Since I came to this House 30 years ago, I have always felt that the House is at its best when it is united. In order that unity can be maintained, I have decided that I will relinquish the office of Speaker on Sunday 21 June. This will allow the House to proceed to elect a new Speaker on Monday 22 June. That is all I have to say on this matter.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. In the debate yesterday, the Minister of State, Department of Health, the hon. Member for Exeter (Mr. Bradshaw), told the House that my constituents could complain about the closure of emergency heart facilities in Ipswich through the consultation process and the intervention of the health strategy committee of the county council. He failed to tell the House that the strategic health authority had refused any consultation whatever, that the county council is debarred from intervening by the purdah period under electoral law and that the strategic health authority has chosen this moment to push through a very damaging decision without any kind of disclosure. Would you please ask—

Order. I think I have made every allowance in the circumstances. I tried to give as good a hearing as I could to the right hon. Member but it was becoming apparent that it was not strictly a point of order. However, I hope he has sufficient on the record for the point to have been made.

Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

Order. There is no point of order, so I cannot take a further point on it. I have ruled, and I ask the right hon. Gentleman to accept that ruling.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am sorry to raise this, but is there no way in which one can ask a Minister to return to the House to correct the record on a point of order?

I think that that was the original non-point of order part 2, and all this arose on a debate on Mid Staffordshire, as I recall. The fact of the matter is that I have no power to call a Minister. The right hon. Gentleman has got that on the record, and it will be noted.

I wonder—

Is it a point of order?

Yes, absolutely, Mr. Deputy Speaker. You will recall countless debates in which other hon. Members and I have protested about the Intelligence and Security Committee trying to pretend that it is a parliamentary committee. We recently debated its rather dotty report. This morning, the Prime Minister published its report on the London underground bombings, but you will notice that there is no statement. When my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Margaret Beckett) was in the revolving door of being the Chairman of that so-called Committee, she wrote to the Prime Minister to say that, given the seriousness of public interest, she hoped that debates on the report when it came out

“will be held in both Houses of Parliament shortly thereafter.”

She has moved back to the Ministry; the report has come out today, without a ministerial statement; and there is no indication whatsoever that a debate is likely. Will you use your good offices, Mr. Deputy Speaker, to rap the knuckles of the Government for not making a statement and a response to the report today and to give notice to them that they will not get away with it?

I recall listening to the generous contribution—in terms of length—that the hon. Gentleman made to that debate. I am sure that he will pursue this in his customary, dogged fashion, and he knows that there are other ways to do so, through questioning, debate and so on, other than on an attempt at a point of order.

On a point of order of which I have given notice, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I raised last week at business questions, as did other hon. Members, the problem with programme motions being imposed on the House and Opposition parties. I asked the Leader of the House whether she planned to negotiate with Front and Back Benchers about where the knives go. She said in response:

“We will have as much discussion as we can and will try, if possible, to reach agreement on the allocation of time in the full day’s debate on Report.”

She repeated that assertion in her response to the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir Nicholas Winterton)—a senior Member—saying, “we will have discussions”. I raised the issue on a point of order at that time with Mr. Speaker and asked him whether he has a role in ensuring that Back Benchers are protected from imposed programme motions, and he said:

“He will have heard the remarks made by the Leader of the House a few minutes ago.”—[Official Report, 14 May 2009; Vol. 492, c. 1026-32.]

A programme motion has been announced for the debate that follows. We can debate it, but it was not subject to consultation with Front or Back-Bench colleagues. Indeed, the Government Whip said that it is up to Opposition parties to go to the Government. That is the first that we have ever heard of that. Can you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, advise how we as a House can ensure that negotiations take place on programme motions and on where the knives go before they are imposed?

That is not a decision that can be made solely by the occupant of the Chair, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman will understand. I am sure that the Procedure Committee would be happy to examine this. The points that he wishes to make can be made in the debate, when he could seek to challenge the programme motion if he was successful in catching my eye.

Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. In an attempt to take that advice, my colleagues and I have tabled an amendment to the programme motion. Is it within your gift to select that amendment, so that we can have a debate that is more focused on the problem of the Government imposing their timetable on the House which is unable to scrutinise huge chunks of the Bill?

I am sure that all those points were at the forefront of Mr. Speaker’s mind when, unhappily, his ruling was not to accept the hon. Gentleman’s amendment.

I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to place the Commission for the Compact on a statutory basis; to confer powers on the Commission; and for connected purposes.

Let me first remind the House what the compact is. It is the national agreement between Government and the voluntary and community sector, aimed at improving their relationship for mutual advantage and community gain. It contains undertakings by both the Government and the sector about how they will conduct relations with each other. The agreement is voluntary and freely entered into, so although both sides are committed to the compact, it is not legally binding, and its undertakings cannot be enforced. The Bill does not change that arrangement.

In 1998, along with the then Home Office Minister, Paul Boateng, and Sir Kenneth Stowe, the compact’s author, I had the privilege of formally launching the compact. The compact was a world first, and it has inspired other countries to develop their own. Across Europe, in particular, many have looked to the United Kingdom for guidance, and several countries have established similar agreements. The compact should be hailed as a great achievement. It has clearly set out the Government’s commitment to an independent, diverse and thriving voluntary and community sector. It enshrines the sector’s right to that independence, including its right, within the law, to campaign, comment on and challenge Government policy. The agreement has also been a driver for change at national and local level, defining what partners can expect from each other, and improving how they work together. That has resulted in better programmes, policies and services for citizens and communities, by setting clear standards for consultation, improving funding processes and providing resources for building the capacity of the third sector.

A milestone in the 10-year history of the compact was the development of local compacts, through which local authorities have worked alongside the sector to develop a compact way of working, making an invaluable difference to the communities that they serve. Just over the river in Lambeth, for example, a local compact turned the campaign to keep Brockwell lido open into a partnership to manage it jointly, allowing a much-loved landmark to survive, and to continue to be a special place for generations to come.

At the national level, the picture has been less clear-cut. There is a perception in the sector that commitment to, and compliance with, the compact in some—but by no means all—areas of government is somewhat patchy. A Home Office consultation in 2005 highlighted a lack of awareness of the compact, and identified a number of barriers to its adoption and implementation, so in April 2007 it was decided to establish the Commission for the Compact to act as a champion of the code and drive a change in behaviour. The compact advocacy programme of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations and Compact Voice have also played a fundamental role in promoting the compact and its principles, the former by advocating on behalf of individual organisations to ensure that the Government follow the agreed principles, and the latter by raising awareness within the voluntary and community sector, building up a strong network and representing the sector’s voice on compact issues to Government.

In July 2007, the third sector review acknowledged that there was a desire within the sector for better partnership working with all levels of Government. It was concluded that that stronger approach was required to ensure that public bodies consistently adhered to the compact principles. A number of areas have been identified, and are well known, where the 10-year-old compact is being overtaken by developments in policy and practice. Although there has been little or no questioning of the desirability of maintaining a partnership working agreement between Government and the third sector, there is a perception that the compact is out of date, especially in respect of public service delivery.

Looking at the national level, many in the third sector are frustrated that the undoubted political commitment to the compact may not have been translated consistently into Government practice. As a result of that analysis, Sir Bert Massie, as Commissioner for the Compact, was asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Corby (Phil Hope), then Minister for the Third Sector, to launch a debate on the future of the compact and the commission. The consultation concluded that the compact agreement should retain its voluntary nature and its values, rather than being replaced with a statutory version, so the Bill does not alter the status or the content of the compact.

However, a majority also recognised that significantly more needs to be done to ensure proper implementation of the compact. There was strong consensus that the most effective way to do that would be to establish the Commission for the Compact as a permanent, independent statutory body, and to give it a mandate and a limited range of legal powers to secure better implementation. The Commission for the Compact is a non-departmental public body with the object of promoting and strengthening partnership working between public bodies and voluntary and community organisations. Its sole voting member is the Minister for the Cabinet Office. In addition, it has a small board consisting of directors with wide knowledge and experience. The members of the board are not intended specifically to represent central or local government, but they are meant to work independently and impartially in the interests of strengthening partnership working.

To fulfil the role, the commission needs to act independently and be seen to do so, but the current legal structure does not ensure that. The Minister created the commission, holding 100 per cent. of the membership voting rights himself, as well as full powers over its constitution and existence. In practice, successive Ministers have allowed the commission full operational independence, but there is no guarantee that future Ministers would do the same, in which case both the commission’s status and its credibility could be undermined. The commission is not a regulatory body and has no powers beyond those of any private citizen.

With this Bill I propose to place the Commission for the Compact on a statutory basis and confer a very limited range of legal powers to enable it to promote better implementation of the compact. Having the commission established by Parliament, with a constitution and powers determined by Parliament and a duty to report to Parliament, would make a great difference, lifting the commission out of direct Government control and making it inherently and visibly independent.

During the discussions held in the other place on the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Bill, Lord Best tabled an amendment with similar intent to my Bill. However, it was ultimately deemed not to be within the scope of that Bill, despite having cross-party support. In particular, the Communities and Local Government Minister, Baroness Andrews, was very sympathetic to its objectives.

Now is the right moment to introduce the necessary changes. We are at a watershed with the compact. Ten years on, we must ensure that it remains a relevant and helpful tool in improving the relationship between Government and the third sector. The provisions of the Bill propose to convert the commission into a corporation with statutory powers, thus making it accountable to Parliament. The commission would consist of the Commissioner for the Compact and a small number of additional board members appointed by the Minister for the Cabinet Office.

The new commission would have a number of functions, mainly to promote and strengthen understanding and use of the compact across all tiers of government and within the voluntary and community sector. Its limited number of new powers and duties will constrain it to act in particular ways. Those would include powers of investigation where there have been inconsistencies with compact principles, access to relevant information, and the ability to impose a duty on others to co-operate with its investigations.

Both the statutory sector and voluntary and community organisations would be included within the commission’s remit. Given that the compact is about better partnerships, it is fair and reasonable for the commission’s powers to apply to both sides. There are no sanctions included in the Bill, as I believe that those would be outside the spirit of the compact, other than the power of naming and shaming those who are found not to be acting in that spirit.

This is a unique opportunity to make the compact more real and more relevant. It comes at a time when the compact is being scrutinised by the public and the third sectors with a view to agreeing changes. By strengthening the commission, we will finally have the mechanism to remove blocks to compact compliance and spread best practice on working together across government and the third sector. The end result would be not only a compact agreement that is more effective at all levels, but refreshed relationships between all the parties involved.

In practice, the Bill applies only to England. We would be the first country in Europe to take such a landmark step, setting the standard for the way in which relationships between Government and the voluntary and community sector should be conducted. Once again, our Government would be at the forefront in their relations with this ever more important and influential sector. I seek leave to bring in the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Ordered,

That Tom Levitt, Liz Blackman, Dr. Roberta Blackman-Woods, Mr. David Blunkett, Mr. Tim Boswell, Richard Burden, Mr. David Drew, Mr. Robert Flello, Fiona Mactaggart, Alun Michael, Dan Rogerson and Andrew Selous present the Bill.

Tom Levitt accordingly presented the Bill.

Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time on Friday 16 October and to be printed (Bill 99).

I beg to move,

That the Order of 19 January (Policing and Crime Bill (Programme)) be varied as follows:

1. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Order shall be omitted.

2. Proceedings on consideration shall be taken in the order shown in the first column of the following Table.

3. The proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the times specified in the second column of the Table.

4. Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on consideration are commenced.

The motion has apportioned time to allow for debate about the main issues that were brought forward by Members and stakeholders both in and outside Parliament. These brief remarks are intended to allow the maximum amount of time for debate.

The programming of the entire Bill has been quite extraordinary. The worst aspect is the allocation of just one day on Report to debate an extremely far-reaching Bill, which includes clauses that cover police reform, prostitution, lap dancing, gang injunctions, alcohol-related disorder, extradition, proceeds of crime, aviation security and the DNA database. I could add more.

One day is simply not adequate to apply the proper legislative scrutiny that the Bill requires. My hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) and others from all parts of the House have consistently made clear at the last two business questions their dissatisfaction with the decision. Noting those concerns, the Leader of the House made assurances that all concerned parties would be consulted on the programme motion for Report. However, no such consultation took place with us, despite the activity that we exhibited in Committee.

We seem to be in a strange situation whereby the Leader of the House, none other, makes an assertion—a pledge—from the Dispatch Box at business questions but does not deliver on it. What explanation—perhaps there is one—can possibly be consistent with that assertion and pledge having been given in good faith?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. I am certainly unable to speculate on what has happened, but it is absolutely clear that we may now have as little as 30 minutes to debate the hugely important issue of the future of the DNA database. That is simply unacceptable, and it comes after the extremely late tabling in Committee of new clauses on DNA and gangs, which effectively precluded much debate and, indeed, the tabling of any Opposition amendments. The DNA amendments were tabled on the Friday of the February recess, allowing very little time to draft amendments before the deadline of Tuesday midday for the final Committee sitting.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Paul Holmes) pointed out in Committee, the purposes of such Committees are to scrutinise the Bill, to table probing amendments, to ask questions and to allow the Government time to clarify their positions and aims. Little or no opportunity for any such scrutiny was provided on the DNA and gang amendments. With only one day on Report and wholly inadequate programming, there will again be little or no time for the House, as the elected representatives of the people, properly to debate these crucial issues. It is, frankly, shameful.

That raises the wider issue, so pertinent in the current climate, of whether the Government should bear sole responsibility for setting the business of the House through such programme motions. The measure was introduced during the first world war—at a time of national emergency—and has long outlived its usefulness. Few other legislatures allow the Executive to decide business in that way. No other western democracy forbids private Members’ motions, and when it comes to legislative scrutiny the House’s procedures are seriously lacking, as we have seen with the Bill. Scrutiny is easily fashioned to suit the Government’s political objectives, and inbuilt majorities for the Executive ensure support for even the most peremptory truncation of debate.

Public Bill Committees, such as that which considered this Bill, take up an enormous amount of MPs’ time yet, without Government support, seldom make any substantial difference to legislation—even when they have heard expert evidence. This Bill is an excellent example of that, as not a single Opposition amendment was agreed in Committee. Over the past 10 years, legislation has increasingly been fast-tracked through the Commons, with timetable motions ensuring that large sections of important Bills are never scrutinised by MPs. This is just another outrageous example. There have been similar problems with the Coroners and Justice Bill; my noble Friend Lord Thomas of Gresford made just that point on Second Reading in another place yesterday.

The volume of legislation shovelled through in that way has been absolutely immense; we are now looking at 3,600 new criminal offences—and this Bill is the 66th criminal justice Bill since 1997. It is becoming abundantly clear that quantity does not make up for a lack of quality, yet instead of programming adequate time to debate such Bills on Report or allowing enough time for debate of new amendments in Committee, the Government are set on pushing quantity through with no regard whatever for quality. We therefore rely on the unelected House of Lords to do our job for us—for which, frankly, we should be embarrassed and ashamed.

The Bill that we are so cursorily considering today is one of the worst examples of the bad practices that have grown up in the Chamber. As I said, we may have just 30 minutes to debate the DNA provisions and perhaps less time to debate the gang provisions once votes are taken into account. We will then be left with approximately two hours for the prostitution and lap-dancing provisions, with little, if any, hope of reaching the several other substantive parts of the Bill, such as those on police reform, alcohol, extradition and proceeds of crime—let alone the many excellent and interesting new clauses that have been tabled on issues such as demonstrations around Parliament, anti-terrorism laws and drug paraphernalia.

For that reason, we will vote against the programme motion, having tabled amendments to it. The amendments would allow for an hour and 30 minutes on DNA, the absolute minimum required; an hour and half on gangs; and an additional hour at the end of the debate to fit in as much of the remainder of the Bill as possible. We would scrap the hour set aside for Third Reading, as such a debate is not of any practical use for a Bill that has received such shockingly inadequate scrutiny and debate. We will vote against the motion, and strongly urge the Government to think more carefully about the purpose of the House when programming in future.

This is an important Bill, and it is worth putting on the record the fact that in Committee my hon. Friends and I had a fruitful set of debates with Ministers. There was important agreement on the means of increasing and improving police efficiency through, among other things, collaboration, and important agreement on significant reforms to the law relating to sexual offences, alcohol abuse, extradition and so on. However, since Second Reading a large number of Government amendments have been tabled relatively late, so in Committee there was not sufficient time to get into the meat of some of them. We Conservatives have also tabled amendments for debate on Report. As I look at the number of amendments in front of us, I wonder whether one day will necessarily be enough.

Bearing in mind that this debate is about the programme motion, we would all like to be as brief as possible, while not prejudging the outcome of the vote, so that we do not have even less time to discuss these important issues.

I share the concerns of the hon. Members for Eastleigh (Chris Huhne) and for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Ruffley) about the programme motion. There should be no party issue about a debate such as this on a Bill of this kind; it should be about making sure that the legislation works and that there is proper scrutiny. We are dealing with very important issues as far as policing and crime are concerned.

I was not surprised when the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds said that the Committee stage had been fruitful, because whenever I have had discussions with the Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing on Home Office issues, I have always been pleased with how he has taken on board the concerns of parliamentarians and the wish to reach a consensus. However, my concern is that we are dealing with more than 100 new clauses and amendments on some very important issues.

If the Home Secretary had come to the House and made a statement about her policy on databases—[Interruption.] I am happy to be corrected by the Minister, but I do not think that she did; she went on Radio 4, on the “Today” programme, to do it. [Interruption.] The Minister says that it was him; perhaps it just sounded like the Home Secretary. I think that she did the same in dealing with gang-related violence—the media came first and Parliament second. We have had no notice of the changes that have been proposed on sex-related offences and establishments, or on police reform and accountability, which are all crucial areas.

I would have thought that the Government would want Parliament to help them to secure a robust piece of legislation that will last in time and make an important impression on the level of crime in this country. Even at this late stage—I know that the Minister will respond in the consensual way in which he always deals with these issues—I urge the Government to provide more time. If we do not finish the business today, I am sure that it will be possible to find additional time. The views expressed by the hon. Members for Eastleigh and for Bury St. Edmunds are shared by Members in all parts of the House. Let us make sure that we have a Bill that will last; let us scrutinise it properly.

The programme motion that we are faced with is outrageous—there is no other word to describe it. It is not as though it is the first time that such a motion has been tabled and it is a one-off—it happens time and again. I put it to the Government that they do not understand how important Report stage is for the scrutiny of legislation. It is the only opportunity for Back Benchers who did not serve on the Public Bill Committee to debate with Ministers about the provisions in the Bill. What is the point of their speaking on Second Reading—particularly Government Members who do not agree with the Government and therefore talk themselves off the Committee—if they do not then have the chance to express their concerns on Report? It is the only real chance for Back Benchers’ amendments to be promoted, but the opportunity to debate several cross-party Back-Bench new clauses and amendments will be stifled by today’s motion. It is the only opportunity for Select Committee members—particularly their Chairmen, who are generally not on Public Bill Committees—to participate in detailed debate. We want to hear the views of the right hon. Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz), who has so much experience to offer this debate, and those of the Home Affairs Committee, which he chairs.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights looks at every Bill with human rights implications and issues a report, and it is its job to ensure that that report is made available on Report in the first House. What is the point of its doing that when huge numbers of its recommendations—this is a cross-party, cross-House Bill—can never be debated on the Floor of this House because the Government’s programme motion precludes the opportunity for even those groups of amendments to be reached?

My hon. Friend makes a powerful case about the lost opportunity for Back Benchers, members of Select Committees and so forth to contribute. However, that even applies to those of us who served on the Public Bill Committee and had fruitful discussions with the Minister. During the last week of Committee, two major amendments were tabled on gangs and on DNA, but we had totally inadequate time to discuss them. We will have a similarly ludicrous amount of time for discussion in the next hour or two. That represents a failure for everybody—those who were on the Committee and the vast majority who did not have the chance to take part in its deliberations.

I entirely agree.

It is not in the Government’s interests to present a Bill to the House of Lords—where, thank goodness, they do not have a majority—that has had inadequate scrutiny here because their lordships then recognise that we have failed and give the Government a harder time. We then end up with delayed legislation, whereas if we had done the job properly here, the Government could rightly say, “This is the will of the elected House”, and urge their lordships to consider that opinion more appropriately.

I agree with the view expressed by the right hon. Member for Leicester, East about the Minister; we had very productive debates in Committee. However, part of the nature of Committee is that one wants to save the key Divisions for Report so that one is not unnecessarily divisive in Committee. That approach allows all Members, perhaps including Government Members with sincere objections who wish to raise them, and even vote on them, to have their say on Report. The Government’s curtailing of debate, as in this programme motion, denies the House the chance to debate such important issues and encourages more Divisions in Public Bill Committees, which is not in the interests of democracy or scrutiny.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the provision of more time for consideration would also be better for the Government? Why do they not understand that it would produce a better Bill, and they would have less egg on their face much less often, if we were able to debate these matters? They would not subsequently find out about problems out in the world, where they look very bad indeed.

Absolutely, and the corollary to that is that if legislation were passed that turned out not to be great, the Government could share the blame with the House as a whole. I would certainly be willing to take my share of the blame if we had debated a matter and failed to convince the House that the legislation was bad.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Paul Holmes) recognised, the timetable in Committee sometimes means that even when Government new clauses are tabled at that stage, there is simply not enough to time to debate them because of the end point in the programme motion. The Committee on this Bill was productive and did not drag on, and there was little excess verbiage on all sides, yet, as my hon. Friend said, still the Government brought in at the last minute two chunks of legislation in new clauses, too late for amendments to them to be tabled. This is the only chance that we have to debate those clauses, and it will be curtailed.

It is treating the House with contempt—there is no other word for it—for us not to have the opportunity to debate huge chunks of the Bill. That is a particular problem with regard to the DNA proposals, which state that the House will not have the chance to debate primary legislation when the Government sort out what they want to do. We have a Government proposal that would curtail Parliament’s ability to amend legislation, and it is going to be rushed through in whatever time we have at the end of this programme motion debate.

The points that I have made are not just my opinion. They have been debated among a group of MPs, of which I am one of the more junior members, called Parliament First. That is an organisation that comes together to ask, as my hon. Friend the Member for Eastleigh (Chris Huhne) did, “Is it not time for Parliament to reassert itself and have control of the timetable?”

What else are we to debate in this Session? Is it crammed full of Bills that we need to scrutinise and have Second Reading debates on? The record will show that there are fewer Bills this Session than in practically any other. There are vanishingly few Second Readings still required, and we have had more days of general debates and Adjournment debates than ever before. I am not against those, but they do not trump scrutiny of legislation, which is our primary duty. More of those days have fizzled out, with unused time, than in any other Session that I can remember.

This is not the first time that such timetabling has happened in this Session. The Coroners and Justice Bill was given two days, but the first day had so much crammed into it that the House did not get the chance to debate murder. I understand that we are debating the present programme motion, but this is not the first time that we have been presented with a programme motion that packs so much into one day that we cannot reach important debates. There have been other examples of that, which I shall not go into now.

It cannot be said that the House did not urge the Government to reconsider a programme motion such as this. Going backwards in time, I raised the general problem at business questions on 26 March, in another Bill debate on 23 March, in business questions on 19 March and 5 March, in a written question to the Leader of the House on 5 March, in questions to the Leader of the House on 22 January, in business questions on 30 October, on 22 October and in business questions on 16 October. I am getting sick of me, so I am sure the Leader of the House is getting sick of me. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] I asked for that. But it is an important point—what more can we do than raise the matter at business questions and in points of order time and time again?

In business questions two weeks ago, at least six Members mentioned the programming of this Bill. In response to my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), the Leader of the House said that she would undertake to

“look at how much time is needed for the Bill”

In response to the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Mark Fisher), she said, “Don’t worry, there is plenty of scrutiny of these Bills.” I am paraphrasing there, but that response is obviously not going to apply to this Report stage.

The right hon. Member for Leicester, East made the powerful point that an extra day was needed. It would not add greatly to the Government’s burden, but it would provide the House with an opportunity to explain why the Government’s position on DNA, to which he referred, is wrong. I raised the same point again, asking how the Government intended to deliver the pledge that the Prime Minister gave when he was selected as Prime Minister: that Parliament would have greater scrutiny of the Executive. That pledge has not been delivered, and we are considering another example of that failure.

In response to me and the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir Nicholas Winterton), the Leader of the House said that

“there are discussions between the parties about the time allocated to Bills.”—[Official Report, 7 May 2009; Vol. 492, c. 351, 357.]

Last week, she said:

“We will have as much discussion as we can and will try, if possible, to reach agreement on the allocation of time in the full day’s debate on Report.”

That was after we had to accept that we would be given only one day. Again, in response to the hon. Member for Macclesfield, the Leader of the House said:

“I have said that we will have discussions to make sure that we can try to reach agreement on programming so that hon. Members are able to debate all the important parts of the Bill.”—[Official Report, 14 May 2009; Vol. 492, c. 1026 and 1029.]

What discussions and negotiations took place? I have investigated and, despite the Leader of the House’s undertaking, to which the Speaker referred when I made a point of order last week, Government Whips held no discussions with Liberal Democrat Members. Usual channels are usual channels only if they exist. As I understand it, no discussions took place with any Back Benchers who have tabled new clauses. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) has tabled several new clauses, yet there were no discussions.

I ask the Government, through you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, what is to stop the Government Whip on the Bill asking Liberal Democrat Members and Back Benchers generally through the usual channels where the knives should go in such a motion, thereby delivering the Leader of the House’s commitment? Has the Government Whip been struck mute or is there another reason for his or the Government’s decision not to implement the Leader of House’s words, thus rendering them meaningless?

I am following the hon. Gentleman’s speech with great interest. Is he telling the House that no discussions whatsoever have taken place about the matter, despite the fact that he and I and other hon. Members have raised it continually at business questions? Has not a single discussion about the time available for this important Bill taken place?

I understand that the only discussion took place between the Government Whip and the Conservative Front-Bench spokesman. The Government Whip—the hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Steve McCabe)—confirmed that. I alerted him to the fact that I would raise the matter and he admitted that he had not approached the Liberal Democrat party or any Back Bencher. I ask the Government whether the Leader of the House’s commitment was made in good faith. If so, who is responsible for its not being delivered? Can the Government answer that question or will they undertake to come back and let us know the reason? What is the point of debating such matters at business questions, and of the Leader of the House making a commitment, if her side cannot deliver it? We are currently holding debates about whether the Executive are treating the House fairly; I believe that they are not.

Let us consider what will not be covered because of the insertion of knives: six Government amendments on police reform and accountability; eight Government amendments on extradition; 51 Government amendments on the proceeds of crime, and seven Government amendments in the last group. [Interruption.] It is not acceptable for hon. Members to say that if I speak on the important matter of the Government’s failure to allow adequate time for debate, I am taking time from the deliberations. Whether we have 45 or 35 minutes on DNA, it is not enough.

When will the Government give the House the time it needs to debate even the Government amendments—introduced at the last minute—let alone the rest of the Bill? When will the House assert itself and vote against such programme motions? I invite the Conservative party and Government Back Benchers to assert the House’s supremacy. Until that happens, we will have poor scrutiny.

A provision on extradition goes to the heart of human rights issues, but we will clearly not reach it, regardless of how long we spend debating the programme motion. That provision is relegated to a debate of about two and a half hours at the most and is down for consideration after prostitution, lap dancing and police reform. It simply will not be reached.

There are 51 Government amendments on the proceeds of crime. Why do the Government bring Bills to the House, just one part of which requires 51 Government amendments, and then deny the House the time to scrutinise those amendments? That is not acceptable either.

The Prime Minister’s record on delivering his pledge to provide for proper parliamentary scrutiny of Government business will be shown to be hollow every time the Government table a programme motion such as this one, with knives in place to deliver, on just one day and after the required votes, half an hour or 45 minutes of debate on DNA and half an hour of debate or less on gang-related violence.

That is not good enough and Parliament should not stand for it. That is why I urge all hon. Members, including the official Opposition, if they are indeed doing their job of scrutiny, to vote against Government programme motions such as this one. I appeal to the House, when it is in a reforming mode, to find ways of ensuring that it is the House that determines its own business, not the Government. The Government are given their allocation of time, but they are not allowed to force through legislation without scrutiny in the disgraceful way that they are today.

I simply want to place on record my extreme concern that, yet again, our debate on a piece of criminal justice legislation is being curtailed and guillotined in the way that it is today. I appreciate the need for the efficient management of the business of the House and for programming and guillotining at certain stages, but the Bill is a piece of legislation that, if enacted, will deprive a number of our citizens of their liberty. On that basis, debate should not be curtailed in this way.

May I suggest a way forward? We have a convention in the House that although Finance Bills are programmed to a certain extent, when issues are identified for debate, they are not subject to a guillotine. Indeed, we have gone late into the night on particularly important subjects. Debate on criminal justice Bills that, when enacted, will in effect deprive a number of our citizens of their liberty should be protected in that way. That would protect the rights of Back Benchers such as me, who, for some strange reason, do not serve on Public Bill Committees, and would give us the opportunity to engage in the debate and involve ourselves fully in the legislative process.

In the current discussions on somehow rehabilitating the name of this House in the eyes of the general public, we need to demonstrate that we are doing our proper job, which is scrutinising legislation, and particularly significant legislation that could result in a number of people losing their liberty. On that basis, the House needs to consider whether criminal justice legislation should be at least partially exempted from the kind of severe guillotining that is taking place today.

If there is something rotten with the body politic in this country as far as expenses are concerned—and there is, and I do not exclude myself from that—it is right that there should be media and public attention on the work that we do. Equally, attention should be paid to the rotten way in which we conduct our business. Today is a supreme example of that.

I agree with every word that the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) said. It is not as though there is pressure on Government time. For weeks now, we have had days of general debates, and when we get back after the Whitsun break, there will be at least two days of general debates. There is time. The Government could, if they so chose, give time to important legislation such as the Bill that we are considering today. For those reasons, I urge the Government to reconsider and will be voting against the programme motion, as I have on several occasions in the past.

I have heard what hon. Members have said, and all that I would say is that this is a matter for the usual channels. No doubt there will be discussions on the points that have been made. I am grateful for the comments about the constructive way in which the debate in Committee was conducted. Indeed, we had an additional sitting of the Bill Committee. From memory, I think that we had 16 sittings, including four public sittings, in which many of the issues were debated. We have tabled a number of amendments as a direct result of what was said in Committee, and we have tried to address some of the concerns that were raised. We have also tried to allocate time today in a way that will allow debate on some of the main topics, including DNA, gangs and sex-related offences.

Question put.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Destruction of samples etc: service offences—

‘(1) Section 113 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60) (application to armed forces) is amended as follows—

(2) After subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) After a person is released without charge or acquitted of the offence for which a sample has been taken that sample shall be destroyed within one month of the fingerprints or sample being taken or the person being acquitted, unless the offence was of a violent or sexual nature.

(2) If the offence was of a violent or sexual nature that sample must be held for a period of three years, after which it must be destroyed.”’.

New clause 3—Destruction of samples etc (Northern Ireland)—

‘(1) That Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/3141 (N.I 12)) is amended as follows—

(2) After Article 64A insert—

“Destruction of samples etc

“(1) After a person is not charged or acquitted of the offence for which a sample has been taken that sample shall be destroyed within one month of the fingerprints or samples being taken or the person being acquitted, unless the offence was of a violent or sexual nature.

(2) If the offence was of a violent or sexual nature that sample should be held for a period of three years, and then be destroyed.

(3) This section applies to the following material—

(a) photographs falling within a description specified in the regulations,

(b) fingerprints taken from a person in connection with the investigation of an offence,

(c) impressions of footwear so taken from a person,

(d) DNA and other samples so taken from a person,

(e) information derived from DNA samples so taken from a person.

(4) For the purposes of this section—

(a) “photograph” includes a moving image, and

(b) the reference to a DNA sample is a reference to any material that has come from a human body and consists of or includes human cells.”’.

New clause 31—Retention of voluntary samples etc.—

‘(1) That the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60) is amended as follows.

(2) After section 64(1A)(b) insert—

“(c) any other provision in this Part does not prohibit or restrict their retention or require their destruction.”.

(3) For section 64(3AC) substitute—

“3AC Retention of voluntary samples etc.

Where a person from whom a fingerprint, impression of footwear or sample has been taken consents in writing to its retention—

(a) that sample need not be destroyed under subsection (3) above;

(b) subsection (3AB) above shall not restrict the use that may be made of the sample or of any information derived from it; and

(c) that consent shall be treated as comprising a consent for the purposes of section 63A(1C) above;

provided that—

(1) No sample or information derived from any sample may be retained on any child under the age of 10 years; and

(2) Consent given for the purposes of this subsection shall be capable of being withdrawn by such person upon making written application to the responsible chief officer of police or person authorised by the Secretary of State for such purpose whereupon such sample and any information derived therefrom shall be destroyed as soon as possible following receipt of such written application.”’.

New clause 32—Retention of samples following arrest—

‘(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c.60) is amended as follows.

(2) After section 64A insert—

“64B Retention of samples

(1) Subject to subsection (2), where a sample has been taken from a person under this Part, unless such a person has been given consent in accordance with section 64(3AC), all such samples and all information derived from such samples shall be destroyed as soon as possible following a decision not to institute criminal proceedings against the person or on the conclusion of such proceedings otherwise than with a conviction.

(2) Subsection (1) above shall not apply—

(a) where the record, sample or information in question is of the same kind as a record, a sample or, as the case may be, information lawfully held in relation to the person; or

(b) where the person is cautioned for a recordable offence or given a warning or reprimand in accordance with the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 for a recordable offence in connection with the decision not to institute criminal proceedings or following the withdrawal or cessation of criminal proceedings; or

(c) where sections 64C or 64D apply.

(3) For the purposes of this section, criminal proceedings shall not be deemed to have concluded until the earlier of the (1) the lapse of any applicable appeal period and (2) a decision is made not to appeal such proceedings.

64C Retention of samples etc (violent and sexual offences)

(1) This section applies where any sample has been taken from a person under this Part where criminal proceedings were instituted against such person in respect of a sexual offence or violent offence and such proceedings concluded otherwise than with a conviction or with the person being cautioned for a recordable offence or given a warning or reprimand in accordance with the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 for a recordable offence.

(2) Subject to subsections (6) and (7) below, the sample and any information derived therefrom shall be destroyed no later than:

(a) 3 years following the conclusion of the proceedings (“the initial retention date”); or

(b) such later date as may be ordered under subsection (3).

(3) On application made by a chief officer of police within the period of 3 months before the initial retention date, the Crown Court, if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for doing so, may make an order amending, or further amending, the date of destruction of the relevant sample and any information derived therefrom.

(4) An order under subsection (3) shall not specify a date more than 2 years later than the initial retention date.

(5) Any decisions of the Crown Court may be appealed to the Court of Appeal within 21 days of such decision.

(6) Subsection (2) does not apply where—

(a) an application under subsection (3) above has been made but has not been determined.

(b) the period within which an appeal may be brought under subsection (5) above against a decision to refuse an application has not elapsed; or

(c) such an appeal has been brought but has not been withdrawn or finally determined.

(7) Where—

(a) the period within which an appeal referred to in subsection (5) has elapsed without such an appeal being brought; or

(b) such an appeal is brought and is withdrawn or finally determined without any extension of the time period referred to in subsection (2),

the sample and any information derived therefrom shall be destroyed as soon as possible thereafter.

(8) For the purposes of this Part a “sexual offence” or “violent offence” shall mean such offences of a violent or sexual nature as shall be set out in any order made by the Secretary of State with reference to this section.

64D Retention of Samples - Residual Power

(1) On application by a chief officer of police, the Crown Court may make an order requiring the retention of a sample taken from a person and any information derived therefrom in circumstances where such a sample and any information derived therefrom would otherwise be required to be destroyed if it has reasonable grounds to believe that:

(a) there is a serious risk of harm to the public or a section of the public; and

(b) such retention would prevent, inhibit, restrict or disrupt involvement by the person in the commission of a sexual offence or violent offence.

(2) An order under this section is not to be in force for more than 5 years beginning with the date of the commencement of the order.

(3) Any decision of the Crown Court may be appealed to the Court of Appeal within 21 days of such decision.

(4) Where an application has been made for an order under this section, the relevant sample and any information derived therefrom shall not be destroyed until such application and any appeal thereof has been determined.

(3) At end of section 113(1) insert—

“provided always that the protections in Part 5 relating to the retention of samples and any information derived therefrom shall also be applied to persons investigated or under arrest under such Acts.”.’.

Amendment 28, page 116, line 16, leave out Clause 95.

Government amendment 112.

Amendment 29, page 117, line 32, leave out Clause 96.

Amendment 30, page 118, line 3, leave out Clause 97.

Government amendment 113.

These new clauses and amendments address the issue of the retention of fingerprints and other DNA samples stored on the police national database, and seek to fulfil two purposes. Amendments 28 to 30 would seek to remove clauses 95 to 97. New clauses 1 to 3 then replace the current rules on the retention of DNA samples with our preferred alternative. We believe that this is both legal in the eyes of the European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998, and puts liberty, respect for a private life, and the presumption of innocence at the heart of the rules.

The UK has the largest DNA database in the world; it is far larger than its American equivalent. It contains records from more than 4 million British citizens; 1 million of those people have no record on the police national computer, and 1 million were added as children. Almost one in two of all black men are on the database. This has been not so much a policy—that would have entailed some systematic attempt to collect DNA—but a random accretion of profiles from anybody who happens to run into the police.

On 4 December last year, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the retention of the DNA samples of two men—S and Marper—was illegal, and that it violated their right to a private life. The ruling stated that the judges were

“struck by the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the power of retention in England and Wales”.

They ruled that

“the retention in question constituted a disproportionate interference with the applicants’ right to respect for private life and could not be regarded as necessary in a democratic society”.

That is a damning indictment of the Government’s policy on DNA retention, and serves to highlight the Government’s dangerous and illegal obsession with massive, Big Brother-style databases, whether for DNA, e-mails and phone calls, or biometric data collected for ID cards. A report by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust concluded that out of 46 databases examined, one quarter were almost certainly illegal, as the existing DNA database has been found to be, and fewer than 15 per cent. of those assessed were effective, proportionate or necessary.

The effectiveness of this random accretion in the DNA database is itself highly questionable. Figures have shown that despite the huge increase in the number of profiles on the database—from 2.1 million in 2002 to 5.6 million at the last count—the number of detected crimes in which a DNA match was available has fallen from 21,098 to 17,614 last year. Ministers have failed to produce any respectable peer-reviewed research that supports their case for this random increase in the collection of DNA samples and profiles—indeed, size is, in itself, problematic, as it makes the data more unwieldy in finding matches. Ministers like to say that DNA is essential in detecting crime, and of course it is, but the most significant application of DNA testing is when DNA is found at the scene of a crime and can then be matched with a suspect. That process will continue, and it should do, but what should not continue is the topsy growth for no reason in the number of samples and profiles added to the database.

Given the weight of evidence in favour of reform of the DNA database, the Government have signally failed to justify their current proposals. I am forced to conclude that Ministers are putting forward what they believe to be the absolute minimum that they can get away with before the European Court, while hoping that campaigners will not mount any further legal challenges. I think that Ministers will be proved wrong; to hold records for six years on people charged with or convicted of no crime, and to hold them for 12 years on those arrested for serious offences, makes a mockery of the presumption of innocence that has been fundamental to our law for centuries. There is no evidence that such a lengthy retention period is proportionate, necessary or effective.

Despite the extremely sensitive nature of these issues, the Government are essentially asking us to defer all serious decisions to statutory instruments that will be introduced at a later stage—there would then be no requirement even for a debate on the Floor of the House. The House backs far too many, “I’m a Minister, trust me” clauses in any case, but it should certainly not accept their use in this important matter—to do so would frankly be an outrage. This is an issue of national significance and national debate that potentially affects the human rights of millions of people, and it should be addressed only through primary legislation. Ministers will say that time was pressing, consultation periods are long and that what they propose is the only practical way of dealing with the issue, but that is nonsense. We have a precedent for a tailor-made, one-purpose Bill in respect of the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008, which was also drafted in response to a court judgment and commanded support from all parts of the House.

The Government should not be allowed to get away with passing legislation that has not been subject to proper scrutiny in this House—we heard in the programme motion debate how little scrutiny the Bill received in Committee. Their manoeuvring with consultations and the use of secondary legislation is simply unacceptable, given the seriousness of the issue. We, on the Liberal Democrat Benches, along with Members from all parts of the House, have signed amendments to remove the DNA provisions from the Bill and we will certainly push them to a vote.

Let me turn to our proposed alternative. We propose a similar system to that which has worked so well in Scotland. When we were in coalition in the Executive in Scotland, my Liberal Democrat colleagues in the Scottish Parliament led the charge to introduce less Orwellian rules for Scotland than those currently in place in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The Scottish provision allows that any samples and profiles taken, voluntarily or otherwise, from somebody who is subsequently released without charge or acquitted of an offence should be destroyed within one month. However, if an offence was of a violent or sexual nature, a sample can be held for up to three years—we propose that the same period apply.

There is a legitimate debate to be had over the length of time that retention is acceptable in the cases of those arrested for serious violent or sexual offences. The Government propose to set this limit at 12 years, whereas the Scottish system sets it at three years, as in our new clauses, but allows for a possible two-year extension. The Conservatives’ proposals are similar, but we part company with the official Opposition where they allow for a blanket application to retain samples and profiles for up to five years after an arrest for any offence because we believe that to be disproportionate and to depart from the spirit of the Scottish legislation.

To my mind, the Government’s proposals—and, I am afraid to say, those of the Conservatives—do not get the balance right between liberty and the prevention and detection of crime. If there was evidence that the retention of samples for five years or 12 years was significantly more effective in preventing or detecting future crimes, there would be a case to be weighed in the balance, but we have not heard that case from the Government. It is my belief that we should err on the side of the tried and tested principles of British justice, respected as they are and will continue to be north of the border. The presumption of innocence is a cornerstone of our judicial system and must be protected. Our provisions would adequately roll back these intrusive and illiberal powers, while recognising that DNA is an important crime fighting tool and that the taking of samples during investigations must continue. Our proposals get the balance right, and I commend them to the House.

I have a great deal of sympathy with the hon. Member for Eastleigh (Chris Huhne), who based his arguments on the system in Scotland, which offers us an example of what can be done. I feel—this prompted my intervention during the discussion on the programme motion—that this serious and important area of policy deserves a proper debate in the House, rather than the time that we have allocated for this debate.

The Government are reacting to a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. When the judgment was made, the Home Secretary made a statement to the House at the end of last year. Several months passed before the Government decided what their new policy would be. The Government have not met the fundamental objection to holding the DNA of innocent people on the DNA database. Either someone has committed an offence, or they have not. If they have not committed an offence, it is fundamentally wrong that their DNA should be retained on the database. If it is retained, as the Government hope, and an arbitrary figure, such as six years or 12 years, is chosen—I am not sure why those periods were chosen—the worry is that if that arbitrary figure cannot really be justified, it goes against the whole argument in changing the principle.

When this matter has been raised in the House on numerous occasions, Ministers have said that we need to retain the DNA of individuals in case they commit criminal offences in the future. Ministers have given many examples of the retention of DNA over one issue resulting in people being arrested or imprisoned for another issue several years afterwards. They come to the House with legitimate arguments and evidence to support their view, but I think that that is evidence in support of an even bigger database—the mother of all databases—on which would be retained the DNA of every individual in this country. Either we should have it for everybody, or we should retain only the DNA of those who have been convicted of an offence. The retention of DNA on the presumption that people who are in trouble over one issue will get into trouble over another because they have some kind of criminal tendency is, I think, wrong. That is the problem with the Government’s argument—it is the fundamental flaw that they have in trying to address the proper ruling of the European Court of Human Rights. The suggestions made by the hon. Member for Eastleigh deal with that point.

I hope that when the Minister comes to reply he will be able to tell us that the DNA samples of children—of all children—have now been removed from the database. The Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing is nodding, but I give the Under-Secretary the opportunity to put that on the record from the Dispatch Box. I do not think that we have heard that from the Dispatch Box since this matter first came into the public domain.

Let me give an example of an innocent person who suddenly has his DNA retained. A hooray Henry—a helpful guy—goes into a pub to enjoy himself. He intervenes to prevent a fight. The police are called to stop everyone in the pub, or outside it, causing a disorder. The police take everyone in and the DNA of the person who intervened to stop the fight is retained.

One of my constituents did exactly that. He intervened to prevent a fight, was arrested, detained overnight in a police station and had his DNA taken. He had no criminal record whatever, yet his DNA was retained. Why retain his DNA? Why presume that he might commit another offence when he has an absolutely clean record and intervened only because he was trying to prevent two people from fighting? He went out to enjoy himself with his friends. He was not involved in the disorder—he tried to stop it.

A Member of the House has raised the following matter on a number of occasions. When an elderly member of his family died in suspicious circumstances, the police took the DNA of all members of the family. The hon. Gentleman tried for months—it may be years now—to get an answer from the relevant chief constable and to have his DNA removed. He came to me, as Chairman of the Select Committee on Home Affairs, and the Committee wrote to the Home Secretary to ask what was happening about the hon. Gentleman’s DNA. I am not talking about the hon. Member for Ashford (Damian Green), although he too has a legitimate case for asking for his DNA back.

Why should the DNA of a Member who was not involved in any criminal activity be retained? He was not even at the scene of a crime, but happened to be related to a person who died in suspicious circumstances—although I understand that they are no longer suspicious.

Does the right hon. Gentleman share my concern about the example I gave in Committee? Two boys had their DNA taken because they built a tree house in a cherry tree—many people probably built tree houses when they were young. Earlier, the right hon. Gentleman asked whether children’s DNA would be removed. If those boys were 15 or 16 when their DNA was taken, would their DNA be removed when they were over 18 and adults?

I absolutely share the hon. Gentleman’s concern. A particular incident could lead to DNA being retained. The House knows very well the circumstances relating to the hon. Member for Ashford, and the Select Committee recently published a report about them, although it did not mention the hon. Gentleman’s DNA. However, the fact is that his DNA was taken and there would be no prospect of its being removed for six years under the Government’s proposals, unless we were to make an exception for Members of the House, and in the current climate we should never be in a position to make exceptions for hon. Members. But why retain that DNA?

We know that the DNA of a disproportionate number of black and Asian people is held on the database, because if a disproportionate number of black and Asian people are stopped and searched under stop-and-search legislation there will be more DNA from people from the black and Asian community. Their DNA, too, is retained on the database. Why do the Government say that their DNA should be retained for six years or even longer because they were stopped under stop-and-search powers? There is a fundamental flaw in the Government’s argument: either it is okay for everybody or it is okay only for people who have committed criminal offences.

The hon. Member for Eastleigh did not deal with the possibility of loss of data, although I am sure he would have done so if he had had the time he sought under the programme motion. Although the situation is better, unfortunately the Government were afflicted by loss of data for a period last year. I do not just blame the present Government—any Government who sought to retain so much data would be affected. The more data the Government possess, the greater the likelihood that the data will be lost, so why hold information if nothing is being done with it?

Ministers must address those issues if we are being serious about the subject. It is not that those who say that a limit is needed are against catching criminals. Of course we want to catch criminals, and we want to use everything in our power—every piece of new technology—to achieve that.

The professor of genetics who invented the way in which DNA is extracted and retained is Alec Jeffreys of the University of Leicester—one of our most eminent citizens, recently given the freedom of the city of Leicester—and he is on record as saying that he does not understand why the Government have made these proposals. He has talked about other ways in which such things can be used to aid the police and other authorities, without the retention. If our arguments are dismissed because we are not experts, I hope that the Government will listen to the expertise of none other than Sir Alec Jeffreys, who says that the Government are wrong on the issue. I know how fond Governments are of relying on experts, so the Government should take it from Alec Jeffreys, if not from us, that they need to think again.

As the Bill is going through Parliament, the view is, “Let’s just stick it in the Bill, because we don’t know when the next one is coming out.” We have had 66 such Bills, as the hon. Member for Eastleigh said—quite a lot of Bills—and we have had almost as many immigration Bills. We need to think carefully before we adopt something that is a knee-jerk reaction, and we should not have a knee-jerk reaction, because we have known about this for seven months, so there is every reason for people to have thought about it very carefully. I hope that Ministers will reflect on the proposal before they push it through the House. I have every sympathy for the Liberal Democrat suggestion, and I hope that the Minister can reassure us that sufficient safeguards are in place.

One of the best safeguards is that, when people write in, they receive replies. In the case of the hon. Gentleman whom I mentioned, he has not had the decency of a reply from the chief constable. At the very least, there should be a robust process of challenging. It should not be exceptional; there should be a reasonable way in which people can challenge the retention. I wrote about my constituent, and I received a very flimsy reply from the custody sergeant. I expect more and better from a Government who are keen to ensure that our liberties are protected.

In Committee, I said that the Government’s proposal to deal with the retention of DNA data under an order-making power was utterly unacceptable and that we would oppose it vigorously. The Government have not changed their standpoint, and neither have we. The irony was that the Committee debate was held in a vacuum: we had absolutely no idea what the Government would propose. We were simply asked to provide a blank cheque. Now that we have some more details, we do not have the time to debate them sufficiently. Therefore, it is ironic that the most scrutiny allowed for any proposed order would last an hour and a half in Committee, although these very sensitive and controversial issues need to considered carefully.

Despite the Government’s promises of consultation outside the House—obviously, we hear what they say—we must wonder why the Government are seemingly prepared to debate this highly sensitive issue anywhere other than the House. The Constitution Committee of the other place recommended in its recent report, “Surveillance: Citizens and the State” that

“The Government should introduce a Bill to replace the existing regulatory framework governing the NDNAD. This would provide an opportunity to reassess the length of time DNA profiles are retained under regulatory oversight of the NDNAD.”

We agree. The use, retention and destruction of DNA records and the oversight that sits behind it require detailed primary legislation in their own right, with full and detailed debate and examination in Parliament.

There is little doubt about the importance of DNA as an evidential tool in prosecuting criminals and bringing them to justice. DNA can form an important part of the evidential case to prove guilt and ensure that serious criminals are brought to justice. The fight against crime—in particular, organised crime and terrorism—depends on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification. However, as the European Court of Human Rights noted in the case of S and Marper, basic freedoms

“would be unacceptably weakened if the use of modern scientific techniques in the criminal justice system were allowed at any cost and without carefully balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life interests.”

That frames this debate. The Government were well and truly on the wrong side of the line, and we would argue that they are still on the wrong side of the line.

I shall respond to the amendments and new clauses tabled by Opposition Members and speak to those tabled by the Government.

I begin by saying to my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz) that, in line with commitments given by the Home Secretary in her speech in December, I am pleased to confirm that the DNA of all under-10-year-olds has been removed from the database. My right hon. Friend also asked about the security of data on the DNA database. There has not been a single instance of the loss or misuse of data retained on the DNA database. I hope I have reassured him on those points.

I shall respond to the points raised by Opposition Members in the substance of my remarks. I welcome the aim of new clauses 1, 2 and 3 because they acknowledge that it is important to ensure that the biometric data of those suspected of violent or sexual offences are subject to a different regime of retention and destruction from the biometric data of a person arrested but not convicted. We would, however, have great difficulty supporting the amendments. I shall deal with the technical problems with them and then put them in the context of the wider argument.

First, the amendments do not clearly define the status of a person who has been released without charge. They could apply to a person released without charge and on bail, or to a person released without charge and informed that no further action would be taken. I can only assume that the latter is the intention of the amendment. The definition of an offence

“of a violent or sexual nature”

may be too vague. It may be more appropriate to list the actual offences involved and, therefore, clarify what offence is and what offence is not subject to a specific period of retention for DNA and fingerprints. It is neither correct nor appropriate to amend section 113 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as proposed, because the section allows equivalent legislative provision in part 5 of the Act to be applied to the armed forces, subject to modifications that are considered necessary to cater for the different circumstances in which the armed forces operate. Any amendments in respect of part 5 of the 1984 Act would be reflected in the statutory instrument that applied those provisions to the armed forces.

Those are technical points. I now turn to the more substantive point about the need to engage the public in any new framework that we propose for the retention of biometric data that are taken during a criminal investigation. I shall also reply to the accusation that we are responding simply to the judgment, because, in fact, we seek to go further than that.

I recognise that some people who are currently on the national DNA and fingerprint databases who have been arrested but not convicted may well ask why, in the light of the European Court of Human Rights judgment, their samples are not being destroyed. The judgment did not hold that any retention of samples of unconvicted people is unlawful per se; rather, it held that we cannot maintain a blanket scheme of retention that applies to all samples. Moreover, as Members will be aware, the existing law stands until such time as Parliament changes or amends it.

The contents of the Government’s enabling clause will allow for a retention and destruction framework to be put in place to ensure compliance with the European Court judgment within a reasonable time, and for such regulations to be subject to the consideration of both Houses.

Hon. Members who tabled new clauses 31 and 32 may have done so in the absence of sight of the Government’s proposals that were published on 7 May in the consultation paper entitled, “Keeping the right people on the DNA database”. It sets out very clearly our proposals to implement the judgment of the European Court in the case of S and Marper, but it also shows that in some areas we have gone further than the judgment requires. One such area is samples.

It is important to get on the record the fact that we have announced our intention to destroy all samples, whether they were taken from a person who was arrested and not convicted, or arrested and convicted, amounting to about 4.5 million samples. That is in direct response to the level of public concern about the retention of living samples by the criminal justice system. In addition, we have indicated that in future all samples must be destroyed as soon as possible and held only up to a maximum of six months for the purposes of ensuring that an acceptable profile is placed on the DNA database. The proposals that hon. Members have set out in new clause 32 do not make the important distinction between samples and profiles, and they fail to take into account a key area of public concern and an issue that was raised in the S and Marper judgment.

Does the Minister accept that it would be far better to introduce primary legislation following the—albeit welcome—consultation that he just mentioned? The House would be able, by amendment rather than by resolution after a one-and-a-half hour debate, to give its view on the response to those discussions. That would be the most effective and mature way of developing legislation on these complex topics.

We had that debate at length in Committee, and there are several points to make in response to the Opposition’s call for a primary legislation route. First, we have to meet the time scale of responding to S and Marper, and our legal advice is that we have a 12-month period, so there would be absolutely no opportunity to introduce any primary legislation in that time. I must also say to the hon. Gentleman that to believe that such a rule has been applied to date is to misunderstand the way in which the current framework has evolved. Such a proposal would set an important precedent, because DNA guidelines and their operation move over time. If he is saying that every time the DNA guidelines change, we must have primary legislation, he misunderstands the way in which the DNA issue moves—and moves very quickly.

Has my Friend consulted the Information Commissioner? If so, what is his view?

Of course we consult and take advice. At present, I am not in a position to tell my hon. Friend exactly what that advice is, but I am sure that I will be able to find it and provide it to him in the foreseeable future.

Will the Minister give way?

I shall not, because I am running out of time. Research by the Jill Dando Institute indicates that 52 per cent. of subsequent offending takes place within the first six years of initial conviction, and that two thirds takes place within 12 years. Studies from the United States suggest that it takes up to 15 years for an individual who has been arrested to have the same risk of being arrested again as exists among the general population.

A point was made about the Scottish model. We did consider that model, which involves shorter retention periods. However, in the light of the research evidence available to us, which did not inform the Scottish Executive’s decision, we have decided to propose six-year and 12-year retention periods. We recommend six years for most crimes and 12 years for those with high impact such as serious violent offences and sexual and terrorist-related offences.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 37, in clause 32, page 26, line, leave out ‘two’ and insert ‘four’.

Amendment 40, page 26, line 6, leave out ‘on the balance of probabilities’ and insert ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.

Amendment 201, page 26, line 13, leave out paragraph (b).

Amendment 38, page 26, line 13, at end insert—

‘(3A) The third condition is that the applicant has demonstrated that prosecution of the respondent for a criminal offence was considered but not proceeded with.’.

Amendment 39, page 26, line 13, at end insert—

‘(3B) The fourth condition is that the respondent is aged 18 or over.’.

Amendment 202, page 26, line 17, leave out paragraph (b).

Government amendment 60

Amendment 149, line 20, at end add—

‘(6) In this section “gang” means a group of people who see themselves or are seen by others as a discernable group and exhibit any one or more of the following factors—

(a) engaging in criminal activity;

(b) identifying with a particular geographical area;

(c) having some form of identifying organisational feature;

(d) being in conflict with other similar gangs.’.

Amendment 204, in clause 33, page 26, line 32, leave out subsections (3) and (4).

Amendment 205, page 27, line 4, leave out ‘and requirements’.

Amendment 206, page 27, line 9, leave out ‘or (3)’.

Amendment 207, in clause 34, page 27, line 13, leave out ‘or requirement’.

Amendment 43, page 27, line 14, leave out from ‘injunction,’ to end of line 16 and insert

‘the period for which it shall be in force.’.

Amendment 208, page 27, line 16, at end insert

‘except that no injunction shall remain in force for a period longer than two years from the date it is made.’.

Amendment 42, page 27, line 16, at end insert—

‘(2A) The period specified in subsection (2) above must not exceed three years.

(2B) Injunctions granted under section 32 may not be renewed.’.

Amendment 209, page 27, line 23, leave out paragraph (b).

Amendment 210, page 27, line 26, leave out ‘or requirement’.

Government amendment 61

Amendment 150, in clause 36, page 28, line 10, at end insert—

‘(c) any primary care trust, mental health trust or other NHS authority that the applicant chief officer considers would be appropriate to consult; and

(d) any youth offending team, local probation service or office of the National Offender Management Service that the applicant chief officer considers would be appropriate to consult.’.

Amendment 151, page 28, line 16, at end insert—

‘(c) any primary care trust, mental health trust or other NHS authority that the constable considers would be appropriate to consult; and

(d) any youth offending team, local probation service or office of the National Offender Management Service that the constable considers would be appropriate to consult.’.

Amendment 152, page 28, line 22, at end insert—

‘(c) any primary care trust, mental health trust or other NHS authority that the applicant local authority considers would be appropriate to consult; and

(d) any youth offending team, local probation service or office of the National Offender Management Service that the applicant local authority considers would be appropriate to consult.’.

Government amendments 62 and 63

The new clause was tabled by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris), my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, Southall (Mr. Sharma) and me on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in order to give effect to the recommendations we made in our 15th report. The Government responded to them only today. The amending provisions relate to the Bill’s treatment of gang-related violence. In the report we expressed our concern about the fact that provisions highly significant for individual liberties and human rights appeared not when the Bill was first published, but only in the later stages of the Committee proceedings.

During the Committee stage, the Government explained that provisions were needed because of a judgment by the Court of Appeal in the case of Birmingham city council v. Shafi. In that case, the council had sought civil injunctions against individuals who were alleged to have been involved in gang-related offences and public nuisance. The Court of Appeal noted that the terms of the injunctions sought were identical, or almost identical, to those of antisocial behaviour orders. It noted the “striking feature” that the local authority sought ASBOs against those aged under 18 and injunctions in identical terms against those aged over 18. The court recognised that Parliament had laid down a number of specific safeguards applying to the grant of ASBOs, some of which might not apply to injunctions granted at common law.

The court held that the council should therefore seek an ASBO so that

“the detailed checks and balances developed by Parliament and in the decided cases”

would apply. The court considered that it would be bizarre if a different standard of proof applied. As the order sought by the council was essentially the same as an ASBO, the lower court had been correct to apply the same standard of proof that applied in proceedings for an ASBO. The court had to be sure that the defendants had acted in the antisocial way alleged. The court recognised that there might be cases in which the injunctions sought were not identical, or almost identical, to an ASBO, or which involved more complicated facts. In such cases, the civil standard might apply.

The first issue that we raised was the fact that there was no definition of what constituted a gang in the first place. Government amendment 60 deals with that, although I question whether it is sufficiently precise. I note that the Opposition have tabled an amendment on the same issue which is a little more precise. We were told that guidance would be laid before Parliament as soon as possible before the legislation came into force, for the purpose of interpretation.

We were anxious to ensure that the provisions were not open-ended, and that they were necessary. Given the findings of the Court of Appeal, we asked the Minister to explain why the existing law was inadequate, and why it was proposed to use civil law to tackle what was effectively criminal behaviour. We requested an explanation of why the Government had opted not to require those seeking an injunction to explain why criminal prosecution in an individual case was impossible. That is the purpose of amendment 38. In our view, the Government have failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of the need for the provisions, including the rather bizarre clause 32(3)(b), which is apparently intended to protect the respondent from himself. The Government have not published any statistically robust evidence showing why the existing law is inadequate.

I am not here to defend the Government. My organisation, the Centre for Social Justice, produced an important report on gangs and gang-related violence after its members had travelled to Boston, Los Angeles, New York, Liverpool and Glasgow to see what was going on in those places. A key principle, which I think the Government have now generally adopted—although there are some faults in the arrangement—is that the provision is required for the simple reason that we are trying to get ahead of the problem. We need to identify people who may be at risk of violence, and who may end up being in street gangs. Where this has been applied, it has worked: it has worked in Boston and Los Angeles, for instance.

I shall come to the points that the right hon. Gentleman has made. He has given us some evidence in support of what the Government propose, but so far we have not been given such evidence by the Government. All that we have been given are anecdotal explanations based on the Birmingham cases. If there is robust evidence from overseas, I am surprised that the Government have not produced it in response to our report or our earlier correspondence with the Minister.

The Minister told us that using the criminal law to deal with gang-related violence remained the preferred option. However, the Government considered it not advisable to make it a prerequisite for the Crown Prosecution Service to explain why it was impossible to charge an individual beforehand. The Minister said that the Government were clear that injunctions should not short-circuit the criminal justice process, but we were very concerned about the issue.

In earlier reports, we have drawn attention to the unsustainability in the long term of resort to methods of control which are outside the criminal process, and which avoid the appropriate standards of fairness. Gang injunctions constitute another step in that direction. In our view, the civil law is an inappropriate tool to deal with what is effectively criminal behaviour. We are pleased to note the Government’s commitment to use of the criminal law as the preferred option, but it worries us that the Bill does not make that explicit, and that there are no safeguards in the Bill to ensure that it occurs. In particular, there is no requirement for those seeking an injunction to demonstrate that criminal prosecution has been considered as an option first.

We recommend in amendment 38 that the Bill be amended to impose an express duty, throughout the period during which the injunction has effect, to ensure that the question of criminal prosecution is reviewed and is kept under consideration when there is a reasonable prospect of successful prosecution of the subject of the injunction. We have raised a similar issue time and again in relation to control orders. It seems that once a control order has come into effect, little effort is made to prosecute those involved.

I am particularly concerned about the impact of the Bill on children and young people, as amendment 39 makes clear. It is in this regard that I consider the Government’s response to be weakest. We welcome the Government’s commitment not to amend the Bill to cover children and young people explicitly. However, we do not agree with their contention that part 4 will not be applied to children or young people. We recommend that the Bill be amended to make that clear, and to set a minimum age limit of 18 for respondents.

We spent a lot of time on our report. One of the reasons why we recommended no age limit of 18 was that street gangs, as defined in places such as America, Liverpool and Glasgow, consist of people ranging from children of 11 to men of 26. It is crucial to use civil orders to deal with those people in order to take them out of the gangs. If we wait until they are 18 and on a criminal charge, we shall have to wait until they have done what they intend to do, which will make the position much more dangerous.

The problem with the right hon. Gentleman’s contention is that the process is likely to bring the law into disrepute. Injunctions against those under 18 are unenforceable. According to the response that we received from the Government today,

“Injunctions must be enforceable and it is unlikely in practice that these injunctions would be enforceable for under 18s because the court cannot fine someone without a source of income.”

The Government also refer to the penalties for those over 18, which could involve fines or imprisonment. They say:

“a court cannot sentence an individual under the age of 18 to detention…for a civil contempt of court. Therefore where when a gang member is under 18 and is without an independent and legitimate source of income, the court would be unable to sanction any breach and so would not grant an injunction.”

That constitutes a paper tiger. That is why we have ASBOs.

The Government go on to say that

“there may be occasions where it would be both appropriate and enforceable”,

and that

“whilst these instances are likely to be rare”,

they want to retain their provisions in the Bill. However, we have not been given an example of where those provisions would be enforceable. If injunctions cannot be enforced, or are refused because they cannot be enforced, there is no point in having the power in the first place. It will simply bring the law into disrepute.

The other issue that concerns us particularly, as is reflected in amendment 40, is the applicable standards of due process. Breach of an injunction is a civil offence which is treated as civil contempt of court, but must be proved to the criminal standard of “beyond reasonable doubt”. In the leading ASBO case, although ASBOs were considered to be civil orders—like injunctions—the House of Lords upheld the argument that the proceedings relating to ASBOs should carry the criminal standard of proof. Magistrates should apply that standard: they must be sure that the individual in question acted in an antisocial manner before they can make the order. We believe that similar standards should apply to injunctions which are very akin to ASBOs.

The analogy with ASBOs is particularly acute given the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the Shafi case, which recognised that ASBOs in identical terms could be sought. Some of the proposed injunctions are identical to or more severe than ASBOs, which require proof on the criminal standard. If they are to be more demanding than an ASBO, the argument that they should require the criminal standard of proof is all the stronger.

The hon. Gentleman must have seen in his surgeries, as I have in mine, numerous people who have been victims of antisocial behaviour on the part of gangs, collections of young people, or whatever we want to call them. Why is he trying to make it difficult to enforce order and peace for the benefit of the law-abiding community?

That is not the point. What I am trying to do is ensure that when we introduce draconian powers, we make certain that the individual concerned is subject to those draconian powers. That is the view that the courts have expressed time and again. We should bear in mind the debate in the country more widely about civil liberties, for this is a civil liberties argument. The hon. Gentleman suggests that we go down the route of the civil standard and conclude that, on the balance of probabilities, people have been involved in extremely violent criminal behaviour.

If we go down that route, we will run the risk of a major infringement of our civil liberties. If there is evidence of that, I think the criminal standard ought to be applied, bearing in mind the severe restrictions available through the injunction process and the fact that a breach of an injunction will be a criminal offence. As I have said, so far as young people are concerned the injunction process is pretty pointless; the ASBO is the only way in which can be dealt with, and, as the House of Lords has said, that should be judged by the criminal standard.

We do not have much time to speak on these matters, and as I will not be able to respond in detail to my hon. Friend’s remarks, may I put on the record the fact that we will look at the issue of time limits and duration in respect of injunctions?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. As a result of that assurance, I do not feel the need to put my argument any more strongly today. I am aware that other Members wish to speak, so I shall now bring my remarks to a close.

As many Members will be aware, the background to the Government’s gang injunction proposals is the approach in Birmingham, where injunctions under section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 were deployed to combat gang-related violence. Discussions of their use with West Midlands police and Birmingham city council have made it clear that they regarded the injunction as a useful tool to combat serious gang activity, basing a claim on the nuisance caused by gang activity and seeking to bring this within the remit of the Act. In many respects, the use of the injunction to disrupt gang activity is a model based on the tools used to disrupt gangs in Boston, where the injunction is seen as an important mechanism available to law enforcement officers.

We should be under no illusions about the nature of some of the challenges currently facing young people in this country. The children’s charity NCH—now Action for Children—highlights the shocking situation of young people growing up with the real fear of becoming a victim of crime, particularly violent crime. Therefore, we are certainly prepared to consider the application of injunctive relief to communities and neighbourhoods. The House will be aware that injunctions are used to prevent domestic violence, for example, and their application in a preventive sense in respect of harm is understood by the courts. However, in the case of Birmingham city council v. Marnie Shaft and Tyrone Ellis the use of section 222 injunctions was ruled to be inappropriate by Nottingham county court, and that decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal last October.

As I said in Committee, I understand why the Government have thought it appropriate to bring these proposals before the House. One of the most insidious aspects of the organised criminal gang structure is that gangs consciously focus their recruitment of new members on some of the most vulnerable members of society, such as those with poor educational attainment, weak family structures, addictions and mental illness. They also try to undermine the family ties that do actually exist.

Various approaches have been taken to combat gang crime and pernicious gang activity in different parts of the country, reflecting the fact that gangs are different in their structure and nature in the different areas in which they operate. It is right, for example, that Birmingham should be able to adopt a strategy different from that followed in Manchester, Liverpool or London, based on the particular problems it experiences and the nature of the relevant gang activity. Some gangs are simply interested in territory; others are motivated by broader criminal intent and the wish to fund a lifestyle. What they all tend to have in common is a sense of identity, often using colours to distinguish which gang people are part of, and aping some of the activities of gangs in the US.

The key question is whether the injunctions sought by the Bill are appropriate, and in particular whether they overstep the line from being preventive to being punitive, with all of the consequences in human rights law that that would impose. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has made a number of important points in its fifteenth report, and I am only sorry that the response to it—promised in the Home Secretary’s statement today—had not reached the Vote Office prior to the commencement of the debate on this Bill, so that Members have not had a proper opportunity to assess and assimilate the Government response. I hope the Minister will be able to set out some of the Government’s thinking on some of the key issues that have been highlighted, in particular the application of the criminal standard. The Minister will be aware of the McCann case, as we have discussed it at length.

The issue of the treatment of children is also relevant. It is my clear understanding that these injunctions would not be suitable for application to children, but from my brief look at the Government response to the Joint Committee it appeared that there was some suggestion that they could be used in certain restricted circumstances. We need to have a clearer understanding of the application of these provisions if they are intended to operate in that way; the Minister will be aware of issues in respect of enforcement and the fact that they would come not before the youth court but before the High Court or county court. There is certainly a very different enforcement regime governing breach of what is a civil injunction than breach of an ASBO, for example, which would be treated as a criminal matter and the individual concerned would be brought before a youth court.

The Minister will be aware that the injunctions seek to impose positive conditions on the recipient. That goes much further than what might be considered to be protective, either for the individual concerned or for the community affected. These provisions will inevitably be challenged, ultimately before the courts, on their compliance with applicable human rights law. The Minister needs to satisfy the House that they are likely to withstand this challenge. This is particularly the case for injunctions that are designed to be open-ended in duration and without formal review within a specific period as to their continuing suitability or necessity. I heard, however, what the Minister said about this being a live issue that the Government are looking into, and I welcome that.

On a slightly more conciliatory note, I should acknowledge that the Government have sought to address some of the concerns highlighted in Committee. These injunctions centre around the concept of gang-related violence but without defining what is understood by the term “gang”, with Liberty asking:

“Is it simply a group of young people wearing hoodies?”

We understood from what the Minister said then that it was not, and the Government have now brought forward an amendment to provide some greater clarity, but we need still more clarity. We have tabled an amendment in relation to this issue, and the work done by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith) and the Centre for Social Justice has set out some of the alternative thinking. The definition of the term “gang” is important if we are to define the application of these provisions properly, so that they are used in a manner appropriate for serious gang activity.

We also believe it is appropriate for relevant NHS bodies, and for probation and other relevant agencies, to be involved in the consideration of these injunctions. I note that the Minister has introduced further amendments to address those issues, which we welcome.

The further issues and concerns highlighted in Committee and in some of the amendments introduced today are important, and a response to them is necessary. Too many young lives are being lost as a result of gang-related disputes over postcode territories or minor disagreements where a perverse notion of “respect” is seen to have been challenged. We need to be satisfied that these injunctions are appropriate, and the Government still need to make out their case for certain important aspects.

As was said during the programme motion debate, this complex issue was introduced late in the Public Bill Committee—in the last week. That meant that we could not discuss it in full and prepare properly in Committee, and we have a derisory 30 minutes to discuss it now, so clearly nobody can be satisfied with the amount of scrutiny that we can give it at this point.

Has the hon. Gentleman noticed that both Ministers have excused their inability to answer questions by saying that they do not have enough time? Is it not time that they realised that the time is in their hands, and that the reason why they do not have enough time is that they have denied themselves that opportunity?

Absolutely, but as the case was well made during the debate on the programme motion, I shall not go back over that ground.

The injunctions on gang members were said by the Government to be very effective in Birmingham, but Nottingham county court and then the Court of Appeal ruled that, first, the evidence being used to justify such draconian controls on people was too flimsy to justify them, and secondly, that existing powers and legislation were adequate.

In the short time that we had to debate this matter in Committee—perhaps this will also be the case in the two or three minutes that the Minister will have to answer today—the Government have in no way been able to make an adequate case as to why they think the existing legislation is inadequate and needs this draconian step forward; why such serious restrictions, which could almost amount to a control order, depending on how they are imposed, should have a lesser burden of proof—the civil burden of proof rather than the criminal standard—and why the state should protect people against their will in some cases, other than, obviously, in cases involving mental health legislation.

The Government have not given us any evidence, either, that they have considered the USA evidence from California and Chicago. The Stanford Law Review examined the approaches there, which have been in use for 20-odd years in some cases, and said that gang injunctions appear to work, but in fact simply move the problem to the next neighbourhood and do not have any effect, except to stigmatise large groups of people. It cited the case involving a 16-year-old, in which the police told the school involved that he was a cousin of some gang members who lived on his street and was thus probably in the gang, so he ended up being suspended from school, although there was no evidence that he had any involvement at all.

The university of Manchester has done research in Britain that shows similar stigmatisation occurring. It has studied the American examples and shown how the gang injunction process in America has slipped into mainstream law. In Committee, I, like other hon. Members, raised the issue of the way in which various pieces of legislation—counter-terrorism legislation—have similarly slipped into use in mainstream law in terms of controlling peaceful demonstrations at arms fairs, environmental events and so on.

Finally, the Government have not explained why, given that most of the examples the Minister gave at the start of the debate in Committee involved 15, 16 and 17-year-olds carrying guns and knifing each other, this legislation does not apply to anybody under 18 and, as has been said, is therefore a toothless paper tiger. Liberal Democrats believe that, as I argued in Committee, for such serious restraints on people’s liberty, which potentially amount to control orders, a criminal standard of evidence, and time limits, should apply to injunctions. We expressed doubt about the state imposing draconian restrictions on someone “for their own protection”, so we tabled our amendments, which are very similar to the conclusions reached by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the amendments that resulted from those.

Given the derisory and insulting amount of time— 30 minutes—that we have had to debate this matter today, which means that the Minister will barely be able to answer, I do not propose to push the amendments standing in my name and those of my colleagues to a vote. I know that in Committee the Minister feared that this provision would not get through the House of Lords. I hope that that House will take note of what was said in Committee, and what has been said—very briefly—today, and will go through this in great detail and at great length. I hope that either it will insist that the Minister makes some very convincing arguments, which we have not yet heard, or it will radically alter the Bill when it reaches the other place.

I shall be brief, because everyone is waiting for the Minister to sum up. The only reason why I wish to speak is that I produced a report, having sent a number of people around America and the UK, whose outcome tends towards this approach. The Government have drawn some of the provisions in this particular area from the report, and I therefore congratulate them on having read it. They are going in the right direction, but I wish to make two points.

The UK has a major and growing problem with street gangs. The way in which cities in other parts of the world, particularly in America, have been successful in tackling the problem has been based on the idea of getting to younger kids earlier, on a looser parameter—not to make criminals of them; quite the contrary: the aim is to draw them out of criminality. The voluntary sector is involved, these people go into remedial education and they are got out of the gangs. Very few of them end up going through the criminal process in Boston—only the ringleaders do—and this approach is crucial in pulling them out of that once they have been identified. What follows is the necessary step of other organisations in the police stations picking them up straight away, and that has yet to be resolved.

The definition is crucial in all of this; the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) was right to say that we need a clear definition. We know that the Home Office has a definition and that it has stuck it back in as an amendment, but we do not think it is sufficient; we think that the better amendment is one based more on what has been put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch (James Brokenshire), because it is drawn directly from our report. There was a reason for that definition too, because we drew that from what people in Boston, New York, Glasgow and Liverpool, where there had been remarkable success, said to us.

I wish to make a couple of quick points in the time available to me. I thank all the Members who have spoken, albeit briefly, because some important points have been made. I particularly thank the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith), because we have tried to draw on the work that he has done.

Before I deal with the issue of under-18s, I wish to make another point. The hon. Member for Chesterfield (Paul Holmes) asked about the evidence. In Birmingham, the injunctions were used for over-18s, not under-18s. In Handsworth-Lozells-Newtown, the level of robberies in the four months prior to the injunctions averaged 55 a month—compared with 33 a month while the injunctions were in place; after the injunctions were removed, the level rose again to 48 a month. In Aston-Nechells, an average of 11 firearms incidents took place in the four months preceding the orders, compared with four for the period when the orders were in place, and after the court judgment the figure rose to nine—

rose—