on this subject.

Of course, what I say today, as with what I said on the last occasion I addressed this issue, represents my views and mine alone—and I do not purport to speak on behalf of the committee. It is fair to say, however, that the painstaking work of the officials charged with implementing those recommendations—I come here to praise officials rather than to criticise them—has not been at all easy. There are a number of issues, the resolution of which is essential if the work is to proceed to a successful conclusion, but they have not yet been resolved. They must be resolved, but the Bill’s provisions will make intercept evidence admissible in some inquests without showing any recognition whatever of the need for rigorous safeguards or of the need to deal with those issues. As far as the Bill is concerned, those issues might just as well not exist, but I cannot believe that that is either right or what the Government really intend.

I thus pose this question, and I hope that either the Lord Chancellor or the Under-Secretary will deal with it in the course of their replies. Would it not be far better and far more sensible to postpone this particular provision until the officials working on the Chilcot committee’s recommendations have completed their work, the Government have decided whether intercept evidence can be admitted in criminal trials and, if so, under what conditions, and a regime can be established and incorporated into our law to deal with the admissibility of intercept evidence as a whole rather than in the piecemeal fashion that this Bill provides for? I hope that I will receive an answer to that question.

Ever since the underground fire in King’s Cross station in my constituency in the 1980s, I have been pressing—first as an Opposition Member, then as a member of the Government and now as a Government Back Bencher—for reform of the coroners’ system. Generally speaking, it is unsatisfactory, so I welcome most of the provisions in the Bill. It seems to me, however, that the coroner provisions are ruined by the proposition to hold what will effectively be secret inquests.

I do not believe that my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench are wicked or sinister, and I recognise that they have to balance security and individual liberty, but I think that they are getting the balance wrong. I say that particularly at this time when they have quite rightly talked about rebalancing the criminal justice system in favour of victims and relatives. The secret inquests proposal is a rebalancing in the wrong direction, because inquests are all about victims and their relatives—they are the reason for the inquest system. If someone has been done to death, the truth needs to be brought out, victims’ relatives and friends are entitled to know what happened, the public are entitled to have confidence in our system, and lessons are supposed to be learned. The proposition is that a Minister would certify that a normal inquest could be prejudicial to national security, to relations with another state—that is the bizarre one—to the prevention and detection of crime, and to the prevention of threats to jurors or witnesses. However, even under the amended system—I welcome the changes, compared with the original proposal—the Minister will go to a judge, and I do not know whether a single case can be quoted in which a judge has not accepted the Executive’s statement that national security was at risk.

Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that one of the most encouraging developments in jurisprudence over the past 20 years has been a willingness on the part of the High Court—some people say that it goes too far—to cut down the Executive? Time and again, judges in the administrative court in particular have held that Secretaries of State have acted ultra vires or been plainly wrong on the merits.

More narrowly, I was challenging any Member of the House to identify a case in which a judge has decided to set aside an assertion by a member of the Government that national security was at stake. I do not think that there are any such examples.

My point is a different one: as I said in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore), the judge does not have to set aside the original certificate by the Secretary of State that national security, serious crime or the other criteria have kicked in, to decide that a non-jury inquest is not necessary to meet the conditions under the Bill. The amendment is clear that the judge can decide that there are adequate precautions to protect the relevant material, with a jury. That will be the first port of call.

That is all very well, but it would all be part of a process, which would begin, “Old reliable Jack, he wouldn’t start off this process unless there were a threat to national security or relations with a friendly state.” The judge will be part of a process that has been started off, and is unlikely to put a chock under the wheels at a later stage. It would be possible, but it is very unlikely.

Under the proposal, therefore, the state, in its manifestation as a Minister, could, in effect, order a secret inquest into a case in which agents of the state have killed someone or been in some way involved in the killing of a British citizen, or in which agents of another state have had similar involvement. That is not a sound position in which to place this country, especially as, to say the least, fresh in our minds is the acceptance by the previous Labour Prime Minister that Guantanamo Bay was apparently quite a decent place, or the involvement—to what extent we will never know—in extraordinary rendition, possibly involving the use of British soil, British citizens or people resident here. Let us suppose that someone had died while being tortured, or while being transferred following torture. I am not saying that that is what my good friend the Secretary of State intends, but it might happen, not necessarily under him but possibly under a successor.

I accept the need to protect witnesses, and possibly to protect sources, but that can be done already. When the secret inquests proposition was first put forward, a then Minister said to me, “There will be no chance of a de Menezes inquest unless we get this through.” Then, lo and behold, the proposition is dropped, and there is a de Menezes inquest. Evidence on counter-terrorism arrangements was put to that inquest, which was relatively open, and some of the material was read to the family. I understand that the fact that that evidence was presented was welcomed by the police officers who shot Mr. de Menezes, because they felt that they had the opportunity to put their side of what happened and the circumstance in which they found themselves. Therefore, the victims were not the only ones who got some satisfaction from that arrangement. Such matters might be embarrassing, but they are not likely to reveal genuine secrets that would be a threat to national security.

A secret inquest is no good for the relatives, no good for public confidence in the system at the moment, and would not be any good for learning lessons. What lesson could be learned, privately and secretly, from the secret aspect of an inquest involving extraordinary rendition? It might be, “Don’t creep to the United States.” Inquests are an essential part of our open society.

No, I am finishing.

What could be more important than open explanation of a death? On such standards, a secret inquest is no inquest at all.

I shall be brief.

First, I recognise that the Secretary of State has come a long way from his position last year. I served on the Committee that considered the Counter-Terrorism Bill, and strongly opposed the powers that it gave to the Secretary of State of an exclusive jurisdiction as to when a jury-free inquest should be held. That was wholly objectionable, for the reasons that right hon. and hon. Members have expressed during the debate.

However, we must all ask ourselves one question: are there no circumstances in which one would hold that the presence of a jury was inimical to a full inquiry? I found that a difficult question, because I have always been, and I always am on the libertarian side of the argument. I hope that the House will allow me that. However, I served in the Foreign Office and the Home Office for seven years, and I am conscious from my time in government that there are matters—very few—that are not in the interests of the nation to be widely known. One needs to define those categories very strictly, and one needs to set them about with real constraints. I do not think that the Justice Secretary has gone far enough, but I believe that the process that he is putting in place is the right one, because he is allowing the judge—the coroner—to make the decision.

I do not accept that a High Court judge would simply rubber-stamp the original certificate. We might be able to improve the process—the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) made a valuable point about the special counsel assisting the court on that specific inquiry. It is a process that we shall consider tomorrow in the context of the anonymity of witnesses. I have tabled amendments.

We could raise the evidential bar so that a judge would have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. That is the burden and standard of proof referred to by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard). We could say that the Secretary of State should not issue the certificate unless he is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. There are a number of things that we could do. The central question to which we must return, however, is whether there are some cases, albeit very few, in which it is not right for material to be made available to a jury.

Let me say this to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). If material is made available to a jury, even if it is provided in camera, the possibility must be contemplated that it will not be not confined to the jury, but will become public. At the end of the 1980s, I was an Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office. At that time, we had counter-terrorism legislation relating particularly to Northern Ireland. No doubt my hon. and learned Friend will remember the amendments that were tabled with the aim of preventing discovery of documents being made available to defence counsel and other lawyers.

I had charge of that Bill, and we were faced with the considerable difficulty of determining whether there were classes of document that should not be disclosed to defence counsel. We decided that there were such classes of document, and it got me into terrible trouble. What I said in Committee—it was true—was that at that stage there were lawyers who were too close to terrorist organisations. Shortly thereafter, a man was murdered, the solicitor Mr. Finucane, and I was blamed for it. It has always been a great source of distress to me that people thought that I was associated with his death, but that was said of me. The truth is, however, that we reached the conclusion—I still believe it could be the case—that there are classes of document that must be held very close, and what we are discussing is that sort of case.

I shall not vote against the Justice Secretary’s proposals, because I think that they are moving in the right direction. I think that they can be improved, and I hope that they will be improved in the other place, but I hope it will be recognised by the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) that although I am always on the libertarian side of an argument, on this issue I shall not be with them.

Let me make one further apology, which I have mentioned to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am afraid that I may not be present for the winding-up speeches. However, I shall be here to abstain in person.

I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for at least being here now. The problem with his argument is clear when we examine amendment 97, especially what it asks judges to do. My experience of High Court judges is that they apply the words of the statute as given to them. If they apply the words of what would become clause 11(6)(b)—thinking in the way in which the right hon. and learned Gentleman thinks—they will always conclude that it is necessary to hold the inquest without a jury. What the judge is asked to do is satisfy himself, or herself, that

“it is necessary to hold the inquest without a jury in order to avoid in order to avoid the matter being made public”.

If it is the case that juries are leaky in the way that the right hon. and learned Gentleman contemplates, surely that will always be the case.

That is a fair point. My amendment 51—this makes me very reluctant to vote against the Secretary of State’s amendment—is designed to secure a certification process which would enable the coroner to make the final decision.

I am prepared to accept that the hon. Gentleman has made a good drafting point, but, while I recognise that drafting is the business of Parliament, let us stand back from the drafting for a moment, and ask where we stand on principle. All I am saying is that I believe that there is a small category of cases that are properly addressed by the kind of mechanism that the Secretary of State is introducing. I think that it can be improved in the way that I have suggested, and perhaps it will be improved in the other place, but because that category exists, I shall not vote against what the Secretary of State has in mind.

I rise primarily with the aim of interesting the House in my amendment. It would strike out schedule 9, which effectively extends clause 7 to Northern Ireland. I also want to express some dismay, however. Clause 11, which is preoccupying the House this evening, is based on exceptional circumstances relating to national security, but seems—I am open to correction on this—not to extend to the kingdom of Scotland. It is as if, somehow, national security considerations such as the disclosure of documents and the involvement of relatives simply will not arise in Arbroath or Dunfermline.

Scots law has always been different. It was different before devolution, and it is different now. They do not have inquests in Scotland, so the point is nugatory. In any event, if the people of Scotland want to change the law it is a matter for their Scottish Parliament, under the Scotland Act.

I did not need the Lord Chancellor to explain the constitutional arrangements to me. I fully understand that which is devolved to the Parliament in Scotland; indeed, I support it. I am merely pointing out how ludicrous it is that such massive considerations should apply in England and Wales—I shall come to Northern Ireland in a moment—while there is no comparable anxiety in relation to Scotland. Of course I understand that the whole regime is different there, but this Parliament is not saying “We need to ensure that there is protection of information in relation to what might be a heavily disputed death in Scotland”.

We acknowledge that, under the devolution legislation, matters of this kind are a competence for the Parliament in Scotland, and I have made clear that I support that, but why, in that case, are we legislating in relation to Northern Ireland? Schedule 9 amends an old Stormont Act, passed by the Northern Ireland House of Commons. That Act needs to be updated, but not in this sloppy way.

Earlier, from a sedentary position, the Lord Chancellor told me another thing that I already knew: that there were special arrangements for Northern Ireland, and that we must do things differently. We do not have to do things in a sloppy fashion, however, which is what will happen if we incorporate schedule 9 in this legislation. There needs to be a root-and-branch review, and a bringing up to date, of the coroners legislation in Northern Ireland, and I think that the primary vehicle for that should be the Northern Ireland Assembly. However, if there are overriding considerations that should be ring-fenced or a matter for the United Kingdom Parliament for reasons of national security, there should be a separate instrument, or Bill, for that purpose.

I hope that I made clear to the House earlier my charge that this is a sloppy way of legislating. In support of my case, I cite clause 5(2), which states that in order to avoid any doubt, an inquest must ascertain the full circumstances of a death. That provision is intended to prevent the Government from getting into trouble in connection with their commitments under the European convention. However, it does not extend to Northern Ireland, which, in my view, demonstrates that we are making flawed legislation which was ill thought out and not properly examined. That is why I want to interest the House in supporting my amendment, or comparable amendments, proposing the deletion of schedule 9.

This is not just my brainwave. I rely on the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, a statutory body set up by the House of Commons whose functions include a duty to review

“the adequacy and effectiveness of Northern Ireland law and practice relating to the protection of human rights, advising on legislative and other measures which ought to be taken to protect human rights, advising on whether a Bill is compatible with human rights”.

The NIHRC has made it clear that article 2 is hit by the effect of this Bill.

I am not suggesting that the statutory NIHRC should tell us how we should legislate. It has not got a right of veto, and it is not a legislative body, but it has a duty to advise and a right to be heard. What is most serious is that it alleges that it has not been consulted about the Bill. It states:

“As regards Northern Ireland, the inquest provisions of the Bill present a case of the worst of both worlds. Clause 38 extends the “secret inquests” provisions of Clause 11 without the extension of a number of the positive provisions of the Bill”

that extend to England and Wales.

“The explanatory notes which accompany the Bill state that:

‘The legislative changes proposed in the Bill are part of an overall package of reform aimed at addressing the weaknesses in the present coroner and death certifications systems.’

Unfortunately this is not the case for Northern Ireland where the negative proposals in relation to inquests are not set out within a package of general coroner reform. While there has been administrative reform of the coronial system in Northern Ireland in recent years the governing legislation remains the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959.

The two most glaring omissions”,

one of which I have referred to already, are

“the failure to extend to Northern Ireland a broader definition of the purpose of an inquest”,

which is in clause 5, and

“the failure to extend rights of appeal”

to Northern Ireland.

I have twice urged the Government to reflect again. For one such intervention, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Lewisham, East (Bridget Prentice), and the Lord Chancellor were present, and there was some confusion between them as to the extent of the legislation in respect of Northern Ireland. They are its architects so they should have been on the ball, but they were not certain—I do not want to rub it in, but they were demonstrably not fully apprised of the impact of their legislation. The Lord Chancellor kindly wrote to me afterwards reaffirming the line, which he has referred to earlier, that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and his Minister of State say they will not apply this legislation to what they call the legacy cases—which, as we know, involve a sensitive issue that affects families, loved ones and the supporters of various traditions. As they said they would not use the powers, that begs this question: why not put it in the Bill that they will not exercise those powers? This raises another issue, too. If they will not apply the legislation to those legacy cases, why is Northern Ireland not left out? The matter could be left to be treated as a normal domestic legislative issue by the Northern Ireland Assembly. That principle applies for Scotland. The only case for extending the legislation to Northern Ireland is so that it can be exploited in order to deal with national security issues, and the Government should say so.

Does my hon. Friend not see some contradiction in the fact that only recently the House passed a Northern Ireland Bill providing for the devolution of policing and justice to Northern Ireland, and yet we will have a situation where a devolved Justice Minister, who will have the coroners courts and so forth under their responsibility, will be in the invidious position of being completely bypassed by a Secretary of State who issues a certificate that removes a jury or instructs that part of an inquest be held in absolute secrecy? That Justice Minister and devolved Assembly will then say, “This has absolutely nothing to do with us. We are just the devolved authority and Minister.” Does that not test the credibility of devolution in a most sensitive manner?

Of course, I wholeheartedly agree. In terms of the legislation that was so recently passed in this place, I remember expressing concern to a rather empty House about what we were doing. I said it was ill thought out and it had not been adequately dealt with. We had even less time to deal with that Bill than we have had this evening, but we passed it. It seems to me that Members on the Treasury Bench do not understand what they are doing in relation to the constitution. If we devolve, it means that we have devolved and we should not be trying to claw back power.

In any event, we have had no explanation from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Everything has been second hand, by way of a letter from the Lord Chancellor and gossip between Ministers sitting on the Front Bench when they have been challenged. This is not the way to make legislation and I urge hon. Members to join me, or others who succeed in calling a Division, in striking out the provisions that apply to Northern Ireland so that we can make better law instead. If necessary, we could pass precision law, which is targeted on national security issues, if they exist, but which leaves the good people and Assembly Members of Northern Ireland with the responsibility to deal with their coroners courts as they think fit.

I rise to make a brief contribution, particularly on the issue of military inquests, in which I have a particular interest. I am a Wiltshire Member and it is the Wiltshire coroner who currently carries out the vast bulk of military inquests—although previously it was the Oxford coroner—because of the geographical peculiarity that our casualties from Afghanistan and Iraq are repatriated through RAF Lyneham in my constituency.

I raised the matter of military inquests in Committee. The Under-Secretary immediately responded to my concerns about whether they would be subject to the Bill’s provisions by saying that most military inquests already have no jury. She is to a certain degree correct, but she is also incorrect in that the Coroners Act 1988 stipulates that the coroner may ask for a jury in military inquests, although they only occasionally do so—I believe a case is at present being considered in the Court of Appeal. Therefore, she was not quite right that all military inquests have no jury, although many of them do not.

What we are considering today is a special case. I welcome the fact that the Secretary of State has altered the provisions considerably since their introduction. I understand his point that incredibly few cases would fall under the provisions of clause 11—he anticipates one or two cases going through the designated procedures and going to the High Court. However, he is asking us to put on the statute book laws that a Secretary of State—not him, but someone at some stage in the dim and distant future—may use not for the laudable aims he has described, but for the much less honourable purpose of avoiding Government embarrassment and the like.

In order to illustrate my point, it might be helpful if I focus on one recent inquest carried out by the excellent Wiltshire coroner David Masters. Although he has retired as a coroner, I am very glad he agreed to carry on as a particular specialist in military inquests. He will continue to hear some of those inquests as a deputy coroner.

The inquest I have in mind is that into the tragic loss of Hercules XV179, which was on its way from Baghdad into northern Iraq, flying at an extraordinarily low level. It went down with 10 soldiers and airmen on board, all of whom were lost. Many of them were my constituents, or were at least based in my constituency. There are all sorts of peculiarities about XV179. The plane was flying at remarkably low level and it was on special forces duties. That has been made plain but a number of things about the special forces duties in the evidence given to David Masters were redacted, and perfectly happily so. Indeed, there were all sorts of secret things we never got to know about because they were secret and that is fine.

Other peculiarities of the case included the fact that David Masters discovered that the Americans knew there was enemy activity in the area where XV179 was on that day, but they failed to pass that on to the British, so the pilot did not know that. Curiously, the Americans refused to come to the Wiltshire inquest and to give evidence to it, because they felt it might be embarrassing to them as they had failed to pass that intelligence on. It is clear that there had been a breakdown in intelligence between the two countries.

As I said, there were a variety of very peculiar things with regard to Hercules XV179, so David Masters looked into them and he came to a perfectly satisfactory conclusion. He said that it was shot down by enemy fire—probably small arms fire; possibly a rocket-propelled grenade—and this was a tragic loss. The case had one other element and he looked into that too, concluding that had the plane been fitted with suppressant foam in the wing tanks, as all the Australian and American Hercules planes are, there is a chance that the tragedy—it is no certainty—might not have occurred. He was rather critical of the fact that the Government had not fitted the foam in the wing tanks, and he gave the Government quite a hard time over it. Of course, the Oxford coroner had recorded something similar with regard to the Nimrod case and two or three other military inquests of that kind.

Although the Government say that the Bill’s provisions are not designed in any shape, size or form to interfere with the coronial process, which worked extraordinarily well in the case of flight XV179, the circumstances of that case fit, without question, into the definitions as laid down in the Bill. It is perfectly possible that some Secretary of State in the future, seeking to avoid embarrassment for the Government over suppressant foam, to avoid upsetting the Americans over the failure of intelligence or to keep secret—perfectly properly—the fact that it was a special forces flight, might use any of those excuses to say to the High Court, “These are important matters and it is important that we should not hear this inquest in public, because it is against the national interest.”

I understand the importance of the military inquests, particularly the case to which the hon. Gentleman refers—I happen to have known one of the crew who was on that ill-fated flight. I can honestly say to him that I can provide him with almost complete reassurance because, as he will know, there has never been a jury involved in a military inquest. There have been more than 200 military inquests and the issue of juries has never arisen. It is hard to see in what circumstances it would arise.

That is, of course, the case, and I made precisely that point a moment ago. The Lord Chancellor is possibly not quite right, because there have been juries in one or two such cases in the past.

I am happy to accept the correction on the matter. The point I made a moment ago is that I know that there were no juries involved, but the inquests are not secret. There is nothing private about the inquests at all—the families and the public are present. As the local Member of Parliament, I was at the inquiry—it was a public inquest and inquiry.

If the hon. Gentleman will allow me, I shall continue for the moment. The risk involved is that the Bill, as drafted, may allow a subsequent Secretary of State to say, “These are delicate matters that might affect the security of the nation and might embarrass our great friends, the Americans, so for those reasons I request not only that the case should be heard with no jury but that it should be heard in secret.”

These powers explicitly arise only where otherwise a jury inquest is required; they cannot be brought into force, as the Bill makes absolutely clear, unless—many Opposition Members are nodding—otherwise a jury is required.

I am surrounded by Queen’s counsel and learned—I am probably the only non-learned gentleman in the House this afternoon. [Interruption.] The right hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Frank Dobson) is equally as unlearned as I am—I beg his pardon.

Am I not right in thinking that the Coroners Act 1988 itself stipulates that the coroner in military inquests may ask for a jury? That tends not to be the case but it is perfectly possible that some military inquests would have juries and therefore would become subject to the terms of this legislation. I am ready to be corrected by the very learned Lord Chancellor if my understanding is wrong—it is certainly also the understanding of INQUEST, which has raised the point with me. It says that it is perfectly possible to imagine that military inquests would be caught up by these provisions and that therefore at some future point embarrassing military inquests of the kind that I have described would be subject to secret hearings. I would be happy to accept the Lord Chancellor’s assurances, but perhaps he could get some advice from those in the box on this. It might be that I am barking up the wrong tree and I would be happy to accept that I am. All of our advisers, including plenty of QCs in INQUEST and in the other organisations briefing us, advise us that there is at least a risk that that might be the case. For that reason alone, I shall join my hon. Friends in supporting amendment 2, which seeks to strike clause 11 out entirely.

A number of hon. Members wish to speak and there is a lot of business to be got through, so I shall attempt my own exercise in gisting.

The key issue involved here is that of public confidence, as other hon. Members have said. I was involved in the Ricky Reel case, which some may recall—my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor certainly will, because he was exceptionally helpful. A constituent of mine went missing following a racial attack and was subsequently found dead. It was a most distressing case in which the most critical issue for us was to ensure that the interests of the family were protected, that they gained as much information as possible and in the end at least felt that they had had a fair hearing. I also met the de Menezes family and their lawyers, and discussed some of the issues that arose out of that case.

The concern that a number of us have is that although the Bill contains elements relating to coroners that we wholeheartedly support, because they are a significant move forward, on this clause 11 issue we share the view of the Royal British Legion. My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) read a quote from it, but he failed to include the first sentence. The Royal British Legion stated:

“As long as Clause 11 remains in the Bill, we regret it may not be possible to dislodge the perception that crucial evidence will be heard behind closed doors.”

That is the key issue, because the provision is a step too far in terms of public confidence. It is regrettable because the system has evolved in a way that has adapted to the needs of national security and other issues—the de Menezes case certainly exemplifies that—without undermining overall public confidence. This measure would be a step too far and it would undermine public confidence.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Frank Dobson) has said, the whole panoply of methods was used in the de Menezes case. The High Court judge who was appointed to undertake the case was able to judge on public interest immunity applications, and he did so. However, he did so in such as way as to enable the process of evolution throughout that hearing, so that where he ruled in respect of PII that certain information was not to be provided, he also ruled that some information could be provided to the legal teams on the strict understanding of confidentiality and security. In that way, at least some element of confidence was maintained that the family was having access to that information. My key point is that their own lawyers, whom they had appointed, were able to see that information.

I can understand why people are arguing for the introduction of special advocates, but they have not had the public confidence that is instilled when one appoints one’s own lawyer. I was involved in the early Special Immigration Appeals Commission cases when the Sikh gentlemen were arrested, and the key issue was that the special advocate was not able to communicate the full range of information to the person they were meant to be representing. At least in the de Menezes case there was a line of communication and where there was a common agreement that only certain information was provided, the idea of gisting was brought forward and summaries were provided to the family, and in that case confidence was maintained.

I am concerned that the processes that the Secretary of State has brought forward to improve on the original proposals certainly do not go far enough and do not tip the balance in maintaining public confidence. In parliamentary procedural terms there is a phenomenon called Strawism, whereby one produces a Bill that throws in the entire kitchen sink and is so outrageous that the House recoils from it, and one then introduces a series of amendments and Members skip through the Lobby happily, thinking that they have obtained major victories and amendments. This is not an example of Strawism in extremis, but it is close to it. I do not think that the Bill has gone far enough in protecting the interests of the families—those who have lost loved ones—and in maintaining public confidence. On that basis, clause 11 needs to be withdrawn, and that is why I shall support amendment 2.

We have heard something very important from the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell). As usual, he made his case strongly, but he also introduced a new term. We have heard of Thatcherism and Blairism: we now have Strawism. No doubt we will look back with fondness on this occasion on which it was first used.

I am probably the only hon. Member here who has acted as a coroner. In my early days I was an assistant coroner. I was taught always to empanel a jury if the case was complicated or there was any possible involvement of the state or a public body, whether by negligence or act of omission or commission. My senior partner then—he is now the main coroner for the district—always believed that we had to shed the maximum amount of light on the evidence.

The whole purpose of the coronial system is to discover what happened in relation to the death. Specifically, if there is the possibility of an act of omission or commission by an authority—be it the police or anyone else—it is vital that that happen. Over the years I have also acted as an advocate at inquests many times. After hearing all the evidence, the family leave the court able to reach the conclusion of the grieving process. In many cases, the grieving process remains open until the coroner’s verdict or the jury’s verdict has been delivered and the family knows, having heard all the evidence, what happened. To those of us who have not lost close family or other loved ones and who have not been through the process, it may sound difficult to believe, but I can assure the House that hearing all the evidence does very much assist in the grieving process.

The right hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Frank Dobson) mentioned the issue of confidence, and that is the main building block of the coronial system. There are some good ideas in the Bill. Indeed, there are good and bad coroners, as there are good and bad in every walk of life. We must weed out the bad ones.

The right hon. Gentleman said that PII certificates might not work because the judge might not grant them. That decision would be appealable, so it is unlikely that anyone would withdraw from the proceedings simply on that basis.

Some 10 or 12 years ago, there was an arson campaign in Wales. Some of the individuals were caught and charged, and appeared before Caernarvon Crown court in north-west Wales. It was a unique case in that MI5 was heavily involved in tracking those guys down. MI5’s evidence was redacted, gisted and subject to PII certificates, but the jury followed it adequately. Nobody—prosecutor or defence counsel—complained about the fairness of the proceedings. I suggest that that is one reason why we could look at the panoply of existing ways we could achieve justice. At that time, there was a fragile peace in Northern Ireland, and the identity of the MI5 agents had to be protected at all costs, because not to do so might have had fatal results. It worked, and nobody has ever complained about how that trial was conducted. Justice was achieved in that case.

I am very concerned about clause 11(2), which refers to the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country. I mentioned in interventions that the deputy coroner for Oxfordshire has made many loud complaints about the inability of the US air force to deliver the videos of the fighter pilots unfortunately mistaking UK troops and dispatching them. The coroner was brave in raising those concerns in public, but I suspect that he did so because he was unable to get anywhere in private with the US authorities. His only avenue then was to make the issue public. I guess that his actions would be caught by this provision, and it would be enough for any Secretary of State to apply to minimise any embarrassment for the US.

I am not casting aspersions on Ministers—it is not part of my function to do that—but clause 11(2) covers the “relationship” between the UK and another country. Embarrassing that other country would undermine the relationship, so that would be the effect of the wording, unless Ministers can tell me otherwise.

Along with the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), I am a member of the Criminal Bar Association, and it was refreshing to hear the Secretary of State praying in aid that organisation. Far be it from me to suggest that he was desperate for support, but he certainly cited its opinions a lot, and fair play to him. We are fortunate to have an independent judiciary, and we are extremely fortunate that members of the High Court bench are prepared to tell the Government when they go wrong. That is refreshing, and it is how a democracy should work, with the separation of powers.

If I have understood the process correctly, the Secretary of State will issue a certificate and the High Court judge will decide whether it should proceed. I suggest once again to the Secretary of State that the PII certificates work day in and day out in our courts—I mentioned the case at the Crown court in Caernarvon. Alongside that we have that other process we have heard about today of gisting—a wonderful word. It has been in the public domain before, but it has been very much in evidence today. Why not use that process too? The Jean Charles de Menezes inquest employed all those techniques, and it seemed to work all right. Have we not learned anything from that experience that can inform our approach? If we employ all the safeguards—the judge will undoubtedly have in mind the need to ensure a fair trial, that there is equality of arms and that both sides of any dispute are heard fully and properly—that inquest proves that we do not need this legislation.

My greatest fear—I do not know whether it will apply to military inquests—is that there is no doubt that families will feel short-changed if they do not have the right, and I use that word advisedly, to have a jury trial in the coroner’s court when there are these complicating features. Yes, that trial should apply all the safeguards because, as was said earlier, of course juries can leak.

I would not want anybody’s life to be imperilled by national security leaks—of course I would not—but as a lawyer I do not see the need for this provision, given that we have the existing provisions and just need somebody to pull them together. It is not beyond the wit of a High Court judge to do that easily and comfortably and to ensure fairness. A High Court judge has been appointed because he or she is probably at the top of the legal tree anyway—they are not there for any other reason—and they are there because they have very special qualities. Given that they have very special qualities, surely they could ensure that we could avoid using this particular provision.

My biggest problem is that people will feel short-changed, hard done by or whatever phrase we want to use. Families will not feel that the matter has been heard properly, and I think that that is the worst possible thing that could happen. Given the reason why coroners’ courts are convened and given the fact that families deserve to be told the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, I believe that it is those families’ common law right, as mentioned by the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore), to be entitled to have a jury hear their case.

The hon. Member for Hendon, who is Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, referred to several things that the Committee had suggested in its concluding paragraphs—no fewer than nine, or maybe 11, suggestions that would add to the panoply of provisions that we already have. I think that this part of the Bill is flawed. I said that on Second Reading. I am as concerned now as I was then, and although I acknowledge, with great respect, that the Secretary of State and his team have moved in a certain direction, I think that the other place will make them move even further.

I shall be brief, because I want just to raise a few issues about clause 11. There has already been a great deal of debate on that clause. At the outset, I should say that I recognise that the Secretary of State has moved a very long way from where he was on Second Reading. He has introduced significant changes. The Bill contains a great deal of good in the part that deals with coroners, but I still have a problem with clause 11. It is pretty obvious that the provisions of clause 11 will come into play only in some contentious—and then inevitably high-profile—cases. That is inevitable. It is more critical than ever in such cases that we ensure that the families of those people for whom the inquests are held are satisfied with the way in which they are held.

I am still not clear about how we can be sure that the families will be properly represented. I hope that I will hear an answer later in this debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) raised the question of special counsel—whether there will be a special advocate. The Secretary of State referred to a special advocate for the inquest but did not mention anything similar for the families. It is even more important that the families’ legal representatives are able to take part fully in the process and that, if necessary, legal aid is made available.

The hon. Gentleman will know that new clause 31, which I tabled but which has not been selected for debate, proposed precisely that—legal aid for those whom the coroner chose to designate as deserving of it. I hope that that new clause will be taken up in the other place.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that point. It is critical that we do not reach a situation where a family cannot be properly represented, and represented in two ways. First, how are they represented at the point of certification and how is it possible for them to be involved in challenging the process of certification? Secondly, if certification goes ahead and an inquest is held at least partly in private, how in the families’ absence will their legal representatives be involved in hearing that evidence?

I am also still far from clear on what ills the change is supposed to cure. Two cases have been referred to—one in which an inquest was held up, and another in which the inquest is now going ahead. That is all. It is suggested that they were the trigger for the powers. I have not heard a long litany of cases in which there have been problems. Indeed, some very difficult cases have gone ahead, with safeguards in place to make sure that some evidence was not made public. I need to be convinced that the measures are the only way of dealing with the one or two problem cases.

The Secretary of State says that only one or two cases will be dealt with in such a way, but in clause 11—even the revised version, once his amendments are made to it—there are quite broadly drawn criteria that could be used if an inquest without a jury is sought. The criteria include protecting national security or a relationship with another country, and preventing or detecting crime. It seems that to some extent we are dealing not with problems that have occurred but with hypothetical problems that may occur in future, and that always makes me nervous in legislation. It always makes me nervous when we are sold legislation on the basis that something may happen in future to make it necessary; we should rather be able to point to a real problem that has happened and needs to be corrected.

The Secretary of State says that uses of the power will be few and far between, and that the judges will decide, but I am not sure that I can read the minds of High Court judges and say what they would do in future, when faced with representations from a Secretary of State that an inquest should take place without a jury. I am not sure, either, what counterweight there would be to the Secretary of State’s propositions when the judge comes to make the decision if, as I suspect, the family will not easily be able to make counter-representations. I need to be convinced that the current inquest procedures to protect sensitive material cannot continue to be used.

Finally, I want to reinforce the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) about public confidence. One of the most sure and certain ways of destroying public confidence in a process is for the public to believe that things are being hidden from them. A few years ago, I recall dealing with the case of Zahid Mubarak, although not in the context of an inquest. He was a constituent of mine who was murdered by a racist cellmate while in Feltham young offenders institution. One of the worst aspects of the case was the continued resistance of the Home Office to holding a public inquiry. It was only after the matter had gone to the House of Lords that the family were able to get a decision made to hold a public inquiry. That poisoned the case—the belief that what was happening was an attempt to keep secret what was going on.

That, I suspect, will be the consequence of inquests that the public perceive to be happening behind closed doors. It will be much harder for the state—the Government—to persuade people that there has been a fair process, and that there is not something going on that people want to hide. That is an important consideration in trying to maintain the integrity of the coroner system; people must feel that it is working and that its findings can be trusted.

I want to follow on from the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard), the right hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Frank Dobson), and the hon. Members for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd), and for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell); the latter introduced the concept of Strawism, and made an important point. I have been in the House for a very long time now—30 years, I think. During that time, an Official Secrets Act was brought forward. I remember that the first intimation, or leaks—that is frequently how Governments are run—were that Lord Hurd, as he now is, was about to introduce into the House a truly draconian measure. When the Bill was published there was such relief that the full weight of all that had been leaked was not to come about that the House almost passed it with a sigh that this was a major improvement. It is true that sometimes our fears are too great, so any concession inclines us to be more respectful of the measure before us.

I have difficulties with the Bill and they centre on clause 11. The right hon. and hon. Members whom I mentioned spoke about a profound principle in our system of law and liberty. The circumstances into which a coroner may inquire are the most obvious ones. We would want to know the circumstances leading to someone’s death in the protection or custody of the state, and whether the death was murder, whether it occurred in suspicious circumstances, and so on.

There is a wider public interest in that matter, not just the family, although one understands and reaches out because the death of a member of the family is of crucial importance to the family and to neighbours and friends. It is also of crucial importance to us as a society. Why bother to have coroners’ courts if we are not interested in the circumstances of an unexpected or unexplained death that happens in our midst?

Clause 11 has been said to deal with secret inquests. Indeed, it does invoke secrecy,

“in order to protect the interests of national security”.

Who are we to argue what national security constitutes? That, essentially, has been the argument of the Executive through the ages. We must determine that because we cannot know what it is that we must secure in the national interest.

We have moved on from that. I give the example of the injunction that the Nixon Administration tried to secure against The New York Times in the case of the Pentagon papers. The American authorities insisted that there could be no revelation of the papers, which went to the security and heart of the American state. They dealt with the Vietnam war. A judge decided the matter and the papers were published in The New York Times. No state fell. America progressed and retreated from Vietnam.

What was in the public interest? Was the secrecy in the public interest? “National security” was the cry. Absolute national security was what the Nixon Administration demanded. They were denied it by the independence of a judicial process. Looking back 40 years later, did the world end? No. But the result was greater public knowledge and a wider public perception of national public policy. It could therefore be challenged, debated and understood.

The second reason given for an inquest to be held without a jury is the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country. From memory, this and the preceding reason appear in our Official Secrets Act. I remember from the debates that the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country was a contested matter. These matters are vital to everyone’s interest—every citizen of this country and everyone who is concerned about public policy. These are considered greater interests than the ascertaining of the death of a person by the judgment of two people. The Secretary of State, or the Justice Minister, or the lord high panjandrum—he has so many responsibilities—puts the notion before a judge. The judge will determine what the public interest is, but many of us feel that it is for Parliament to decide what the public interest is in matters of this nature. The rule of law must be open and above board, preventing or detecting crime to protect the safety of a witness or another person, or preventing real harm to the public interest. This, however, is a whole bag that catches everything that is inconvenient—perhaps only that—to those who administer the state.

As I said, I have been here a long time. There was a time when the attestation of a public interest immunity certificate, for instance, was almost an absolute assertion. One learned from the unravelling of the Scott inquiry that judges did not necessarily look behind the public interest immunity certificate; in fact, they quickly back-tracked. We are told that now judges take a determined interest in a public interest immunity certificate. However, there were all the arguments leading up to the Scott inquiry, which was about the standing of Britain—whether we had exported arms and whether the process had been correct. Scott’s judgment was that two Cabinet Ministers had failed in their constitutional duty to keep the House informed.

It may seem that I have wandered widely from what happens in a coroner’s court. But a coroner’s court is no less a part—and a very important part—of our freedom. It is a safeguard that ensures that the state cannot just override the inconvenience of someone’s death or something that has happened to someone. It tells us the actual nature of what our real public policy is. That, I think, is why the provisions that I have been discussing are in the Bill.

The Secretary of State’s argument is that the interests of our country may not always coincide with the rule of law. We are talking about Executive, Crown appointees who use prerogative as the foundation—although much circumscribed by the House over time—through which there can be protection in respect of the inconvenience of the public, united, disagreeing with their judgment on what public policy should be. That is the tension that lies in secrecy about great matters. We are talking about the death of a citizen, and the reasons set out in the Bill are important. We should not take clause 11 or the processes that get us there lightly. Is it not better to know that when such a certificate is brought into place, it is open to real challenge?

I have learned a new word: “gisting”. I thought that “gist”—the “gist” of something—was only a noun. Just think about it: the “gist”. That is not the facts.

The hon. Gentleman says that it is “spin, spin”. I do not accept that it is necessarily intended to be that, although we are well accustomed to spin. But each one of us does a précis of things. I remember it from school; we were marked on the quality of our précis, and we did not always do a good one of the central facts. I do not doubt that clever judges and those educated and powerful in the law, which I certainly am not, can make a better fist of things than I did as a schoolboy. But I do not like the idea of only the “gist” of something being involved. However, it seems acceptable to many in the House, so I listen with interest.

The principle that our processes should be open, however inconvenient, is one that has to be genuinely undermined by the arguments of the Executive, and we did not hear that today in the responses to the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth), who spoke on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, or to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), who represented us so eloquently from the Front Bench. This House could therefore confidently reject this proposal on the basis that something better will come in another place, whose Members will have enough time and opportunity properly to examine these contentions.

In the Public Bill Committee, I made the same criticisms of the Government’s original clause 11 that the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) made earlier, so I was no fan of that proposal. However, I support the Government’s current proposals.

I said in Committee, and say tonight, that we must approach two principles in this debate. First, is it within Parliament’s contemplation that in an investigation into a death where there would be an inquest with a jury, there might be protected matters of such sensitivity that the inquest could not proceed with the jury? It is reasonable for some parliamentarians to conclude that there are no circumstances in which we should allow the inquest to proceed without a jury, and hon. Members who have come to that conclusion should clearly oppose these provisions. I come to the other conclusion.

When this matter was discussed in Committee, what defence was given for the idea that we should have secret inquests where they involve matters of relations with other countries that may have legal systems that are nowhere near the standard that we would wish or expect?

I am not the Minister defending such proceedings. However, national security involves relations with other nations, and the argument is that the Bill’s definition of national security alone might not protect some of the exchanges of intelligence with other states’ Governments that would involve matters of shared national security—theirs and this country’s. That was the Government’s reason for extending the provisions beyond the phrase “national security”, but it is not my explanation.

The first principle concerns whether there might be circumstances where there are protected matters that mean that a jury could not be empanelled in order for the inquest to proceed. I am fortified in coming to my conclusion rather than that of those who disagree with this by the fact that there are apparently, even today, inquests that are stalled because of such a situation. As we have heard, there have been two such instances in the past. It is true that in one of those cases the impasse has recently been resolved and the inquest is going to proceed, but the other one is still stalled. If there is already a case before we pass this law, it is within our contemplation that there could be cases in future.

The case that has been stalled has no international dimension whatsoever—it is about a straightforward police shooting.

May I put a hypothetical case to my hon. Friend? Let us suppose that somebody is in detention in Pakistan and is tortured, and there is an allegation that the British secret services were complicit; that that individual is then rendered by, say, the United States to Morocco, where they are tortured again and there is a suggestion that the British secret service supplied questions; and that he then ends up in Guantanamo Bay, where he dies of his injuries. That is the case of Binyam Mohamed; he survived, but let us suppose that he died. Is that the sort of case that my hon. Friend thinks might be caught by these provisions?

I agree that these are serious issues. However, even the new clause recognises that there might be matters of national security that form the basis for saying that protected matters can arise. I do not think that it is helpful to get involved in an individual case.

The second principle is that it is surely the Executive’s responsibility to identify protected matters, subject to an unreasonable decision being capable of challenge in the courts through judicial review, but it is the judiciary’s responsibility to determine how to conduct judicial proceedings. The Government try to make that distinction in the new proposals. A judge making a determination on how to conduct an inquiry in the knowledge that protected matters have been identified by the Executive will have before him or her what has been called the panoply of powers short of not having a jury at all, and the Bill may add new powers to that panoply. The judge could consider the measures that have been discussed tonight and determine whether some of them would be sufficiently effective to safeguard the protected matters so that the inquest could continue with a jury.

Does the hon. Gentleman believe that the judge has the ability, under the terms of amendment 97, to consider whether a certification that matters should be protected made by the Secretary of State was proper? I do not think that he does.

The determination of protected matters is an Executive role, not a judicial one, though it may be subject to judicial review if people want to challenge the reasonableness of the protection.

The point that the hon. Gentleman made in Committee applied to national security, and I could follow that. But the Government’s proposal does not apply just to national security but to the other three matters as well, about which the Government have no particular advantage over the rest of the criminal justice system.

That brings us back to judicial review, I am afraid. That would be the answer to someone saying, “This measure does not prevent crime or protect the life of a witness—the Executive are being unreasonable in saying such a thing.” That would be a matter of challenge through judicial review.

When people say that the measure is still not right, and that work needs to be done in the other place, what comes to my mind are the remarks of the Secretary of State, when he said that a judge would bend over backwards to use other powers so as not to exclude a jury from an inquest. The amendment does not use words “bend over backwards”, but equally it does not use a qualification that would be recognised in legal terms to ensure that a jury would not be empanelled only in an in extremis case. In that sense, a bit of work might still need to be done on the measure.

May I take the hon. Gentleman back to the point he made about judicial review? In the light of his answers to the Liberals’ questions, does he accept that a judge would not be in a position to judge the merits of the Government’s decision? As he said, the judicial review would judge only the reasonableness of that decision so that at no point would anyone judge externally the merits of the Government’s decision.

The right hon. Gentleman has not been here all through the debate, and other speakers before myself have made the case that today’s judiciary challenges strongly any Government claims that they have made the right decision. A judge in a judicial review challenge would be able to examine the Government’s case that there were protected matters that should not be disclosed in an inquest.

I support the Government’s proposals in amendment 97, although there is still the question of whether a judge would bend over backwards to ensure that there is a jury in an inquest unless the case were particularly exceptional.

With the leave of the House, I should like briefly to respond to the points raised in the debate before the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) concludes it.

The right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) mentioned intercept evidence and asked why we were not waiting for the Chilcot review before accepting intercept evidence in special inquests in the circumstances described in clause 13. I am in exactly the same position as he is, because I want to be very cautious about allowing intercept evidence to be made available in criminal trials.

As I think the right hon. and learned Gentleman will recall, there is already provision in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 for limited exceptions to the prohibition of the evidential use of intercept, which is set out in section 17 of that Act. Those exceptions are enclosed proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission or the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission and the making of control orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. Of course, inquests are civil, not criminal proceedings, and Chilcot was directly related to concerns about criminal proceedings. I suggest that what we are doing is consistent with the precedent that has been set in the cases of SIAC and POAC.

But surely the Secretary of State would accept that the provisions in RIPA predate the Chilcot committee, all the work that is currently being carried out and the importance attached to those safeguards. Now that we know that the Chilcot committee has reported and that officials are working through its recommendations with conscientiousness and care, the situation is different from that which pertained when RIPA was enacted. Given what is happening now, we ought to wait for the result of those investigations before legislating in this way.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman’s point would be a good one if inquests were criminal proceedings, but they are not. They are civil proceedings, and there is a much stronger parallel with POAC and SIAC—I believe that he established the latter process. Precisely because RIPA preceded Chilcot, we have those precedents in section 18 of that Act.

I wish to provide the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) with reassurance about whether non-jury inquests could apply in the case of military inquests. If he looks at clause 7(2), he will see the circumstances in which a jury must sit in an inquest. They are essentially cases in which there has been a death in state custody or resulting from an act or omission of a police officer or member of a service police force, or a death

“caused by a notifiable accident, poisoning or disease.”

A senior coroner has the discretion to have a jury, but those criteria apply to state custody deaths or similar circumstances. They are simply irrelevant to military deaths, which arise in quite different circumstances. That being the case, the trigger in amendment 94 could not be fulfilled. That amendment sets out that the Secretary of State may certify an investigation under various criteria, including, as stated in proposed paragraph (b), if

“the inquest will (if the investigation is not certified) be held by a senior coroner with a jury”.

I can therefore provide the hon. Gentleman with the absolute assurance that he seeks.

On the central issue, I say to my right hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Frank Dobson) and other hon. Members that I understand their use of the term “secret inquests”, and we are certainly talking about inquests that will receive secret evidence, parts of which will be held in camera. However, it is common ground among all parties that there would have to be parts of inquests held in camera even if they were before a jury. The only part of such inquests that will be held in private, without the family being present, will be when there is protected evidence. When that takes place, counsel would be appointed to the inquest and directed by the coroner to take the responsibility of representing the family’s interests and to test the evidence that could not be disclosed. I appreciate that that is second best, but the process has been used in plenty of other circumstances relatively satisfactorily.

Under the set of procedures that we have discussed, the Secretary of State certifies, and the matter then goes before a judge to determine—I stress to hon. Members that it will be for judges to decide; amendment 97 plainly anticipates the judge’s holding an inquest without a jury on the established criteria and if he is satisfied that it is necessary to do that to avoid the matter’s being made public or unlawfully disclosed, and the next limb anticipates an inquest with a jury. I emphasise to my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney) that the central issue will not be the certificate but its effect. The certificate simply triggers the application, so it is hardly necessary to go behind it, although the learned judge will want to know the reasons for it because they will be germane to the evidence to be protected. The question then is whether there are ways in which to protect the material other than being without a jury.

Because the Secretary of State may be concerned about the need to protect the information. However, we do not believe that the Secretary of State should be the determining individual, who decides whether to dispense with a jury. I know that my right hon. Friend is sceptical about the independence of the judiciary, but, as someone who has been rolled over in judicial review after judicial review almost weekly since I became a Secretary of State 12 years ago, I believe that the courts are very independent, and on precisely the sort of issue that we considering. I remind my right hon. Friend of the excoriating judgments by the Law Lords about control orders. If the courts were a patsy, they would have said, “Fine, we’ll simply accept them.”

Hon. Members of all parties accept that there may be occasions when the information to be protected is such that it cannot go before a jury. The difference between Conservative Front Benchers and us is that we believe that a judge in the High Court should make that judgment. The hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) rather eccentrically takes the view that a Secretary of State should make it. Under his proposal, when the information could not be presented before a jury, it would be for a Secretary of State to establish a special inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005.

At the risk of repetition, I should make clear what I said earlier. I believe that, if one sticks to the existing system, the likelihood of any departure from a jury’s sitting in a coroner’s court will be greatly lessened. That is the only reason for my saying that the existing system is better than what the Secretary of State has devised.

Hansard will show something different.

The hon. and learned Gentleman also said that, when necessary, he preferred the Inquiries Act route, whereby the Secretary of State determines whether to dispense with a jury, to the Bill. I believe that the proposal whereby any decision by a Secretary of State has to be tested before and by a judge is much less likely than his to end in juries being dispensed with. I am glad to say that on that, if on few other issues, I have the full backing of the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), who made it clear that the process that we are putting in place is correct.

The whole debate has been dominated by two things. One is public confidence in the verdicts of inquests, which is related to the issue of the jury. Without a jury, how can we have confidence that verdicts in such cases will not be a stitch-up, especially given the circumstances in which juries are called into being in inquests in the first place? That was the point made by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), among others.

The second issue is about whether families are excluded from the process. Throughout his remarks, the Secretary of State never satisfied me or anyone else in the Chamber on that point. He had several goes at it, but in the end it came down to this: somebody else might, in certain circumstances, represent the family. That issue, which was raised by the right hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Frank Dobson) and the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard) among others, goes to the heart of whether what has been proposed really protects victims and their families. I am certain after hearing the debate that it does not.

The hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) made several important points, especially about cases in his experience where the security services have been involved. He also pointed out the simple fact that the cases that we are talking about are those that involve deaths at the hands of the state. That is why we need the widest possible use of juries in such cases. That is the counterweight to what the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney) and the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) said about cases in which there might be some nervousness about using a jury. We need to think about what those cases are. They are cases of deaths at the hands of the state in the first place.

Whenever someone says that there are cases where the jury has to be excluded, they never come up with a convincing example. The one example of a case where the process is frozen, which the hon. Member for Stafford mentioned, is one that has nothing to do with national security. However, as the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) mentioned, in that case things seem to have gone very badly wrong legally.

The other remark from the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham that made me nervous was his assumption, which I think the Government share, that juries are inevitably leaky. If one follows the wording of what is proposed, one sees that it would mean that a judge, even bending over backwards, would be unable to allow the jury to continue in the case, because he or she would have to conclude that the protected matters would end up being made public.

The hon. Gentleman may have shared my experience, but I was trying to rack my brains to think of instances in the past where vetted juries doing espionage cases were alleged to have spilt the beans in the public domain afterwards, and I simply cannot think of any such example.

I could not think of one either. We briefly discussed vetting juries in Committee, but the Government’s only reply was that the standard for vetting juries for espionage trials and terrorist cases would be too low for such inquests. I find that just incomprehensible.

In the end, the debate comes down to the point that the hon. Member for Hendon made. The crucial question is this: if the process now proposed by the Government had been in place in the past 10 years, would it have affected important inquests such as the de Menezes inquest? Would the Government have asked for the jury to be removed? I have no doubt that they would have asked for that and that they would have put in place that certification. The Government’s only defence is that perhaps the Secretary of State would have been found to be mistaken by the judge and perhaps the judge would have applied the words of the statute in a way that would not be justified and overturned the Secretary of State’s judgment. That seems highly unlikely, given what is being proposed this evening and—this is the point that the hon. Member for Walthamstow made—given that the only arguments and evidence before the judge at that point would be those of the Government. We are talking not just about national security, but about that broad range of items, which are not those about which the Executive would have better knowledge than anybody else.

On the question of relations with other countries, what does the hon. Gentleman think would be the definition of a good relationship? Would it be a question of whether the country was a dictatorship or a democracy, or whether it fulfilled all international requirements? Or would it simply come down to issues such as arms sales and the murder of British people in those countries?

All experience shows that it is the latter. It would be up to the Secretary of State to decide that on the certificate, and there is no way of getting behind that certificate in court.

There is broad scope for the abuse of these powers. The question that the hon. Member for Hendon asked needs to be answered in the affirmative: yes, it would have made a difference if these powers had existed sooner; and, yes, it would have resulted in more inquests being held without juries. As the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) said, the only conclusion that one can draw is that we must excise clause 11 from the Bill. There might be better ways forward, and there might be other ways of doing this. We do not know what the Government might propose if we were to excise the clause, but excise it we must, in order to allow further and better debate on this subject in another place. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause, although I wish to press amendment 2 to a vote.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 11

Certified investigations: investigation by a judge, inquest without jury

Amendment proposed: 2, page 6, line 2, leave out Clause 11.—(David Howarth.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Amendments made: 94, page 6, leave out lines 3 to 16 and insert—

‘( ) The Secretary of State may certify an investigation under this Part into a person’s death if—

(a) an inquest will be held as part of the investigation,

(b) the inquest will (if the investigation is not certified) be held by a senior coroner with a jury,

(c) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the investigation will concern or involve matters (referred to below as “protected matters”) that should not be made public in order to protect the interests of—

(i) national security,

(ii) the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country, or

(iii) preventing or detecting crime,

or in order to protect the safety of a witness or other person, and

(d) the Secretary of State is of the opinion that it is necessary for the inquest to be held without a jury in order to avoid protected matters being made public or unlawfully disclosed.’.

Amendment 95, page 6, leave out lines 28 and 29 and insert—

‘(4) Where the Secretary of State has certified an investigation under this section—

(a) the Secretary of State must as soon as possible inform the senior coroner of the certification;

(b) the senior coroner must as soon as possible inform all interested persons whose name and contact details are known to the coroner that the investigation has been certified.

A reference in this subsection to the senior coroner is to the senior coroner who is responsible for conducting the investigation, or would be but for subsection (3).’.

Amendment 96, page 6, line 34, at end insert—

‘(5A) Where a certification under this section has effect, the Secretary of State must inform the judge responsible for conducting the investigation what are the protected matters.’.

Amendment 97, page 6, leave out lines 35 to 38 and insert—

‘(6) The judge holding an inquest as part of a certified investigation must hold it without a jury if—

(a) there is a protected matter that would need to be revealed to the jury (if there was one)—

(i) in order for the jury to be able properly to discharge its duty under section 10(1), and

(ii) in order to avoid a breach of any relevant Convention rights (within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42)),

and

(b) the judge is satisfied that it is necessary to hold the inquest without a jury in order to avoid the matter being made public or unlawfully disclosed.

If the judge decides to hold the inquest with a jury, the judge must not allow any protected matter to be revealed to the jury unless it is a matter within paragraph (a).’.

Amendment 98, page 6, line 40, leave out from ‘effect’ to end of line 42 and insert ‘—

(a) as if references in it to the Chief Coroner were references to the Court of Appeal;

(b) with the omission of subsections (8) and (9).’.

Amendment 99, page 6, line 43, leave out lines 43 to 45 and insert—

‘( ) In this section—

(a) a reference to conducting an investigation, in the case of an investigation that has already begun, is to be read as a reference to continuing to conduct it;

(b) a reference to holding an inquest without a jury, in the case of an inquest that has already begun, is to be read as a reference to continuing the inquest without a jury.

Where by virtue of subsection (6) an inquest begun with a jury has to be continued without one, the judge holding the inquest must discharge the jury.’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Clause 12

Discontinuance of certification

Amendment made: 3, page 7, line 1, leave out Clause 12.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Clause 13

Intercept evidence

Amendments made: 101, page 7, line 21, at end insert—

‘“( ) a disclosure made by the Secretary of State to a judge of the High Court in pursuance of section 11(5A) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009;’.

Amendment 102, page 7, line 31, leave out ‘or’ and insert—

‘( ) a disclosure made by the Secretary of State to a coroner in pursuance of section 18A(2)(a) of the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959; or’ .—(Bridget Prentice.)

Clause 34

Coroners rules

Amendment made: 109, page 19, line 35, leave out from ‘provision’ to ‘from’ in line 37 and insert

‘conferring power on a person holding an inquest as part of an investigation that has been certified under section 11 to give a direction excluding persons’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Clause 36

“Interested Person”

Amendment made: 110, page 20, line 39, at end insert—

‘( ) in the case of an investigation that has been certified under section 11, the Minister who certified the investigation;’ .—(Bridget Prentice.)

Clause 38

Amendments to the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959

Amendments made: 111, page 23, line 26, at end insert—

‘( ) In section 13 of the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959 (c. 15) (coroner may hold inquest), in subsection (1), for the words from “a coroner within whose district” to “an unexpected or unexplained death” substitute “a coroner—

(a) who is informed that the body of a deceased person is lying within his district; or

(b) in whose district an unexpected or unexplained death”.’.

Amendment 112, page 23, line 28, leave out ‘sections 11 and 12’ and insert ‘section 11’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Schedule 3

Appointment etc. of senior coroners, area coroners and assistant coroners

Amendment made: 113, page 126, line 32, leave out ‘, 3 or 12(3)(a)’ and insert ‘or 3’. —(Bridget Prentice.)

Schedule 9

Amendments to the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland, 1959

Amendment made: 120, page 141, line 21, leave out from beginning to end of line 19 on page 142 and insert—

‘“18A  Certified inquest without jury where interests of national security etc require

(1) The Secretary of State may certify an inquest if—

(a) the inquest will (if it is not certified) be held with a jury;

(b) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the inquest will concern or involve matters (referred to below as “protected matters”) that should not be made public in order to protect the interests of—

(i) national security,

(ii) the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country, or

(iii) preventing or detecting crime,

or in order to protect the safety of a witness or other person; and

(c) the Secretary of State is of the opinion that it is necessary for the inquest to be held without a jury in order to avoid protected matters being made public or unlawfully disclosed.

(2) Where the Secretary of State has certified an inquest under this section—

(a) the Secretary of State shall as soon as possible inform the coroner of the certification and of the protected matters;

(b) the coroner shall as soon as possible inform every person—

(i) who in the coroner’s opinion is a properly interested person, and

(ii) whose name and contact details are known to the coroner,

that the inquest has been certified.

(3) There shall be no proceedings on an inquest certified under this section—

(a) until the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the date of the certification, or

(b) if proceedings for judicial review of the certification are brought within that period, until the conclusion of the proceedings.

(4) The coroner shall hold a certified inquest without a jury if—

(a) there is a protected matter that would need to be revealed to the jury (if there was one)—

(i) in order for the jury to be able to make a proper decision on their verdict as to the particulars mentioned in section 31(1), and

(ii) in order to avoid a breach of any relevant Convention rights (within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998);

and

(b) the coroner is satisfied that it is necessary to hold the inquest without a jury in order to avoid the matter being made public or unlawfully disclosed.

If the coroner decides to hold the inquest with a jury, he shall not allow any protected matter to be revealed to the jury unless it is a matter within paragraph (a).

(5) A reference in subsection (4) to holding an inquest without a jury, in the case of an inquest that has already begun, is to be read as a reference to continuing the inquest without a jury; and where by virtue of that subsection an inquest begun with a jury has to be continued without one, the coroner shall discharge the jury.”’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Schedule 20

Transitional, transitory and saving provisions

Amendments made: 127, page 215, line 22, leave out ‘sections 11 and 12’ and insert ‘section 11’.

Amendment 128, page 215, line 25, leave out ‘sections 11 and 12’ and insert ‘section 11’. —(Bridget Prentice.)

New Clause 33

Death of service personnel abroad: investigation in Scotland

‘(1) This section applies to the death outside the United Kingdom of a person within subsection (2) or (3).

(2) A person is within this subsection if at the time of the death the person was subject to service law by virtue of section 367 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52) and was engaged in—

(a) active service,

(b) activities carried on in preparation for, or directly in support of, active service, or

(c) training carried out in order to improve or maintain the effectiveness of those engaged in active service.

(3) A person is within this subsection if at the time of the death the person was not subject to service law but—

(a) by virtue of paragraph 7 of Schedule 15 to the Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52) was a civilian subject to service discipline, and

(b) was accompanying persons subject to service law who were engaged in active service.

(4) If—

(a) the person’s body is within Scotland or is expected to be brought to the United Kingdom, and

(b) the Secretary of State thinks that it may be appropriate for the circumstances of the death to be investigated under the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976 (c. 14),

the Secretary of State may notify the Lord Advocate accordingly.

(5) If—

(a) the person’s body is within England and Wales, and

(b) the Chief Coroner thinks that it may be appropriate for the circumstances of the death to be investigated under that Act,

the Chief Coroner may notify the Lord Advocate accordingly.

(6) In this section “active service” has the same meaning as in section 8 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52).’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 34—Death of service personnel abroad: investigation in England and Wales despite body being brought to Scotland.

Government new clause 35—Amendments to the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976.

The new clauses respond to the calls from service families in Scotland, as well as Members of the House—particularly my right hon. Friend the Member for East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow (Mr. Ingram), who has pressed us in this regard—for action to enable fatal accident inquiries into the deaths of service personnel killed abroad to be held in Scotland when their families are based there. The new clauses will do that by amending the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976 to allow fatal accident inquiries to be held in Scotland for those who are killed abroad while on active service, or while supporting, or involved in the training of, those on active service. This means that in most cases their families will not need to travel to England to attend an inquest.

We have been examining this issue for some time with colleagues in the Ministry of Defence and the Scotland Office and with the Scottish Executive. These discussions were still ongoing at the time of the Bill’s introduction, which is why these provisions were not included earlier. I am very grateful for the support of my ministerial colleagues and others, and for the co-operative and constructive way in which this matter has been dealt with.

There is currently no legislative basis under Scottish law for the Lord Advocate to investigate any death abroad. Current arrangements enable investigations to be held in England and Wales into deaths of all service personnel killed on operations, because fatalities from Iraq and Afghanistan are repatriated via either RAF Brize Norton or RAF Lyneham. Therefore, the inquests have been carried out by the local coroners in either Oxfordshire or Wiltshire. Families based in Scotland, however, have had to travel to England for inquests, which has caused them extra difficulties when they already have to cope with the burden of bereavement and concern about the circumstances of their loved ones’ deaths. These new clauses will rectify that problem, and put Scottish families in the same position as other families in England and Wales, where, when it is appropriate, the investigation is transferred to the coroner closest to the family’s home.

Is there any reason why Scottish families cannot secure a fatal accident inquiry in Scotland for Army deaths that occurred in England? This is a main recommendation of Nicholas Blake in his Deepcut review; it is suggested that there should be easy access for Scottish families in this respect, too. Is there any reason whatever why this cannot happen for Army deaths that occur south of the border?

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. There has been that anomaly because there are no inquest provisions in Scotland, but he will know that Lord Cullen is currently investigating the whole panoply of fatal accident inquiry principles in Scotland, and I suspect he will address that in the inquiry.

I thank my hon. Friend for her kind reference to me and the effort I have put into this matter. When we deploy forces, they are now deployed on the basis of a comprehensive approach, so there could be personnel from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or the Department for International Development, or civilian police or prison officers, alongside armed forces personnel. Will the proposed change to the law include such other personnel, because it seems to me there should be no differentiation? I appreciate that my hon. Friend may not be able to answer that question now, but if she were to give some thought to it and provide a response later, I would appreciate that.

Again, my right hon. Friend makes an important point, and he has been campaigning on this issue for some time. My understanding is that the Bill is drafted in such a way that a person in that situation would be subject to this change in the law if they were a civilian subject to service discipline. If there are issues beyond that, I will write to my right hon. Friend about those outwith that range.

I am very grateful to the Minister for her succinct and clear explanation of the new clause. As she points out, we discussed this in Committee, and she mentioned at the time that there is still work to be done on it and that she would come back to the House on Report.

I want to clarify a couple of points. If the body of a deceased serviceman or woman from Scotland is repatriated to the UK, that would probably be through RAF Brize Norton or RAF Lyneham and, as the hon. Lady pointed out, it makes a great deal of sense for the body then to be moved to Scotland to be repatriated to the family. Presumably there would then be a fatal accident inquiry in Scotland—that is what the Bill allows for. One also presumes that increasingly in such tragic circumstances the body would be flown straight to Scotland. Will there be reciprocity under the new clauses? For example, if the body of an English serviceman or woman is repatriated to Scotland, would, as I presume, the arrangements work in reverse? I believe that that is covered by new clause 34, but perhaps the Minister could clarify that particular point. Presumably new clause 35 is consequential, because most of it appears to flow from the earlier new clauses and most of it is of a technical nature.

On that basis, Conservative Members support what the Minister is doing, because it makes a great deal of sense, the Ministry of Defence has been pushing for it for some time and it fits in with what we discussed in Committee. We decided in Committee that it was far better that inquests of servicemen and women who have served this country with such courage and loyalty should take place, where possible, in the home towns or cities of the bereaved families. It is only right that those inquests should take place nearest to where the families live, and that includes servicemen and women from Scotland.

I welcome these important new clauses, and I congratulate the Minister on achieving agreement with the Scottish Executive—I know that that was not particularly easy. My interest stems from the experience of a family in my constituency who lost their son, Lance Corporal Allan Douglas of The Highlanders, in Iraq. Following his death, the family received excellent support from the Ministry of Defence and Army personnel to help them through their difficult time. They were told that there would have to be a coroner’s inquiry, that it had to be held in Oxford—almost 450 miles from Aberdeen—and that it might not happen for another two years. The stress that that put on the family was considerable—I saw it at first hand. We managed to get the inquiry accelerated, but it still caused immense stress.

I wish to ask the Minister a couple of questions. In that particular case, the family took the view that they did not want an inquest, because they already knew everything that there was to know about their son’s death, and it was being dealt with as a single inquest. In Scotland, it is part of the process that the procurator fiscal take into account the views of the family when consideration is given to a fatal accident inquiry—that is a matter of process, rather than being statutory, but I know from my own experience as a practising solicitor how valuable that is. It does not mean that the family has a right of veto, but their views are taken into account, and that is extremely important, psychologically, in the difficult circumstances. I know that the arrangement is not written into this Bill either, but it would be helpful if the Minister could give some consideration to that.

The proposed new section 1A(7) set out in new clause 35 makes it clear that there can be circumstances when deaths will not be referred to Scotland, and it would be helpful if the Minister would outline what they might be. I am interested in new clause 33, which sets out the circumstances whereby the Lord Advocate may be notified, either by the chief coroner or the Secretary of State, that an inquiry should be held in Scotland. What happens if it is the other way round? Is there a process whereby the Lord Advocate notifies the chief coroner or whoever?

I should like to put on record the fact that the Liberal Democrats welcome these changes, given that they will clearly make life much easier for the families involved. As has been mentioned by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham), we discussed this at length, on occasion, in Committee. Will the Minister confirm that the provisions in the new clauses will be taken alongside those elsewhere in the Bill that allow cases to be transferred from coroner’s area to coroner’s area depending on which is the most convenient for the family involved?

Given that the rest of the Bill applies to England and Wales specifically, and this provision now includes Scotland, will the Minister confirm that cases would be able to be transferred between Scotland, England and Wales, depending on the preference of the family involved? Given the difficulties experienced by families, I am glad to see that the new provisions have now been agreed.

I rise to support Government new clauses 33, 34 and 35. Today is a good day for service families.

I will never forget 12 September 2006, the day on which a C17 Globemaster landed at RAF Kinloss in my constituency. It was repatriating 14 servicemen who had died aboard Nimrod XV230 some 10 days earlier in Afghanistan. It was a very moving ceremony for the families, all those who attended and everybody who worked at or had a connection with the station. Ten of the 14 personnel lived in Scotland, and most of them lived in Moray. However, not long after their return to RAF Kinloss, the bodies were flown back to RAF Brize Norton for the subsequent coroner’s inquest in Oxford.

The new clauses will rectify shortcomings that were vividly displayed by the experiences of families who lost loved ones aboard Nimrod XV230. Since 1968, the MOD has repatriated service personnel who died abroad, but in those 41 years no one has sought to rectify, or has succeeded in rectifying, the anomaly that sees the legal system of England and Wales play its part in explaining overseas military death while the Scots legal system does not. The consequence is that families already traumatised by the loss of a loved one have to travel hundreds of miles to attend coroner’s inquest proceedings in Oxfordshire, Wiltshire or elsewhere, and suffer substantial delays caused by the backlog of cases.

My hon. Friend will know that I am the constituency MP for Jim and Yvonne Collinson, the parents of James Collinson, who died seven years ago to the day at Deepcut barracks. He will know of the distress and chaos of families making trips to England to take part in public inquests. Does he agree that inquests and fatal accident inquiries must be held as locally as possible for families when they consider issues of such massive importance?

My hon. Friend has been a doughty campaigner in support of the Collinson family. The Bill not only addresses the issue of fatal accident inquiries in Scotland, but recognises the wish in England to see proceedings take place as close as possible to people’s homes. I hope that the Minister is alive to the possibility of that happening after fatal accident inquiries are up and running in the case of military deaths outside Scotland.

Since 2007, there has been a Scottish Government committed to changing the situation, and UK Ministers have realised that the situation as it stands is not acceptable. There has been very welcome co-operation between the Governments here and in Edinburgh and I pay tribute to all involved—

The right hon. Gentleman had the chance to make a speech, but he decided not to do so.

In Scotland in particular, I pay tribute to Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill and Lord Advocate Elish Angiolini, who have worked hard to make this day possible, at the same time as undertaking a wholesale review of the fatal inquiry system. At Westminster, I had much contact with the previous Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Des Browne), and more recently with the Minister for the Armed Forces and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Lewisham, East (Bridget Prentice), as part of formal and informal efforts to secure a change to current practice. All who have been involved in getting to this stage tonight have made a huge step forward in righting a wrong. Service families will finally be put first. These improvements to the inquest and inquiry systems are clearly too late for the families of Nimrod XV230, but their support and perseverance in the campaign to make these common-sense changes happen is a tribute to them, and it will be a stark improvement in the experience of the inquest system for families in the future.

Shona Beattie, whose husband Flight Sergeant Stephen Beattie died aboard Nimrod XV230, said in advance of today’s proceedings:

“It is really good news that the Scottish Government has made substantial progress with the UK Ministry of Defence and these changes will become law.”

She also said:

“For decades, service families in Scotland have been overlooked, but this is changing. It is now time for the Scots legal system to play its role investigating overseas military deaths”

and that

“I’m also pleased that other families will benefit from this. It’s one positive issue that has come out of a tragic event.”

For that reason alone, it would be fitting for the amendments to be agreed without Division tonight.

The amendments are the only part of the Bill to have effect in Scotland. All the other provisions relate to England and Wales, and in part to Northern Ireland, and to the legal systems there. It is no surprise that I did not take part in the Public Bill Committee, which debated only those provisions of the Bill that affect England, Wales and Northern Ireland—[Interruption.]

It is very unfortunate that on a day of good news, Labour Members from Scotland heckle on such an important subject but did not seek to speak this evening as we debate the changes.

Although the Scottish National party appreciates that there are issues of concern in the wider Bill for some English, Welsh and Northern Irish colleagues, we will support the amendments that relate to Scotland and the Bill. There is much to learn about the operation of its provisions and we will be watching closely in the years ahead. We hope, of course, that they will not be needed and that no service family will need to sit through a fatal accident inquiry, but as our armed forces are on high-tempo operations, such an occurrence, unfortunately, is likely.

It is always possible to revisit the mechanics of how the Bill will operate, but the principle is that this decision has been made tonight after 41 years of lack of delivery, within a few short years of an SNP Government in Scotland, by some Ministers who realised that the time had come to change the situation. That change is happening tonight and I welcome it wholeheartedly.

May I say how warmly I welcome the arrangement that has been made by the Government and their accommodation with the Administration in Edinburgh? My recollection of history is not entirely in line with what the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) has just said. I pay tribute to the right hon. Member for East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow (Mr. Ingram). When he was Minister, he and I had correspondence over many years about the matter. We both knew that the system had to change.

Her Majesty’s coroner for Wiltshire is based in Salisbury, in my constituency, and I pay tribute to him. David Masters has had a remarkable career looking after military inquests in Wiltshire and he retires at the end of this month. A lot of the spade work has been done by him. I also pay tribute to the coroner’s officers who have looked carefully after the families of the deceased servicemen who have been flown back to Wiltshire and to Oxfordshire. They have been at the front line, coping with the needs of families from all over the UK. It has been very difficult for them, of course, to make a civilised contribution to the needs of families from as far away as Scotland. I warmly welcome the provision. I hope that it is something that we can all agree on, in spite of our historical differences over who did what. What matters is that it is a matter of common courtesy and common decency that Scottish families should have such an arrangement. I fully respect the fact that Scottish law has been different from English law, but on this occasion at least we should all come together to say that this has been a job well done.

I shall take the views of the hon. Member for Salisbury (Robert Key) to heart, and shall not make any party political points about members of the SNP who did not turn up to Committee where they could have raised this issue.

The hon. Member for Salisbury is quite right that this point is something that everyone, on both sides of the House, agrees on. Colleagues in government in the Scotland Office and the Ministry of Defence have been working very hard on it, including both present colleagues and those who were previously in some of those posts. I welcome the fact that the Lord Advocate and the Justice Minister in Scotland have worked with us to achieve a process of decency, as the hon. Gentleman said, for the families of British armed forces personnel who happen to live in Scotland, to enable them to deal with the death of their loved ones closer to home than is currently the case.

Will the Minister clarify what will happen in cases in which a single incident gives rise to the death of several servicemen, some from Scotland and some from England?

I was going to come to that in my response to my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Doran). In the case of a single incident in which there are multiple deaths, the repatriation would be to England. However, if the majority of the deaths happened to be of Scottish personnel, the chief coroner would have a discussion with the Lord Advocate on whether it would be more appropriate to transfer all the bodies to Scotland, my point being that the deaths would be considered in a single inquest. However, the wishes of the family would also be taken into account, as the hon. Member for Cardiff, Central (Jenny Willott) and my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North requested. A discussion would take place at the time.

The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) asked whether the provisions would operate in reverse, if a body were repatriated to Scotland. The answer is yes, they would. Of course, the whole point of the amendments is to benefit service families who happen to be based in Scotland. If the body were still outside the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State for Defence would seek the agreement of the Lord Advocate to hold a fatal accident inquiry into the death, following consultation with the next of kin—something for which my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North, asked. If the Lord Advocate agreed to that, the body would be repatriated directly to Scotland. If the body were repatriated to England or Wales, the chief coroner would take on that role and would hold those discussions with the Lord Advocate.

I hope that that answers the detailed points that right hon. and hon. Members have raised. I am pleased that there is consensus across the House that we should give bereaved families, wherever they are in the United Kingdom, the comfort of knowing that their loved ones will be repatriated as close to home as possible. They can then hear of the exact circumstances surrounding the death, and can grieve properly.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 33 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 34

Death of service personnel abroad: investigation in England and Wales despite body being brought to Scotland

‘(1) The Chief Coroner may direct a senior coroner to conduct an investigation into a person’s death if—

(a) the deceased is a person within subsection (2) or (3) of section [Death of service personnel abroad: investigation in Scotland],

(b) the Lord Advocate has been notified under subsection (4) or (5) of that section in relation to the death,

(c) the body of the deceased has been brought to Scotland,

(d) no inquiry into the circumstances of the death under the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976 (c. 14) has been held (or any such inquiry that has been started has not been concluded),

(e) the Lord Advocate notifies the Chief Coroner that, in the Lord Advocate’s view, it may be appropriate for an investigation under this Part into the death to be conducted, and

(f) the Chief Coroner has reason to suspect that—

(i) the deceased died a violent or unnatural death,

(ii) the cause of death is unknown, or

(iii) the deceased died while in custody or otherwise in state detention.

(2) The coroner to whom a direction is given under subsection (1) must conduct an investigation into the death as soon as practicable.

This is subject to section 3.’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 35

Amendments to the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976

‘(1) The Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976 (c. 14) is amended as follows.

(2) After section 1 insert—

“1A Death of service personnel abroad

(1) Subsection (4) applies where—

(a) the Lord Advocate is notified under section [Death of service personnel abroad: investigation in Scotland] (4) or (5) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 in relation to a death,

(b) the death is within subsection (2) or (3), and

(c) the Lord Advocate—

(i) decides that it would be appropriate in the public interest for an inquiry under this Act to be held into the circumstances of the death, and

(ii) does not reverse that decision.

(2) A death is within this subsection if the person who has died was, at the time of the death, in legal custody (as construed by reference to section 1(4)).

(3) A death is within this subsection if it appears to the Lord Advocate that the death—

(a) was sudden, suspicious or unexplained, or

(b) occurred in circumstances such as to give rise to serious public concern.

(4) The procurator fiscal for the appropriate district must—

(a) investigate the circumstances of the death, and

(b) apply to the sheriff for the holding of an inquiry under this Act into those circumstances.

(5) But subsection (4) does not extend to a death within subsection (2) if the Lord Advocate is satisfied that the circumstances of the death have been sufficiently established in the course of any criminal proceedings against any person in respect of the death.

(6) An application under subsection (4)(b)—

(a) is to be made to the sheriff of the appropriate sheriffdom,

(b) must narrate briefly the circumstances of the death so far as known to the procurator fiscal,

(c) may relate to more than one death if the deaths occurred in the same or similar circumstances.

(7) It is for the Lord Advocate to determine the appropriate district and appropriate sheriffdom for the purposes of subsections (4) and (6)(a).”

(3) In section 2 (citation of witnesses for precognition), in subsection (1), after “section 1(1)” insert “or 1A(4)”.

(4) In section 3 (holding of public inquiry), in subsections (1) and (3), after “section 1” insert “or 1A”.

(5) In section 6 (sheriff’s determination etc), in subsection (4)(a)(i), after “section 1” insert “or 1A”.’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 36

Reports and advice to the Lord Chancellor from the Chief Coroner

‘(1) The Chief Coroner must give the Lord Chancellor a report for each calendar year.

(2) The report must cover—

(a) matters that the Chief Coroner wishes to bring to the attention of the Lord Chancellor;

(b) matters that the Lord Chancellor has asked the Chief Coroner to cover in the report.

(3) The report must contain an assessment for the year of the consistency of standards between coroners areas.

(4) The report must also contain a summary for the year of—

(a) the number, nature and outcome of appeals under section 30(1), (3), (4) or (8);

(b) the matters reported under paragraph 6 of Schedule 4 and the responses given under sub-paragraph (2) of that paragraph.

(5) A report for a year under this section must be given to the Lord Chancellor by 1 July in the following year.

(6) The Lord Chancellor must publish each report given under this section and must lay a copy of it before each House of Parliament.

(7) If requested to do so by the Lord Chancellor, the Chief Coroner must give advice to the Lord Chancellor about particular matters relating to the operation of the coroner system.’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: new clause 1—Inquests into the death of a child (restrictions on publication in newspapers)—

‘(1) Section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (power to prohibit publication of certain matters in newspapers) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) If the proceedings are an inquest and relate to the death of a child, the court must direct that no newspaper report of the proceedings shall reveal the identity of the deceased child except in so far (if at all) as may be permitted by the direction of the court, unless the court considers that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to make such a direction.”.

(3) In subsection (3) at end add “and includes proceedings in a coroner’s court”.’.

New clause 2—Academic research—

‘It shall be the duty of a coroner to co-operate, so far as is reasonably practicable, with bona fide academic research into the operation of the coronial system and related matters.’.

New clause 3—ICD classification of cause of death—

‘Each verdict recorded by a coroner must include a classification of the cause of death according to one of the categories in the most recent version of the International Classification of Deaths published by the World Health Organization.’.

New clause 4—Clusters of deaths—

‘(1) The Chief Coroner must have regard to any evidence placed before him which indicates clusters of deaths in a given geographic area, location, or profession, and must ensure that an investigation is carried out in relation to the causes of the cluster of deaths by appropriate and suitably qualified researchers.

(2) The results of the investigation must be reported to the appropriate authority, which must publish details of the action which needs to be taken to prevent subsequent deaths.’.

New clause 7—Presumption of death investigation and certification—

‘(1) The Chief Coroner must conduct an investigation into a person’s disappearance when it appears to him that there is prima facie evidence that—

(a) the person is thought to have died, or

(b) the person has not been known to be alive for a period of at least 7 years.

(2) If after an investigation under subsection (1) the Chief Coroner declares that the person has died, he shall then issue a certificate of presumed death, which shall be valid for all purposes as if it were a certificate of death.’.

New clause 28—Oversight by the chief coroner—

‘(1) The Chief Coroner may require senior coroners and medical examiners to provide him routinely with information he deems necessary in order for him to identify—

(a) trends in deaths reported to coroners and deaths not reported to coroners, and

(b) problems in the functioning, capacity of funding or the coronial system.

(2) A copy of reports submitted by senior coroners under paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 4 and a copy of responses to those reports must also be submitted to the Chief Coroner.

(3) The Chief Coroner may keep central records of all information provided to him under subsection (1) and reports under subsection (2).

(4) Where trends in deaths are identified under subsection (1), the Chief Coroner may order an investigation to ascertain the causes of deaths to be carried out by—

(a) a senior coroner, or

(b) appropriate and suitably qualified researchers.

(5) The results of an investigation carried out under subsection (4) must be reported to the Chief Coroner and to the appropriate authority.

(6) Where an authority receives a report under subsection (5), it must publish details of the action which needs to be taken to prevent subsequent deaths.

(7) The Chief Coroner must provide an annual report to the Lord Chancellor which may contain—

(a) details of problems identified under subsection (1),

(b) details of action taken under subsections (4) and (6),

(c) details of senior coroners’ reports and responses to them under paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 4, and

(d) matters of outstanding concern to the Chief Coroner in relation to this section.

(8) The Lord Chancellor must lay a copy of the Chief Coroner’s annual report before Parliament within 60 days of receiving the report.’.

New clause 32—Duty to conduct investigations—

‘(1) Where in respect of the circumstances of a death it seems to a senior coroner necessary in order to establish a matter of—

(a) criminal liability on the part of a named person (including liability in respect of a service offence); or

(b) civil liability,

he may request an investigation, whether jointly or separately, by

(i) the police;

(ii) the health and safety executive; or

(iii) any other investigating authority.

(2) When requesting an investigation under subsection (1), he may request such an investigation to be carried out as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable.

(3) Any investigating authority under subsection (1) must comply with a reasonable request from a senior coroner.

(4) Where, following an investigation into the circumstances of a death, a court determines—

(a) criminal liability on the part of a named person (including liability in respect of a service offence); or

(b) civil liability,

then, notwithstanding section 10(2), that determination may be taken by the senior coroner to satisfy the requirement for a determination under section 5(1)(b).’.

New clause 41—Inquests in cases of multiple deaths—

‘(1) This section applies where it appears from a coroner’s investigation under this Part that more than one death has occurred from related causes.

(2) Where this section applies, a coroner may hold the inquests into the deaths as a single proceeding.

(3) Such a proceeding may deal with the deaths either jointly or sequentially.

(4) The coroner must consult the next of kin of each of the deceased persons, and obtain their consent in writing, before holding inquests as described in subsections (2) and (3).’.

Amendment 134, in clause 1, page 2, line 1, at end insert—

‘(2A) For the purposes of this section, the circumstances when the deceased should be considered to have been in “state detention” include—

(a) detention by a constable or other public authority pursuant to statutory or common law powers;

(b) detention or deprivation of liberty pursuant to the requirements of mental health legislation, including the Mental Health Act 1983 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005, as amended by the Mental Health Act 2007;

(c) the placement of a child in secure accommodation;

(d) detention pursuant to immigration and asylum legislation; and

(e) the detention of any person in custody or otherwise detained while he or she is being transported from one place to another.’.

Amendment 154, in clause 5, page 3, line 41, at end insert—

‘(1A) For the avoidance of doubt, the requirement in subsection (1)(b) shall include making the best possible estimate of the precise time and date of a person’s death.’.

Amendment 135, page 4, line 4, at end insert—

‘(2A) The senior coroner may determine that the purpose of any investigation shall include ascertaining the circumstances the deceased came by his or her death where—

(a) the senior coroner is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to determine that the continued or repeat occurrence of those circumstances would be prejudicial to the health and safety of members of the public, or any section of it; or

(b) the senior coroner is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to consider such circumstances in the public interest.’.

Amendment 136, in clause 10, page 5, line 40, at end insert—

‘(3A) Subsection (2) shall not affect the duty on the coroner to conduct an investigation which meets the requirements of section 5.’.

Government amendment 107.

Amendment 12, in schedule 4, page 131, line 27, leave out first ‘may’ and insert ‘must’.

Government amendment 151.

Amendment 13, page 131, line 30, at end insert—

‘(3) The senior coroner may then request the relevant person to submit, within three months, a full update on any action he has taken, or alternatively detail the reasons for any failure to take action.

(4) The senior coroner must at the end of each year forward all reports and updates to the Chief Coroner, who must present them to Parliament.’.

New clause 36 fulfils a commitment that I gave in Committee to consider how the provisions in respect of the prevention of future deaths might be improved. The new clause places on the chief coroner a statutory duty to make an annual report to the Lord Chancellor, and it details what should be included in it. Among other things, it will include a summary of the reports made by senior coroners.

As the Minister rightly pointed out, we are talking about a commitment that she gave in Committee. Will the chief coroner’s report include action to be taken on reports by individual coroners, so that, for example, if action is advised to improve highways, that action is taken to prevent future deaths?

I am grateful to the Minister for listening to what we said in Committee. She said at the time that she was attracted to our amendments. The key point is that from time to time coroners throughout the country will make reports—

Debate interrupted (Programme Order, this day).

The Speaker put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair (Standing Order No. 83E), That the clause be read a Second time.

Question agreed to.

New clause 36 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

The Speaker then put forthwith the Question necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83E).

Clause 27

Chief Coroner and Deputy Chief Coroner

Amendments made: 103, page 14, leave out lines 21 to 26.

Amendment 104, page 14, line 27, leave out ‘further provision about’ and insert ‘provision about the appointment etc of’.

Amendment 105, page 14, line 31, leave out ‘this section or’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Clause 30

Appeals to the Chief Coroner

Amendment made: 106, page 16, line 13, at end insert—

‘( ) a decision whether to exercise a power conferred by virtue of section 34(3)(a) or (4) to exclude persons from all or part of an inquest;’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Clause 33

Coroners regulations

Amendment made: 107, page 18, line 17, at end insert—

‘( ) provision requiring a summary of specified information given to the Chief Coroner by virtue of paragraph (e) to be included in reports under section [Reports and advice to the Lord Chancellor from the Chief Coroner];’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Clause 34

Coroners rules

Amendment made: 108, page 19, line 22, leave out from ‘requiring’ to end of line 23 and insert

‘permission to be given for the making of an appeal to the Court of Appeal under any provision of this Part’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Schedule 4

powers of senior coroners

Amendment made: 151, page 131, line 30, at end insert—

‘(3) A copy of a report under this paragraph, and of the response to it, must be sent to the Chief Coroner.’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Schedule 7

Chief Coroner and Deputy Chief Coroners

Amendments made: 114, page 136, leave out lines 16 to 25 and insert—

‘Appointment of Chief Coroner

1 (1) The Lord Chief Justice may appoint a person as the Chief Coroner.

(2) To be eligible for appointment as the Chief Coroner a person must be—

(a) a judge of the High Court or a Circuit judge, and

(b) under the age of 70.

(3) The Lord Chief Justice must consult the Lord Chancellor before making an appointment under this paragraph.

(4) The appointment of a person as the Chief Coroner is to be for a term decided by the Lord Chief Justice after consulting the Lord Chancellor.

The term must be one that expires before the person’s 70th birthday.

(5) In this paragraph “appointment” includes re-appointment.

Appointment of Deputy Chief Coroners

1A (1) The Lord Chief Justice may secure the appointment as Deputy Chief Coroners of however many persons the Lord Chief Justice thinks appropriate.

(2) To be eligible for appointment as a Deputy Chief Coroner a person must be—

(a) a judge of the High Court, a Circuit judge or a senior coroner, and

(b) under the age of 70.

(3) The Lord Chief Justice must consult the Lord Chancellor as to—

(a) the appropriate number of persons to be appointed as Deputy Chief Coroners;

(b) how many of them are to be persons eligible for appointment by virtue of being judges and how many are to be persons eligible for appointment by virtue of being senior coroners.

(4) The function of appointing a person as a Deputy Chief Coroner is exercisable, in the case of a judge of the High Court or a Circuit judge, by the Lord Chief Justice after consulting the Lord Chancellor.

(5) The appointment by the Lord Chief Justice of a person as a Deputy Chief Coroner is to be for a term decided by the Lord Chief Justice after consulting the Lord Chancellor.

The term must be one that expires before the person’s 70th birthday.

(6) The function of appointing a person as a Deputy Chief Coroner is exercisable, in the case of a senior coroner, by the Lord Chancellor at the invitation of the Lord Chief Justice.

(7) The appointment by the Lord Chancellor of a person as a Deputy Chief Coroner is to be for a term decided by the Lord Chancellor after consulting the Lord Chief Justice.

The term must be one that expires before the person’s 70th birthday.

(8) In this paragraph “appointment” includes re-appointment.’.

Amendment 115, page 136, line 27, leave out ‘or a Deputy Chief Coroner’ and insert

‘, or a Deputy Chief Coroner appointed by the Lord Chief Justice,’.

Amendment 116, page 136, line 31, at end insert—

‘( ) A Deputy Chief Coroner appointed by the Lord Chancellor may resign from office by giving notice in writing to the Lord Chancellor.

( ) But the resignation does not take effect unless and until it is accepted by the Lord Chancellor, who must consult the Lord Chief Justice before accepting it.’.

Amendment 117, page 136, line 33, leave out ‘or a Deputy Chief Coroner’ and insert

‘, or a Deputy Chief Coroner appointed by the Lord Chief Justice,’.

Amendment 118, page 136, line 34, at end insert—

‘( ) The Lord Chancellor may, after consulting the Lord Chief Justice, remove a Deputy Chief Coroner appointed by the Lord Chancellor from office for incapacity or misbehaviour.’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Schedule 8

Investigation by Chief Coroner or judge, former judge or former coroner

Amendment made: 119, page 138, leave out lines 27 to 41 and insert—

‘3 (1) Where—

(a) by virtue of this Schedule an investigation is conducted by a person who holds or has held office as judge of the High Court (including the Chief Coroner if he or she is such a person) or by a person who has held office as a judge of the Court of Appeal, and

(b) the investigation gives rise to an appeal under section 30,

that section has effect as if references in it to the Chief Coroner were references to the Court of Appeal, and with the omission of subsections (8) and (9).

(2) Where—

(a) by virtue of this Schedule an investigation is conducted by a Circuit judge (including the Chief Coroner if he or she is a Circuit judge), and

(b) the investigation gives rise to an appeal under section 30,

that section has effect as if references in it to the Chief Coroner were references a judge of the High Court nominated by the Lord Chief Justice.’.—(Bridget Prentice.)

Schedule 19

Minor and consequential amendments

Amendments made: 121, page 195, line 22, leave out ‘entry’ and insert ‘entries’.

Amendment 122, page 195, line 25, at end insert—

“Deputy Chief Coroner appointed by the Lord Chancellor under that Part who is not also a senior coroner.”’.

Amendment 123, page 195, line 28, leave out ‘entry’ and insert ‘entries’.

Amendment 124, page 195, line 31, at end insert—

“Deputy Chief Coroner appointed by the Lord Chancellor under that Part who is not also a senior coroner.”’.

Amendment 125, page 196, line 18, at end insert—

‘Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 (c. 8)

In Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 (other offices that may be qualifying judicial offices), after the entry relating to the Adjudicator to Her Majesty’s Land Registry there is inserted—

“Deputy Chief Coroner appointed by the Lord Chancellor who is not also a senior coroner”.’.

Amendment 126, page 200, line 42, at end insert—

‘Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4)

In Schedule 14 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (the Judicial Appointments Commission: relevant offices and enactments), at the end of Part 3 insert—

“Deputy Chief Coroner

Paragraph 1A(5) of Schedule 7 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009”.’.

(Bridget Prentice.)

Bill to be further considered tomorrow.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. A number of Members of Parliament have been involved in inquests such as that for Stephen Lawrence, who was one of my constituents, or the inquest that might have been held for Jay Abatan, another of my constituents, in my constituency. I had been hoping to raise these matters under new clause 36. The selection of amendments is unexceptionable, but I hope it will be taken on record that when scheduling the business of the House, Ministers should allow MPs to speak on subjects on which they have personal experience and to put forward the views and experiences of their constituents.

That is not a matter for the Chair. These matters are arranged through the usual channels. However, the hon. Gentleman has put the matter on the record.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Tonight we have conducted inadequate scrutiny of the Bill. There are tens of Government amendments and new clauses that have not been scrutinised in most of the groups that you selected. I speak on behalf of those in all parts of the House who are keen to scrutinise legislation. Given that the Leader of the House said in business questions under your chairmanship that she took seriously the issue of how we scrutinise Bills on Report and said that in respect of the Coroners and Justice Bill she would seek to ensure with the Secretary of State that the two days are used in the best possible way for these important measures, can you advise whether there is any way that we can ask the Leader of the House to come back to explain why we end up yet again with inadequate scrutiny by the elected House of very important matters, including the revision of the law on murder, of all things?

The programme motion was decided earlier this afternoon. I am bound by the decision of the House and therefore I am bound by the programme motion. The hon. Gentleman is at liberty to take up with the Leader of the House anything that the right hon. and learned Lady said and any criticism of her.

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Knowing that the Secretary of State for Justice is on the Front Bench, may I, through you, ask that he consider what happened today? As you rightly say, the matter lies with those on the Government Front Bench to take the initiative. I hope that they will be sympathetic, and I am sure that you would accommodate that if they were.

Business Without Debate

Delegated Legislation

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),

Criminal Injuries Compensation (Northern Ireland)

That the draft Alterations to the Northern Ireland Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2002, which were laid before this House on 17 December, be approved.—(Ian Lucas.)

Question agreed to.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),

Criminal Injuries Compensation (Northern Ireland)

That the draft Northern Ireland Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2009, which was laid before this House on 28 January, be approved.—(Ian Lucas.)

Question agreed to.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),

Tribunals and Inquiries

That the draft Revenue and Customs Appeals Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 9 February, be approved.—(Ian Lucas.)

Question agreed to.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),

Immigration

That the draft Immigration (Biometric Registration) (Amendment) Regulations 2009, which were laid before this House on 9 February, be approved.—(Ian Lucas.)

Question agreed to.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),

Pensions

That the draft Occupational Pension Schemes (Levy Ceiling) Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 10 February, be approved.—(Ian Lucas.)

Question agreed to.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),

Pensions

That the draft Pension Protection Fund (Pension Compensation Cap) Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 23 February, be approved.—(Ian Lucas.)

Question agreed to.

Blacklisting (Construction Industry)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—(Ian Lucas.)

I am pleased to have secured this Adjournment debate on blacklisting, because the practice impacts on the health of the construction industry and is accordingly a matter of public concern. The Government are the sector’s largest client, so they have some responsibility to ensure that the working practices of the 1930s have no place in our modern construction industry. I hope that the Minister will take action to encourage the industry to change.

I want to make four brief points. The first is about the impact on the health and safety culture of the industry, and the second is about the climate of fear that discrimination creates. My third point is about the fact that many of the companies using the list kept by the Consulting Association were major companies working on publicly procured projects. Finally, I want to suggest to the Minister that, along with other measures, section 3 of the Employment Relations Act 1999 should now be implemented.

The construction industry is important. Before the recession, it provided employment for more than 2.8 million people. It contributed 8.7 per cent. of the UK economy’s gross value added in 2006; to put that into perspective, I should say that that is twice that produced by the energy, automotive and aerospace industries combined. Construction has a huge impact on the UK economy. It is vital, and that is why we need a world-class construction sector that uses the best employment practices.

The health and safety record of the industry is worrying. Construction, for example, accounts for almost one third of workplace fatalities in the UK. The year 2006-07 saw an increase in the number of fatalities from 60 to 77, and in 2007-08 there were 72 fatal injuries. More than half those deaths resulted from a fall or from a worker’s being struck by a falling object.

Workplace safety representatives are an essential tool in helping to improve the health and safety culture on site, but the blacklisting of people who take on the job militates against that. The Government have an important role to play in the issue, and workplace safety representatives will need to be reassured that they will not be blacklisted if they do their job properly. I shall return to that issue later.

Does my hon. Friend agree that health and safety should be part of the criteria when construction companies bid for Government contracts? The Government should look at the companies’ track records on health and safety to flush out those that do not regard the issue as important.

I thank my hon. Friend for that comment, which I agree with. The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007 place an onus on the client to include health and safety in its criteria, and given that the Government are the biggest client in the public sector, they have a responsibility to take on and ensure health and safety.

Between 2004 and 2007, a health and safety advisory scheme operated in the construction industry, run jointly by the Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians and employers. That scheme, which included the Health and Safety Executive, was considered a success, but it has run into the sand because no more funding is available. Clearly, getting it up and running again is important for safety in construction. Bearing in mind that the 2007 regulations place a responsibility on Government, it is definitely something that they should pick up and put in place.

I recently spoke with a construction worker whose name is on the blacklist; I do not want to use his name for obvious reasons. He told me that he believed that the blacklisting was much more insidious than merely a list being kept by the Consulting Association. He had worked all his life in the industry and had been blacklisted for 35 years, basically for standing up for trade union rights, particularly in health and safety. In his view, what happens in the industry is that lists are exchanged from company to company. He came to that conclusion having been moved from one job to another. When he had been on site for only two or three days, he would be visited by the site agent and told that there was no work there for him. That caused him and his family enormous hardship, because he was continually moving from job to job and never having long-stay employment. He told me that the first time that he ever had any security was when he moved into the mining industry to work with construction companies such as Thyssen and Cementation that he had been working with on sites, because in mining they came under the framework of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954 and had to adhere to that. That gave him much more of a feeling of certainty than he had ever had on sites. The fact that he had to move from site to site, taking all his family, shows the kind of hardship that is imposed on a person in the position of being blacklisted by companies involved in construction.

An article in The Times on 7 March 2009 indicates the kinds of companies—household names—that are involved in blacklisting. It says:

“Sir Robert McAlpine is one of more than 40 companies accused by Richard Thomas, the Information Commissioner, of breaching data protection laws after an investigation by his office sparked fears that many workers were being unfairly ‘blacklisted’.

The commissioner alleges that Ian Kerr, of Droitwich, Worcestershire, charged companies £3,000 a year to consult his database of 3,213 workers, whose names were accompanied by notes such as ‘poor timekeeper, will cause trouble’ and ‘Irish ex-army bad egg’.”

It goes on to say that from invoices that have been obtained,

“‘It would appear that Sir Robert McAlpine and other companies made thousands of requests a year’, a spokesman for the Information Commissioner said. He said that each request for information on a specific employee cost about £2.20 on top of the yearly subscription. That suggests that Sir Robert McAlpine made more than 10,000 requests”

for information on individuals in the past year.

I understand that sentiment, and we need to ensure that companies engaged in publicly procured projects adhere to the law, which means that we need the regulations set out in the 1999 Act, the safety advisory schemes and the 2007 regulations.

When the 1999 legislation was introduced and debated in this House, we were ecstatic that the provisions in question were included. When I raised the matter in 2004 or 2005, and asked why that element of the legislation had not been implemented, the argument was that there was insufficient evidence to justify implementation—there was no evidence of blacklisting. The published evidence referred to by my hon. Friend clearly blows that argument out of the water. We now need swift implementation of that legislation.

I agree totally with my hon. Friend’s comments.

The fact that many of the companies making use of the Consulting Association are some of the country’s largest construction companies is a worry. The fact that the public sector was the client in just over 31 per cent. of construction output in 2006, making it the industry’s largest customer, suggests that the Government, as a major client, have some responsibility to use the powerful lever that exists to ensure that companies who use blacklists are not engaged on projects, which brings us to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Livingston (Mr. Devine). Still more could be done to change the behaviour of construction companies working on publicly procured projects by strict use of the 2007 regulations and the use of workers health and safety advisers, which together could start to change the culture.

The Minister may have seen my early-day motion 1020, which does not demand new primary legislation. There is no need for such legislation because the power is already in the statute book and available to the Secretary of State—it just needs to be enabled. Section 3 of the 1999 Act provides that the Secretary of State may make regulations prohibiting the compilation of lists that contain details of members’ trade unions or persons who have taken part in the activities of trade unions, and lists which are compiled with a view to being used by employers or employment agencies for the purpose of discrimination in relation to recruitment or to the treatment of workers. The Minister will know that in 2003, the Government consulted on the regulations. A number of trade unions and trade union law firms responded to say that rather than wait for evidence of blacklisting, the Government should enact the regulations immediately. They did not. But now that evidence has emerged that blacklisting is taking place, it is time to bring them into effect.

If the Information Commissioner is to prosecute the Consulting Association and is considering what action to take against the construction companies to which information has been supplied, the Government must use their powers under the regulations to ensure that structures are in place to prevent it from reoccurring. That is an important point that must be emphasised. We need to ensure sustainability for those working in the industry.

Obviously, the Government have to take action on this matter, but in the absence of immediate action, would my hon. Friend arrange for other Members throughout the House to be informed of the list of construction companies that have been operating the blacklist so that we can take it up with housing associations, councils and other organisations in our constituencies?

I hear what my hon. Friend says, and his point is well made. The Minister will have heard it, and no doubt other Members will be thinking of tackling the issue in that way.

There was a consultation in 2003, and as far as I am aware, only two bodies—the CBI and the Engineering Employers Federation—said that they hoped that the regulations would not need to be introduced. Given that we have shown that there clearly is evidence that they need to be introduced, I would think that those two bodies would accept the points that were made at the time of the consultation and agree that the regulations should be brought into force.

Does my hon. Friend agree that those two bodies epitomise what is wrong with this country? There is absolutely no level playing field. If this had been the other way round, and trade unions were restricting their trade, they would have been up before a High Court judge.

I could not agree more with my hon. Friend’s point.

I welcome the Department’s statement of intention to review whether to use its powers if there were compelling evidence that blacklisting were being used. What could be more compelling than the evidence produced by the Information Commissioner? It has shown clearly that bodies such as the Consulting Association are involved in blacklisting. Some time ago, we thought that the Economic League and the Freedom Association had disappeared and that this kind of thing no longer happened, but the evidence clearly shows that it is happening.

Is it not clear to my hon. Friend and all those who have worked in the industry that blacklisting went on all the time? Anyone with any experience of the industry knew that scores and scores of people were driven not just out of work but out of the industry. They effectively had their trade stolen and were sent to work in other places. That has been common practice for very many years.

I agree that anybody who has worked around the construction industry, and talked to people such as those I have talked to in preparing for the debate, gets the feeling that blacklisting has been around for many years, and that it is not just the large organisations that we have mentioned that organise it but the construction companies themselves. They prepare blacklists and exchange them among themselves.

As the Minister will be aware, the Information Commissioner is considering regulatory action against the firms involved. That is welcome, but the Government must move positively to bring into force section 3 of the 1999 Act to stop this outdated practice that has blighted many lives. I hope that he will say this evening that he is willing to act.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley, West and Penistone (Mr. Clapham) on securing the debate. I begin with something of an apology to you, Mr. Speaker, and to him for the slightly weak nature of my voice tonight. I hope that I manage to get through my response.

This subject is important and topical. The Government believe that people have a right to join a trade union if they so wish. That is a free choice and should not result in their being denied employment, so I share my hon. Friend’s concerns about the recent revelations in the construction industry. He is right that that industry is of particular concern, because the safety of workers can be at stake as well as their employment.

The freedom to belong to a trade union is a key human right set out in many international treaties, including the European convention on human rights. Trade union representatives and activists—we should not forget that they are mostly unpaid volunteers—perform an important and valuable role in the workplace. For the most part they work in partnership with employers, but of course sometimes they challenge them. That can be when tensions arise, but it is important that trade union representatives are not subject to victimisation.

The practice of blacklisting should be anathema in today’s Britain. It is a relic of the past, and if what has occurred recently in the construction industry is blacklisting rearing its head again, of course we will take that seriously. I shall come to what we are doing to address that, but first I shall briefly set out some of the protections that currently exist.

Sections 137, 146 and 152 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 make it unlawful for an employer to refuse employment, cause someone to lose out at work or dismiss someone on the ground of trade union membership or activities. Those rights have been in place for decades, although we made some modifications in, for example, the Employment Relations Acts 1999 and 2004, providing more protection against victimising workers for using a union’s services.

My hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley, West and Penistone also referred to the Data Protection Act 1998. To run any system, an organisation needs to manage a large amount of data, and organisations or persons managing such data are classed under the Act as data controllers. That means that they must register with the Information Commissioner—failure to do that is a criminal offence. In accordance with the Act’s data protection principles, data controllers must make proportionate and fair use of data.

Trade union membership is classified as “sensitive personal data”. According to the Act, it is unlawful, save for a few exceptions, to process such data without the subject’s explicit consent. Since blacklisting is, by its nature, a covert activity, it is impossible to operate a blacklist successfully and stay within the provisions of the Act. The Information Commissioner has strong powers to investigate cases in which he thinks the Act is being breached. He used them extensively during his investigation into the affairs of the Consulting Association, which I will call TCA. He secured two search warrants and confiscated a large amount of material. One prosecution has begun. He can also issue enforcement notices, which require persons to act in accordance with the 1998 Act by taking, or refraining from taking steps. One enforcement notice has so far been issued.

My hon. Friend mentioned section 3 of the Employment Relations Act 1999, which provides a power for making regulations to outlaw blacklisting. As he said, we have produced draft regulations, on which we consulted in 2003. They would allow individuals to obtain compensation for being refused employment or for suffering discrimination by their employer because of their inclusion on a trade union blacklist. Those complaints would be determined by the employment tribunal.

In addition, people, including trade unions, could claim damages from the compilers, disseminators and users of the blacklists for financial loss.

Why do we not just tell the companies on the list that they will not get Government contracts?

I have already received a letter from one of the companies that have been mentioned, dissociating itself from the activity and claiming that it did not realise that it was buying into it. I will revert to that.

We reiterated our position that we would not consider implementing the regulations until clear evidence arose. That was the position in 2003. The investigation began in the middle of last year, when my Department learned that the Information Commissioner was investigating allegations of blacklisting. My officials were involved at an early stage and worked with the Information Commissioner’s office. I pay tribute to those in that office for their diligence in pursuing a complex investigation.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley, West and Penistone described, significant abuse of the data protection principles and data protection law was uncovered. TCA has secretly listed more than 3,300 individuals and kept more detailed information on 1,600 of them.

The compilers of the list can be prosecuted under the Data Protection Act and one such prosecution is pending. I believe that a fine can be imposed in a lower court, or a higher fine can be imposed in a higher court.

The critical question that my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley, West and Penistone asked is what our response is. Around 25 construction companies appear to have been subscribers to the services of TCA and about 18 of them appear to have used the system recently. The information relates to the employment histories of individuals and in some cases it refers to their involvement in trade unions or their participation in industrial action.

The Government need to decide whether those activities fall within the definition of blacklisting found in section 3 of the 1999 Act. Earlier this month my officials spent two days at the offices of the Information Commissioner and they have examined much of the material that he has taken from TCA. My noble Friend the Secretary of State and I will closely examine their findings on the material and decide what action to take.

Briefly, it is 10 years since we put the legislation through and we now have evidence of blacklisting, which the Government were unsure of before. We urgently require the implementation of the regulations, but we need to make them retrospective, so that those people who have suffered, particularly over the past 10 years, can gain proper compensation.

I will come to how we are dealing with the problem.

Procurement has been mentioned. Any company, whether it works on public contracts or not, should comply with the law of the land. We expect companies not to break either data protection law or trade union law when planning or undertaking work for the public sector. Of course we recognise that construction companies need to ensure that they recruit the right calibre of person for the job, but there is no need to undertake covert and unfair vetting of the kind that TCA appears to have performed.

The Information Commissioner is following up his investigation in various ways. First, TCA is to be prosecuted, as I have said. I understand that the case will be heard towards the end of April. I also understand that the Information Commissioner is making further inquiries with the subscriber companies to determine the extent of their involvement with TCA. Those inquiries could lead to further action by the Information Commissioner. My Department will stay in close touch with the Information Commissioner and, as I have said, BERR officials have already inspected many of the records held by the Information Commissioner.

It is not the weakness of your voice that concerns me, but the weakness of the response that our Government are making. Will you not unreservedly condemn the activities—

Order. The traditions of the House are such that if the word “you” is used, it means me, the occupant of the Chair, and we cannot have that, can we?

I unreservedly apologise, Mr. Speaker. Would my right hon. Friend unreservedly condemn the activities of that company and others that produce such lists, which result in the exclusion of workers from their proper and reasonable trade?

I have said that blacklisting is anathema and it should have been left in the past.

My officials have already inspected many records. Our objective is to assess precisely whether the activities undertaken represent the kind of blacklisting activity that section 3 of the 1999 Act was designed to cover. The Secretary of State and I will examine the evidence in the case and we will examine the papers. We will take the matter seriously and the Government will make a decision on how to proceed. Let me reiterate that I share the deep concern that my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley, West and Penistone has expressed about the revelations that have been made. We need to address the matter diligently and speedily. I assure him that we share his concern about the reports. We will examine the papers and the evidence and we will come to a conclusion in the near future.

Question put and agreed to.

House adjourned.