Cookies: We use cookies to give you the best possible experience on our site. By continuing to use the site you agree to our use of cookies. Find out more
House of Commons Hansard
x
Northern Ireland Security Arrangements (Carlile Report)
20 March 2015
Volume 594
The edit just sent has not been saved. The following error was returned:
This content has already been edited and is awaiting review.

This is a summary of the main findings from the report by Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer of national security arrangements in Northern Ireland, covering the period from 1 December 2013 to 31 December 2014:

“Throughout the year I have been briefed extensively on the state of threat in Northern Ireland. The context in which national security activities are performed in Northern Ireland remains challenging. There have been successes in 2014 and a number of trials of significant alleged terrorists are pending. This is a very dangerous, unpredictable terrorist threat, though one which is much smaller than in the days of PIRA terrorist activity. The authorities are achieving a good level of attrition. Most of the public lead lives unaffected by terrorism.

I regard 2014 as a year of continuing success in thwarting and detecting terrorism. Pending trials are likely to demonstrate this, as have trials during the year. However, there is no sign of reduced ambition in the minds of terrorists, and limited evidence of a lack of capacity on their part. Attrition and continued effort against the dissident republican groups remain a paramount requirement. The number of ongoing investigations remains high. The work is painstaking and, for some involved, potentially dangerous. Peace is in no small way the result of these efforts by PSNI and MI5 personnel.

In preparing this report I have considered the current threat level, and what I have learned of events of a terrorist nature during the year. There have been several serious incidents during 2014, as well as a spate of crude letter bombs. Once again the parading season proved a challenge. Although there were some injuries as a result of sectarian clashes, it was more peaceful than in 2013, with fewer injuries to police and public.

During 2014,1 have met a range of stakeholders. I have engaged with PSNI and MI5 and examined the relationship between them and others. I have held meetings with HM Inspectorate of Constabulary concerning activities relevant to this Report, and with the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Executive's Minister of Justice, David Ford MLA. The liaison between Mr Ford and those responsible for national security issues is satisfactory. I have also engaged with the Independent Human Rights Adviser to the Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB) and the Board itself. The Policing Board can feel reassured that the Human Rights Adviser is well able to discharge her duties in respect of national security. The Board has been shown the material reports in relation to Northern Ireland of the Office of the Surveillance Commissioners, subject to minor redactions. Compliance is at 'best in class' level. I am grateful to NIO Ministers for their close interest in national security matters discussed; meetings with Ministers have occurred. Ministers are always very well informed on all material security issues.

I am satisfied that the periodic briefings provided to me have been full and not selective, and that I have a good understanding of relevant matters. I note that when matters of moment occur, active steps are taken to ensure that I am briefed. When I request access, it is given.

I have asked questions again this year about the relationship between MI5 and PSNI staff working alongside each other in security operations in Northern Ireland. Comments made to me in 2014 about the relationship between the two services were strongly mutually supportive. That they work together well and in the national interest is beyond question. The effectiveness of what they do is demonstrated by the successful disruptions that have taken place over the year.

This year once again I have reviewed in some detail the arrangements for Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS). Overall, the use of CHIS has been effective. All activity and decision making concerning CHIS are documented carefully and European Convention on Human Rights issues are fully considered. There is a rigorous legal and policy framework for dealing with CHIS. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, and associated orders and codes, provide the legal framework for authorising and managing CHIS within the UK in a way that is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, and particularly the right to privacy. It requires that use of a CHIS is subject to prior senior officer authorisation, limits the purposes for which the CHIS may be used, ensures detailed records are maintained, establishes independent oversight and inspection, and provides an independent appeals mechanism to investigate complaints.

I have also considered a number of issues relating to terrorism prosecutions including arrangements for the continuation of the temporary and renewable non-jury trial arrangements provided under the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007. The situation continues to improve. The number of cases requiring non-jury trial diminishes. The Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland uses considerable and proper care in the identification and selection of such cases. It is fully recognised that the norm is jury trial but the residual serious and lethal threat of terrorism justifies the continuation of the non-jury system.

There is no evidence of any disadvantage in terms of outcome to defendants in the current system of non-jury trials. They are as likely to be acquitted as in jury trials, and have the advantage of reasoned judgments, and less inhibited access to appeals. Part of the criminal justice setting in need of appraisal is sentencing in terrorism related cases. Generally such sentences are considerably shorter than comparable sentences in England and Wales, with notably different tariffs in murder cases.

I remain as concerned as before about the disclosure regime operated in scheduled cases in Northern Ireland. In England and Wales issues of Public Interest Immunity and other disclosure issues are dealt with by the trial judge, who of course is not the tribunal of fact save in the rarest of trial exceptions, or in 'Newton' hearings where there has been a plea of guilty on a disputed factual basis. In Northern Ireland in non-jury trials there is a separate disclosure judge. This still leads not only to delays in trials, but to a disconnect between the day by day reality of the trial and the insulated disclosure process.

I remain concerned that the disclosure issue outlined above is a real difficulty in dealing with non-jury cases. Given the high regard held generally for the quality of the reasoned judgments given in such cases, and also for the fairness of the trials, I find it difficult to accept that there would be any diminution in actual fairness if the trial judge dealt with disclosure too.

I have inquired about the use of intercept evidence. I remain satisfied that there is solid scrutiny and review of interception, in an environment in which communications technology is developing quickly.

As before, I have asked about loyalist paramilitaries. These are people and groups whose real interest is in making money from crime. The authorities are well sighted against these organisations. I have enquired about violent Islamism in Northern Ireland. For the present this is not a significant threat.

Continued vigilance and the maintenance of counter-terrorism resourcing are essential. However, once again I have drawn comfort from the successful joint operations between MI5 and the PSNI.Normality is a genuine and mostly realisable ambition, rather than merely an aspiration.

I have measured performance in 2014 against the five key principles identified in relation to national security in Annex E to the St Andrews Agreement of October 2006. My conclusions in relation to Annex E are set out in the attached Table.”

Further to reinforce this comprehensive set of safeguards, the Government confirmed that they accept and will ensure that effect is given to the five key principles which the Chief Constable has identified as crucial to the effective operation of the new arrangements, viz:

Text of Annex E

Conclusions

All security service intelligence relating to terrorism in Northern Ireland will be visible to the PSNI.

There is compliance. Arrangements are in place to deal with any suspected malfeasance by a PSNI or MI5 officer.

PSNI will be informed of all security service counter-terrorism investigations and operations relating to Northern Ireland.

There is compliance.

Security service intelligence will be disseminated within PSNI according to the current PSNI dissemination policy and policy and using police procedures.

There is compliance. Dissemination policy has developed since the new arrangements came into force.

The great majority of national security CHIS in Northern Ireland will continue to be run by PSIN officers under existing police handling protocols.

The majority of CHIS are run by the PSNI. Protocols have not stood still. A review of existing protocols and the development of up to date replacements should always be work in progress and clearly accountable.

There will be no diminution of the PSNI’s responsibility to comply with the Human Rights Act or the Policing Board’s ability to monitor said compliance.

The PSNI must continue to comply. The Policing Board, with the advice of their Human Rights Advisor as a key component, will continue the role of monitoring compliance.

[HCWS436]