The Moreton Hall report was commissioned in February 2005 and presented to the British National Space Centre in June 2005. The cost of the report was £26,100. The report is classified as ‘Commercial-in-confidence’ and there are no plans to put it in the public domain.
The list of recommendations from the report is as follows:
A system for licensing should be retained.
BNSC should act to establish precise responsibility for sub-orbital manned flight with the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and, if necessary, introduce changes to the licensing process and procedures to suit.
The different classes of satellites and missions should be recognised and addressed in different licence application procedures and fees as detailed in this report.
Overseas Territories/Crown Dependencies should be permitted to issue their own licences provided that clauses are inserted to ensure that ascent phase third party liability insurance provides cover to UK Government and that the territory indemnifies the UK Government.
Protocols should be established for each of the territories, with respect to division of responsibility BNSC/Territories for licence application support and licence issue, and guidance notes should be produced for staff.
In-orbit third party liability insurance should be no longer routinely required. However, BNSC may wish to consider insisting upon TPL insurance if the space object is designed/planned to re-enter. The omission of in-orbit TPL should be kept under review because of the presence of man-made orbit debris that could, in future, be identified.
With regard to post-separation-pre-orbit phase third party liability, this should be retained, and if possible, be covered by an extension of launch vehicle TPL insurance.
Research and educational satellites are now exempt from all third party liability indemnities and insurance requirements, and this practice should continue. The UK Government must be fully aware that they have unlimited liability for third party damages which may be incurred by these satellites.
BNSC should propose the establishment of protocols for proportional sharing of liability where more than one state is classified as Launching State within the meaning of the UN treaties/conventions.
Consideration should be given to establishing a simple bilateral recognition of other nations' safety evaluations and licensing procedures.
Consideration should be given on taking an active part (i.e. even leadership role) in the EU/ESA licence harmonisation process.
With respect to the Human Rights Act, no changes to the existing or herein proposed licence procedures are recommended; however, it should be clearly understood that if the SoS wishes to refuse a licence, there must be strong grounds for so doing, such as national security/threatened safety of persons, not in public interest (if strong enough).
BNSC should take the lead in establishing clear protocols for resolving quickly any disagreements as to responsibilities between Government Departments in respect of space activities.
The division of responsibility vis-à-vis BNSC/Ofcom for Radio Frequency aspects of satellite missions is well-established and no further action is required.
De-orbiting strategies should be required and included in the licence terms. Further, ensure that they are compatible with the emerging International Office for Standardisation (ISO) standards.
Earth Observing mission licences should include a requirement on licensees to comply with 1986 Principles relating to Remote Sensing of Earth.
In the secondary register, where ownership has changed, it should be recorded that change of liability has similarly been transferred (if it has) and to which state.
To ensure the proper notification of orbit changes to the UN, some form of regular monitoring of licensee's activities must be established.
BNSC should ratify, and fully implement, a revised auditable licensing process, addressing through-life monitoring, as identified in this report.
The process, supporting procedures and forms, should be documented and disseminated in the form of updated notes for the guidance of staff and applicants (two sets).
Procedures, methodologies and associated acceptance criteria for the safety evaluation should be defined in more detail as outlined in this report.
The safety evaluation contractor should be given the added responsibility of development and maintenance of a database of acceptance criteria and relevant best practice and international standards.
The responsibility for the debris-collision risk assessment at time of application may be transferred to the applicants either to undertake themselves, or via a service company.
Debris-collision risk assessment should be undertaken as part of the through-life monitoring function/responsibility, and these may be delegated to the operator (by wider dissemination of the debris-collision risk assessment model). In addition, measures should be implemented to ensure the debris data content of the debris-collision risk assessment tool be maintained as current.
Applicants who have supplied comprehensive insurance briefing packages should make BNSC aware of the detailed table of contents as soon as possible, as the information therein may well provide adequate responses to the safety evaluation questions.
BNSC should give considerations to the revision of the fee structure as indicated in this report.
BNSC should give consideration to delegation of responsibility for elements of the licence application process as indicated in this report. In particular, a new role of Safety Licence Support Contractor should be considered, and, if agreed, may be competed for by appropriately qualified organisations.
The role of safety evaluation and maintenance of safety standards may be competed for by appropriately qualified organisations.
The BNSC website should be revised to provide enhanced guidance to applicants and links to relevant documents and standards as outlined in this report.
Changes should also be made to the licence application form on the site as detailed in this report.