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Passports: Fraud

Volume 496: debated on Monday 20 July 2009

To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many biometric passports issued to applicants had subsequently been withdrawn on the basis of (a) fraud and (b) ineligibility of the applicant on the latest date for which figures are available. (276828)

In terms of fraud recording, the Identity and Passport Service does not yet differentiate between biometric and non-biometric passports.

To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many fraudulent passport applications were detected in each year since 1997; and how many instances of passport fraud his Department estimates were undetected in each such year. (285925)

The Identity and Passport Service (IPS) figures for passport frauds detected in each year since 1997 are shown in table 1:

Table 1

Number

19971

1,880

19981

1,368

19991

1,535

January to March 20001

362

2000-01

1,484

2001-02

2,419

2002-03

1,973

2003-04

2,651

2004-05

1,497

2005-06

6,497

2006-07

6,108

2007-08

9,382

2008-09

9,254

1 Calendar years were used until April 2000

The estimated number of fraudulent passport applications which go undetected, for years in which figures are available, is set out in table 2

Table 2

Estimated proportion of fraudulent applications (percentage)1

Estimated number of undetected frauds1

1997

1998

1999

January to March 2000

2000-01

2001-02

-

2002-03

0.09

2,974

2003-04

2004-05

2005-06

0.25

10,058

2006-07

0.25

9,672

2007-08

0.25

5,372

2008-09

0.26

4,410

1 Figures do not include cases in which a false declaration has been made by a passport applicant but identity and eligibility for a passport are not in doubt.

The process IPS uses to estimate the number of fraudulent applications it receives is based on sampling and statistical extrapolation.

The estimate of the number of fraudulent applications which evade IPS controls is derived from a simple arithmetical calculation in which the number of frauds identified and prevented is deducted from the estimated number of fraudulent applications received.

IPS first conducted an exercise to establish an estimate of the number of fraudulent applications in 2002 and details of its findings were made available to Parliament in response to questions.

In 2006 IPS introduced a more refined and robust sampling process drawing on the experience of 2002 and its increased understanding of the nature and pattern of fraud. This increased understanding of the nature and pattern of fraud has also enabled IPS to refine the way it records fraud and to identify fraudulent applications which had been stopped by routine controls but which had not been previously recorded as fraud.