The Ministry of Defence is currently collating and validating the data needed to answer this question. I will write to the hon. Member when this work is complete, and place a copy of my letter in the Library of the House.
Substantive answer from John Hutton to Liam Fox:
I am writing to provide you with the information promised in my holding replies to your Parliamentary Questions regarding contacts between British forces and anti-coalition militia in Afghanistan (Official Report, 24 February 2009, column 520W).
The Ministry of Defence has recently completed a review of the data required to answer this question, and has revised the manner in which we classify and present data to ensure consistency.
The numbers of troops in contact events, regardless of the instigator, involving the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and insurgents in Helmand province as part of Task Force Helmand for each complete month from June 2006 to February 2009 for which verified data are available are provided in the table below.
20061 20071 20081 20091 January — 60 70 180 February — 100 70 180 March — 140 80 — April — 70 50 — May — 120 60 — June 10 110 80 — July 120 130 110 — August 100 130 200 — September 100 130 180 — October 40 90 170 — November 40 110 200 — December 50 130 220 — 1 Rounded to the nearest 10
ISAF forces operating in Helmand come from a number of different nations, which often operate closely alongside each other and alongside Afghan Army and Police units. Without undertaking a detailed assessment of each engagement, it is not possible precisely to define in every case whether an attack was aimed at UK forces, at our ISAF partners, or against Afghan units. Data are therefore collected on the number of incidents involving ISAF forces in Helmand without attempting to identify the nationality of the forces actually being attacked. The environment in which forces are operating makes it extremely difficult precisely to distinguish between incidents initiated by insurgent forces and those initiated by ISAF.
These data are based on information derived from a number of sources and can only be an estimate, not least because of the difficulties in ensuring a consistent interpretation of the basis for collating statistics in a complex fast- moving multinational operational environment.
I hope that the above information addresses your concerns on this matter.
I will place a copy of this letter in the Library of the House.
The Ministry of Defence is currently collating and validating the data needed to answer this question. I will write to the hon. Member with the information requested and place a copy of my letter in the Library of the House.
Substantive answer from John Hutton to Michael Ancram:
I am writing to provide you with the information promised in my holding reply to your Parliamentary Question regarding military engagements between UK armed forces and the Taleban (Official Record, 23 March 2009, Column 10W).
The Ministry of Defence has recently completed a review of the data required to answer this question, and has revised the manner in which we classify and present data to ensure consistency.
The number of engagements, regardless of the instigator, involving the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and insurgents in Helmand province as part of Task Force Helmand, for the last two complete months for which verified data is available are provided below.
January 20091—210
February 20091—200
1 Rounded to the nearest 10
ISAF forces operating in Helmand come from a number of different nations, which often operate closely alongside each other and alongside Afghan Army and Police units. Without undertaking a detailed assessment of each engagement, it is not possible precisely to define in every case whether an attack was aimed at UK forces, at our ISAF partners, or against Afghan units. Data are therefore collected on the number of incidents involving ISAF forces in Helmand without attempting to identify the nationality of the forces actually being attacked. The environment in which forces are operating makes it extremely difficult precisely to distinguish between incidents initiated by insurgent forces and those initiated by ISAF.
These data are based on information derived from a number of sources and can only be an estimate, not least because of the difficulties in ensuring a consistent interpretation of the basis for collating statistics in a complex fast-moving multinational operational environment.
I hope that the above information addresses your concerns on this matter.
I will place a copy of this letter in the Library of the House.
[holding answer 31 March 2009]: Data on the total number of personnel at each rank deployed on Operation Herrick 4-7 is provided in the following table.
Rank Number deployed on Op Herrick prior to April 2007 Number deployed on Op Herrick 6-7 Total 19,340 27,420 Officers 3,520 4,830 By rank5: Brigadier and above 50 90 Colonel 110 170 Lieutenant Colonel 400 480 Major 1,080 1,430 Captain 1,630 2,180 Lieutenant and below 250 480 Other ranks 15,330 22,590 By rank5: Warrant Officer 790 1,190 Staff Sergeant 1,200 1,600 Sergeant 2,060 2,750 Corporal 3,240 4,330 Lance Corporal 2,070 3,770 Private 5,970 8,950 Unknown ranks5 490 * 1 All figures are rounded to the nearest 10, with figures of 5 or below denoted by *, totals and sub-totals have been rounded separately and so may not equal the sum of their rounded parts. 2 UK armed forces personnel includes UK Regular Forces, Gurkhas, Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS) personnel and mobilised reservists. 3 Due to data quality issues it is not possible to separate data for roulements 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Op Herrick. 4 All data are provisional and subject to review. 5 All rank information is based on NATO rank and includes equivalent ranks in the Naval Service and RAF. Rank shown is rank on outflow.
34 UK armed forces personnel attended the UK field hospital during Herrick 4-7 for psychiatric reasons. Due to the small number it is not possible to provide attendances for psychiatric reasons by roulement.
The number of personnel who were referred to a Department of Community Mental Health (DCMH) in 2007 following deployment on Operation Herrick 4-7 is provided in the following table. Of the 414 who were assessed as having a psychological disorder, 47 were diagnosed with PTSD.
Herrick roulement Initial assessment Herrick 4-5 Herrick 62 Psychological disorder 180 234 Of which: PTSD 25 22 1 These figures show the number of new attendees who have been identified as deployed to Herrick prior to their first referral at a DCMH. 2 Includes 156 people who had also deployed to Herrick 4-5, of which 10 had PTSD.
Five armed forces personnel who have returned to the UK for treatment from Op Herrick 4-7 have been medically discharged for mental and behavioural disorders.
2,141 armed forces personnel attended the UK Field Hospital during Herrick 4-7 for physical injuries. The following table provides the breakdown by roulement.
Roulement Physical injuries All 2,141 Herrick 4 369 Herrick 5 487 Herrick 6 691 Herrick 7 594 1 Data source: Operational Emergency Department Attendance Register (OpEDAR)
A proportion of those with physical injuries were returned to the UK for treatment. Since October 2007 these patients have been tracked through their care. For those deployed on Herrick 7 178 personnel were returned to the UK for treatment of their injury.
Of the 178 personnel who were returned to the UK for treatment, eight have since been medically discharged for injury related-conditions.
It should be noted, that the medical discharge may not be as a result of their injury in Afghanistan and Medical Boards do not make decisions on attributability to service.
[holding answer 1 April 2009]: Data on the number of deployed personnel at each rank broken down individually for each of Operations HERRICK 4, 5, 6 and 7 and who have left the armed forces are not available and as such could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
[holding answer 1 April 2009]: Officials are collating and validating the data needed and this is taking longer than anticipated. I will write to the hon. Member when this work is complete.
British armed forces personnel in Afghanistan are not forewarned of alleged US Predator unmanned aerial vehicle attacks into Pakistan or whether Predator unmanned aerial vehicle flights over Afghanistan originate within Pakistan.
Since the Rifles formed on 1 February 2007, up to 28 March 2009, there have been two very seriously injured (VSI) and one seriously injured (SI) casualty from 1 Rifles in Afghanistan. We do not publish data on less severe injuries, so this information could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
All personnel deploying to theatre, including infantry, undertake either collective or individual reinforcement training, which includes counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) training. During pre-deployment training, they are given training in current tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to deal with IEDs. These TTPs are constantly being improved in theatre, and the training conducted prior to deployment reflects the latest developments. A number of individuals are then given more in depth training on the use of specialist equipment for detection of other explosive devices. Training for patrolling skills includes detailed improvised explosive device awareness and avoidance techniques in both the mounted and dismounted roles.
Since the start of operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and up to the 15 March 2009, the latest date for which statistics are available, 82 UK service personnel have suffered very serious injuries (VSI) and 103 have suffered serious injuries (SI). These figures include all injured personnel, regardless of the mechanism or circumstances of their injury.
I am withholding further information on the numbers of personnel injured by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as its disclosure would, or would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the armed forces.
Defence Analytical Services and Advice (DASA) compile statistics on the number of operational casualties in the UK armed forces, the latest reports are available at the following websites:
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/Operations Factsheets/OperationsInAfghanistanBritishCasualties.htm
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/Operations Factsheets/OperationsInIraqBritishCasualties.htm
DASA update the casualty tables fortnightly, a fortnight in arrears on the MOD website.
The main tasks undertaken in Afghanistan by private contractors listed as working for the Ministry of Defence are: troop welfare, leisure and retail services, logistics, provision of catering supplies, and works and maintenance services.
UK troops, as part of International Security Assistance Force, support Afghan security forces to target narcotic traffickers and facilities that are supporting the insurgency. UK forces have also provided support to both the Poppy Eradication Force and the Governor-led eradication plan within Helmand province. The number of UK troops engaged in such activities varies both on a day-to-day basis and also by season.