Hansard

Amendment proposed: 303, Clause 8, page 5, line 12, at end insert—

“(aa) has confirmed that no other practitioner has undertaken a second assessment for the same person.”—(Danny Kruger.)

This amendment would prevent a patient from seeking multiple assessments from different doctors.

Division 40

Amendment proposed: 1, in clause 8, page 5, line 13, at beginning insert

“is a registered medical practitioner who is registered in the specialism of psychiatry in the Specialist Register kept by the General Medical Council and”—(Sojan Joseph.)

This amendment would require that the independent doctor is a registered psychiatrist.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 41

Amendments made: 197, in clause 8, page 5, line 13, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

“(a) meets the requirements specified in regulations under subsection (6A),”.

This amendment and Amendment 198 impose a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations about the training, qualifications and experience required in order to act as the independent doctor.

Amendment 198, in clause 8, page 5, line 25, at end insert—

“(6A) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about the training, qualifications and experience that a registered medical practitioner must have in order to carry out the functions of the independent doctor.

(6B) The regulations must include training about—

(a) assessing capacity;

(b) assessing whether a person has been coerced or pressured by any other person.

(6C) Subject to that, the regulations may in particular provide that the required training, qualifications or experience is to be determined by a person specified in the regulations.”

See the statement for Amendment 197.

Amendment 199, in clause 8, page 5, line 28, leave out subsection (8).

See the statement for Amendment 187.

Amendment 21, in clause 8, page 5, line 29, at end insert—

“(8A) Regulations under subsection (6)(a) must specify that training in respect of domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse is mandatory.”

This amendment would require the registered medical practitioner acting as the independent doctor to have undertaken training on domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse.

Amendment 200, in clause 8, page 5, line 30, leave out subsection (9).—(Kim Leadbeater.)

See the statement for Amendment 188.

I am satisfied that the items contained within the clause have been adequately debate. I do not therefore propose to permit a clause stand part debate.

Clause 8, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Doctors’ assessments: further provision

I beg to move amendment 201, in clause 9, page 5, line 36, leave out “and their medical records” and insert

“, examine such of their medical records as appear to the assessing doctor to be relevant,”.

This amendment provides that the duty on an assessing doctor to examine a person’s medical records is limited to records appearing to the doctor to be relevant.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 422, in clause 9, page 5, line 36, after “records” insert

“make such enquiries of professionals who are providing or have recently provided health or social care to the person as the assessing doctor considers appropriate,”.

This amendment requires an assessing doctor to make such enquiries of professionals who are providing, or have recently provided, health or social care to the person as the assessing doctor considers appropriate.

Amendment 468, in clause 9, page 5, line 37, at end insert—

“(aa) ask the person why they are seeking an assisted death.”

Amendment 423, in clause 9, page 6, line 20, at end insert—

“(2A) To inform their assessment, the assessing doctor must—

(a) consider whether they should consult a health professional or social care professional with qualifications in, or experience of, a matter relevant to the person being assessed;

(b) consult such a professional if they consider that there is a need to do so.

(2B) Where an assessing doctor consults a professional under subsection (2A)(b), the assessing doctor must give a written record of the consultation to the other assessing doctor.”

This amendment requires the assessing doctor to consider whether they should consult specialist health or social care professionals, and to consult them if they consider there is a need to do so. A record of any consultation must be shared with the other assessing doctor.

Amendment 201 provides that the duty on an assessing doctor to examine a person’s medical records is limited to records appearing to the doctor to be relevant, which makes sense. Amendment 422 requires an assessing doctor to make such inquiries of professionals who are providing, or have recently provided, health or social care to the person as the assessing doctor considers appropriate. Amendment 423 requires the assessing doctor to consider whether they should consult health or social care professionals, and to consult them if they consider there is a need to do so. A record of any consultation must be shared with the other assessing doctor.

The amendments seek to emphasise the importance of taking a holistic and multidisciplinary approach to the assessments by both doctors. The Bill as drafted provides that the assessing doctor must

“make such other enquiries as the assessing doctor considers appropriate”

when making the first and second assessments. With the amendments, I have sought to strengthen that language, by being much more explicit and making specific reference to consulting health and social care professionals. I have done so in response to the evidence we have received from professionals such as nurses and social workers, who often spend a significant amount of time with terminally ill adults.

It is clearly right that the assessing doctors should have access to all relevant details of a person’s medical records. If the records show that the person has recently been receiving health or social care, that may impact their application, so the doctors have to consult the providers of that care. As is the case at all stages in the process, records should be kept of any and all such discussions, and reports should be shared where appropriate.

Taken together, the amendments would ensure that the doctors’ assessments are thorough and comprehensive, and have taken into consideration the views and opinions of any wider health and social care team that may be working with a patient.

I will speak briefly to each of the amendments in this group. I will allow my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate to speak to the amendment in her name, but I state clearly that I very much support it. In my view, it is very important that the doctor asks the simple question of the patient, “Why do you want an assisted death?” The question is not being asked at the moment.

I respect the points that the hon. Member for Spen Valley has just made about amendment 201, and that the amendment may be intended to focus assessments on the information that is relevant. Nevertheless, it would introduce subjectivity into what is deemed relevant, and by narrowing the scope of the review of patient records, it could unintentionally allow for incomplete assessments, thereby undermining the safeguards that we all want to see. The risk is that potentially crucial medical history, including past mental health concerns, poor coercion indicators or undisclosed diagnoses, might be overlooked.

I call the Committee’s attention to the evidence from the British Geriatrics Society, which raised concerns that the definition of terminal illness in the Bill is often vague and risks misclassification, especially for older patients. Limiting the review of medical records could exacerbate that issue, as doctors may not have a full picture of the patient’s long-term prognosis and their mental health history. The General Medical Council has called for strong regulatory oversight to ensure that eligibility assessments are thorough.

Allowing doctors to determine which records are relevant, without standardised criteria for that judgment in the Bill, risks inconsistency and potential misdiagnosis. The criteria should include diagnosis and prognosis, treatment history, consultation, second opinions and mental health history. Consideration should also be given to disclosures of domestic violence and abuse, or patterns in medical records that might indicate domestic abuse without explicit disclosure, such as frequent visits for unexplained pain, chronic pain complaints, mental health concerns such as anxiety and depression, inconsistent explanations for injuries, and multiple visits to different healthcare providers. All of that should be properly considered by the assessing doctor.

I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that in the Netherlands, 1% to 2% of assessments annually—a significant number when we consider the volumes we are talking about—are deemed “not careful” under the law. Other countries do not have adequate ability to look into the data, but that is significant, and it is often due to inadequate consultation or documentation. I also draw attention to the fact that in our country, I am afraid to say, the cause of death listed by doctors is too frequently inaccurate. Analysis of postmortems suggests that one in 20 deaths have been wrongly recorded. Clearly, mistakes are made in medical records, and therefore it is particularly appropriate to require doctors to give complete consideration to the full medical history of the patient.

I recognise very much that we are trying to create a Bill that works in practice; nevertheless, I think we can emphasise streamlining and efficiency at the expense of patient safety, and we are doing that here. If we tell doctors that they are only required to sift through records that appear relevant to them—a quick skim of recent notes, a glance at the obvious items in a medical history—that may sound efficient, streamlined and practical, but it is likely to leave the vulnerable exposed, in particular when social workers and psychiatrists are not involved at this early stage, as they plainly should be. No multidisciplinary team is looking at the patient at this stage.

10.30am

Medical records in England and Wales are not an easy read, which is perhaps why concerns have been expressed about the requirement that doctors address the entirety of a patient’s medical history. That is a problem. There is a sprawling and fragmented archive of information. I have been discussing that with doctors to try to understand what they have to do. A patient’s story spills across GP files on EMIS or TPP, hospital notes from separate NHS trusts and scraps of paper from decades past. The NHS app gives a snapshot, but not the full picture.

Great care is needed from a doctor reviewing an assisted dying request, not only when it comes to diagnosis and prognosis—as we have discussed at length—but to gain a complete picture of the patient. Mental health history is where vulnerability screams the loudest. I have discussed this with doctors who have raised their concerns with me. A recent record might say, “Anxiety: sertraline prescribed”, which would appear relevant, but what if a psychiatry file siloed in another trust states: “Severe depression, 2023: suicidal ideation”? What if a GP note from five years back states: “Patient tearful, family pressure”? Those are not flashing neon signs, but they are there. The complex and difficult cases that we have spoken about again and again are the ones that are missed when a doctor skips the deep dive—when they look just for what they regard as relevant information, providing the necessary legal cover for any criticism after the event.

Let us think about abuse. Coercion does not advertise itself. A patient’s “yes” to assisted dying in last month’s consultation might look voluntary, leading us to close the case, but a safeguarding log saying, “Concerns raised about son’s influence, 2022” or “A&E visit: bruising unexplained” might sit untouched in files that might be dismissed as irrelevant. We know that these things are already missed too often.

This is not hypothetical. Buckinghamshire Disability Service informed me that disabled people are so used to finding that their NHS records are incomplete or inaccurate that Citizens Advice and other advice agencies recommend to them that they get their local record—their summary health record—personal independence payment-ready before they apply for disability benefits. People extremely commonly find diagnoses and treatments missing, wrong dates and inaccurate statements—the wrong leg listed as amputated; allergies or medication intolerance wrongly cited; major health incidents, including heart attacks, not listed; long-term conditions such as diabetes wrongly listed or not included. Mental health conditions are particularly likely to be missed off health summaries. This is not about bureaucracy or drowning doctors in paperwork.

Does the hon. Member share my concern that the wording in medical records has no duration over a person’s lifetime? For example, consulting all the medical records of someone in their 70s or 80s at the end of their life would surely include the records from when they were a child—childhood vaccinations, the removal of tonsils and so on—and that would clearly be impractical. Does he not agree that amendment 201 would clarify that element?

What the amendment clarifies is that the doctor does not have to look at any records at all unless he or she considers them relevant. It gives total discretion to the doctor to disregard huge swathes of the patient’s history. Yes, I do expect the doctor to review the entirety of a patient’s record—obviously, the record of a childhood broken leg can be skipped over quickly. What I do not want to do, as the Bill currently does, is allow the doctor to say, “Oh, I missed this evidence of a mental health condition” or “this indication of coercion from five or 10 years ago, because I didn’t consider that aspect of their records to be relevant.” It places a significant obligation on the doctor, but that is, I am afraid, what we are doing in the Bill. We are placing huge obligations on doctors and we should do it properly.

As the amendment states, it is about examining medical records for things that are relevant. If we are talking about coercion or capacity, these sorts of items will be relevant. I do not know if Members have ever seen medical records. Some people have extremely large medical records, and we have summaries for that, but if a part of that summary indicated something that we were suspicious of, we would look into it. As my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central has just said, the complexities of childhood tonsillitis do not really need to be examined in this case. We have to, and we always do, specify what we look into doctors.

As I have said in my many exchanges with the hon. Gentleman, I want to see the good practice that he claims—absolutely accurately, I am sure—to perform is applied across the system. He says that if doctors see in the summary some indication of concerns, they will look more closely into it. Well, I jolly well hope they would. The problem is that the summary might not be complete. I suppose the distillation of my point is that we should say, “Don’t rely on the summary. Proceed with a proper analysis. Take responsibility for making sure that you have reviewed the entirety of the patient’s record.”

We have to address throughout our consideration of the Bill the workload that we are placing on busy professionals. Nevertheless, if we consider that this matters—and it is a question about knock-on effects on the NHS, which we could discuss in due course—it is appropriate to expect proper time to be taken. A specialist with two hours and a full record in front of them might spot the misdiagnoses, question the prognosis, flag the depression and catch the abuse. If given half the time and a licence to skim the record, as the amendment would give them, they could very easily miss something, so I think the word “relevant” is a great gamble.

The hon. Member is discussing amendment 201, but there is also amendment 422, which indicates that the professional should make inquiries of other healthcare professionals who have been involved in treatment recently. Does he not agree that that would mitigate against the sort of scenario he describes?

I will come on to that. I agree with him: amendment 422 is a very helpful amendment, and I support that. It is a very good suggestion that wider consultation should be made, and it is a point that we have been trying to make with amendments throughout. I recognise that that would enhance the safeguards in the Bill—I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman.

Amendment 422 seeks to introduce an additional requirement that the assessing doctor must consider whether to consult health or social care practitioners who are providing, or have recently provided, care to the patient. The amendment is presented as addressing previously expressed concerns, but I regret to say that I feel it is excessively weak. It is a positive step in recognising the issue, but it does not ensure a broader and more informed assessment of a patient’s condition and external influences.

Patients with terminal illnesses often receive care from palliative care teams, social workers or community nurses who might have crucial insights into their wellbeing and the potential external pressures on them. The British Psychological Society has highlighted that mental health and social pressures are often overlooked in assisted dying requests in other countries. Social workers and allied health professionals play a key role in assessing whether a patient feels pressurised due to financial, social or familial burdens. As I have repeatedly said and we will debate further in due course, in my view it is very important that that assessment comes earlier in the process.

We have evidence from doctors—I will not cite it at length—pointing out that independent doctors who refuse assisted dying requests are often ignored, and patients are simply referred to another doctor willing to approve the request, as we have discussed. Consultation with health and social care professionals could act as an additional safeguard against that practice. Although the amendment introduces an obligation to consult other professionals, it leaves it to the discretion of the assessing doctor. It relies on the doctor’s subjective judgment

“if they consider that there is a need”.

I think that is too weak for assisted dying, where consistency is so critical. One doctor might consult a palliative care specialist to explore pain relief options, while another might not, assuming that they understand the patient’s suffering sufficiently. The variability in the Bill—this discretion—undermines fairness and safeguarding.

There is also a lack of accountability in what is a very sensitive process. There is no requirement to document the consideration process, which weakens oversight in a context where errors could be fatal. I respect the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire that we must not police conversations and that being prescriptive may encourage a tick-box approach. I am afraid that we risk that tick-box approach if this amendment is all that we do on this subject. We can imagine a scenario in which a doctor simply makes a note in the record with little underpinning substance.

There is also no obligation to act on the specialist input, so the duty ends at the consultation. There is no requirement to integrate the findings of the additional input that the doctor has received, which is a glaring flaw in what is an irreversible procedure that is being authorised. Finally, there is insufficient rigour for the ethical stakes. This discretionary duty is too weak to catch the difficult cases.

On the hon. Member’s point about recording those consultations, amendment 423 states in its proposed new subsection (2B):

“Where an assessing doctor consults a professional…the assessing doctor must give a written record of the consultation to the other assessing doctor.”So the consultation is recorded.

The hon. Lady is absolutely right, and that is very welcome. My concern is that there is no obligation to do anything about it. There is no obligation for the doctor to integrate the conclusions of the additional professionals that they have consulted into their treatment. I recognise that that provision is valuable and I welcome the amendments, but I suggest that they do not go far enough.

Let me use a hypothetical example to bring my point home to the Committee. Imagine a woman with terminal lung cancer asking to end her life. Her assessing doctor considers consulting a palliative care specialist for symptom control or a social worker to check on her home life, but decides, “My notes are enough. There’s no need for that.” What if the patient’s pain could be eased with a new approach that the doctor does not know about? What if her family’s pushing her to spare them the burden of her care goes unnoticed without a social worker’s input? The lady might die needlessly or be denied treatment unfairly.

The discretionary duty that the amendment would introduce essentially collapses because it does not force the broader scrutiny that patients deserve. The amendment sees the problem, but it is too feeble: it is too discretionary, too vague and too unenforceable for a choice as profound as assisted dying. While I will support it, I do not think it goes far enough.

Amendment 423 builds on amendment 422 by requiring that if the assessing doctor consults a specialist, a written record of that consultation must be shared, as the hon. Member for Spen Valley just mentioned. It is critical for transparency, consistency and accountability in decision making. In high-stakes cases, such as assisted dying requests, paper trails matter. Without a formal record, one assessing doctor might dismiss concerns raised by another professional without accountability—a point made by the hon. Member for Richmond Park.

As I pointed out in an intervention on the hon. Member for Richmond Park, it is remarkable how few jurisdictions around the world have such safeguards. The American model in Oregon, Washington and California does not track how many doctors a patient consults before finding one willing to approve an assisted dying request, so we do not know the extent of doctor shopping abroad. Canada’s system does not require refusals to be formally documented, making it difficult to assess the patterns of approval. Ensuring that records are available to both assessing doctors would add an extra layer of scrutiny and help to prevent doctor shopping.

However, while the amendment is a step in the right direction, it does not require an independent review of the records. Sir James Munby, the former president of the family division of the High Court, has criticised the lack of procedural rigour in oversight mechanisms, warning that assisted dying laws risk becoming a rubber-stamp exercise if refusals and approvals are not documented with transparency. The Royal College of General Practitioners has called for independent oversight of the entire process, not just a reliance on individual doctors. These amendments would partially address that, but would not fully resolve it.

Amendments 422 and 423 are welcome but otiose: they would simply give doctors permission to do what they should be doing anyway. If they are conscientious, they will do it anyway, and if not, they will not. It is slightly like an illegal gun amnesty: the good guys will not have illegal firearms in the first place, and the bad guys with guns are not going to hand them in voluntarily. I fear that we are requiring good behaviour of good people, and not requiring it of doctors who are not doing their job properly.

10.45am

We are constantly told that the Bill is about patient autonomy, but in fact we are creating huge doctor autonomy, and in one direction only. Amendment 201 refers to

“appearing to the assessing doctor to be relevant”,

amendment 422 to

“as the assessing doctor considers appropriate”,

and amendment 423 to

“if they consider that there is a need to do so.”

That is helpful in so far as it makes it clear they should pursue good practice, but there is a real concern that it will be seen as unnecessary to query the patient’s wish, examine their records or consult previous medics or other specialists, because it will be regarded as bureaucracy.

It has been suggested in this Committee that we are creating unnecessary hoops for doctors and patients to jump through. I am afraid that leaving it to the doctor’s discretion will compound the problem. Any discretionary inquiry to other doctors will be seen by the patient as unnecessary delay and will be potentially very stressful to them. My view is that inquiries should be routine and mandatory, but meaningful. They should be done properly. The only way to ensure that is by strengthening the Bill in the way we have suggested.

Order. Rebecca Paul has an amendment tabled in this group, so I shall call her next. I have had indications from Rachel Hopkins and Dr Opher that they wish to speak, and I see two others, of whom I shall make a note.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I rise to speak to my amendment 468 to clause 9, which would ensure that the assessing doctor must

“ask the person why they are seeking an assisted death.”

We have heard a lot in this Committee about the importance of the patient-doctor relationship. My hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said that we should be

“trusting in the judgment of clinicians, who know their patients well”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 26 February 2025; c. 634.]

He also said that patients

“may want to speak to their GP because they have had a relationship with them over 30 or 40 years”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 481.]

It is therefore worth asking how the Bill shapes the patient-doctor relationship.

The Bill asks doctors to do many things to and for patients. It asks doctors to consider whether to raise the subject of assisted suicide; personally, I wish we had agreed to the amendment that would have ensured that it was the patient who brought the subject up first, but we are where we are. The Bill asks doctors to explain the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis and to lay out options for treatment and palliative care, if there is any available; if there is not, the doctor can only state that point and move on. Nevertheless, we are asking the doctor to look into the matter and lay out possibilities.

The Bill asks doctors to check for capacity and for coercion, to ascertain whether the patient has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, to witness declarations and, eventually, to give the patient a substance and oversee the patient taking it. In other words, it makes doctors absolutely central to the process, as the facilitators of the process, as the people who accompany the patient and as the professionals with the biggest responsibility for ensuring that the safeguards are followed, yet it never asks doctors to make a simple but vital inquiry: why?

That is all that my amendment would add. It would simply require the assessing doctors to ask the person why they are seeking an assisted death. I hope that the Committee will agree that that would be a reasonable and not overly burdensome change. Some hon. Members have suggested that certain amendments embroider the Bill too much, but in this case, the patient-doctor conversation is already embroidered. The Bill makes some very specific demands of the doctor as to what the conversation should cover. Surely it is only natural, amid all the conversations, for the doctor to take a moment—perhaps more than a moment, but a moment at the very least—to help the patient to talk through their reasons. This is a very vulnerable moment in somebody’s life.

The simplest of questions can often unlock the most information. In some cases, for the small number who would benefit from the Bill, the answer would probably reassure the doctor, but for those others we worry about, the question would provide another important safeguard. It would be another opportunity to check that this really is in the best interests of the patient.

How would the conversation go? I do not think that we can generalise. It might be the briefest exchange or it might lead to a really searching discussion. Doctors know how to take their cue from the patients in these things. Crucially, the doctor’s role is not just to offer advice or information. Even if the doctor says nothing, it may make all the difference for the patient to be able to speak aloud their concerns, their confusion and their hopes and fears. I absolutely accept that many doctors, if not most doctors, would ask the question why anyway, but given its importance, I still urge the Committee to set that out in the Bill. In doing so, we would be affirming that this is more than a bureaucratic exercise; it is about a person and about getting to the truth of what they want and need.

I do not think we should not make the mistake of assuming that every doctor has the time, or will take the time, to have the in-depth conversations needed to really understand what is driving a patient’s request. It is up to us to make legislation that keeps standards high at all times. There is currently nothing in the Bill that will guarantee an in-depth conversation. I am afraid that not all doctors believe that that is even a likely outcome. In written evidence, the GP Edward Tulloch states:

“To conduct the required assessments outlined in 7.2 and 8.2 of the Bill within a standard GP appointment (lasting 10-15 minutes) is completely unrealistic. It will require multiple appointments to properly carry out such detailed discussions and complete the associated legal paperwork.”

We all know what pressure the NHS is currently under. Many of us cannot get a GP appointment. So, how certain are we that adequate time can be allocated to the assisted dying process to ensure the criteria are truly met?

By putting the “why” question on the face of the Bill, my amendment would bring us closer to the possibility of real, serious and honest conversations about a patient’s reason for seeking an assisted death. That would be especially helpful for those who have just received a terminal diagnosis. We have received some important written evidence from six palliative care doctors, who state that

The consultant psychiatrist Jennifer Bryden provides an especially interesting perspective, as someone who has seen this from both sides:

“Having gone through several long episodes of illness, I now know that feeling entirely useless and a burden to everyone is a phase that will pass. For many people a terminal diagnosis will be their first time through the cycle and they will believe those thoughts represent reality. In coming to terms with a severe illness, depression is an expected phase and learning to accept all humans need each other takes time”.

Dr Bryden goes on to say that the current cooling-off period is not enough time for people to come to terms with such a diagnosis. Clearly, people may need all the help they can get to understand their new situation. Asking the patient for their reasons is only the beginning of that process, but one that may help them come to terms with their situation and validate, or not, their initial inclination.

Finally, asking why can identify those patients who are being coerced or pressured. Nobody should think that that is easy to spot. According to the charity SafeLives, which counters domestic abuse, it takes the average person who experiences violent abuse 2.3 years to access effective help. In the year before they finally get help, 85% of victims will have sought help of some kind from an average of five professionals. Often, sad to say, those who missed the signs will have been healthcare professionals. That is for physical abuse; psychological abuse will be far harder to spot. We cannot put in enough safeguards to ensure that doctors have all the tools they need and all the opportunities they can, to spot those signs.

For clarity, at what point in the conversation does the hon. Member expect the question to be raised? In reference to an assessing doctor, do I take it that the question must be asked twice, at different times, by both the co-ordinating and the independent doctor?

I thank the hon. Member for his very good questions. I suggest that it be asked twice, because it makes a lot of sense to ensure that the patient is given the chance to really explain what is driving their decision. It is the simplest of questions, but it is amazing what can sometimes come out of the simplest question.

I return to the safeguard against coercion. In a sense, this is not a new safeguard; rather, it confirms and bolsters the other safeguards in the Bill, which are there to explore the reasons for assisted dying. Asking why will help doctors to better understand what is driving a patient’s decision and to give that patient an opportunity to validate that they are truly eligible. It is the simplest of questions, driving the most significant conversation that a doctor and patient can have. I hope that hon. Members will support my amendment.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I rise to speak in support of amendments 201, 422 and 423, which stand in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, and against amendment 468.

On amendment 201, a point was made earlier about the relevance of records. It was mentioned that it might well not be relevant to look at a childhood tonsillectomy. However, I wish to speak in slightly more specific terms, in support of women and their reproductive rights, and to highlight the risk of unconscious bias if all records are to be looked at.

If a woman had a termination in her teenage years, that will be highly irrelevant to her decision, many decades later, whether to choose an assisted death. Relevance is very important, because there will be a high level of record keeping in the process. It is not only the doctors working with the patient on the assessment who will read the records and reports; ultimately, it will also be the panel. I make the point again that so many parts of a patient’s medical records are highly irrelevant to the diagnosis and prognosis of a terminal illness, and to the six months under the eligibility criteria. Indeed, there is a risk of unconscious bias in the judgment. It is about the professionalism of the doctor in respect of understanding the records that are relevant for the process.

Will the hon. Lady give way?

I will continue, if I may.

I turn to amendments 422 and 423. The importance of a rounded, holistic assessment and discussion with the patient has been pointed out in many of our discussions, as has the importance of the multidisciplinary team and the other health and care professionals who support the patient with health and social care. That would all have to be recorded—the conversations that have been had, and why the assessing doctors and other health and social care professionals were involved. In oral evidence, many doctors in other jurisdictions said that they worked in multidisciplinary teams. The amendment would firm that up. It is about being clearer, because the clarity that the amendments provide would make for a stronger process.

On amendment 468, the hon. Member for Reigate pointed out that it asks a very simple question. However, I return to the point about the professionalism of the doctors involved in the process, who will be working within the legal requirement under the Bill that the individual have a clear, settled and informed wish. The doctors will have to check individuals’ eligibility under the requirements, for example that they are over 18 and have a terminal illness with a six-month prognosis. The doctors will use their expertise and professionalism, and that of the multidisciplinary team, to make assessments about coercion. They have strong rules about assessing for capacity.

The requirement to ask why someone wants an assisted death is a requirement to police the conversation that the doctor has with their patient. Setting it out in primary legislation would lead to a tick-box exercise, with doctors saying, “You’ve told me a number of times already in our conversation that I’ve been having with you, but I’m sorry: I have to officially ask this question and tick the box.” That could lead to an insensitive conversation and relationship between the relevant people in the process.

To a certain degree, the patient may think, “So what? Do I have to tell you why? It is none of your business why I want to pursue this legal course of action down the line.” I appreciate where the hon. Member for Reigate is coming from, but with the best of intentions, her amendment would actually lessen the individual’s autonomy and their right to choose what if the Bill passes will be a legal course of action. I am content that the stringent training that will be required for any of the assessing healthcare professionals will enable a good holistic conversation so that good judgments can be made. Adding this extra sentence would detract from that, so I cannot support the amendment.

11.00am

I support amendments 422, 468 and 423, which I think would strengthen and safeguard the Bill. However, as someone who worked in mental health for many years, I have grave concerns about amendment 201, which would restrict access to medical records. Health professionals work in environments with great confidentiality of records; I have no concern about health professionals or doctors having access to health records. Some Committee members have talked about doctors not needing to know whether a person had tonsillitis, but most medical records or GP summaries will note whether someone has had tonsillitis, along with details about vaccinations and infections. I do not think that those records will necessarily be relevant or that a doctor would look in detail at what medication they have had in that respect.

What is relevant, however, are records for people who have a mental health disorder or are vulnerable. For example, people with serious mental illnesses such as chronic treatment-resistant schizophrenia may be on treatments such as clozapine that, if stopped, will have an impact on their mental health. The treatment that they may undergo during terminal illness may have an interaction, and medication that they have been using for many years to treat their mental health condition may have to be stopped. Doctors need to know why the person wanted to choose that route, and whether it will have an impact on their mental health.

Restricting access to important medical records by the doctor who makes the decision will have an impact on very vulnerable people. As we have discussed before, people may be homeless or may not have any family members, and it will all have an impact on why they decide to seek the assisted dying route. People may feel that they are a burden to society and the system. If there is any documentation from six months or a year ago, it will be relevant for the doctor. Removing access to medical records for doctors will have an impact on people with mental disorders, intellectual disabilities and neurodevelopmental conditions, so I oppose amendment 201, although I support the other amendments.

I will try to keep my remarks brief. I first speak to amendment 468, tabled by the hon. Member for Reigate, on the asking of the question why someone wants to have an assisted death. When I originally came to this debate, Dermot, a humanist who was also my election agent—a lovely guy—came to me and said, “Now that this Bill is going through Parliament, will you support it”? I said, “Explain it to me.” He never once mentioned the word “autonomy”. If I remember correctly, what he talked about was suffering, pain and horrible deaths, which many hon. Members have referred to. We have heard lots of examples during this Bill Committee.

My hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire said that the decision was none of a doctor’s business and that the issue was about autonomy. However, if a woman was being coerced into an assisted death, the idea that it was none of the doctor’s business would not quite wash with me. We talk about autonomy, but if someone does not have autonomy in their lives—if they are in an abusive relationship, are a victim of coercion or have a vulnerability—they might not have the choice.

When we ask a question, it is often about something else. I have experienced this myself. I am very passionate; when I am talking about things, somebody might just stop me and say, “Naz—what’s this actually about?” That is all it takes to make me stop, take a step back and a breather, and think for a deeper minute about whether the issue could actually be about something else. We do not always stop to think.

The amendment is good practice; I do not in any way deny that. The hon. Member for Reigate is obviously coming from a really good place. However, the amendment is almost like specifying that when someone goes to see a doctor, the doctor has to say, “How can I help? What is wrong?” It is just unnecessary; that is my only feeling about it. If someone came in and said, “I would like to request an assisted death”, the doctor would not just say, “Okay”—they would ask how the patient was feeling. It is normal medical practice to ask what is going on in someone’s mind, so that does not need to be specified in the Bill.

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. There is a medical model and a social model of intervention. If I walk into a GP surgery with a really bad headache, I am prescribed paracetamol. If the headache gets worse, I am prescribed something stronger—maybe co-codamol or codeine. Doctors are really busy. We have had to add another 40,000 appointments just for people to get through systems, so we know how hard it is to get a GP appointment.

If the person who turns up at the GP’s with a headache is usually quite healthy, the doctor might not take a minute to ask about what has actually happened. If I say, “I have a headache because I am banging my head against the wall—I have that much stress”, that is a whole different conversation. Having that conversation with the patient—probing a little more—is, for me, very important from a holistic point of view.

I want to check that my hon. Friend was not implying that I had not thought deeply—for more than a minute–in the course of making my comments earlier.

No, that was not my implication. When referring to my hon. Friend’s remarks, I was speaking about a patient perhaps saying “It is none of your business” or that my hon. Friend was talking just about autonomy.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reiterating those points. Does she accept that it is a patient’s right to say, “It’s none of your business” in the course of the conversation?

I absolutely accept that it is the patient’s right to say, “It’s none of your business”, with the really clear caveat that they could well be a vulnerable patient. They might say that it was none of the doctor’s business, and that doctor might then not be able to explore the other things going on with that patient. That is why, for me, this does not wash.

The point that I am trying to make is that, in the course of a normal consultation, it is presumed that every doctor will know their patient and be able to have these conversations. In most cases, they probably will because we have amazing doctors; I have amazing relationships with my doctors. But does that mean that the doctors will ask that one question: “Why?” That is the crux of the whole Bill.

The right to say, “It’s none of your business” might be fine when no one else is involved, but if someone seeks an assisted death, that involves multiple members of NHS staff. There is an impact on all those people, who need to be comfortable with what they are doing. Maybe the person needs to accept that they do need to provide some information so that the medical staff feel comfortable about the question of eligibility.

That opens up a whole different debate for me. Some clinicians will not sign up to this process and some will. That is a whole different debate, but I take the point that there has to be a reason.

We talk about the option for referral to palliative care. I have previously moved amendments that would have meant a referral, without the option; however, when considering that option, a doctor needs to understand that if a patient says, “I do not have to explain myself—full stop”, or, “I do not want to talk about palliative care”, that should raise alarm bells. If a doctor says, “You’ve got this terminal illness. These are the options—let me spell them out for you. You have the option of referral to palliative care and the option of these drugs, so why do you want to kill yourself?”, and the patient turns around and says, “It’s none of your business”—

Will my hon. Friend give way?

Sorry, I will just finish my point.

From a common sense perspective—I am not medically qualified—that situation should make me, as a human being, want to understand more. As a human being, I would like to understand whether something else was going on, such as anger towards—

Will my hon. Friend give way?

Sorry, I will not give way until I have finished my point.

I would like those conversations to be at least explored, which is why I support the amendment.

The Bill already sets out a number of things that a doctor has to assure themselves of, with regard to coercion and capacity. They would do that having had a significant amount of training to establish, in the round, after consulting others, that one way or another the legal requirements have been met. The “Why?” question appears to me to bring in a judgmental element—

Subjective.

Indeed: subjective, as the right hon. Gentleman said. That is the point that I am trying to get at. There is an objective assessment, which is wholly appropriate, but a subjective assessment would lead down a different route and muddy the objective assessment.

I absolutely see where my hon. Friend is coming from and appreciate her concern, but we will have to agree to disagree as we have a difference of opinion. A subjective assessment might reveal that something else is going on for that patient.

I hate to put myself in this position, but imagine I have just received a diagnosis and I am going to die within six months. I could have a whole load of anger about that happening to me and I could say, “I don’t want this. I don’t want to talk about it. It’s none of your business. I’m angry—this is what I want.” At that point, does the doctor stop? In most cases, my hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire is absolutely right, but in some cases she might not be. I might want to shut the conversation down because I am angry or because other things are going on in my head and I do not want to explain. Amendment 468 would allow the doctor, from a compassionate point of view, to have another conversation with the patient.

11.15am

Does my hon. Friend agree that she is making a powerful case against amendment 468? A multitude of conversations and different circumstances will need to be taken into account; it is wholly inappropriate to have a mandated question in primary legislation. We should go back to clause 1, which I think the Bill is actually about. It states that the person must have

“a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”.

Does my hon. Friend agree that that is what is at the heart of the Bill, rather than decisions about what is in the person’s best interests?

I respectfully disagree. I am making the case that there is a conversation to be had. Yes, there is informed choice but is my hon. Friend suggesting that the question should not be asked at all? I take the point that with an informed choice there would have been an exploratory conversation, but sometimes just calling something out, or stating the obvious, makes a huge difference.

I wish to clarify that the amendment is about not an additional assessment but merely a simple question. Like many who have spoken, I hope that most good doctors would ask the question anyway and take the answer. It may inform them or it may not but sometimes, as the hon. Member for Bradford West has just discussed so powerfully, it is helpful to remind medical staff, who are under lots of time pressure, that sometimes it is worth stepping back and asking why.

I agree. Sometimes it will be the simple thing of asking the question as a human being—among all the conversations that are happening, just stopping and asking why.

I appreciate that my hon. Friend has given way a number of times, but I gently suggest that we already know the crux of the Bill and what we are debating. The “why” is that people with a terminal diagnosis, with six months to live, would like a course of action to end their lives in a pain-free way and to have the autonomy to do so.

We are in danger of over-legislating for a range of different permutations that could potentially happen in conversations. I agree that these kinds of questions are absolutely crucial, but it may satisfy my hon. Friend that amendment 21, to which we agreed a few moments ago, requires medical practitioners to take training on

“domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse”.

That sort of protection and safeguard has already been agreed to.

We will rely on highly specialised individuals to pick up on these issues. They may want to explore, through further questioning, why people are making these decisions but we cannot legislate for all the different sorts of conversations, and all the emotions that may be going through people’s minds. If someone comes back and says, as my hon. Friend put it, “Well, it’s none of your business,” or whatever the answer may be, we will rely on the specialised professionals to pick up on danger signs. However, that would not necessarily lead them in every single conversation to have a suspicion of the patient’s motives. Life and conversation do not work like that and we cannot legislate in that way.

I absolutely agree that life does not work like that. Life is very complicated and that is why I want the conversation to happen. My hon. Friend referred to amendment 21, which we have just agreed to. I spoke extensively about why that is a brilliant amendment that moves us towards much more safeguarding, but I also think that it does not go far enough for women, marginalised communities and people from ethnic minority backgrounds. I genuinely do not feel that amendment 468 is about over-legislating. It is just stating an obvious fact: sometimes, even in normal life, we go around the houses to get to a conversation and get to the right point. That is what I want to get to.

To follow up on the example my hon. Friend gave earlier, if—to be glib—someone said, “None of your business”, she would want the doctor to keep probing. At what point does that end? If someone genuinely does not want to have that conversation and says, “I want to end my life because I have a terminal diagnosis. I live in fear of the pain that could await me and I don’t really want to go into much detail,” where does that end? Where does that conversation continue to?

My hon. Friend makes my case for me. If that person says, “It’s none of your business, but I have so much pain,” at that point, automatically, as we naturally do as human beings—

But this is a pure example.

That example is a good example that strengthens my position.

I completely agree with the hon. Lady’s point. The conversation goes on in the way the doctor would want it to, but they have at least asked the question. Is it not very simple? The Bill already requires doctors to look for signs of external coercion. As we have acknowledged, there is no way to determine internal coercion—the influence people have on themselves. There is no way in the Bill at the moment to identify whether somebody feels that they want an assisted death because they fear that they are a burden to others. This question is the only opportunity we have to tease out that answer: does she agree?

I thank the hon. Member for that intervention and he makes an important point.

What is an acceptable answer? Can we have a list?

Does the right hon. Gentleman want to intervene?

indicated dissent.

The hon. Member for East Wiltshire makes an important point. Where are the opportunities? When doctors are doing the assessment.

The other issue that speaks to me is the question of internalised bias. We will have professionals with subconscious bias or affirmed bias. They will be clinicians who have chosen or agreed to take part in the process; fundamentally, the majority of clinicians will not take part in this process because of their beliefs. It changes the relationship between doctor and patient from a societal perspective.

I know that a number of times I have been stopped during a process and asked a different question, and at times that opportunity for reflection—even without the pressure of knowing I have only six months to live—is of benefit to me. I am sure that others would benefit from it, too, particularly because the decision is so momentous. For that reason, I will certainly support amendment 468.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley for tabling amendment 201. I have mixed views on it. I appreciate what my hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire said about medical records, especially when it comes to women and their past, but I also appreciated what my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford said about his experience from a mental health perspective.

I am still thinking about the amendment and I am not sure whether I will support it or not, but further thought needs to be given to the subject. There are the issues of mental health and women’s rights, but another issue applies, too. If someone has experienced trauma in childhood but that trauma has come out much more recently, even though it does not necessarily affect the decision at hand—whether to choose an assisted death—is there some kind of historical post-traumatic stress disorder that would then need to be explored? I do not have the answer, but I look forward to hearing the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on that point. I would value hearing whether she has thought about that and what her understanding of it is.

As I have mentioned before, the Government have worked closely with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on some mutually agreed amendments, including amendments 201, 422 and 433. The amendments that the Government support aim to ensure the legal robustness and operability of the legislation, should it pass, and I will offer a technical explanation for them.

Amendment 201 will clarify the wording in clause 9 on the doctor’s assessment. It provides that the duty on an assessing doctor to examine a person’s medical records applies only to records that appear relevant to the doctor. The effect of the amendment is to make clear as part of the assessment process that the assessing doctor is required only to review medical records that are considered by the doctor to be relevant to the person’s request to seek an assisted death.

Amendment 422 would add an additional requirement on an assessing doctor to make inquiries of professionals who are providing or who have recently provided health or social care to the person and make such other inquiries as the assessing doctor considers appropriate. This applies to—

Order.

11.25am

The Chair adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No. 88).

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Seventh sitting)

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Dawn Butler, Dame Siobhain McDonagh, Dr Andrew Murrison, † Graham Stuart

† Bool, Sarah (South Northamptonshire) (Con)

† Botterill, Jade (Ossett and Denby Dale) (Lab)

† Eagle, Dame Angela (Minister for Border Security and Asylum)

Forster, Mr Will (Woking) (LD)

† Gittins, Becky (Clwyd East) (Lab)

† Hayes, Tom (Bournemouth East) (Lab)

† Lam, Katie (Weald of Kent) (Con)

† McCluskey, Martin (Inverclyde and Renfrewshire West) (Lab)

Malhotra, Seema (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department)

† Mullane, Margaret (Dagenham and Rainham) (Lab)

† Murray, Chris (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)

Murray, Susan (Mid Dunbartonshire) (LD)

† Stevenson, Kenneth (Airdrie and Shotts) (Lab)

† Tapp, Mike (Dover and Deal) (Lab)

† Vickers, Matt (Stockton West) (Con)

† White, Jo (Bassetlaw) (Lab)

† Wishart, Pete (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)

Robert Cope, Harriet Deane, Claire Cozens, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 11 March 2025

(Morning)

[Graham Stuart in the Chair]

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

9.25am

Would everyone please ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent mode? We now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The grouping and selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room, as well as on the parliamentary website. I remind Members about the rules on the declaration of interests, as set out in the code of conduct.

Clause 37

Repeal of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

It is a pleasure once more to be in this delightful room doing line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill.

The clause repeals in full the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. The Act, which requires that decision makers treat Rwanda as a safe third country for the purposes of removing individuals there, and disapplies sections of the Human Rights Act 1998, was passed by the previous Government in an attempt to facilitate removals to Rwanda under the migration and economic development partnership. Despite that, the Act has served no practical purpose since it became law: no decisions were made that were affected by its provisions, and, as we have stated repeatedly, only four individuals were ever relocated voluntarily. No enforced removals to Rwanda ever took place under the partnership.

The Government have been clear from the outset that we will not proceed with the partnership. There is no evidence that it was successful in deterring small boat arrivals, nor has it delivered value for money for the British taxpayer. On the contrary, nearly 84,000 people arrived on small boats between 14 April 2022, which was the date the partnership was announced by the former Government, and 5 July 2024, which was the day after this Government were elected.

The Government have been clear that we will not make further payments to Rwanda, saving £100 million in upcoming annual economic transformation and integration fund payments, and a further £120 million that the UK would otherwise have been liable to pay once 300 individuals had been relocated to Rwanda. That is without even considering the additional staffing and operational costs, which would have been substantial. We will also exit the UK-Rwanda treaty as part of ending the partnership. It is therefore appropriate for the Government to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act so that the legislation, which relies on the provisions of the treaty, will no longer be on the statute book. That is what clause 37 achieves.

Clause 37 repeals the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. In doing so, the Government are removing the only deterrent, and indeed the only place where we can send people who have arrived from a safe third country. It is well established that it is extremely difficult to return people to some countries. In addition, the lack of documentation can frustrate the process of removal to someone’s home country. That is why a third country deterrent is needed: if people cannot be removed to their home country, they can and will be removed to a third country.

The logical consequence of repealing the Safety of Rwanda Act is that a greater number of migrants will arrive from countries that are harder to return them to. Without some form of agreement to send the migrants to a safe country, they will continue to come and to stay. Section 80AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 contains a list of safe countries, but the list is limited to countries that contribute very few illegal migrants, save for Albania. The last Conservative Government cut the number of Albanian illegal migrants coming to the UK by small boat crossings by over 90%, showing that our returns agreement with Albania worked. As the former director general of Border Force said:

“If we cannot send them back, we could send them to another safe country—ergo, Rwanda—where they could be resettled safely without adding to the continuing flow of arrivals by small boat from France.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 41, Q43.]

Channel boat crossings are up 28% since the election, with more than 1,300 people crossing in the week commencing 1 March 2025. This Labour Government have smashed farmers, small business owners and pensioners, but it seems that the people-smuggling gangs are the only ones who are safe. The only thing that will stop the gangs is a strong deterrent that means that people do not board small boats because they know that they will be deported if they reach the UK, and they will not be allowed to stay.

The additional offences and powers in this Bill are welcome as far as they go, but, with the scrapping of the Conservatives’ deterrent—that if someone has no right to be in this country, they will not be able to stay—this Bill is just window dressing. It will not, and cannot, stop people crossing the channel in small boats. The Government know that, because their own impact assessment shows that only a handful of people each year would be imprisoned because of the new offences created by this Bill.

Since the announcement that our deterrent would be scrapped, there are almost 8,500 more people in asylum hotels. That is the Government’s failure.

I was trying to count the number of times the hon. Member used the word “deterrent”, and I ran out of fingers. Could he please define what a deterrent is?

Does the hon. Gentleman want me to use my fingers to help him to count? The deterrent is preventing people from getting in those boats. If people know that they will be detained and removed when they arrive in this country, they will stop coming.

Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that the crossings have risen from 299 in 2018 to more than 150,000 since then, the majority of them on the Conservatives’ watch? Does he also acknowledge that deportations have increased by 24% under this Government?

Does the hon. Gentleman know what has happened with global migration? If we compare the movements that have been made in the last week, those into Europe and those into this country seem to be slightly misaligned. The number of people arriving in this country is up 28%. The number of people put into hotels in communities across this country is up 29%; that is 8,500 more people. The number of people who have arrived in this country illegally and been removed is down significantly since this Government came to office.

It is clear that a new approach is needed. The National Crime Agency said that stopping channel migrants is not possible without a Rwanda-style scheme. It was a terrible mistake for Labour to cancel our deterrent before it had even started. The Labour Government like to point out the cost of the Rwanda plan, but a deterrent that stops illegal migrants from making the crossing and settling in the country will save the state billions in lifetime costs.

As Karl Williams from the Centre for Policy Studies pointed out,

“the Office for Budget Responsibility’s analysis last summer…estimates that a low-skilled migrant, or low-wage migrant as the OBR puts it, will represent a lifetime net fiscal cost to the taxpayer of around £600,000.”

Williams then pointed to

“analysis from Denmark, the Netherlands and other European countries that asylum seekers’ lifetime fiscal costs tend to be steeper than that” ––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 43, Q49.]

The evidence therefore suggests that if 35,000 people cross the channel a year—that is roughly where we were last year—at that sort of cost range, the lifetime costs will probably be £50 billion or £60 billion.

I ask the hon. Member to desist from referring to that report. In oral evidence, I asked two experts whether they thought it was possible to make such assessments on the basis of the available evidence, and they declined. In fact, the author of that report said that the available evidence was fairly lacking in robustness and integrity. When I asked him whether he had considered certain key counterfactuals, he admitted that he had not. Later, in response to my question about whether it was appropriate for MPs to brandish such research, Professor Brian Bell said that it would be “foolhardy” to do so because the report itself made “very brave” assumptions.

Will the hon. Member now desist from using that report, given that we are in a democracy, we are striving for accountability and truth, and we should not be using fake information?

Order. Interventions must be short.

I apologise, Mr Stuart.

I will not desist from using those figures, but I would be happy to hear the hon. Member’s alternative figures when the time comes. I am sure this is not cost-neutral; I am sure it is very expensive.

As I was saying, that is why an effective removals and deterrent agreement is needed. I ask the Minister whether the Government are looking at a removals and deterrent agreement. If not, why are they repealing the UK’s only deterrent? How does she think we can control our borders without one, when it is clear that this Bill will not be effective in doing so? Does she agree with the National Crime Agency that a removals agreement is the only way to stop channel migrants, as happened with Operation Sovereign Borders in Australia?

The Government say that they are clearing the backlog and returning people who arrived on small boats. That is just not the case. The most recent immigration figures show that the asylum backlog is higher than when Labour came into office, and returns of small boat arrivals were down again in the most recent quarter, with only 4% of arrivals being removed. In fact, of the total returns between October and December 2024, only 16% were enforced; in the three months before, only 13% were. Does the Minister think that allowing 96% of illegal immigrants who arrive by small boat to stay in the UK is a deterrent?

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart, and I promise that I will be briefer. Does the hon. Member agree that the overwhelming trend under the last Conservative Government in the balance between enforced and voluntary returns was in favour of voluntary returns? In fact, in 2023, only 24% of returns were enforced, in 2022, 25% were and in 2021, 27% were. Does he not agree that the trend over the last years has been one of voluntary returns?

I would say that the big issue around deterrence is how many of those who arrive in small boats are removed. Despite the fact that the number of those arriving illegally is up 28%, the number who are being returned is down significantly. That is the big question at play here.

I thank the hon. Member for his patience. Does he agree that he is moving the goalposts slightly to manufacture a political argument that, as he knows, would not be supported by the evidence available? Furthermore, will he look back into history at the record of the last Labour Government? I invite him to comment on their success—I know that he will want to jump at that. In 2004, 85% of people reaching our country were removed through enforced returns; in 2005, 73% were. Where there was a trend of enforced returns, it was actually under the last Labour Government.

In terms of the political arguments, what people out there want to see is the number of people arriving illegally in this country going down. They are not seeing that; it is up 28%. They want to see the number of hotels in communities across the country going down. It is not, although it was. The number of people arriving was also going down, but it is now up 28%, and there are 8,500 more people in hotels. That is the reality of the situation.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way; he is being very generous. Of course, that is what Committee debates are meant to be about; it is easier to have a bit more to and fro in Committee than it often is on the Floor of the House, when we have two and a half minutes and we have had to rewrite our speech and discard most of what we were going to say.

Will the hon. Gentleman admit that the way in which the Illegal Migration Act interacted with the Safety of Rwanda Act meant that nobody could be processed at all; they were just stuck, and there was a build-up in hotels of small boat arrivals and other asylum claimants who could not be processed? That meant that there was a big backlog, and we have had to restart decision making. That inevitably means that there will be a slowdown in sending back people who have arrived by small boat until we can get on top of the backlog that the Conservative Government created.

The principle at stake is that if someone arrives in this country illegally, they will be removed. We were not processing people who had arrived illegally and were meant to be removed, but we were returning more of them before the election than we are now. However, I will get through my comments, and there will be plenty of time then for debate—we have a full morning ahead of us.

Does the Minister think that allowing 96% of illegal migrants who arrive by small boat to stay in the UK is a deterrent? At the moment, people know that if they come here on a small boat, they are 96% likely to be allowed to stay. That is a strong pull factor. The only way to remove that pull factor is to reinstate a strong deterrent. People need to know that if they arrive here on a small boat, they will not be able to stay. Can the Minister explain how she will increase the number of removals without a third country to which migrants can be sent? If it is not Rwanda, where will they go? Will it be Redcar? Will it be Romford? Will it be Richmond? Where will these people who cannot be removed to a safe country go?

As Alp Mehmet said,

“repealing the Rwanda Act will encourage illegal immigration… 240,000 people were declared to have entered”

the EU “illegally last year” and will likely end up coming to the UK. The Government have confirmed with this Bill and the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda Act that there is no deterrence, because once people arrive here, the likelihood is that they will be able to stay. Mehmet also echoed the comments from the National Crime Agency, saying,

“the only deterrent is to restrict arrivals, and to contain and remove quickly. That will send the right message.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 39-40, Q43.]

As he pointed out, there is not “anything in the Bill” that would suggest that people will be removed quickly. Why has a removals agreement not been included in the Bill? The EU is now looking at offshore processing and deportation centres. There is also a growing consensus in the EU that the 1951 refugee convention is not fit for purpose. What assessment has the Minister made of the impact of these changes on the UK? Why have the Government scrapped the Rwanda plan, leaving the UK as an outlier? We wish to oppose the repeal of the Act by way of a Division.

I welcome the opportunity to examine the failed Rwanda scheme. The Israeli scheme, which was set up more than a decade ago, provides stark evidence that the previous Government should have considered before recycling an idea that has cost taxpayers £700 million. In Israel, asylum seekers were given a stark choice: be sent home, go to a migrant detention facility or take $3,500 on a one-way flight to Rwanda. One such asylum seeker quickly found that he was not welcome on arrival. No sooner had he landed in Kigali than he was told he had to leave again for Uganda, and for a fee. He said that he quickly left for Greece on a small boat and then travelled over land to Switzerland, where he is now settled. Another used a $5,000 payment that he received to catch a flight to Amsterdam, where he then claimed asylum status.

The previous Conservative Government entered into the agreement with Rwanda with full knowledge of the previous failings there and offered individuals a personal payment of £3,000 to resettle their lives. Figures have been bandied about on how many asylum seekers Rwanda was willing to take, with the previous Government saying 1,000, and Rwanda saying between 100 and 200. It is not clear who was right, but a question that has often been repeated to me is: how can that be regarded as a deterrent? Indeed, our witnesses from the refugee support organisations made the point that people will continue to come and try their luck, and 84,000 took that risk. I welcome the fact that we have our common sense back and we are repealing the Act, but I despair at the waste of taxpayers’ money on pursuing a fantasy that had already failed elsewhere.

Good morning to you, Mr Stuart, for week two of our fascinating journey into the depths of the Bill. There will be absolutely no argument from me about this one, and I wholeheartedly agree that the Bill must go through. When we look back at the whole sorry Rwanda debacle, we will wonder how on earth such a crackpot scheme was not only conceived, but actually constructed and delivered. A few words will be forever on the gravestone of the last Conservative Government: “stop the boats” and “Rwanda”. It was the first time, in my experience, that an Act decreed a new reality. Through sheer willpower alone, the Conservatives declared that Rwanda was a safe place, and in true Orwellian style, they even called the legislation the Safety of Rwanda Act. It was the most blatant political attempt ever to try to convince us that black was white.

Rwanda is so safe that it is currently accused of supporting the M23 militia, which is claimed to be recruiting child soldiers and carrying out killings and rapes of civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Saying all that, Rwanda played an utter blinder. It milked this for all it was worth. It saw these mugs coming. So far, Rwanda has made £240 million—money that will not have to be paid back. The Bill was described by the Law Society as “defective” and “constitutionally improper”, and it was declared unlawful in the Supreme Court. All those rebukes did nothing for the Conservatives other than to encourage them to ensure that the idea became a reality.

We just have to look at the sheer waste and the sheer stupidity that was the very essence of the Rwanda policy. The headline was that it cost taxpayers £750 million and failed to deport a single asylum seeker against their will. There was £270 million to support economic development in Rwanda, £95 million for detention and reception centres and £280 million for other fixed costs. Fifty million pounds was spent preparing for flights that never took off.

Then there is the farce of the Kigali four—the four volunteers sent to Rwanda, who were the only people who actually made it through the whole scheme. Tortoise did us a favour by unearthing the script that was used when the Home Office tried to persuade people to take up a “generous one-time offer” of a relocation package to Rwanda. One source said that demonstrated an

“insane level of resource that went into just proving the concept”.

9.45am

The Tories were so obsessed with the scheme that it totally blinded them to what was happening in the rest of the immigration landscape. We heard an example of that from the Minister. They were so exclusively focused on Rwanda and spent so much political capital on it that they did not notice the hundreds of thousands of people who just happened to come into the UK through a new immigration system that they had put in place but did not properly understand. Even small boat crossings hit record levels in the year that the Rwanda policy was announced, and deaths in the channel steadily rose in the subsequent period. A deterrent it most definitely was not.

Asylum seekers came to the same assumption as every other practical person in the UK: they knew that there was no chance, or very little chance, that they would ever be put on a flight to Rwanda. The Tories tell us that they want to keep the policy. Instead of defending it and trying to bring it back, they should apologise for it and promise never to come up with something as hare-brained again, but after listening to the leader of the Conservative party over the weekend talking about stopping human rights for asylum seekers, I do not think they have learned their lesson. They should be asking for forgiveness for trying to forcibly remove refugees to a third country where their safety could not be guaranteed. They have a hard neck trying to bring the scheme back, and have lost the little credibility they had left on asylum.

I have just few words of caution for my Labour colleagues. It was great to see them so animated this morning; this is obviously a real target. We all love Tory-bashing, and this presents such an obvious target for all of us, so enjoy yourselves—but I have a warning. Labour Members talk about deterrence, and I followed with great interest the exchange between the hon. Member for Stockton West and the hon. Member for Bournemouth East. The Government have put deterrence at the heart of their Bill, but if Rwanda was not going to work, neither are some of the features in the Bill. People sitting in a war-torn region take no account of deterrence.

I wonder just how long it will take the Labour Government to start to get into the same territory as the Tories. I can see it coming: they are backtracking on the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and some other features in this grotesque race to the bottom of who can be the hardest on Reform. I suspect that in a few years’ time the hon. Member for Stockton West might actually get his wish and the Labour party will introduce Rwanda mark 2. I say to Labour Members: “Think very carefully—particularly about clause 38, about the IMA—about wandering down this route.” I have my doubts that they will resist the temptation to revisit some of the territory that the Conservatives trailblazed with their last stupid scheme.

I thank the hon. Member for Stockton West for his creative statement. The chaos in our asylum system and the dangerous rise in illegal small boat crossings is, of course, one of the greatest challenges facing our country, and for years the British public have been promised solutions. They were told that the previous Government’s Rwanda policy would fix the problem, but instead it proved a costly failure. It got stuck in legal battles, was riddled with operational flaws and was utterly ineffective. I will go into detail about that soon.

In 2018, 299 people crossed the channel on small boats. By 2022, the number had surged to 30,000—a hundredfold increase on the Conservatives’ watch. Despite their grand claims that the Rwanda scheme would act as a deterrent, more than 80,000 people crossed the channel after the scheme was announced, and not a single asylum seeker has been successfully removed under it—not one. It is clear that this policy failed.

Let us start with the legal reality. The Rwanda asylum scheme was not just controversial but unlawful. In November 2023, the UK Supreme Court struck it down, ruling that Rwanda was not a safe country to send asylum seekers. The reason for that was systematic defects in Rwanda’s asylum system: almost no claims from Afghans, Syrians or Yemenis were ever approved. The Court found a serious risk that genuine refugees could be sent back to danger, in direct breach of international law. Let us not forget that Rwanda has a track record here: a previous deal with Israel, mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw, led to refugees being secretly deported back to their home countries, in clear violation of human rights protections. This policy depends on breaking the law, and that is no policy at all. It is a legal and moral dead end.

That is why the Bill repeals the Rwanda scheme and replaces it with a system that upholds the rule of law. It will focus toughness where it belongs: not on desperate people, but on the criminal gangs who exploit them. Instead of wasting years in court, we will implement a legally sound system that actually works.

Further, the Rwanda scheme was not just unlawful; it was an economic disaster. As of mid-2024, at least £318 million had already been spent on this failing policy. What did taxpayers get in return? Nothing—no removals or deterrent effect, just an ever-growing backlog of cases and ever-rising hotel bills, which we have inherited. Even if the scheme had gone ahead, it would have been staggeringly expensive. The National Audit Office estimated that removing just a few hundred people could cost up to £2 million per person, yet we are expected to believe that this was a serious solution to the problem of tens of thousands arriving each year on the Conservatives’ watch.

This Government are putting an end to that waste. Instead of throwing money at a scheme that does not work, we are investing in practical measures. This approach is already delivering results: since taking office, the new Government have increased enforced removals by 24%. That shows that when we have a working system, we do not need gimmicks like the Rwanda plan; we just need competence.

This is not just about law or economics. It is also about how we treat people. A core British value is strength, but another is decency. Strength without decency is weakness, as the previous Government demonstrated. The Rwanda scheme was not just ineffective; it was cruel. It was based on the idea that people fleeing war and persecution should be someone else’s problem, no matter the risk to their safety.

Let us be clear that many of those crossing the channel are genuine refugees—they include people fleeing the Taliban in Afghanistan, dictatorship in Iran and war in Syria—but the Rwanda policy, and, it would seem, the Conservatives, did not care. The policy made no distinction, lumped everyone together and treated them as a problem to be shipped off 4,000 miles away, out of sight and out of mind—although of course it did not work.

That is not the British way. This country has a proud history of offering sanctuary to those in need, and we do not abandon our humanitarian duties for the sake of a headline and a gimmick. Of course, those who should not be here will be deported, as we are already seeing, and those who genuinely need help will receive it under this Government. A true deterrent is taking out the smuggling gangs and deporting those who should not be here. The truth is that we do not stop the boats by shouting slogans; we stop the boats by giving people an alternative.

Finally—I thank hon. Members for their patience—the Rwanda plan was never operationally viable. Even if it had survived the legal challenges, the logistics were impossible. To make it work, the Government would have had to detain nearly every small boat arrival indefinitely—a task for which we simply do not have the detention space, the staff or the legal authority. Rwanda itself had agreed to take only a few hundred people a year, which is a drop in the ocean—excuse the pun—compared with the scale of the problem. Meanwhile the real criminals—the smuggling gangs—continued to operate freely. The Rwanda plan did nothing to target them. It was an illusion of control, rather than a real solution.

This Government take a serious, workable approach. That is how we secure the border: not through wishful thinking, but through real enforcement. The Conservatives have tried gimmicks. They tried grandstanding; they tried expensive, legally dubious, headline-chasing policies, and they failed. It is time to move forward. We will uphold the rule of law, protect those in genuine need and take real action against the criminals exploiting them.

These are difficult problems and challenging questions. Practically every country in the western world is struggling with this and, with the notable exception of Australia, effectively none has solved it. The basic logic of the situation is that, if someone comes here illegally from a place to which it would be dangerous to return them, there are only four options.

First, they could be sent back to the country they came from. That is not legal in our current framework—even before getting to the morality of doing such a thing. Secondly, they could be put in immigration detention indefinitely. That is also not legal; a person can be held in immigration detention only if there is a realistic prospect of removal, which there would not be in this case. Thirdly, they could stay here indefinitely. That is not fair, and it is not what the public want. Finally, they could go somewhere else—a safe third country. Such an agreement was very difficult to broker; indeed, until the Rwandans agreed, many considered it to be impossible.

Clearly, the Government have little time for the Rwanda scheme and destroying it was one of the first things they did in office, but the basic logic problem remains. The last Conservative Government did not get everything right—that is for sure—but the Rwanda scheme was a genuine attempt to solve this truly hard problem, and it remains the only solution that we can see.

Does the hon. Lady accept that there is a fifth option? Just because someone does not have the right to be in the UK, it does not mean that they do not have the right to go to any other country in the world. The programme of voluntary returns, which massively went down under the Conservatives but has gone up massively under this Government, is part of the solution to that.

As we have heard, people who have come here illegally are not voluntarily leaving the country. Most of the voluntary returns are overstayers or people who have not come here on small boats.

But they could.

But they do not. There will always be people who come to this country illegally from dangerous places. They are human beings responding to obvious incentives. Could the Minister please tell us which of the four options she thinks is the right one? Is it sending someone back to a dangerous country, which will entail a change in the law and probably leaving the European convention on human rights? Is it holding someone in immigration detention indefinitely, which has the same conditions? Is it allowing people to stay here, or is it sending them to a third country?

It is a pleasure, once again, to serve under your chairpersonship, Mr Stuart. I was disappointed but not surprised to hear that the official Opposition want to keep the Safety of Rwanda Act on the statue books. I was disappointed for a number of reasons, which I will set out shortly, but I was not surprised. I have seen the way in which the Tories continue to position and conduct themselves on immigration policy. It is clear to me that they simply refuse to learn the lessons of the last 12 months. The public saw right through their Rwanda plan. They could see it for exactly what it was: a gimmick that was both unworkable and unaffordable.

Before today, I thought I would familiarise myself with the Report stage and the Third Reading of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. At the time, a good number of Committee members, including me, had yet to be elected, but reading the debates really brings home the sense of chaos that had engulfed the Conservative party at the time. The then shadow Home Secretary, now Home Secretary, summed it up:

“What a farce…We have a Prime Minister with no grip, while the British taxpayer is continually forced to pay the price. Former Tory Cabinet Ministers and deputy chairs from all sides have been queueing up to tell us it is a bad Bill. They say it will not work, it will not protect our borders, it will not comply with international law and it is fatally flawed.”—[Official Report, 17 January 2024; Vol. 743, c. 966.]

A previous Attorney General, the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), stated that

“to arrogate to oneself the right to declare one’s own compliance with international law runs the risk of, first, other states finding comfort in our example and, secondly, undermining our own messages in other situations. That makes this not just bad law, but bad foreign policy.”—[Official Report, 17 January 2024; Vol. 743, c. 855.]

This is an example of utter chaos. The Law Society, in welcoming the repeal of the Rwanda Act, said in its evidence to this Committee that the Act

“set a dangerous legal and constitutional precedent by legislating to overturn an evidence-based finding of fact by UK courts that Rwanda is an unsafe country to send asylum seekers to.”

However, the measure made it on to the statute book. The Rwanda plan ran for two years and, as we know and have heard several times this morning, a grand total of four volunteers were sent to Rwanda at the not insubstantial cost of £700 million to the UK taxpayer—quite a remarkable feat.

While hundreds of millions of taxpayer pounds were sent to Rwanda, the legislation’s effect was felt in the UK. As a result of the fantastical Rwanda plan, huge backlogs of asylum claims were building, with tens of thousands of people in hotels unable to leave because of the design of the Illegal Migration Act. We know that the use of hotels does not represent value for money and we are moving away from it. When it comes to the idea of the Rwanda policy being a deterrent, from its inception to the announcement it was to be scrapped, 84,000 people crossed the channel in small boats. It is always difficult to measure a deterrent’s effectiveness, but that is a pretty clear indicator that a deterrent it was not.

10.00am

An important part of this scrutiny process is that we take the opportunity to hear from witnesses who have valuable expertise in this area. From listening to the oral evidence and wading through the written evidence, we do not have to dig too deep to find out what organisations and individuals think of the Rwanda legislation. We asked about the repeal of the Rwanda Act and the majority of the Illegal Migration Act. At that point, Enver Solomon from the Refugee Council called the Act a “disaster” that caused

“a fundamental meltdown that resulted in the system pretty much coming to a standstill. The system slowed down, with productivity in asylum decision making at its lowest level since the height of the covid pandemic.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 6-7, Q3.]

On the strain that such a system put on public services, he said:

“The number of people in hotels—asylum contingency accommodation, as it is called—reached record numbers. Hotels were being stood up in communities without proper prior assessments with relevant agencies of the potential needs—health, the NHS, and tensions vis-à-vis the police.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 10, Q9.]

The Children’s Commissioner also gave evidence and, speaking from children’s perspective, stated:

“I am pleased to see the Rwanda Act repealed. Children told me that it would not have stopped them coming; they were just going to disappear at 18. It would have ended up putting them at more risk.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 22, Q21.]

So not good for children, not value for money and a huge increase in the asylum backlog. When it comes to the idea of a deterrent, the evidence suggests it would have been unsuccessful in that regard too. We heard from Professor Brian Bell, who said:

“The numbers are certainly not consistent with a story of a very significant deterrent effect from the Rwanda Act…The cost was staggering for a policy that was very unlikely to have a significant deterrent effect.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 56-57, Q84.]

Professor Bell went on to say:

“My personal view is that getting asylum claims dealt with more quickly would have been a much more effective use of public resources.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 57, Q85.]

I could not agree more. That is what this Government are focused on doing.

The Government have transferred staff and resources from the failed Rwanda scheme. We have refocused our efforts on a new returns and asylum system and Border Security Command, which has boosted levels of returns and enforcement. That, as we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Dover and Deal, has led to a 24% increase in enforced returns in our first seven months of those who have no right to be in the UK. Some 19,000 people were returned by the end of January, including the four largest return charter flights in our country’s history. There has been a 38% increase in illegal working raids and arrests compared with the same period under the previous Government.

There are no more gimmicks. Instead there is investment in a workable system with new structures and resources to smash the gangs that cause so much misery to so many vulnerable people.

Good morning, Mr Stuart. It was interesting to hear from the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire that he considered the Rwanda scheme a crackpot scheme. Another opinion is that it was “un-Conservative and un-British”—the opinion of John Major, the former Conservative Prime Minister. We have to acknowledge that the basic principle of this Bill is to address the failures of past legislation. Indeed, the Minister explained during an earlier debate that it is not possible to make the suite of legislation involved in the Safety of Rwanda Act and the Illegal Migration Act work together coherently. Not to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act would undermine confidence in the credibility of the Bill. We are moving away from reliance on expensive gimmicks, hotel use, the flaw that is the Rwanda Act, with its price tag of £700 million of taxpayers’ money, and failure to effectively process the people arriving on our shores. Do we really believe that clinging to a piece of dead legislation is the way to protect our borders and put the safety of our country in focus and at the front?

May I start by saying that it is a pleasure to serve under your chairpersonship, Mr Stuart? I am particularly enjoying the opportunity to have these debates in a free-flowing way—while sticking to parliamentary etiquette, obviously.

I commend the hon. Member for Stockton West, with whom I have some sympathy. He has been sent here to defend the impossible. I half wondered, when he came in wearing that fetching yellow tie, which I slightly covet, whether he had come to hold his hands in the air, make an apology and perhaps stand on the side of classical liberalism, but no: he stood true to the 2024 manifesto on which he was elected. I hope that in addressing how he would define a deterrent, I will add something new. When I asked him for a definition, he said that a deterrent would prevent people from coming and that it would do so by detaining and removing them. I shall make a case that challenges his assumptions on that basis.

A deterrent is a strategy aimed at preventing external actors, targets and adversaries in the military sense from taking unwanted actions. For the Rwanda asylum policy to be a deterrent, the Conservative Government would have needed to achieve certain things: to maintain the capabilities required to deter and be highly resolved to deploy them—as the hon. Member said, to be able to detain and remove—and to effectively communicate their resolve to act. In any communication, one needs to be understood to be highly resolved and capable of following through.

For the Rwanda asylum policy to be a deterrent, the Government would have needed to persuade potential migrants of their capabilities and resolve to send them to Rwanda to process their claims after they had illegally entered the country, and to have stopped migrants from paying significant sums of money to smuggler gangs facilitating illegal migration. In short, from what the hon. Member said, it feels as though the principal target of deterrents was migrants. The Rwanda asylum policy was always doomed to fail on those key conditions, because it was not able to achieve detention or removal.

On detention, Professor Brian Bell, the chair of the Migration Advisory Committee, told us that the numbers given by the Government

“are certainly not consistent with a story of a very significant deterrent effect from the Rwanda Act.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 56, Q84.]

Dr Peter Walsh of the Migration Observatory cited concerns about

“where people would be detained”,––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 14, Q13.]

as the UK immigration detention system had capacity for only 2,200 people, with roughly 400 spaces free. Moreover, he said that Rwanda would struggle to process more than “a few hundred” asylum claims a year.

That takes me to the question of removal.

Does my hon. Friend realise that the detention estate was used by the Conservative party to empty some prison places and try to relieve pressure there? I think it highly unlikely that there would be even 400 spaces.

I thank my hon. Friend for that important reminder that when the Labour Government took office after our historic win, we inherited an awful mess in our prison system, which was described by independent experts and organisations as near to collapse—so near that there were just a few hundred spaces left at a time when the country was rioting.

Is my hon. Friend also aware that under the previous Government, the Home Office tried to secure additional detention estate for asylum seekers but catastrophically failed to do so? For example, at Northeye, they spent hundreds of millions of pounds to secure the site—far more than the previous owners had paid—yet found that it had contaminated ground and could not be used, and the Bibby Stockholm in Dover closed very swiftly after opening.

I thank my hon. Friend for those important points. In fact, the Bibby Stockholm was moored just off a place near my constituency in Dorset. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Lloyd Hatton) for campaigning so quickly and efficiently to have the Bibby Stockholm closed, and I thank the Government for responding so constructively to that request. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh about how we have seen significant challenges to the state’s ability to detain. As a consequence, in one of the two conditions set out by the hon. Member for Stockton West for an effective deterrent, it is clear that the Conservative Government failed.

For the next component of an effective deterrent—removal—we need only look at the ultimate proof: who went to Rwanda? What deportations actually happened? I can anticipate some of the ways that the Conservatives may challenge that, so I would like to take them on. First, they may blame this Labour Government for cancelling the policy, without also saying that the Conservative party controlled the timing of a general election that they seemed certain to lose. That they believed they were certain to lose is perhaps why they called the election before they could begin deporting asylum seekers to Rwanda. In fact, the first flight was set to take off on 24 July. If the Conservatives had delayed the Dissolution of Parliament by just 20 days, to 19 June rather than 30 May, the first planes could have taken off.

The last Prime Minister could have waited out those 20 days, if he did not have anything else to do. With a zombie Government that were not showing any ambition, if he had wanted to show ambition, he could have spent a nice 20 days watching all 90 hours of the TV show “Lost”. If he wanted to go at a more leisurely pace—and the Conservatives were excelling at going at a leisurely pace—rather than binge watching something, he could have watched all 30 hours of the TV show “Stranger Things”. Instead—and this is where the “ba-dum” comes in—the Government manifested signs of being lost, and the last Conservative Cabinet just comprised stranger things.

Elegant.

I thought I would to and find a moment of humour in the dispiriting debate on this topic.

The Conservatives may progress to blaming successful legal and judicial challenges to the policy. The Rwanda policy was, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dover and Deal said, unlawful and deemed to be so by the courts. If they do, His Majesty’s Opposition should confirm whether they respect the independence of our judiciary in adjudicating such challenges on the one hand, and respect the international human rights laws, under which challenges were made and were successful, on the other. That is important, because one of the hallmarks of the new Government is to be lawful and to respect our judiciary. We need to embrace that change. The Opposition could also reflect on the probability of further legal challenges being undertaken because of the human rights concerns about Rwanda, which my hon. Friend highlighted so effectively.

Last, the Conservatives may want to blame political challenges for undermining the credibility of their Rwanda asylum policy. In a democracy, it is of course right that Members of Parliament raise concerns on behalf of their constituents—indeed, that is what we have been doing—but the Conservatives overcame those political constraints by passing the Safety of Rwanda Act to address judicial concerns, and they signed a legally binding agreement with Rwanda. So the idea that the deterrent was not able to function because of legal or political challenges is actually farcical, because the previous Government held the cards in their hands.

I have heard it said that the Conservatives could have followed the Australian asylum policy, which has been described as a successful model—perhaps it even inspired the Rwanda asylum policy—but there is good reason to believe that UK could not have achieved the deterrent effects of the Australian offshore asylum processing model. Indeed, Professor Brian Bill, chair of the Migration Advisory Committee, said in oral evidence that it was inappropriate to draw comparisons between the Rwanda scheme and the Australian policies.

Were we to be generous and accept the view of the hon. Member for Weald of Kent that the Australian policy stood out in the world as being successful, there would be challenges to assessing the efficacy of that policy. As the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, an expert and independent institution, has said, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that the Australian offshoring policy was the reason for a drop in numbers of people going to Australia. Put bluntly, if migrants were paying attention to the last Government’s policy, they had no reason to believe that they would be barred from staying in the UK.

That takes me to my third and final definition of what would make an effective deterrent. Yes, the state must be understood to be highly resolved to deter, detain and remove, and capable of doing so, but it takes two to tango. Britain can only be understood if asylum seekers are able to understand, which in turn depends on several key factors. It means migrants being able to do at least three things: to pay close attention to the last Government’s actions—I struggled to do that, so I cannot see how asylum seekers would—to stay fully informed about the many twists and turns in the Safety of Rwanda Act asylum policy, which again I struggled to stay abreast of, and to behave as rational actors who weigh up the costs and benefits of action.

We have heard in testimony and oral evidence that migrants are typically unaware of Government policy and actions, because they are too busy being asylum seekers and migrants. Moreover, it can be said that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the chaotic and difficult circumstances that they are forced to inhabit prevent them from being the rational actors that they would otherwise be, calmly and objectively assessing the trade-offs between the perceived costs of illegal entry, the probability of those being incurred, and whether those are outweighed by the potential benefits of migration.

10.15am

If we are querying the ability of the asylum seekers seeking to come to the UK to behave rationally, it is also right to assess whether, in fact, the last Government were acting rationally themselves. As Professor Brian Bell said, the Rwanda policy was a product of

“a problem in the Home Office at the time: there was little rational thinking about what the costs and benefits of different policies were.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 57, Q85.]

Finally, it is worth ruminating on the additional emotional reasons why a migrant considering an illegal and dangerous crossing might be motivated to embark. As we heard in oral evidence, our country exercises a strong pull effect on migrants seeking a new life, which means that they may be willing to pay smugglers large sums of money for dangerous crossings. Here I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh, who has repeatedly made the point throughout our sittings that demand is inelastic, so we need to find a way of addressing that particular nature of the demand.

Given that, I wanted to pick up a point that the Minister summed up well on Second Reading. Conservative Members started off by saying that all they had to do was talk about the Rwanda scheme, and it would be a deterrent. Then it was, “Once we have put it on the statute book, it will be a deterrent.” Now, all of a sudden, they are saying, “Oh well, it never worked because not a plane took off.”

The Minister was right. Just talking about a scheme does not create a deterrent effect; the number of people taking the channel route did not fall following the policy’s announcement, according to a 25 July Q&A by Peter Walsh of the Migration Observatory. Putting it on the statute book does not create a deterrent effect; 84,000 people crossed the channel from the day the policy was announced to the day it was scrapped by the new Government. Last, as I have outlined, the deterrent effect was never going to work because planes did not take off under a Conservative Government and were never going to. As Dr Walsh said in the Q&A that I cited earlier:

“If only a few hundred asylum seekers were sent to Rwanda…as suggested by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Home Office’s modelling…the probability of a person crossing the Channel in a small boat being sent to Rwanda would have been… around 1–2%.”

The costs of this fiasco are extraordinary. The Conservatives lost control of our borders. They made our asylum and immigration system dysfunctional. Their plans did not work. More than 84,000 people crossed the channel between the announcement of the scheme and its scrapping. An eye-watering £700 million of taxpayers’ money was haemorrhaged on a system that the Conservatives knew could not work and that did not work. For three years, they invested and poured all their energies, all their time and all of this country’s focus on asylum and immigration into the failed Rwanda gimmick, instead of focusing on the source of the small boats problem: the organised criminality behind the highly lucrative trade in people smuggling.

That is why I commend this new Labour Government’s new border security Bill; it will put right what the Conservative Government got so wrong and, unfortunately, continue to defend today. It will strengthen border security that was weakened and undermined by the last Government, bring in counter-terrorism-like powers, strengthen international co-operation, and co-ordinate and command so that everybody, in every part of our system, is pulling in the same direction: going after the criminal gangs that are the source of the small boats problem.

As Martin Hewitt, the Border Security Commander, says, there is no “simple answer” to stopping the small boat crossings. We need a toolbox that is filled with tools. To co-ordinate is to command and to disrupt is to deter. That is what this Bill will do, and in so doing it will, thankfully, replace the failed Rwanda gimmick.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart. I rise to put on the record my support for the Government’s decision to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act. It is important to remember that this Act was passed by a Conservative Government who knew that they were on their way out—a Government who had run out of road and run out of ideas. The Safety of Rwanda Act was nothing more than a gimmick, as has been pointed out many times this morning. It was a waste of taxpayers’ money and only reaffirmed the widely held view that the Conservative Government had lost control of our borders.

The Bill brought forward by the Labour Government aims to tackle an extremely challenging issue—one made far more challenging by the incompetence shown by the previous incumbents. It marks a welcome shift from wasting taxpayers’ money on projects such as the Rwanda scheme to a plan that genuinely aims to smash criminal gangs and stop small boat crossings at the source, with a consistent approach of respecting the vulnerability of the human lives involved. That is why we must reject Conservative attempts to continue their failed schemes.

For those now in Opposition, one would have thought the lessons of July last year were to look outwards, consider what went wrong and reassess their positions on key matters such as immigration, but clearly, they are carrying on as they have done for years, insistent on making the same mistakes that cost the public purse millions that could have been spent on supporting the working people of the United Kingdom. I reiterate my support for the repeal of the Rwanda scheme and look forward to supporting this Government’s plans for restoring control to our borders and delivering on the priorities of the British people.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart, especially after we have had such an interesting debate with some very thoughtful contributions. I will respond to some of the issues that have been raised.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East mentioned that I keep quoting Peter Walsh, and I am going to again, because the point he made in the evidence sessions was one of the most critical points on immigration policy in Britain overall. He said that demand for Channel crossings is “fairly inelastic”. The demand will not wax and wane hugely in response to Government policy, which tells us that deterrence will have only limited use. That is the conceptual flaw at the heart of the Rwanda plan. It put all the country’s cards and money on a deterrence-only approach. Deterrence has to be real and believable, which the scheme clearly was not.

I listen closely to what the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire says about the role of deterrence in migration policy. The exchanges we are having are helping to clarify the thinking. It is clear from the Bill that deterrence can only ever be a component. We must focus on the supply—the ability for people to cross the Channel—and not just the demand. That requires the measures in the Bill, but also diplomatic work and upstream work.

The repeal of the Rwanda legislation was inevitable and written in the stars from the very beginning of that hare-brained scheme. Before it passed, the European Council on Foreign Relations said that the scheme was doomed to failure and a “floundering disaster”, because it was unlikely to deter illicit migration, it would damage the UK’s standing in international law, it would endanger refugee lives and it would come at huge financial cost. Every single one of those predictions came to pass, so it is no surprise that we are having to deal with this today. I would also say that it presaged the Conservatives going down in an historic election defeat, so it was clearly a failure politically for them as well.

On the point about removal to third countries, before we left the European Union, the UK had the capacity to remove people to safe countries in the EU that they had travelled through. The Conservatives manifestly failed to avail the country of that power we had, and then failed with the Rwanda system. Clearly, the Conservative track record on third countries is very poor. There is a component in the immigration system for people going to third countries when they have no right to stay here, which is something we need to look at further ahead.

The hon. Member for Stockton West made reference to the Albania relationship and returns increasing to Albania, as if that somehow proves that the Rwanda scheme would have worked if we had just let it take its course, but it is a completely spurious parallel. The returns to Albania happened before the communiqué was signed with Albania, so the two are not related—perhaps he was arguing that the prior readmission agreement was the variable that led to the increase, but it came after the spike, so it cannot be held responsible. The Albania agreement was not just about illegal immigrants; it also included a huge number of foreign national offenders—a different group of people entirely. It was also about people from Albania returning to Albania, not third-country nationals. The idea that the Albania scheme is somehow an alibi for Rwanda can be completely rejected.

That is not actually the point, however, because the Rwanda scheme would never have worked at the scale required, even if it had been able to work at all. The Minister was correct when she talked in her initial remarks about the interaction between the Illegal Migration Act and the Safety of Rwanda Act. That meant that nobody was getting processed, so the country ended up with a perma-backlog of asylum seekers with nowhere to go; they could not return to the country they came from through a voluntary returns agreement or be recognised as refugees. The Rwanda scheme would never have worked at a meaningful scale, and it would never have been able to deal with the backlog. We were on track to having to take over half the hotels in the country to accommodate asylum seekers.

We can have a debate about how best to manage an asylum system—voluntary returns, swift processing, meaningful decisions and removals are clearly components of that—but we can surely say in debating this clause that the Rwanda Act was not the solution. Some £240 million of our constituents’ money was wasted on the scheme, which the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire was quite correct to call “crackpot”. Passing legislation to assert that reality is not what it is will never be an effective way to govern anything, never mind the asylum system, so I am pleased that the Act will finally be off the statute book.

We have had an interesting debate about taking the Safety of Rwanda Act off the statute book, as clause 37 does. I am distressed that the Conservative party continues to assert without evidence—in fact, contrary to most evidence—that that Act and the Illegal Migration Act were about to work. Apparently, those Acts were on the cusp of being a great success when the evil new Government came along and cancelled them.

I speculate that many Conservative Members are secretly pleased that they can assert that, because it gets them out of an embarrassing, expensive farrago; the Safety of Rwanda Act will go down in this country’s history as one of the most catastrophic pieces of legislation that Parliament has ever dealt with. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dagenham and Rainham rightly pointed out, it was not ordinary or normal for Conservative ex-Prime Minister John Major to pronounce the Act to be “un-Conservative”. The Act is many things, unconservative being one of them.

Government Members, and the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire, assert that the Act was not a deterrent. This is the current discourse: we are saying that it was not a deterrent and that we can prove it, and the Conservative party, which was responsible for the Act, is left asserting that it was a deterrent, despite there being absolutely no evidence for that despite all the years since the policy was announced and all the years the Act was on the statute book.

That reminds me of discussions I used to have as a student—a very long time ago—about whether communism in its pure sense had actually ever existed. It was obviously a failure, but when one came across the ideologues, they simply asserted that the communism that had been tried to date just was not pure enough, and it was therefore still likely to succeed if ever it was tried properly. Does that sound similar to the discussions we are having about this iteration of fantasy asylum policy as gimmick? I think it does.

10.30am

What we are now close to hearing from the Opposition is that Rwanda has not been tried properly, even though it has wasted £715 million of taxpayer money, and that somehow it was just about to work, but then the dastardly new Government were elected—by a landslide, it has to be said—and stopped this policy, which was inevitably going to work, even existing. That is arrant nonsense, and I am disappointed to hear the Conservative party, from its berth in Opposition, continuing to spout it.

There is no evidence that the policy worked, was beginning to work or would have ever worked, as many of my hon. Friends pointed out. It was not a deterrent. It was a catastrophic waste of taxpayer money, and it risked our reputation as a country that respects the rule of law internationally. It would have had—in fact, it had begun to have—many consequences for our reputation and ability to influence other powers.

Let us look at the costs that were published for the scheme. A breakdown of Home Office costs for the migration and economic development partnership with Rwanda was published on 2 December 2024. The then Government were going to pay £150,874 per individual sent to Rwanda. The Government of Rwanda only ever agreed to take 300 people, but 84,000 people crossed the channel while the Conservatives were talking about the Rwanda scheme. One does not have to be much of a mathematician to understand how much it would have cost to deport large numbers of people if we had had to pay £150,874 for each person deported over five years.

Had it been possible to deport those people, and had Rwanda agreed to take more than 300, it would have cost a fortune, and that is without considering about all the extra IT that had to be designed and the cost that had to be written off for that. New detention accommodation would have been required, as we have only 2,500 detention spaces at the moment, though the Government are building more so that we can bring some integrity back to our system with enforced returns. We certainly would not have had anywhere to put 84,000 people pending their deportation to Rwanda. I also do not know where the detention camps were going to be, who was going to guard them or what it would have cost to escort that number of people out of the country to somewhere else.

On top of that, we have had to place sanctions on the Rwandan regime for its involvement in M23’s incursion into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the displacement of nearly 1 million people in that area. I do not know whether, in the fantasy world that some Opposition Members seemingly still inhabit, every part of Rwanda will always be safe because at one point we asserted legislatively that Rwanda was a safe place. There are many flaws in the way that the legislation was conceived, enacted, put on the statute book and never operationalised, and events continuing to happen may well have impinged on it too.

I have asked this question a few times and never quite got to the bottom of it. We were sending people to Rwanda who could not be returned to their home country because it was not safe. Where will those people go now, if not Rwanda? Does the Minister fear that, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire said, the Government might end up coming back to this issue in a few years when they realise that things are continuing to go the wrong way?

First things first: the hon. Gentleman was not going to send to Rwanda only those whom we could not return to their own country; in theory, he was going to deport to Rwanda absolutely everybody who arrived to claim asylum after March 2023—that was what we were told. In reality, those people all ended up in hotels, unable to be processed and growing in number, while the Conservative party indulged in its expensive gimmicks and fantasies of how the world should be.

As many Committee members have pointed out, the day job was not being done while that parallel universe policy was being developed. It took all the attention away from running what is a complex enough system as it is. Many resources were diverted to try to create that new reality, resulting in the neglect of the system, and huge backlogs were built into the system because of how the Illegal Migration Act interacted with the Safety of Rwanda Act. That made it impossible to run the current system or to move to a new system that was remotely workable, thereby landing this country with a huge, dysfunctional series of backlogs, and a system that we have had to literally start up again from scratch to try to get working coherently.

The Minister may have been coming on to the second part of the question asked by the hon. Member for Stockton West, but will she be brave enough to tell the Committee that this Labour Government will never consider sending asylum seekers and refugees to a third country?

The Home Secretary has said that she does not rule out third country processing; that is not the same as the Rwanda scheme, which was deportation to a third country permanently. I think the hon. Gentleman is talking about third country returns, such as reviving the Dublin system. When the previous Government negotiated the EU withdrawal agreement, they perhaps should have included something about returns to Europe. Had they done so, perhaps we would be in a different situation, but those would also have been third country returns. He asked a wide-ranging question, and I have been as honest as I can in answering it at this point.

We could spend all day, and probably many more days, talking about the failure encompassed in the interaction of the Safety of Rwanda Act and the Illegal Migration Act. Our job today, though, is to tidy it up. Clause 37 will take the Safety of Rwanda Act off the statute book and put it in the dustbin of history, where it belongs.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 8

Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38

Repeal of certain provisions of the Illegal Migration Act 2023

The Liberal Democrat spokesperson is not here to move amendment 9, so we move to clause 38 stand part.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 2—Repeal of the Illegal Migration Act 2023—

“The Illegal Migration Act 2023 is repealed.”

This new clause would repeal the Illegal Migration Act in full. In combination with Amendment 8 to leave out clause 38, it would replace the selective repeal in the Bill with a full repeal.

As always, the Lib Dems are keeping us on our toes. I hope there is a benign reason why they are not in attendance today—perhaps my horrible cold made its way over to them and they are not well.

Clause 38 repeals the vast majority—not all—of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. We decided not to take a blanket approach to repealing it all, and we will have that debate when the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire speaks to new clause 2. He has given us the choice whether to repeal the Illegal Migration Act as a whole. Our view, which I will explain in response to his speech, is that there are a few useful clauses in the Act that we have decided to keep on the statute book.

In general, we all know that the Illegal Migration Act was a flawed piece of legislation that made it impossible for us to process and run asylum claims. It was on the statute book in the context of the Safety of Rwanda Act, which assumed that anyone who arrived after March 2023 would not be allowed to become part of an asylum claim in this country. It contained the so-called duty to remove, which placed a statutory duty on the Home Secretary to remove everyone who came to this country after that time. It was flawed in many ways, but it made it impossible for us to run asylum claims in this country lawfully. Therefore, it is important that the vast majority of this flawed legislation should be removed from the statute book, and that is what clause 38 does.

I will set out in detail why we have decided to keep six clauses of the Act. I will try to explain to the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire and the rest of the Committee our thinking behind each case, but I will do so when the new clause has been spoken to.

Clause 38 repeals sections 1 to 6 and schedule 1, sections 7 to 11, sections 13 to 15 and schedule 2, sections 16 to 28, sections 30 to 5, sections 53 to 58, section 61 and section 66 of the Illegal Migration Act.

Section 2 of the Illegal Migration Act placed a duty on the Home Secretary to make arrangements to remove persons to their home country or a safe third country who have entered or arrived in the UK illegally. Let me point out to those people who are concerned about genuine asylum seekers that section 2(4) of the IMA makes it clear that the provision does not apply if someone comes directly from a place of danger, which is consistent with article 33 of the 1951 refugee convention. However, people who come here directly from France, a safe country where no one is being persecuted and which has a perfectly well-functioning asylum system, should not illegally enter the United Kingdom.

I ask the Minister why the Government are repealing this duty. Is it because they do not think they are able to remove those who have arrived illegally? Is it because the Government think people who arrive in this country illegally should be allowed to remain?

Section 5 of the Illegal Migration Act provides that asylum claims are automatically deemed inadmissible for those who have arrived illegally. One of Labour’s first actions in government was to allow illegal migrants to claim asylum. Can the Minister explain how allowing illegal migrants to claim asylum is providing any deterrent? Surely it will help the smuggling gangs, by providing a stronger incentive for people to make those dangerous crossings of the Channel in small boats.

The Illegal Migration Act, which we are discussing under this clause, was put on the statute book by the previous Government, but they did not commence much of it at all. Can the hon. Member explain why that was?

There is a lot to do in the way of commencement; the Bill is there and could be commenced at any time, if the Government felt it was of help. In fact, in a few years’ time, when they come back to the drawing board to try to find a deterrent, they might well want to do that.

Sections 31 and 32 of the Illegal Migration Act prevented people who have entered the country illegally from obtaining British citizenship. The Labour Government are repealing this provision. Their position is hardly surprising when the Prime Minister does not think that British citizenship is a pull factor, but that does not mean it is the right thing to do. Why are the Government repealing this clause, allowing illegal migrants to get British citizenship?

Do the Government not believe that British citizenship is a privilege rather than a right, especially for those who have entered the country illegally? If so, why have the Government not included measures to stop illegal migrants obtaining British citizenship, and instead only issued guidance stating that

“applications made after 10 February 2025 that include illegal entry will ‘normally’ be refused citizenship, regardless of when the illegal entry occurred.”?

Section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act states:

“The Secretary of State may make regulations about the effect of a decision by a relevant person (“P”) not to consent to the use of a specified scientific method for the purposes of an age assessment…where there are no reasonable grounds for P’s decision.”

This means that, if a migrant refused to undergo an age assessment, they would be considered an adult. Labour have removed age assessments for illegal migrants who claim to be under 18, resulting in the risk that grown men may end up in schools with teenage girls. In fact, the most recent data on age disputes shows that more than 50% of migrants claiming to be under 18 were actually adults. How do the Government therefore intend to ensure that migrants claiming to be under 18 actually undergo age assessments, and why is that not included in the Bill?

The SNP’s new clause 2 would repeal the Illegal Migration Act entirely, so the SNP must be agreeing with the Labour Government that illegal migrants should be able to get British citizenship and should not have to undergo age assessments. Therefore, I ask the same questions: does the SNP not believe that British citizenship is a privilege rather than a right, especially for those who have entered the country illegally? How would the SNP ensure that migrants claiming to be under 18 actually undergo age assessments, and why is that not included in new clause 2?

By repealing the Illegal Migration Act in its entirety, the SNP want to stop the seizure of mobile phones from illegal migrants, something that helps to establish identities and obtain evidence of immigration offences. As Tony Smith said:

“Passport data, identity data, age data and travel history data are often held on those phones—all data that would be useful when considering an asylum application.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 40, Q43.]

The Liberal Democrats’ amendment 9 would have repealed section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act, which requires the Secretary of State to remove people who have sought to use modern slavery protections in bad faith. Do the Liberal Democrats think that people using modern slavery protections fraudulently should be allowed to stay in the UK? If so, do they believe that people who make fraudulent immigration claims should be allowed to stay in the UK? We believe that the effect of repealing the majority of the IMA and the entirety of the Safety of Rwanda Act will be an increase in the number of people arriving in this country illegally and remaining.

I have therefore asked the Government whether they would be prepared to be transparent about the numbers. If they are convinced that the approach set out in the Bill will be successful, let us measure it. Will the Minister commit to publishing all the numbers, and the nationalities, of all those who might have been excluded from the UK asylum system on grounds of connection with a safe third country or a late claim, but have not been—with reasons why not—and to setting out the obstacles to returning them to their country of origin and what steps are being taken through international agreements to overcome that, as recommended by Tony Smith in evidence to this Committee? We will oppose the inclusion of this clause in the Bill by way of a Division.

I must say to the hon. Member for Stockton West that he really does not want to know my views on British citizenship, because they are likely to blow his head—but we will leave that one at that.

It is disappointing to note the absence of our Liberal colleagues. Back in the day—the good old days, Mr Stuart —when we had an effective, efficient, diligent and conscientious third party, there would always be someone present to ensure that the views of the third party were represented. I am sure that the Liberal Democrats have good excuses, but I hope they start to take a bit of interest in this important Bill, because it has been disappointing thus far.

I say to the Minister, “‘Useful clauses?’ Come on!” We are talking about sections 29, 12, 59, 60 and 62, some of the nastiest and most pernicious parts and aspects of the Illegal Migration Act. I cannot believe that this Government want to continue that horrible and heinous Tory set of proposals and clauses in this Bill. This was their great opportunity to wipe the slate clean of the previous Government’s hopeless and useless crackpot Rwanda scheme and their heinous and horrible Illegal Migration Act.

I will give the Minister a few quotes from some of her colleagues, some of which I wish I had come up with myself. The now Prime Minister said at the time that the Illegal Migration Bill would drive “a coach and horses” through protections for women trafficked to the UK as victims of modern slavery. The now Home Secretary said that that IMA does the “total opposite” of providing support for those who have been trafficked, and that it was nothing other than “a traffickers’ charter”. There are other prize quotes from the Home Secretary and various Ministers within the Home Office—absolutely and totally correct, right and true—about the horrible Illegal Migration Act. Now we have a Labour Government inconceivably standing by large swathes of an Act that they so rightly and widely rubbished and wanted rid of only a short while ago.

It would be different if the Government were maintaining some benign, useful or helpful parts of that Tory Act, but they are maintaining some real, pernicious nasties. Provisions that were damaging, dangerous and contrary to human rights under the Tories are just as damaging, dangerous and contrary to human rights under this new Labour Government. I remind the Minister what the then Home Secretary said on that Bill when introducing it:

“I am unable to make a statement that, in my view, the provisions of the Illegal Migration Bill are compatible with the Convention rights, but the Government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill.”

The previous Government could not care less about our obligations under international law or about human rights, and they were quite happy to set them aside. Now we have a Home Secretary who stands by certain provisions of that Act, with all its difficulties concerning its relationship with convention rights.

The hon. Gentleman will have noted on the front of the Bill that we are debating the statement from the Home Secretary on the European convention on human rights:

“In my view the provisions of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill are compatible with the Convention rights.”

I am glad that the Home Secretary stated that, as she always does when it comes to our relationship with, and compatibility with, human rights. I want to raise a couple of issues and ask a couple of questions about just how very loosely this Bill is connected with the Government’s obligations and about some of our real concerns on human rights. I will come to that in the course of what I hope will be a short contribution.

It is completely incomprehensible that the Government have chosen to repeal only some aspects of the IMA rather than the whole Act, particularly since so many members of this Government have been so vocally opposed to the IMA in the past. Can we please just have a look at some of the stuff that they want to retain? The one that concerns me most, and the one that concerns the range of organisations, groups and charities associated with refugees and asylum seekers, is the retention of section 29.

Let us remind the Committee what section 29 does. It extends the public order disqualification originally introduced by section 63 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and mandates that victims of trafficking and modern slavery who have criminal convictions or are considered a threat to public order be disqualified from support and protection. To me, that provision is deeply concerning, as it means that victims of trafficking, many of whom have been coerced into committing crimes as part of their exploitation, could face detention, deportation or removal rather than the support and recovery that they need.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that, prior to section 29 coming into law, Home Office figures show that up to 73% of foreign national offenders were using modern slavery as a means to avoid deportation, which could in turn put members of the public in danger?

I do not know where the hon. Member gets his figures, but let me give him some in return. Home Office statistics from 2024 revealed that 70% of the individuals disqualified under the provision had elements of criminal exploitation in their case. What is so wrong about this particular measure is that it stops us giving the necessary and relevant support that we should give—that we owe—to people who have been victims of human trafficking.

Does the hon. Gentleman also realise that under compelling circumstances, if there is evidence that they have been victims of modern slavery, those who have been convicted and apply will fit into the system?

This is where we start to get back into very uncomfortable and dangerous territory, where it is going to be up to the individual to prove that they are not guilty of such crimes. This is a blanket clause that will entrap them and leave it to them to make their way through the courts to prove their innocence when they have been innocent all the time, or particularly when they have been victims of trafficking and forced into criminal activity. The system could punish vulnerable individuals who were coerced into committing crimes, often by their traffickers, thus reinforcing the power dynamic that allows traffickers to exploit their victims further.

The retention of section 29 increases the likelihood of re-trafficking and re-exploitation as victims might fear coming forward to the authorities due to the threat of detention, removal or criminalisation. That has issues for us in Scotland. Quite rightly, I suppose, immigration is totally and utterly reserved, but we have responsibility under our devolved powers to ensure that victims of modern slavery who come to Scotland are looked after and tended to by Scottish legislation. There are powers that we have within Scotland.

In retaining section 29 of the IMA, the Bill also restricts the ability of the Scottish Government to support the victims under the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015. The Scottish Act places a duty on Scottish Ministers to secure immediate support and recovery services for victims of human trafficking and exploitation. In Scotland we have tried to design a system that, unlike this Bill, places an emphasis on victim care and rehabilitation.

That is the approach that we take in Scotland, and that is what we want to try to deliver within our range of devolved power, but it relies on the national referral mechanism identifying and supporting victims of trafficking. The disqualification provisions in section 29 could result in vulnerable individuals in Scotland being detained or deported without being properly identified and supported as trafficking victims, thus weakening the Scottish Government’s ability to implement their own modern slavery protections.

11.00am

Then there is the retention of section 59, which makes asylum and human rights claims from a range of countries inadmissible. I do not know how the section is considered to be useful, but I would be interested in the Minister’s views.

The Bill introduces worrying new measures that expand the scope of immigration offences and the Government’s ability to detain migrants. Although the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings has not been entirely incorporated into UK law, some of its obligations were implemented by the Modern Slavery Act 2015—do you remember that Act, Mr Stuart? It was seen as a landmark achievement and as pioneering legislation, but it has now been hollowed out, with survivor protections restricted, undermined and effectively erased by legislation such as this.

Section 12 of the IMA enables the Executive to decide the lengths of all forms of immigration detention; it intends to overturn an established common-law principle that provides for judicial oversight over the length of detention as an important safeguard against arbitrary detention. The section is to be retained, so that principle will go.

Section 59 of the IMA extends the current general inadmissibility process for asylum claims from nationals of EU member states, including Albania, which we have debated at length in Committee so far. India and Georgia were added by the prior Government, despite concerns about their general safety. Section 59 will be retained despite the fact that the UK’s country policy information on Albania notes issues with trafficking and sexual or criminal exploitation, as well as people being targeted on the basis of sexual orientation. Similarly, in recent months Georgian officials have been the subject of UK sanctions for a brutal crackdown on media and protesters. Now people from those countries will not be able to secure any rights in the UK.

Section 60 of the IMA, rather than introducing the new safe routes that are so urgently required, places a duty on the Executive to make regulations containing a cap—not a quota, but a cap—on the number of persons who may enter the United Kingdom annually using safe routes. Finally, if that is not enough, section 62 means that if a person making a human rights or asylum claim does not follow the Home Office’s instruction to let it look at everything, including private, sensitive information on their phone, the Home Office could take that into account as damaging the person’s credibility when deciding whether to believe that person. This provision must also be considered in connection with the new extended powers in the Bill to search, seize and retain mobile devices.

I scoured the Illegal Migration Act for anything that could remotely be described as useful or helpful in smashing the gangs and disrupting their business operations, which are what the Government tell us the Bill—and these Committee sittings—is all about. I could not find one thing. Only with the full repeal of this horrible, harmful Tory Act, and the introduction of stronger protections for victims of trafficking and modern slavery, can we protect the vulnerable, uphold human rights and ensure justice for those who have suffered exploitation and abuse.

Like the Safety of Rwanda Act clause, this clause is an inevitability, because it was clear from the outset that these sections of the Illegal Migration Act were never going to work. I know that the Conservatives tend to think that everybody who works in the migration sector set out to thwart their plans at every turn, but that is not the case. I was working for the strategic migration partnership in Scotland when the Illegal Migration Bill was introduced two years ago. I remember sitting down with local authorities, the police and other key stakeholders to look at the legislation, and all of us collectively said, “How is this going to work? This is never going to be feasible in reality.”

I draw people’s attention to one component of the Act that is being repealed, which brings its failure to the fore. The IMA placed on the Home Secretary a duty to remove that applied to all asylum seekers regardless of their case. For anyone under 18, the duty to remove kicked in at the age of 18, but when we were working with local authorities, unaccompanied asylum-seeking children came across and sought asylum in this country. These children are among the most vulnerable people in the world. They have lost their loved ones, they are on their own and they are in a strange country. In the UK, we have a national transfer scheme to disperse them around different local authorities. I worked with the officers who were trying to help those children to get themselves together after a really traumatic experience.

The Illegal Migration Act meant that, at the age of 18, in theory those people would be eligible for immediate removal. What does the Committee think that did to those children in terms of their attempts to secure any services, learn English or get any education? It made it impossible for them and it had a direct impact: they did not leave the country, but they disappeared. Some of them are probably out there being exploited right now, as a direct consequence of clauses in the Illegal Migration Act. The Act did not just put those children at risk; it put incredible pressure on overstretched local services around the country. For the previous Government to set out to use immigration legislation to put further pressure on overstretched local services was only going to have negative consequences in communities, and it should never have happened.

More broadly, the duty to remove, which this clause repeals, essentially shut down the asylum system and created what IPPR has called a “perma-backlog”. We have talked about deterrents and incentives, but I do not see any greater incentive for someone seeking to exploit the asylum system in this country than shutting it down overall, which is what that duty to remove did. It created a vicious circle, which frankly was bad for asylum seekers themselves, because genuine refugees had to spend years in hotel accommodation, which is not a particularly nice thing to do, and for the taxpayer in the UK, because costs soared from £18,000 per asylum seeker per year in 2019 to £47,000 in 2024. It was also bad for communities, because people could not be moved through that process, which clearly put pressure on an already febrile immigration situation. It is good that we are repealing this duty; as I said, it was inevitable, because it was never going to work.

Finally, I understand the points that the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire made about human trafficking. It is really important that we offer the victims of modern slavery proper protections, especially when they are forced to commit crimes in the course of being trafficked. This legislation does not completely take that power away, but again, I have to draw on my experience of the last couple of years. There was an increase in the number of exploiters—those who were perpetrators of trafficking—using the trafficking system to evade prosecution. I worked closely with Police Scotland and the Crown Office, including in the Perth and Kinross council area. We saw, particularly in the Vietnamese community, the growth of that development.

We must not see the world in black and white. I am by no means saying that every victim of trafficking is somehow an imposter and we must stop them getting any protection, but it is happening, so it is proper that we keep the clauses in place so that we can tackle that. If we do not have that component, the system will break down. Just as we saw with the asylum system, if we do not have clauses to make the system functional, it will break down and everybody loses.

It is an honour to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh, who, in an outstanding speech, set out the major challenges with the Illegal Migration Act, part of which will be repealed.

I want to knock on the head four things that were said by the hon. Member for Stockton West. The first was in reference to section 23 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. That provision, which the Opposition have talked about, was never implemented by the last Government, so in effect he is opposing a repeal of something that his last Government never started. That feels to me like the worst kind of politics. Between the Royal Assent given to that legislation and the Dissolution of Parliament, 315 days passed, yet no effort was made to implement that provision.

Secondly, sections 9 and 10 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 were, as we have heard, unworkable. They allow people to arrive, claim asylum in the UK, get support, and be put up in a hotel, which as my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh described, will often be in the some of the most dire conditions that somebody can go through after fleeing some of the worst experiences that people can have, be it trauma, famine, disease or poverty—the list goes on. Applications were not processed, so people were not able to leave their hotel. The consequence of that is not just an expensive asylum backlog, but people living with serious psychological scarring for a significant amount of time.

That brings me to my third point. I will talk more about this when we reach new clause 26, which relates to scientific age assessments, but I really do not know how the Conservative party can talk about the welfare and protection of children when we heard oral testimony from the Children’s Commissioner about children who were subject to, and vulnerable to, organ harvesting, rape, sexual assault and disappearance from hotels and into wider society, where, as my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh said, they are likely to continue to be abused, exploited and victimised. I will make those points when we reach that debate.

Lastly, on the point about France, I wish the Conservative party would stop throwing stones at one of nearest neighbours and most important strategic allies, particularly when we are in such a volatile international climate. It is really important that we properly scrutinise legislation, but do not indulge in the petty politics that defined the last Conservative Government, disrupted so many of our international relations, and actually made us less secure.

This has been a small but perfectly formed debate on clause 38, which repeals all but six sections of the Illegal Migration Act. As Government Members have pointed out, despite the amount of time that has lapsed since the Act got on the statute book, the vast majority of its provisions have never been commenced. In fact, we had to commence one tiny bit of it so that we could restart asylum processing; that is probably the most it ever had any effect.

Let us be clear: the Illegal Migration Act meant that thousands of asylum claims were put on hold, because of the duty to remove, increasing the backlog, putting incredible pressure on the asylum accommodation system and creating what has been called the “perma-backlog”. We all know what that was, and how big it was when we came into Government. The Act has largely not been commenced, nor will it be under this Government. We need to sort out the chaos created by the unworkable and contradictory provisions in the Act. Despite the bravado of the hon. Member for Stockton West in his earlier contribution, I suspect that most Conservative Ministers knew that the Act was unworkable, because it was not commenced when they had the ministerial capacity and power to do so for all the time between when it was put on the statute book and when we formed a new Government a year later.

The system had been left in chaos but, were the Government to accept new clause 2 and simply repeal the entire Act, it would lead to a missed opportunity to improve our immigration system. I will go through some of that with the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire. Clause 38 will repeal section 2 of the 2023 Act, which provides for the duty to remove. The Government are committed to ending the migration and economic partnership with Rwanda, so section 2 will be repealed to deliver that by repealing the duty to remove and associated provisions.

On sections 22 to 28 of the Illegal Migration Act, we are not retaining the vast majority of modern slavery provisions in the Act because they are connected to the duty to remove irregular migrants. These sections were never commenced and provided that where a duty to remove was applied for an individual, that individual should be disqualified from the national referral mechanism unless certain limited exemptions applied. We are removing sections 30 to 37 relating to permanent bans on entry, settlement and citizenship, which, while held up as a success by others, were unenforced and unworkable. Sections 57 and 58 of the Act are also repealed. They relate to age assessments, but both sections are unworkable and irrelevant without the duty to remove.

11.15am

The hon. Member for Stockton West should not go away from today’s debate thinking that we are not interested in scientific age assessments. That is not true, but the Illegal Migration Act’s scientific age assessment provisions related to the duty to remove, which is being repealed. We can come back to talking about using that kind of technology, but not in this context.

Is there any reason we cannot introduce provisions in this area as part of the Bill, and when can we expect to see them?

Work is going on in the Department to assess the accuracy of the various methods of age assessment, which ministerial predecessors from the hon. Gentleman’s party commenced, but which has not yet been finished. As soon as we have more idea about how reliable scientific age assessment can be, how expensive it is and all those things, I will either come to Parliament or make a statement about how we intend to proceed. The hon. Gentleman must not assume that because these sections have been repealed we are not interested in scientific age assessments and their potential per se. They were simply unworkable because they were attached to the duty to remove, which was such a feature of the Illegal Migration Act.

The six measures that the Government intend to retain, including where provisions are in force, have been identified as having operational utility and benefit. These powers are all ones that the Government see as important tools to allow for the proper operation of the immigration system and to achieve wider priorities alongside the powerful measures set out in the Bill.

The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire talked about section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act. The public order disqualification under the Nationality and Borders Act is currently in operation. It enables decisions to disqualify certain individuals from support and protections afforded by the national referral mechanisms on grounds of public order and bad faith. Public order grounds include serious criminality and threats to national security. Such decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, considering the individual’s vulnerabilities. That is the sole modern slavery measure in the Illegal Migration Act that is being retained. It would, if commenced, amend the public order disqualification to allow more foreign national offenders to be considered for disqualification from modern slavery protections on public order grounds. Disqualification will continue to be assessed on an individual basis.

I am glad that the Minister got to that last sentence, because it is quite clear from section 29 that victims of modern slavery only have to be considered a threat to public order. It is quite likely that many victims of modern slavery will get caught up in this; in fact, they already have. Is the Minister happy that those who were probably coerced into criminal activity will now almost be blanket-banned from any opportunity to go through the asylum process in the United Kingdom?

There will not be a blanket ban. Individuals who have been subject to public order disqualification will have been disqualified for things such as multiple drug offences, possessing a firearm and ammunition, multiple counts of sexual assault and assault by beating, grooming and engaging in sexual communication with a child. Those are the kind of things that currently lead to public order disqualifications. Nothing in the retention of section 29 will mean that individual circumstances on a case-by-case basis cannot be taken into account. It is important to understand that that will still happen. If it were commenced—it has not yet been—section 29 would introduce a duty to apply the public order disqualification, unless there are compelling circumstances that the disqualification should not apply. That still ensures case-by-case consideration.

The citizenship ban is removed from the Bill because it was unworkable and unenforced; that is, again, attached to the duties to remove. We have updated the good character guidance to prevent people from gaining citizenship if they arrived illegally by dangerous journeys. The idea is to emphasise that citizenship is not a right, but a privilege. We will continue to make those decisions on a case-by-case basis.

The other sections that we have retained are thought to be useful. The six measures in section 12 emphasise the right of the Secretary of State to determine what constitutes a reasonable time period to detain a person for the specific statutory purpose of effecting removal from the UK. Section 52 allows flexibility in our judiciary by making first-tier tribunal judges eligible to sit in the upper-tier tribunal. I cannot imagine anyone in the Committee would worry about that.

Section 59, if commenced, would extend the inadmissibility provisions to asylum and human rights claims from nationals in a list of generally safe states. Section 60 requires an annual cap to be set on the number of individuals admitted to the UK by safe and legal routes. Section 62 adds failing to provide information, such as a passcode to an electronic device, to the behaviours that could be considered damaging to the credibility of an asylum and human rights claim. All those issues are thought to provide utility, but outside the context of the duty to remove.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 9

Clause 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Martin McCluskey.)

11.23am

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Eighth sitting)

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Dawn Butler, † Dame Siobhain McDonagh, Dr Andrew Murrison, Graham Stuart

† Bool, Sarah (South Northamptonshire) (Con)

† Botterill, Jade (Ossett and Denby Dale) (Lab)

† Eagle, Dame Angela (Minister for Border Security and Asylum)

† Forster, Mr Will (Woking) (LD)

† Gittins, Becky (Clwyd East) (Lab)

† Hayes, Tom (Bournemouth East) (Lab)

† Lam, Katie (Weald of Kent) (Con)

† McCluskey, Martin (Inverclyde and Renfrewshire West) (Lab)

Malhotra, Seema (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department)

† Mullane, Margaret (Dagenham and Rainham) (Lab)

Murray, Chris (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)

Murray, Susan (Mid Dunbartonshire) (LD)

† Stevenson, Kenneth (Airdrie and Shotts) (Lab)

† Tapp, Mike (Dover and Deal) (Lab)

† Vickers, Matt (Stockton West) (Con)

† White, Jo (Bassetlaw) (Lab)

† Wishart, Pete (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)

Robert Cope, Harriet Deane, Claire Cozens, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 11 March 2025

(Afternoon)

[Dame Siobhain McDonagh in the Chair]

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

2.00pm

I congratulate everyone on their very prompt arrival.

Clause 39

Sections 37 and 38: consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

It is a great pleasure to see you, the fourth Chair of our Committee, Dame Siobhain. I welcome you to the Chair. It is a pleasure to serve with you directing us.

The clause is a simple consequential one: it removes references to and amendments made by the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 when they no longer serve a purpose. During the passage of those two pieces of legislation it was necessary to amend existing Acts of Parliament, to cross-reference them and to enable enactment of the provisions within them. Few, if any, of those provisions were ever properly commenced or enacted but, since this Government intend to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act and large parts of the Illegal Migration Act, which we spent most of this morning discussing, those references no longer serve any practical purpose. They should therefore be removed from the four existing Acts of Parliament.

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Dame Siobhain, as it was yesterday afternoon. It is good to see you two days in a row.

The clause, as the Minister said, makes consequential amendments necessary as a result of the two clauses that we discussed this morning: clause 37, which repeals the Safety of Rwanda Act 2024, and clause 38, which repeals provisions of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. As we do not support either of those repeals, we do not support these revisions or agree that the clause should stand part of the Bill.

We have had our debates about the contents of those Acts. The clause concerns truly miscellaneous aspects, although I understand the logic of the hon. Lady’s argument. I certainly hope that we will press on and agree clause 39.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 10

Clause 39 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 40

Immigration advisers and immigration service providers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to consider schedule 1.

The clause introduces schedule 1, which will allow the governance arrangements for the Immigration Services Commissioner and deputy commissioner to be made more flexible. That will bring them in line with other public appointments by allowing for interim or shorter appointment lengths.

Schedule 1 sets out that the commissioner and deputy commissioner are to hold office for a term not exceeding five years. That allows the appointments to be for less than five years; currently, there is a fixed five-year term. Schedule 1 will make it discretionary to appoint a deputy commissioner, allowing for the governance arrangements to remain flexible to meet the demands of the organisation. It will enable the Home Secretary to appoint a senior, experienced member of staff to act in the commissioner’s place in certain circumstances. It is to be used, for example, to ensure that cover is in place during a public appointment process where there is a vacancy in the commissioner and deputy commissioner posts. It does not replace the provision to appoint a deputy commissioner and will ensure continued regulatory oversight of immigration advisers, which is the point of this organisation.

The schedule will mean that the work of the Immigration Services Commissioner will continue and will operate more flexibly to ensure that good immigration advice is readily available. That is critical to the effective running of a coherent, efficient and fair immigration system.

As the Minister has outlined, clause 40 inserts schedule 1 into the Bill. That provides that the Immigration Services Commissioner is not to hold office for a term exceeding five years. The current regime is based on there being a commissioner and deputy, so schedule 1 sets out that the commissioner may appoint a deputy. There is also a provision to enable a member of the commissioner’s staff to act in the commissioner’s place in certain circumstances, such as the roles of commissioner and deputy both being vacant. That effectively allows for the appointment of an interim commissioner.

As was said in evidence to the Committee, these amendments do not seem to us to have operational consequence. We will not oppose them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 41

Detention and exercise of functions pending deportation

I beg to move amendment 7, clause 41, page 35, line 32, leave out subsection (17).

This amendment would leave out the subsection of this clause that applies subsections (1) to (13) (relating to detention and exercise of functions pending deportation) retrospectively, i.e. as if they have always had effect.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

It is great to see you in the Chair, Dame Siobhain; it makes a pleasant change from what we have had in the past couple of weeks. I say that in the nicest way to Mr Stuart.

I will have to find out more!

Clause 41 introduces a significant expansion of detention powers, allowing individuals to be detained from the moment a deportation is considered rather than waiting for a formal order. However, my main concern with the clause is that it is to apply retrospectively, meaning it would legally validate past detentions that were previously unlawful. As would be expected, the provision has sparked serious concerns among legal experts, human rights organisations and advocacy groups, raising critical questions about the rule of law, human rights and judicial oversight.

We had the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association with us as part of an evidence session. They have expressed great concern with this provision, saying:

“We are concerned with the dangerous precedent which would be set if unlawful deprivation of liberty were to be treated as lawful—such retrospectivity undermines the rule of law and remains wholly unjustified in the materials accompanying the Bill.”

I have looked at this issue and there does not seem to be any sufficient justification for this exceptional measure. The ILPA warns us that it could rewrite history, denying justice to individuals who could have sought remedies for unlawful detention.

Amnesty International, which again gave very good evidence to the Committee, has also voiced strong objections. It has highlighted how detention powers have expanded significantly while judicial oversight has weakened, leading to risks of serious injustice.

Bail for Immigration Detainees has stressed that clause 41 risks

“further criminalising migrants and refugees”.

It urges instead for a system that upholds human rights and dignity.

Combined with the Illegal Migration Act, the clause could lead to longer, more expensive and potentially unlawful detentions in breach of article 5 of the European convention on human rights. The Government’s own impact assessment acknowledges that clause 41 effectively makes lawful past detentions that were not compliant with due process at the time, yet the European convention on human rights memorandum does not properly address whether that retrospective validation aligns with the fundamental legal safeguards of article 5. I would particularly like the Minister to address those concerns.

Clause 41 therefore undermines accountability, weakens judicial scrutiny and risks setting a dangerous precedent through which the Government can retroactively legitimise actions that would otherwise have been unlawful. Given the weight of these concerns, there is a strong case for leaving out the retrospective provisions from clause 41, and that is what my amendment 7 seeks to do. Upholding the rule of law means ensuring that detention powers are subject to proper legal safeguards and that individuals are not denied their fundamental rights through legislative backtracking.

The purpose of clause 41 is to clarify the existing powers of detention pending deportation set out in schedule 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971. The clause ensures that the Secretary of State can detain individuals once they have been notified that deportation is being considered. It also aligns the power to detain with the power to take biometrics and to search for nationality documents. That is because the taking of biometric information and any other searches will ordinarily take place at the point that somebody is detained. The effect of clause 41 is to make clear that a person subject to deportation may be detained at any stage of the deportation process. It strengthens an existing power; it does not create a new power. It clarifies a power that has always existed and been used for this purpose.

Another effect of the clause is to confirm that the Secretary of State may take biometrics and search for those documents. Since clause 41 clarifies existing powers, the detention provisions it contains are regarded as always having had effect. It is extremely important for Members to understand what the clarification of the powers of detention means. If a person is subject to deportation on the basis that the deportation is conducive to the public good, they may be detained at any stage of the deportation process. It is extremely important that the Home Office should be able to detain those it is seeking to deport on that basis. Some of these foreign national offenders pose a high risk of harm to the public. Therefore, inability to detain them could have a direct impact on public safety.

The clause makes it clear that it is lawful to detain a person once they are notified that the Home Office is considering whether to make a deportation order against them, but that is not a new detention power; it has been misunderstood in some of the commentary from outside of this place. The clause clarifies an existing power to ensure there is no ambiguity about when someone subject to a conducive deportation can be detained. The accurate identification of such people is very important.

The clause also makes consequential amendments to existing powers to search detained persons—potential deportees—for documents that prove their identity or nationality, and to take their biometrics upon their being detained. Clause 41 sets out the power to detain pending deportation, as the Home Office has always understood it to operate. It is therefore right that the provision applies retrospectively. That deals with amendment 7, which is in the name of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire and seeks to remove the retrospective element of the clause.

Clause 41 clarifies the existing statutory powers of detention. There are important public safety reasons why these powers need to be put beyond doubt. Clause 41 clarifies the powers as the Home Office has always understood them to operate. There will be no operational impact that we can assess, or increased use of the power, and no effect on people in relation to whom this power has been exercised. It is entirely right that these provisions should apply retrospectively in these circumstances.

2.15pm

I hear the Minister’s justification for the powers and why she feels they are necessary, but I do not hear any compelling reason for why they have to be introduced retrospectively. What on earth is that supposed to help with? She knows the range of concerns raised by a number of legal organisations. I wish she would address their concerns about the consequences of the clause.

The clause seeks to put beyond any doubt that the Home Office has the power to detain, in conducive deportation cases, at the earliest point. It has been doing that for many years. The clarification in the clause applies retrospectively to ensure that those who have been detained in the past have not been detained unlawfully. We do not believe they have, but this puts it beyond doubt. To clarify, this is not an extension of deportation powers; it is putting beyond doubt in the Bill the understanding of how and when these powers can be used—at the earliest opportunity, if it is a conducive deportation. The powers, including to detain at the earliest opportunity, have always existed.

If the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire were agreed to, it would cast doubt on many of the arrests and detentions ahead of deportations that have happened in the past, which I do not think the hon. Gentleman would want to do. To reassure the hon. Gentleman one final time, this is not an extension of deportation powers; it is a clarification of the way that they have always been understood to work. The clause puts beyond legal doubt that if somebody is being detained pending deportation, they can be detained lawfully at the earliest opportunity. That understanding has always been the case, but the clause puts it beyond any legal doubt.

Clause 41 confirms that the Home Office may detain someone subject to deportation from the point at which the Home Office serves the notification that deportation is being considered, when that deportation is conducive to the public good. We support this provision to allow for detention before a deportation order is signed, but that only applies if the Secretary of State has notified the person in writing. Can I seek reassurance from the Minister that the requirement for a written notice will not build any delay into the process? We also support the provision in clause 42 to allow the Home Office to capture biometrics at the new, earlier point of detention.

I will not detain the Committee for long. I do not like clause 41 anyway—I think the extension of deportation powers is overwhelming and I do not believe they are required—but I do not like this retrospection one bit. I have not secured an adequate explanation from the Minister about why that is necessary. I would therefore like to put my amendment to a vote, Dame Siobhain.

Thank you for clarifying, as that was going to be my next question. Does anybody else wish to contribute?

May I ask for a response from the Minister to my question?

I am happy to give the hon. Lady the assurance that she sought. If somebody is going to be detained, it will always be done with written notice, and that should not delay anything—it has not in the past.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 11

Clause 41 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 42

Powers to take biometric information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

You are getting a lot of practice with locking and unlocking the doors and having Divisions, Dame Siobhain—it is quite exciting this afternoon.

Clause 42 modernises our powers to capture biometric information, so that we have greater flexibility over who can take that information. It will enable a wider range of appropriately trained people to take biometric information, strengthening processing resilience following instances of small boat crossings or unexpected arrivals. In a situation where it is essential to capture biometrics at the earliest opportunity and through streamlined processes, we will be able to utilise our resources more effectively. For example, the measure will enable contractors working at a short-term holding facility to capture biometrics in the same way as other contractors based in detention centres currently do. The clause also includes a power to make secondary legislation where there is a need for others to be able to capture biometric information. That is a future proofing of the legislation.

These are sensible and necessary measures to ensure that we can identify people quickly and establish whether they pose a threat to public safety if they have arrived in an irregular or illegal way.

We are essentially supportive of clause 42, which among other things allows a person employed by a contractor in a short-term holding facility to be an authorised person to take fingerprints. The clause also includes a regulation-making power to allow other types of people to be authorised for this purpose.

May I ask the Minister how the regulation-making power is intended to be used? Are there currently other categories of people whom the Secretary of State or others in the Department would like to authorise to take fingerprints, or is this essentially a future-proofing measure, as the Minister mentioned?

This is essentially future proofing. If another category or range of people became available, we may future proof this power and use the regulation-making power to ensure that they are taking biometrics lawfully.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 43

Articles for use in serious crime

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 44 stand part.

Clauses 43 and 44 cover the creation of two new offences concerning articles for use in serious crime. Law enforcement agencies are increasingly encountering individuals in possession of, or supplying, articles suspected to be intended for serious crime. However, proving intent or knowledge for a prosecution is often difficult, as the connection to a specific crime may not be immediately clear and facilitators frequently go undetected.

To address that challenge, clause 43 introduces two new criminal offences. The first criminalises the possession of specified articles; the second targets the importation, manufacture, adaptation, supply or offer to supply of those articles where there is a reasonable suspicion that they will be used in a serious offence. The specified articles include templates for 3D-printed firearms components, pill presses and vehicle concealments. Those concealments are particularly concerning in relation to smuggling operations, as they are often used to hide individuals for irregular immigration purposes.

The accused will need to prove that they did not intend for the article to be used in a serious offence, or that they could not have reasonably suspected it—given the few, if any, legitimate uses for the articles I have just mentioned. Those offences will be triable either way, with a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, a fine or both.

Clause 43 defines “serious offences” broadly, to include drug trafficking, firearms offences and assisting unlawful migration, as outlined in schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007. The clause strengthens the ability of law enforcement agencies to target those facilitating serious crime. It does that by closing legal gaps and addressing emerging criminal tools.

Clause 44 defines the specific articles to be included in the new criminal offences in clause 43. As I said, the articles are templates of 3D-printed firearms or their components, pill presses and encapsulators, and vehicle concealments. Law enforcement agencies have been clear that those articles are being increasingly used by organised crime gangs, and they will continue to be used unless we take action now. 3D-printed firearms templates are increasingly being used by organised criminals, and they are at present not illegal to possess. Pill presses are being used to manufacture illicit drugs, particularly benzodiazepines. Similarly, vehicle concealments have become a significant concern for law enforcement agencies, and they are used as aids in people smuggling and irregular migration.

Clause 44 also provides the Secretary of State with the power to amend the list of specified articles, allowing the law to adapt to emerging threats. Any changes will be subject to the affirmative procedure. The Home Office will continue to work closely with law enforcement agencies and other partners to monitor and update that list, ensuring that it remains relevant as criminal tactics evolve. By capturing those articles, the aim is to disrupt the enablers and facilitators who profit from supplying tools for organised crime.

The clauses seem broadly reasonable, but we have a few questions on which I would appreciate some clarification from the Minister. Clause 43 creates two new offences: the possession of articles for use in serious immigration crime, and the importation, manufacture, and supply or offer to supply of articles for use in serious immigration crime. Could the Minister explain whether she feels that UK Border Force currently has the right capabilities to identify and intercept the harmful materials captured by the clause?

Clause 43 reverses the evidential burden of proof, in that a person charged with offences under it can successfully prove their defence if they provide enough evidence in court to raise a question about the issue, and the prosecution cannot prove the opposite beyond reasonable doubt. Could the Minister please explain why the decision has been taken to do that? The maximum penalty for the offences created under the clause is imprisonment for five years, a fine or both. Could the Minister please explain how and why those penalties were decided on?

Clause 44 defines “relevant article” for the purposes of the offences created in clause 43. Could the Minister please explain whether clauses 43 and 44 provide any operational benefit in terms of tackling smugglers operating abroad, and if so, how?

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairpersonship, Dame Siobhain. I want to dwell briefly on clause 43 because it embodies a significant theme in the Bill: preparing our country for the challenges we face today and those we will face to a greater extent in the future. In that context, it is so important to talk about the risk posed to our country’s security by 3D-printed firearms.

I commend the campaigning of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Edgbaston (Preet Kaur Gill), who has done an enormous amount of work on this issue. 3D-printed firearms are a serious threat to our security, and present a new challenge to law enforcement because they can easily be made at home and are untraceable and undetectable. Indeed, files containing IKEA-like step-by-step guides to 3D print firearms at home can be downloaded from the web in as little as three clicks. That is terrifying. If we can tackle that through the Bill, that feels like a significant contribution.

2.30pm

We know that law enforcement is calling out for these powers. In oral testimony, we heard comprehensively from operationally and frontline-focused senior leaders that they want to be able to do more to get ahead of these threats. One of the great things about the Bill is that it has been drafted by people who have listened to the experts, and it will give them the resources they need. As a consequence, we will be able to secure our border and make sure that people are safe on our streets.

The hon. Member for Weald of Kent may be familiar with the provisions in clauses 43 and 44, because they were in a Bill introduced by her predecessor, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who is now the shadow Home Secretary. That Bill was interrupted by the general election. Oddly, I chaired that Bill Committee in the last Parliament and listened to him make a speech about this issue. I therefore hope that there will be no real objection to the powers we need to take in clauses 43 and 44 to make it easier to disrupt and prevent harm from serious organised crime, some of the tools used in it and the facilitators who enable it. Such people might not have been at the scene of the crime, but they have enabled a lot of harm by supplying or importing the goods that I mentioned.

There are two sets of offences, which are designed to target different types of activity. The hon. Member for Weald of Kent asked about the evidential burden. These articles do not have ordinary, normal uses that I would consider legitimate. Printing 3D guns, or having pill presses in order to produce drugs for street sale, does not seem to be as legitimate as, say, purchasing a boat engine or indeed a boat. Given that there are no real, legitimate uses for such items, we think that placing the evidential burden on the defence to explain why on earth the person charged with possessing them has them is wholly reasonable.

Clauses 43 and 44 are intended to disrupt serious organised crime efforts to penetrate our border with paraphernalia for producing drugs or guns, or any of the things that go along with serious organised crime activity in this country, and thereby to keep people safe. I hope that the Committee will support them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 43 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45

Confiscation of assets

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45 amends the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to include offences related to the possession and supply of articles intended for serious crime, as outlined in clause 43. It will enable law enforcement agencies to seize the assets of individuals convicted under clause 43.

Specifically, the clause adds:

“Offences relating to things for use in serious crime”

to the criminal lifestyle schedules for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. A defendant convicted of an offence listed in those schedules will automatically be deemed to have led a criminal lifestyle and to have benefited from criminal conduct over a period of time. That means that assets obtained or spent in the six years prior to conviction are presumed to be derived from criminal conduct and are subject to confiscation unless the defendant can prove otherwise. However, the court is not required to make that assumption if it would result in injustice or is shown to be incorrect.

Confiscation orders are calculated based on the defendant’s monetary gains from crime—known as the benefit—and the assets they have available to them when the order is made. Orders are made to reflect the amount gained from crime and can be increased if the defendant’s finances improve. Non-payment of orders can lead to the defendant returning to prison.

By including these offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act, we can target financially criminals who profit from facilitating crime, disrupting both the crime and the financial gains that support it.

Clause 45 allows the relevant articles listed under clause 44 to be confiscated under the Proceeds of Crime Act. We support this measure.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46

Electronic monitoring requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The purpose of clause 46 is to remove any ambiguity about the court’s power to impose electronic monitoring as a condition of a serious crime prevention order or interim serious crime prevention order.

As currently drafted, the clause applies in England and Wales for any serious crime prevention order or interim serious crime prevention order, and in Scotland and Northern Ireland in terrorism-related cases only. However, since the Bill’s introduction, further legal complexities have come to light regarding the devolved Governments’ powers to impose an electronic monitoring condition. Pending agreement from the Scottish Cabinet Secretary, an amendment will be tabled to remove that express provision for Scotland. Northern Ireland’s position is still to be determined. I point that devolution complication out to Committee members and will keep them informed as those discussions develop.

Electronic monitoring serves as a deterrent, but it also improves the detection of any breaches. If the subject violates the conditions, it enables quicker intervention by law enforcement agencies. The clause outlines specific requirements for both the courts and the individual, including the obligation for the subject to consent to the installation and maintenance of monitoring equipment and to avoid tampering with it.

Additional safeguards are included. For instance, electronic monitoring can be imposed only for up to 12 months at a time, with the possibility of extension. A further safeguard requires the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice on handling monitoring data, ensuring consistency and clarity for law enforcement.

This clause on electronic monitoring for those subject to serious crime prevention orders will enhance the effectiveness of such orders and interim SCPOs, supporting efforts to disrupt serious and organised crime, reduce harm and protect the public. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 46 allows the courts to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as part of a serious crime prevention order. The clause is helpful for investigating suspects who are already in the UK, and we broadly support it. Will the Minister confirm that the requirement for electronic monitoring will apply to those who are on immigration bail? What value does the Minister feel serious crime prevention orders might have as a deterrent for those operating abroad?

Clause 46 specifies that there will be a code of practice to outline the expectations, safeguards and broad responsibilities for the data gathered, retention and sharing of information on these orders. When will that code of practice be issued, and can the Minister please outline what the Government expect to be included?

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain. I would like the Minister to define electronic monitoring for us, if she can. I do not believe that there is such a definition in the Bill or in other Acts of Parliament. As a result, I worry that there is confusion, so I would welcome her thoughts.

We are talking about electronic monitoring in the context of serious crime prevention orders; we are not talking about monitoring simply in connection to being an asylum seeker or migrant. I would not want Opposition Members to worry or mix up those two things.

This part of the Bill is about dealing with serious and organised criminality, some of which will involve people smuggling, and some of which will involve drugs, firearms or other serious organised crime. This is electronic tagging in the context of the granting of serious and organised crime orders, or interim serious and organised crime orders, which are designed to disrupt and prevent the activities of serious organised crime groups, not just general asylum seekers or migrants. Obviously, there may be some connection between the two, but it is not direct in this area.

Those orders and their conditions, such as electronic monitoring, therefore will not apply to migrants generally. Law enforcement agencies use serious crime prevention orders to manage individuals who have been convicted of, or are suspected of, serious criminality, where the order will protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting the person’s involvement in serious crime.

Serious crime prevention orders can be imposed on offenders for a range of offences relating to people smuggling. The specific conditions of the order will be a matter for the judge in the High Court who makes it, and for the law enforcement body that makes the application. This is very focused, and it is all about the context of the individual who has been served with such an order. For that to happen, there has to be evidence of their involvement in serious and organised crime.

Clearly, tagging is about being able to check where people are, while electronic monitoring can also apply to other activity. It will apply in a particular context to a particular person for disruption reasons, so there is not one definition of electronic tagging. I hope that helps the hon. Member for Woking to understand the monitoring that we are talking about. On that basis, I hope members of the Committee will agree to clause 46.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47

Interim serious crime prevention orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 2.

Clause 47 introduces interim serious crime prevention orders as part of the wider regime of serious crime prevention orders established under the Serious Crime Act 2007. Interim serious crime prevention orders are designed to protect the public while a full serious crime prevention order application is considered. The Court can impose an interim serious crime prevention order within hours, imposing a range of conditions and restrictions to disrupt further criminal behaviour. For example, anyone suspected of being involved in people trafficking or other serious crime could face bans on travel, using the internet and mobile phone use.

2.45pm

Interim serious crime prevention orders will allow enforcement agencies to act swiftly to prevent, disrupt or restrict serious offences before they occur. These are the counter terrorism-style powers that attach to the Bill, and they are about disruption and prevention. It is not about waiting until the harm has happened and then arresting people for causing it; it is about trying to prevent the harm from happening in the first place. Interim crime prevention orders will allow enforcement agencies to act swiftly to prevent, disrupt or restrict serious offences before they occur, stopping offenders from reorganising or destroying evidence. This clause allows without notice applications, enabling interim orders to be made without the individual present, if notice could undermine the order’s effectiveness.

Additionally, given that this is a powerful tool, clause 47 provides key safeguards, including the requirement to serve notice of an interim serious crime prevention order within seven days, and to allow individuals to challenge the order in court via the appeal process, or on application to vary its terms or discharge. This is not without precedent; interim orders are successfully used in areas such as sexual risk and modern slavery, where the urgency to protect the public justifies temporary restrictions or requirements on individuals. Clause 47 will enable the National Crime Agency, the police and other law enforcement agencies to act more quickly than current powers allow to protect the public from serious criminals, including those who are engaged in organised immigration crime.

Schedule 2 introduces a series of consequential amendments to the Serious Crime Act 2007 to extend existing provisions to interim serious crime prevention orders. These amendments ensure that interim serious crime prevention orders are governed by the same legal safeguards and processes as full orders. Key provisions include extending protection for individuals under the age of 18, granting the right to make representations in court, and aligning rules for the duration, variation and discharge of orders. The amendments also apply to bodies corporate, partnerships and unincorporated associations, ensuring accountability if they breach an interim serious crime prevention order. Schedule 2 ensures that interim serious crime prevention orders have the same effective safeguards as serious crime prevention orders, while strengthening the legal framework for preventing serious crime.

Clause 47 introduces a new provision for interim serious crime prevention orders. These allow the High Court to impose immediate restrictions, pending the determination of a full serious crime prevention order application. The Court can do that if it considers that it is just to do so. Can the Minister explain a little more by what process the Court will decide whether it is just? Is the criterion that it is necessary for public protection?

Proposed new section 5F of the Serious Crime Act makes provision for without notice applications. That is where the application for an interim serious crime prevention order, or the variation of an interim serious crime prevention order, is made without notice being given to the person against whom the order is made, in circumstances where notice of that application is likely to prejudice the outcome. Subsection (2) of proposed new section 5F makes provision for the Court to allow the relevant person to make representations about the order as soon as is reasonably practicable. Can the Minister explain whether that will always happen after the order is granted?

The High Court will be empowered to impose an interim serious crime prevention order if it considers it just to do so. In other words, it is not an evidential test, because the Court does not apply a standard of proof. Rather, it invites the Court to impose an order before it has heard and tested all the evidence in instances that require fast-paced action to prevent and disrupt serious and organised crime. It is therefore an exercise of judgment or evaluation. There is a precedent for this approach in interim sexual risk orders and interim slavery and trafficking risk orders, which are currently a feature of the system and work reasonably well.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 48

Applicants for making of orders and interim orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Currently, the High Court can make a serious crime prevention order only upon application from the Crown Prosecution Service, the Serious Fraud Office and the police in terrorism-related cases. However, High Court serious crime prevention orders have not been fully utilised; between 2011 and 2021, only two applications were made, and only one resulted in a successful order. Clause 48 extends the list of agencies that can apply directly to the High Court for a serious crime prevention order, or an interim serious crime order, to the National Crime Agency, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the police in all cases, including the British Transport Police and the Ministry of Defence Police. The clause also specifies who within each agency is authorised to apply for these orders.

This extension will simplify and expedite the application processes for serious crime prevention orders, making it easier for agencies that are directly involved in tackling serious crime to make an application where appropriate. It gets rid of a gateway process that has proven to be so tight that it has not allowed very many of these orders to go forward at all. Those agencies are often best placed to apply for a serious crime prevention order as they already have an in-depth knowledge of the case.

The clause also requires the CPS to be consulted by the applicant authority, as it will continue to have responsibility for ensuring that the order is not used as a substitute for prosecution. That is a very important part of ensuring that these orders work appropriately. In practice, this clause will make serious crime prevention orders more readily available to the agencies that are most likely to use them, to ensure that this powerful tool is used to best effect to protect the public by preventing and disrupting serious and organised crime.

Clause 48 details who can apply to make orders and interim orders, and it replaces and extends the previous list in section 8 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Can the Minister please explain how long an application for an interim serious crime prevention order might take when made to either the High Court or the Crown court?

I want to reflect on where we have got up to. We have moved through the clauses at quite a pace, and that is very pleasing to see. The Bill responds to the requests of operationally and frontline-focused people in law enforcement and border security, and it is an attempt to give them the tools and powers that they need. I particularly wanted to mention that in the context of interim serious crime prevention orders, which we have spoken about in clauses 47 and 48.

That cuts such a sharp contrast with what has happened over recent years. In 2022, one Home Secretary introduced the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. At the time, the Government said that that would deter people from crossing in small boats, but it did not. In 2023, another Home Secretary brought in the Illegal Migration Act 2023. At the time, the Government said that that would turn people away from crossing the channel in small boats, but it did not. In 2024, another Home Secretary brought in the Safety of Rwanda Act, which happily we have just repealed today. At the time, the Government talked about the prospect of sending people to Rwanda, and they said that alone would be sufficient to deter people from crossing the channel in small boats. It is no wonder that that failed, too.

I wanted to set out how in 2022, 2023 and 2024 we had three separate Acts, which all aimed to do something and failed to do so. They have not delivered what operationally focused people have requested. We really need to look at how, just eight months into this new Government, we are turning the page on our asylum system and giving enforcement powers to the people who need them. We are also tidying up the statute book and ensuring greater co-ordination across the key agencies that can secure our border. I commend clause 48 to the Committee, as I do the series of clauses before it and the Bill overall.

The idea behind the creation of interim serious crime prevention orders is to ensure that they can be brought into use ahead of a longer lasting serious crime prevention order. The widening of the range of organisations that can apply for them is designed to empower organisations such as the National Crime Agency, HMRC and the MOD police to apply, because they are much closer to the evidence that could enable the disruption of a particular serious organised crime group.

The hon. Member for Weald of Kent asked how long it would take to get such an order, and that would vary from case to case. It depends on the evidence. As I pointed out in relation to the previous clause, this is about the High Court reviewing the papers. It is not about a trial or a pre-trial; it is just about issuing an order that will prevent something that might cause damage from happening. We think that the changes made by the clauses that we have just debated, up to and including clause 48, make it more likely that serious and organised crime orders will be used and will be effective.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49

Notification requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49 amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to introduce a standardised list of notification requirements for individuals and bodies corporate that are subject to serious crime prevention orders. This is a process of standardisation. Currently, notification requirements are added at the court’s discretion on a case-by-case basis. The clause will standardise those requirements for all serious crime prevention orders, improving the consistency and monitoring of the orders across police forces.

We have worked closely with law enforcement partners to identify appropriate requirements. The standard list will include monitoring legitimate income, checking addresses or communication methods for signs that criminal activities are being re-established, and monitoring foreign travel to assess potential indications of a return to crime. The courts can then impose additional requirements and conditions as part of the serious crime prevention order.

For bodies corporate, a designated individual must be named to liaise with the police and provide the notifiable information—including personal details, employment, financial data and contact information—which is essential for law enforcement to ensure compliance and assess risk to public safety.

The clause includes a delegated power to add to the list of notification requirements, ensuring flexibility to meet operational needs as technology evolves. The statutory instrument will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure. Individuals who are subject to a serious crime prevention order must provide the notifiable information within three days of the order coming into force. Failure to provide information, or providing false information, will be a criminal offence punishable by a fine or up to five years’ imprisonment. The standardisation of notifications will improve consistency in managing serious criminals and improve law enforcement agencies’ ability to assess risk and therefore more effectively protect the public.

Clause 49 sets out a prescribed set of notification requirements, so that a person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order is required to provide the police or the applicant authorities with certain information. We support the clause, although can the Minister explain why three days has been given as the deadline to respond with the notifiable information requested?

Three days seems a reasonable amount of time to allow the individual or body corporate concerned to gather the information, but also to ensure that the authorities get it in a timely way, so as to prevent any potential harm that might come from delay.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50

Orders by Crown Court on acquittal or when allowing an appeal

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Currently, the High Court has the authority to impose a serious crime prevention order without a conviction, provided that the Court is satisfied that the person has been involved in serious crime and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the order will protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting their involvement in serious crime.

Clause 50 amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to grant the Crown court the power to impose a serious crime prevention order on individuals who have been acquitted of an offence, or in circumstances where the appeal has been allowed, if the same two-limb test is met. There may be cases where a person is acquitted but a serious crime prevention order is still needed. This can happen if the threshold for a criminal conviction is not met but there is still enough evidence to show that the person is involved in serious crime, and that the order would protect the public.

The Crown court would have just heard the evidence of the case and would be in the best position to assess whether an order is necessary to protect the public. Again, this approach is not new; similar provisions are found in other laws, such as domestic abuse protection orders under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and restraining orders under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, where orders can still be issued even after an individual has been acquitted. The effect of this clause is to streamline the process, enabling serious crime prevention orders to be applied more regularly and effectively in appropriate cases.

Clause 50 allows the Crown court the power to impose a serious crime prevention order on acquittal or when allowing an appeal. Subsection (2) provides that in order to impose a serious crime prevention order in these circumstances, the court has to be satisfied both that the person has been involved in serious crime and that the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the order would protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement by that person in serious crime in England or Wales. Why do both tests need to be satisfied for a serious crime prevention order to be imposed? Where these cases involve acquittal, as the Minister outlined, it might be hard to satisfy the first test. It seems to us that the second test of protecting the public is sufficient grounds to impose a serious crime prevention order.

It is a two-limb test. Obviously, the evidential test for criminal proceedings is beyond reasonable doubt. There is a lower evidential test in other court instances, and it may very well be that someone who did not pass the “beyond reasonable doubt” test in a criminal trial would still be considered by the court to be involved in criminal activity, and therefore they would pass the first limb of the test. They would pass the second limb as they would still be likely to be involved in criminal activity in the future. We think that the two-limb test is an appropriate response to protect civil liberties, while protecting the public from the behaviour of those who are involved in serious and organised crime. We think that that balance is about right.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Martin McCluskey.)

3.04pm

Adjourned till Thursday 13 March at half-past Eleven o’clock.

Written evidence reported to the House

BSAIB27 The Bar Council

BSAIB28 Detention Action, Medical Justice and Bail for Immigration Detainees

BSAIB29 Liberty

BSAIB30 Safe Passage International

BSAIB31 Scottish Refugee Council (supplementary submission)

BSAIB32 Young Roots

BSAIB33 Public Law Project and Freedom from Torture (joint submission)

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Ninth sitting)

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Mrs Emma Lewell-Buck, Sir Desmond Swayne, † Matt Western, Sir Jeremy Wright

† Baxter, Johanna (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)

† Berry, Siân (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)

† Coyle, Neil (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)

† Darling, Steve (Torbay) (LD)

† Dewhirst, Charlie (Bridlington and The Wolds) (Con)

† Egan, Damien (Bristol North East) (Lab)

† German, Gill (Clwyd North) (Lab)

† Gould, Georgia (Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office)

† Jameson, Sally (Doncaster Central) (Lab/Co-op)

† Jones, Gerald (Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare) (Lab)

† McKee, Gordon (Glasgow South) (Lab)

† Milne, John (Horsham) (LD)

† Payne, Michael (Gedling) (Lab)

† Smith, Rebecca (South West Devon) (Con)

† Welsh, Michelle (Sherwood Forest) (Lab)

† Western, Andrew (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions)

† Wood, Mike (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)

Kevin Maddison, Simon Armitage, Dominic Stockbridge, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 11 March 2025

(Morning)

[Matt Western in the Chair]

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

9.25am

I remind Members to send their speaking notes by email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk and to switch all electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are of course not allowed during sittings.

Clause 75

Eligibility verification: independent review

I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 75, page 41, line 25, at end insert—

“(1A) Prior to appointing an independent person, the Minister must consult the relevant committee of the House of Commons.

(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1A), ‘the relevant committee’ means a committee determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.”

This amendment would ensure further oversight into the appointment of the “Independent person”.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 38, in clause 75, page 41, line 29, leave out “person” and insert “board”.

This amendment would replace the “independent person” with an independent board.

Amendment 39, in clause 75, page 41, line 32, leave out “person” and insert “board”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.

Amendment 40, in clause 75, page 42, line 19, leave out subsection (7) and insert—

“The Secretary of State may by regulations appoint persons to, and confer functions upon, an independent board for the purposes of securing compliance with subsections (1) to (6).”

This amendment is related to Amendment 38.

Amendment 41, in clause 75, page 42, line 23, leave out first “person” and insert “board”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.

Amendment 42, in clause 75, page 42, line 24, leave out “person” and insert “board”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.

Clause stand part.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. We have touched previously on having an independent overview of the activities that will take place under the Bill, and this is another opportunity to have the checks and balances I have alluded to on a number of occasions. Of course, all Members in the room are reasonable people, but we see in world politics what happens when people are unreasonable. Given that the United Kingdom’s constitution is unwritten, beginning to build those checks and balances into legislation is important. Amendment 37 would hardwire them into the Bill, and I ask that the Minister give it serious consideration. I have heard hints that it may be taken into account in one way or the other when the Bill goes to the other place, but I would welcome some reassurance, if possible, that that is the case.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. As my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay said, the amendment is about checks and balances. We appreciate that the Bill has been introduced in the context of the Government’s desire to cut the benefits bill, but the Treasury deeming something to be financially necessary does not necessarily make it right.

The percentage lost to fraud and error is relatively modest, but of course the sums are huge because the overall number is huge. We need to remember that these measures will not get anywhere near recovering all that money, so the question is: is the action proportionate, considering the sacrifice we are making in terms of civil liberties? It is vital that we get the best value from public money, but the amount expected to be recovered is just 2% of the estimated annual loss to fraud and error of £10 billion, and just a quarter of what is lost to official error at the Department for Work and Pensions.

As drafted, the clause empowers the Minister to appoint an independent person to carry out reviews of the Secretary of State’s function under schedule 3B to the Social Security Administration Act 1992. There is no external oversight, and that undermines the credibility of the role. Our amendment states:

“Prior to appointing an independent person, the Minister must consult the relevant committee of the House of Commons”,

which means

“a committee determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.”

Without proper scrutiny, the role’s independence is undermined, potentially damaging trust in the process.

The Committee previously heard evidence from Dr Kassem of Aston University, who stated:

“I would recommend a board rather than an individual, because how sustainable could that be, and who is going to audit the individual? You want an unbiased point of view. That happens when you have independent experts discussing the matter and sharing their points of view. You do not want that to be dictated by an individual, who might also take longer to look at the process. The operation is going to be slower. We do not want that from a governance perspective—if you want to oversee things in an effective way, a board would be a much better idea.” ––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 13, Q15.]

A board would ensure that the appointment is truly independent and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. We therefore propose that the Minister must consult the relevant House of Commons Committee before making such an appointment. That simple steps would ensure genuine independence and parliamentary scrutiny, and would strengthen transparency and public confidence.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mr Western. As we have just heard, Liberal Democrat amendments 37 to 42 would mean that, before appointing an independent person, the Minister had to consult a Committee of the House of Commons nominated by Mr Speaker. Amendments 38 to 42 seek to replace an independent person with an independent board, and therefore to allow the Secretary of State to appoint persons to, and confer functions upon, the board.

I have a couple of questions for the hon. Member for Torbay. What greater independence do the Liberal Democrats think will be gained by changing the requirement, given that both the independent board and the independent person would be appointed by the Secretary of State? What practical difference will the amendments make to improve the review process and ensure that it is high quality?

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Western. With your permission, I will speak to amendment 37 before speaking to amendments 38 to 42. I will then speak to why the unamended clause 75 should stand part of the Bill.

Before I begin, I will respond to a couple of the comments made by the hon. Member for Horsham on the relatively small amounts of fraud and error we see. With this particular measure, as he is aware, we are initially targeting the three benefits with the highest levels of fraud and error. To take universal credit as an example, it is £1 in every £8 spent, which is a tremendously high number and one we must do everything we can to bring down. However, it is worth recognising and explaining to colleagues that the measures in the Bill are part of a broader package to tackle fraud, which reached £8.6 billion across the relevant period. This is not the beginning and end of the Department’s work on fraud across that period, but it is the part of that overall package that requires legislation.

Returning to my substantive notes on the question of a “board” versus a “person”, I think there may be some misunderstanding of definitions here. Amendment 37 seeks to oblige the Secretary of State to consult a relevant Committee of the House of Commons before appointing the independent overseer of the eligibility verification measure. I believe that the amendment is unnecessary and I will be resisting it.

We recognise the importance of appointing the right person or body to oversee the use of the eligibility verification measure. That is why we have made it a requirement that the overseer report annually on the use of the power directly to the Secretary of State, who will then lay the report before Parliament. We have included that key safeguard to ensure the effective and proportionate use of this power and to introduce greater transparency in the use of it. The person or body will be appointed following a fair and public recruitment process, which will be carried out under the guidance of the Commissioner for Public Appointments.

I assure the Committee today that we will abide by the governance code on public appointments throughout the process. Whether this role is subject to pre-appointment scrutiny will be governed by the code, and we will follow its guidance at all times. The final decision on who will oversee this measure will, in all cases, be made by the Secretary of State. That is because the governance code on public appointments points out:

“The ultimate responsibility for appointments and thus the selection of those appointed rests with Ministers who are accountable to Parliament for their decisions and actions.”

We will keep the House informed about the process at all key stages, including when the process is set to begin and on the proposed final appointment.

Am I right in thinking that the Work and Pensions Committee will be entitled to call any witness, including whoever is appointed to this role, to give evidence to it and to be scrutinised by its members?

My hon. Friend is entirely correct. The Select Committee always has that power, and were it to have any concerns whatever, it would look to exercise that power at the earliest opportunity.

I recognise that the amendment has been tabled with good intentions. However, because of our commitment to an open and transparent recruitment process, and because we will be abiding by the requirements of the governance code on public appointments, it is unnecessary and I will resist it.

I will now turn to amendments 38 to 42, which seek to remove the term “person” and insert the term “board” in reference to the appointment of an independent reviewer of the eligibility verification measure, as set out in clause 75. I recognise the intent behind the points raised, but the amendments are unnecessary and I will resist them. It is probably useful to clarify that, legally, the term “person”, as referred to in the clause, can refer to an individual person, a body of people or a board, as per the Interpretation Act 1978. I therefore reassure the Committee that any reference to “person” in the Bill includes a body of persons, corporate or incorporated, that is a natural person, a legal person or, for example, a partnership.

I reassure the Committee that the Secretary of State will appoint the most appropriate and suitable independent oversight for the measure. That might be an individual expert, which is consistent with the approach taken for oversight of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, or it might be a group of individuals who form a board or committee. As the Cabinet Office’s governance code on public appointments clearly sets out, Ministers

“should act solely in terms of the public interest”

when making appointments, and I can assure the Committee that we will do just that.

To offer further reassurance, I confirm that the appointment process for the independent person or body will be open, fair and transparent, adhering strictly to the governance code on public appointments, which ensures that all appointments are made based on merit, fairness and openness. The Government will of course notify the House of the appointment. I therefore resist these amendments.

I will now turn to clause 75. Independent oversight is one of several safeguards for the eligibility verification measure, and I remind the Committee of the others that we discussed on Thursday. First, we are initially pursuing the measure with just three benefits in scope. Others can be added by regulations, but not, in any circumstances, the state pension, which is specifically excluded from the Bill. Furthermore, limits on the data that can be collected are set out in the Bill. For instance, no transactional data or special category data can be shared. Finally, as we discussed at length on Thursday, a human decision maker will be in place to determine whether any fraud has been committed.

Clause 75 provides a vital safeguard for the eligibility verification power. By inserting proposed new sections 121DC and 121DD into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, it establishes a requirement for independent oversight of the power, to ensure accountability, compliance and effectiveness. We recognise the importance of safe and transparent delivery of the eligibility verification measure, which is why we are legislating to make it a requirement for the Secretary of State to appoint the independent person to carry out annual reviews.

As per proposed new section 121DC(2), the person must prepare a report and submit it to the Secretary of State. And as per new subsection (3), the Secretary of State must then publish the report and lay a copy before Parliament. New subsection (4) outlines that the first review must relate to the first 12 months after the measure comes into force, and new subsection (5) outlines that subsequent reviews must relate to each subsequent period of 12 months thereafter. Those annual reviews and reports will ensure transparency in the use of the measure and its effectiveness.

To ensure that the eligibility verification measure is exercised in a responsible and effective manner, in accordance with the legal framework, new section 121DC further details what each review must consider during the review period. That includes compliance with the legislation and the code of practice, and actions taken by banks and other financial institutions in complying with eligibility verification notices. The review must also cover whether the power has been effective in identifying, or assisting in identifying, incorrect payments of the benefits covered during the review period. In new subsection (7), there is provision for the Government to bring forward regulations to provide relevant functions to the independent reviewer to enable them to perform their duties under the clause.

In order to ensure that the independent reviewer is able to fulfil their duties, clause 75 also provides a legal gateway for the Secretary of State to disclose information to the independent reviewer, or a person acting on the reviewer’s behalf, for the purposes of carrying out the review. That can be found in new section 121DD, which is inserted by clause 75. Data protection provisions in new sections 121DD(2) to (4) make it clear that such sharing must comply with data protection legislation and other restrictions on the disclosure of information.

In conclusion, the clause represents a key safeguard in relation to the new power and confirms a previous commitment to Parliament to establish oversight over it and ensure its proportionate and effective use. On that basis, I propose that clause 75 stand part of the Bill.

Apologies, Mr Western, because I probably should have spoken to clause 75 stand part when I made my earlier remarks—it was just 9.20 am. Thank you for letting me speak now.

As we have discussed, clause 75 amends the Social Security Administration Act 1992, adding provisions for a review of the powers given through clause 74, which we debated last week. The Secretary of State must appoint an independent person to carry out the reviews, and a report must be submitted, published and laid before Parliament. I am grateful to the Minister for his assurances that, by definition, a “person” could be a body, a board or a panel. That has precluded quite a lot of the notes I was going to read out this morning, but it is good to hear that that definition is included in the Interpretation Act 1978.

However, it is worth again putting on record some of the evidence that we heard, and the fact that that definition caught the attention of some of those who gave evidence during our initial sittings. Some experts were concerned to have the eligibility verification reviewed by, potentially, a panel to ensure that it was both sustainable and auditable and that an unbiased viewpoint could be presented. Dr Kassem said:

“Personally, I would recommend a board rather than an individual, because how sustainable could that be, and who is going to audit the individual? You want an unbiased point of view. That happens when you have independent experts discussing the matter and sharing their points of view. You do not want that to be dictated by an individual, who might also take longer to look at the process. The operation is going to be slower. We do not want that from a governance perspective—if you want to oversee things in an effective way, a board would be a much better idea.” ––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 13, Q15.]

Clearly, the Minister addressed that in his comments, but it does raise the question of what volume of work he envisages the independent person, panel or body having to assess. I appreciate that that could well be a “How long is a piece of string?” exercise at this point, but does it have any bearing on whether the Secretary of State will appoint one person or several people at the point at which this body is instituted? I ask that question to reflect the concerns about volume, speed and the ability to get the review produced in the right amount of time, and also to provide clarification to those who gave evidence.

Finally, we heard from Helena Wood that she had concerns that the Bill is a “very blunt instrument”, specifically in relation to its powers on eligibility verification. What consideration has the Minister given to those comments, especially about the proportionality and reasonableness of the measures in the Bill, to ensure that it does not get used as the blunt tool it appears to be? What more information about how the powers in the clause are to be exercised will be set out in the code of practice in due course?

I acknowledge what the hon. Lady said about the evidence we heard and the preference for a board. If I am being absolutely transparent with the Committee—as I would be expected to be—I am entirely open-minded at this point about where we may end up. I do not have a person, body or group in mind. That is why I hope that the open and transparent process yields the best possible result in terms of the qualifications and specialisms of the individual or individuals who may ultimately be appointed. A range of skills would be of use to us—specialisms in data and human rights, and in welfare, obviously—so I am open-minded about where we end up in relation to who takes this work forward for us.

On the question as to the volume of work, the hon. Lady is correct that it is something of a “How long is a piece of string?” question. However, in terms of the bare essentials, the requirement is to produce an annual report to be laid before Parliament, so I would not expect the volume of work to be at the extreme end in terms of how onerous it would be.

9.45am

On Helena Wood’s evidence, she also acknowledged, on the question of proportionality and reasonableness, the significant additional oversight that we have put in place. I will quote what she said, to provide assurance to the Committee:

“If we compare this Bill with the predecessor Bill that was put forward by the previous Government, the concerns have been listened to. There is much more significant oversight and much more limited scope.”––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 17, Q22.]

That speaks to proportionality, in terms of the way the scope has been narrowed, but also to the work that we have taken to address the concerns, which are understood and heard, about the extent of these powers even with the additional safeguards that we have built in. There have been a number of fair challenges, but I acknowledge and agree with Helena’s points about the safeguarding and oversight that have been built in.

I am pleased to have had the debate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 75 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 76

Entry, search and seizure in England and Wales

I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 76, page 43, line 38, leave out from “the individual” to end of line 1 on page 44 and insert

“is an official of a government department and—”.

This amendment clarifies that to be an authorised investigator an individual must be an official of a government department and be of the specified grade.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Clause 77 stand part.

Government amendments 4, 5 and 33.

Schedule 4.

Clause 78 stand part.

New clause 3—Application of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to investigations conducted by the Department for Work and Pensions—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, introduce regulations for the purpose of applying certain powers of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, subject to such modifications as the order may specify, to investigations of offences conducted by the Department for Work and Pensions.

(2) The powers to be applied must include—

(a) the power of arrest;

(b) any other such powers that the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(3) Regulations made under this section shall be made by statutory instrument.”

Clause 76 will insert a new section 109D to the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to make provision for specialist DWP staff to apply to the courts for a warrant to enter a premises for the purposes of search and seizure. That is one of the five overarching powers that we are looking at in the Bill. It is a new power for the Department, but not uncommon across Government more broadly. These actions may be exercised only by an authorised investigator—an individual who has received authorisation from the Secretary of State and completed industry standard training.

As drafted, subsection (6) of proposed new section 109D could be interpreted as requiring an authorised investigator to be either an official of a Government Department or of at least higher executive officer grade. Amendment 34 makes it explicit that an authorised investigator must be both an official of a Government Department and an HEO, for the purpose of these powers in England and Wales. That is an important clarification and is in line with our original policy intent. I trust that the amendment is welcome, as it ensures that there are clear criteria in place and that only those who hold the right office and grade may be authorised to exercise the powers in clause 76 and schedule 4.

I turn to clause 76 itself, and the substance of the powers of entry, search and seizure for the DWP. The clause will insert new section 109D and schedule 3ZC into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, which will provide DWP-authorised investigators with the power to apply for warrants, enter a premises, search it and seize items. It will also give authorised investigators power to apply for an order to gain access to certain types of materials that refer to business or personal records, defined in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 as “excluded material” under section 11 or “special procedure material” under section 14.

The ability to undertake this activity will play a crucial role in gathering and securing evidence to bring serious and organised benefit fraudsters to justice. Currently, DWP investigators must rely on the police to undertake all this activity—securing the warrant from the court and exercising it—on their behalf. The clause changes that. It means that DWP-authorised investigators will be able to apply directly to a court for a warrant to enable them to enter, search and seize items from premises, but only during a serious and organised criminal investigation.

I can assure the Committee that DWP-authorised investigators will be required to meet the same legal requirements when submitting an application as the police. That includes undertaking all activities in compliance with the Home Office code of practice on entry, search and seizure. In addition, independent inspections of the DWP’s use of the power may be conducted by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services in England and Wales or by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary in Scotland. That is addressed in clause 87, which we will consider later, and will be in addition to the internal safeguards, including clear processes for signing off warrants, that the DWP will have in place to ensure that the powers are used appropriately, safely and lawfully.

Clause 77 will insert new section 109E and new schedule 3ZD into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, and will provide equivalent entry, search and seizure powers for DWP-authorised investigators carrying out investigations of serious and organised fraud in Scotland. The powers enabling entry, search and seizure in England and Wales are primarily provided by PACE, and that is addressed in clause 76; however, there is no equivalent Act in Scottish law to provide the basis for these powers, so the powers in relation to Scotland are set out in this Bill. New schedule 3ZD to the 1992 Act —inserted by clause 77 and schedule 4 to the Bill—provides the basis for applying for a warrant for entry, search and seizure and exercising that warrant in Scotland. Those powers are similar to those set out in clause 76 and schedule 4 for England and Wales.

Clause 77 enables a DWP-authorised investigator to apply for and execute a warrant or a production order—a court-authorised directive requiring an individual to promptly disclose information relevant to a criminal investigation—in Scotland. It also provides for the DWP to search premises and seize items when that action is authorised by a sheriff in Scotland. The clause is intended to achieve parity between the nations, and I commend it to the Committee.

Government amendments 4 and 5 are minor and technical and aim to deliver the original policy intent of schedule 4, relating to entry, search and seizure for the DWP in Scotland. Their effect is to provide that where an authorised investigator who is exercising a search warrant identifies materials or items that have a bearing on any offence under investigation, they should seize them only if taking a copy or record, such as a photograph, is deemed to be not appropriate. That will ensure that items or materials are seized only where necessary, and will apply the same safeguard in Scotland as is currently the case in England and Wales.

As the Bill is drafted, the requirement to take a copy where possible, rather than seizing something, would apply only to an item and not to material. The amendments will deliver the original policy intent, which was not to differentiate. They will also ensure that no seizure, copies or records should be made where an item or material is subject to legal privilege or defined as “excluded” or “special procedure” material. I hope that my explanation assures Members that the amendments are minor and technical, and will ensure that schedule 4 works correctly and is in line with the existing approach taken by the police. I commend Government amendments 4 and 5 to the Committee.

Government amendment 33, which is very similar to Government amendment 34, makes it clear that an authorised investigator must be both an official of a Government Department and of HEO grade, but this time in relation to the use of these powers in Scotland, under schedule 3ZD, which is set out in schedule 4 to the Bill. I trust that the amendment will be welcomed like amendment 34.

Schedule 4 outlines modifications to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for entry, search and seizure operations in England and Wales, and includes equivalent legislation for operations that take place in Scotland. The schedule sets out the essential modifications and practical details needed for DWP-authorised investigators to fully execute powers of entry, search and seizure. It outlines new schedule 3ZC to be inserted into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, to modify certain provisions in PACE to provide the relevant policing powers to DWP-authorised investigators in England and Wales.

The schedule sets out the minimum grade required to be an authorised investigator, which is the minimum civil service equivalent of a police constable. The DWP will require 250 authorised investigators to be trained to industry standards, and they will be subject to internal management checks. The schedule also restricts the use of the powers so that they are exercisable only for the purpose of investigating a DWP offence, as defined in clause 84 of the Bill. It permits others to accompany an authorised investigator on to the premises named in the warrant and limits a DWP-authorised investigator’s authority so that they can conduct searches only of “material” and not of people. The schedule also makes technical modifications to PACE, to allow the DWP to carry out entry, search and seizure activity in the same way as the police.

Schedule 4 also outlines new schedule 3ZD to the 1992 Act, which makes provision for entry, search and seizure in Scotland. As far as possible, this replicates the approach taken in England and Wales, except where an alternative approach is needed to account for the different legal system in Scotland. The primary differences between schedule 3ZC and 3ZD are the process that must be followed when executing a warrant in Scotland, which includes providing a copy of the warrant to persons on the premises; the process for issuing receipts for items seized; the legal requirements for making applications for Scottish production orders and Scottish warrants for special procedure material.

Clause 78 replicates the approach taken in legislation governing police actions in respect of the Crown and Crown premises. It sets out how the law applies in the unlikely event that the DWP needs to obtain a warrant to enter Crown premises. It provides for a DWP-authorised investigator to apply for a warrant to search the locker of a suspect who works in, for example, a Government Department, but it prohibits the use of these powers in the interests of national security once the Secretary of State has certified that this is the case, and with regard to any private estates belonging to His Majesty and the Houses of Parliament. The package of measures in the Bill will leave very few places for organised criminals and the gangs who attack the DWP to conceal the evidence of their crimes, but clause 78 keeps us in line with other similar legislation.

The DWP has fewer powers than other organisations, such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, which are tasked with investigating economic crime. We know that it does not have the power to arrest or to conduct search and seizure. Clause 76 will allows DWP-authorised investigators to apply for and execute a court warrant with or without police involvement in England and Wales. The aim is to help the DWP investigate and disrupt serious and organised fraud by giving investigators the power to make searches and seizures. That will allow them to deal with, for example, cases where universal credit claims are made using false identity documents.

We in the official Opposition want the Bill to work and the DWP to be able to successfully identify and tackle benefits fraud. DWP estimates of fraud and error in the welfare system exceeded £8 billion in each financial year from 2020-21 to 2023-24, with a combined total of £35 billion overpaid. For the financial year 2023-24, the DWP’s central estimate is that benefit overpayments totalled £9.7 billion, which is 3.7% of all benefit expenditure. Of that overpayment figure, £7.4 billion, or 76%, was due to fraud, £1.6 billion, or 16%, was due to claimant error, and £0.8 billion, or 8%, was due to official error, or 8%. It is clear that fraud costs the DWP the most, yet we worry that the Bill will be more effective at tackling error than fraud. We therefore support the powers in clause 76 to tackle fraud.

10.00am

Currently, the DWP investigatory team is its economic, serious and organised crime team, which forms part of the counter fraud, compliance and debt team. Will it be officials in the economic, serious and organised crime division who are able to use the powers in clause 76? The Bill allows the Secretary of State to designate the investigators. Can the Minister confirm what level of seniority the investigators will have? It appears from the Bill that they will be higher executive officers, but can the Minister confirm that? How much are higher executive officers paid in comparison with police officers? Is the seniority equivalent?

The Minister has previously reassured the Committee that there will be adequate training for investigators, but what training will DWP investigators have to ensure that the powers in clause 76 are used appropriately, and what might be the equivalent qualification level? Is it the sort of qualification that could be transferred elsewhere?

Clause 77 sets out equivalent powers to those in clause 76 for the DWP in Scotland. It allows the DWP to seek a court warrant, enabling DWP-authorised investigators to carry out these actions with or without police involvement in Scotland. Clause 78 sets out how the entry, search and seizure powers should be interpreted and the restrictions that apply for premises linked to the Crown, Parliament and national security limitations.

Government amendments 33 and 34 clarify that to be an authorised investigator, an individual must be an official of a Government Department and be of the specified grade. Government amendments 4 and 5 clarify respectively that paragraphs 2(3) and 2(4) of proposed new schedule 3ZD to the Social Security Administration Act 1992, as inserted by schedule 4 to the Bill, apply in relation to any item or material. The Minister has set out his position on each of those provisions. We acknowledge that Government amendments 4 and 5 are minor drafting corrections to reflect what should have been in the Bill when it was introduced, so we have no issues with them.

Schedule 4 specifies how certain terms in PACE are to be interpreted in the context of their use by authorised investigators, and makes amendments that are consequential on clause 76. We support the schedule, but we have tabled new clause 3 to add the power of arrest to the powers given to DWP investigators by clause 76. It seems illogical that the Government want to give DWP investigators the power to enter and search a premises, seize, retain and dispose of material, obtain sensitive material and use reasonable force, but not to arrest someone if the evidence shows that is necessary.

Can the Minister explain why the Bill gives powers to use reasonable force to DWP investigators but not to Public Sector Fraud Authority investigators? The Government state in their explanatory notes that that the power

“will be limited to using reasonable force against things not people.”

However, that is not specified in the Bill itself. What will be the safeguards on the use of the power, and why they are not included in the Bill? Finally, can the Minister explain why DWP investigators have not been given a power to arrest suspects?

The power to seize items, down in the weeds of an investigation, is essential to ensuring that we hold the right people to account. However, I am alive to the fact that seized items are often kept for a long time. Our mobile phones often contain our whole lives. Not that long ago, a resident in Torbay who was accused of a criminal offence and was under investigation had his mobile phone seized by Devon and Cornwall police for a very long time—a matter of months. What assurance can the Minister give that when the power of seizure is used—particularly when it is used to seize a mobile phone—items will be returned in a timely manner? What timescale does he plan to set for civil servants to return such items?

Let me begin with some of the questions from the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for South West Devon. Her comments setting out the challenge and her commitment to wanting the Bill to work are incredibly welcome. She is right to set out the scale of the challenge. That is why we are taking the powers that we are proposing.

On whether the requests and the use of the powers of search and seizure will be reserved to members of our staff working in serious and organised crime only, the answer is yes. On the level of seniority of team members executing those powers, it is HEO-grade officers that do that. In terms of salary equivalent, salary can be quite a crude comparison for a number of reasons. Police officers undertake shift work and an element of their salaries is higher as a result. Obviously, as members of the emergency services, there is a level of risk to their work. The National Crime Agency suggests that an HEO grade is the equivalent of a police sergeant, although in salary terms, it is probably more akin to a police constable.

On training, they will receive the industry standard training, equivalent to the training that police receive in this area. On safeguards more broadly, for the power in the Bill, a lot of the safeguards in place relate to the fact that a warrant is granted by a judge. There is always that specialist person making a determination in terms of appropriateness and proportionality. All warrant applications and all warrants would be exercised in compliance with the Home Office code of practice for entry, search and seizure. That is specifically limited to serious and organised crime only—that is multiple people working together to commit complex fraud, typically resulting in higher value overpayments.

As I said, everybody executing this power would be of HEO grade. They would have had the industry standard training. Investigations will also be subject to independent inspections, which will report on the DWP’s use of the powers, and any serious complaints can be reported to the Independent Office for Police Conduct. A range of safeguards is built into the proposals.

If I may, I will come later to the question from the hon. Member for Torbay about the return of information. There are specific provisions to enable us to keep items for as long as is needed, but there is a desire to return things as soon as possible. Elsewhere in the Bill, we speak to the specific powers that would be required were we wanting to go further and not return an item. There is a commitment to return, unless specific powers are required to prevent further criminality based on evidence found on phones. I cannot give a specific timeline—something would be kept for the length of time necessary for the purposes of the investigation—but I hear the point, particularly about mobile phones.

I stress again that this is about serious and organised crime. If I think of some of the cases I have seen—Operation Volcanic, for example—we are talking about going into buildings where there are several dozen, if not hundreds, of pay-as-you-go mobile phones set up expressly for the purposes of fraudulent activity and criminality. I would perhaps be less sympathetic to the swift return of those phones, and I hope the hon. Gentleman understands why.

I turn to new clause 3. I appreciate the explanation of the rationale from the hon. Member for South West Devon, but I do not share her view. I gave great consideration to the question of whether to take powers of arrest when first having discussions about the scope and shape of the Bill. The Bill enables trained DWP investigators to apply for a search warrant to enter a premises, search it and seize items or material that may have a bearing on the DWP case being investigated. Put bluntly, it gives us the right tools to do the job effectively.

Crucially, it enhances police efficiency by allowing the DWP to handle warrant applications and carry out search and seizure activity, freeing the police from those administrative and investigative tasks that they currently undertake for the DWP. No longer will DWP investigators always need to rely on the police for search warrants, take up police time briefing them on the specifics of the warrant applications or always be restricted to simply advising the police as to what items may be relevant during a search, only for them to then be seized by the police and later transferred to the DWP.

On efficiency, we are taking the powers we need to smarten up our processes. The current process is clearly imperfect. It is inefficient for both the DWP and the police, as well as burdensome in terms of resource, and the Bill resolves that situation. There is a clear rationale for the powers set out in the Bill, but the same cannot be said for the amendment.

To close, I will explain why it is not appropriate for the DWP to undertake arrests as well. I am concerned about the safety impacts; the police have expertise that equips them to carry out arrests. The policy intent is to facilitate more effective investigations and smoother administration, striking the right balance between activities undertaken by the DWP and the police. A power to arrest would require the DWP to take on roles that go beyond those that are administrative and evidence gathering in nature.

Not only that, but it is common for a serious organised DWP offence to involve other types of serious and organised crimes. As a result, a suspect is likely to be involved in wider criminality than just a DWP related offence, such as firearms, drugs or being involved in people trafficking. It makes sense that the police would conduct the arrest in such a situation and, after that, DWP investigators could focus their time on searching the scene for relevant evidence related to the DWP offence.

In addition, for the DWP to be able to operate independently of the police would require the DWP, for example, to have appropriate vehicles for transporting an arrested person and custody suites for detaining them. Currently that is not the case and, to be clear, we are not moving in that direction. We do not operate extensively in that area and allocating resources there is unlikely to be efficient or make sense.

The powers in the Bill promote effective collaboration between the DWP and the police, bring some genuine efficiencies and allow each team to focus on its strengths, which is the right approach. This amendment would not serve the same purpose and it would add a layer of complexity to the DWP’s work that we are not equipped to deal with, either in terms of the expertise of our team or the equipment that we have. For this reason, I must resist new clause 3.

Amendment 34 agreed to.

Clause 76, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 4

Social security fraud: search and seizure powers etc

Amendments made: 4, in schedule 4, page 91, line 28, after “item” insert “or material”.

This amendment clarifies that paragraph 2(3) of new Schedule 3ZD of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (as inserted by Schedule 4 of the Bill) applies in relation to any item or material.

Amendment 5, in schedule 4, page 91, line 31, after “item” insert “or material”.

This amendment clarifies that paragraph 2(4) of new Schedule 3ZD of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (as inserted by Schedule 4 of the Bill) applies in relation to any item or material.

Amendment 33, in schedule 4, page 93, line 32, leave out from “individual” to end of line 33 and insert

“is an official of a government department and—”.—(Andrew Western.)

This amendment clarifies that to be an authorised investigator an individual must be an official of a government department and be of the specified grade.

Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 78 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 79

Offence of delay, obstruction etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

10.15am

I am sure colleagues will be pleased to know that this speech will be brief.

Cases of serious and organised fraud against the DWP can amount to millions of pounds being stolen from the taxpayer. Clause 79 provides for consequences when those suspected of serious and organised fraud intentionally attempt to delay or obstruct an investigation. A suspect can be prosecuted if they intentionally try to frustrate a DWP investigation, and if convicted, they can be fined up to £1,000. Without this important provision, DWP fraud investigations into serious and organised criminal attacks on the social security system could be wilfully manipulated by those suspected of carrying out the fraud, which would be an untenable situation.

I am sure the Committee will be pleased to hear that I will also be brief.

It is an offence under section 111 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to intentionally delay or obstruct an authorised officer, and conviction for a failure to comply may result in a fine of up to £1,000. Clause 79 means that obstructing an authorised investigator will be treated in the same way as obstructing an authorised officer, which means that obstructing an authorised investigator will be a criminal offence carrying a fine of up to £1,000. We are happy for the clause to stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 79 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 80

Disposal of property

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

This clause gives the DWP a clear legal path to seek court approval to dispose of property that has come into its possession when executing a search warrant. In most cases, the seized items will be returned to their rightful owner as soon as they are no longer required by a criminal investigation. However, as I alluded to in responding to the hon. Member for Torbay, there are certain circumstances in which this may be either not possible or not desirable.

An order may be sought when a seized item does not belong to the suspect and where it is not possible to identify the rightful owner, where there is a high risk that returning the seized item means it could be used for the furtherance of crime or where information needs to be deleted before the item is returned to prevent a further offence. This will prevent the risk of, for instance, returning a seized smartphone that contains data relating to hijacked or stolen identities that may enable fraud and the distribution of information that could be used for criminal gain. With the increasing use of technology, it will be ever more critical to ensure this does not happen. This clause allows the DWP to act in the same way as the police.

To avoid the risk of incorrect disposal of seized items, applications for any action of this kind must be made to, and must be approved by, a court. In addition, there are restrictions on how quickly seized material can be disposed of. In all cases, six months must elapse from the approval of an application by a court before a seized item can be destroyed.

Finally, any person with an interest in an item can make an application to the court. This could be the DWP, the item’s rightful owner or the person from whom it was seized. The clause sets out specific criteria in relation to any challenges that may be brought and the procedures that apply. If an order has been given for the item to be destroyed, the order cannot be revoked. However, the timeframe for the item to be destroyed may be challenged.

This clause creates a legal and proportionate gateway for the DWP to deal with seized items appropriately. This ensures that the DWP can act in the same way as the police when concluding fraud investigations.

Where DWP investigators seize items from a premises, they will generally be returned to the owner if they are no longer needed for an ongoing investigation. As we have heard, it may not be appropriate to return an item in certain cases, such as if the person from whom the item was taken is not the actual owner or if the owner cannot be traced. In some cases, there may be a risk that a seized item could be used for a criminal purpose if it were returned. We acknowledge that clause 80 gives the DWP a lawful basis for disposing of the items. Clause 80 stipulates that items cannot be destroyed until six months have passed from when the magistrate approved the application to destroy them. Why is six months the chosen timeframe, and what are the precedents for other evidence seized in criminal investigations?

We support the provision allowing someone with an interest in the item to request the court to alter an approved action in relation to the item. We believe that is sensible. Can the Minister give an example of the sort of scenario that might refer to, just for the benefit of the Committee? What will the timeframe be for such applications? Finally, how will interested parties be made aware of items they may wish to take court action over? I assume it will not be a police lost property office, but ultimately it is one of those questions of how someone will know that there is something in which they might have an interest.

I will briefly answer those questions. The period of six months is the same as set out in the Police (Property) Act 1897. We want to ensure alignment where we can to make the process between the police and the DWP as seamless as possible, so that serious and organised fraudsters do not recognise any difference.

On the question of how someone will know if we were intending to destroy their items, the clause does not require the DWP to inform any relevant person of any intended action in relation to the seized item. That is commensurate with how the 1897 Act works for the police in similar circumstances, but anyone who has an interest in the seized goods will have the same access right as the Secretary of State to apply to a court for a particular course of action to be taken. That could include seeking an extension before the seized item is destroyed. In all cases, a notice to occupier information notice will be left at the property, which will provide information about the search, the items seized and relevant points of contact.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 80 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 81

Amendments to the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 81 applies only to Scotland and amends the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 to enable DWP-authorised investigators to seize an item from a premises and scrutinise it off site to determine its relevance to the investigation. This will apply in circumstances where it is challenging or even impossible to determine the relevance of an item to an investigation while on site. In some cases, large volumes of documents could be found that may comprise valuable evidence, but that will take a long time and need detailed scrutiny to assess. A locked electronic device may be found that could have evidence stored on it. This clause gives DWP-authorised investigators the ability to deal with those kinds of situations in the same way as the police by seizing items and taking them off site for sifting or further examination elsewhere. Without the authority granted by this clause, vital evidence could be missed, lost or even destroyed if left on site. In all instances, the DWP will seek to return seized items as soon as possible to the owner, where they are no longer needed or found to be irrelevant to an ongoing investigation. Those are the main provisions in clause 81, and I commend it to the Committee.

Clause 81 amends the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 to deal with situations where authorised investigators cannot ascertain whether an item or material contains information relevant to that search, such as when dealing with large volumes of materials or files or electronic devices. That material therefore may need to be taken to be examined elsewhere, and we recognise that the clause allows for material to be seized and then sifted, rather than sifted and then seized. For that reason, we are happy for the clause to stand part of the Bill.

I seek the Minister’s guidance as to how DWP officers, when they undertake these acts, will ensure that seize and sift will not be the standard modus operandi and that it is used only in appropriate cases. When will the Government publish a code of conduct? What guidance will be given? It might be tempting to undertake trawling operations for information rather than taking the spear-fishing approach that would garner the evidence more easily. I would welcome the Minister’s reassurance on that.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for South West Devon for her support and to the hon. Member for Torbay for his questions. By way of reassurance, the DWP cannot just seize anything and everything from a place it has entered with a warrant; it can seize only items that are directly relevant to the investigation. Other oversight is built in, given the ability to make complaints to the IOPC and the oversight powers we are affording to HMICFRS, and people will be trained to the industry standard and so on, but fundamentally they must be able to demonstrate that a seizure is directly relevant to the investigation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 82

Incidents etc in England and Wales

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to debate clause 83.

Clause 82 amends part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 and will insert proposed new section 26H, which provides for the IOPC to investigate any serious complaints or serious harm related to the use of the powers of entry, search and seizure. There are multiple safeguards—including industry-standard training for all authorised investigators—to minimise the risk of the Bill’s entry, search and seizure powers being used incorrectly. I assure Members that the likelihood of a serious complaint, particularly anything that involves death or serious harm, is extremely unlikely. However, an effective and independent complaints process is essential when it comes to powers of this nature.

Whenever a search warrant is executed, information will be provided setting out how to raise a complaint and what to do in the unlikely event that the complaint is serious or involves death or serious harm. The clause aligns the DWP’s approach to serious complaints and incidents relating to entry, search and seizure with that of other bodies with similar powers, including the police. That is why we have agreed with the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner that they will investigate serious incidents that occur in Scotland related to the use of the powers of entry, search and seizure by the DWP under clause 83.

If a complaint is not of a serious nature, as defined in IOPC guidelines, it can still be raised via the existing departmental complaint procedures. It will be investigated internally, and if an individual is not happy with the complaint response, they can ask for their complaint to be reviewed by a more senior manager. If an individual remains dissatisfied with the Department’s final response, they may escalate their concern to the independent case examiner.

Clause 83 amends articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2013. It mirrors the provisions of clause 82, which applies to England and Wales, and provides for similar independent investigation arrangements for serious incidents in Scotland. I again reassure Members that robust safeguards will be in place, including investigators having comprehensive training, robust internal governance with clear processes for signing off warrants, and the external independent authorisation of all warrants by the courts.

In the very unlikely event that a fatality is associated with the DWP’s use of the powers, the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner can be directed to investigate by the Crown Office Procurator Fiscal Service, which is Scotland’s public prosecution service and death-investigation authority. We expect that, in almost all cases, incidents relating to the DWP’s use of the powers will fall outside of the scope of being serious in their nature. In such cases, the Department’s existing complaint procedures will be used, as I set have out.

It is crucial to build trust in the Department, especially when serious incidents happen. The public must know that their concerns will be handled with importance and impartiality. Clauses 82 and 83 provide that assurance by establishing a transparent and accountable investigation process that is independent of the Department. Having outlined their main provisions, I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Clause 82 specifies that the Independent Office for Police Conduct—which oversees complaints, professional conduct matters and serious incidents involving the police and similar bodies in England and Wales—will handle serious complaints relating to the DWP’s use of the powers under proposed new section 109D in relation to DWP offences. That will be done through a regulation-making power, so will the Minister explain what modifications might be made to how the IOPC oversees complaints when its functions are extended to DWP investigators? How much additional funding does the Minister anticipate the IOPC will need to take on those functions?

10.30am

The clause also provides that the Secretary of State may disclose information to the director general, or a person acting on the director general’s behalf, for the purposes of the exercise, by the director general or any person acting on their behalf, of the DWP complaints function. What sort of information does the Minister think it will be necessary for the Secretary of State to divulge? Will he provide some illustrative examples? What is the range of individuals who might act on the director general’s behalf, to whom it will be appropriate to disclose the information?

Clause 83 provides for an independent complaints route for when the DWP exercises the powers in proposed new section 109E and proposed new schedule 3ZD to the social Security Administration Act 1992. Less serious complaints or incidents will be handled using existing DWP processes. The Police Investigations and Review Commissioner independently investigates incidents and complaints involving policing bodies in Scotland, and will be responsible for handling and investigating serious incidents relating to the use of section 109E powers by the DWP.

We welcome the measures in the clauses to provide a route for complaints where needed. Will the Minister set out for the Committee the process for someone to make a complaint about DWP investigators? How quickly do the Government anticipate that such complaints will be resolved? Will that be included in a future code of practice, or is that outside the scope of such a code? What redress will there be for complainants when the IOPC or the PIRC finds against the DWP? What assessment has been made of the cost of the process, and who is liable for the costs?

On the question of funding for the IOPC and the PIRC, we are in ongoing discussions with them about what the exact costs will be. We clearly do not expect the costs to be excessive because it is not a massive shift from the work they undertake already.

On the question of what modifications are required to the IOPC role, the regulations will set out how the functions will work for the DWP. It is important to remember that we envisage that the IOPC will look at cases only where there have been serious complaints and deaths, so we are not talking huge numbers.

There could be a range of ways in which people can refer. It may even be that we would self-refer if there has been a death. One of the principal reasons why I did not consider it prudent to take the power of arrest is that that minimises the likelihood of our finding ourselves in that position. Where arrests are undertaken, clearly the police will be on site with us and responsible for that.

I do not envisage the process for making the complaints to be set out explicitly in the code of practice, but clearly if someone contacted the Department and wanted to make a complaint of that nature about something very serious that was outside the scope of internal complaints—for instance, if there had been harm or death—we would immediately refer the person and the case to the IOPC. As I say, the costs are not expected to be excessive, but we would expect to meet them ourselves.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 82 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 84

DWP offence

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause creates a new definition of “DWP offence”, expanding on the existing definition of “benefit offence” set out in the Social Security Administration Act 1992. The DWP must have the power to respond to the different types of fraud we find. We know that, for example, the misuse of national insurance numbers can be a gateway to wider fraud. If criminals steal the identities of honest people and misuse their details to make false benefit claims, that is unacceptable and we need the power to act.

Fraud is not just contained to the most claimed benefits, like universal credit—as we saw with kickstart, grant payments intended to support people when they need extra help can also be abused—yet DWP investigative powers are limited when investigating other types of crime. By providing a new definition of a DWP offence, the clause ensures that fraudulent activity relating to grants, loans, national insurance numbers and other financial support issued by the DWP is explicitly captured in the law. It allows any offences linked to the payments to be met with firm action. The new definition works hand in hand with our enhanced investigation and entry, search and seizure powers in the Bill, thereby giving the DWP the ability to obtain critical evidence needed to prove or disprove allegations of fraud, in a fair and proportionate way.

The clause is about ensuring that every pound lost to fraud, and taken away from those who genuinely need support, is pursued with all the powers we have, whatever the nature of the payment may have been. I commend the clause to the Committee.

I thank the Minister for outlining the plans around the clause, which would establish the definition of a “DWP offence” to allow any offence relating to a benefit payment, credit or grant that the DWP administers to be included under the new information-gathering powers. It would also include offences related to national insurance numbers.

We support the clause, which should hopefully allow DWP to gather information more holistically and lead to more successful prosecutions, but I have a couple of brief questions. What assessment has been made of the scale of prosecutions that could be made? What assessment has been made of the cost of exercising the new power?

I thank the hon. Lady for her support and her questions. I would not want to put a specific number on the prosecutions—as I said, we have not had the powers to investigate these crimes in full before—but we think that by bringing these areas it into scope not only will we find significant offences that we need to clamp down on but there will be a deterrent effect. Having both levers together makes this an important tool to have in our arsenal.

On the costs, they would be broadly similar to those we already bear for investigating any other type of offence. They would not be materially different in terms of the implications for our budget.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 85

Disclosure of information etc: interaction with external constraints

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause is an important safeguard for the DWP’s information-gathering powers. It sets out the kinds of information that a DWP-authorised officer cannot compel from an information holder. The exemptions are similar to those set out in the Social Security Assistance (Investigation of Offences) (Scotland) Regulations 2020. They are designed to prevent information from being obtained that is particularly sensitive, or if it would be inappropriate for the DWP to do so. For instance, as with the existing legislation, exemptions apply to legally privileged material and to information that could lead to the self-incrimination of the person or their spouse or civil partners.

In addition, the clause sets out exemptions for excluded material and certain special procedure material, as defined in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. This includes material such as medical records, records about counselling that an individual may have received, and journalistic material. The clause also prevents information notices from being issued for personal information about the use of organisations that provide free advice and advocacy services—including, for example, charities that provide refuge from abuse—thereby ensuring that vulnerable people can seek help without fear that their information will be disclosed.

Any use of the powers must be compliant with obligations set out in data protection legislation, which requires that personal data is kept secure and is not misused. The powers cannot be used to obtain communications data. If the DWP seeks communications data as part of its investigation, it must follow the authorisations and processes under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Further detail on the safeguards will be in our code of practice, which will be consulted on before being laid before Parliament, and to which all authorised officers will be required to adhere. Having outlined the main provisions of clause 85, I commend it to the Committee.

Clause 85 sets out that DWP’s actions under part 5 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 must comply with existing laws relating to the use of data and with the existing protections to protect confidential data and data prohibited under the Investigatory Powers Act. I have a brief question before I move on to subsection (8). Does the Minister envisage that clause 85 will provide much practical constraint on how the DWP is able to share information?

Subsection (8) states:

“A person who provides services on a not for profit basis in relation to social security, housing (including the provision of temporary accommodation) or debt, may not be required under the provision to give personal data about the recipients of the services.”

I acknowledge what the Minister just said about the particularly vulnerable, who may be in refuges or places like that, but the provision feels quite broad, particularly in relation to debt recovery and support. Many organisations might have quite a lot of information that would be helpful to the DWP—I think particularly of, for example, Citizens Advice, which sees the records of quite of a lot of people. Why has that carve-out been included and what purpose does it serve, beyond protecting particularly vulnerable groups that we do not want to put in danger?

My other question is about whether the provision excludes local authorities, which often provide temporary accommodation, for example. Does the subsection mean that local authorities will not be part of the group that could be asked for information?

First, I am not of the view that the protections overly constrain our ability to gather the information we need and execute fraud operations as effectively as possible. The provision significantly broadens the overarching information-gathering package, the number the organisations from which we can compel information and the nature of the information that we can receive, but it is important that we take the steps needed to rule out some of the obvious kinds of information that people would expect us to remove, such as medical records and journalistic material.

It will probably help if I clarify the matter of the special protection status for certain organisations—I apologise if I was not clear when I said this before. The clause does not exempt charities or any specific organisations; it exempts certain types of information, such as that from organisations that provide services free of charge in relation to social security, housing or debt. We can still ask them for information, but not in relation to the advice they have provided. The measure is therefore perhaps not as restrictive as it may seem. It is not that the organisations can never be asked for information; it is just that certain types of information, of the nature I outlined in my principal contribution, will be protected.

Local authorities are not exempt, and they will have a part to play in much of our investigatory work, as the hon. Member for South West Devon suggested.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 85 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 86

Giving notices etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The information-gathering powers set out under clause 72 will be amended to ensure that information can be compelled from third parties digitally. That is an important step forward for us. The updated information-gathering powers create a single, clear legal gateway so that the DWP can compel information from third parties, it is more straightforward to respond, and that information can be provided digitally.

The Department must ensure that provisions are in place so that, in the event of a failure of digital systems, investigations are not impacted. Therefore, under such rare circumstances, the DWP will retain the power to compel information in writing, as set out in clause 86 —[Interruption.] I think Jennie likes this one. The clause also confirms that the DWP giving an administrative penalty notice by post is sufficient to effect service, and also applies to the eligibility verification measure, enabling the DWP to issue a notice to financial institutions by post, if necessary.

10.45am

Clause 86 inserts the provision for the DWP to retain the ability to issue an information notice and receive relevant documents by post. The Minister will be pleased to hear that he has answered my questions. The only thing I would ask is: how often does he expect information notices to be issued digitally? I suppose the flip question is: are you expecting the system to work perfectly and the post option to be used very rarely? For example, with vulnerable and older groups, might the post option need to be used more broadly than digital in certain cases?

Clearly, in individual cases, if someone were to request contact by post, we would want to bear that in mind, but without wishing, as the Minister for transformation, to sound over-confident about the digital capability of some of our systems, in my view we would need to use these powers extremely rarely. It would be digital by default, except in the instance of, for example, system failure.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 86 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 87

Independent review

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 87 introduces an important safeguard by providing that all the criminal investigation powers in the Bill are independently inspected. As the Committee would expect, the DWP will make every effort to ensure that its criminal investigations are carried out to the letter of the law—through effective training, internal guidance and, for our entry, search and seizure powers, independent authorisation by the courts. However, it would not be right for the Department to simply mark its own homework. That is why the clause provides for an independent person to be commissioned by the Secretary of State to undertake inspections. This will ensure that there is a formal provision in place to establish that arrangement, and that it can be done in a way that is suitable for both the DWP and the independent person.

The independent person will be responsible for impartial inspection of the Department’s effectiveness, and compliance with relevant codes of practice and guidance in its criminal investigations. That aligns with other Government bodies such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority and the National Crime Agency, which also use investigatory powers at different levels and are also subject to independent inspections.

I am pleased to say that the independent person the DWP intends to commission is His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services for matters relating to investigations in England and Wales, and His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary in Scotland for investigations in Scotland. Those well-established bodies are experts in conducting such inspections and independently assessing the use of criminal investigation powers. Their reports will be published and laid before Parliament, including any recommendations for improvements.

The clause ensures that the Department’s criminal investigations will be conducted with transparency and accountability, demonstrating its commitment to fairness and transparency when exercising its criminal powers.

Clause 87 provides for DWP investigation activity to be inspected and evaluated by an independent person or body. The Secretary of State will be able to appoint someone to inspect DWP criminal investigations, and to provide written reports and recommendations to the Secretary of State, which must be published and laid before Parliament. That review will also consider the DWP’s compliance with the codes of practice, which we have not yet seen, as was much discussed in earlier sittings.

We welcome the transparency that clause 87 will bring to how the DWP is using these powers; however, unlike clause 75, the clause does not state how often reviews would have to be conducted. Is there a reason for that? The Secretary of State would give “directions” as to the period to be covered by each review, having first consulted the independent person. Can the Minister confirm how frequently the Secretary of State will ask the DWP investigation activity to be reported on, and will the independent person or body be able to carry out reviews on their own initiative or will they have to wait until directed to do so by the Secretary of State?

The Minister has already given the Committee an indication of who may be appointed to lead those reviews, and I assume the layout of the police and fire authorities relates to that particular question, so I will not restate that for the record, but can I also ask the Minister how quickly reviews are expected to be concluded once they have been initiated—referring back to the wording of clause 75? For these reviews to be meaningful, there must be a way for the DWP to learn lessons and improve practice, so how can the Minister reassure the Committee that there will be a process in place for that to happen?

I remind Members to bob if they wish to catch my eye to speak, and to refrain from using the word “you”, which refers to me as opposed to the Minister.

My colleague has just partially asked my question. While we broadly welcome the clause, we are concerned by the absence of the code of practice. Could the Minister give any indication of the kind of guidance that it might contain? Also, at what stage of the parliamentary process will there be scrutiny of it, given that it will not be during this Committee?

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Western. I want to raise the comments made by the Information Commissioner in relation to the Bill and the updates to the previous Government’s proposals. I understood that they were more content with this Bill than the previous Bill. They were pleased that it brought data protection more tightly within the measures, and that it talked about data protection in a much more consistent way with the law. They said that the Bill more tightly scopes the types of information that can and cannot be shared. I understand that our debate on clause 85 covered some of those improvements.

However, at the end of their comments, the Information Commissioner talked about the review process, and said very clearly that they would like to explore with the Government the role that the Information Commissioner’s Office can play in assisting with the review process. This clause does not set out the different offices and people with whom the independent reviewer needs to liaise in preparing their report. I wondered whether Ministers could comment on their thoughts surrounding that process, and consider setting out in the code of practice or further guidance how the independent reviewer might engage properly with data protection in their review.

There were a number of questions there—I was scribbling at pace—so if I miss anything, please intervene. In terms of when and how often investigations will happen, it is expected that the period for each review will be set and carried out in mutual agreement with each of the bodies. On whether they can ask to undertake a review, it would need to be in consultation with the Secretary of State, but it is fair to say we would be doing ourselves no favours by refusing to bear their request in mind. Likewise, on timescales, it is all in collaboration with the Secretary of State.

On when we can expect to see the codes of practice, for search and seizure the Home Office’s existing codes of practice will apply, but for information-gathering powers it will be the updated code of practice, which will be consulted on and laid in Parliament before being used. We anticipate that new codes of practice will be available before Committee stage in the House of Lords.

In relation to the response to inspections and how we would learn from them, once the independent body has produced its report the Secretary of State must publish it and lay it before Parliament. Although no legal obligation is placed on the Secretary of State to implement recommendations, we will respond to all recommendations promptly and, as a learning organisation, always look to make continuous improvements.

I thank the Minister for answering those questions. The lack of stipulation on timeframe, frequency and so on begs the question of why this provision is in the Bill. Ultimately, what will trigger a review? That is the bit we probably have not touched on. Who will say to the Secretary of State, who no doubt is an incredibly busy woman, “This is what we need to be doing at this time”? I appreciate that it would be her officials, but this provision is buried in the middle of the Bill and there is no stipulation that a review has to happen after a 12-month period, every six months or whatever. How do we ensure that this transparency, which we welcome, will actually take place, and that the benefits of having a review come to pass?

That is a reasonable question. Clearly, if there are incidents such as those that would bring into scope the IOPC powers, that would attract significant attention and it would be obvious and—dare I say it?—necessary for the Secretary of State to refer there. In relation to timescales and so on, much of that would depend on what has happened in a period. Were we to say that this was something that will be done every year or every other year and then something happened immediately, we would lack the flexibility to utilise the powers in the agile way we hope to do so. I appreciate that it may appear vague when compared with some powers that we have previously discussed, but that is so we can respond to events, rather than seek to dodge the use of the power.

Clearly, to an extent we will always work in collaboration. As I say, I would not intend at any point to resist a request from HMICFRS or any other body to look into work that we had undertaken, in particular in response to anything that may be considered controversial, not least because search and seizure powers are totally new for the DWP. We need to land them appropriately and build trust that we are able to execute the warrant powers properly.

The Information Commissioner’s comments related primarily to the eligibility verification measures, as they pertain to a direct comparison to the third-party data powers in the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill. Obviously, the Information Commissioner has fairly wide-ranging powers to involve himself in any investigations. It is not something that we would look to resist. I think the channels are already in place for him to engage wherever he feels that it is appropriate.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 87 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 88

Enforcement of non-benefit payments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 88 sets out the details of how an overpayment of a non-benefit payment, such as under the kickstart scheme that was used after the pandemic, will be made recoverable. This is necessary if we are to use the administrative penalty in connection with such cases to enable us to improve fairness, allowing the Department to address fraud wherever it occurs in the welfare system. As the Bill specifically seeks to extend the use of the administrative penalty—a penalty that is considered only after a criminal investigation of a suspicion of fraud—we are specifically extending the recovery of overpayments to cases of fraud against a non-benefit payment.

This means that, before we can recover overpayments of non-benefit payments, the DWP will need to have completed a thorough criminal investigation into a suspicion of fraud and either an administrative penalty is accepted or there is a court conviction. Once that has happened, the process for recovery of non-benefit overpayments will be the same as the long-established processes for social security overpayments. As with social security overpayments, a notice must be sent to the person who received the non-benefit overpayment. The notice sets the right to challenge the overpayment decision.

The overpayment decision can be challenged first by requesting a review by the Secretary of State, and if the decision is maintained, they can appeal to the first-tier tribunal. Individuals have one month to apply for a review and one month after the notification of the outcome of the review to appeal, as outlined in proposed new subsections 71ZK(2) and 71ZK(6). These time limits are the same as those for challenging benefit overpayment decisions. If the decision is not disputed or is upheld following a review or appeal, the non-benefit overpayment becomes recoverable in the same way as social security overpayments.

Clause 88 is fundamental. It ensures that there is fairness in the DWP’s response to fraud, meaning our investigators and decision makers treat cases of fraud against any DWP payment in the same equitable way.

11.00am

Clause 88 sets out the mechanism for the recovery of non-benefit payments. This applies when a person misrepresents or fails to disclose a material fact, and as a consequence they or another person receives a non-benefit payment, or an amount of a non-benefit payment, that they would not otherwise have received. Subsection (2) provides a power to recover the overpayment.

Clause 88 also sets out what the Secretary of State must do before an overpayment can be recovered. This includes providing an overpayment notice, the detail that must be included in that notice, and that the person must have had the opportunity to challenge the overpayment. The Secretary of State can issue an overpayment notice only if the person has been convicted of an offence set out in the legislation, or if it appears possible to institute proceedings against a person for an offence. The only grounds to appeal a notice are if there has been no overpayment of a non-benefit payment or if the amount stated in the notice is not correct. Any appeal must be made before the end of the period of one month, beginning the day after the day on which a person was given the notice.

This question has probably been answered in an earlier debate, but I will ask it anyway to get it on the record: will the notices be sent in the post or electronically? That links back to our debate on clause 86; how the Government ensure that the notices get to the right people is going to be particularly important. Finally, why is there no ability to extend the one-month period, and on what basis was one month decided?

I just want some assurance on how it was decided that one month was long enough. For my sins, I served the people of Torbay in elected of office for 30 years before getting elected to Parliament. I am alive to the fact that some people have chaotic lives. I am only too aware of how sometimes people turn up to the citizens advice bureau with a couple of carrier bags full of unopened envelopes because due to their mental health challenges the only way they are able to deal with their world is by putting their head in the sand, sadly.

I wanted an assurance on whether there was a level of flexibility. It appears from the clause that there is a drop-dead proposal here. What flexibility is proposed? I look forward to hearing the Minister speak about those people who are perhaps more vulnerable than the rest of us.

I was hasty in putting down my notes and I realised I left out a bit, so thank you for humouring me, Mr Western. Clause 88 also sets out that there is a right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal against the notice, unless it has been revoked on review. We welcome the ability to appeal to the first-tier tribunal, but can I ask the Minister whether any amounts recoverable will be paused during the appeal process? Again, there is only one month to appeal to the first-tier tribunal, so can he explain on what benefit this timeframe was chosen?

On whether notices will be sent in the post, it will be a mixture, as in the case for benefits rather than grants. The means of communication may be electronic or by post—there is always a blend. When we follow up in instances where debt recovery is required, we always use a range of mechanisms, such as telephone, digital and post, to attempt to get hold of somebody when we need to.

On the question from the hon. Members for South West Devon and for Torbay regarding how we came up with the one-month period either side of the appeal, that is the existing practice in the case of benefits, and we feel that it is therefore appropriate for non-benefit grants. To give some assurance on flexibility and vulnerability, the characteristics of claimants that might make them vulnerable, such as mental health difficulties, disabilities and other mitigating circumstances, will always be factored in by the decision maker when deciding whether to opt for an administrative penalty in the first place. At present, that happens in the case of benefits, and we would be extending that practice to grants and other non-benefit issues.

If the customer is suspected of being vulnerable at any stage of the investigation, the team leader or higher-investigations leader, in consultation with the investigator, will decide on the appropriate next steps. On the question of the timeliness of recovery, recovery will not start before an appeal was made. If there is an appeal, there will have been no recovery.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 88 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gerald Jones.)

11.06am

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Tenth sitting)

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Mrs Emma Lewell-Buck, Sir Desmond Swayne, Matt Western, † Sir Jeremy Wright

† Baxter, Johanna (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)

† Berry, Siân (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)

† Coyle, Neil (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)

Darling, Steve (Torbay) (LD)

† Dewhirst, Charlie (Bridlington and The Wolds) (Con)

† Egan, Damien (Bristol North East) (Lab)

† German, Gill (Clwyd North) (Lab)

† Gould, Georgia (Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office)

† Jameson, Sally (Doncaster Central) (Lab/Co-op)

† Jones, Gerald (Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare) (Lab)

† McKee, Gordon (Glasgow South) (Lab)

† Milne, John (Horsham) (LD)

† Payne, Michael (Gedling) (Lab)

† Smith, Rebecca (South West Devon) (Con)

† Welsh, Michelle (Sherwood Forest) (Lab)

† Western, Andrew (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions)

† Wood, Mike (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)

Kevin Maddison, Simon Armitage, Dominic Stockbridge, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 11 March 2025

(Afternoon)

[Sir Jeremy Wright in the Chair]

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Clause 89

Recovery and enforcement mechanisms

2.00pm

I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 89, page 55, line 6, leave out from “unless” to the end of line 14 and insert—

“(a) the liable person agrees, or

(b) there has been a final determination by a court or tribunal that it is necessary and proportionate to exercise a power under Schedule 3ZA.”

This amendment would mean that the Secretary of State can only exercise powers to recover amounts from a person where the person agrees or where a court or tribunal has determined that such recovery is necessary and appropriate.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

It is a pleasure to have you back in the Chair this afternoon, Sir Jeremy. The amendment covers direct deduction orders relating to social security payment debt of individuals who are no longer on benefits and not employed within the pay-as-you-earn system, as well as the use of powers to disqualify debtors from driving—a power I oppose, and we will debate that when we come to schedule 6.

The clause introduces the power for the Department for Work and Pensions to recover funds directly from a person’s bank account without a court warrant. The Secretary of State may make a direct deduction order in respect of a recoverable amount, where the debtor is no longer on benefits and is not employed within the PAYE system. As I understand it, the powers apply to all benefits under sections 71 to 78 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, including universal credit, and employment and support allowance. The powers apply to not only overpayments caused by deliberately fraudulent behaviour, but negligent oversight, incorrect statements and failure to disclose information. A DDO may be issued in relation to a joint account, if that is the only account that the debtor has.

The amendment would replace the conditions for such powers under proposed new section 80A(5) of the 1992 Act and would mean that the Secretary of State can only exercise powers to recover amounts from a person where the person agrees that the payment is due, or where a court or tribunal has determined that such recovery is necessary and appropriate. The language and wording almost exactly mirrors that in clause 12, on page 9 of the Bill, which provides that protection for debtors to public authorities. If the likes of potential covid fraudsters and corrupt company directors get the protection of a court or tribunal decision, it is difficult to understand why a benefit recipient should not get the same.

It is worth noting that we already have powers to address the scenario where a debtor is no longer on benefits and not in PAYE employment. In such cases, the DWP can recover overpayments through county court enforcement proceedings. I am aware that the DWP argues that the county court method of enforcement is slow and resource-intensive. However, that is not a good reason to jettison judicial oversight from a process that allows the Government to take money directly from individuals’ bank accounts.

My amendment 7 seeks to address the concern that those powers hand an extraordinary amount of discretion to the Secretary of State, as there is no threshold to determine what constitutes hardship or what would be fair in all the circumstances. Furthermore, as far as I can see, no floor is defined for the amount of money that must be left in the debtor’s bank account.

I understand that the DWP maintains that the power is like those used by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Child Maintenance Service, but that is not comparing like with like. Child maintenance is money owed—already defined to be affordable—by one parent to ensure provision for their dependant who does not live with them. That differs from an individual claiming money from the social security system who has been overpaid, potentially through no fault or a simple mistake of their own, where restitution may be extremely difficult to manage fairly and affordably.

Furthermore, I understand that HMRC powers have safeguards: before the powers are exercised, debtors must receive a face-to-face visit from an HMRC agent; and HMRC must retain at least £5,000 across the debtor’s accounts. By contrast, the Bill leaves those protections to the DWP’s discretion, based on the debtor’s representations and covertly obtained bank statements.

The amendment is also needed because the direct deduction powers as drafted would not be powers of last resort. For example, there is no requirement for the minimum number of times a liable person has failed to engage with the DWP before the powers can be exercised; there is no definition of whether someone has been given a reasonable opportunity to settle the debt; and there is no requirement for an in-person visit from the DWP. Such safeguards matter, because benefit recipients may not be engaging due to incapacity, illness, mental health problems or other genuine reasons. If those circumstances are ongoing, this will be an ineffective deterrent to force people to engage and repay their debts.

The amendment would mirror protections in part 1 of the Bill by limiting the availability of direct deduction order powers to cases where the debt is accepted, either by the debtor or by judicial determination. That would prevent the DWP from lowering the legal threshold at which funds can be removed directly from an individual’s bank account. I hope that we will come back to this issue at a later stage, as I really do want some action on it.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Sir Jeremy. Amendment 7 would introduce a new requirement for the direct recovery from account power, restricting its use to cases where the debtor agrees or where a court or tribunal determines that the exercise of the power is necessary and appropriate. I am not clear whether the amendment would do exactly what the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion intends, which I believe is to place the restriction on all the new DWP recovery powers proposed in the Bill, but I will address the amendment as I think it was intended.

Although I share the view that there should be protections in place to ensure that the direct recovery power is used proportionately and appropriately, I do not agree that the amendment is necessary. In my view, the Bill already contains sufficient safeguards. The amendment would also introduce unnecessary burdens for courts and tribunals, create avoidable inefficiencies and, ultimately, reduce the amount of taxpayers’ money that the power would bring back into the public purse.

The Department has long-standing powers under sections 71 and 71ZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to recover public money wrongly paid in excess of entitlement. Those provisions include a strong framework, including rights of reconsideration and appeal against the overpayment decision. The DWP already has powers to recover such overpayments through deduction from benefits and PAYE wages under sections 71, 71ZC and 71ZD of the 1992 Act.

The power in the clause is aimed at recovering taxpayers’ money owed by debtors who persistently evade repayment and refuse to engage with the DWP to agree affordable repayment terms, even though they have the means to do so. It is highly unlikely that those debtors, who, until this point in the debt recovery process, have ignored all reasonable requests by the DWP to work with it to agree repayment terms, would suddenly willingly agree to the DWP recovering the money they owe directly from their bank account. It is therefore highly likely that, under the amendment, the DWP would be required to seek a determination from the court or tribunal that a direct deduction order is necessary and appropriate.

The DWP can already seek lump sum recovery from a debtor’s bank account through the courts by applying for a third-party debt order. The very rationale for introducing this power is to recover more than £500 million of public money over the next five years without using court time unnecessarily. The amendment would create entirely avoidable inefficiencies.

The Bill already makes sufficient provision for a debtor to challenge a direct deduction order if they do not agree with it, first through the right to make representations concerning the terms of the order prior to any deductions being made and, following that, through a right of appeal to the tribunal. That is in addition to the debtor’s existing mandatory reconsideration and appeal rights concerning the decision that there is a recoverable overpayment that must be repaid.

In addition to those safeguards, the Bill includes sufficient provisions to ensure that the power is used appropriately and proportionately. Specifically, it provides that it is a last-resort power that can be used only if recovery is not reasonably possible by deductions from benefit or PAYE earnings. The debtor can avoid the power entirely at any point by working with the DWP to agree affordable and sustainable repayment terms.

Separately, the disqualification from driving power can be exercised only at the discretion of the court. Again, that provision includes necessity and proportionality considerations by requiring disqualification to be suspended provided that the debtor makes the payments ordered by the court, and ensuring that an order cannot be made if the court considers that the debtor has an essential need for a licence.

Lastly, the amendment would be likely to reduce the expected deterrent impact of the direct deduction power. Although the DWP will take the appropriate action, in line with legislation, to address debtors who persistently evade repayment of taxpayers’ money when they have the financial means to repay, the power is expected to encourage debtors to agree affordable and sustainable repayment with the DWP without the need to proceed with an order.

Making such an amendment would lessen the power’s effectiveness, meaning that the DWP would have to take this action more frequently than envisaged and potentially subject debtors to court proceedings where the DWP would not have as the Bill is currently drafted. I hope—but I suspect possibly not—that I have reassured the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion that the Bill contains sufficient provisions and safeguards.

Is it fair to say, for the reasons that the Minister outlined on the removal of the deterrent, that this amendment would not only assist some who seek to commit fraud but cost the DWP in its internal legal responsibilities and duties, as well in what it has to contribute to the court process to pay for what the amendment would require, in the sum of tens of millions of pounds?

I would not put a specific value on it, but my hon. Friend may well be right with the sort of figures that he suggests. Yes, there would be additional costs from the preparation in advance of court appearances, as well as the administrative costs of applying to the court itself. I think we would bear a significant burden, were we to agree to this amendment. Having outlined my reasons, I will resist amendment 7.

Clause 89 inserts proposed new section 80A into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, and it sets out which debts can be recovered by the new DWP recovery powers introduced in part 2 of the Bill. The new recovery powers are, firstly, the power to recover from bank accounts via direct deduction orders and, secondly, the power to disqualify a person from holding a driving licence.

The introduction of this clause ensures that the DWP can apply the new recovery powers to relevant social security debts. The clause is crucial to ensure that the new recovery powers in clauses 90 and 91 are used proportionately, appropriately and as intended by making them a power of last resort. By that, I mean that the DWP can use the new powers only after a debtor has been given all reasonable opportunities to repay the money owed, and only where recovery by existing powers is not reasonably possible.

The DWP debt stock stands at over £9 billion. As set out in the impact assessment, there is approximately £1.7 billion of off-benefit debt where individuals are able to avoid repayment, as the DWP is currently unable to recover effectively and efficiently in these cases. The Department’s current recovery powers are limited to deductions from benefits or PAYE earnings, meaning that those with other income streams and capital can choose not to repay their debt. The powers are vital to tackle those who repeatedly and persistently evade repayment, bringing £565 million of taxpayers’ money back into the public purse over the next five years.

These powers are expected to have a deterrent effect and to encourage many debtors to agree to repay without the powers being used. Debtors will be notified of the powers and their potential to be used to recover the money owed, should the individual continue to evade repayment. Let me be clear: where someone keeps money to which they are not entitled and repeatedly refuses to repay, the DWP will recover that money through these new powers. I commend the clause to the Committee.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Jeremy. Clause 89 sets out how money is to be recovered. It specifies that the Secretary of State cannot recoup the money from someone’s bank account or disqualify them from driving until they have given the liable person a reasonable opportunity to settle their liability, notified the liable person that the Secretary of State may exercise the power to recover the amount, if the liability is not settled, and the Secretary of State must also have given the liable person a summary of how the power would be exercised.

We support the recovery of money that has been fraudulently claimed, and I believe it is pretty clear that we need to do it. However, when the money has been given out in error, particularly to vulnerable claimants, as has been mentioned this afternoon, will the Minister explain how those vulnerable claimants will be communicated with? How will the DWP ensure that funds can be managed in a way that is sustainable for the individual who has to make those repayments? I hope that would also reassure the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion.

Green party amendment 7 would mean that the Secretary of State can exercise powers to recover amounts from a person only where the person agrees or where a court or tribunal has determined that such recovery is necessary and appropriate. We in the official Opposition question why the Secretary of State should be prevented from recovering amounts that have been fraudulently claimed, unless the person in question agrees. The amendment seems to us to entirely frustrate the purpose of clause 89, which may well be its intent.

2.15pm

Would the hon. Member care to comment on the fact that in clause 12, actual fraudsters are given the option to either have a court agree, or for them to agree to repay the amount?

In terms of the Cabinet Office powers that we debated under part 1 of the Bill, I think we are not comparing apples and apples; we are comparing apples and pears. I am not the Government, so it is not my Bill, but ultimately we have heard the figures—indeed, I have shared the significant amount of fraud we are talking about—and if I were in the Minister’s shoes, I would say that the number of cases is not comparable. I continue with my view that this is different from the first part of the Bill.

I would be interested to hear an explanation from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about why she does not believe that money that has been fraudulently claimed from the DWP should be paid back. However, I have a question for the Minister off the back of amendment 7, which is similar to the question I asked him about clause 89. Regarding the concerns about the definition of hardship and vulnerability that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned, what might those levels be? I appreciate that that is potentially difficult to include in the Bill, but it would be interesting to know what is defined as a level of hardship that would have an impact on repayment, and how that would be determined.

I will spend a moment setting out the process around the establishment of communications prior to deduction from a bank account and the affordability considerations that we undertake.

A person who is not paid under PAYE, or is in receipt of benefits, is identified and referred to the DWP’s debt management team initially to recover the debt. The debt management team makes multiple attempts, by letter or phone, to contact the person over at least four weeks to agree a voluntary repayment plan. If no contact can be made at that point, the case is referred to the DWP debt enforcement team, who will make at least four further separate attempts at contact, by letter or phone. That will include, at a minimum, two written notifications setting out the debt amounts owed, how the DWP may enforce the recovery of the debt, and with signposting to debt support to ensure that support is offered to vulnerable people.

If there is still no contact made, the person has repeatedly refused to engage and agree a voluntary plan. At that point, the DWP will check that the person has not made a new claim for benefit or entered PAYE employment, to check the person is suitable for this sort of recovery action. The person’s bank can then be contacted by the DWP to provide three months of bank statements from their accounts to check the affordability for any deduction, and to help the DWP work out the right amount, and frequency, of any deduction. The deductions must be line with caps in legislation. For regular deductions, that must not exceed 40% of the amounts credited into an account over the period for which bank statements are obtained. This will ensure that no one is forced to repay more than they can afford, so no one is pushed into financial hardship due to the recovery of debt.

Once that affordability assessment is complete, the DWP must write to the person to outline the debt that is being recovered—in other words, what has been overpaid and what is owed—the amount and frequency of the deduction, and how the deduction will be made, which in this case is from their bank account. The letter must outline the opportunities for the person to make representations to the DWP about any circumstances that the Department should consider before making the deduction, and it must also outline their right for the deduction decision to be reviewed. The person has a month to make representations or request a review. The letter must also outline appeal rights, including that if a person has made representations or asked for a review and the deduction order has been upheld, they may appeal the decision to the first-tier tribunal.

If there is no contact, one month after notifying the person of the proposed deduction the DWP will instruct the bank to deduct money, and repayments will be made directly to the DWP from the person’s bank account until the debt is repaid. That shows that it is quite a rigorous process, with a number of attempts to make contact with the person and a number of safeguards in rights to object and rights to appeal. In addition, for particularly vulnerable people, we have the vulnerability framework; part of that process supports people through referrals to advice services. We work with the Money and Pensions Service in particular, and frequently refer people to its services frequently.

For specific vulnerabilities and in particular cases, there is discretion to consider waiving the debt. That is unusual, but it is clearly an important safeguard for extreme cases—for instance, where domestic violence or financial coercion is involved. That is applied very much on a case-by-case basis; it is not a power or a policy that we would expect to use regularly.

I hope I have given the Committee an indication of the support and process for vulnerable people, and the number of humps in the road, as it were, before we get to the point at which we make a deduction.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 89 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 90

Recovery from bank accounts etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 90 inserts proposed new section 80B into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, adding the direct deduction order power to recover public money owed to the DWP directly from a debtor’s bank account. Direct deduction orders are vital to recovering funds owed by debtors who have the means to repay a debt but refuse to do so. This is essential to bolster the DWP’s ability to recover more of the public money owed by those who persistently evade repayment, to minimise losses to the taxpayer and to redirect the funds recovered to essential public services.

The powers also make DWP debt recovery fairer. At present, the DWP can recover debt directly from people on benefits by making deductions from benefits; it can also recover debt directly from those on PAYE through a direct earning attachment, but for those who are neither on benefits nor on PAYE, the DWP has limited options for recovery if they refuse to pay. That cannot be fair. For those not on benefits or PAYE, where all attempts to agree an affordable and sustainable repayment plan have failed, the option available to the DWP is to seek a third-party debt order via the court. Such action is restricted to lump-sum recoveries and can lead to debtors facing challenges securing credit due to the court judgment. Introducing the new power will allow the DWP to return taxpayers’ money to the public purse more effectively through affordable and regular deductions, without using court time.

There are important safeguards. First, the powers are to be used only as the last resort; multiple attempts at contact must be made, and those must be of different types—for example by letter and telephone. Secondly, all direct deduction orders will be subject to an affordability assessment based on the three months’ bank statements obtained. Thirdly, before any recoveries are made, individuals must be notified of the proposed action; they will have the right to present information to the DWP about their circumstances and the proposed terms of the order, in response to which the DWP may vary or revoke the order. Fourthly, if an order is still upheld after a review or consideration of information presented, the individual has a right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal. These are important safeguards to ensure deductions do not cause undue hardship. In addition, the Department will always signpost to debt management advice. In the oral evidence session, we heard from the Money and Pensions Service about how well that partnership is operating.

Direct deduction orders are essential to increasing the amount of debt that the DWP can recover. They are balanced measures, with robust safeguards to protect those who are vulnerable or experiencing financial hardship. Having outlined the main provisions in clause 90, I commend it to the Committee.

Clause 90 makes provision for recovery of social security debts directly from the liable person’s bank account. That power is broadly similar to powers contained in the Child Support Act 1991 and the Finance (No. 2) Act 2015, which enable deductions to be made directly from the liable person’s bank account without a court order. We support the inclusion of the power in the Bill, but further to our debates on part 1, I should be interested to know whether any other measures beyond bank account recovery and disqualification from driving were considered. Reference was made earlier to the ability to seize assets, particularly in relation to part 1 and the Public Sector Fraud Authority, but as that is not on the face of the Bill I would be grateful for further details about if and where that is allowed for within part 2.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Jeremy. I am again raising concerns about a serious power to make direct deductions from people’s bank accounts.

Life does not always come in neat paragraphs; it is messy. I have had a number of letters from constituents in Horsham setting out the kind of errors that can happen. A lady called Marianne, who is a universal credit recipient, received a small inheritance, which she tried to report by phone and email, but that still resulted in her wrongly losing her UC for a period. Another constituent, Hannah, said:

“I have zero hours contract and work between 9-11 hours a week at just over minimum wage. At times I have had a back dated pay rise which pushed me over the allowance limit (I wasn’t informed in advance this was happening). I’m also at the mercy of someone else submitting my hours, so if they aren’t submitted on time they roll over to the next pay period causing me to exceed the allowance limit.”

At no time did she ever come anywhere near the allowance limit in real earnings; nevertheless, she was caught up in the rules.

Does the Minister feel that we have sufficient safeguards to avoid that kind of inadvertent administrative error? Mistakes have happened in the past and will continue to happen, but this is a very strong power that could cause real distress.

We have not considered the seizure of assets under this Bill; nor are we are looking at forcing the sale of a home. We want to ensure that the powers we take are proportionate. We are not seeking to cause further hardship, and clearly the loss of their home would likely move a person into that category. Those decisions would ultimately remain with the court were we to take particularly serious case through the courts.

The hon. Member for Horsham raised some examples from his casework of people in receipt of universal credit who found they were inadvertently in receipt of overpayments. If they are still in receipt of universal credit—I think they are, going by what the hon. Gentleman said—they would be out of scope for the debt recovery powers that we are considering, so this provision would not apply in those specific examples.

If someone tells us of a change of circumstances, we always seek to action that as swiftly as possible. In cases such as the second example that the hon. Gentleman cited, where the mistake was the employer’s, there is not a tremendous amount that the Department can do. I have sympathy with his constituent, but it does not sound like that case would fall under the umbrella of departmental error. I assure him, however, that as both his constituents were still in receipt of benefits, they would not face a deduction from their bank accounts. That does not mean that an overpayment would not be recovered through other means, but recovery would be out of scope of this power. The treatment of overpayments from universal credit as recoverable was determined by Parliament a long time ago—I believe in 2012.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill..

Schedule 5

Recovery from bank accounts etc

2.30pm

I beg to move amendment 8, to schedule 5, page 98, line 10, leave out from beginning to end of line 24 on page 99.

This amendment would remove the requirement for banks to provide information to the Secretary of State for the purposes of making a direct deduction order.

My amendment 8 is related to our debate about direct deduction orders and safeguards for people with social security debts. The amendment would remove the requirement for banks to routinely provide information to the Secretary of State for the purposes of making a direct deduction order. It is important to note that before the Secretary of State can make a direct deduction order, they must submit an account information notice to the bank with which the debtor has an account requesting copies of the debtor’s bank statements covering a period of at least three months prior to the notice being issued.

I understand that the disclosure’s intended purpose is for the Secretary of State to consider whether the debtor can afford to have the funds deducted, but the schedule states that the bank must not inform the debtor or joint account holders if it receives an AIN. I am concerned that powers to request granular information from banks about their customers, without the customers’ knowledge, to decide whether an individual can afford to pay back an overpayment are intrusive and potentially authoritarian. Bank statements can reveal sensitive and private information about an individual’s movements, associations, political opinions, religious beliefs, sex life, sexual orientation and trade union membership. Since an AIN can also apply to joint accounts, individuals who are not themselves benefit recipients can have their private financial information disclosed to the DWP in a similar way.

The powers will affect individuals who have been overpaid because of mistakes and oversights. The Secretary of State should not be able to covertly demand a person’s financial records without suspicion that the person has committed any criminal offence. I sincerely hope that the Minister will consider amendment 8. It would remove the powers that require banks to hand over bank statements and account information, and thus it would prevent direct deduction orders being issued on the basis of covert financial surveillance. As with amendment 7, I hope we will come back to the issues raised by amendment 8 at a later stage, and that we will see some changes in this area.

I will resist amendment 8. It is challenging to receive an amendment such as this after a conversation about what we are doing to protect vulnerable people. Having stressed the need to do that and to ensure that debts can be repaid in a way that is affordable, it would be wrong of me to agree an amendment that would entirely remove our ability to ascertain that.

The amendment seeks to remove the requirement for banks to provide information to the Department in response to an account information notice and a general information notice for the purpose of making a direct deduction order. That removes a critical safeguard on direct deduction orders.

Will the Minister consider the covert aspect of the requirement? The information is not given voluntarily by the person concerned. That is the authoritarian surveillance aspect and that is what concerns me the most; it is not merely that the Secretary of State is seeking useful information.

The challenge is that, by that time, we will have made repeated and sustained attempts to contact the person to ask them to engage with us to agree an affordable repayment plan, to assess their ability to agree that plan and to encourage them to pay back what has already been established as a recoverable debt. The requirement is part of a power of last resort. I am not convinced that we would be able to secure engagement from such a person, as the power applies in relation to someone we have repeatedly tried to contact. Without it, I fail to see how we could both have a conversation with someone whom we have not previously been able to contact and assure ourselves that we would not be putting somebody in a particularly challenging financial position.

Is it fair to say that the impact of this amendment, if made, would be to require the DWP to ask people that they suspect of committing fraud for their permission to investigate whether they are committing fraud? Is it not likely that the number of potential fraudsters willing to give that information would be the roundest of round numbers?

Not quite. We would not be contacting banks to establish whether fraud had been committed under the amendment. We would already have established that a debt is owed, so that investigation would already have been completed. The debt, whether it was the result of fraud or error, has been established. However, I agree with my hon. Friend on the number of people who, having previously not engaged with us at all, will concur on the need to check bank statements to assess affordability. That may well be the roundest of round numbers.

Under the Bill, before any direct deduction order is actioned, the DWP must issue an account information notice to a bank to obtain bank statements. The AIN must contain the name of the debtor and identify the targeted account. This is a necessary and important safeguard so that the DWP can gather sufficient financial information to make informed decisions on fair and affordable debt recovery. Obtaining this information is also vital to the effectiveness of the direct deduction power, as the Bill is clear that a deduction cannot be made until this information has been acquired. Without the information from bank statements, the DWP will not understand a debtor's financial circumstances and will not be able to establish an affordable deduction rate and commence recovery.

I remind the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion that the reason the information is not known is the sustained lack of engagement by the debtor in efforts to agree a voluntary and affordable repayment plan, and that the power is aimed at recovering taxpayers’ money from debtors who persistently evade repayment and refuse to engage with the DWP. The information gathered will make it clear whether they have the means to do so. Finally, I remind the Committee that these powers will be used as a last resort, and that by working with the DWP to agree affordable and sustainable repayment terms, debtors can avoid the application of the powers altogether.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment 48, in schedule 5, page 101, line 17, leave out from “exceed” to the end of line 18 and insert—

“(a) in a case to which sub-paragraph (3A) applies, the amounts credited to the account in the relevant period, or

(b) in any other case, 20% of the amounts credited to the account in the relevant period.

(3A) This subsection applies in a case where the Minister is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the payable amount to which the regular direct deduction order related is recoverable from the liable person because the liable person committed fraud.”

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 22, in schedule 5, page 110, line 29, at end insert

“to which paragraph 6(3A) does not apply”.

As hon. Members can see, amendment 48 would change the percentage of collections made, to bring them in line with what we have debated previously, so taking it down from 40% to 20%. It is fairly self-explanatory, but we felt that this decrease would make sense and tidy things up a bit. We are interested to know whether the Minister is in agreement.

Does the hon. Member wish to speak to amendment 22?

Amendment 22 is self-explanatory and I assume it is not something the Minister will be interested in, but we thought it was worth seeing what conversation could be had around it. Ultimately, it is as it is written and we are interested to hear the Minister’s response.

Amendments 48 and 22 seek to limit the amount that can be deducted via a direct deduction order in any month to 20% of the amount credited to the account in the relevant period in non-fraud cases, and to set no limit in cases where the Department considers it more likely than not that the debt is the result of fraud.

The hon. Member for South West Devon will know I have sympathy with the idea of quickly collecting debts that arise due to fraud, but the measures in the Bill already allow the Department to collect higher amounts through a lump sum deduction order, rather than through a regular deduction order. This important flexibility in the application of these powers will allow us to seek a higher level of deductions. A lump sum deduction order can also be followed with a regular deduction order, if deemed appropriate.

The Bill currently states that, where recovery is made under a regular deduction order, the deduction must not exceed 40% of the amount credited into the account during the relevant period. Forty per cent is the maximum and is in line with other maximum rates for the DWP’s existing recovery powers, such as the direct earnings attachment power and the Child Maintenance Service’s deduction from earnings order power.

Perhaps the Minister can correct me if I have misunderstood, as the drafting obviously relates to the parallel provisions we debated in clause 22. My understanding is that, as currently drafted, if the Minister or the Public Sector Fraud Authority is satisfied that a loss is the result of fraud, they can impose a lump sum deduction up to 100% of the credited amount in an account. However, if they were to use a regular deduction order, each sum can be only 40%. Is there any reason, in principle or for welfare, why it is okay to take 100% of someone’s account on day one but not okay to take 50% today and 50% the following month?

Put simply, my understanding is that if an individual debtor has sufficient money in their account to pay 100% on day one without financial hardship, we will apply that power. Where that is not possible—for example, if a person’s debt exceeds their means to repay it in one go—we will look at a regular deduction order. It is on that basis that we came to the 40% figure, which is based on the income going into an account each month.

We have set the cap to ensure that ongoing living costs can still be met on a month-by-month basis. It may not be that the figure used is 40%. We are simply seeking to give ourselves flexibility up to that amount. We are not saying that we will never recover more than that. If someone has £10 million in a bank account and owes the Department £1 million, it is reasonable to assume it will not cause them undue hardship to recover all of it in one go through a lump sum deduction.

The two powers are complementary but separate—one deals with ongoing recovery from a person who does not have sufficient means for recovery in one go, and the other deals with people who have savings or means significant enough to do just that. I hope that answers the question. I am happy to take another intervention if not.

The Bill currently states that when a recovery is made under a regular deduction order, deductions must not exceed 40% of the amount credited into the account during the relevant period—month by month is the obvious example. Forty per cent is the maximum and is in line with other maximum rates for the DWP’s existing recovery powers. The Department intends to set lower rates for regular deductions in non-fraud cases, allowing those rates to remain in line with existing recovery powers. Paragraph 24 of proposed new schedule 3ZA to the Social Security Administration Act 1992 therefore makes provision for regulations to be brought forward to set a maximum percentage deduction that is less than 40% in these cases.

It sounds as though the Minister is speaking to amendment 22, which would restrict his power to set a lower amount to non-fraud cases. If we agree that lower limits should apply only in cases that do not involve fraud, can we just accept the amendment?

2.45pm

My argument is that the amendment is not required. The intention is to align deduction rates with other recovery methods used by the Department, and therefore the maximum rate of deduction is expected to be limited to a maximum of 20% in non-fraud cases.

I stress that these are maximum regular deduction rates; the actual deduction rate will depend on the level of income and other affordability considerations, based on the Department’s experience when applying deduction caps using existing recovery guidance outlined in the benefit overpayment guide, which can be found on gov.uk. In non-fraud cases, the amount regularly deducted will likely range between 3% and 20%. Similarly, not all fraud debt will be recovered at 40%. Regular deductions in fraud cases will range between 5% and 40%, depending on the debtor’s circumstances.

How the new debt measures operate will be clearly set out in the forthcoming statutory code of practice. These powers will enable the Department to apply the most appropriate debt recovery method to ensure efficient recoveries are made. Having outlined why I feel amendments 48 and 22 are unnecessary, I will therefore resist them.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment 6, in schedule 5, page 107, line 2, leave out from “review” to end of line 7.

This amendment leaves out provision that is not needed; paragraph 13(5), (6) and (8) of new Schedule 3ZA of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (as inserted by Schedule 5 of the Bill) makes the necessary provision.

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 5.

This amendment seeks to remove unnecessary repetition in the Bill, specifically removing part of paragraph 18 of proposed new schedule 3ZA to the Social Security Administration Act. This concerns the provision for the Secretary of State to notify the bank, the liable person and any other account holders, where appropriate, of the outcome of a review where a direct deduction order has been varied by the DWP.

This amendment does not change or remove that provision, as the DWP has a key obligation to ensure that all affected parties are notified of any changes to a direct deduction order following a review. This amendment simply removes a provision that is not needed; paragraphs 13(5), (6) and (8) of proposed new schedule 3ZA already makes the necessary provision. This amendment will simplify the Bill and prevent unintended confusion and duplication.

Schedule 5 introduces proposed new schedule 3ZA, which contains the substantive provisions of the new direct deduction orders, introduced in clause 90. The ability to recover directly from bank accounts is vital to recover public money owed to the DWP by those who have the means to repay but refuse to do so. As I outlined in my speech on clause 90, these powers will bring greater fairness to DWP debt recovery. At present, the DWP can recover debt directly from people on benefits only by making deductions from their benefits, and from those on PAYE through a direct earnings attachment.

For those who are on neither benefits nor PAYE, the DWP has limited options for recovery. Currently, there are an estimated 885,000 debtors off benefit who are not in repayment, with an estimated £1.74 billion not in recovery from this group. This schedule outlines powers to make lump sum and regular direct deductions from bank accounts through the use of a direct deduction order, as outlined in paragraph 1 of proposed new schedule 3ZA. Paragraph 3 outlines the information notices that the DWP can give to a bank, how the bank must comply, the information it must provide and how this information can be used.

To determine whether to make a direct deduction order, the DWP can give a bank an account information notice or a general information notice. An account information notice must be given to a bank, prior to any direct deduction order, to obtain bank statements. It must contain the name of the debtor and identify the targeted account. It is a necessary and important safeguard so that the DWP can gather sufficient financial information to make informed decisions on fair and affordable debt recoveries. A general information notice can be issued at any time for the purpose of determining whether to make a direct deduction order. It requires the bank to provide information on all the bank accounts held by the debtor, including any joint or unincorporated business accounts.

A bank must comply with an information notice, and may be liable to a penalty for failure to comply without a reasonable excuse. The information provided by the bank is necessary and proportionate to ensure that the DWP considers a debtor’s financial situation before making a direct deduction order. As set out in paragraph 4, the schedule also requires the DWP to presume that any moneys in a joint account belong equally to the debtor and the other account holder, unless there is evidence to the contrary. That ensures that only the portion of funds reasonably attributable to the debtor can be recovered from joint accounts, protecting the rights of other account holders.

Before seeking to recover debt, the DWP must give the debtor notice. The notice must identify the account to be subject to the proposed order, state the terms of the order and identify the recoverable amount to which the order relates. It must also invite the debtor to make representations. It must set the time for representations to be made, which must be at least one month. The Secretary of State must consider those representations and uphold, vary or revoke the order. Only after any representations have been considered can the direct deduction order be made. If no representations are received, the order can be made but the account holders are given a further month to request a review.

To ensure that funds necessary for debt recovery are not deliberately concealed or withdrawn, a bank may be required to take steps, in response to the notice, to ensure that the amount proposed to be deducted is not removed while the account holders are given time to make representations or request a review. That is vital to ensure that funds necessary for debt recovery are available in the debtor’s bank account so that the direct deduction order cannot be evaded.

If an order is made, it must be given to the bank and account holders. If the account holder is still dissatisfied, having made representations or sought a review, they can appeal to the first-tier tribunal, as I outlined previously. That allows disputes between the DWP and the debtor to be worked through quickly, while providing fair opportunities for the use of the power to be challenged.

When making a direct deduction, a DWP official will assess the bank information and determine the most appropriate deduction. As set out in paragraph 6, the schedule limits regular direct deductions to no more than 40% of the funds entering the account over the period in which the bank statements have been supplied. Regulations can lower, but not raise, the maximum percentage in some or all cases. That safeguards against excessive deductions and brings the powers in line with existing DWP recovery method legislation.

There is no legislative cap on lump sum deductions, as we expect to use them only where someone has large available savings. However, the DWP must be satisfied that neither lump sum nor regular deductions will cause the debtor, the other account holder or their dependants hardship in meeting essential living expenses. The Secretary of State may also vary direct deduction orders in the light of a change of circumstances—for example, if the debtor has a change of income or makes a new benefit claim.

In addition, paragraph 8 includes provision for a bank to deduct from the debtor’s account the administrative costs it has reasonably incurred by complying with a direct deduction order. That provision is essential to ensure that banks are compensated for the administrative efforts required to comply with the orders, thereby facilitating the efficient operation of debt recovery processes while protecting account holders from undue financial strain.

The schedule also contains provisions to ensure flexibility in direct deduction orders. Paragraphs 12, 13 and 16 allow the Secretary of State to vary, suspend or resume a regular direct deduction order. That provides the Secretary of State with the necessary flexibility to take appropriate action in relation to an order where a debtor’s circumstances change. Paragraph 9 requires that no deduction be made where the amount in the account is lower than the amount to be deducted. It is an important further safeguard to ensure that no one is pushed into hardship by a direct deduction order. Paragraph 17 makes provision to revoke a direct deduction order upon notification that the debtor has died.

Overall, the measure represents a significant part of the Bill, enabling the recovery of public money owed from those who persistently refuse to repay effectively, proportionately and fairly. Through this measure, the DWP estimates that it will realise benefits of £565 million in recovered debts over the forecast period.

Schedule 5 makes provision regarding direct deduction orders from bank accounts. These can be regular or lump sum. The Secretary of State may make a direct deduction order in respect of a joint account only if the liable person does not hold a sole account in respect of which a direct deduction order may be made that would likely result in the recovery of the recoverable amount within a reasonable time. I would be grateful if the Minister explained what criteria will be used to decide whether a person has such an account. This came up last Thursday in relation to the main bank account of a claimant and the fact that the DWP will not be able to ascertain what other bank and savings accounts may be held. Is the same true here? Is this relevant only if the joint account is the account into which the benefits are paid? For the record, I am referring to column 238 of Hansard on 6 March.

The schedule will give the Secretary of State a power to request bank statements that is not time limited. It will also give the Secretary of State the power to request from banks details about the accounts that a person holds with that bank. The Secretary of State can set out how and when the bank must comply with the notice, and explain that the bank may be liable for a penalty under it if it fails to do so without a reasonable excuse. Can the Minister reassure the Committee about his planned engagement with banks—indeed, has he already had such engagement? Do banks think that this is a manageable requirement, and what will the costs of administering it be? Should that engagement with banks be due to happen, what might be done to reflect their views?

We have discussed that there is quite an onerous expectation on banks. The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, the hon. Member for Queen’s Park and Maida Vale, made a comment, in terms of the Cabinet Office powers, that it was almost the banks’ civic duty to make sure that they do this. I am intrigued to know whether they agree with that. It would be interesting to know what engagement Ministers have had, and what they will do about it. Lastly, how long will banks have to comply with notices, and what level of penalty will be levied on them if they do not comply? I think those are fair questions.

The hon. Member raises the issue of the burden on banks; there is also the potential burden on the claimant. Banks sometimes have very large administrative charges, well in excess of the actual costs of whatever it is they do. Can the Minister give any assurance that there is some upper safety limit on excessive charging by banks? For instance, will a bank be able to charge for its corporate cost centre—a contribution towards its head office or functions—as can be the case with other charges? Basically, I seek clarity on the balance of how the charges will be administered.

That relates to what I was going to say on amendment 43, had we got to it. I entirely appreciate what the hon. Member says about dealing with the vulnerable and protecting them from undue expectations, but is it not right that, if someone’s bank account goes overdrawn, they pay those charges regardless of their financial situation? Are we potentially seeking to give claimants more rights than they would ordinarily have with their own bank account simply because it is the DWP that is trying to recoup the money, rather than their bank?

I am simply concerned that there should be some control of, or protection against, excessive charging. In the past, institutions have inflicted disproportionate charges that bear no relation to the actual cost of servicing whatever action had to be remedied. I am therefore seeking confirmation from the Minister that there is some protection in that direction as well with regard to the costs on the banks, as we said earlier.

3.00pm

On the question raised by both the Opposition spokesperson and, substantively, the hon. Member for Horsham on the amounts that banks will levy in administrative charges on customers who are subject to a deduction order, paragraph 8 of schedule 5 makes provision for banks to deduct sums from an individual’s account for the purpose of meeting reasonable costs. Paragraph 23 makes provision for the Secretary of State to make regulations to set and maintain a cap on the charges that the banks may deduct. That is in line with the approach taken by the Child Maintenance Service, which sets maximum rates that the debtor can be charged for lump-sum or regular deductions.

To give an indication of the maximum amounts, that is £55 for a lump-sum deduction and £10 that the bank may charge for each regular deduction. It is worth stating, for the benefit of Members, that banks do not necessarily charge that amount; it can be significantly lower, but that is the most that someone can expect to pay.

On banks more generally, the exact costs to banks of this are still being worked through, for obvious reasons, but they have the ability to claim back administrative costs, as we have just discussed. On engagement, I have met UK Finance and a number of banks on a number of occasions. I think that the overarching theme of those conversations is that they would not want anything too onerous placed on them, but that they welcome the thrust of what we are trying to achieve and want to be helpful in working with us to achieve that. Speaking of costs to banks is probably a natural point for me to mention the penalty that can be placed on banks for not complying, which is £500.

On the question of multiple accounts and the determination of which accounts to look into and so on, we would make multiple orders if we wanted to look at more than one bank account. We would send information notices to each of those. We can use those notices to see other accounts that are held and relevant. Were someone to have a number of accounts, they would not be able to evade this provision, as was the case perhaps when we were discussing the eligibility verification measure.

I think I have probably answered everything that I had noted. Please let me know if there is anything else. I was about to repeat myself—

No need for that.

Amendment 6 agreed to.

Schedule 5, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 91

Disqualification from driving

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to consider schedule 6.

The clause inserts proposed new section 80C into the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to enact the disqualification-from-driving power. The introduction of the clause will allow the DWP to apply to the court to disqualify temporarily a person from driving, if they persistently and deliberately fail to repay their debt. The power is vital to boost the DWP’s ability to recover public money.

In accordance with clause 89, the power will be used as a last resort in the most serious cases, where the outstanding debt is at least £1,000 and where the debtor has persistently and deliberately evaded repaying their debt, such as by moving their capital out of reach of a direct deduction order, introduced under schedule 5, despite having the financial means to repay.

Schedule 6 inserts proposed new schedule 3ZB into the 1992 Act and it contains the substantive provision of the disqualification-from-driving power introduced under clause 91. The schedule sets out when the power may be used and how it will operate, including rules on the operation of suspended and immediate disqualification orders, variation and revocation of orders, as well as the grounds on which an order may be appealed. Appeals may be made to the appropriate appellate court on points of law, including the terms of an order or the court’s decision to make, not make, vary or revoke an order.

Only when all attempts at recovery, including the new direct deduction power, have failed will the Department for Work and Pensions be able to apply to the court for a suspended DWP disqualification order. If the court agrees that the debtor had the means but did not repay without a reasonable excuse, it will order the debtor to make what it assesses to be affordable repayments. The debtor can avoid being disqualified by making those repayments; it is only if the debtor does not comply with the court’s repayment terms that the DWP can apply for an immediate DWP disqualification order. It is at that point—again, only if the court agrees—that the debtor can be disqualified from holding a licence for up to two years.

Before either a suspended or immediate order can be made, the debtor will have opportunity to be heard by the court. We recognise that stopping someone from driving is a serious step, so my Department has built in several safeguards to give debtors every opportunity to avoid that. For example, missing a single instalment will not result in an immediate disqualification order. Even when someone is disqualified, they can get back the right to drive when they start making the repayments and the court considers that repayments are likely to continue.

However, persistent evaders who have the means to pay their debts will no longer be able to evade paying; it is against them that we would utilise this power. It is important to note that the court cannot make either a suspended or immediate order if it considers that the debtor has an essential need for their licence, such as if they need to drive as part of their job or to care for a dependant. That important safeguard in schedule 6 ensures a balance between taking robust action against those who deliberately evade recovery and preventing undue hardship.

The powers are key to recovering funds from those who deliberately evade repayment of public money owed to the DWP. Having outlined the main provisions in clause 91 and schedule 6, I urge the Committee to support them.

Clause 91 makes provision for a liable person to be disqualified from driving. Any disqualification from driving will always be suspended in the first instance, subject to the liable person complying with what the court has assessed to be affordable and reasonable payments. When disqualification does occur, it is temporary and the liable person can have the disqualification lifted by satisfying the court that they are now making and will continue to make repayments.

We support the clause in general, but I have a few questions for the Minister about the practicalities, which are worth debating. First, however, will he clarify whether the clause is for cases of fraud, error or both? From what he said, it feels as if it is for both, and it is worth getting that on the record. What safeguards will the Department put in place to ensure that someone is not disqualified unnecessarily? Again, it sounds as if there is a long process before getting to that point. Is there a right of appeal or can the process be stopped before the disqualification takes place?

A few additional questions came to mind as I listened to the Minister just now. What role are the DVLA and the police expected to play in the wider disqualification? Who is responsible for the enforcement of that disqualification? I certainly know of a neighbour of mine who was disqualified for two years but continued driving; it was frustrating when I knew what he had done. Who would be responsible for that enforcement? In that instance, I knew that I could ultimately go to the police, but the scenario could be different in this case.

Likewise, will the decisions to disqualify from driving be publicised as they are when someone is disqualified for speeding or drink-driving? Again, that is part of the punishment; it also enables other people to know when somebody is in breach and promotes enforcement. It is also worth querying what measures might be put in place when somebody cannot be disqualified. The Minister said that some people would not be disqualified because of their jobs or family situations. What would be the deterrent for those people?

Furthermore, what if the person were not a driver or in possession of a driving licence? Obviously, recovery will be attempted from bank accounts, but if losing a driving licence is the final stop point it will be in the interests of fraudsters to divest themselves of theirs. We need to make sure that whatever it is that we are trying to achieve in the Bill, there are no shortcuts or opportunities for people to evade the repayment that the Department seeks.

I am uncomfortable with this proposal, because it seems unfair that one group of people should be liable to a punishment and not another. If someone cannot drive or they do not have a car, this punishment means nothing to them, whereas another group who do drive are affected—and some of them very deeply, depending on their lifestyle, such as living in the country or other necessary means. I am fundamentally uncomfortable with what seems to be a punishment that falls on only one group of people, when it should be levied equally.

As we have been discussing, schedule 6 and clause 91 make provision that, where all other methods of debt recovery have failed, including the direct deduction order measures we have been discussing, the DWP may apply to a court to have the debtor disqualified from driving. Like the hon. Member for Horsham, I have real concerns about these new powers. I cannot see how this specific novel civil penalty of removing a driving licence is at all appropriate to the particular group of people we are discussing, nor do I see the equivalence to the people being enforced upon by HMRC and the Child Maintenance Service, which have similar powers.

Legitimate benefit claimants who are overpaid through error, make a mistake or for any other reason owe money to the DWP are, almost by definition, in need of help. They might often make mistakes or fail to disclose information through an oversight, and their failure to engage with the DWP to date might be due to genuine incapacity and health issues. I am therefore very concerned that there are ineffective safeguards in the court process for these powers.

Although the DWP must apply to the court for the disqualification order, the court does not have discretion to refuse unless the debtor needs a driving licence to earn a living or has another essential need for one. It is unclear the extent to which this will protect vulnerable benefit claimants who have not engaged with the DWP due to incapacity, illness or mental ill health, or for whom driving is not essential for their work, but may be essential for their wellbeing or family life. I am not sure that the proposed legislation is clear enough about what will be deemed essential or what will be reasonable for the court to object to.

I also have concerns, as outlined a moment ago, that these powers cannot be exercised unless the people concerned have tried every other method, from benefit deductions or deductions from earnings to the direct deductions from bank accounts—the measure we have just discussed, which is extraordinarily intrusive on people’s financial information and privacy. Given that these powers would only be used where it appears that those other powers cannot be, is it not true that they are basically only for when a debtor cannot physically pay back what they owe? In effect, this measure of removing the driving licence is a punishment. It is a poverty penalty for those who do not have the means, despite all the intrusion that Ministers have gone through to establish that, to return what they have been overpaid.

I cannot support this power. It is incredibly punitive. I do not think it will create the conditions in which debtors are encouraged to engage with the DWP, but it could create dire consequences for individuals who are already struggling and least able to afford repayments.

I will attempt to answer those questions, and hon. Members are free to intervene if I have missed anything. The Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for South West Devon, asked whether this would be a power that is implemented in response to just fraud, or fraud and error. Because it is in response to a failure to repay a debt, it could be utilised for either. The criteria for its use is not how the overpayment came about, but whether the person has engaged to pay it back.

The safeguard around whether somebody is disqualified unnecessarily is all the various measures that we have attempted previously, plus the determination of the court. Responsibility for enforcement would lie with the Courts and Tribunals Service and the DVLA. However, if somebody was driving without a licence, that would clearly also be a legal issue. On the question whether we would advertise that somebody had had their licence suspended, we would not, because no crime has been committed; the suspension is just as a result of somebody failing to repay a debt. That is distinct from somebody who has had their licence removed because they have broken the law through drink-driving or some such crime.

3.15pm

On the deterrents for non-drivers, to respond to the hon. Member for Horsham, this is just one of a suite of powers available to us. We could also look at options such as charging orders, were this power not available to us, but we have seen from the Child Maintenance Service that this is a really strong lever to bring people to the table. It is a power of last resort, and a power that, in practice, is used very sparingly; it is more of a deterrent, when people are refusing to engage with us or to repay money that is owed.

In the light of the Minister’s confirmation that this power does refer both to error and fraud, I am all the more concerned. Removing a driving licence can mean the removal of a means of income. It is almost like the old-fashioned debtors’ prison: someone is in debt, so they are put in prison, and then they cannot get out of their debt. It is a Catch-22 situation.

I understand that the power has been used regarding the Child Maintenance Service. I have a case in Horsham where a constituent feels that he is being unreasonably demanded of; he is in trouble because he will potentially lose his job because of just such an order. Therefore, this power could be applied inaccurately or incorrectly—it is inevitable that in a large organisation there will be mistakes—so I am concerned that the power seems both very extreme and, as I said before, not generally applied. It should be generally applied in order to be legitimate.

On the point about a debtors’ prison, if somebody requires their vehicle for work, that is a criterion that a judge can consider in terms of whether a licence should be disqualified. It is also worth remembering that, in all cases, the initial move would be to suspend the suspension of the driving licence to give somebody the time to engage with us and start to pay. While, as I say, this is baked in as a last resort, we have put a number of break points in this process for people to engage. Indeed, even after we have suspended the licence, if somebody starts making repayments, they can have their licence reinstated. However, we have explicitly stated that caring responsibilities and the need for a car for employment purposes are criteria that would mean that we would not look to pursue that suspension.

Turning to the comments from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, I understand where she is coming from. She is consistent in her view of an erosion of civil liberties coming about as a result of many aspects of this Bill. However, I must say to her that the idea that we have exhausted everything, including deductions from benefits, fundamentally misses the point about the cohort of people who would be in scope for this power. Benefit claimants and people who are paid through PAYE would not be in scope of the driving licence power; it would be people who are no longer on benefits. Indeed, if they were on benefits, we would be able to deduct from those benefits directly, without needing recourse to such actions.

I therefore take a fundamentally different view from the hon. Lady on whether this amounts to a poverty penalty. Clearly, the poorest people would not be impacted by this power; it is for people who we know have the means to pay. Usually, we know they have the money, but they have moved it out of our reach, so we have ascertained their ability to pay, but it is not possible to lay our hands on those funds. This power—like wider mechanisms for people who do not drive, such as charging orders—is the initial lever to bring people to the table.

As I said in response to the hon. Member for Horsham, before we suspend a licence, we will ask people to engage with us. After agreeing the right to suspend that licence, we will give somebody a further opportunity to engage with us and to begin making regular repayments. After the licence has ultimately been suspended, there will again be the opportunity to commence regular payments and have the licence reinstated. All that is a power of last resort.

I will give the Child Maintenance Service statistics for context. The CMS utilised this power on seven occasions last year; six of those were suspensions of suspension and only one was an actual suspension of a driving licence. That tells us that this power is important as much as a deterrent as in practice. It is for that reason that it forms a part of this Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 91 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 6 agreed to.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Gerald Jones.)

3.21am

Adjourned till Thursday 13 March at half-past Eleven o’clock.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting)

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Peter Dowd, Clive Efford, Sir Roger Gale, † Carolyn Harris, † Esther McVey

† Abbott, Jack (Ipswich) (Lab/Co-op)

† Atkinson, Lewis (Sunderland Central) (Lab)

† Campbell, Juliet (Broxtowe) (Lab)

† Charalambous, Bambos (Southgate and Wood Green) (Lab)

† Francis, Daniel (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)

† Gordon, Tom (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)

† Green, Sarah (Chesham and Amersham) (LD)

† Hopkins, Rachel (Luton South and South Bedfordshire) (Lab)

† Joseph, Sojan (Ashford) (Lab)

† Kinnock, Stephen (Minister for Care)

† Kruger, Danny (East Wiltshire) (Con)

† Leadbeater, Kim (Spen Valley) (Lab)

† Malthouse, Kit (North West Hampshire) (Con)

† Olney, Sarah (Richmond Park) (LD)

† Opher, Dr Simon (Stroud) (Lab)

† Paul, Rebecca (Reigate) (Con)

† Richards, Jake (Rother Valley) (Lab)

† Sackman, Sarah (Minister of State, Ministry of Justice)

† Saville Roberts, Liz (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)

† Shah, Naz (Bradford West) (Lab)

† Shastri-Hurst, Dr Neil (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)

† Tidball, Dr Marie (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)

† Woodcock, Sean (Banbury) (Lab)

Lynn Gardner, Lucinda Maer, Jonathan Whiffing, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 11 March 2025

(Afternoon)

[Esther McVey in the Chair]

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

2.00pm

I remind the Committee that electronic devices should be turned off or switched to silent mode and that tea and coffee are not allowed in the Committee Room.

We will now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. I remind Members that interventions should be interventions, by which I mean that they should be short and should raise a point of clarification or ask a question; they are not speeches. Members who wish to give a speech should bob, and should continue to do so at the appropriate points in the debate in which they wish to take part. When Members say “you”, they are referring to the Chair, which is me. If they do not mean me, they might find it easier to look at me and direct their speeches to me, so that they address the Committee correctly.

Clause 9

Doctors’ assessments: further provision

Question proposed (this day): 201, in clause 9, page 5, line 36, leave out “and their medical records” and insert

“, examine such of their medical records as appear to the assessing doctor to be relevant,”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment provides that the duty on an assessing doctor to examine a person’s medical records is limited to records appearing to the doctor to be relevant.

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 422, in clause 9, page 5, line 36, after “records” insert

“make such enquiries of professionals who are providing or have recently provided health or social care to the person as the assessing doctor considers appropriate,”.

Amendment 468, in clause 9, page 5, line 37, at end insert—

“(aa) ask the person why they are seeking an assisted death.”.

Amendment 423, in clause 9, page 6, line 20, at end insert—

“(2A) To inform their assessment, the assessing doctor must—

(a) consider whether they should consult a health professional or social care professional with qualifications in, or experience of, a matter relevant to the person being assessed;

(b) consult such a professional if they consider that there is a need to do so.

(2B) Where an assessing doctor consults a professional under subsection (2A)(b), the assessing doctor must give a written record of the consultation to the other assessing doctor.”.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship this afternoon, Ms McVey. When we adjourned at 11.25 this morning, I had just been discussing amendment 201, but I will start again.

Amendment 201 seeks to clarify the wording in clause 9 relating to doctors’ assessments. It provides that the duty on an assessing doctor to examine a person’s medical records applies only to records that appear relevant to the doctor. The effect of the amendment is to make it clear as part of the assessment process that the assessing doctor is required only to review medical records that are considered by the doctor to be relevant to the person’s request to seek an assisted death.

Amendment 422 would add an additional requirement on an assessing doctor to make inquiries of professionals who are providing or have recently provided health or social care to the person and make such other inquiries as the assessing doctor considers appropriate. This applies to the co-ordinating doctor carrying out the first assessment and the independent doctor carrying out the second assessment.

Amendment 423 would require the assessing doctor to consider whether they should consult specialist health or social care professionals. These professionals should have qualifications in or experience of a matter relevant to the person being assessed, and they must be consulted if the assessing doctor considers that there is a need. This applies to the co-ordinating doctor carrying out the first assessment and to the independent doctor carrying out the second assessment. The amendment also provides that a record of any consultation with the specialist health or social care professionals must be shared with the other assessing doctor.

As the Bill is currently drafted, the co-ordinating doctor and the independent doctor are required to ascertain that the person has

“a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”.

That is set out in clauses 7 and 8. There is also a power in clause 30(1)(a) for the Secretary of State to issue codes of practice in connection with

“the assessment of whether a person has a clear and settled intention to end their own life”.

There are requirements for the assessing doctors to ascertain that a person is making the declaration

“voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person”.

That is set out in clauses 7(2)(g) and 8(2)(e). Amendment 468 would supplement those requirements with a requirement for the assessing doctor to ask a person why they are seeking an assisted death. I hope that those observations have been helpful to the Committee.

I have nothing further to add.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 42

Amendment 201 agreed to.

Amendment made: 422, in clause 9, page 5, line 36, after “records” insert

“make such enquiries of professionals who are providing or have recently provided health or social care to the person as the assessing doctor considers appropriate,”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)

Amendment proposed: 468, in clause 9, page 5, line 37, at end insert—

“(aa) ask the person why they are seeking an assisted death.”—(Rebecca Paul.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 43

I beg to move amendment 93, in clause 9, page 6, line 1, leave out “might” and insert “is to”.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 305, in clause 9, page 6, line 3, after “about death” insert

“and any other effects in addition to death.”

This amendment would require the assessing doctor to explain effects the provided substance would have in addition to death.

Amendment 142, in clause 9, page 6, line 3, after “death” insert

“and how it will be administered”.

This amendment requires the assessing doctor to explain and discuss with the person how the substance that might be provided to assist the person to end their own life will be administered.

Amendment 362, in clause 9, page 6, line 3, after “death” insert

“and the risk and nature of possible complications including pain”.

This requires the doctor to explain the risk of possible complications to the person.

Amendment 306, in clause 9, page 6, line 6, after “section 18” insert

“including the escalation of medical intervention”.

This would require the assessing doctor to include the escalation of medical intervention in their discussion of the person’s wishing in the event of complications arising in the administration of the substance under section 18.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey, and to speak to this group of amendments. Amendments 93, 305, 142 and 362 relate to clause 9(2)(b)(iv); amendment 306, tabled by the hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell), relates to clause 9(2)(c).

Clause 9(2)(b)(iv) stipulates:

“The assessing doctor must…explain to and discuss with the person being assessed…the nature of the substance that might be provided to assist the person to end their own life (including how it will bring about death)”.

My amendment 93 would replace “might” with “is to”. In my view, the word “might” creates an air of possibility. The Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definition:

“A possibility as distinct from a certainty”.

The Cambridge Dictionary goes somewhat further, defining “might” as the expression of a

“possibility that something will happen or be done, or that something is true although not very likely”.

In the context of the Bill, I consider that the use of “might” would create too ill-defined a concept.

For a patient to provide informed consent, it is necessary that the healthcare professional set out the relevant information in sufficient detail to enable that person to make an educated decision. In the circumstances of providing a substance, it follows that that information must include what that substance is. In my submission, it is insufficient simply to inform a patient that they might be provided with a substance, although they are just as likely, if not more likely, to receive another substance. Changing “might” to “is to” would provide greater certainty and precision in the wording of the Bill.

I recognise the concerns that have been raised that adopting amendment 93 would overly restrict which substance can be used, which may create an issue if the substance needs to be changed, for example if it was to be taken orally but has to be administered via a different route because the individual is no longer able to ingest orally. To my mind, however, the amendment would not prohibit a clinician from setting out to the individual a range of substances that could be used to provide them with the ability to end their own life, as long as the clinician includes the substance that is used and, crucially, the person seeking an assisted death indicates that in those circumstances they are content for that particular substance to be used. For example, it would be entirely open to an individual to inform a clinician that they are happy with regimes A, B and C, but not D.

I absolutely agree with what my hon. Friend is trying to do. This is a genuine question: does he think that it is possible at this stage for the Government, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, the NHS or whoever to provide the information that would be required? What is needed to enable the Bill to come into effect with the amendment that he proposes, so doctors are able to say exactly what drugs will be used?

In the scenario that I envisage, as we have seen in other jurisdictions, there are a variety of regimes that could be used in the given circumstances. It would be appropriate for an approved list of medications and substances to be a delegated matter for the Secretary of State. As medical and pharmacological studies progress, there may be changes to those regimes, so I do not propose putting a list on the face of the Bill. The way I envisage it operating, if the Bill comes into law, is that there would be an approved list of substances that would be open to use. There would have to be a range; we are acutely aware that there are supply chain issues at times, so limiting it to just one regime would be impracticable. I believe that amendment 93 would strengthen the wording of the Bill to provide greater certainty that the nature of the substance to be provided will be explained to and discussed with the person who is seeking an assisted death. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for indicating his broad support for the amendment.

I turn to amendment 305, tabled by the hon. Member for York Central. I appreciate the premise of the amendment, but I have some concerns about the precision of the drafting. It would require the assessing doctor to explain the effects of the provided substance, in addition to how it would bring about death. In its current form, the Bill requires the discussion with the assessing doctor to set out how the provided substance will result in death. My understanding is that the intent of amendment 305 is that they set out the side effects beyond those directly related to the mechanics of bringing about death; this would include any wider discussion around side effects.

2.15pm

It is important to consider the specific meaning of “side effect”: an effect of a drug, chemical or other medicine that is in addition to its intended consequences. My understanding is that specifically using the term “side effect” in amendment 305 would make the drafting more precise and would achieve the effect that the hon. Member for York Central intends.

In many ways, however, I feel that the amendment is unnecessary, because a discussion of side effects should be incorporated into any informed consent discussion. Additionally, subsections (2)(b)(iv) and (2)(c) of clause 9 indicate, in conjunction, that there will be a discussion of any complications that may arise as a result of substances given. It flows from that, I submit, that there must be a conversation about side effects.

Currently, when we start a patient on any medication, we usually give out information on indications and contraindications. If patients ask for one, we will give them a leaflet with information about the medication. Can the hon. Member clarify whether the amendment would help in that situation? Does he agree that a leaflet should be given to the patient?

The hon. Member makes an important point. In practice, one would of course discuss the side-effect profile of any medication or substance to be administered. I do not feel that specifying that in the Bill, as amendment 305 is drafted, would achieve its purpose. The amendment refers to “any other effects”, but it does not specifically mention side effects. In any event, it must flow from the interaction between clause 9(2)(b)(iv) and clause 9(2)(c) that the conversation about complications as a result of the administration of a substance will encompass a conversation about side effects.

It is worth noting that all substances have a side-effect profile; what the side effects are will be specific to the substance in question. I do not think it a helpful improvement to the Bill to presuppose what the side effects may be. Amendment 305, although imperfect, is therefore preferable in my view to amendment 362, which would require that specific side effects be set out and which presupposes a scenario involving a particular set of medication.

Nevertheless, I remain concerned about the wording of amendment 305. I would be grateful if the hon. Member for Spen Valley provided some reassurances as to the steps she has taken to honour the intention of the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for York Central and achieve a tighter piece of legislative drafting.

I turn to amendment 142, tabled by the hon. Member for Broxtowe. It seeks to ensure that the discussion with the assessing doctor includes a discussion of how the substance will be administered. Although it may not be strictly necessary, because that should be a conversation that takes place when someone is going through an informed consent process, I do not consider that its inclusion would undermine the operability of the Bill. I am therefore minded to support the amendment. I do not consider that it will be restrictive should the circumstances change, because there may be a broad conversation about the variety of substances that can be administered, depending on the circumstances. As the drafting of the Bill does not preclude or prohibit such a wider discussion, it would be eminently sensible to include the route of administration.

Amendment 306, in the name of the hon. Member for York Central, would require the assessing doctor to include the escalation of medical intervention in their discussion should complications arise. In many ways, that issue is covered by clause 9(2)(c), so the amendment would not aid the operability or interpretation of the Bill. It would be much better dealt with under the code of conduct, to avoid the Bill becoming overly prescriptive and to allow flexibility as scientific and medical knowledge adjusts and adapts over time.

I will speak to amendment 142, which would insert

“and how it will be administered”

into the Bill. It would require the assessing doctor to explain and discuss with the person how the substance that might be provided to assist them to end their life will be administered.

The amendment would be a key step towards giving peace of mind to a terminally ill individual who is seeking an assisted death. It would also preserve their autonomy right up to the final stage. Ensuring that the method of administration is thoroughly explained would provide the doctors and the individual seeking an assisted death with the opportunity to consider the options—if there are options available to them—and decide which method would best preserve the autonomy of that individual.

Assisted dying presents many opportunities for individuals to be coerced, especially at the final stage—death itself. Therefore, the method of administration is key information for the individual to know, and it is not sufficient for it to be withheld from them. We must make it a prerequisite of the Bill that it is supplied. Making an informed choice about the assisted death pathway involves careful consideration, and knowing and understanding every step of the process. It is appropriate for the person to maintain their agency. Minimising the role played by the doctor at the administration stage is also key to ensure that the final act belongs to that individual.

We must acknowledge that many individuals seeking assisted death may experience significant mobility and physical limitations, particularly because of their terminal illness. Those limitations can affect their ability to engage with the process in ways other people may take for granted. For example, a patient suffering from severe weakness, paralysis or chronic pain might have difficulty physically positioning themselves or administering some types of substance, depending on the options available. A person may have difficulty swallowing and would not be able to ingest a substance in the form of a pill, but they may be able to autonomously operate a system that would allow them intravenous administration.

In these cases, the method of administration must be carefully considered and explained in a way that accommodates the patient’s unique physical needs. By discussing the challenges openly at this stage, doctors can help to ensure that the patient understands the options open to them, while making the process as comfortable and accessible as possible. Addressing their mobility and physical limitations in this context is not only a matter of practicality, but a reflection of our compassion and respect for that individual’s circumstances.

By limiting the doctor’s physical role, we also ensure that the patient retains control over the process. Making the act of self-administration as independent as possible ensures that the final part of the process gives the patient agency in choosing how and when to end their life. The individual must maintain a primary role in their death, but the actual administration is the final assurance and assertion of the individual’s choice to end their life. The amendment emphasises the importance of ensuring that, within the Bill, the doctor’s involvement is limited to preparation and support. That is key to making sure that the patient’s final moments are self-directed and as free from any unnecessary external interventions as possible.

Subsection 6 of clause 18, on the provision of assistance, discusses the role of the doctor in administration. It says that a doctor might

“assist that person to ingest or otherwise self-administer the substance.”

By ensuring that the method of administration of the substance aligns with the physical capabilities that a person has to self-ingest, which may be limited, we limit the role played by the doctor at this crucial stage, and limit the chance of the coercion of the individual or of the individual having a death that lacks real autonomy.

In conclusion, amendment 142 plays a crucial role in safeguarding the rights and autonomy of a terminally ill individual seeking an assisted death. By ensuring that the method of administration is clearly explained, we empower patients to make an informed, autonomous decision about the way in which they wish to end their life.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Esther. [Interruption.] You are Dame Esther, aren’t you?

I am not.

Are you not? That is an extraordinary oversight. That must be rectified as soon as possible— I am sure it will be. I will speak in support of the amendment in my name and those in the names of the hon. Member for York Central and my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley. As he has explained, amendment 93 requires doctors to specify what drug “is to” be used, not just “might be” used. My amendment 362 states that there must be clarity on the complications and risks involved in the procedure. Amendment 305 states that we must be clear about

“other effects in addition to death.”

Amendment 306 discusses escalation in the event of complications.

We have discussed informed consent previously. We have identified that the General Medical Council’s guidance on critical information that patients must receive has been selectively placed in clause 7. Of the five areas that the GMC says should usually be conveyed to patients, two were omitted: first,

“uncertainties about the diagnosis or prognosis, including options for further investigation”,

and secondly,

“the potential benefits, risks of harm, uncertainties about and likelihood of success for each option, including the option to take no action. By ‘harm’ we mean any potential negative outcome, including a side effect or complication.”

It is not being explicitly stated that doctors should communicate that to patients.

Telling a patient exactly which drug or substance will be used to end their life, and its likely side effects, is critical if they are to have informed consent. Full understanding requires the patient to know the specific drug that will be used. It lets the patient grasp the method, its effects and its finality. Patients deserve to know how the drug will work; what its administration will be, whether oral or intravenous; the time it will take to have an effect, whether that is minutes or hours; and the other sensations that will be felt. It is difficult to say that we can convey that information without being specific about which drug will be used.

In other countries, for instance in the Netherlands, the criteria require that patients are fully informed, including about the drug that will be used and the method. In Oregon, the Death with Dignity Act similarly requires discussing the prescription of the specific drugs. That equips the patient to find out more, should they wish to do so, and to ask questions. A patient with a terminal disease needs to know the drug to confirm if it aligns with his or her wish for a peaceful death—it is not just an abstract agreement to die, trusting that medicine will do the trick.

An important consideration to note is age. Dr Jessica Kaan, writing in the Journal of Aid-in-Dying Medicine, found

“a clear and linear correlation between younger patient age and longer times to death. Older-age patients have, on average, shorter deaths.”

It is important for clinicians to be aware of that research. She continued:

“Clinicians should consider and discuss this information as part of informed decision-making…with patients.”

They can do that only if they are aware of what the drugs will be.

2.30pm

Amendment 305, in the name of the hon. Member for York Central, seeks to ensure that the medical practitioner discusses possible effects arising from the substance used to end the person’s life. Clause 9 currently states that the assessing doctor must

“explain to and discuss with the person being assessed…the nature of the substance that might be provided to assist the person to end their own life”.

The amendment would introduce a further requirement for the practitioner to explain and discuss

“any other effects in addition to death.”

That is important, because there will not always be safe, pain-free, curated deaths, as I am afraid are sold by campaigners for this law. We need to start with the uncertainties, and the fact is that assisted dying does not offer a risk-free death. In Oregon between 2012 and 2022, there was an 11% complication rate. Reported side effects included regurgitation, seizures, and surviving lethal drugs. Nine patients have regained consciousness after taking assisted suicide prescriptions. Half of all deaths in Oregon took over 53 minutes, which was the median time. The longest took 137 hours. It is not guaranteed that someone will have an uncomplicated, easy or indeed pain-free death.

Complications have been reported in other jurisdictions as well. In 2019, Washington state stopped reporting data relating to complications, despite multiple complications being reported in the years before then. None the less, complications including regurgitation, seizures and regaining consciousness have all been recorded since implementation in Washington. In 2018, there were eight recorded complications in Washington, all of which were regurgitation as a result of the ingestion of lethal drugs.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling amendment 362. Does he accept that Australia, for example, has a very different regime from America? In Australia, people are given pentobarbital, which has not failed on any occasion—in any of the 2,500 treatments since assisted dying was legalised. In America, people are not allowed to use that; instead, they use another cocktail of drugs, which is not as ideal and can have other side effects. May I also say that I am not sure whether it is totally relevant to discuss the problems of a drug given in America in this context? We are discussing just putting down in law what the doctor is obliged to say to the patient.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for those points because he helps me to direct my argument. It is essential to discuss the evidence from abroad about the complications that arise from assisted suicide, but the evidence is very patchy: we know what we know, but we don’t know much. There is a complete dearth of evidence, including in Australia. When Australians gave evidence to the Committee, it was put to them, accurately, that there is a great lack of adequate data gathering in Australia, as in other countries too. So when he says there have been no complications in Australia, what he means is that there have been no reports of complications in Australia. As we always need to point out, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

That question was indeed put to the experts from Australia, but actually they were quite clear that there is a huge amount of evidence. Indeed, there is a very robust reporting mechanism in Australia—the best in the world, I suggest—so there is a huge amount of evidence from that jurisdiction.

Let us not rehash the conversations that we had in the evidence sessions, but I would advise Members to review those conversations. Indeed, there is further publicly available evidence, which I am happy to share, of the problems with data collection in Australia, as in other countries. To the point of the hon. Member for Stroud about the evidence of complications that arise in other jurisdictions being irrelevant to our discussions, because of the lack of clarity in the Bill about what drugs would be used to bring about the assisted suicides that we are proposing to legalise, all we can do is rely on evidence from abroad, and I will insist on doing so.

As well as questions about complications and side effects, there is also a crucial question about how long it takes to die. In Canada, a study demonstrated that in 5% of cases, patients experienced a prolonged time to death. Another study showed that 50% of cases in Canada with available data—again, there is a lack of data—were unsuccessful within 60 minutes. It is clearly common in other countries for death to take up to or more than an hour.

The Canadian Association of MAiD Assessors and Providers—the people who do it—acknowledged that patients who ingest assisted suicide drugs can experience burning, nausea, vomiting and regurgitation. I am not saying that that always happens, or that it happens in the majority of cases, but it clearly happens. It is therefore appropriate for patients to be properly informed of those risks, if they are associated with the drugs that will be used. We do not know what those are going to be at this stage.

In the Netherlands, where assisted dying or assisted suicide has been legal for 20 years, a third of people with assisted suicide deaths experience some adverse symptoms such as pain, restlessness, shortness of breath, secretions, nausea and vomiting—that is, a third of people experienced some of those distressing side effects as they died, so it is very far from a guarantee of a pain-free death. It is vital that people considering an assisted death are aware of those possible effects, in addition to the primary effect of the drugs which is, of course, to kill them.

There is also a question about the method of administration. People should know that where regimes use the intravenous route of a short-acting anaesthetic, that is also not without problems. People would understand, and potentially argue for, having an anaesthetic as the first part of the cocktail of drugs that will be administered, but evidence from abroad demonstrates that the anaesthetic induction agent, which is usually propofol, a drug that puts people to sleep before surgery, can wear off rapidly in some people, particularly in younger patients, those who are less ill and those who are larger in size.

In around two thirds of assisted deaths with administrations that use that technique, that anaesthetic is rapidly followed by a paralysing agent. The patient cannot then move a muscle and, unable to breathe at all, they die of asphyxia. Unfortunately, there has been no monitoring of patients while they are given those drugs to ascertain whether they regain consciousness as they die. They cannot move a muscle, so they cannot signal distress. We are unclear what the experience of the dying person is beneath the apparent calm that has been induced in them by the paralytic drug that they have been given.

We do know, however, that similar combinations have been used in judicial executions. Post mortems have shown, as reported in The Lancet in 2005, that the level of anaesthetic induction agent in the blood at the time of death was lower than that required for surgery in 88% of executed inmates. Shockingly, in 43%, the concentrations were consistent with awareness, meaning they may have suffered during the execution.

The hon. Gentleman is bringing up lots of rather horrible stories about assisted death. That is why, in Australia, Switzerland and Holland, they have decided, instead of using the regime that he is talking about, to use pentobarbital. At 15 grams, that has not had any failures—no one has woken up. The only real side effect that people complain of before they go to sleep, which happens very quickly, is that it is very bitter. One of the reasons why Dignitas uses it is that it is so effective and it does not have those effects. I would push back on some of those scare stories.

I am afraid to say that the whole debate about assisted dying is replete with scare stories. The hon. Gentleman says that they are descriptions of horrible events, but that is the situation that we are dealing with. We are here to try to pass legislation that is designed to avert horrible deaths. I am absolutely committed to that as well, but the evidence from abroad shows that people can also have a horrible death with assisted dying.

The hon. Gentleman points to Australia, but the evidence from Western Australia in particular is that over 4% of assisted deaths reported complications. He might be right that it is a better regime than that used in the United States, but even there complications occur. We do not know yet what the regime will be here, but I am alerting the Committee to the genuine danger of an assisted dying regime that induces very unpleasant results for patients.

The hon. Member may be surprised to hear that I am inclined to support his amendment 362 and amendment 142 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe, not because of, in the words of my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud, the scare stories or the examples that the hon. Member has been giving, but predominantly because of what the amendment says on the tin: that a person must be given a full explanation of the risks of complications and how a substance should be administered. As I have said a number of times in Committee—

Order. Can I just check that this is an intervention?

It is an intervention, Ms McVey. My plea to the hon. Member is to focus on exactly what the amendment states. I appreciate all the stories and examples that he wishes to make, but it is important to reflect on the words of the amendment. As I said, I am minded to support it.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention.

Amendment 306, tabled by the hon. Member for York Central, addresses the question of what to do in the event of complications. I recognise that clause 9 states that that must be discussed, which I welcome. I think, though, that there is a significant absence that this amendment would address, which is what to do in the event of complications—specifically, which intervention would be appropriate.

Here we get into a very difficult area. I personally find it difficult to understand a way out of it, because it is a consequence of the sort of legislation that we are considering: what do we do when complications arise? Specifically, what do we do when the patient does not die and is still alive some hours later, possibly in distress? I have cited evidence about some of the complications that occur and the prevalence—for example, that 10% of such people in Oregon experience complications, including some who simply wake up again. We need to resolve this. On explaining possible side effects and complications, under the Bill as it stands none of the declarations that are signed by the doctors or the person requesting assistance confirm in writing that the criterion has been met for proper communication, so that is one concern.

My more substantial concern—I will finish with this—is that at the moment the doctors have to explain the complications, even though we do not know what the drugs are going to be yet, but they cannot discuss or decide with the patient what they would do in the event of complications. We know that the doctor must be present at the end or in the next room, but can they halt the process if complications arise—if the patient wakes up or is exhibiting signs of distress? That would be against the last known wishes of the patient who had said that they wanted to go ahead with the death. Should the doctor expedite the death knowing that that is what the patient theoretically wanted? Of course not, because that would be euthanasia; it would be the doctor actually killing the patient, which is illegal under the Bill. Do they stand by and do nothing at all, which goes against the doctor’s obligations to address symptoms and illness in a patient? If the patient is fitting or vomiting, the doctor would normally clear their airways. Should they do that, knowing that that might bring the patient back to life—that it might resuscitate them and stop the assisted death?

When we debate clause 18, we will discuss the process of the assistance that the doctor gives, but we are obliged, when we come to debate the Bill fully, to choose between three options. We could allow complications without any guidance, which is what the Bill does; that raises all sorts of challenges, and practical and ethical concerns, for doctors. We could stipulate that the patient should be revived, perhaps if a certain degree of distress is witnessed or if the patient is still alive after a certain period of time. Finally, we could allow euthanasia and say that, in that event, the doctor should be authorised to expedite the death. I do not know what the option should be. That is a question that a doctor would have to face in reality, in the bedroom of a patient who is exhibiting complications. I do not know what to do, but I do not think we should be proceeding with this Bill. Those who do believe in it have to answer this question: what does a doctor do if a patient is exhibiting distress and not dying—do they bring them back to life, expedite their death or do nothing?

2.45pm

I rise to speak in support of amendment 362, tabled by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, which requires the registered medical practitioner to explain and discuss the nature and the risk of the lethal drugs. There is a bit of a theme to the amendments I have tabled so far: they have almost all been about giving the patient more information. The promoter of the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, is quite right in focusing on the importance of the patient’s autonomy. I absolutely believe in and value that autonomy—I am sure everybody across the Committee does so too—but true autonomy is linked to having access to good quality and accurate information. It can severely impact someone’s autonomy if they do not. This Bill states that the person must have an informed wish to end their own life. I believe that this must explicitly include an understanding of the nature of, and the risks of, the lethal drugs involved in assisted dying.

This Bill’s passage through this place has led to lots of conversations and a greater awareness of the issue of death across the country. Morbid as that is, it is a really good, healthy thing that people are talking about end of life—something which we will all encounter—and that is welcome. The debate on assisted dying has made many people concerned about the nature of death and the choice that they might face at the end of their life. Inevitably, for some, the impression has been given that an assisted death uniformly provides a pain-free alternative. I accept that that is absolutely what the promoter of the Bill, and those in support of it, are aiming for—that is not in question—but we have heard from the hon. Member for East Wiltshire about issues with that, and that there have been exceptions in places where such laws have been put in place. I also point to the evidence of James Haslam, a consultant in anaesthesia and intensive care medicine, who put in his written evidence to the Committee that assisted dying

“does not guarantee a painless, peaceful and dignified death.”

The key word there is “guarantee” because, unfortunately, some people who ingest the prescribed lethal drugs do experience distress and complications. In the Netherlands, a high dose of barbiturates is used for all administrations of lethal drugs, and in two thirds of cases—the majority—the person dies within 90 minutes, but a third of cases do take longer and can take up to 30 hours. Complications include difficulty swallowing the whole prescribed dose, vomiting, and in some cases re-emergence from coma. I do not accept that this is an incidental concern. Vomiting affects up to 10% of assisted deaths by oral administration in the Netherlands. There is no easy way to research the efficacy of these drugs on humans given their lethal effects, and as a result there is no regulatory authority in the world that has approved these drugs to be used for this purpose. The data that we have shows that these complications take place in all jurisdictions that have assisted dying. As the hon. Member for East Wiltshire has already mentioned with respect to Oregon, between 2012 and 2022, 11% of the time there were complications.

These complications raise important ethical and medical questions for the doctor and for the terminally ill person. Of course, by the time complications occur, it is too late to discuss or reconsider the person’s options. That is why it is essential that the registered medical practitioner has already explained and discussed with the person the risk and nature of the lethal drugs. Choice is about not simply having options available, but understanding them. That goes to the point I made at the beginning: autonomy is absolutely linked to the quality of the information that someone has been given in order to make that autonomous choice. That requires the registered medical practitioner to explain the full risk and the nature of the possible complications from the lethal drugs.

The General Medical Council sets out five points of guidance for doctors on how they should hold a dialogue with their patients about reaching a decision. Three of the five GMC points are already covered by the Bill, but two are excluded: uncertainties about the diagnosis or prognosis, including options for further investigation; and the potential benefits, risks of harm, uncertainties about and likelihood of success of each option, including the option to take no action.

I can see no good reason why we would not want doctors to be entirely honest with patients who are considering assisted dying, even to the point of saying that the vast majority of people will not have any complications, but there is a chance. Personally, I see no issue with that, or why there should be. Doctors should give their patients that information; not only is that good practice—as we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley—but, as the GMC guidance makes it clear, they should do so because we should not give people with serious illnesses a false picture of what assisted death means. I link back to the emphasis on the word “guarantee”, as per the written evidence I quoted.

Amendment 362 would affirm the commitment of the Bill’s promoter, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, to upholding medical standards. It would clarify the full responsibilities of the registered medical practitioner under the General Medical Council guidelines. Perhaps more importantly, it would put the terminally ill person in a better position to understand fully the options available and the associated risks.

In Committee, we have heard frequently that the Bill is about expanding choice and autonomy at the end of life. To act autonomously, terminally ill people need— I emphasise this again—to understand what they are facing as best they can, with the best and most accurate information available to them as early as possible. That is why I support amendment 362, and I urge the Committee to do so, too.

I rise to speak in support of amendments 305 and 306, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for York Central.

Under amendment 305, a doctor would have to explain what effects the medicines would have as well as death. I appreciate the points made by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley, and what other Members have said about effects and side effects. I would first say: we do not know the side effects. There is no research into any of the drugs being used for the purpose that we are looking at—for assisted suicide, euthanasia or whatever whichever jurisdiction calls it. We therefore cannot give a clear view of what the side effects are; they are largely unknown, as I understand it.

In addition, there are different drugs. My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud mentioned one drug, pentobarbital, which has caused huge concern. I did not know about the issue in Australia, but I know the evidence from death row in America, after Texas started using pento-barbital; there have been huge concerns and lawsuits there. I am happy to be referred to other evidence. In some cases, the effect of the drug has been described as akin to suffocating or even as being waterboarded or drowning.

Concerns have been expressed about the use of such drugs in other jurisdictions. I agree with the hon. Member for East Wiltshire that we should be looking at all such jurisdictions, because this is something new for us. If we are to learn from other jurisdictions where assisted dying has happened and it has been okay for people, whether that is Australia or others, it is equally right that we hear from those jurisdictions where things have not gone right or to plan. That is important.

Clause 9(2)(b) states:

“The assessing doctor must…explain to and discuss with the person being assessed”,

among other things,

“the nature of the substance that might be provided to assist the person to end their own life (including how it will bring about death)”.

Amendment 305 would instead require that the assessing doctor explain to and discuss with the person being assessed the nature of the substance that might be provided to assist the person to end their life, including how it will bring about death and any other effects it would have in addition to death. That is really important.

There are several relevant things that patients should know if they are to be able to make an informed choice. First, they should have as clear an idea as possible what the experience of taking the lethal drug is like. In some countries where people undergo assisted dying, they swallow a cocktail of drugs. Patients whose assisted dying process did not succeed have said that the drugs are bitter tasting. If this is to be the method used in assisted death in this country, applicants should be aware of that, because some people do not take tablets—they just will not do it. If other methods are to be used, doctors should inform patients of what the experience will be like to the best of their knowledge.

The second thing assisted death applicants should know is that they may suffer complications. We know from countries and states that have assisted dying that some patients undergo complications during the process. It has been said before, but I will repeat the point, because it is really important: there can be complications. People may vomit or undergo seizures. One assisted dying recipient took 137 hours to die. That is five days and 17 hours.

We do not know the full number of patients who have died very lengthy deaths in Oregon, because the lethal drugs are self-administered, usually with no doctor present, but just because there is no report saying that things have gone wrong, it does not mean that everything has gone right. Oregon also found that at least nine patients failed to die from lethal drugs. We do not know whether that is the total number—again, because the assisted dying applicants in Oregon self-administer drugs. We can say with certainty that complications exist, although, unfortunately, gaps in the data mean that we do not know how common they are.

Amendment 306 would change the duties of a doctor present during the assisted dying process. Currently, clause 9(2)(c) states that the co-ordinating doctor must discuss with the person

“their wishes in the event of complications arising in connection with the self-administration of an approved substance”.

If the amendment were accepted, the clause would state that the co-ordinating doctor must discuss with the person their wishes in the event of complications arising in connection with the self-administration of an approved substance

“including the escalation of medication intervention”.

This is a point of great importance, both for the person seeking assisted dying and the doctor, who would have to be present for the process. It would mean that the applicant and the doctor would have to think through what they wanted to happen if the applicant did develop complications. Should the doctor at a certain point act to revive an applicant—for example, if the person seemed to be suffering extreme pain as a result of a lethal drug? Alternatively, should the doctor remain as an observer and, if it were clinically possible, someone to administer further pain-relieving drugs? Not doing anything is clearly not an option. Both courses of action might seem harrowing to the person seeking assisted dying, but it is something that they should clearly discuss with the doctor, because these situations could really happen.

There are clearly no easy answers to these questions, but if applicants are to take an informed choice over assisted dying and if we want to provide autonomy, they must know that these questions exist and they must discuss them with their doctors. We have talked a lot about autonomy for people with serious illness. Those people will not have autonomy unless they are informed in accurate detail about the possible outcomes of assisted dying, and these amendments would ensure that.

Ultimately, if someone takes a drug to end their life, they will either die or not die and be left in a compromised state. Are they then escalated to A&E, because leaving them in that state is not an option for any doctor—or does the doctor proceed to administer more drugs? What does the doctor do?

My hon. Friend raises a really important point. As clause 9 says, the doctor has an obligation to discuss with the person their wishes in the event of complications, so that conversation would have happened with the patient. To be clear, the doctor cannot intervene to expediate the patient’s death. That is very clear in the Bill.

3.00pm

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. Actually, clause 9(2)(c) covers the complications but does not state clearly what would happen in the event of those complications. Would the patient still want to carry on down that path?

To be clear, it does say

“discuss with the person their wishes”.

That includes whether they would want the doctor to call an ambulance if things got complicated, or whether they would want to be left—so the doctor would discuss with the patient their wishes in that situation. Fortunately, it does not happen very often.

Yes, fortunately not. I am not convinced that the clause covers it. I will go back to that, but I have just read it because the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley raised it and I support his amendment, and somebody else raised it earlier.

I am not convinced that the complications are covered, because the clause does not set it out. In the usual sense, complications are side effects from medications. We have research and literature given to us and we understand the potential side effects. In this instance, we do not have a yardstick. I do not know whether the Minister can speak about the Government’s intentions—it would be helpful to have an impact assessment—and whether any research has been done in this area.

I am not convinced that clause 9(2)(c) actually covers this point, and I think the amendment would make the Bill much stronger. Ultimately, these drugs have not been tested—and for a very good reason, because they lead to death. We are in unchartered territory. When we are doing things that we have not done before, we cannot just pick and choose what we apply an analogy to. We need to be careful. We really need to consider the options to make this clause in particular much stronger.

I completely understand what my hon. Friend is saying about what may need to happen in respect of medical intervention, but I gently point out that the amendment would not cover that. It does not spell out in any way, shape or form what a medical intervention would look like. It says that there needs to be a random discussion, but it does not lay out any sense of the medical intervention. I do not see how the amendment will do what my hon. Friend is looking for.

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. As drafted, the Bill does not include effects. All it says is “complications”. It does not include the potential effects of the drugs that will be used. That is how the amendment would strengthen the Bill.

We might appear to be dancing on a pinhead, but this goes to the heart of the question about what on earth we do in the event of complications. As the hon. Member for Spen Valley says, the Bill as drafted says that discussions should be had about wishes in the event of complications. That might simply be, “Do you want us to call somebody? Do you want us to try to make you more comfortable?” The amendment would require a discussion of escalation—what further medical interventions might be appropriate in the event of complications arising. There is a huge question for us, which we have not yet had answered, about what on earth should be the range of options for a doctor. The importance of the amendment is to specify that there may be further medical interventions in the event of complications. Does the hon. Lady agree that that is the value of it?

I completely agree with the hon. Member. He said it much better than I did in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich, so I thank him for that.

I will be brief, because I think we have discussed this enough. I totally agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury. Patients need to be informed about the procedure—there is no argument about that—and I approve of the first three amendments in this group.

Let me say a bit about data. I met the pharmacist from Australia who is in charge of assisted dying and he had data on 2,500 assisted dying patients. The data is clear: all the patients died—no one survived. Almost everyone immediately goes to sleep, which can be a problem, because if they do not take all the medicine, it causes a slight difficulty that I will explain in a minute. Fifty per cent died within 30 minutes, 70% within an hour and 95% within two hours. One patient survived for 21 hours because she had not taken the full dose because she fell asleep; that is a potential problem. All these things should be described, and are routinely described to patients in Australia.

The first thing, then, is that we have plenty of data. The second thing I want to say is that we are dealing with the end of life. I have sat with patients as they have died; I have sometimes seen people being a little bit sick. We know how to cope with that. We do not need to specify how we cope with someone who is dying, because we have done it many, many times. I do not think amendment 306 will add anything to the Bill because it is part of what doctors do normally.

I am genuinely trying to understand and would like my hon. Friend to clarify. He says that doctors generally do this anyway, but the difference is that, in this instance, somebody has chosen to die. Generally, when doctors do anything they are trying to save patients, are they not? The general rule of thumb is that a doctor saves lives. In this instance, they are not doing that because the patient wants death.

We are not doing that in situations of terminal care—we are allowing someone to die. We are very experienced in allowing people to die. I have done it for 25 years. It is not a new skill just because we have the assisted dying element. We deal with the situation as it arises.

rose—

I had virtually finished, but I give way.

The hon. Gentleman puts his finger on a key point. The hon. Member for Bradford West is absolutely right: surely the hon. Gentleman acknowledges that there is a difference between allowing somebody to die and giving them lethal drugs that make them die. I am sure he would acknowledge the practical, if not the moral, distinction between the two. He says he has lots of experience of helping people to die; has he ever had experience of watching somebody die after administering them lethal drugs? No.

No, I have not, because that is currently illegal—this Committee is about changing that—but I have sat with patients who have slowly died. It is not about whether we get an ambulance; we know we do not do that. We are allowing the patient to die, and if something happens that involves having to help them, we just do it. We do not need to specify that in the Bill: it is part of normal medical practice.

I will be brief, as I have already alluded to my support. I put on the record my support for amendment 93. There has not been a lot of debate on it because it is a fairly straightforward proposal.

There has been a lot of discussion. Members on both sides of the Committee have spoken in defence of the medical profession in respect of huge parts of the Bill, although they should not have to. We have of course seen occasional bad practice, as we do in all professions, but we should take a moment to reflect on the dedication, diligence, hard work and expertise of medical professionals in everything they do. This debate has on occasion almost presented this as a 50:50 choice between good doctors and bad doctors. I think we would all agree that although we want to put in the right safeguards, that is not the case at all.

I have made this point a number of times, but I do not want to accept amendments that spell out all the rules and regulations so that every doctor has to go to the nth degree all the time. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud has said eloquently on a number of occasions, it is already in their codes of conduct, working practice, training and everything else. However, on occasion we cannot be satisfied that something is a given. For that reason, particularly in respect of amendments 142, 362 and perhaps 305, if we say that

“the nature of the substance that might be provided to assist the person to end their own life (including how it will bring about death)”

must be discussed, it is not a huge leap to say that we should also spell out how it may be administered and the possible risks and complications that come with that. As I have said, I do not think it will create any unintended consequences. I do not think it puts the full rulebook on the face of the Bill. If we are stipulating how it will bring about the death, it is not a huge leap to also talk about the other side effects.

Cutting through some of the stories, and everything else we have heard this afternoon, we should be considering what the amendments seek to do—what they say on the tin, as it were. We should be asking doctors to have the conversations, although I am absolutely sure that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud said, those conversations will happen naturally anyway. I do not think there is anything harmful in the particular amendments, as we have discussed today.

Finally, on amendment 306, I understand the points that my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West and the hon. Member for East Wiltshire made. To be totally honest, I fail to see how the amendment satisfies the arguments they were trying to make, as powerful as those arguments are. It does not solve the issue they are looking to solve; I do not think it answers any of those questions. For that reason, I will not support amendment 306, but I am minded to support the other amendments in the group.

Amendment 93 relates to the discussion during the assessment that the co-ordinating doctor and the independent doctor are required to have with the person. The amendment would require that each of those doctors, during their assessment, must discuss the nature of the substance that “is to be provided” to the patient to end their life, rather than the substance that “might be provided”.

On amendment 305, clinicians in all areas are expected to work with patients to make decisions about their care and treatment as part of a shared decision-making process, including by discussing the risks, benefits and possible consequences of different options. The Committee may wish to note that the GMC’s “Good medical practice” states that when discussing a patient’s condition doctors must discuss with patients

“the potential benefits, risks of harm, uncertainties about, and likelihood of success for each option.”

That is the very point I am struggling with. Generally speaking, the GMC guidelines are absolutely right, and doctors are saving lives and making the person better. In this instance, somebody might have complications and they might vomit, for example—that happens a lot because people are unconscious. What does the clinician then do? Do they proceed with an assisted death, or do they get the person into A&E? I am trying to understand the answer to that question, and I hope the Minister can respond.

My hon. Friend will know that the Bill states that the assessing doctor must discuss with the individual

“their wishes in the event of complications”,

which could include medical interventions. What is also absolutely clear is that the Bill precludes the doctor from making any intervention, vis-à-vis the patient, that may lead to the patient’s death. The Bill is based on self-administration, not on administration by the doctor. By definition, the actions that can be taken by the doctor are things like calling an ambulance; they would not be things like escalating the substance that has been used in order to bring about the death of the patient. I hope that is clear to my hon. Friend.

I thank the Minister for that explanation. What happens if the patient sets out in advance that they want no interventions? What if they have said, under the clause as the Minister laid out, “In the event of complications, if I am vomiting and in distress, I want no interventions”, but when that happens the pain and distress are at a different level and they are begging the doctor to help them? What does the doctor do in that instance?

The key point, and what takes primacy above all else, is the professional judgment of the doctor. I commend the words of my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich about every doctor in the profession; he reinforced the point about the immense skill, professionalism and judgment of clinicians and medical professionals across the length and breadth of our country. Clearly, in a crisis situation such as the one the hon. Lady described, the professional judgment of the doctor would kick in and they would take whatever action is necessary. If a patient stipulated what they wanted to happen in the event of complications and something like the hon. Lady just described were to happen, I do not think the doctor would accept those conditions.

3.15pm

I thank the Minister for that clarity. Does he think it would be worth while setting that out in more detail, in order to protect doctors and make it really clear what would happen in such a situation? This would be an unprecedented, unique and very new process, and I can imagine substantial moral injury to doctors from being put in that predicament if we are not very clear about what they are required to do and what they are required not to do.

The basic position of the Department of Health and Social Care and, by extension, the Government is that we rely on and trust our medical professionals to make judgments and do the right thing. They take the Hippocratic oath, so they are going to do what is right for the patient in the circumstances of their interaction with that patient. That is set out in guidance and in the corpus of law that we already have. There is a risk of destabilising the system by introducing measures that may well cause confusion and muddy the waters when the waters do not need to be muddied.

I am afraid that the waters are pretty muddied by the Bill. It states a direct contradiction of the Hippocratic oath, which requires doctors to save people’s lives and do nothing to bring about their death—including giving them lethal drugs. It is right there in the Hippocratic oath. There is obviously a real challenge if somebody has had assisted death drugs and then exhibits complications—if they are not dying quickly, for example, or are showing distress. Normally, the obligation on a doctor would be to relieve their symptoms and try to bring them back to life. Is the Minister saying that is what they should do—and if not, what should they do?

There is a debate to be had about the Bill’s effect on support for a patient. I am not here as a member of the Government to comment on the rights and wrongs of that, but those who support the Bill would argue that a doctor participating in and facilitating assisted dying is actually helping the patient and is, therefore, absolutely aligned with the Hippocratic oath, which is to do no harm. That is in the eye of the beholder, as I am sure the hon. Member would agree, and it is not my job to get into the whys and wherefores of the philosophy that underpins the Bill.

Order. If we could come back to the amendments, that would be helpful.

I will do so with huge pleasure—thank you, Ms McVey—but I would be more than happy to take up that discussion with the hon. Member for East Wiltshire at another time.

On amendment 142, it is worth noting that options for the method of administration of the substance may change if a patient’s condition alters as they progress through the process set out in the Bill.

Amendment 362 would add to the list of matters that must be discussed at the first and second assessments by the co-ordinating and independent doctors. It would require the assessing doctor to include an explanation and discussion of not only how the approved substance will bring about death, as set out in the Bill as drafted, but the risk and nature of any possible complications, including pain. The Committee may wish to note that the GMC’s “Good medical practice” already states that doctors must discuss with a patient

“the potential benefits, risks of harm, uncertainties about, and likelihood of success for each option”

when discussing their condition.

As it stands, the Bill specifies that the assessing doctor must discuss the individual’s

“wishes in the event of complications”,

which could include medical interventions. However, amendment 306 would go further and specify that medical intervention must be discussed.

I hope those observations were helpful to the Committee.

I will start with amendment 93 tabled by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley. He made a really important point about the language in the clause, and I am very happy to support the amendment.

It is quite clear that, across the Committee, there is no disagreement that a terminally ill person requesting assistance to shorten their death should be given all the information necessary to help them make the clear, informed and settled decision the Bill requires. That should include an explanation of the drugs that are likely to be used—bearing in mind that there may be more than one option available to the person when the time comes, depending on their medical circumstances—and how they would be administered. As such, I am minded to support amendment 142, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe. Amendments 142 and 93 both provide helpful clarity for the Bill.

There are good intentions behind amendments 305, 306 and 362, but I am confident that they are already covered by clause 9(2)(b)(iv) and clause 9(2)(c). I do, however, take on board the point made by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley about the concept of side effects. Going forward, it might be helpful to look at that use of language. To conclude, I am minded to support amendments 93 and 142.

You will be delighted to learn that I have nothing further to add to this debate, Ms McVey.

Amendment 93 agreed to.

Amendment proposed: 305, in clause 9, page 6, line 3, after “about death” insert

“and any other effects in addition to death.”—(Danny Kruger.)

This amendment would require the assessing doctor to explain effects the provided substance would have in addition to death.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 44

Amendment made: 142, in clause 9, page 6, line 3, after “death” insert

“and how it will be administered”.—(Juliet Campbell.)

This amendment requires the assessing doctor to explain and discuss with the person how the substance that might be provided to assist the person to end their own life will be administered.

Amendment proposed: 362, in clause 9, page 6, line 3, after “death” insert

“and the risk and nature of possible complications including pain”.—(Danny Kruger.)

This requires the doctor to explain the risk of possible complications to the person.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 45

I beg to move amendment 307, in clause 9, page 6, line 18, leave out from beginning to “advise” and insert

“unless the assessing doctor has concluded in good faith, that this would not be in the person’s best interests.”

This amendment would require the assessing doctor to inform the person’s next of kin that the person wishes to seek assistance to end their own life unless it is not in the person’s best interests.

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 308, in clause 9, page 6, line 20, at end insert—

“(g) If that doctor considers that it is not in the person’s best interests under paragraph (f), this decision and the doctor’s reasoning must be documented.”

This amendment is consequential to Amendment 307 and would require a decision that it is not in the person’s best interests to inform their next of kin to be documented with its reasoning.

Amendments 307 and 308 concern the question of who should be informed when an application has been made or when an assisted death has been approved, and at what stage it is appropriate for family members or next of kin to be informed. During the debate on clause 8, we discussed whether a patient should be asked to state whether they have informed their family.

I think it is appropriate to have a stronger requirement for doctors to notify a patient’s next of kin. Amendment 307 would remove the phrase

“in so far as the assessing doctor considers it appropriate,”

leaving that they should

“advise the person to consider discussing the request with their next of kin”.

Amendment 308 is either supplementary to amendment 307 or could work in isolation, because it states:

“If that doctor considers that it is not in the person’s best interests under paragraph (f), this decision and the doctor’s reasoning must be documented.”

These are important amendments because they communicate the truth that it is not just the patient who is affected by an assisted death; I suggest that others are affected. Conversely, behind that apparently autonomous individual patient, who might think they are acting with absolute autonomy and without reference to others, there may somebody who is exercising undue influence on them.

To me, these amendments speak to the essential tension at the heart of the Bill: whether we are talking about isolated individuals or recognising the reality that no man or woman is an island. We are all connected and we all have obligations, whether as a society to the people who will be involved in the administration of the procedure or, more directly and obviously, to family members or to the patient themselves, to be sure they are not subject to undue influence. There are many ways to try to identify undue influence, but one important one that would be addressed by this amendment is the opportunity to involve a person’s wider family in the discussions leading up to their assisted death.

3.30pm

I want to read out some of the short testimonies we have received—again, I do not want people who have submitted evidence to feel that their efforts have been in vain and that it has gone into a black hole. Some of us, at least, have digested it, and I want to repeat some of it for the benefit of the Committee. Let me quote Anna Bossong:

“I was at home late one evening in London when I received an unexpected call from a nurse at my mother’s nursing home in Australia. She said to me “I am calling from your mother’s room. All her friends are around her bed and are singing as they see her off. She has a morphine pump in her hand and I am helping her to pump it.

It is an understatement to say that I was shocked as this had come totally out of the blue.”

She goes on to explain the efforts she made, and the enormous trauma she suffered, as a consequence of this event happening without her prior knowledge.

Alicia Duncan also gave evidence to us:

“My mother informed us of her scheduled MAiD”—

that is a reference to the Canadian medical assistance in dying system—

“less than 48 hours before her initial appointment, leaving my sister and me scrambling to respond. Over the next five days, we used every legal tool available, including obtaining a warrant under the Mental Health Act, to try to keep her alive through all legal means. She was admitted to a psychiatric unit but released after 48 hours and died without our knowledge just four hours later. Both of us have been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result of these events.”

I am afraid to say that there are a number of terrible examples of this happening in jurisdictions where assisted dying is legal, and such things would be possible in our country too. I draw the Committee’s attention to the points made by the hon. Member for York Central, who tabled this amendment, about a constituent whose parent had an assisted death without her knowledge and about the trauma she suffered because she felt that it was the wrong thing to do and that the medical team should have had more knowledge of the circumstances surrounding her parent’s life.

We had evidence from the British Association of Social Workers, who wrote in after the oral sessions, conveying significant concerns about the Bill and stressing the absolute imperative of having proper family input at the right stage of the process. Indeed, the point seems to be half-recognised in the Bill, because clause 9 uses the phrase:

“in so far as the assessing doctor considers it appropriate”.

Again, doctors are being given that discretion not to proceed and to make sure that families are informed.

Requiring the doctor, when considering a patient’s request for assistance to end their life, to decide whether it is appropriate to advise them to discuss it with their next of kin introduces several problems. It places a subjective burden on the doctor. The term “appropriate” is very vague. Does it hinge on the patient’s family dynamics, their emotional state or indeed the doctor’s own biases?

The amendment that the hon. Member is supporting speaks of a doctor having to consider what is

“in the person’s best interests”,

which is wholly subjective. Does he not agree that the same difficulties he identifies with the current drafting are extrapolated greatly by the amendment?

I am afraid there is a huge degree of subjectivity throughout the Bill, and we are putting an enormous obligation on doctors to use their best judgment. However, I think it is right to stipulate more clearly that it is appropriate, in general, to inform patients’ families. Leaving the vague term “appropriate” essentially implies that it is either/or—that it is a 50:50 choice whether they do so. So it is important to specify that the expectation is that they should do so. Of course, there will be circumstances in which that would not be the right thing to do, but as the amendments make clear, they should explain that clearly if they are not going to do so.

A doctor might hesitate to suggest a discussion with family if they suspect that there are strained relationships within it. My concern is that, without clear guidance, that judgment could be inconsistent or legally challenged. The doctor might know the next of kin and believe that they would try to stop the patient from ending their life. We have heard quite often the concern about the family being some sort of coercive force, trying to prevent people from fulfilling their autonomous choice to end their life, and that we should put in place barriers to stop families trying to dissuade their loved one from assisted suicide. We heard that repeatedly, particularly from the Australian witnesses.

My concern—this goes specifically to certain communities within our country—is that doctors from individualistic cultures, which we have in western Europe and North America, would prioritise personal autonomy. They would deem it inappropriate to suggest family involvement, viewing that as an intrusion on the patient’s rights. We need to state clearly that that is not the expectation and that the expectation is that they should consider involving the family in the discussion.

My concern is also about an exaggerated respect for medical confidentiality. As the Committee knows, my belief is that this is not a healthcare treatment at all, but if it is to be regarded as such, we should not assume that medical confidentiality applies in an absolute sense. There are specific differences between this so-called medical treatment and others, which do justify an override of the assumption of total medical confidentiality. It is therefore appropriate, as in certain other medical procedures, that family members should be involved.

I want to cite the written evidence from Dr Rosemarie Anthony-Pillai, who pointed out that clause 9

“lays bare the reality that in trying to, rightly, diminish any accusation of coercion or family disagreement, this Bill will lead many to a lonely death.”

She also said:

“Families/loved ones finding out only after the event how the person died will have its own bereavement issues that this Bill in no way seeks to consider.”

I also cite the written evidence we had from AtaLoss, which is a UK charity dedicated to ensuring that bereaved people can access support. It said that discovering the decision that somebody has had help to take their own life without prior warning

“can replicate the distress often associated with sudden or suicide-related deaths, thereby intensifying bereavement trauma and potential suicide contagion.”

That is a very significant threat. We will not rehash the argument about whether suicide increases in countries with assisted suicide, but my strong view, from the evidence, is that it does.

In terms of the patient’s safety, if the process is kept secret even from those who know the patient well, the assessing doctors and the panel will be asking very difficult questions about the patient’s feelings and circumstances partly blindfolded. If a patient is in a controlling relationship, they and the person abusing them are not going to volunteer to the doctor or the panel that there is any pressure going on—indeed, the patient may not even understand it to be pressure. It is very common for an abusive partner to try to isolate the victim from their close friends and family. The hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Dr Huq) wrote recently about how this has come up in her constituency. The ex-husband of her constituent’s sister reappeared on the scene, charmed and isolated this woman, and got her to change her will in his favour. That is a technique of coercive control. Some level of required notification to the wider family would make it much harder for a controlling partner to push someone through this process without it being exposed.

It was made clear earlier today that the Bill’s supporters do not want any hard-edged reasons that count as bad reasons to die to be stated in the Bill—they do not want it asked at all why someone wants to have an assisted death. As it stands, the doctors and the panel would have to approve the death as long as it was the patient’s clear, settled and informed wish, but involvement of those who know the patient well might demonstrate that it was not clear, settled or informed. They may have regularly gone through patches of feeling unloved and unsupported all their life, and that could change. That is information that only the wider family would know.

To conclude, there is real suffering hereto—as I have said, nobody exists in a vacuum. I want to reference the opinion of Judge Elósegui in the European Court of Human Rights. Her opinion was a partial dissent in the Mortier case, which has been discussed before. She said:

“it should be underlined that it cannot be said in an exhaustive way that the principle of autonomy always and at all costs has primacy over the other three principles of bioethics. In particular, we must take into account the consequences of our actions on the rest of the family unit and on our circle of friends.”

That is highly relevant. If we see cases where somebody dies by assisted suicide, and the first thing their child or parent knows about it is they are told to come and collect the body, that will be a scandal. That has happened in other countries, and the Mortier case is a case in point.

I mentioned other cases in which it is obligatory to consult and inform family members. At the moment, that is what happens at the Court of Protection with much less serious applications. Practice directive 9B requires doctors to notify

“at least three persons who are likely to have an interest in being notified”.

That is in the case of organ donation and other procedures. Families are required to be notified, and an indicative list is given, which is supposed to be worked through in order—spouses, people who live with as a spouse, parents, children and so on. The authorities are to jump along through that list, again with some discretion given to them.

To end, on the standard guidance referred to in judgments on that procedure, the judgement of Senior Judge Lush in the Court of Human Rights included the observation that the decision not to notify someone who would otherwise be entitled to be notified is not something that just affects the applicant. It is not just about their interests; there is a wider concern for the whole of society and indeed the family. That is why I support the amendment.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for York Central for tabling the amendment. The crucial word that the hon. Member for East Wiltshire said in all that was “should”. It is really important that people are strongly encouraged to discuss this with their families. Clause 9(2)(f) states that

“in so far as the assessing doctor considers it appropriate, advise the person to consider discussing the request with their next of kin and other persons they are close to.”

I totally support all that the hon. Member said: the family should always be involved in every decision. However, in the way we practice medicine in this country, if a patient has capacity—if they are not under a section under the Mental Health Act, for example, and can show that they have capacity—they can make decisions about their own healthcare. That involves whether they tell their family.

I agree that not to tell the family is not the best thing and not something I would say that the patient should do, but that is in their remit. It is important because, if we change that, we get rid of all the basis and the foundation of medical care and consent in this country. I agree wholeheartedly with the hon. Member, and I am a strong supporter of the family—I also think that in almost every situation the family will be involved—but the patient does not have to tell the family. That must remain part of their decision.

I am torn by this amendment. I absolutely accept that it is the right, the autonomy, of an individual to make the decisions and to have confidentiality when making those decisions, but I will touch on a few things that I have said previously.

First, briefly, I hear what the hon. Member for East Wiltshire said about coercion. Secondly, however, there are two other aspects. Let me go back to something I have talked long and hard about, which is learning disability. One amendment has been accepted and I hope more are to come, but given what my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud said, in that scenario, someone might have to be helped by the doctor to make the decision, because of their level of capacity. When I have made the argument throughout our debates, that has never ever been doubted. The person who has been helped to make that decision may have decided, because they are a burden on their elderly parents, that they will not inform them. Again, that was the rationale of where I got to on Second Reading, frankly.

I see people with elderly parents, often now in their 70s or 80s, who have cared for that person throughout their life. As the Bill and the Mental Capacity Act are laid out, that person could go to the doctor to say, “I do not want my parents to know. I hear what you say, doctor, but under this provision of the Act”—clause 9 of the Bill—“I am not going to tell them.” Under the Mental Capacity Act, if the doctor had any queries about the capacity of that person to make those decisions, that doctor would have to assist them in making them. Let us be clear that that is what the Mental Capacity Act 2005 provides for, and that is what the code of practice says.

3.45pm

I am sorry to keep talking about myself, but as I have said previously in these debates, during covid I was the carer for my whole household. My wife was having chemo and both my children were off school. One of my children needed full-time care, and no carers were allowed in the house. In that period, I really saw the power dynamic. I know exactly when it was: on the evening of Maundy Thursday, my wife had an enormous epileptic seizure during her chemotherapy treatment. I remember being on the phone to the cancer nurse who was saying, “Put her in an ambulance.” I said, “I’m not putting her in an ambulance because of covid.” I am sorry to be so graphic, folks, but that evening I had my wife in one bed covered in vomit and my daughter in one bed lying in her own faeces. The next morning, my wife would have done anything to remove me from that situation, quite frankly.

We were so lucky: a few months later, my wife’s chemo was finished and she was cancer free. We are out of that pandemic, thank goodness, but there are people out there who have had a loved one by their side for 30, 40, 50 or 60 years and do not want to see them go through that pain anymore. They will not take the decision out of fear; those who have six months left do not know what their end will be, and whether it will be painful or not. They just do not want the person who has stood by them all those years to have to be their carer. That is the power dynamic.

On balance, because I believe in autonomy, I may well not support the amendments, but these are the issues that I have wrestled with, because as the Bill stands, someone could simply go to a doctor, the doctor could say, “Have you told your loved one—your partner, your husband, your wife?” and they could say, “No, I’m not going to, because I do not want them to suffer anymore, caring for me in these circumstances.”

As ever, the hon. Gentleman speaks very powerfully. Does he acknowledge that under the amendments, and under the Bill, it would be possible for a patient to proceed without informing their wider family, if they and the doctor conclude that it is not appropriate or necessary? The value of the amendments is that they would require a conversation to be had about why that is not happening. Does the hon. Gentleman not recognise that such a conversation would be appropriate?

That is what I have wrestled with. That conversation will happen, and at the end of it, I accept that the autonomy is with the individual, who may well make a decision that they believe is for the best but with which their loved one does not necessarily agree. I think there are examples from overseas of that having happened.

I agree about the primacy of autonomy, but does the hon. Gentleman agree that, given the status quo and the many stories that we have heard about individuals who took their lives but kept it secret from their families, whether by going to Switzerland or by doing it in a horrible way in lonely circumstances, a regulated atmosphere would makes it more likely that people will talk to their family about what their death will be like and, as we have learned from overseas, make arrangements for their family to be around them, or at least to say goodbye, as they move into that process? At the moment, because this area is unregulated, way more people do it in secret than need to.

I am not entirely persuaded. I think there is currently a mixture of cases, and there will potentially be a mixture of cases in future. I hear what the right hon. Member says, but my primary concern is about the way things are. As I say, I am minded not to support the amendments on balance, but I am concerned that we could end up hearing stories about someone’s loved one of 50 years, or their child with a learning disability, having had an assisted death—and the first they knew about it was when it was too late.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship this afternoon, Ms McVey.

I feel that we are dancing on the head of a pin, but I oppose the amendment. Members across the debate have recognised that, as Dr Sarah Cox from the Association for Palliative Medicine said, it is always for the patient to decide. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley pointed out, both the original clause and the amendment rightly retain that decision with the patient. They also retain the discretion of the doctor, whether that is on an appropriate test or a best interests test.

I note that in its submission the Royal College of Physicians advocated the removal of the clause, saying that it goes beyond current practice. I support the clause on balance, because of the importance of these conversations and so on, but the physicians who are likely to carry out the conversations think that it is inappropriate to specify these conversations in primary legislation.

There are two phrases in the amendment that I think are entirely inappropriate. First, there is “concluded in good faith”. I am sure it is not the intent of the author and mover of the amendment, but it suggests that in other instances people might be acting other than in good faith. I commend the words from my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich. We have to start from the point that doctors are operating in good faith. It is dangerous to set up a good faith test, as opposed to an “other faith” test, in primary legislation.

Secondly, I am certainly not trying to reopen the long debates we had about the Mental Capacity Act, but Members will recall that in those debates we were very clear that the “best interests” test should not and does not apply. Introducing language about best interests the first time in the Bill is very dangerous, and totally against the spirit and principle of what we have debated so far. For those reasons, I am against both amendments.

My hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central has made many of the points that I planned to, so I will be brief. The primacy of patient autonomy when it comes to familial relationships is a principle that should not be interfered with in the medical sphere, which this is—we can call it treatment or something else, but it is undoubtedly a relationship between a doctor and a person.

I agree with my hon. Friend on the term “good faith”. I do not doubt the motives, but it put forwards the proposition that a doctor would act in bad faith and not tell a family member. It is a rather bizarre drafting, and wholly unhelpful for the intent for which it was put forward.

The most alarming is the second part and the issue of “best interests”. I will not labour the point that my hon. Friend has made, but what is a doctor to do? A doctor is not a social worker. A doctor is not a family support worker. What questions are they to ask? If someone says, “Oh, I don’t really want to tell my next of kin, who is my sister. We fell out last year because of tit for tat,” is the doctor going to make a value judgment as to whether that argument is profound enough to stop the notification?

The point that the hon. Member makes is, I think, exactly the case—raising this conversation and talking about it is probably not in anyone’s best interests in the first instance. I think about my own situation. If I were to find myself terminally ill and falling within the scope of this law, and my mum had passed away, then my dad, who I have not spoken to in over a decade, with whom I have a very difficult and estranged relationship, would have to be notified and we would have to have a conversation about it. On my deathbed, the last thing I want to be thinking about is some childhood trauma being brought back before me in the confines of that terminal illness. Does the hon. Member agree that, while the intention might be good, the consequences could be damaging to the patient and their best interests?

I agree. I think in some of these debates—I am probably guilty of this as well—we forget the context in which we are operating: someone is dying, imminently. Therefore, how we approach these conversations, these assessments and this process must take that into account.

The hon. Gentleman accurately points out that doctors are not social workers or psychiatrists, and we are asking them to make a difficult judgment, in consultation with the patient, about whether they should engage wider family in the discussion. That goes to the broader point: we are imposing a huge obligation on doctors to make very complicated decisions about capacity, coercion and the psychosocial circumstances of the patient. The value of this amendment’s saying, “I think we should involve the family if it is safe to do so”—it might very well not be in certain circumstances—is surely to assist them in having the wider conversation that is necessary.

As we heard in evidence from the chief medical officer, doctors deal with capacity issues on a day-to-day basis; I am not sure they necessarily need assistance from family members in that regard. However, I appreciate the point—I was going to come to that—

Will my hon. Friend give way on that point?

I am going to make some progress, because I am not sure that point is crucial to the debate about this amendment; I am sure my hon. Friend will grab me afterwards. I did not mean to mischaracterise the evidence on that point.

I accept that there is a tension here. No man is an island, as the hon. Member for East Wiltshire notes, and of course this process may cause upset to others. Equally, the input of third parties to the assessment of all the issues of eligibility is worth while, but it has to be dealt with in a proportionate way. When we debate clause 12—hopefully shortly—perhaps we can discuss that, and I hope to speak to that point.

However, this amendment is trying to crack that delicate nut with a huge hammer. It fundamentally changes the relationship between doctor and patient, and puts the doctor in a position where they do not have the skills or expertise to make that best interest decision. The amendment therefore fails, and that is why I will vote against it.

I am concerned that maybe I am misunderstanding the debate. For clarity, right now clause 9 says that

“in so far as the assessing doctor considers it appropriate,”

they should

“advise the person to consider discussing the request with their next of kin and other persons they are close to.”

It will read very similarly if the amendment is agreed to. Instead, it will say,

“unless the assessing doctor has concluded in good faith, that this would not be in the person’s best interests, advise the person to consider discussing the request with their next of kin and other persons they are close to”.

That is a very subtle change—it is just a little more encouragement to consider contacting the family. No one here is telling the doctor that they must tell the patient to contact the family; it is just a little bit of strengthening to encourage that. I invite the hon. Gentleman to confirm if I have misinterpreted, but that is my understanding of the clause.

I will double check whether this is right, but the explanatory statement suggests that that is not the case. It says:

“This amendment would require the assessing doctor to inform the person’s next of kin that the person wishes to seek assistance to end their own life unless it is not in the person’s best interests.”

That is not what it says.

Even if that is not what it says, and even if the explanatory statement is wrong, it is not appropriate for doctors to advise patients what they should do with their family. Yes, they should consider it, but that is what this clause does. I will be voting against this amendment.

The amendments relate to whether the assessing doctor advises the person seeking assistance to end their own life to discuss that with their next of kin and other persons they are close to. Amendment 307 would change the test that the assessing doctor must apply before advising a person to consider doing so. The current test, as set out in clause 9(2)(f), is that

“in so far as the assessing doctor considers it appropriate,”

they must

“advise the person to consider discussing the request with their next of kin and other persons they are close to.”

The effect of amendment 307 is that the assessing doctor must advise the person to consider discussing their request with their next of kin and other persons they are close to, unless the assessing doctor has concluded in good faith that it would not be in the person’s best interests to do so. It should be noted that the amendment as drafted would not require the assessing doctor to inform the person’s next of kin, although there is some confusion, as that appears to be what is suggested by the explanatory statement.

Amendment 308 is consequential to amendment 307 and requires that

“If that doctor considers that it is not in the person’s best interests under paragraph (f), this decision and the doctor’s reasoning must be documented.”

I hope those observations were helpful.

4.00pm

I have nothing to add, other than that I will not be supporting amendments 307 and 308. I associate myself with the comments made by my hon. Friends the Members for Rother Valley, for Stroud and for Sunderland Central.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 423, in clause 9, page 6, line 20, at end insert—

“(2A) To inform their assessment, the assessing doctor must—

(a) consider whether they should consult a health professional or social care professional with qualifications in, or experience of, a matter relevant to the person being assessed;

(b) consult such a professional if they consider that there is a need to do so.

(2B) Where an assessing doctor consults a professional under subsection (2A)(b), the assessing doctor must give a written record of the consultation to the other assessing doctor.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)

Amendment 415, in clause 9, page 6, line 20, at end insert—

“(2A) When making an assessment under subsection (2), the assessing doctor must first ensure the provision of adjustments for language and literacy barriers, including the use of interpreters.”—(Jack Abbott.)

Amendment 6, in clause 9, page 6, line 27, leave out “may” and insert “must”.—(Sarah Olney.)

This amendment would require the assessing doctor to refer the person being assessed for a mental capacity assessment if the assessing doctor had doubt as to the person’s capacity.

Amendment 370, in clause 9, page 6, line 29, leave out

“registered in the specialism of psychiatry”

and insert

“a practising psychiatrist registered in one of the psychiatry specialisms”.

This is a drafting change.

Amendment 202, in clause 9, page 6, line 31, leave out “capability” and insert “capacity”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment corrects a typographical error.

Clause 9, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10

Another independent doctor: second opinion

Amendments made: 203, in clause 10, page 6, line 42, at end insert—

“(A1) This section applies where the independent doctor has—

(a) carried out the second assessment, and

(b) made a report stating that they are not satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in section 8(2)(a) to (e).”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 421.

Amendment 204, in clause 10, page 6, line 43, leave out from beginning to second “the” in line 44.—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 203.

Amendment proposed: 458, in clause 10, page 6, line 45, after “declaration” insert “and if there has been a material change of circumstances,”.—(Sarah Olney.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 46

Question accordingly negatived.

Amendment made: 459, in clause 10, page 7, line 3, at end insert—

“(2A) “(a) Where a referral is made to a registered medical practitioner under subsection (1), the coordinating doctor must provide that new registered medical practitioner with the report by the independent doctor setting out their reasons for refusal.

(b) If the new registered medical practitioner reaches a different conclusion from the original independent doctor, they must produce a report setting out why they disagree.

(c) Those two reports must be made available to any subsequent decision maker under this Act and to the Commissioner.”—(Sarah Olney.)

I beg to move amendment 205, in clause 10, page 7, line 11, at end insert

“; but this is subject to subsection (4).

(4) Where—

(a) a referral is made under subsection (1) to a practitioner,

(b) the practitioner dies or through illness is unable or unwilling to act as the independent doctor, and

a further referral may be made under subsection (1).”.

This amendment provides that a further referral may be made under this clause where a practitioner dies or is unable or unwilling to act as the independent doctor due to illness.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

I will speak briefly to this small amendment, which provides that a further referral be made under clause 10 when a practitioner dies or is unable or unwilling to act as the independent doctor due to illness. In the very unlikely circumstances that the doctor who has agreed to give a second opinion dies or—because of illness or whatever reason—is unable to continue before making a report into the case, it would be right to seek a second opinion elsewhere. I hope the Committee will support my amendment 205.

This is one of the amendments on which the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to ensure that the Bill is legally robust and workable. As the Bill is currently drafted, in clause 11 there is provision to replace a registered medical practitioner acting as the co-ordinating doctor if they become ill or die. However, there is no similar provision to replace a registered medical practitioner acting as the independent doctor should they be unable to complete their role.

Amendment 205 makes provision under clause 10 that a further referral may be made by the co-ordinating doctor to another independent doctor if the second independent doctor becomes unable or unwilling to continue to make a report of their assessment due to their death or illness, provided that the second independent doctor has not prepared a report. It would thereby ensure internal consistency in the Bill in relation to this matter.

I reiterate the concern I raised when speaking to my amendments this morning: as far as I can see, seeking the second opinion of a second independent doctor allows the person seeking assisted suicide to have a second bite at the cherry if their first independent doctor has not granted permission. I do not think anyone has an objection to going to a second independent doctor if the first independent doctor has been unable, through either death or illness, to complete the task; nor is there any objection if there has been a material change of circumstances, which my amendment 458 sought to add.

However, the possibility of seeking the view of another doctor simply because the first one did not give the desired answer is a troubling one. There is no objection to patients seeking a second, third or even fourth opinion in medicine when it is about what different treatment pathways might be available, but there is a crucial difference between seeking different appropriate treatment options and what is being proposed in the Bill. In the Bill, the function of the two doctors is not primarily diagnostic or advisory; it is a safeguarding role.

The doctors will have been entrusted by Parliament to make sure that the criteria for assisted dying are met. Their determination makes the difference between a lawful act and the commission of an act that, as per clause 24, Parliament would still regard as sufficiently serious to be a crime. Their role is therefore that of a decision maker, and in no other setting can someone go to a different decision maker if they do not like the answer given by the first. Even in appeals before our courts, an appellate judge would not interfere with a decision simply because they would have reached a different conclusion; the appellate judge must consider that the decision was in some way incorrectly reached.

It is also true that in some settings one can ask a decision maker to reconsider a matter, but that is not what is being proposed in clause 10 either. Instead, the clause allows the person to try again with a different referee if the first one did not give the desired answer. It is true that there is an added layer of protection from the High Court or the possibility of a panel, but under the Bill as it currently is there is no procedure whereby the High Court or the panel will hear from the first independent doctor. That is concerning. They would have to go simply on the basis of the second independent doctor, without any awareness of why the two disagreed.

4.15pm

I fear that the point the hon. Lady is making relates to before her amendment 459 was accepted. Does she not agree that by accepting amendment 459, we have guarded against the first independent assessment not being available for subsequent decision makers?

I am not used to my amendments being accepted. The hon. Gentleman is, of course, absolutely right.

Dr Matthew Doré, the palliative medicine consultant and honorary secretary of the Association for Palliative Medicine, said in written evidence:

“Allowing patients to seek multiple opinions undermines procedural integrity. Furthermore, allowing the coordinating doctor to seek multiple opinions even further undermines the selection of doctors willing to provide AD”—

that is, assisted dying. He goes on:

“The lack of a centralised tracking system facilitates ‘doctor shopping’.”

Notwithstanding the fact that amendment 459 has now been accepted, there is still grave concern about the possibility of doctor shopping. We should take steps to avoid it. That is why I am speaking against clause 10 in its entirety.

Under clause 8, the independent doctor has five matters to verify: that the person is terminally ill; that they have capacity; that they have a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life; that they are acting voluntarily and without coercion or pressure; and they are over 18. The last requirement is unlikely ever to be in any form of doubt, so I will focus on the other four. The effect of clause 10 is to allow someone to be assisted to die when one out of three doctors who examined them had concluded that they were not terminally ill, that they lacked capacity, that they did not have a settled wish to die or they were coerced. It therefore raises a real risk that someone not actually eligible for assisted dying would none the less be so assisted. In such matters of life and death, we ought to proceed with great caution.

Doctors can get things wrong, of course. If the first independent doctor did get it completely wrong, I would have no objection to the second independent doctor effectively acting as a form of appeal—or, to borrow the test from the law of medical negligence, if the first independent doctor reached a conclusion not supported by a reasonable body of medical opinion, of course it would be right for that opinion to be disregarded. But that is not what the Bill provides for, which is not an appeal or reconsideration but picking a new referee simply because the first answer was not desired.

I still have misgivings about clause 10 notwithstanding the fact that it has been amended. I urge other Committee members to vote against it. I appreciate your indulgence, Ms McVey.

I rise to speak against clause 10 as it allows doctor shopping in the event that someone does not qualify for assisted dying. “Not happy with the verdict? Just find another doctor!” How many times are we happy for a patient to try again with a different doctor? It is inevitable that at some point the patient will find someone willing to make the statement and put them on their way to an assisted death, even if their eligibility is in doubt.

When I put forward the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire (Dame Harriett Baldwin), which requested residual discretion for doctors, they were challenged by Committee members on the basis that the whole point of having defined criteria was so that they determined whether a patient was eligible. I run the same argument now: if the process is followed to the hilt and the independent doctor refuses to issue the statement, why on earth would we allow another bite—or even multiple further bites—at the cherry? Surely that is to allow abusers a way to push their victims into an assisted death by re-running the process again and again until they find a less attuned doctor.

Imagine the case of an elderly woman who has spent a lifetime under the coercive control of her husband. She is completely done with it all, and sees death as a welcome way to escape this man, who has made her life a misery. The abuse has escalated since she has become ill: because of her ill health, she cannot cook or clean any more, and he hates that. But no one sees. She never wanted the kids to know; she is really good at hiding it. Now, he wants to seek an assisted death, because it is better for them all. She agrees. When asked by a doctor, she is unlikely to say, “My husband is pressuring me into this, and I’m afraid of not doing what he wants,” particularly if she has suffered abuse over many years.

Let us say that the first independent doctor does a really thorough job—the kind of job that we hope all doctors would do. Perhaps the doctor manages to discern that the patient is very much controlled and unduly influenced by her husband. The trouble is that it can be very difficult to find hard evidence of coercive control. According to recent figures, only 3.7% of recorded cases of controlling or coercive behaviour result in a charge, and more than half of cases are dropped because of evidential difficulties. The doctor therefore cannot get the police to intervene; his only lever is the power to reject the application. So that is what he does. But the patient does not give up; she is still absolutely sure that the best thing is an assisted death, and her abuser is still whispering in her ear, telling her she is right.

The second independent doctor does not have the same emotional intelligence as the first, and he does not see what the first doctor saw. He approves the application.

This is a similar point to the one I made before: amendment 459, which we have just passed, means that, in the scenario that the hon. Lady describes, the second independent doctor will have in their possession the first independent doctor’s concerns about coercion. Does she not agree?

I will come to that exact point shortly.

Members of the Committee will recall that I previously tried to get “undue influence” and “encouragement” added to the Bill explicitly to deal with more subtle forms of influence and pressure, as opposed to those that are more obvious to third parties. When objecting to my amendments, the Minister said that they were unnecessary, because “coercion or pressure” already covered them. I hope that the Minister is proven to be correct.

The key point is that those forms of behaviour are not always easily discernible. Dr Mullock told us in oral evidence that

“the kind of undue influence that might occur might be very subtle. More needs to be done to recognise that and the subtle encouragement that might take place, where a relative might frame their support for the person seeking to die in terms of, ‘This will be better for you,’ and, ‘Have you considered this?’ That is not necessarily an example of clear abuse, so when the person seeking to die then consults the doctor, they are not going to characterise what has happened to them as coercion or abuse. More needs to be done to discuss with the person whether or not they have been encouraged by the people around them.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 162, Q204.]

These are the very real consequences of this clause, which undermines the independent doctor safeguard. In written evidence, Mr Michael Vidal hits the nail on the head:

“It seems to negate the purpose of having a second opinion if the second opinion can be ignored and a fresh second opinion obtained.”

I recognise and welcome the fact that amendment 459 has been accepted. It would mean that the second independent doctor would have the benefit of the report of the first independent doctor. However, this is not a failsafe protection and cannot be relied on entirely. First, the report of the first independent doctor is required to be made available to the patient. In a case such as this, would the first doctor want to spell out exactly what led to that conclusion, knowing that it could place the patient in harm’s way if her husband saw it? Also, he is not 100% sure; does he want to make such accusations in writing without hard evidence?

Secondly, even if the report was detailed and available to the second independent doctor, he would still need to make his own assessment, and he might not agree. Or it could be that although he recognises signs of coercion over a long period, he may truly believe that, to the best of his knowledge, the decision made by the patient has not been coerced in that moment.

I am afraid therefore that clause 10 is a loophole that will be exploited by domestic abusers, and it is largely women who will pay the price. For that reason, I cannot support it.

I was not going to speak to this clause, but I feel I must rebut some of the points made, which are clearly incorrect. The hon. Member for Reigate asks how many further opinions there will be; the answer is clearly one, because that is what is set out in the Bill. The safeguards in amendment 459 mean that it is not just the second doctor who will be aware of the first doctor’s concerns; any subsequent decision maker will be.

We are about to discuss significant amendments in clause 12. However, whether there is a panel or the decision remains with a High Court judge, it is inconceivable that, when presented with an initial assessment that the criteria are not met and a subsequent assessment that disagrees with it, that third-tier decision maker will not want to explore the issues in detail. I believe that all Committee members are trying to work together in a spirit of genuinely improving the legislation, but our arguments and discussions need to reflect the amendments that we have accepted. Clause 10, as amended, is significantly improved and strengthened. It continues to provide significant safeguards for the Bill, and I am happy to support it.

Amendment 205 agreed to.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Division 47

Clause 10, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

Replacing the coordinating doctor on death etc

I beg to move amendment 461, in clause 11, page 7, line 15, leave out “or otherwise”.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 310, in clause 11, page 7, line 23, at end insert

“and

(c) to ensure the High Court is notified of the substitution of the coordinating doctor and the reason for the substitution.”

This amendment would include ensuring the High Court is notified of substitutions of the coordinating doctor in the list of matters the Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for.

Amendment 309, in clause 11, page 7, line 23, at end insert—

“(3) Regulations under subsection (1) must include provision to require the reassessment of the patient under section 7.”

This amendment would require a regulations covering the replacement of the coordinating doctor to include a reassessment of the person by the new coordinating doctor.

Clause stand part.

The amendment would remove the phrase “or otherwise” in the clause. All I am proposing is for the wording to be consistent with amendment 205 to clause 10, which has just been agreed. It does not specify “or otherwise”, but simply uses the words,

“the practitioner dies or through illness is unable or unwilling”.

What might “otherwise” incorporate? It indicates that there might be a range of reasons beyond death or illness why the co-ordinating doctor would drop out. In many ways, I am trying to probe what the other reasons might be. If there are no other reasons, and consistent with amendment 205 that we have just agreed, we should drop the phrase “or otherwise”.

4.30pm

I want to speak briefly in support of the hon. Lady’s amendment and also in support of amendment 310, tabled by the hon. Member for York Central. The hon. Member for Richmond Park is absolutely right. I will not rehearse her argument, which is very straightforward. The question is: what other reason could there be to justify a co-ordinating doctor transferring the case? The Committee might reject that amendment, in which case I hope they will accept the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for York Central, which specifies that whatever the reason, particularly if it is other than death or illness, it is important for the High Court or the panel to be notified of the substitution and the reason why.

Maternity leave is one reason and retirement might be another.

Those might be appropriate reasons; I hope that can be specified. The crucial thing is that if there is an unwillingness—not an incapacity but an unwillingness—to proceed, that is of some concern. It is not that they are no longer able to do it—possibly for the reasons that the hon. Lady suggested—but if there is an actual unwillingness to proceed, what is the reason?

On amendment 309, if the first doctor is replaced for whatever reason, surely it is imperative that the new doctor conduct their own assessment, rather than taking the previous doctor’s word for it. A doctor is legally responsible, obliged under all medical regulation and law for their actions, and they cannot rely on a previous assessment. If the first doctor gave up the case because of some kind of incapacity—an illness, or, indeed, their demise—it might be that their own judgment was impaired at the time. I would have thought it was obvious that the new doctor should take responsibility for conducting an assessment and proceeding with full responsibility for the case.

I rise to speak to amendment 309 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central. The amendment proposes that if a doctor changes, there should be a reassessment of the patient. My understanding is that that is in line with current practice: if a doctor is changed, the new doctor has to assess a patient to their own satisfaction because they cannot rely on just looking at notes. It is a sensitive issue where a doctor is required to make objective and subjective assessments, as has been agreed by the Committee to date, in clinical decision making. A clinician does not inherit the risk of another clinician without being satisfied themselves that the conclusion of another clinician aligns with their own.

For instance, the clinician has a responsibility to fulfil their own professional standards and their own duty of care. In the light of the significant impact of the decision, it is important that the doctor can be satisfied as they will need to consent to a patient having capacity and not being coerced. They cannot just take the word of another clinician who has managed the case before them. They themselves need to be satisfied. If a doctor does not do that and something goes wrong, and it comes to light that the patient did not have capacity, the clinician who is the new co-ordinating doctor would carry liability. It does not stand up if they say, “But someone else assessed that the patient had capacity” or, “Someone else said that the patient had not been coerced” if it comes to light later that they have.

This measure would therefore protect the clinician and ensure that the patient understood that a further assessment would need to take place. Having this measure in law would hopefully dissuade doctors from transferring their patients unless absolutely necessary for the continuity of care. It would also dissuade the clinician from taking on a new case if they were aware that continuity of care would be disrupted, due to, for example, a move.

This set of amendments relates to the Secretary of State’s ability to make provision, by regulations, for the replacement of the co-ordinating doctor if they are unable to continue to carry out the functions of the co-ordinating doctor.

I will turn first to amendment 461. Clause 11, as currently drafted, provides the Secretary of State with a discretionary power to make regulations that provide for cases

“where, after a first declaration has been witnessed by the coordinating doctor, that doctor dies or through illness or otherwise is unable or unwilling to continue”.

Amendment 461 removes the “or otherwise”. The effect could be to limit scenarios in which the Secretary of State could make provision via regulations for the replacement of the co-ordinating doctor. The Secretary of State could not provide for replacing the co-ordinating doctor in circumstances other than a doctor’s death or illness, which could include family issues or retirement. That would mean that the person seeking an assisted death may need to begin the process again.

Amendment 310 expands the list of matters that regulations made under subsection (1) may cover. That includes notifying the High Court of substitutions of the co-ordinating doctor, where the co-ordinating doctor is unable to continue to carry out their functions. It should be noted that clause 11 confers only a power, not a duty, on the Secretary of State to make regulations about replacing the co-ordinating doctor. It is not certain that the matter of a substitution of the doctor would be covered in those regulations.

The explanatory statement for amendment 309 suggests that the amendment aims to ensure that a replacement co-ordinating doctor is required to carry out a new assessment of the patient—in other words, to repeat the first assessment made under clause 7. The amendment requires that the regulations that may be made by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) make provision for such cases. Although the Secretary of State has a power to make regulations to provide that the co-ordinating doctor be replaced by another doctor, that is not a requirement. The amendment assumes that there will be a replacement co-ordinating doctor, which is not a specific requirement of the legislation.

I will speak briefly about amendment 461. A co-ordinating doctor is central to the whole process set out in the Bill, from start to finish. If a co-ordinating doctor becomes unavailable, a replacement would need to be found. There may be a number of reasons, not restricted to the doctor’s own death or illness, why that could happen. We have already heard a few examples—it could be retirement, maternity leave or anything going on in that doctor’s personal life. A close family member might fall ill or die, or something else might happen in the doctor’s life that forces them to withdraw. We have talked a lot about patient autonomy, quite rightly, but we need to think about the autonomy of the doctors involved in the process as well. It is therefore important that they have the ability to step away, as set out in clause 11. Additionally, I associate myself with the Minister’s comments about amendments 309 and 310. It feels as though those amendments do not necessarily do what was intended.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 206, in clause 11, page 7, line 24, leave out subsection (3).—(Kim Leadbeater.)

See the statement for Amendment 188.

Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

4.41pm

Sitting suspended.

5.00pm

On resuming—

[Carolyn Harris in the Chair]

Clause 12

Court approval

I beg to move amendment 105, in clause 12, page 8, line 15, leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert—

“(4A) Rules of Court must secure that in relation to an application under subsection (1), the High Court must—

(a) prescribe a procedure which in relation to each application appoints a person (the Official Solicitor in cases in brought in England and Wales) to act as advocate to the Court,

(b) hear from and question, in person—

(i) the person who made the application for the declaration,

(ii) the coordinating doctor,

(iii) the independent doctor, and

(i) persons properly interested in the welfare of the person who made the application for the declaration and other persons they are close to, and

(ii) any other person who has provided treatment or care for the person being assessed in relation to that person’s terminal illness.”

This amendment would require court rules to be made that would ensure an adversarial court process, by appointing an advocate to the court. It would also require them to hear from the person seeking assistance to end their life and both assessing doctors, and to consider also hearing from family members and others involved in the person’s care.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 407, in clause 12, page 8, line 19, leave out “may” and insert “must”.

This amendment would require the High Court to hear from and question the person who made the application for the declaration.

Amendment 410, in clause 12, page 8, line 27, leave out subsection (6).

The amendment would remove the ability of the court to hear from and question any person other than the person who made the application for the declaration and the assessing doctors.

Amendment 106, in clause 12, page 8, line 30, leave out “(5)” and insert “(4A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 105.

Amendment 107, in clause 12, page 8, line 44, leave out “(4)” and insert “(4A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 105.

I will withdraw amendment 105 later, but will speak to it briefly, as my name is on it. The amendment aims to require court rules to be made that would ensure an adversarial court process, by appointing an advocate to the court. It would also require them to hear from the person seeking assistance to end their life and both assessing doctors, and to consider also hearing from family members and others involved in the person’s care.

In our oral evidence sessions, we heard from Nicholas Mostyn and Alex Ruck Keene about some of the merits of doing so, with reference to the Bill that was before us at that stage. Since then, a significant number of amendments and new clauses have been tabled, so I will not press this amendment to a vote, given the other amendments now before the Committee.

I rise to speak to amendments 407 and 410. Amendment 407 would leave out the word “may” and insert the word “must”, and would require the High Court to hear from and question all persons who made the application for a declaration. It is a probing amendment, which aims to question the guidelines for the judge to question and hear from some people and not all people. I will not press the amendment to a vote, but I seek clarity on what the criteria would be for the judge to question some people and not others.

I hope I can provide some reassurance. This issue is covered by my new clause 21. The amendment, I think, asks why the High Court would not have heard from the patient. My new clause would ensure that the panel—as it potentially would be—will hear from the patient.

I thank my hon. Friend for that explanation.

I move on to amendment 410, which would remove the ability of the court to hear from and question any person other than the person who made the application or the declaration for an assisted death and the assessing doctors. I have strong reservations about using a proxy or giving another person the right to speak on behalf of an individual who wishes to have an assisted death, and I question the scope of those people who could be the proxy to speak on behalf of a person requesting an assisted death. Who exactly would those people be?

One of the arguments we have consistently debated in this Committee is around coercion and patient autonomy. When multiple third parties such as family members or caregivers are allowed to testify, there is an increased risk that an individual might influence the court’s decision in a way that is not aligned to the true wishes of the applicant. In some cases we have talked about pressure from family members or loved ones, for whatever reason—whether their vested interest is financial or something else—to have the applicant hasten their death or have an assisted death. I would not want that kind of pressure to be put on the person and I do not believe any third party should be allowed to speak on their behalf or to be a proxy.

By limiting the scope of the testimony to the applicant and assessing doctors only, the amendment helps to safeguard against such manipulative tactics and ensures that the court focuses solely on the applicant’s own will and the medical assessment of their eligibility, removing the potential for family dynamics or any other outside influence to interfere with the judicial review. It offers a necessary refinement to the Bill for assisted deaths, a request that is both efficient and respectful of the autonomy of all people involved. By limiting the court testimony to the applicant and assessing doctor, the amendment addresses several of the concerns I have spoken about.

I will speak briefly, because many of these issues and themes will be debated in clause stand part and amendments 371 and the others from my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. Amendment 267 was not moved, but I would have opposed it in any event, on the basis that the discretion given there was way too wide and I did not understand the basis of the amendment in any way. Amendments 105 to 107, tabled my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North (Catherine Atkinson), attempt to add an adversarial element to proceedings. Again, I will not comment too much because that issue comes back in the fourth grouping under this clause.

I turn briefly to amendment 410, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe just spoke. My understanding is that, although this relates to the High Court—which may be deemed redundant as we move on through this clause—the amendment aims to limit the people that the judge or panel can hear from. In my view that would be wrong and dangerous. The purpose of a judge or a panel is to explore the circumstances in this matter. That must mean that they have discretion to hear from others as well. In my view, this amendment, if passed, would significantly limit the safeguards and be quite dangerous.

As my hon. Friend has already said, amendment 407 has been superseded, and I think we all agree on that.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. As I and my colleague and hon. Friend the Member for Aberafan Maesteg have made clear throughout the debate, the Government continue to remain neutral on this Bill and do not take a position on assisted dying. My remarks will therefore focus on the legal and practical impact of the amendments, to assist the members of this Committee in undertaking line-by-line scrutiny.

Amendments 267 and 105 to107, which have now been withdrawn, deal with the Bill as currently drafted in relation to the High Court. Clause 12 as currently drafted would require the High Court to make a declaration that the requirements of the Bill have been met, following a person’s first declaration to receive assistance to end their own life, with statements from a co-ordinating doctor and an independent doctor. The amendments relate to how the High Court will declare itself satisfied that a person has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life and that they have not been coerced or pressured.

Briefly, amendments 407 and 410 seek to change who the High Court—as others have said, we might come on to debate some of these themes relation to the panel—would engage with when considering applications for assistance under the Bill. In determining whether the person has a clear, settled, and informed wish to end their life and that they have not been coerced or pressured, the High Court would be required to hear from and question the person seeking assistance, as opposed to having the option to do so. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley pointed out, in the later provision in relation to the panel, that has now become a requirement.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe made clear, under her amendment 410 the High Court would lose the ability to hear from or indeed question any other party other than the person seeking assistance and the assessing doctors. Removing the ability—whether of the High Court or, as we may come on to debate, of the panel—to hear from and question any other party may limit that body or court’s ability to interrogate wider evidence or points of view.

The probe that I have on that point is that the individual who is seeking the assisted death, and the doctors who have been working with that person, really have all the information. I am trying to ascertain, if we are not going to agree on this amendment, who else they would be seeking information from. Is there a risk if they are getting evidence from family members or other people, or having them give evidence or speak on behalf of that declaration?

As I understand it, both in the context of the High Court—which has the ability to speak to whomever it likes—and of the panel, when we come to debate its role, that is a discretion. It is a requirement to hear from the person seeking an assisted death; it is a requirement to hear from the co-ordinating doctor. However, hearing from others is discretionary, which means that, if it is necessary in order to be satisfied that the eligibility criteria are met—which is what the scheme requires—in that context, under the panel’s or the High Court’s discretion, it may seek evidence from elsewhere. That is what the provision, as the Government reads it, is designed to do.

The amendment that my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe puts forward clearly limits that discretion; whether that is desirable is a policy choice, but that is how it is intended to function. As I have said, the Government will continue to remain neutral on these substantive policy questions, but I hope that is useful to members of the Committee.

I think I have responded to the hon. Member for Broxtowe on amendment 407 by saying that the concern will potentially be covered by my new clause 21. On amendment 410, it is also my view that, whether it is the High Court or the panel or whoever we end up having over the course of this Committee, that third layer of scrutiny and safeguarding should be able to hear from other people, not just the patient and the doctor, so I would not support that amendment.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 410, in clause 12, page 8, line 27, leave out subsection (6).—(Juliet Campbell.)

The amendment would remove the ability of the court to hear from and question any person other than the person who made the application for the declaration and the assessing doctors.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 48

5.15pm

I beg to move amendment 432, in clause 12, page 8, line 31, leave out paragraph (a).

This amendment is linked to amendments which remove proxies from the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 433, in clause 19, page 13, line 26, leave out subsection (4).

This amendment is linked to amendments which remove proxies from the Bill.

Amendment 434, in clause 36, page 22, line 16, leave out paragraph (c).

This amendment is linked to amendments which remove proxies from the Bill.

I recognise that we are moving on and that we want to get on to the substantive clauses, and I certainly will not press these amendments to a vote. However, I want to put on record that I have extreme concerns about the role of the proxy in clause 15. It is unclear to me why a proxy is needed. I regret that we are not sticking with the High Court process, which would have enabled us to debate these amendments at this stage, but I will let it pass.

Amendments 432 to 434 would remove provisions regarding proxies from the Bill. They deal with proxies in the context of the High Court process. As a consequence, the High Court would be unable to hear from the person’s proxy where the proxy has signed the first declaration, and the person would be unable to use a proxy to authorise a medical practitioner to provide assistance to end their own life. Removing the ability for persons seeking assistance to use a proxy would limit access to the assisted dying process for people who, for example, have a physical impairment, are unable to read or are for some other reason unable to sign the declaration. As I said earlier, the Government remain neutral, but I hope that provides some context and an explanation of how the amendments would operate.

I will be brief, because we will come on to this debate when we get to clause 15. To be clear, the circumstances where a proxy would be involved in this process are literally when somebody is so ill that they are unable to sign their own name, so it is a very limited set of circumstances.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment 312, in clause 12, page 8, line 34, at end insert—

“(7A) Any person who wishes to challenge an application for a declaration under subsection (1) must enter a caveat in any district registry of the High Court within 14 days of the application being lodged or received, stating their belief that the requirements of this Act have not been met in relation to the first declaration, with specific reference to the matters listed in subsection (3).

(7B) Where a caveat is entered under subsection (7A), the High Court must hear from the person who has entered the caveat in addition to those persons listed in subsections (5) and (6).”.

This amendment would allow a person who believes that the requirements of the Act have not been met to make this known to the High Court and be heard before a declaration is made.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 269, in clause 12, page 8, line 35, leave out subsections (8) to (11) and insert—

“(8) Any party to the proceedings may apply for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal in accordance with the applicable Rules of Court.”.

This amendment would allow any party to apply for permission to appeal a decision and remove the requirement for the Court of Appeal to conduct a re-hearing.

Amendment 313, in clause 12, page 9, line 1, leave out subsection (11).

This amendment would enable appeals to be heard against a decision by the High Court to make a declaration.

Again, I will not press this amendment; I just want to put on record my support for the principle. This amendment, tabled by the hon. Member for York Central, is quite a clever device: if we were sticking with the High Court, it would have meant that someone with genuine concerns, for example a family member or acquaintance of a patient, could flag them without needing to be informed that the application was going ahead.

As we have discussed, there is a concern about these proceedings happening in the dark, as it were, without wider family being informed. If a family member suspected that there might be an assisted dying application in the works and that they were being excluded from consideration or discussion of that, there would have been the opportunity to put on record their concern, which would have required the judge to take a wider consideration than would be enabled without this amendment. I regret that that is not happening, but it may be possible through the course of the Bill to ensure that there will be further opportunities to introduce such measures. I welcome that new clause 21 would impose a requirement on the panel to consider family members, so there is an element of the right system there.

Amendments 312 and 313 would make several changes to the process for High Court approval of applications under the Bill as drafted. Amendment 312 would allow a person who believes that the requirements of the Act have not been met to make that known to the High Court and to be heard before a declaration is made. The proposed mechanism is that the person would enter a caveat in any district registry of the High Court within 14 days of the application being lodged or received.

Of course we will come to later amendments, but under the Bill as drafted, the High Court has the power to hear from and question any person to determine whether the applicant has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and that they have not been pressured or coerced, so there is that mechanism to hear from others through that channel.

Amendment 313 would enable appeals to be made against a decision by the High Court to make a declaration, as opposed to only where a declaration is not granted. As drafted, the Bill provides that any person may seek a judicial review of any decision of the High Court, including the decision to make a declaration, if they are adjudged to have standing.

Amendment 269 would enable any person, other than the person seeking assistance, to apply for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal against a decision of the High Court. The amendment would also enable appeals to be made against a decision by the High Court to grant a declaration, as opposed to only where a declaration is not granted. The Court of Appeal would not be obliged to consider the matters set out in the Bill when forming its decision. It is important to say that whether with or without the amendment, any person may still seek a judicial review of any decision of the High Court, if they are adjudged to have standing.

I have nothing to add.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 371, in clause 13, page 9, line 5, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

“(a) a certificate of eligibility has been granted in respect of a person, and”.

This amendment is consequential on NC21.

Amendment 61, in clause 13, page 9, line 5, leave out from “the” to “has” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.

This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.

Amendment 372, in clause 13, page 9, line 12, leave out from third “the” to end of line 13 and insert

“certificate of eligibility was granted,”.

This amendment is consequential on NC21.

Amendment 62, in clause 13, page 9, line 13, leave out from “the” to “or” in line 14 and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.

This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.

Amendment 373, in clause 13, page 9, line 17, leave out “declaration was made” and insert “certificate was granted”.

This amendment is consequential on NC21.

Amendment 377, in clause 16, page 11, line 12, leave out paragraph (d) and insert—

“(d) a certificate of eligibility has been granted in respect of a person;

(da) a panel has refused to grant such a certificate;”.

This amendment is consequential on NC21.

Amendment 63, in clause 16, page 11, line 12, leave out “the” to “has” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.

This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.

Amendment 378, in clause 18, page 12, line 9, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

“(a) a certificate of eligibility has been granted in respect of a person,”.

This amendment is consequential on NC21.

Amendment 64, in clause 18, page 12, line 9, leave out from “the” to “has” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.

This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.

Amendment 381, in clause 27, page 16, line 16, leave out sub-paragraph (iii) and insert—

“(iii) a certificate of eligibility,”.

This amendment is consequential on NC21.

Amendment 65, in clause 27, page 16, line 16, leave out from “the” to “under” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.

This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.

Amendment 388, in clause 34, page 20, line 40, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—

“(c) a panel has refused to grant a certificate of eligibility;”.

This amendment is consequential on NC21.

Amendment 66, in clause 34, page 20, line 40, leave out from “the” to “has” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.

This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.

Amendment 390, in clause 40, page 23, line 24, at end insert—

“‘certificate of eligibility’ has the same meaning as in section (Determination by panel of eligibility for assistance);”.

This amendment is consequential on NC21.

Amendment 391, in clause 40, page 23, line 24, at end insert—

“‘the Commissioner’ has the meaning given by section (Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner);”.

This amendment is consequential on NC14.

New clause 14—Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner—

“(1) There is to be a Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.

(2) The Commissioner is to be appointed by the Prime Minister.

(3) The person appointed must hold or have held office as a judge of—

(a) the Supreme Court,

(b) the Court of Appeal, or

(4) The Commissioner’s principal functions are—

(a) receiving documents made under this Act;

(b) making appointments to a list of persons eligible to sit on Assisted Dying Review Panels (see Schedule (Assisted Dying Review Panels));

(c) making arrangements in relation to such panels and referring cases to them (see section (Referral by Commissioner of case to multidisciplinary panel));

(d) determining applications for reconsideration of panel decisions under section (Reconsideration of panel decisions refusing certificate of eligibility);

(e) monitoring the operation of this Act and reporting annually on it (see section 34).

(5) In this Act “the Commissioner” means the Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.

(6) Schedule (The Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner) makes provision about the Commissioner.”.

This new clause provides for there to be a Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.

New clause 15—Referral by Commissioner of case to multidisciplinary panel—

“(1) This section applies where the Commissioner receives—

(a) a first declaration made by a person,

(b) a report about the first assessment of the person which contains a statement indicating that the coordinating doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in section 7(2)(a) to (g), and

(c) a report about the second assessment of the person which contains a statement indicating that the independent doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in section 8(2)(a) to (e).

(2) The Commissioner must, as soon as reasonably practicable, refer the person’s case to an Assisted Dying Review Panel for determination of the person’s eligibility to be provided with assistance under section 18.

(3) But where the Commissioner receives a notification that the first declaration has been cancelled—

(a) the Commissioner must not refer the person’s case to such a panel, and

(b) if the person’s case has already been so referred, the Commissioner must notify the panel of the cancellation.

(4) Schedule (Assisted Dying Review Panels) makes provision about Assisted Dying Review Panels.”

This new clause provides for the Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner to refer a person’s case to a multidisciplinary panel, to be called an Assisted Dying Review Panel.

New clause 17—Reconsideration of panel decisions refusing certificate of eligibility—

“(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person’s case is referred under section (Referral by Commissioner of case to multidisciplinary panel) to an Assisted Dying Review Panel (“the first panel”), and

(b) the first panel refuses to grant a certificate of eligibility in respect of the person.

(2) The person may apply to the Commissioner for their case to be reconsidered on the ground that the first panel’s decision—

(a) contains an error of law,

(b) is irrational, or

(3) The Commissioner must consider an application without a hearing.

(4) On the application—

(a) if the Commissioner is satisfied that any of the grounds mentioned in subsection (2) applies, they must as soon as reasonably practicable refer the person’s case to a different Assisted Dying Review Panel for a fresh determination under section (Determination by panel of eligibility for assistance);

(b) in any other case, the Commissioner must dismiss the application.

(5) The Commissioner must give reasons, in writing, for their decision.

(6) The Commissioner must notify the following of the outcome of the application, and give them a document containing their reasons for their decision—

(a) the person who made the application;

(b) the coordinating doctor;

This new clause provides for certain decisions of Assisted Dying Review Panels to be referred to a different panel for reconsideration.

Amendment (a) to new clause 17, leave out subsections (1) to (3) and insert—

“(1) The person applying for assisted dying, their next of kin, any of their relatives (within the meaning of the Family Law Act 1996), the registered medical practitioners who are treating them and anyone who took part in proceedings before the panel or gave evidence to the panel may apply to the Commissioner for the Panel’s decision to be reconsidered.

(2) The Commissioner will allow the application for reconsideration if the Panel’s decision was—

(a) wrong, or

(b) unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings.

(3) The Commissioner may consider the application without a hearing if they consider it in the interests of justice to dispense with a hearing.”

New clause 21—Determination by panel of eligibility for assistance—

“(1) This section applies where a person’s case is referred under section (Referral by Commissioner of case to multidisciplinary panel) or (Reconsideration of panel decisions refusing certificate of eligibility) to an Assisted Dying Review Panel (“the panel”).

(2) The panel’s function is to determine whether it is satisfied of all of the following matters—

(a) that the requirements of sections 5 to 9 have been met in relation to—

(i) the first declaration,

(ii) the first assessment and the report under section 7 on that assessment, and

(iii) the second assessment and the report under section 8 on that assessment;

(b) that the person is terminally ill;

(d) that the person was aged 18 or over at the time the first declaration was made;

(e) that before making the first declaration, but when the person was aged 18 or over, a registered medical practitioner conducted a preliminary discussion with the person;

(f) that the person is ordinarily resident in England and Wales and has been so resident for at least 12 months ending with the date of the first declaration;

(g) that the person is registered as a patient with a general medical practice in England or Wales;

(h) that the person has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life;

(i) that the person made the first declaration voluntarily and was not coerced or pressured by any other person into making that declaration.

(3) Subject to the following and to Schedule (Assisted Dying Review Panels), the panel may adopt such procedure as it considers appropriate for the case.

(4) The panel—

(a) must hear from, and may question, the coordinating doctor or the independent doctor (and may hear from and question both);

(b) must (subject to subsection (5)) hear from, and may question, the person to whom the referral relates;

(d) may hear from and may question any other person;

(e) may ask any person appearing to it to have relevant knowledge or experience to report to it on such matters relating to the person to whom the referral relates as it considers appropriate.

In paragraphs (a) to (c) the reference to hearing from or questioning a person is to hearing from them, or questioning them, in person or by live video or audio link.

(5) The duty under subsection (4)(b) to hear from the person to whom the referral relates does not apply if the panel is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which justify not hearing from that person.

(6) The panel—

(a) must, if it is satisfied of all of the matters mentioned in subsection (2), grant a certificate to that effect (a “certificate of eligibility”);

(b) must refuse to do so in any other case.

(7) The panel must notify the following of its decision—

(a) the person to whom the referral relates;

(b) the coordinating doctor;

(d) any other person specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

Where it grants a certificate of eligibility, it must give a copy of the certificate to each of these persons.

(8) If the panel is notified that the first declaration has been cancelled, it must cease to act in relation to the referral (and, in particular, it may not grant a certificate of eligibility).”

This new clause provides for a person’s eligibility to be provided with assistance under clause 18 to be determined by a multidisciplinary panel (instead of the High Court).

Amendment (d) to new clause 21, in subsection (4), leave out paragraphs (a) to (e) and insert—

“(a) must hear from, and must question, the coordinating doctor and the independent doctor;

(b) must (subject to subsection (5)) hear from, and must question, the person to whom the referral relates;

(d) must consider hearing from and questioning—

(i) persons properly interested in the welfare of the person who made the application for the declaration and other persons they are close to; and

(ii) any other person who has provided treatment or care for the person being assessed in relation to that person’s terminal illness; and

(e) may hear from and may question any other person, including any person appearing to it to have relevant knowledge or experience to report to it on such matters relating to the person to whom the referral relates as it considers appropriate.”

Amendment (c) to new clause 21, in subsection (4), after paragraph (e) insert—

“(aa) if it considers that the matters mentioned in subsection 2(c), (h) or (i) are established on a balance of probabilities but still considers that there is a real risk that they are not satisfied, then the panel must stay its proceedings until such further inquiries it orders are made,”.

Amendment (e) to new clause 21, after subsection (4) insert—

“(4A) Where the panel considers it appropriate for medical reasons, it may make provision for the use of pre-recorded audio or video material for the purposes of subsection (4).”

Amendment (a) to new clause 21, in subsection (6)(a), after “satisfied” insert “beyond reasonable doubt”.

Amendment (b) to new clause 21, in subsection (6)(a), after “subsection (2)” insert

“unless it believes that there are particular circumstances which make it inappropriate for the person to be assisted to end their own life,”.

New clause 2—Tribunal authorisation—

“(1) Where—

(a) a person has made a first declaration under section 5 which has not been cancelled,

(b) the coordinating doctor has made the statement mentioned in section 7(3), and

(c) the independent doctor has made the statement mentioned in section 8(5), that person may apply to the First-tier Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) for a declaration that the requirements of this Act have been met in relation to the first declaration.

(2) On an application under this section, the Tribunal—

(a) must make the declaration if it is satisfied of all the matters listed in subsection (3), and

(b) in any other case, must refuse to make the declaration.

(3) The matters referred to in subsection (2)(a) are that—

(a) the requirements of sections 5 to 9 of this Act have been met in relation to the person who made the application,

(b) the person is terminally ill,

(d) the person has relevant and available palliative care options available to them,

(e) the person is not liable to be detained under the Mental Health Act 1983,

(f) the person was aged 18 or over at the time the first declaration was made,

(g) the person is ordinarily resident in England and Wales and has been so resident for at least 12 months ending with the date of the first declaration,

(h) the person is registered as a patient with a general medical practice in England or Wales,

(i) the person has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and

(j) the person made the first declaration and the application under this section voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making that declaration or application.

(4) The Tribunal—

(a) may hear from and question, in person, the person who made the application for the declaration;

(b) must hear from and may question, in person, the coordinating doctor or the independent doctor (or both);

(c) for the purposes of paragraph (b), may require the coordinating doctor or the independent doctor (or both) to appear before the tribunal.

(5) For the purposes of determining whether it is satisfied of the matters mentioned in subsection (3)(g) and (h), the Tribunal may also—

(a) hear from and question any other person;

(b) ask a person to report to the Tribunal on such matters relating to the person who has applied for the declaration as it considers appropriate.

(6) In considering an application under this section, the panel must consist of—

(a) a sitting judge,

(b) a medical practitioner, and

(7) In subsection (4)—

(a) in paragraph (a), the reference to the person who made the application includes, in a case where the person’s first declaration was signed by a proxy under section 15, that proxy, and

(b) “in person” includes by means of a live video link or a live audio link.”

This new clause would replace the role of the High Court with the tribunal system.

New clause 3—Tribunals in Wales—

“(1) For the purposes of this Act, the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, in exercising functions under or arising from this Act in relation to Wales, are to be treated as devolved tribunals within the meaning of paragraph 9 of Schedule 7A to the Government of Wales Act 2006.

(2) The Welsh Ministers may by regulations make provision relating to the procedure to be followed by the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal in exercising functions under this Act in relation to Wales.

(3) Statutory instruments containing regulations made under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by resolution of Senedd Cymru.”

Amendment 67, in schedule 4, page 28, line 32, leave out from “The” to “has” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.

This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.

Amendment 68, in schedule 5, page 30, line 6, leave out from “the” to “made” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.

This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.

Amendment 69, in schedule 5, page 30, line 10, leave out from “the” to end of line and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.

This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.

Amendment 70, in schedule 6, page 32, line 3, leave out from “of” to “declaration” and insert “First-tier Tribunal”.

This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NC3.

New schedule 1—The Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner—

“Status

1 (1) The Commissioner is to be a corporation sole.

(2) The Commissioner is not to be regarded as—

(a) the servant or agent of the Crown, or

(b) as enjoying any status, immunity or privilege of the Crown.

(3) The Commissioner’s property is not to be regarded as property of, or property held on behalf of, the Crown.

General powers

2 The Commissioner may do anything the Commissioner considers appropriate for the purposes of, or in connection with, the Commissioner’s functions.

Deputy Commissioner

3 (1) The Prime Minister must appoint a person to be the Deputy Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner (the “Deputy Commissioner”).

(2) The person appointed must hold or have held office as a judge of—

(a) the Supreme Court,

(b) the Court of Appeal, or

(3) The Commissioner may delegate any of the Commissioner’s functions to the Deputy Commissioner, to the extent and on the terms that the Commissioner determines.

(4) The delegation of a function under sub-paragraph (3) does not prevent the Commissioner from exercising that function.

(5) The functions of the Commissioner are to be carried out by the Deputy Commissioner if—

(a) there is a vacancy in the office of the Commissioner, or

(b) the Commissioner is for any reason unable or unwilling to act.

Appointment and tenure of office

4 (1) A person holds and vacates office as the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner in accordance with the terms and conditions of their appointment as determined by the Secretary of State, subject to the provisions of this paragraph.

(2) An appointment as the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner is to be for a term not exceeding five years.

(3) A person may not be appointed as the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner if a relevant appointment of them has been made on two occasions. “Relevant appointment” here means appointment as the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner.

(4) The Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner may resign by giving written notice to the Secretary of State.

(5) The Secretary of State may by notice in writing remove a person from the office of Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner if satisfied that the person—

(a) has behaved in a way that is not compatible with their continuing in office, or

(b) is unfit, unable or unwilling to properly discharge their functions.

Remuneration

5 The Secretary of State may pay to, or in respect of, the person holding office as the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner—

(a) remuneration;

(b) allowances;

Staff: appointed by Commissioner

6 (1) The Commissioner may appoint staff.

(2) Staff are to be appointed on terms and conditions determined by the Commissioner.

(3) The terms and conditions on which a member of staff is appointed may provide for the Commissioner to pay to or in respect of the member of staff—

(a) remuneration;

(b) allowances;

(4) In making appointments under this paragraph, the Commissioner must have regard to the principle of selection on merit on the basis of fair and open competition.

(5) The Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 does not require insurance to be effected by the Commissioner.

Staff: secondment to Commissioner

7 (1) The Commissioner may make arrangements for persons to be seconded to the Commissioner to serve as members of the Commissioner's staff.

(2) The arrangements may include provision for payments by the Commissioner to the person with whom the arrangements are made or directly to seconded staff (or both).

(3) A period of secondment to the Commissioner does not affect the continuity of a person's employment with the employer from whose service he or she is seconded.

Staff: general

8 (1) Before appointing staff under paragraph 6 or making arrangements under paragraph 7(1), the Commissioner must obtain the approval of the Secretary of State as to the Commissioner's policies on—

(a) the number of staff to be appointed or seconded;

(b) payments to be made to or in respect of staff;

(2) A function of the Commissioner may be carried out by any of the Commissioner's staff to the extent authorised by the Commissioner (but this is subject to sub-paragraph (3)).

(3) Sub-paragraph (2) does not apply in respect of—

(a) the Commissioner’s function under paragraph 2(1) of Schedule (Assisted Dying Review Panels) of making appointments to the list of persons eligible to be panel members;

(b) the Commissioner’s function of determining applications for reconsideration under section (Reconsideration of panel decisions refusing certificate of eligibility).

Financial and other assistance from the Secretary of State

9 (1) The Secretary of State may—

(a) make payments to the Commissioner of such amounts as the Secretary of State considers appropriate;

(b) give such financial assistance to the Commissioner as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(2) The Secretary of State may—

(a) provide staff in accordance with arrangements made by the Secretary of State and the Commissioner under paragraph 7;

(b) provide premises, facilities or other assistance to the Commissioner.

Accounts

10 (1) The Commissioner must—

(a) keep proper accounts and proper records in relation to them, and

(b) prepare a statement of accounts in respect of each financial year in the form specified by the Secretary of State.

(2) The Commissioner must send a copy of each statement of accounts to the Secretary of State and the Comptroller and Auditor General—

(a) before the end of August next following the end of the financial year to which the statement relates, or

(b) on or before such earlier date after the end of that year as the Treasury may direct.

(3) The Comptroller and Auditor General must—

(a) examine, certify and report on the statement of accounts, and

(b) send a copy of the certified statement and the report to the Secretary of State.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament each document received under sub-paragraph (3)(b).

(5) In this paragraph, “financial year” means—

(a) the period beginning with the date on which the Commissioner is established and ending with the second 31 March following that date, and

(b) each successive period of 12 months.

Application of seal and proof of documents

11 (1) The application of the Commissioner's seal is to be authenticated by the signature of—

(a) the Commissioner, or

(b) a person who has been authorised by the Commissioner for that purpose (whether generally or specially).

(2) A document purporting to be duly executed under the Commissioner’s seal or signed on the Commissioner’s behalf —

(a) is to be received in evidence, and

(b) is to be treated as duly executed or signed in that way, unless the contrary is shown.

Public Records Act 1958

12 In Part 2 of the Table in paragraph 3 of the First Schedule to the Public Records Act 1958 (bodies whose records are public records), at the appropriate place insert “The Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner”.

House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975

13 In Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 (offices disqualifying person from membership of House of Commons), at the appropriate place insert—

“The Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner or the Deputy Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.”

Freedom of Information Act 2000

14 In Part 6 of Schedule 1 to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (public authorities for the purposes of the Act) , at the appropriate place insert—

“The Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.”

Equality Act 2010

15 In Part 1 of Schedule 19 to the Equality Act 2010 (public authorities subject to public sector equality duty), at the end of the group of entries for bodies whose functions relate to health, social care and social security insert—

“The Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner.””

This new Schedule contains provision about the Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner.

New schedule 2—Assisted Dying Review Panels—

“Introduction

1 In this Schedule—

(a) “referral” means a referral under section (Referral by Commissioner of case to multidisciplinary panel) or (Reconsideration of panel decisions refusing certificate of eligibility) (and similar references are to be construed accordingly);

(b) “panel” means an Assisted Dying Review Panel.

List of persons eligible to be panel members

2 (1) The Commissioner must make appointments to a list of persons eligible to sit as members of panels.

(2) A person may be appointed to the list only if—

(a) the person (a “legal member”)—

(i) holds or has held high judicial office,

(ii) is one of His Majesty’s Counsel, or

(iii) has (at any time) been requested to act as a judge of the Court of Appeal or the High Court by virtue of section 9(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981,

(b) the person (a “psychiatrist member”) is—

(i) a registered medical practitioner,

(ii) a practising psychiatrist, and

(iii) registered in one of the psychiatry specialisms in the Specialist Register kept by the General Medical Council, or

(c) the person is registered as a social worker in a register maintained by Social Work England or Social Work Wales (a “social worker member”).

(3) In this paragraph “high judicial office” means office as—

(a) a judge of the Supreme Court,

(b) a judge of the Court of Appeal, or

Tenure of persons appointed to list

3 (1) Subject to the provisions of this paragraph, persons on the list hold and vacate their appointments in accordance with the terms on which they are appointed.

(2) An appointment to the list is to be for a period not exceeding five years.

(3) A person who has held appointment to the list is eligible for re-appointment for one further period not exceeding five years.

Membership of panels

4 (1) The Commissioner must make arrangements for determining the membership of a panel.

(2) The arrangements must ensure that a panel consists of—

(a) a legal member,

(b) a psychiatrist member, and

Decisions of panels

5 (1) The legal member of a panel is to act as its chair.

(2) Decisions of a panel may be taken by a majority vote; but this is subject to sub-paragraph (3).

(3) The panel is to be treated as having decided to refuse to grant a certificate of eligibility if any member votes against a decision to grant such a certificate.

Panel sittings

6 (1) Panels are to determine referrals in public (but this is subject to sub-paragraph (2)).

(2) The chair of a panel may, at the request of the person to whom a referral relates, decide that the panel is to sit in private.

Staff and facilities

7 The Commissioner may make staff and other facilities available to panels.

Practice and procedure

8 (1) The Commissioner may give guidance about the practice and procedure of panels.

(2) Panels must have regard to any such guidance in the exercise of their functions.

Reasons

9 Panels must give reasons, in writing, for their decisions.

Money

10 The Commissioner may pay to or in respect of members of panels—

(a) remuneration;

(b) allowances;

House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975

11 In Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 (offices disqualifying persons from membership of House of Commons), at the appropriate place insert—

“Person on the list of those eligible for membership of an Assisted Dying Review Panel.””

This new Schedule contains provision about Assisted Dying Review Panels.

Amendment (c) to new schedule 2, in paragraph 4, after

“(c) a social worker member.”

insert—

“(3) The Commissioner must ensure that each member of a panel has had training in respect of domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse.”

Amendment (a) to new schedule 2, in paragraph 4, after

“(c) a social worker member.”

insert—

“(3) Each member of a panel must have fluent proficiency in the Welsh language if services or functions in the Act are to be provided to an individual in Welsh.”

Amendment (b) to new schedule 2, in paragraph 8, leave out sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) and insert—

“(1) The Commissioner must give guidance about the practice and procedure of panels.

(2) Such guidance must prescribe a procedure which in relation to each application appoints a person nominated by the Official Solicitor to act as advocate to the panel.

(3) Panels must have regard to such guidance in the exercise of their functions.”

This amendment would require Assisted Dying Panels to follow an adversarial process to test the evidence by appointing an advocate to the panel.

Could you just repeat that? [Laughter.]

I hope you are sitting comfortably, Mrs Harris; it is a pleasure to see you this evening. I rise to speak to new schedules 1 and 2, new clauses 14, 15, 17 and 21, and their consequential amendments. These provisions relate to the introduction of the assisted dying commission, which would oversee the assisted dying process in England and Wales, and the multi-disciplinary panels of experts, which will operate as part of the commission, should the Bill be passed.

It has always been my view, and I have always been clear, that there should be a third layer of scrutiny and safeguarding in the assisted dying process, particularly given the significance of the change in the law. However, I appreciate that, if we compare the Bill with the many other models of assisted dying around the world, this is very unusual. Most jurisdictions have a process that involves two doctors, as the Bill does, but there is no additional stage.

There are different views as to whether a third layer is necessary; many other jurisdictions have processes that provide a very compassionate, patient-centred and well-safeguarded approach to assisted dying without it. Indeed, some of the most difficult emails I receive are from terminally ill people who are very concerned about the complexity of the process laid out in the Bill. They feel that it is overcomplicated and too bureaucratic to navigate for people who are in their dying days and weeks. I am very sensitive to that. I am also aware that the thorough process set out in the Bill will take time, and there will be people who embark upon it who will die before they can complete it, as happens in other jurisdictions. That is, of course, extremely sad.

I also know that, certainly in this country, people feel strongly that oversight and scrutiny of what we might call the initial medical stages of the assisted dying process are important. The challenge is achieving an appropriate balance between compassion and patient autonomy, and robust safeguarding—plus, of course, medical autonomy.

If there is to be a third layer, what should it look like? As the Bill stands, the third layer of scrutiny is a High Court judge, who would make the final decision regarding a patient’s choice to have an assisted death. I was, and remain, very confident in the ability of High Court judges to have that role, but it is fair to say that there is a range of views on the suitability of the judiciary to fulfil this function—not least from ex-judges themselves. It is important that we as a Committee acknowledge that.

Barrister and former Supreme Court judge Lord Sumption said that

“clause 12 is unnecessary and in some respects undesirable.”

He went on:

“The concern that I have about clause 12 in its current form is that it is not entirely clear what the judge is supposed to do…is he there in order to ensure that the two doctors have done their job and that the ducks are all in a row, or is he there to form his own view on all of those matters, completely independently of those who have already given their certificates?...It seems to me that this is a protection that no other country, so far as I am aware, among those that have authorised one or other form of assisted dying has included.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 172-173, Q222.]

Lord Sumption has been critical of the complexity of the process set out in the Bill as drafted, describing it as

“over-engineered, bureaucratic, and coldly inhumane”.

He told us in evidence that he disagreed with the inclusion of the need for High Court approval of a person’s application for an assisted death.

Former High Court judge Sir James Munby has written various articles in this regard. In his piece “Assisted dying: what role for the judge?” he asks:

“Should the judges be involved at all in this process? Is what is proposed a proper judicial function?”

He continues:

“Is this, indeed, truly a judicial function at all? Many would say that it is not. Where else in our judicial system does one find a judge, sitting judicially as a judge, whose function is not to decide some disputed issue or…to resolve some controversy but only to certify, as it were, that some decision taken by a private individual complies with the law? That, it might be said, is not what judges do and not what judges are for.”

He also expresses his concerns around conscientious objection and the challenges of ensuring

“an open and transparent process that may deter those for whom the scheme is designed, and a secret process destructive of the integrity of the scheme and corrosive of the judicial function.”

I absolutely agree that this is a very tricky balance.

The hon. Lady cites James Munby, who correctly identified the problems with the High Court process as it was designed and exists in the Bill. Is she aware that he also strongly objects to the amendments? He thinks that the newly proposed scheme fails on all the same tests, and he regards it as just as unsafe as the previous one.

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. It is fair to say that there is a range of views on this subject from the judiciary. Ex-judges have commented, and I will come to those comments shortly.

In his evidence, the chief medical officer, Professor Sir Chris Whitty, said that the best safeguards were the simple ones and warned that patients could find themselves in “a bureaucratic thicket” at the end of life if there is too much to navigate. I am very sensitive to that. Responding to his comments, Lord Sumption said:

“I do agree with that…one suggestion that I think would make a significant difference…is the removal of the clause 12 stage.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 182, Q236.]

That shows the difference of opinion among former judges.

5.30pm

Another former High Court judge, Sir Nicholas Mostyn, when discussing assisted dying on his podcast “Movers and Shakers”, expressed strong opposition to the involvement of the High Court bench in the process. He argued that the judge would be

“no more than a symbolic rubber stamp.”

I would argue that point, and that was certainly not my intention when I drafted the Bill. Of course, checking that the process has been followed is very important, but it would be pointless if the third layer were undertaking a purely administrative role. I agree with Sir Nicholas that it would be disastrous if the judge were to be seen as no more than a rubber stamp, hence the inclusion of the obligation for the judge to hear from at least one of the medical practitioners—it could be both—as well as the option to hear from the patient and anybody else they wish.

In their letter to MPs, the former Law Officers said they shared Sir James Munby’s concerns that the Bill fails to align with the purpose and integrity of the judiciary, saying:

“This Bill would place judges in an unprecedented role—not to resolve disputes, but merely to certify that an individual’s decision to end their life complies with the law. Such a function fundamentally conflicts with judicial principles, undermining the judiciary’s very purpose.”

However, Sir James also says:

“I am not contending that there can never be any role for the judge in the context of assisted dying. My concern was (and is) as to the function of the judge and the nature of the process envisaged under the scheme proposed in the Bill”.

I am very respectful of these different views, but my view remains that a third layer of safeguarding and scrutiny is very important. Former Clerk of the House of Commons David Natzler, who was Parliament’s most senior legal and constitutional adviser, asked:

“the question surely is, how CAN confidence be given about the status of an applicant’s expressed and witnessed wish? What non-judicial regime, while having to be swift and not onerously expensive for the applicant or the public, would satisfy, for example, a retired President of the Family Division?”

That is the question I have reflected on at great length since Second Reading.

I have listened carefully to the commentaries and the evidence, and I have taken the decision to introduce the assisted dying commission, detailed in new schedule 1, which would oversee all applications and assign all patients who request an assisted death to a multidisciplinary panel of experts, as per new schedule 2. The panels would be chaired by a “legal member”, who

“holds or has held high judicial office…is one of His Majesty’s Counsel, or…has (at any time) been requested to act as a judge of the Court of Appeal or the High Court”.

They would sit alongside a psychiatrist and a social worker. That multidisciplinary approach would maintain the valuable skills, legal expertise and judicial oversight in the Bill as drafted, with a judge or retired judge acting as the commissioner plus a legal chair of each panel. It would also address the concerns about the role of the judge acting alone in a traditional judicial capacity, without removing the important third layer of scrutiny and safeguarding. Very importantly, it would add multidisciplinary expertise relating to the two biggest issues we have spoken about so much in this debate: assessing capacity and checking for coercion.

As we have already discussed at great length in the Committee, there was a huge amount of evidence about the benefits of a multidisciplinary approach to choice at the end of life. As such, I have already proposed changes to the Bill that would ensure that is the case. My amendment 423 to clause 9 requires both assessing doctors to consider consulting health and social care professionals, and to consult such professionals whenever they consider that there is a need to do so, and a record of any consultation must be shared with the other assessing doctor. The amendment imposes a specific duty on the assessing doctors to consider whether any other expert input is required. I am pleased that the amendment was supported by the Committee.

We have also discussed amendment 6 tabled by the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper), which I support and I think the Committee will support. It would provide that when either doctor has any doubt about the capacity of the patient, they must refer them to a psychiatrist. Importantly, as I have said repeatedly and we must remember, nothing in the Bill replaces or precludes the multidisciplinary approach witnesses have told us about, which already takes place when treating and caring for terminally ill patients.

However, to really embed and emphasise this comprehensive, multidisciplinary approach, new schedules 1 and 2 provide details of the assisted dying commissioner and the assisted dying review panels, which I hope colleagues can support. There is a huge amount of support for this approach. In an open letter last weekend, three former Directors of Public Prosecutions—Dame Alison Saunders, Sir Max Hill and Lord Ken Macdonald—as well as a former Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, and many eminent legal professionals and academics, wrote in support of the introduction of the assisted dying commission and specialist panels. They stated:

“We believe this makes the Bill the strongest and safest of its kind in the world, and a marked improvement on the status quo in this country, which fails to offer meaningful upfront protections…The proposal of an assisted dying commission represents an important step”

towards

“bringing end-of-life decisions out of the shadows and greatly increasing the support and protection available for terminally ill people”.

As the former DPPs have said, the existing law is not fit for purpose. Loved ones who help a terminally ill person end their life could face up to 14 years in prison. Dame Alison, who was DPP from 2013 to 2018, said that she was moved to tears when advising on her first case of assisted dying, and that it was “ghastly” for families to be hauled before police after losing a loved one. Lord Macdonald said that the law is a “real mess” and “discriminatory” against those who cannot afford to travel to Switzerland, and that

“prosecutors are making law by deciding there’s a category of case they won’t prosecute. In the meantime, a lot of people are suffering very ugly deaths. So I think the whole situation is just grim at the moment.”

I agree with him, and they all agree with the

“proposal of multidisciplinary panels, each chaired by a judge or KC, assisted by the expertise of psychiatrists and social workers,”

saying that it is “sensible and practical”. They are approving of the role of retired judges, who they note are

“frequently deployed on to public inquiries or as highly skilled mediators”.

Glyn Berry, co-chair of the Association of Palliative Care Social Workers, told us in oral evidence:

“As social workers, our expertise and strength is in being able to ask difficult questions and really dig into people’s thoughts, feelings and opinions”.

She said that having worked

“in a hospice setting for the last six or seven years…I see daily how social workers contribute to the wider MD team in terms of safeguarding, capacity and applications for deprivation of liberty, but we also do the psychosocial aspect of palliative and end-of-life care…Having conversations about people wishing to end their life is not a new thing: we have those conversations quite regularly.”

She added:

“We have…an extensive skills catalogue…one of our biggest skills we have is in communication and in not being afraid to go where other professionals may feel uncomfortable”.––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 53-54, Q58.]

Glyn Berry also said that

“we feel…that the role of an approved palliative care professional would sit beside the role of clinicians, balancing clinical and social observation and assessment.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 56, Q66.]

I agree, and I think their inclusion in the panels is a real strengthening of the Bill.

Claire Williams, head of pharmacovigilance and regulatory services at NorthWest EHealth and chair of the Greater Manchester central research ethics committee, told us in her oral evidence:

“I absolutely agree that a panel/committee approach would have better safeguarding for patients, because the decision is being made collectively with legal expertise and with other healthcare professionals…It is having that collective view, ensuring that everybody is happy and that that is exactly what the patient wants. I believe it should be a committee/panel-based approach for the final decision.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 244, Q314.]

Even Alex Ruck Keene, for whom I have a huge amount of respect, but who I think it is fair to say is not a supporter of a change in the law, said:

“The more people we have who are able to bring their different perspectives—the social work perspective on the person’s social circumstances or the medical perspective on their medical condition—the better, so that we have as many eyes on the person and insights into the person as possible.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 91, Q121.]

As I have said, most jurisdictions do not have a third layer of scrutiny, but there is evidence that an inquisitorial and investigative layer works. Retired High Court judge Sir Nicholas Mostyn spoke about how assisted dying works in Spain, which I believe is the only other jurisdiction where a panel of some description is involved. There,

“the chairperson of the regulator sets up a panel for each case—a doctor and a lawyer. They have to agree and they check that everything has been done lawfully.”

He added:

“Interestingly, in 2023, 10% extra denials were done by the panel…so the panel was not just rubber-stamping.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 88, Q115.]

I think that is really important, and I know colleagues will be reassured by it.

I have made this point before, but I will do so again: it is very welcome to have these extra professionals involved in the process. Does the hon. Lady not recognise that it would be so much more appropriate to have them involved early on, at the assessment stage? We all want it not to be just a rubber stamp, but they are currently to be involved at the approval stage, at the end of the process, essentially fulfilling a judicial function of deciding yes or no. Why are these professionals not involved earlier?

I disagree: they are involved earlier. I have talked about the amendments we have already made around health and social care professionals. We have tabled those amendments, changed the Bill and added that provision on the basis of the evidence we heard. Remember that either doctor can speak to any other health or social care professional they wish. I would say that, actually, a multidisciplinary approach is taken throughout the Bill and, by ending the process with the panel, that is reinforced.

The hon. Member for East Wiltshire said in his radio interview on 12 February, “I do welcome”—as he has confirmed today—“the additional role of more experts in the process”. Hopefully, irrespective of our different views, that is something that the idea of the panel can coalesce around. Despite the hon. Gentleman’s opposition to assisted dying, I hope that, in the interests of strengthening the Bill, he will be able to support the amendments today, because that is the job of this Committee—to strengthen the Bill, not to try to stop it, however strongly people may feel about the issue.

A significant part of the strengthening is through additional patient-centred safeguards. I firmly believe that the introduction of the assisted dying commission and the addition of the multidisciplinary expertise and oversight provided by the panels are a crucial part of that. The panel will look at the detail of every individual case and scrutinise the doctors’ reports. It must hear from and may question the co-ordinating doctor or the independent doctor; it may hear from and question both; and it must hear from and may question the patient themselves. I mentioned that in relation to the amendment from my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe earlier. It is the default.

This was a difficult decision. I appreciate that to make the patient undergo another level of personal scrutiny could be viewed as cruel. Indeed, a number of people have said to me that they feel it will be too burdensome on the patient during what is already a deeply emotional, highly personal and stressful time, when they are likely to be in pain and having treatment. I acknowledge that. Again, this is about finding the very difficult balance between avoiding an unduly stressful bureaucratic process and ensuring that the patient is making, as the Bill says, a “clear, settled and informed” decision. There is a very strong argument that in order to do so, the panel should hear from the person themselves. That is the decision I have taken, addressing the concerns of colleagues who have tabled amendments to the same effect. Indeed, Lord Munby said of the Bill as it stands that

“the absence of any requirement that the judge ‘must’ hear from and question the patient is a quite extraordinary lacuna.”

I appreciate, though, that there will be exceptional circumstances, which we know may be the case if the patient is very ill and in their last few weeks of life.

The panel may also ask any person who appears to have relevant knowledge or experience to report to it on such matters relating to the person as it considers appropriate. It can basically ask to hear from anybody it wishes. That would obviously vary from case to case. Every case will be different, as we have discussed, and flexibility is really important. Only if all three members of the panel are satisfied that all the criteria have been met will it issue a certificate of eligibility. It must refuse to do so if it is not satisfied. The decision of the panel has to be unanimous. If there is any doubt from any of the panel members that the criteria have been met, the patient cannot proceed.

The patient then enters a 14-day period of reflection, before making their second declaration. It is worth reiterating that, as has been said previously, a significant number of patients get to that stage and never actually continue with an assisted death, but the comfort it provides enables them to live out their final weeks and days with a sense of reassurance. As families have described, a weight is lifted. Indeed, Professor Michael Dooley, who is the director of pharmacy at Alfred Health and the head of Victorian voluntary assisted dying pharmacy services, and who some of us met yesterday, told us that in that state in Australia some 90% of assisted dying patients also still access palliative care. That shows the holistic approach that can be taken.

There is of course another very important role for the commission, which is in relation to the monitoring and reporting of cases—something I feel very strongly about. The details are set out in my amendment 455 to clause 34. The commission must produce an annual report, which must include details about the application of the Act. That report must include details in relation to persons who have protected characteristics, and details of any other description of people specified. That would include data on demographics; statistics on the populations and characteristics of the patients who have chosen an assisted death; their age and gender; geographical analysis; data regarding the illnesses and diseases; how many cases were rejected; and how many patients did not complete the process and so on. When completing the annual report, the commissioner must consult the chief medical officers for England and for Wales, and anyone who represents the interests of people with protected characteristics.

The Law Society, which is neutral on assisted dying, says that if the law were to change, the system must have

“robust, accessible and independent safeguards”

as well as

“strong independent monitoring and review mechanisms”.

I agree. The introduction of a multidisciplinary panel of experts to consider all applications for an assisted death, overseen by a commissioner in the form of a High Court judge, sitting or retired, really does achieve that, and embeds a truly robust, multidisciplinary approach, which I am confident will put patients at the centre of the assisted dying process and provide additional scrutiny, safeguards and protections.

5.45pm

I rise to speak to new clause 21, new clause 14, new clause 16, new schedule 2 and amendment (b) to new schedule 2. I will start with new clause 21—and have a break in between.

I oppose new clause 21, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. I also wish to oppose new clauses 14, 15, 16 and 17, which between them set out the panel procedure to replace the use of a High Court judge, but I will focus my remarks on new clause 21. That is because, first, it is the most recently tabled of my hon. Friend’s new clauses on the panel. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it seems to be an attempt to solve some of the problems of the earlier new clauses.

I welcome what I think my hon. Friend’s intentions are with the new clauses. The Bill as drafted did not provide anything like adequate safeguards. The new clause states that the panel must hear from, and may then question, the doctors who made the certification, the applicant for assisted death, and any other person who may have relevant information. These moves are very welcome steps towards a tighter set of safeguards, but they are inadequate because of what they leave out.

Sir James Munby, the former president of the family division of the High Court of England and Wales, has written several times about the problems with the Bill. It is a matter of great regret to me that we did not hear from Sir James; I appreciate that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley set out that he was invited to give evidence to the Committee. Sir James has expressed profound concern about the series of new clauses— new clauses 14, 15, 16 and 17—that my hon. Friend has tabled. He wrote that the new clauses did address some of the problems of the original Bill, but he went on:

“These changes are to be welcomed, so far as they go. It is important to recognise, however, that they do not, in my opinion, go anything like far enough.”

As I have said, some elements of new clause 21 do indeed address some of the problems that Sir James identified but, again, the new clause unfortunately still leaves many of the biggest problems untouched.

The Bill does not set out that evidence must be heard under oath. That is an extraordinary omission. Sir James Munby asks, in his most recent essay:

“is the panel to hear evidence on oath? Indeed, will the panel have power to administer an oath?”

We rightly expect our courts to hear evidence under oath if they deal with cases concerning property or contract. The matters the panels will be dealing with are far more important than that. It is baffling to me why we should hear evidence on these matters without making witnesses swear oaths to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Anyone speaking to one of these panels should do so with the same commitment to telling the truth as they would in a court of law.

rose—

I call Kit Malthouse.

Danny Kruger; we are easily confused. [Laughter.]

The hon. Lady talks about the question of oaths, and it is extraordinary. Does she agree that it speaks to the confusion about whether the panels are a judicial construct at all? They have a judicial function—they exercise a judicial responsibility—but they are composed of non-lawyers. Maybe that explains why there is no oath, but I agree with the hon. Lady that there should be one. Does it not speak to the confusion in the new clause?

As I make progress, I will speak to that point, but I share the hon. Gentleman’s concern. I will return to my speech and expand on the point when I arrive at that juncture.

Sir James goes on to say that there are even graver problems with the panel procedure. I appreciate that his paper was published before new clause 21 was tabled, but it does not address all the concerns he raised. He referred particularly to new clause 16, but it is relevant to note that the problem he identified is left untouched by new clause 21. Sir James says of new clause 16:

“It says very little about the procedures to be adopted for testing and, if need be, challenging the evidence”.

He goes on to say that

“it says nothing about who should exercise that function; nor about the nature of any independent evidential investigation and nothing about who is to undertake this and who is to pay for it.”

Finally on this point, he says that new clause 16

“says nothing about what, if any, public funding arrangements there will be for the applicant, the two doctors, and any other parties or expert or lay witnesses.”

The first point raised by Sir James is an extraordinary one. The panels will bring together three people: a lawyer, a consultant psychiatrist and a social worker. They will sit on what is a quasi-judicial body. The latter two will not necessarily have any experience of questioning witnesses and assessing evidence as part of a quasi-judicial process. The first person—the lawyer—will have such experience. What is going to happen? Are we just hoping that they will successfully make it up as they go along? Is there not a danger that in some cases the non-legal members of the panel end up deferring to the wishes of the lawyer, who has more experience in these matters?

I appreciate the point my hon. Friend is making, and it is a shame that we did not hear from James Munby in evidence. I understand why he says that: he is looking at it through a judicial lens, because he is a judge. But this is not a judicial entity. It is a panel—it is not a court—and the range of expertise on it is actually a strength, not a weakness.

As I make progress I will address some my hon. Friend’s points—I have a fairly long speech—but I will say now that when the Bill passed on Second Reading, one of the safeguards was that it included judicial oversight. That is very different to what we are talking about now.

This is a very important point, and I am grateful for the hon. Member for Spen Valley’s admission that this is not a judicial process. We have constantly been told that the Bill has been gold-plated with the judicial stage of the application process, but we have now heard that there is not a judicial stage. We have also heard that this is “judge-plus” and somehow an improvement—it is a judge and others—but we should be clear that there is not necessarily a judge in the process, and it is very unlikely that there would be. We have just heard conclusively that the judicial stage of the process in the Bill has been dropped.

I agree: there is not a judicial process, so to speak. There most definitely is not. As I make progress, I will outline my concerns about that very clearly.

Let us take the second point raised by Sir James. He asked who will go about

“testing and, if need be, challenging the evidence”?

New clause 21 finally gives the panel the power to call people to give evidence who are neither the applicant nor the doctor. New clause 21(4) says that the panel

“may hear from and may question any other person”

and

“may ask any person appearing to it to have relevant knowledge or experience to report to it on such matters relating to the person to whom the referral relates as it considers appropriate.”

I welcome that as a start, because it acknowledges that there will be cases in which people other than the applicant and the doctors have vital information. But that really should not be where we finish—not if we want a genuinely robust assisted dying Bill with strong safeguards for vulnerable people.

The ability of the panel to hear evidence from other parties would indeed be one step towards detecting whether people are, for example, being coerced towards an assisted death. That would be one step towards being able to detect whether people were choosing assisted death because of a lack of palliative care or social care. But how will the panels know which witnesses are most likely to have or be aware of the significant evidence they seek?

The panel members will have the statements by the applicant and the doctors, and they will have the answers to any questions they have of the applicant and the doctors. I ask Members to think through how certain it is that those sources alone will be enough to find all the people who might have significant knowledge of a person’s circumstances. I would argue that it will not be certain. Yes, in some cases there will be no hidden circumstances that a panel would hear of from a witness only if they were called, but in other cases there will be, and those circumstances are much more likely to occur in the cases of people who are coerced or who feel like a burden to their families. They will be more likely to occur for those who have poor mental health, who are isolated, or who lack the social care they need. The panels are not likely to find witnesses with relevant information if what they have to go on is the statement of witness evidence of a person who has, for example, been successfully and skilfully coerced.

New clause 21(4)(e) says that the panel

“may ask any person appearing to it to have relevant knowledge or experience to report to it on such matters relating to the person to whom the referral relates as it considers appropriate.”

Does my hon. Friend not agree that the expertise of the three panel members, as set out in the new clause, will mean they will very much have the ability to identify, on the basis of that subsection, the kind of individuals and the knowledge required?

As I have stated before—I will make reference to that very point later—I would argue the safeguards are just not robust enough.

There should be a mechanism for trained and experienced people to find witnesses who might have relevant information. This could relate to another criticism that Members have made of the panel system: there is no provision for the Official Solicitor to act on behalf of the applicant. Sir James Munby argues that we should strongly consider this, saying that

“there must be a rigorous procedure in every case for testing and if need be challenging the evidence, including an independent evidential investigation, perhaps by the Official Solicitor, of the kind discussed in Conway. There are two reasons why this is essential in every case…Without this, it will not be proper for a judge to be involved in the process as a member of the panel.”

He goes on to make it plain that by “judge” he means the legal member of the panel.

I appreciate that this is slightly difficult to get our heads around, but we have legal expertise—we potentially have a judge, a sitting judge, a retired judge or an eminent KC—but they are not there in their capacity as a judge. I understand that that is tricky for people to understand, but they are there because of their skillset. That is the important distinction.

That is the very distinction I am trying to highlight further, because the panel takes away the judicial oversight. Yes, they have expertise—there is no question about people’s expertise—but Sir James Munby says clearly that these people will not be sitting in their capacity as judges, as my hon. Friend just outlined, but just as experts. That does not provide judicial oversight. That is not what the panel does.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and that is the whole point: Sir James Munby said he did not think that was the job for the judge.

I will go into this in even greater detail in later speeches, but I will say now that although the process was not fit for purpose, Sir James Munby also says that this one is not fit for purpose. Neither process gives us the legal aspect—if anything, the Bill has been watered down. As I make progress, I will outline how I think Sir James Munby’s evidence is clear that the safeguard has been watered down. I appreciate the mood in the room while I insist on talking about this, but it is very, very important, because when we voted in the House to send the Bill to Committee, one of the biggest reasons why we did so was judicial oversight. Many Members have said that they let the Bill get to this stage because of that.

Will my hon. Friend give way on that point?

I will make some progress. As it is, we have removed the judicial oversight. I appreciate what my hon. Friend says about the panels having expertise, but that is not judicial oversight.

6.00pm

Sir James Munby continued:

“For otherwise, the judge, and, indeed the panel, is little more than a rubber stamp providing a veneer of judicial approbation—and that is fundamentally unacceptable. I appreciate that there is a question (which I need not explore) as to whether the legal member of the panel is fulfilling a judicial function. For present purposes it matters not. A legal member of a panel who is a judge or former judge will inevitably be thought of as a judge and in this context it is the appearance to the general public that matters.”

He went on to say:

“Even more fundamentally, without a rigorous procedure of this kind the panel will not be able properly to exercise its functions as mandated by NC16(2).”

He explained his reasoning:

“How confident can we be that the procedures set out in NC16 and elsewhere in the Bill will be adequate to enable the panel to identify and prevent possible abuses and in particular be adequate to detect what may be very subtle external pressures? My answer is very simple. Only those who believe implicitly in the omniscience and infallibility of judges and of tribunals such as the panel—and I do not—can possibly have any confidence in the efficacy of what is proposed.”

Such a provision for the Official Solicitor’s representative to appear would make it much harder for panels to miss information about an applicant. Currently, we are in effect asking the three panel members to be investigators, judges and jury. They will hear the evidence, decide whether they need to ask questions of the applicants and doctors, and based on that decide whether they need to summon other parties to speak. The picture that they receive of the applicant’s circumstances may miss key facts; that is not a responsibility that we can put on their shoulders alone. Amendments have been tabled that would permit the Official Solicitor to act on behalf of the applicant for assisted dying. If we care about making this a robust process that would protect vulnerable people, we should vote for them.

I think my hon. Friend just said that the amendments would allow the Official Solicitor to act on behalf of the applicant. Why would that strengthen the process?

I think that by making some progress I will answer that question.

Turning to Sir James Munby’s question about what, if any, public funding arrangements there will be for the applicant, the two doctors and any other parties, experts or lay witnesses, each time a panel meets we will be asking three senior professionals to give up many hours of their time to scrutinise applications, listen to and perhaps question witnesses, and then decide whether to call further witnesses. I could ask many questions about funding, but I will ask just one at the moment. Both Ministers will be well aware that courts and tribunals in England and Wales face lengthy delays—in some cases, delays of years. Will the Government commit to adequately funding the panel so that applicants do not face lengthy delays?

Another question about the resourcing of the panels is just as important: can we make good on the commitment in the Bill to provide a consultant psychiatrist for every panel? I think the answer may well be no. We spoke to the Royal College of Psychiatrists during our evidence sessions, but at that stage my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley had not tabled the amendments that would create a panel including a consultant psychiatrist, so we did not ask the professional body whether it would be able to do so.

I have had private conversations with my team of senior psychiatrists. We asked whether England and Wales had enough consultant psychiatrists to serve on each panel. They said it was extremely unlikely. I would like to understand whether my hon. Friend consulted the Royal College of Psychiatrists before she tabled those amendments. If she did not, that seems an extraordinary omission.

Ministers keep saying that the Government will release an impact assessment only when the Committee has finished amending the Bill. I say again: that seems to me a most unsatisfactory approach to a Bill that would lead to such a huge change. Surely the Minister could ask civil servants to prepare a preliminary estimate of how many applicants there might be in England and Wales. It should probably be phrased as a likely minimum and likely maximum number. That would be extremely helpful. Surely the Government could do the preliminary work on whether the psychiatric profession in England and Wales is capable of meeting that demand. I say this in the light of my understanding that the present state of the country’s judiciary contributed to the removal of the judge in the first instance.

Just to be clear, that was not the reason for the change. We need to be very clear about that. The reason for the change was that it strengthens the Bill.

That was not my understanding; I will come back to that point, because I am sure I have references to where that has been talked about. There is also the question of whether panels should be heard in public. Under new clause 16, the legal member of a panel would decide whether it should sit in public.

Finally, I return to Sir James Munby’s paper on this question. As I have gone through in some detail, he raised significant concerns about panel procedures set out in new clauses 14 to 17. Unfortunately, it seems to me that most of those concerns have not been addressed by new clause 21. Sir James was a very senior judge, who headed the family division of the High Court, and is someone we should listen to with the utmost attention on these matters. He said:

“I appreciate that some may point to the multidisciplinary membership of the panel and to an assumption that the function and process of the panel may (it is said) be inquisitorial rather than adversarial. Plainly, it might be thought, it is an advantage that the panel has a multidisciplinary membership, and it is often said that three heads are better than one. Yet it would be a mistake to think that either of these features of what is now proposed are sufficient to overcome the very real problems I have identified. They are not. What remains crucial is the substance, not mere appearances. If the panel is to perform its function effectively and do more than just ‘check the paperwork’—if it is to be the real safeguard intended by its proponents—then its processes must be much more thorough than is currently proposed.”

Has my hon. Friend had the opportunity to consider the functioning of mental health tribunals, which operate as panels in a very similar way to this proposal: chaired by a legal member with a specialist member and a medical member? They perform a similar quasi-judicial function, receive evidence and make important decisions on people’s healthcare choices. Does she not agree that that model provides a good example of how this system could work?

My hon. Friend’s intervention takes us back to the concerns I already have. I understand that mental health tribunals relate to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which would inform people on that panel in making their judgments. I have spoken extensively against the use of the Mental Capacity Act in this particular field.

I thank my hon. Friend for engaging on this issue, but this is not about the Mental Capacity Act; it is about the Mental Health Act 1983 and whether someone would be sectioned and denied liberty—a significant decision against the person’s own wishes. That determination is made by mental health tribunals sitting in that judicial function, day in, day out, with exactly the sort of panel membership outlined here.

I either misheard my hon. Friend or did not understand his earlier point, so let me speak to the point he makes now. My understanding is that sectioning someone under the Mental Health Act is a very extreme measure. Someone is sectioned in circumstances in which lots and lots of evidence has been taken from people who know the person, and there is a history. That was certainly the case when I chaired a mental health charity. Whether it is carers or other people who contribute to that, there is a long-standing relationship; from my understanding, it is very rare for something to happen otherwise. That is my understanding and experience of it, but I am happy to have a chat with my hon. Friend to talk more about it and understand it more.

Does the hon. Lady agree that the intervention of the hon. Member for Sunderland Central is very helpful because it highlights the difference between a genuine judicial tribunal, as he suggests, and what is being proposed here? This is not a tribunal. It would not sit in a judicial capacity. Its members would not take oaths in the way that members of a tribunal do. They are not appointed through the independent appointments process that tribunals have. This is a multidisciplinary team masquerading as some sort of final judicial stage, without the proper accountability of a judicial stage. On that basis, we cannot regard it as any sort of improvement to the Bill.

I thank the hon. Member for reminding me of that; I talked about that earlier. I agree with him that this is about the legalities. Ultimately, it comes back to judicial oversight, which is what was promised originally. That is why judges were part of the original proposals for the Bill. The words we must listen to are Sir James Munby’s. If we want an assisted dying Bill with real safeguards for the vulnerable, then we should reject new clauses 14 to 17 and new clause 21. They are not thorough enough to do the job.

I should let the hon. Member know that I am happy for her to make five speeches, as she has indicated, but each one needs to be specific to the clause and not replicating the previous speech.

I will speak briefly about an important point that the hon. Member for Spen Valley made. I want to get it on the record that I disagreed with something that she said. We heard a lot in the evidence sessions about the desirability of a multidisciplinary approach or a multi-professional team, and I listened particularly carefully to Dr Sarah Cox, who gave oral evidence to the Committee on 28 January on behalf of the Association for Palliative Medicine of Great Britain and Ireland. She made important and interesting points regarding the desirability of the involvement of multidisciplinary teams in relation to her area of expertise: palliative care.

I am anxious that the panel that the hon. Member for Spen Valley is now proposing is being presented as a response to the comments of Dr Sarah Cox in relation to multi-professional teams, when it is clear that she meant something quite different. My interpretation of what she said was that the initial assessment should be done by a multi-professional team; what is being proposed here is something that happens much later in the process.

To be clear, the point I have tried to make with regard to the evidence that we received was just that there is a need for a multidisciplinary approach, wherever it happens.

I am glad to have had that clarification; however, it is really important to reflect on the fact that Dr Sarah Cox said that it would be considerably preferable to have the input of a multidisciplinary team at the earliest possible stage. That is not what is being proposed with these new clauses.

The point is that it has to happen at every stage, and I think the evidence that we heard was that it does happen. I know from the experiences of family and friends of mine who have had cancer that it does happen. There is a multidisciplinary approach; there is an oncologist, a nursing team and a doctor. That does happen, and nothing in the Bill will take away from that.

I thank the hon. Member, but I think she is responding to a slightly different point from the one that I made.

There was further written evidence from Dr Doré, the honorary secretary of the Association for Palliative Medicine, on 25 February. He wrote:

“To clarify any misunderstanding, the current Bill does not align with the standard multi-professional team…decision-making process used across the health service.

Under the Bill, patient assessments are conducted solely by two doctors without input from a wider MPT. While an amendment proposes the involvement of a panel—including a social worker and psychiatrist—this panel is introduced only at the end of the process and does not participate in the patient’s direct assessment.

We wish to make it clear that the point that Dr Cox was making in oral evidence was that having two independent doctors, working alone, is not an adequate model to safeguard either patients or professionals, and that stipulating that the initial assessments must be carried within a multi-professional team model would strengthen the Bill.”

6.15pm

Committee members will have heard me talk in previous sittings about the need for additional safeguards around mental capacity and those suffering from mental illnesses. I very much welcome the introduction of psychiatrists at any stage, but my point has always been that that intervention must come early—we need the psychiatrist’s evaluation to be part of the initial assessment. I put on record that I do not believe that the amendments, new clauses and new schedules tabled by the hon. Member for Spen Valley address the concerns that I have raised on a number of occasions.

Does the hon. Member not agree that by accepting amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Member for St Albans, we have early intervention with psychiatric analysis at a very early stage, when either of the doctors feels it is necessary?

I am grateful for amendment 6 and to my hon. Friend the Member for St Albans for tabling it. I put on record, however, that I do not think that the panel that we are discussing addresses my earlier concerns. I wanted to make that absolutely clear by highlighting the further evidence from the Association for Palliative Medicine. The panel proposed by this group of amendments does not address its concerns, or the concerns of many other people who were saying that there needs to be a multi-professional team.

I rise to speak in support of new clauses 14, 15, 17 and 21 and the accompanying amendments. I hope also to deal with some amendments tabled to new clause 21.

On Second Reading, I and many other hon. Members said that the Bill was the strongest and safest assisted dying law in the world. I want to be clear that I stand by every word of that, but this change will make the Bill far stronger and far more resilient to questions of capacity and coercion and therefore far safer. It will ensure a further independent layer of assurance: a panel of experts chaired by a senior lawyer to hold the process to account, to ensure that every avenue of inquiry has been explored and to hold professionals in our healthcare system to account when it is appropriate to do so.

The change will replace a single High Court judge, a person with no particular expertise in the issues at hand, with a panel that will adopt a more holistic approach. The social worker will delve a little deeper into the personal circumstances of each individual. The psychiatrist will ask any necessary questions about capacity. They will serve alongside a senior lawyer to ensure that the process is necessarily formal and strict. They will have the powers to make further inquiries if they so wish.

On and after Second Reading, there were legitimate questions about the High Court function—what exactly were we asking the judge to do? I maintain that a High Court judge could have overseen the process, but it is far better and more pertinent to the issues at hand to have a multidisciplinary process involving a social worker and a psychiatrist.

This is our lawmaking process working efficiently: debate has pushed my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to think again. Working with the Government —whose role continues to be to ensure that the Bill will be workable if it is to gain Royal Assent, while remaining neutral on the principle—she has been creative in tailoring a process to the matters at hand. That must be welcomed.

This is new law. The change that the Bill would enact is profound and therefore requires a very new safeguarding process. This is the key point. The panel would not be there to adjudicate on a dispute, undertake a trial or undertake an inquiry; it would be there to ensure that the process is safe. A person would come to the panel seeking assistance to which they are entitled under the law, and the panel would ensure that the process through which their eligibility has been decided has been rigorous and safe.

It is also important to note that the panel would simply regulate and scrutinise an ongoing doctor-patient relationship. Even after a certificate of eligibility has been received, there is a period for reflection and continued assessment. That is crucial, because it means that normal rules of appeal are not appropriate—I will come back to some of the amendments in that regard. Even once the panel’s work is done, the co-ordinating doctor and the commissioner will remain available for reconsideration and oversight.

I want to deal with some of the criticisms that have been levelled at the change set out in the amendments tabled to new clause 21 and others. To my mind, the process should not be adversarial, because it is inherently inquisitorial. What is the dispute that is being decided? The person is deemed to have capacity by two doctors, and perhaps a psychiatrist, to make a decision, and is seeking an eligibility certificate. The starting point must surely be that the person should be allowed to do so. To set up some bizarre dispute where none exists would be counterproductive and unsettling to the person at the centre of the process. It would be a waste of public funds, but more importantly it would be a waste of time—time, in the context of a person who is dying.

The process is not analogous to the Court of Protection, where there are disputes as to capacity, best interests and welfare. It is not analogous to a court approval hearing, where there may be legal arguments as to the appropriate nature of an award or the arrangements for it. It is not analogous to a deprivation of liberty order, where in all likelihood a person would seek not to be deprived of their liberty. It is not analogous to private children’s proceedings, where the child’s welfare is paramount. This is a person seeking help for themselves. The principle of choice and autonomy at the end of life means that that process must be patient-centred and begin from an appreciation of those principles.

The hon. Gentleman is making a very good speech in defence of the change, but could he help me understand something? He said that he supported the previous proposal, involving a High Court judge; he is now suggesting that it would be completely inappropriate to have any sort of judicial oversight of the process. How could it have worked better?

The hon. Gentleman talks about there being no need for any sort of adversarial system, but does he not recognise that there might be another side to the story, and that it would be appropriate for somebody, whether that is a judge or someone else, to hear arguments against the application?

Let me deal with the first point first. A High Court judge could have exercised this function themselves. As I set out in public very soon after Second Reading, I was struck by the fact that we were asking a High Court judge to do this, even though they have no particular expertise in the issues that so concerned hon. Members on Second Reading, whether they voted in favour of the Bill or against it. I thought about the process more, as we are all doing, to try to understand what it would look like in practice. What questions might be asked? Where does a panel or judge need to go? To my mind, psychiatrists and social workers are much better placed than High Court judges to know what avenues to further explore.

I have forgotten the hon. Gentleman’s second question.

I was making the point that there is surely some value in what the hon. Gentleman describes as an adversarial process, in which the decision maker is required to consider whether there are circumstances that the applicant is not presenting.

I will come on to that issue. First, there are avenues for the panel to have information put before it that will be pertinent to the decision at hand and that may be pivotal to that process. That is not quite adversarial. Secondly, there is always a route for an adversarial contest in this matter through judicial review. I hope that that will be very rare, but it is certainly possible, and that has to be maintained. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley and the Minister would accept that that would be an avenue.

The panel will have an array of information to consider. It will have two reports: one from the co-ordinating doctor and one from the independent doctor. In any event, it is often likely to seek medical records. It will speak to the co-ordinating doctor or independent doctor about capacity and any issues of coercion. Crucially, it will speak to the person themselves unless there are extraordinary circumstances that oblige it not to. One can imagine the vast array of circumstances that will come before the panel, but it will have the discretion and freedom to explore as appropriate. That will be a process that is appreciative of the specific facts before the panel.

I made this point earlier, but it is important to remember that this is a very human moment. A person is dying; they come to the panel seeking help. It is right to ensure that there are hurdles to consideration for eligibility, but the idea that a person should be forced to win a trial or a case, or see through complex litigation, is surely not right.

My hon. Friend is making an excellent and powerful speech. I thank him for putting the human being back at the centre of the process; sadly, in this Committee we can forget to do that. Early on, we had Nathaniel Dye here, who is a terminal cancer patient. He has just had a 12-month prognosis. The thought of making that man jump through hoops and over hurdles breaks my heart. I understand that we have to do it, but these are the people that we are actually talking about when we discuss the Bill.

I agree, and I hope to deal with some of the points that my hon. Friend made in her important speech. To mandate that a barrister instructed by the Official Solicitor, or indeed the panel, has to put questions to a person who may have only a few weeks left to live is not only highly inappropriate, but unworkable. What instructions is this barrister working from? Do they have to suppose that somebody who clearly has capacity does not? If not, do they ask questions about the circumstances of the person that would be asked by the panel in any event?

My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West suggested that the Official Solicitor would be working for the person. Well, the person is coming to this panel seeking assistance, so what on earth is the Official Solicitor or their legal representative going to ask of the person they are taking instructions from? To what extent would they be allowed to go on a fishing expedition, delving deep into a person’s relationships to assess any evidence of coercion? That goes back to my original point: what are their instructions? Who is asking them to do what?

I see the force in the amendments from my hon. Friend as to burden of proof, but I deem them inappropriate. The criminal standard does not fit neatly with the more complex issues at play, such as capacity. The Mental Capacity Act states that where there is a doubt about a person’s capacity, the burden of proof is on the person seeking to establish a lack of capacity, on the balance of probabilities. That is the correct approach. In any event, if the panel has any doubts as to capacity, surely it will be obliged—as is set out in amendment 6 to clause 9, which the Committee has just accepted—to seek further psychiatric assessment. It is important to note that the panel will have powers to instruct further expert assessment and reports.

If we implement the criminal standard, the doctors who are part of the process— not only the co-ordinating doctor and the individual doctor, but treating doctors, because we should always remember that someone who is terminally ill will almost certainly be receiving treatment in the NHS—will be working to a completely different burden of proof from the panel’s. The criminal standard does not fit neatly with the innately inquisitorial nature of the panel’s role. That is important. It is very easy to look at the definition of the balance of probabilities and find weaknesses in it, but when we consider what actually happens in practice, I submit that those weaknesses are not often there.

The panel will have a conversation with the professionals and with the person and will consider the response. If doubts creep in, it will not just stop and make a decision on the balance of probabilities; it will continue to search. The more serious the doubts it encounters, the more evidence it will need for those doubts to be overcome. That is how the law has developed on the balance of probabilities in all other areas, and no doubt it will be the same in this area. Importantly, unlike with many other tribunals or courts, the decision must be unanimous, so if the social worker spots something that the psychiatrist or lawyer does not, the case will go no further.

What about the role of third parties? As I have set out before, this is a personal decision, but I also accept that no man is an island—a phrase often used by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire. The process has to strike a real balancing act: allowing third-party information to be considered, but in a proportionate manner that respects individual autonomy. To my mind, the views of third parties are not relevant. Their views on whether the person is making the best decision for themselves are not relevant. This is not a welfare decision. Equally, it must be right that third parties—family members and others—can ensure that the panel has sight of the relevant information. Even after a certificate of eligibility has been given, the co-ordinating doctor will continue to be responsible for assessing new information, and their duties will continue until the final moments, as the Bill sets out.

6.30pm

Given my hon. Friend’s expertise, does he anticipate JR being allowed in the panel setting? If so, would it be before the death or after? Can the decision by the panel be judicially reviewed?

In my mind, any decision to give a certificate of eligibility could be subject to judicial review.

Third parties can put evidence before the panel to be considered, but it is not right that third parties might challenge the application. As I have set out before, this is not a dispute but a rigorous safeguarding process. If they have information about the person’s capacity, their diagnosis or any other relevant factors, they can and must ensure that the panel—if not the doctors or indeed the police—be seized of the information. Third parties can appeal the decision by way of judicial review. That would provide for a decision that was

“wrong, or…unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings”,

per amendment (a) to new clause 17. An injunction would be applied and the matter would have to be dealt with expeditiously. It is worth saying that all the evidence suggests that that would happen incredibly rarely. In Spain—

My hon. Friend is about to refer to Spain, as am I. Article 10 of the relevant Spanish law gives a right of appeal on a point of law to a higher court. Does he believe that we will be in line with the position in Spain? How long does he envision judicial review taking, given that we are dealing with somebody who is at the end of their life?

The answer to my hon. Friend’s question is yes: judicial review is clearly an exercisable option in this case. I said “expeditiously” because lots of cases are heard expeditiously; High Court judges hear cases in the middle of the night, if there is a certain urgency. In these cases, one might imagine similar circumstances, but I must stress that they would happen incredibly rarely. All the evidence suggests that. In Spain, where a not dissimilar model is in place, such an approach is rarely used by family members. The vast majority of families attend the panel because they want to offer support and love to the person who has made the choice.

I just want to confirm that either side has the right of appeal in Spain.

Yes.

The other side of the coin is that we must ensure that the process is workable. In Spain, 20% of people die before the panel hears their case. We must be very careful not to create something that is so burdensome as to be completely pointless. I believe that the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley aim successfully between ensuring flexibility and rigour. Each case will be different—more so than in any other set of proceedings that I can imagine, and I have thought hard. There will no doubt be some that are incredibly complex, in which the panel may require further assessments and hear from relevant experts, but there will be far more that are solemn and serious but straightforward, and that is correct.

Other amendments, such as amendment (d) to new clause 21, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North, seek to mandate certain procedural steps. While I have great respect for her as a former colleague, I fundamentally disagree with her amendment, which would require that the panel “must consider” hearing from persons who may be

“interested in the welfare of the person”.

I repeat that this is not a welfare decision. The panel, just like the High Court judge, is not saying, “What do I think is in the best interests of this person?” It is ensuring that the person has made the decision per clause 1, where we started: “settled”, “informed” and “voluntary”. We enter new ground with this law change, and that is why it is a new process, but to my mind it is safer and workable. Colleagues can be reassured, and I urge people to support the change.

I thank my hon. Friend for giving way at the end of an excellent speech. Does he agree that the provision in new schedule 2 that allows the commissioner, who would be a sitting or previous judge, to give guidance and set procedure for the operation of panels would answer some of the concerns raised by those who think that there would not be sufficient judicial input into the procedure of the panels?

That is an important point, because the change, as drafted in the various amendments, provides for real flexibility. That may cause others some concern, but to my mind it is a reassurance, because it will mean that a weighty figure, the commissioner, will be able to set out rules and regulations for the process to make sure that it is rigorous but is not so burdensome as to be pointless.

I rise to speak to my amendment (a) to new schedule 2. The assisted dying review panel comprises a legal member and the chair, a psychiatrist member and a social worker member. I welcome this third tier of safeguarding and its range of specialities, as laid out in new clause 21.

My amendment (a) would amend paragraph 4, which concerns membership of panels, by inserting a new paragraph 4(3):

“Each member of a panel must have fluent proficiency in the Welsh language if services or functions in the Act are to be provided to an individual in Welsh.”

I emphasise the “if”, because it is in certain circumstances. I have previously touched on the requirements of the Welsh Language Act 1993 and the Welsh Language (Wales) Measure 2011. It appears that the panel can be defined as a legal proceeding and will therefore be required to follow the pre-devolution 1993 Act. Let us consider whether that is sufficient for the level of safeguarding that all Committee members want to provide.

Section 22(1) of the Welsh Language Act 1993 states:

“In any legal proceedings in Wales the Welsh language may be spoken by any party, witness or other person who desires to use it, subject in the case of proceedings in a court other than a magistrates’ court to such prior notice as may be required by rules of court; and any necessary provision for interpretation shall be made accordingly.”

I quote that as the nearest comparator. That means that the 1993 Act, in the situation we are discussing, enables people to speak Welsh and for interpreters to be provided as necessary. That gives people the right to speak Welsh, but it does not give them the right to be heard in Welsh in their own voice. If the legal personnel do not speak Welsh, their decisions will be based on the interpreted communication. The key question is whether we are content to accept the use of interpreters as intermediaries between the individual and the assisted dying panel.

Dr Sarah Davies, a consultant respiratory physician from Colwyn Bay, has written, with 78 other clinicians from Wales as co-signatories, to parliamentarians about their concerns. She states:

“In practice use of interpreters does not provide full communication of appropriate knowledge from clinician to patients. This is because interpreters are often not experienced and confident enough to discuss such complex and legal issues as assisted dying. Even the best possible practice by interpreters cannot match communicating in the person’s own preferred language. Every person whose preferred or primary language is Welsh and who communicates as a family or socially in Welsh should have access to important health information in Welsh. Any necessary assessment of capacity for purposes of consideration of assisted dying, and any assessment of coercion, must be in person and in Welsh if that is the person’s preferred language.”

Dr Davies further states that it is not possible to confidently assess the decision-making capacity of a Welsh speaker in their second language. Superficial conversations in English often fail to demonstrate that a Welsh speaker with significant health problems is confused or does not have a good understanding of their own health condition and treatment options. The presence of confusion or lack of information may become apparent only during detailed conversations with a Welsh-speaking healthcare professional. It can be extremely challenging to detect the presence of coercion, and the nuances of family dynamics will not be apparent to a non-Welsh-speaking professional when the language spoken in the family is Welsh, so it will not be possible to make any assessment of the presence or absence of coercion. That is what Dr Davies says.

The office of the Welsh Language Commissioner believes that there must be provision in the Bill to ensure that a person’s choice of language is considered, recorded and matched with further provisions, including a Welsh-speaking specialist panel. The commissioner’s office agreed that such an amendment relating to the specialist panel is very important. It stressed that a Welsh-speaking panel will be able to provide the same service in English to individuals who are not receiving assistance through Welsh, so the requirement in amendment (a) should not, in and of itself, necessarily mean recruiting more individuals or more panels. None the less, I feel that I must allay fears that it would require every member of every panel in Wales to be able to speak Welsh. It does not. That is not the intention of the amendment, nor is it in its wording. Fluent proficiency is required of all panel members only when the panel is making a decision in relation to a person whose preferred language is Welsh.

So far, the response I have received from Ministers is that this private Member’s Bill does not require specific requirements on Welsh language rights in it and that these rights are already enshrined in law. The hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham and I have written to the Minister as regards discussing how the legislation should operate in relation to Wales and devolution—he had previously committed to a meeting—but we have yet to receive a response. I have withdrawn previous amendments in anticipation of that very meeting, but in this instance—as the provision of interpreters to communicate between the individual and the people charged with being the final guardians of safeguarding is wrong—I will push the amendment to a vote, because I do not believe that the issue is covered in legislation as things stand.

I call Naz Shah for part 2.

Part 2 of five, I might add, Mrs Harris.

I rise to oppose new clause 14 from my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. The clause would create the post of a voluntary assisted dying commissioner. It is quite an extraordinary clause, and I am not sure we have seen anything like it in recent legislation. What I am sure of is that we have not seen a law as far-reaching as this introduced without any of the detailed work that should have been done on it by the civil service.

The voluntary assisted dying commissioner—I will call them the VAD commissioner—created by the new clause would have unusual powers. The commissioner would select the members of the panel, who would in turn decide on people’s assisted dying applications. The commissioner would be the authority to whom people could appeal if their application was refused. The commissioner would also decide if particular panel members had made any mistakes or shown any misconduct in their work.

In this country, we do not give one person the job of selecting judges, overseeing their work and then functioning as a court of appeal, even if that one person is extremely well qualified. That is for good reason. But the new clause suggests giving all those powers to one person. Hon. Members might object and say that the comparison is not exact, and that there will be fewer assisted dying cases heard by the proposed new panels than there are cases heard before the courts, but that misses the point. We do not put all the powers over the judiciary into the hands of one man or woman because it would be a lot of work for them. No, we do not do that, because we do not wish to put too much power into the hands of any one person. However, under the new clause, we would do exactly that.

6.45pm

That may sound like an abstract question, but it is not. One of the great concerns that hon. Members have expressed throughout this Committee is that the assisted dying process might fail to safeguard vulnerable people. Some hon. Members have expressed concern that people might opt for assisted dying because they were coerced or encouraged, or because of a lack of palliative or social care.

Let us say that the Bill, including new clause 14, passes. In that case, the Prime Minister will appoint someone as the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, and he or she will in turn appoint members to the panels. Let us consider what happens if someone successfully applies for assisted dying but, after their death, someone makes a credible allegation that they were coerced or suffered from a preventable lack of social care, or presents facts suggesting that there was a serious misdiagnosis by one of the doctors.

That is not a remote possibility; indeed, it seems very likely to happen at some point, given that we have had similar cases in all the jurisdictions where assisted dying has been going on for some time. That is why I intervened on my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley to ask whether there would be a JR process. If we are talking about a judicial review of any of the decisions by the panel in a case where somebody has less than six months to live, raising the funds and finding somebody to take that to court would potentially take time. Would that time elapse after the person’s death or before? I would really value understanding from the Minister or the Bill’s sponsor what safeguards there are for a potential JR. Have those been built in or not?

This conversation is very helpful, and the point the hon. Lady makes is absolutely right. If we are going to rely on JR as a sort of appeal process, we need to make it clear how that would work. Would there be legal aid? How quickly could these things be done? I think that that needs to be built in. Does she agree?

I absolutely agree that we have not thought this through enough, because that process has not been laid out. We really need to think about these potential eventualities.

When such cases happen, the public, including family members of the person who has died, will rightly demand answers, and so will the media. They will want to know who the panel members were and why they made the judgment they did. In such cases, who would investigate whether panel members had got it wrong? The commissioner who had appointed them? The commissioner, or any person, no matter how honest and how learned, would come back to that question with a very strong bias. The commissioner will mark their own homework. That is not a system that anyone can argue will provide proper safeguards.

Hon. Members might object that the voluntary assisted dying commissioner will be a very senior judge. According to the new clause, the commissioner

“must hold or have held office as a judge of—

the Supreme Court

the Court of Appeal, or

the High Court.”

I agree that only people of high intelligence and good standing become judges in those courts, but that does not mean that the very highest judges in the land do not sometimes make mistakes—sometimes very bad ones.

If we follow that argument, does that mean that we would support the new clauses? If we are moving from that single point of reference—a High Court judge and judicial review—it is surely much safer to move to what is proposed.

The truth is—I said this in my previous speech, which I will not repeat, as instructed by you, Mrs Harris—that neither of the safeguards is strong enough. As it was, the Bill was not strong enough—that has been recognised and changes have been proposed—but neither is the idea of a commissioner.

There is another great problem raised by this set of changes to the Bill: they seem likely to increase the prospect of group-think when it comes to members of the panel. I would argue that that danger has been greatly increased by the move away from the High Court judge model that was originally in the Bill.

When my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley introduced the Bill on Second Reading, she reassured the House that all assisted dying applications would have to be examined by a High Court judge. There were problems with that proposal, which is why she abandoned it. But there was one strength in making a High Court judge the arbiter: the Crown does not appoint High Court judges on the basis of whether they agree with assisted dying. We could all reasonably expect High Court judges to have a range of views on assisted dying; there is no reason I can think of that would mean that High Court judges, as a body, were biased in favour of assisted dying.

Something different will happen if a commissioner selects people to serve on these panels. Anyone serving on a panel will know that they will have to approve some applications for assisted death. We do not know how many applications for assisted death the Government expect to have. We also do not know how many social workers, psychiatrists and lawyers would be unwilling to approve any assisted death applications at all—I do not want to repeat myself, but I will be referring back to psychiatrists in another amendment. However, the number of psychiatrists who are strongly opposed to assisted death is very high, according the Royal College of Psychiatrists. We have also heard strong reservations expressed by the Association of Palliative Care Social Workers. Therefore, many professionals will choose not to sit on these panels, because they will not want to approve any cases. That means that some panel members are likely to end up dealing with dozens of cases per year. That poses the danger that some of the people who sit most on these panels will be advocates of assisted dying and will approve applications that other members may not have.

I thank my hon. Friend for discussing her view of the approach of the proposed panel members. Does she recognise that all three of those professions have professional requirements to act with integrity and in accordance with the law? It is highly unlikely that they will push forward, as she seems to suggest, and risk their professional accreditation.

I am not questioning people’s integrity; I am putting it to the Committee that people have biases. We all have subconscious biases. We have things that we like; we know that that exists, whether it is a subconscious bias or a conscious bias. As human beings, we all have that. In this instance, I am suggesting that if we have members of a panel who choose to be there because they have a fundamental belief, which is different from that of those who oppose assisted dying, there is a risk of subconscious bias and group-think.

rose—

I am happy to take an intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire, and then I will come to my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley.

Order. I call Rachel Hopkins for an intervention, but we need to keep to the point and not labour one particular thing.

The point I was making was that no professional would want to risk their professional accreditation and career by allowing a complete bias to take over any decision making. In fact, I would suggest that some may want to prove their integrity by being involved in these decisions and making them in line with their professional practice.

I disagree with my hon. Friend. Subconscious bias operates in society; this is not about being held to account. People are not doing these things deliberately, but because they have a subconscious bias.

My hon. Friend is making a fine speech. She said that High Court judges make mistakes, which is undoubtedly true. She also said that the panel may be guilty of unconscious bias. Is there any layer of scrutiny that would satisfy her? What does she think about jury trials?

Could the hon. Lady make progress now, please?

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention, but I reject the facetiousness of his point.

Let me speak to the issue of unconscious bias in relation to the proposal before us. In 1992, there was a jury trial, which found my mother guilty of murdering an abusive partner. In 1998, I went to the High Court and put it to three white middle-class judges that my mother could not tell the truth because of the abuse, the dishonour and the concept of izzat, which defined her existence as a woman. They were not capable of believing that, because they did not have that cultural understanding —so, yes, unconscious bias does exist, even in criminal cases in courts of law.

Returning to my argument, I remind hon. Members of the testimony of Dr Ryan Spielvogel from California, who said:

“when I am going through the options with patients who are newly diagnosed with a serious life-threatening illness, I say, ‘Okay, here’s what disease-directed treatment would look like. We can continue with your chemo. Here are some side effects and complications that you might have, and here are the benefits of that. Here’s what palliative care or hospice care would look like.’ Then I say, ‘I don’t know if you know this, but in our state we have this other option for people nearing the end of their lives when they have intolerable suffering. You can ask me to fill a lethal prescription for you to help end your suffering sooner.’…The number of times that people look at me and say, ‘You can do that? That’s an option here?’ is astounding. I would say that nine out of 10 of patients I have conversations with have no idea that that is even legal. If they do not know it is an option, they are never going to ask for it.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 105, Q143.]

I wonder whether I would be comfortable—this is just a personal thing, but I want to put it out there for people to think about—about a doctor such as that, who really supports assisted dying, being on the panel. I am not casting aspersions on him, but I genuinely am unsure.

Of course, the panel will be chaired by lawyers. I would like to remind hon. Members of the evidence of Professor Meredith Blake, who is a senior legal adviser to the Western Australian government on their assisted dying law. Professor Blake’s evidence was quite extraordinary. My hon. Friend the Member for Banbury asked her:

“Does it concern you that a large proportion of people who opted for assisted dying cited being a burden as their reason?”

She replied:

“That is not the evidence that we have got.”

My hon. Friend responded:

“Let me just clarify. The state’s own report in 2023-24 had 35%.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 220, Q284.]

I do not recall having a satisfactory answer from Professor Blake to that question, but please feel free to check Hansard.

If we see a series of questionable decisions by one or more panel member, the only official scrutiny will come from the person who appointed them to do their jobs, and that is not a robust safeguard. Furthermore, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley said earlier that decisions would be unanimous, but that is not entirely correct, and I am happy to point to the relevant bit in the Bill. If two people decide they agree, and the other decides to stay quiet, that would be seen as a unanimous decision, and the panel would proceed. I am happy to point that bit of the Bill out to my hon. Friend, as I would love to see an amendment if one were needed.

I think the point the hon. Lady is making is that each member of the panel has a veto over the decision so, in a sense, there has to be unanimity about the approval. However, she is absolutely right that if two members disagree with one another about any other aspect of their proceedings, including who to invite to give evidence, they could be overruled, so there is not unanimity there.

I completely agree. That is the case in the Bill, which raises concerns.

Finally, Parliament needs to get back into the habit of holding powerful commissioners accountable. There is no mechanism in the Bill for removing a commissioner even if they somehow failed significantly in their duties. We might say to ourselves, “If that happened, they would do the right thing and resign,” or, “They would resign if the Prime Minister said something in public.” I am sorry, but we cannot leave that to chance.

There has been a very telling example recently of just how badly quasi-judicial institutions can fail, and just how hard it is to get their senior leadership to accept responsibility. The Criminal Cases Review Commission mishandled the Andrew Malkinson case. Mr Malkinson was falsely convicted of raping a woman in 2003. She had been raped by another man.

Order. Can the hon. Lady keep to the issue?

This relates to my point, Mrs Harris, I promise you. DNA evidence subsequently proved that Andrew Malkinson was indeed innocent, yet he was allowed to remain in jail.

Members of this House expressed serious disquiet about the conduct of the chairwoman of the CCRC, Helen Pitcher, over the Malkinson case. In July last year, my right hon. Friend the Justice Secretary called for Ms Pitcher to step down, but she refused to do so and remained in office until January. I note that Ms Pitcher remains chairman of the Judicial Appointments Commission—and that is where the link is.

7.00pm

My hon. Friend is saying that there is no mechanism to remove the voluntary assisted dying commissioner. Actually, paragraph 4(5) of new schedule 1 says:

“The Secretary of State may by notice in writing remove a person from the office of Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner if satisfied that the person—

(a) has behaved in a way that is not compatible with their continuing in office”—

I think that addresses a lot of the concerns that she has been expressing—

“or

(b) is unfit, unable or unwilling to properly discharge their functions.”

There is a mechanism in the new schedule that would give the Secretary of State the power to remove the commissioner.

I thank my hon. Friend for pointing that out, and I will look at it, but that was not my understanding.

There are multiple reasons to oppose new clause 21. With it, the Bill will reduce the impartiality that would have been provided by having a High Court judge rule on applications. It will increase the risk that a large number of decisions are taken by people who are enthusiastic proponents of assisted dying, which will reduce patient safety. It will also create a powerful new commissioner, who will appoint panel members and will then rule on whether they have made the right decision. That same commissioner will also be able to decide whether to overturn a panel’s decision to reject an assisted death application. That is a huge amount of power to put in one person’s hands and we should not do so. I urge hon. Members to reject the new clause.

May I say what a privilege it is to have you in the Chair, Mrs Harris? [Laughter.] Clearly, I know how to win and lose an audience.

I rise to speak to amendment (d) to new clause 21, which has been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North. I will start by saying how glad I am that the promoter of the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, has recognised some of the concerns regarding the multidisciplinary panel, and I welcome the improvements that she has made in the new clause.

I am pleased that the panel “must” now hear from the person to whom the referral relates, whereas previously it was the case that the panel “may” hear from them. That is a partial concession, but an important one. It will allow the commissioner to have greater scrutiny over the application and better assess the person’s eligibility for assisted dying.

Amendment (d) is a technical amendment. We have discussed a number of such amendments before in this Committee, many of which have fallen for reasons that I understand, even if I do not agree with them, including on the basis that doctors are already having these conversations and we do not want to police them. The panel stage is brand new; given that and given the level of public scrutiny of the Bill, I make no apology for supporting putting something into primary legislation to say what is expected of this process. It is very important that we make sure from the off that we get things right.

I am deeply concerned about some of the potential oversights in the panel model. The purpose of the panel is to provide meaningful scrutiny of a person’s application. The panel draws on a wider range of experts to assess the complex aspects of the application, such as assessing for coercion and capacity. However, the panel’s ability to fulfil this scrutinising role is in many ways quite limited.

Amendment (d), which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North, would address the significant oversights in new clause 21. It would introduce a far more comprehensive set of requirements for the panel in its review. Those changes are not barriers to access; rather, the amendment would ensure that the panel has a far wider range of information—a theme to which I referred earlier—on which to review the application for an assisted death. Fundamentally, the amendment would give the panel more tools to conduct meaningful scrutiny.

However, let me list what the panel is not required to do under new clause 21. It does not have to hear from one of the two registered medical practitioners. It will hear from the other registered medical practitioner, perhaps via audio link, but it does not have to question them. Likewise, it will hear from the person, perhaps via audio link, but it does not have to question them. The person may have a proxy to sign their declarations, but the panel does not have to hear from or question the proxy. The panel does not have to hear from or question any other person. Let us be clear who that includes: the panel could assess the person’s application without any information from the person’s relatives, family members, friends, social workers or care workers.

New clause 21 states only that the panel

“may ask any person appearing to it to have relevant knowledge or experience to report to it on such matters relating to the person to whom the referral relates as it considers appropriate.”

Subsection (4) makes it clear that, whereas paragraphs (a) to (c) require the panel to hear by live audio from the person seeking assisted dying, the evidence that the panel chooses to take from anybody else could be in written form.

Let me draw out with an example what that might mean in practice. A person is diagnosed with a terminal illness—in this case, heart failure arising from coronary heart disease. Both doctors approve the person’s application for assisted dying, on the balance of probability. The person has a physical disability and asks a proxy—a neighbour, say—to sign off the application. The first doctor speaks to the panel via video link restating the schedule forms and providing no new information. The panel then hears from the person, also via video link. It cannot see the person, but after hearing their statement it decides that it is satisfied that the conditions are met and approves the person’s assisted death.

The panel has not spoken to the second doctor and has not put any questions to the second doctor or to the person applying for an assisted death. Incredibly, the panel has not spoken to the proxy, who may just be someone of good standing in the community. Nor has it spoken to the person’s relatives, to anyone standing to benefit from the person’s death or to anyone in the person’s care. Any one of those people could have concerns that the person is being coerced into an assisted death. They may even have evidence of coercive behaviour. However, at no point is the panel required to consider speaking to any of those people.

Time and again, the Committee has heard from experts that coercion and controlling behaviour can be extremely difficult to detect. Often, the person will not reveal that they are suffering from that form of coercion, yet it is often those who are closest to the sufferer—a close relative, a member of the family or a social worker—who pick up the signals. Any of them could be looking out for the person’s welfare and noticing them becoming more isolated and emotionally manipulated by another. At no point, however, does the panel have to consider hearing from that person. If this Bill is going to do everything to safeguard against the risk of coercion, as everybody on this Committee believes it should, that should change.

The panel must consider listening to the people closest to the person. Amendment (d) to new clause 21, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North, would address those flaws by giving the panel a higher standard of scrutiny. The panel would have to hear from and question both doctors. It would have to question the person, not simply hear from them. If the person has a proxy, as under clause 15, the panel would have to hear from and question that proxy. Crucially, the panel would have to consider hearing from and questioning persons properly interested, and any other person who has provided treatment or care for the person being assessed in relation to that person’s terminal illness. It would also be able to hear from and question any other person whom new clause 21 states can be asked to report to the panel.

The changes in the amendment would significantly improve the scrutiny provided by the multidisciplinary panel. It would provider a broader range and greater detail of evidence for the panel to base its review on. Ultimately, it would make the multidisciplinary review far more meaningful. Why is this greater scrutiny necessary? This is about protecting the vulnerable people who are easily forgotten. The amendment seeks to provide the strongest possible protection for them. This robust and comprehensive scrutiny is necessary to have a better chance of preventing the worst abuses.

I foresee one possible criticism from some hon. Members, which is that the amendment would slow down the decision-making process for people who are at no risk of coercion. That may well be true, but if the amendment is accepted, the panel would have to question both doctors, not just hear from one, and it would have to determine whether to hear from and question other people. In straightforward cases, in which the panel discovers no initial evidence that disquiets it, a small amount of time might be added to the hearing; in cases in which the panel finds evidence that means it may need to dig deeper, there could be a greater delay to the decision.

Personally, I do not see how we can avoid that. If we are serious about having safeguards to protect the most vulnerable, we should and must accept it. The process of vetting applications will take more time on average, and a lot more time in some cases, but the alternative is a simpler and faster system in which it will be much harder for the panel to detect coercion and other disqualifying factors. In that case, the chances will be higher that some coercive or abusive people will find it possible to push people towards an assisted death. Such a system is what we see in new clause 21, as drafted. We face an inescapable trade-off. We cannot lift protection for those who are most vulnerable to coercion because it would make the process easier for people who do not face that risk. I urge hon. Members seriously to consider supporting the amendment.

I rise to speak to two aspects of this group of amendments. The first is the inclusion of social workers. When we first started receiving written evidence, I found the submissions from social workers the most compelling. I agreed with them that their profession has a key role to play in the process. I am pleased that they will feature on the panel: I believe that that will strengthen the safeguards in the Bill.

My second point relates to amendment (a) to new schedule 2, in the name of the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd. I was fortunate to grow up in a Welsh-speaking part of rural north Wales. I am a Welsh speaker, and Welsh is the first language of some of my friends, my neighbours and my family members. It is the language that they dream in, the language they count in and the language that they are most comfortable using, so when it comes to end-of-life conversations it is important that they can use the language in which they are most proficient and fluent.

Should an individual choose to access an assisted death through the medium of Welsh, they should be able to do so without the use of an interpreter. Crucially for the panel, that means that where an individual has chosen that route, the panel will need Welsh proficiency. Welsh speakers have had the right to ask for services in Welsh for years now, so assisted dying should be no different. That is why services in Welsh need to be on the face of the Bill. I wholeheartedly support the amendment and will vote for it if the right hon. Member chooses to press it.

I will not talk for long, because most of my points have already been raised. I welcome the provisions in new schedule 2 on membership of the panel. I was concerned about all patients having access to a psychiatrist and a social worker, so the measures proposed are welcome and reassuring. My reservation, which other hon. Members have raised, is that it would be even better for people to have earlier access to the panel. I am also concerned about whether the panel would have the power to overturn the decisions taken by the two doctors and whether it might be influenced by them.

In addition, will the Health Minister clarify his response to amendment 1? He said that specifying one category of doctor, a registered psychiatrist, would create capacity issues. I hope that that will not be an issue when we have a psychiatrist on the panel. Otherwise, I welcome the proposals.

First, I apologise: I have quite a lot to talk about.

On a point of order, Mrs Harris. I do not know whether this is appropriate, but was there a proposal to adjourn? I am conscious that my hon. Friend is about to make a very long speech.

Yes, there was, but you cannot move the Adjournment while the hon. Lady is still speaking.

I am happy to give way to my hon. Friend.

Order. The Adjournment cannot be moved on an intervention.

As long as I can make another speech, I am comfortable with stopping at this point and giving everyone a break from my voice.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Bambos Charalambous.)

7.16pm

Adjourned till Wednesday 12 March at twenty-five minutes past Nine o’clock.

Written evidence reported to the House

TIAB 419 Nathaniel Dye MBE

TIAB 420 ADF UK

TIAB 421 Dr D. P. Whitehouse (further evidence on BMA Consultants’ Conference motion of 4 March)

TIAB 422 Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh

TIAB 423 Catherine Eden

Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting)

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Wera Hobhouse, † Karl Turner

† Anderson, Callum (Buckingham and Bletchley) (Lab)

† Aquarone, Steff (North Norfolk) (LD)

† Beales, Danny (Uxbridge and South Ruislip) (Lab)

† Bryant, Chris (Minister for Data Protection and Telecoms)

† Collins, Victoria (Harpenden and Berkhamsted) (LD)

† Dearden, Kate (Halifax) (Lab/Co-op)

Entwistle, Kirith (Bolton North East) (Lab)

† Fortune, Peter (Bromley and Biggin Hill) (Con)

† Josan, Gurinder Singh (Smethwick) (Lab)

† Juss, Warinder (Wolverhampton West) (Lab)

† Kumar, Sonia (Dudley) (Lab)

† Macdonald, Alice (Norwich North) (Lab/Co-op)

† McIntyre, Alex (Gloucester) (Lab)

† Obese-Jecty, Ben (Huntingdon) (Con)

† Pearce, Jon (High Peak) (Lab)

† Robertson, Joe (Isle of Wight East) (Con)

† Spencer, Dr Ben (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)

David Weir, Kevin Candy, Sanjana Balakrishnan, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 11 March 2025

(Morning)

[Karl Turner in the Chair]

Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords]

9.25am

Clause 66

The 2018 Act and the UK GDPR

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

It may assist the Committee to know that, when there is no great controversy about a clause and all I am doing is reminding people what is in the clause and the explanatory notes, I will move that the clause stand part formally. We are now starting to discuss part 5 of the Bill, which relates to GDPR. This clause is completely and utterly self-explanatory.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Turner. This part of the Bill relates to GDPR. Although there are some amendments that we will debate later, it makes sensible and long-overdue clarifications with regard to GDPR and the interaction with data protection, particularly through some updates to the use of secondary data for scientific research, which I suspect we will discuss when we come to the next clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 66 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 67

Meaning of research and statistical purposes

I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 67, page 75, line 26, leave out

“and that is conducted in the public interest”.

This amendment removes words from new paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the UK GDPR (meaning of processing for the purposes of scientific research). The words were inserted at Report stage in the Lords.

The UK has a proud tradition of innovative research. Our researchers are at the forefront in fields from quantum computing to medicine—for example, leading on pioneering vaccine development during the covid-19 pandemic. Scientific research can bring life-changing benefits to our society and economy. Given that importance, the UK data protection framework contains certain accommodations for processing personal data for research purposes while maintaining key safeguards. The clause, as proposed by their lordships, would require an up-front public interest test for processing to be considered as scientific research and eligible for these accommodations. We disagree with that.

We agree with wanting to avoid misuse of the term “scientific research”, but as the Royal Society has said clearly, the reasonableness test that is now in the Bill provides adequate protection against that. The new test, provided by the Lords, would also be at odds with the internationally recognised Frascati definition, which does not mention an up-front public interest test.

Such a test would be a new burden on many researchers. The Royal Society is concerned that that could have a negative effect on the conduct of research. The Government agree and are especially concerned about the impact on basic and curiosity driven research. The public benefits from such research may not be known at the time, yet with hindsight may be overwhelming. Many of the great discoveries in scientific history, from penicillin to the electron, originated from research that had no anticipated public interest benefit. No one could know how valuable they would be to us now. Even the mRNA-based vaccines that saved millions of lives during the covid-19 pandemic drew on curiosity-driven research that for years had had no practical applications.

That is research that we should be supporting, not stifling. An up-front public interest test could have a chilling effect on it, which is not in the long-term public interest. Our amendment would therefore remove the public interest test inserted by their lordships.

I listened carefully to the Minister’s remarks on the Government’s position on the public interest test, which was extensively debated in the other place. I have a great deal of sympathy with what their lordships were trying to achieve in parts of that amendment. We are talking about the secondary use of data for scientific research and, as I understand it, the public interest test is used in other types of scientific research tests—for example, with public health data. Therefore this is not something which is completely alien to the concept of defining scientific research. However, I do concede there is an issue with how one can define scientific research.

I think what people are nervous about—particularly in some of the conversations I have around this new definition of scientific research for use for secondary data processing—is this being hijacked by artificial intelligence data companies as a way of getting around some of the challenges with using big datasets for which they do not necessarily have licensing arrangements. I know we are going to come on to that later in the Bill. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain his thoughts and considerations about removing this public interest test. How would that interact with some of the concerns about AI and data use?

From a personal perspective, my concept of scientific research has an altruistic component to it. At least with the scientific research with which I was involved, the whole point was that it was information that is shared freely. Clearly there are challenges and considerations on which one needs to focus when it comes to research being done for commercial benefit. I know part of the debate in the other place was about commercial versus non-commercial research. It is important that scientific research can be commercial. In fact, it must be. However, I appreciate that there is a sentiment that their lordships were putting forward as part of the test.

I would be grateful if the Minister could address, first, some of the concerns around AI companies and secondly how we can capture the essence of scientific research so that when people are do secondary data analysis it is done properly. When it comes to the audit component, a lot of this data analysis is people marking their own homework. Some of the data is not going through human rights committees and being scrutinised in that sense. What assurances can the Minister give that the process will operate properly and that research that is scientific will be legitimately so once these clauses are passed?

First, the hon. Gentleman is right that there are other areas where there is a public interest test. In those other areas it is actually very narrow, however. The public interest test is currently only applied to research using special category data under schedule 1 to the Data Protection Act 2018 and public health data. It is quite specific. This is why we are nervous about extending the test across the whole of data protection. It is appropriate, we think, to have that extra protection for those particularly sensitive areas, but we think it would be disproportionate to make all researchers meet that standard, regardless of the type of data they are using.

The hon. Gentleman mentions AI companies, and the matter was of course raised in the Lords. It is worth reminding the Committee that the clause narrows rather than expands the definition of scientific research. As the provisions of the Bill make clear, web scrapers seeking to reuse personal data for purposes such as training AI models must have a lawful basis. Before even considering the meaning of scientific research, a web scraper would need to pass the balancing test to use the legitimate interest ground. The Information Commissioner’s Office outcomes report, published last year, emphasised that:

“Web scraping for generative AI training is a high-risk, invisible processing activity. Where insufficient transparency measures contribute to people being unable to exercise their rights, generative AI developers are likely to struggle to pass the balancing test.”

In other words, AI companies should not be doing precisely that which he is concerned they would.

The Minister says that the changes in the clause narrow the scientific test. That certainly was not my understanding and I would be grateful if he could clarify. Currently, under scientific research, only three criteria can be used under GDPR: statistical purposes, archiving, and genealogical-type purposes. The clause expands secondary data use under GDPR quite substantially.

If an area of research does not currently count as scientific research, it will not do so under the Bill. Researchers will benefit from having a clearer definition in legislation that reflects the language buried in the recitals and the current ICO guidance. We believe that improving clarity will reduce uncertainty, the risk of misinterpretations and misapplication of the law. The Government will of course monitor the reform’s impact and how researchers navigate the data protection framework. We think that will help us better understand if further changes are required.

The fundamental point is that their lordships inserted a public interest line that we are seeking to take out. They inserted it because they believed it would mean that no data would be used in a way that did not lead to eventual good outcomes. The truth is that when someone starts a piece of research based on curiosity they might have no idea what the final outcome will be. That is an important part of how most researchers work, whether in a commercial or non-commercial setting. That is why the Royal Society has unambiguously stated that if we retain their lordships’ public interest provision, it will have a chilling effect on research in the UK. That is why I commend the amendment to the Committee.

The matter turns on how we define public interest. I appreciate the concerns about the clause. Being a scientific purist, I could argue that even blue-sky research could be justified as in the public interest, provided that we all benefit from the fruits of that knowledge when it is shared. Notwithstanding that point, I will go back to the Minister’s comment. I understand that the point of the clause is to expand the definition of scientific research from the currently narrow criteria under GDPR, so there will be research that is currently not scientific research that will be permitted as a consequence of the clause.

I will try one more time to persuade the hon. Member, but I will be repeating myself. The Government are not expanding the meaning of scientific research. The Bill’s definition is completely in line with present ICO guidance, which states that commercial organisations can also carry out scientific research. Scientific research conducted by commercial organisations can have a life-changing impact, as many hon. Members have noted, but the definition does not cover any commercial activity: it only includes activities that could reasonably be viewed as scientific research.

Amendment 13 agreed to.

Clause 67, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 68 and 69 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 70

Lawfulness of processing

I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 70, page 78, leave out lines 15 to 19.

This amendment would remove subsections (2)(b) and (c) from the Bill which would create a new lawful ground for processing personal data by way of inserting a new Article into the UK GDPR.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 53, in clause 70, page 78, line 17, after “interest” insert “, excluding personal health data”.

This amendment would exclude personal health data from being a recognised legitimate interest.

Amendment 50, in clause 70, leave out from line 24 on page 78 to line 32 on page 79.

This amendment omits subsection (4), (5) and (6) which make amendments to UK GDPR to define certain data processing activities as “recognised legitimate interests”.

Clause 70 introduces “recognised legitimate interests” as a new basis for processing personal data. Although the Liberal Democrats recognise the potential of the benefits of data, we have serious concerns that clause 70, as it stands, grants excessive and unchecked power to the Secretary of State, risking the erosion of fundamental rights. Our key message is that trust and innovation go hand in hand. For us to advance and share the benefits of innovation, we must foster trust.

In the name of constructive opposition, I will talk about the several amendments that we have tabled—amendments 49, 50, 53, new clause 5 and new clause 22, which was also tabled by colleagues in the other place. These amendments are crucial to ensure vital safeguards, ensure proper parliamentary oversight and demand greater transparency. They respond directly to concerns raised on Second Reading. Moreover, they echo the concerns of new civil society organisations, including—

Order. The hon. Lady can only speak to amendments 49, 53 and 50 at this point.

In the interest of time, I would like to talk about all the amendments together.

You cannot talk about them all at once because of how they are grouped.

I shall talk about amendments 49, 53 and 50, which would remove the core of clause 70 that allows the direct establishment of “recognised legitimate interests”. Clause 70 risks bypassing essential parliamentary scrutiny, a point underscored by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Constitution Committee, which expressed concerns about the lack of parliamentary oversight. The amendments are essential to ensure that the Data (Use and Access) Bill fosters innovation responsibly without sacrificing fundamental data protection. I urge Government to look over the proposals, which would help improve the adoption and inclusion of growing technology and its benefits. I would also welcome any proposals to improve this scrutiny when we reach Report.

The new lawful ground of recognised legitimate interest in clause 70 and schedule 4 have been designed to give organisations greater confidence when processing personal data for important public interest objectives, such as preventing crime, safeguarding vulnerable individuals and protecting national security. They also ensure that non-public bodies can share information with public authorities where it is necessary and proportionate to do so without having to conduct a complex balancing test in situations where timely action is essential.

Amendment 49 would remove that provision, making it harder for organisations to share data confidently and swiftly for those public interest purposes. I recognise that the hon. Lady might be concerned that the removal of the need to do a detailed legitimate interest balancing test in this narrow set of circumstances could reduce protections, but strong safeguards remain in place, as was recognised in the House of Lords, which did not approve such an amendment. Any processing must still be necessary and proportionate and comply with data protection principles under UK GDPR to ensure that individuals’ rights continue to be protected.

Amendment 50 would remove the Secretary of State’s ability to amend the list of recognised legitimate interests using regulations, and delete the list itself from schedule 4 of the Bill. We believe that the ability of the Secretary of State to amend the list is a necessary safeguard to future-proof the framework. This power is not unrestricted. It is subject to strict safeguards, including parliamentary approval by the affirmative resolution procedure and the requirement that any additions must serve public interest objectives under article 23(1) of the UK GDPR. Removing the power would make it more difficult to adapt the framework over time.

I have also considered amendment 53, which would prevent health data being processed under the new lawful ground, and I would argue that it conflicts with amendment 49. Health data would be processed under this new ground only in so far as that was necessary for one of the specified recognised legitimate interests in schedule 4 to the Bill. Any processing of health data would also have to meet one of the relevant criteria for processing specific category data in article 9 of UK GDPR and schedule 1 to the Data Protection Act 2018. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Lady will feel able to withdraw her amendments.

I rise to speak to amendment 53. I thank the Minister for his comments, and it is a pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Mr Turner. I support the words of my hon. Friend the Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted. I am concerned not by the unchecked power of the Secretary of State under this regulation—we of course have precedents to go with under GDPR—but it is the specific and extremely high-grade personal health data that remains a concern for me.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 5—Parliamentary approval for changes to data safeguards—

“(1) Where the Secretary of State proposes to exercise any power under this Act to amend, vary or remove a safeguard relating to—

(a) recognised legitimate interests,

(b) automated decision-making,

(d) any data subject right provided under the UK GDPR,

the Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament draft regulations containing the proposed changes and an explanatory statement.

(2) The explanatory statement must include evidence from consultations with the Information Commission, data subjects, and relevant stakeholders, and an assessment of any impact on data adequacy with the European Union where they have occurred.

(3) The draft regulations referred to in subsection (1) are subject to affirmative procedure.”

This new clause would prevent ministerial changes being made to data safeguards without parliamentary debate and approval.

New clause 22—Statement on changes to recognise legitimate interest—

“(1) The Secretary of State must publish a statement outlining the purpose of any additions or variations to what constitutes a recognised legitimate interest if they exercise powers contained under section 70.

(2) This statement must reference—

(a) the purpose of the addition or variation,

(b) whether it is appropriate to specific data controllers, and

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a statement if they add or vary what constitutes a recognised legitimate interest under powers contained in section 70.

Schedule 4.

9.45am

Clause 70 and schedule 4 introduce a new lawful ground for processing personal data under article 6 of UK GDPR, allowing organisations to process data for recognised legitimate interests without conducting a balancing test. The aim is to provide legal certainty and facilitate faster data sharing for key public interest purposes such as crime prevention and safeguarding.

New clause 5 sets out that any future changes to data safeguards, including those related to recognised legitimate interests, automated decision making and special category data, must be subject to greater scrutiny in Parliament. It is essential that significant changes to our data protection go through that democratic process. New clause 22 would require the Secretary of State to publish a statement explaining the purpose, scope and timeline of any additional variations to recognised legitimate interests, again supporting greater transparency and accountability.

The new clauses are there to help improve public trust around data and improve the adoption and inclusion of the growing range of technology and its benefits. They are for the Government to look at when thinking about how we ensure that we bring people along with us. They will help to maintain trust and ensure that we have safeguards in line with recognised legitimate interests. If we are to accept clause 70, the Government must again assure us that robust checks and balances are truly in place.

New clause 5 seeks to strengthen parliamentary oversight of regulations that could amend the recognised legitimate interest list or the provisions on automated decision making and special category data, which we will debate in detail later. The regulation-making powers in the clause are already subject to appropriate safeguards, and have been designed with retaining our EU adequacy decisions at the forefront of our mind—we will return to the topic of EU adequacy in more detail when we reach new clause 2. It is important to respect the European Commission’s processes and its discretion in how its adequacy assessment is undertaken.

New clause 22 would require the Secretary of State to publish a statement explaining the purpose of any changes to the recognised legitimate interest list, to whom they would apply and for how long. As I think I explained earlier on a previous amendment, any draft regulations laid before Parliament under these provisions will be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum, which would lay out precisely the things the hon. Lady seeks. On that basis, I hope she will not push her two new clauses to a vote.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 70 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 4 agreed to.

Clause 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clauses 72 to 76 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 77

Information to be provided to data subjects

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 78 and 79 stand part.

Clause 77 strongly risks bypassing individual data rights by watering down transparency of the processing of personal data for reasons such as research, archiving in the public interest or statistical purposes. Although we welcome efforts to modernise data law, modernisation should not come at the cost of transparency—a cornerstone of public trust. Clause 77 risks seriously watering down rights regarding how our data is collected and processed.

Organisations such as Justice, the British Medical Association and the National Data Guardian share our concerns that this clause erodes transparency regarding the use of patient information. The National Data Guardian has specifically warned that weakening transparency obligations could negatively impact people’s trust in how our health and social care data is used for research, potentially impairing important data initiatives. Those concerns are also shared by the British Medical Association.

While we still face a crisis in the provision of health and social care, I strongly welcome all possibilities to unlock innovation to achieve healthcare benefits, as already discussed today. I welcome that innovation for my constituent Catherine in Harpenden, who was diagnosed with ovarian cancer, which is often overlooked in women; for Andy and Sarah in Redbourn, who lost their daughter at a painfully young age to a brain tumour; and for the families and others across Harpenden and Berkhamsted who are awaiting diagnosis and treatment. It is also for them, and to ensure that we unlock those healthcare benefits by ensuring that more data is used, that I caution against clause 77.

The clause introduces exemptions from providing information to data subjects where that would require “disproportionate effort”. However, it is hard to see how that can improve transparency. That failure to be transparent risks that loss of public trust—a message I will repeat again and again. I urge Ministers to listen to those concerns and to remove clause 77 to ensure that we have genuine public trust and crucial data protection standards, as already discussed today.

I am afraid I do not accept the characterisation the hon. Lady has put on the clause. There is currently an exemption from notifying data subjects if it would constitute a disproportionate effort to do so or prove impossible—obviously, there are cases where it is impossible to notify somebody. At the moment, that exemption can be used only when data was not collected directly from the data subject. Clause 77 will create a new exemption for when data was collected directly from the data subject. It will be limited to processing only for research purposes, and only when there is a change of purpose.

We believe that that will help longitudinal studies that originally obtained data from data subjects but that would struggle to notify them about a change in purpose of the study—for instance, due to having lost contact over years or due to a deterioration in the data subject’s condition. The clause is therefore essential to our research facilities in the UK, and I urge Members to support it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 77 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 78 and 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 80

Automated decision-making

I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 80, page 95, line 19, at end insert—

“(3) To qualify as meaningful human involvement, a review must be performed by a person with the necessary competence, training, authority to alter the decision and analytical understanding of the data.”

This amendment would make clear that in the context of new Article 22A of the UK GDPR, for human involvement to be considered as meaningful a review must be carried out by a competent person.

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 23—Definition of meaningful human involvement in automated decision-making—

“The Secretary of State must, in conjunction with the Information Commission and within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, produce a definition of what constitutes meaningful human involvement in automated decision-making or clearly set out their reasoning as to why a definition is not required.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to produce a definition of meaningful human involvement in automated decision-making, in collaboration with the Information Commission, or clearly set out reasoning why this is not required.

Amendment 51 directly addresses the ambiguity around meaningful human involvement in automated decision making. Clause 80 raises significant concerns around the future of automated decision making. Although the Liberal Democrats recognise the potential of data to drive innovation, we must remember that, behind those automated decisions, are people’s lives. Amendment 51 directly addresses that ambiguity and seeks to ensure that any human review is

“performed by a person with the necessary competence, training, authority to alter the decision and analytical understanding of the data.”

That would help to clarify the crucial definition of “meaningful”.

I am grateful to the hon. Lady because automated decision making and the precise definition of “meaningful human involvement” were a key issue in previous versions of the Bill, and she will know that we have changed this version from the previous one.

Our reforms make it clear that decisions

“based solely on automated processing”

are ones that lack meaningful human involvement. The terminology we have introduced in this version of the Bill goes beyond the current UK GDPR and Data Protection Act wording to prevent cursory human involvement being used to, effectively, rubber-stamp decisions that have been made by automated decision processes.

The point at which human involvement becomes meaningful is of course context-specific, which is why we have not sought to be prescriptive in the Bill. The Information Commissioner’s Office already sets out in its guidance its interpretation that meaningful human involvement must be active. Someone—a human being—must review the decision and have the discretion to alter it before it is applied. The Government’s introduction of the term “meaningful” to primary legislation does not change that definition, and we are supportive of the ICO’s guidance in this space.

As such, the Government agree on the importance of the ICO continuing to provide its views on the interpretation of terms used in the legislation. Our reforms do not remove the ICO’s ability to do that or to advise Parliament or the Government if it considers that the law needs clarification. Broadly speaking, I agree with the hon. lady, which is why I do not think her amendment is necessary.

10.00am

I thank the Minister for those points. I am happy to withdraw the amendment, but it is important to highlight that that person needs to have the necessary competence, training and authority around those decisions, so that that meaningful human involvement is very clear.

Before seeking permission to withdraw the amendment, do you want to speak to new clause 23?

New clause 23 mandates that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Information Commissioner, must produce a clear definition of meaningful human involvement within six months or justify why a definition is not required. Again, that is to ensure that the term “meaningful human involvement” is not just a hollow gesture. I welcome the Minister ’s remarks clarifying the issue, but it is crucial, if we are to get automated decision making right, that these things are defined and clear for everyone involved.

I will briefly add that the Information Commissioner already provides guidance in this sphere. We do not want to prevent the Information Commissioner from doing that in the future. The hon. Member is absolutely right: it has to be meaningful human involvement, and we think we have the balance right in the Bill.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 6.

New clause 1—Requirements of public sector organisations on use of algorithmic or automated decision-making systems—

“(1) No later than the commencement of use of a relevant algorithmic or automated decision-making system, a public authority must—

(a) give notice on a public register that the decision rendered will be undertaken in whole, or in part, by an algorithmic or automated decision-making system,

(b) make arrangements for the provision of a meaningful and personalised explanation to affected individuals of how and why a decision affecting them was made, including meaningful information about the decision-making processes, and an assessment of the potential consequences of such processing for the data subject, as prescribed in regulations to be made by the Secretary of State,

(i) monitor the outcomes of the algorithmic or automated decision-making system to safeguard against unintentional outcomes and to verify compliance with this Act and other relevant legislation, and

(ii) validate that the data collected for, and used by, the system is relevant, accurate, up-to-date, and in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018, and

(d) make arrangements to conduct regular audits and evaluations of algorithmic and automated decision-making systems, including the potential risks of those systems and steps to mitigate such risks, as prescribed in regulations to be made by the Secretary of State.

(2) ‘Algorithmic decision system’ or ‘automated decision system’ mean any technology that either assists or replaces the judgement of human decision-makers.

(3) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”

This new clause would require the public sector to provide increased transparency to service users in informing when automated decision making had been used. It would also require them to develop processes to monitor the outcomes from utilising automated decision-making.

New clause 4—Register of algorithmic tools used in public sector decision-making—

“(1) The Secretary of State must establish and maintain, or arrange for the establishment and maintenance of, a public register of all automated or semi-automated systems used by public authorities to make, or materially influence, decisions affecting the rights, entitlements or legitimate expectations of individuals.

(2) A public authority that uses or intends to use an automated or semi-automated decision-making tool must notify the Secretary of State of—

(a) the name or brief description of the tool,

(b) the decision or class of decisions in which it is used,

(d) details of any meaningful human review required by law or policy.

(3) The information set out in subsection (2) must be submitted to the register prior to the deployment of any automated or semi-automatic decision-making tool by a public authority.

(4) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passage of this Act, publish guidance on compliance with this section, following consultation with the Information Commission.”

This new clause would create a publicly accessible register for AI and algorithmic tools in the public sector.

New clause 7—Information regarding high-risk AI decisions—

“(1) Where a decision based wholly or partly on automated processing, including AI or machine learning, has a legal or similarly significant effect on a data subject, that data subject has the right to request the following information from a data controller—

(a) an explanation of the reasons and criteria used by the automated processing to reach the decision,

(b) a description of the principal factors or features that most significantly influenced the outcome, and

(2) In this section, ‘legal or similarly significant effect’ includes decisions affecting an individual’s access to credit, employment, insurance, healthcare, social security, or other key public or private sector services.

(3) The Secretary of State must by regulations define the criteria and thresholds for ‘high-risk AI decisions’ to which this section applies, following consultation with the Information Commission, technical experts, civil society bodies, and such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) Regulations under subsection (3) are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”

This new clause would give individuals a right to obtain from data controllers an explanation of the key factors determining an AI outcome and provide a mechanism to appeal or request a human review of “high-impact” automated decisions.

New clause 24—Register of algorithmic tools used in public sector decision-making—

(2) A public authority that uses or intends to use an automated or semi-automated decision-making tool must notify the Secretary of State of—

(a) the name or brief description of the tool;

(b) the decision or class of decisions in which it is used;

(d) details of any meaningful human review required by law or policy.

(3) A public authority must not deploy an automated or semi-automated decision-making tool unless the information specified in subsection (2) has been submitted to the register.

(4) The Secretary of State must publish guidance on compliance with this section, following consultation with the Information Commission.”

This new clause would create a publicly accessible register for AI and algorithmic tools in the public sector.

New clause 26—Provision of explanations for high-risk AI decisions—

(a) a concise, explanation of the reasons and criteria used by the automated processing to reach the decision;

(b) a description of the principal factors or features that most significantly influenced the outcome; and

(2) In this section, ‘legal or similarly significant effect’ includes (but is not limited to) decisions affecting an individual’s access to credit, employment, insurance, healthcare, social security, or other key public or private sector services.

(4) Regulations under subsection (3) are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”

As we have several provisions here, it might be worth me making some comments. Clause 80 strikes the right balance between helping organisations to make the most of emerging technologies that drive up economic growth and productivity, while maintaining public confidence. Organisations will be able to make decisions that have significant effects for individuals based solely on automated processes in wider circumstances than presently, but they must implement stringent safeguards.

Those safeguards include individuals’ right to challenge and obtain human intervention if they are not satisfied with the decision. Where law enforcement agencies process personal data for a law enforcement purpose, they will be able to apply an exemption to the safeguards in very limited circumstances, such as to safeguard national security. Where that happens, a human must reconsider that decision as soon as reasonably practicable after it is taken, and that review must be meaningful. For the intelligence services, where entirely automated decision making is used, we are making clarifications to provide greater confidence to controllers and the public.

Schedule 6 contains minor and consequential amendments to UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act. Those amendments repeal and replace references to the current rules on automated decision making with the reformed rules in clause 80 of the Bill to provide legal clarity.

On new clauses 1, 4 and 24, the Government’s algorithmic transparency recording standard, or ATRS, enables public authorities to publish information on how and why they are using algorithmic tools. That includes a description of the human role in the wider operational process of which the tool is part. More than 50 ATRS records are now published in the repository, with more to follow shortly. Where these amendments seek to ensure that such tools are evaluated, the blueprint for modern digital government, which was laid in Parliament in January, makes it clear that part of its role will be to offer specialist assurance support, including a service to rigorously test models and products before release. I hope this provides reassurance to the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted.

I will address new clauses 7 and 26 together, as they intend to achieve the same effect. I would again like to reassure hon. Members—I am trying to offer a lot of reassurance to the hon. Lady and to the hon. Member for North Norfolk—that the data protection framework has stringent safeguards in place for solely automated decision making. The UK GDPR transparency obligations already require organisations to notify individuals about the existence of solely automated decision making and to provide meaningful information about the logic involved.

Under our reforms, after a decision has been made, organisations must also provide data subjects with information about that decision. These information requirements enable individuals to exercise the safeguards I mentioned earlier, and are in addition to the wider transparency requirements of the framework. The safeguards in the reformed article 22 are unnecessary for partly automated decision making, since these decisions already include meaningful human involvement by definition.

When it comes to high-risk decisions, there are already additional requirements for processing that can result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals, including automated decision making. Controllers must carry out an impact assessment for such processing activities and consult the Information Commissioner’s Office where such an assessment indicates a high risk to individuals in the absence of effective measures. That process ensures that potential risks are identified and addressed. I therefore hope that the hon. Members for Harpenden and Berkhamsted and for North Norfolk feel that they do not need to press their new clauses to a vote.

This is a really interesting set of clauses. The debate that we are having, and that they had in the other place, on automated decision making is particularly interesting.

Of course, automated decision making is here. It is everywhere in every part of our lives. I was just looking at the Spotify app on my phone, and my daylist suggested that I start off by listening to Front Line Assembly, which is an industrial metal band. It is probably because, going into the data Bill Committee on a Tuesday morning, I need something to get me started.

Don’t get me started.

Ah, the temptation.

The point about automated decision making is that decisions can be made about people without their involvement, which can have substantial consequences, particularly when decisions are made in the public sector. Of course, automated decision making takes place all the time, day in and day out. We saw it on a huge scale during the covid pandemic when people had to sign up to universal credit, as there were checks on people’s basic characteristics and assets to assess their eligibility. Those decisions had quite a substantial impact on people, but the data points were actually quite simple and straightforward. As I understand it, no particular concern was raised about automated decision making in that context, apart from a few examples where people’s circumstances were remarkably unique.

The purpose of the Bill is to scale up, particularly when it comes to AI and more sophisticated decision making. We think the new clauses seek to place onerous and unnecessary obligations on Government bodies and public authorities. New clause 1, among other things, would require public bodies to give notice on a public register for each and every function they perform where automated decision making is used. New clause 4 would oblige the Secretary of State to put in place and maintain a public register of all semi-automated or fully automated decision-making tools used by public authorities in relation to individuals, with public bodies being precluded from using such tools in advance of their registration.

New clause 7 would provide service users with a range of powers to request information from data controllers in relation to the workings of wholly or partly automated decisions, and to purportedly high-risk decisions. I am amazed by the provisions suggested in new clauses 7 and 26 by the hon. Members for Harpenden and Berkhamsted and for North Norfolk. They seem to give quite extensive discretionary powers to the Secretary of State to define high-risk decisions and regulate them accordingly. I was surprised to see the extent of the powers handed over to the Secretary of State by these new clauses.

The new clauses are especially burdensome and unnecessary, given the widespread use of automated decision making for initial assessments in the Department for Work and Pensions, as I alluded to earlier. Automated decision making is a subject of significant debate, and clause 80 includes more safeguarding measures in proposed new article 22C of the UK GDPR. Those safeguards include requirements on data controllers to provide information to data subjects about significant decisions being taken through solely automated processing, the right to contest those decisions and the right to seek human intervention at the request of the data subject.

Our view is that clause 80, as drafted, provides a proportionate approach to the protection of individual rights, and that these tools will help with potential speed and, importantly, efficiency gains, which I mentioned earlier with regard to the use of automated decision making for universal credit in the response to covid. The basic functions of Government and public authorities rely on widespread automated decision making.

I like to think that the Liberal Democrats are aligned on automated decision making and AI being an exciting opportunity for this country, but it is a fundamental shift. It is our job as a constructive Opposition to put forward proposals for consideration, so that there is proper scrutiny and ideas to ensure we take the public with us. All our proposals are made in that light.

Behind these decisions are real people’s lives. I have a family in Wheathampstead who are desperate for a social home to fit their family life. I have someone from Tring—I will call him John—who says he has been systematically failed since high school. His universal credit claim was closed because he did not upload the correct documents, and he feels that a lack of human understanding of why he was unable to do so was a barrier to getting the help he needed. Another case involves HMRC, with a constituent being taxed on pension income he is not actually receiving—it was only after hours of support from my team and the Department that we were able to turn his case around.

The point is that it will be very difficult for people to fix errors that result from automated decision making if there is not enough transparency. We have to get that balance right. The Secretary of State’s power to define crucial terms such as “meaningful human involvement” and “similarly significant effect” creates uncertainty and the potential for watering down protections.

Clause 80 seeks to update the safeguards around automated decision making, but organisations such as Justice and the Open Rights Group have real worries that it weakens those vital safeguards by broadening the scope for purely automated decisions. Furthermore, the considerable powers granted to the Secretary of State to amend or set aside the safeguards through secondary legislation create a concerning lack of parliamentary oversight.

It is with these reservations in mind, and as a constructive Opposition, that we tabled these new clauses. New clause 1 would place a clear requirement on public sector organisations regarding the use of algorithmic automated decision making. It would demand public notice of their use and the provision of meaningful and personalised explanations to affected individuals about how and why a decision was made. I have already raised some cases that the provision would impact, and I am sure we all have similar cases in our inboxes. New clause 1 directly tackles the concerns about transparency and the right to an explanation—a principle that the Liberal Democrats firmly believe in.

New clause 4 proposes the creation of a publicly accessible register of AI and algorithmic tools in the public sector. New clause 7 seeks to empower individuals by granting them the right to request comprehensive information on decisions based wholly or partly on automated processes that have a legal or similarly significant effect on them. This aligns with the Liberal Democrats’ commitment to ensuring accountability and redress.

New clause 24 proposes the establishment of a public register of all automated or semi-automated systems used by public authorities to make or materially influence decisions. These measures would help to promote transparency and enable public scrutiny, which is something that this House and its Members are here to do, either through legislation or for our constituents on a daily basis. It is important that we ask questions about these increasingly influential technologies.

Finally, new clause 26 would reinforce the right to an explanation by requiring data controllers to provide, on request, clear explanations of high-risk AI decisions. We need to ensure that meaningful human involvement remains central.

The new clauses are not intended to stifle innovation, but to ensure that the evolution of data use is guided by principles of fairness, transparency and accountability. We must ensure that data truly is the new gold for everyone, and that individuals’ rights and protections are not devalued in the process. Indeed, innovation is often better promoted by guidelines. The new clauses represent our commitment to ensuring that clause 80 truly modernises our data laws without sacrificing the fundamental safeguards that protect everyone, including the people behind those decisions. I thank the Minister for his consideration.

I am not sure that I have a great deal to add. I feel caught between the rocks of “You are going too far” and “You are not going far enough,” which suggests to me that what we are advocating is probably proportionate and sensible, so I resist the new clauses and support clause 80.

I simply add that I do not have Spotify on my phone because I choose not to stream—I prefer to pay for my music—but I note that my ministerial podcast is available on Spotify.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 80 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 6 agreed to.

Clause 81

Data protection by design: children’s higher protection matters

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to consider new clause 21—Age of consent for social media data processing—

“(1) The UK GDPR is as amended as follows.

(2) In Article 8 of the UK GDPR (Conditions applicable to child’s consent in relation to information society services)

After paragraph 1 insert —

‘(1A) References to 13 years old in paragraph 1 shall be read as 16 years old in the case of social networking services processing personal data for the purpose of delivering personalised content, including targeted advertising and algorithmically curated recommendations.

(1B) For the purposes of paragraph 1A “social networking services” means any online service that—

(a) allows users to create profiles and interact publicly or privately with other users, and

(b) facilitates the sharing of user-generated content, including text, images, or videos, with a wider audience.

(1C) Paragraph 1B does not apply to—

(a) Educational platforms and learning management systems provided in recognised educational settings, where personal data processing is solely for educational purposes.

(b) Health and well-being services, including NHS digital services, mental health support applications, and crisis helplines, where personal data processing is necessary for the provision of care and support’”.

This new clause would raise the age for processing personal data in the case of social networking services from 13 to 16.

10.15am

I think the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge thinks I was trying to calumniate him earlier by suggesting that he does not pay for his music, but I was not making that suggestion at all.

Clause 81 amends article 25 of the UK GDPR to strengthen the obligations for providers of information society services likely to be accessed by children, such as social media platforms and streaming services, by requiring them to actively consider the protection of children’s data when designing their services, and to ensure that appropriate organisational and technical measures are in place to safeguard young users.

The clause sets out the higher protection matters that ISS providers must consider when designing their services, including how best to protect and support children when processing their personal data. The duty also requires data controllers to consider the fact that children merit specific protection because they may be less aware of the risks and their rights, and the fact that children’s needs vary with age and development. When considering how to comply with the new duty, ISS providers will be greatly aided by the age-appropriate design code issued by the Information Commissioner’s Office, which sets out comprehensive guidance for ISS providers on using personal data in a way that complies with data protection principles and respects the best interests of children.

New clause 21, in the name of the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted, would in effect increase the age of consent for social media from 13 to 16. I am happy to listen to her comments, but much of this was debated in Friday morning’s private Member’s Bill debate—I think that is partly what led her to table the new clause—and in the Westminster Hall debate a few weeks ago. I am happy to respond to her comments, but we will be resisting her new clause.

At the heart of new clause 21 is the aim to restrict access to certain social media platforms by children under the age of 16. I am very sympathetic to the motivations of the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted.

I just want to clarify that the new clause is about the age of data consent, not access to social media. I will cover that in my speech, but I want to ensure that is clear.

I thank the hon. Lady for that clarification. Nevertheless, I think there is an overlap with the debate that took place in the Chamber last Friday on the ballot Bill introduced by the hon. Member for Whitehaven and Workington (Josh MacAlister), which has been dubbed the safer phones Bill. We all took part in that debate.

During Friday’s debate, I highlighted the mounting research and evidence on the harm to adolescents’ mental health from social media platforms. Policy in this area needs to be developed based on the best data and evidence. In that regard, we also need to learn from the roll-out of the Online Safety Act 2023 and the implementation of Ofcom’s guidance on putting in place age assurance in relation to particular types of content and data.

I welcome reports that the Government intend to commission the chief medical officer to review the harms associated with this area. It is disappointing that the Minister did not give a firm commitment on that from the Dispatch Box last Friday. Will he take the opportunity to do so today?

I start with the young people at the heart of this. We have indeed debated this time and again, and it is important that we keep that going. I have been on a Safe Screens tour, speaking to young people across Harpenden and Berkhamsted—from Ashlyns school in Berkhamsted to St George’s school in Harpenden, and beyond. Girl guides have spoken to me of their concerns about online bullying and harmful content. When I visited local schools on my Safe Screens tour, young men told me that social media has shown them extreme content that they do not want to see, and despite their efforts to block or ban it, the algorithm brings it back. Young women have told me of their worries about the growing misogyny in online content. Together, young women and men alike have talked about the impact on their body image, bullying and the amount of time sucked up by social media—time they want to spend doing other things.

There is mounting evidence of the negative effects of our children’s exposure to an unsafe online environment. Every day, we hear the concerns of parents, the anxieties of teachers and, crucially, the voices of young people themselves, all crying out for action to ensure their safety online and calling for stronger regulation of their online experience. I realise that the Online Safety Act is moving forward, but it will not go far enough.

This is a matter of profound importance for the wellbeing of our nation’s children and young people. The digital world is now the fabric of our lives and the lives of young people—it is where they learn, connect and seek entertainment—and yet, as the digital landscape expands, so do the risks they face. As 5Rights highlights,

“the enormous potential of technology can only be realised when it is designed with children in mind”.

Parliament now has an opportunity, perhaps even an obligation, to help shape that technology. It is disappointing that the safer phones Bill was watered down, so we have tabled new clause 21 as a crucial step to strengthen protections for young people in the digital age. It seeks to bring UK data law in line with many of our European neighbours, by raising the minimum age at which internet companies can collect, process and store a user’s data without explicit parental consent to 16.

New clause 21 is not about banning children under the age of 16 from accessing social media. It is important that the responsibility lies with the social media companies to ensure that online spaces are age-appropriate, and to manage content and features. This new clause is a targeted and proportionate measure to require online services to change fundamentally how they handle children’s data. This crucial change will necessitate restricting the pervasive and often harmful influence of algorithms to make the platforms inherently less addictive and ultimately foster a more child-friendly digital environment.

It is imperative that digital technology is designed with the best interests of our children and young people at heart, ensuring that their rights and privacy are upheld—not as an afterthought, but with safety by design and by default. Furthermore, new clause 21 underscores the fundamental principle that the responsibility for managing content and features must remain firmly with the social media companies. We call for the establishment of robust digital standards to ensure that platforms prioritise child safety and privacy as their default setting, rather than as an optional extra.

Our duty to protect children online, however, cannot end with new clause 21. We call on the Government to take further action, such as explicitly recognising and treating children’s use of social media as a critical public health issue, thoroughly examining international best practice, identifying innovative solutions to the challenges we face, and developing evidence-based policies that will demonstrably improve online safety for children. I welcome the Government’s proposal last week to introduce a cross-Government safer screens taskforce to look at research into the multifaceted impact of social media on children’s wellbeing.

This is not an overnight phenomenon. Last year marked 20 years since Facebook was created and 18 years since the smartphone was launched. We now face mounting calls from young people, parents and teachers. Now is the time for greater action on the gaps left by the Online Safety Act. I urge the Government to recognise the urgent need for decisive action and to support new clause 21. This is a pivotal opportunity to strengthen protections for young people online and to cultivate a digital world where they can thrive, not merely navigate potential harms. Let us work together across party lines to ensure a safer and brighter digital future for all our children.

It is a pleasure to speak under your chairship, Mr Turner.

I have some sympathy with what the hon. Lady is trying to do with new clause 21. I invite the Minister to address, as I am sure he will, her very specific point that it is not about restricting access to social media for people aged between 13 and 16, but about further restricting how social media is targeted at those age groups. After visiting schools in my constituency, I am minded to support her argument. At Ryde academy, I heard the reaction of young people to their school restricting access to their phones, which a school can only do during the school day.

I am interested to hear the Minister’s response to the quite reasonable proposition on how to restrict social media companies from targeting children aged 13 to 16. Restricting the way they collect their data sounds like a small, but meaningful, step that the Government could take.

I thought the debate might stray a little from the precise point my hon. Friend just made to into broader issues about young people’s use of smartphones and social media in general, and inevitably it has. This is a very live issue, of which the Government are painfully aware, as I tried to say in the debate last Friday. We are trying to work out the best way forward to a place where the rules that were implemented in the Online Safety Act, some of which only come into force in the spring—some have yet to get parliamentary approval; that will probably come in April—bed in properly and are adhered to before we take further action. That is simply because it is difficult to know otherwise whether the Online Safety Act has gone far enough. I wish that the Online Safety Act had been not the Online Safety Act 2023, but the Online Safety Act 2021 or 2019. Had it been, we might now be in a position to assess its effects.

In the debate on Friday I referred to the feasibility study commissioned by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology from the University of Cambridge, which is working with other researchers. Work on that will finish in May, so I hope to have further information then. There is already a lot of guidance out there for parents, teachers and schools, but if we need to provide more informed guidance in the future, we will certainly look into that.

The precise targeting of young people by algorithms and so on is, at least theoretically, already dealt with by the Online Safety Act. That is why I do not think that new clause 21 is an appropriate measure to take forward at this time. Whether the age limit should be 13 or 16 was decided by the previous Government and agreed by Parliament after quite extensive consultation during the passage of the Data Protection Act 2018. All these matters have to be kept under review, and we are doing so in an urgent way, not least because a lot of Members are bringing up concerns raised by their constituents, families and so on.

I sometimes worry that the concentration solely on schools is to the detriment of the wider issues we are facing, not least because, as teachers readily admit, they only ever see children for about 20% of their time, and we need to set this in a wider context. I understand the motivation behind the new clause, but I will still resist it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 82 to 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedules 7 to 9 agreed to.

Clauses 86 to 88 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 89

Joint processing by intelligence services and competent authorities

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 90 stand part.

New clause 8—Intelligence services and law enforcement data-sharing: enhanced oversight—

“(1) Where intelligence services or law enforcement bodies share personal data under this Act, the Commissioner must review the nature, purposes, and scope of the data-sharing annually and produce a report assessing—

(a) the necessity and proportionality of the data-sharing,

(b) any impact on individuals’ rights, and

(2) The Commissioner must lay the report under subsection (1) before both Houses of Parliament, subject to any redactions strictly necessary on national security grounds.

(3) This section does not authorise or require the Commissioner to disclose information that could jeopardise national security, but the Commissioner must endeavour to provide the maximum transparency compatible with security requirements.

(4) The Secretary of State must respond to each report within 90 days of their laying before Parliament, addressing any recommendations made by the Commissioner.”

This new clause would require the Information Commission to review, annually, data-sharing by intelligence and law enforcement services, and to publish a report of its findings.

10.30am

I rise mainly to speak to new clause 8, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted. It would require the Information Commissioner to review and publish an annual report on data sharing by law enforcement and the intelligence services. Any processing of personal data by law enforcement and the intelligence services must, by definition, be lawful, which inherently includes the requirement that the processing be necessary and proportionate.

The Information Commissioner is obliged to provide an annual report to Parliament under the Data Protection Act 2018, and may also produce additional reports as they see fit. The commissioner has powers of investigation, monitoring and enforcement that they may exercise as appropriate to oversee law enforcement agencies and intelligence services. Given the current system of oversight, and the fact that the commissioner is already required to provide reports annually, I hope the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted will not press her new clause to a vote.

I am sure members of the Committee will be pleased to hear that I have a very short speech. Clause 89 permits the processing of personal data jointly between law enforcement and intelligence services for the crucial purpose of safeguarding national security. While the Liberal Democrats recognise the necessity of such collaboration in specific circumstances, the inherently sensitive nature of the data demands the highest level of protection and scrutiny. New clause 8 is designed to ensure that ministerial changes to the data safeguards on this joint processing cannot be enacted without proper scrutiny by Parliament. We would also welcome hearing from the Government on Report proposals to uphold and ensure that parliamentary scrutiny.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 89 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 90 and 91 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 92

Codes of practice for the processing of personal data

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 27—Secretary of State’s powers in relation to the Information Commission—

“(1) Prior to issuing any guidance or statement of strategic priorities to the Information Commission, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee of the House of Commons, and

(b) the Senedd, Scottish Parliament, or Northern Ireland Assembly where guidance relates to devolved powers.

(2) The Secretary of State may not reject or change a Code of Practice prepared by the Information Commission without a resolution to do so from each House of Parliament.”

This new clause seeks to strengthen the regulator’s independence by limiting ministerial powers to direct or override the Information Commission without oversight.

Clause 93 stand part.

I rise to speak primarily to new clause 27. The Government are committed to the independence of the regulator, which will continue to be accountable to Parliament. The Bill does not introduce a statement of strategic priorities, as the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted seems to suggest in her new clause, nor does the Secretary of State issue discretionary guidance to the regulator. Neither the Bill nor existing legislation provides for the Secretary of State to amend or reject a code of practice. I therefore do not see that this new clause is necessary.

I have a specific point on the text of new clause 27. We do not support this curtailment of powers, particularly in this context. I am sure that the Secretary of State will consult as a matter of course in carrying out his duties, whatever they are, and a specific requirement to consult the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, notwithstanding its prowess and stature, would be inoperable.

For us, the amendment is again in the spirit of ensuring proper scrutiny. However, I welcome the Minister’s comments and am happy not to press it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 92 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 93 and 94 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 95

Regulations under this Part: Parliamentary procedure and consultation

I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 95, page 120, line 31, leave out subsection (1).

This amendment removes a subsection which was inserted at Report stage in the Lords.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Clauses 135 to 139 stand part.

New clause 17—Statement on application of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to activities by web-crawlers or artificial intelligence models—

“The Secretary of State must, within three months of Royal Assent, issue a statement, by way of a copyright notice issued by the Intellectual Property Office or otherwise, in relation to the application of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to activities conducted by webcrawlers or artificial intelligence models which may infringe the copyright attaching to creative works.”

New clause 18—Report on regulation of web-crawlers and artificial intelligence models on use of creative content—

“The Secretary of State must, within three months of Royal Assent, lay before Parliament a report which includes a plan to help ensure proportionate and effective measures for transparency in the use of copyright materials in training, refining, tuning and generative activities in AI.”

New clause 19—Report on reducing barriers to market entry for start-ups and smaller AI enterprises on use of and access to data—

“The Secretary of State must, within three months of Royal Assent, lay before Parliament a report which includes a plan to reduce barriers to market entry for start-ups and smaller AI enterprises on use of and access to data.”

New clause 20—Publication of a technological standard—

“The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of Royal Assent, publish a technological standard for a machine-readable digital watermark for the purposes of identifying licensed content and relevant information associated with the licence.”

Clause 95(1) relates to artificial intelligence and copyright and the related reporting requirement on the Information Commissioner. I will set out our fuller reasoning on copyright shortly, but for now, I merely state that we believe that now is not the right time to place an additional reporting obligation on the Information Commissioner in the Bill. Government amendment 22 would therefore remove subsection (1), which was added to the Bill on Report in the Lords.

Subsection (2) requires the Information Commissioner to publish key performance indicators. The Government take the performance and accountability of UK regulators seriously. Regulators undertake important functions across our economy and society, and the Information Commissioner’s Office is no exception, so it is important that Parliament and other stakeholders have the right means to hold them to account. Publishing such metrics is best practice and a transparent way of providing measurable analysis of the ICO’s performance year on year. This forms part of a package of additional reporting requirements, alongside those in clause 91 and the report on regulatory action in clause 102, which we will discuss later. Together, they will increase understanding and transparency about priorities, performance and enforcement activities.

Clauses 135 to 139 are in this group, although we will vote on them later. They set out further requirements regarding copyright and AI, and I urge that they do not stand part of the Bill. These clauses require regulations to be made to ensure compliance with copyright law by web crawlers and general AI models, and transparency about the use of web crawlers and the works they scrape. There is also an enforcement requirement for the Information Commissioner, and provision on a review of technical solutions.

The Committee well knows, because I have mentioned it several times, that I agree with many of the points raised in debate on the clauses and the importance of transparency for rights holders in the creative industries. It was one of the key principles in the consultation we published on copyright and AI that closed on 25 February. We want genuine transparency about what is used in training AI, alongside rights holders’ control of their work and appropriate access to training material for AI. However, although I accept the intention behind the amendments—that is, clauses 135 to 139, which were added in the Lords—we do not believe that the Bill, which is a data measure, is the right vehicle for action.

We received more than 11,000 detailed and heartfelt responses to our public consultation on AI and copyright. Many set out specific views on transparency, technical standards and a range of the questions that we asked in the consultation. We are taking care to read each response. Although we believe that action needs to be taken on transparency and web crawlers, as well as other issues relating to AI and copyright, it is only right that we carefully consider all the viewpoints and evidence before acting. We have heard loud and clear the message that stakeholders do not want us to rush to legislate on this topic, and we intend to heed this message. Yesterday the Secretary of State met representatives of the creative industries and repeated that point.

The engagement will not end with this consultation. I have already stated our intention to create working groups to move the conversation forward, including on technical solutions. Industry often comes up with the best ideas, so I want to harness that, whether it is greater transparency about AI training or standards on web crawlers, metadata and watermarking. Whatever the solution, we want to be confident in its efficacy and, critically, in its simplicity and accessibility. We have said repeatedly that we will not move forward in this sphere unless we are confident we can give rights holders greater control over the use of their works. Once we have analysed the responses to the consultation, we will publish proposals. Clauses 135 to 139, which were added to the Bill on Report in the House of Lords, should not stand part of the Bill.

Opposition new clauses 17 to 20 also relate to AI and copyright. I am grateful for the way in which the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, has advanced these suggestions. These new clauses would require the Secretary of State to issue a statement on the application of UK copyright law to the activities of web crawlers and artificial intelligence models. One of the new clauses sets out the possibility of this being a copyright notice, issued by the Intellectual Property Office. They also require the Secretary of State to produce two reports, one of which should include a plan for transparency regarding the use of copyright materials with AI; the other should be on access to data and how to reduce market entry barriers for start-ups and smaller AI enterprises. Finally, they would require the Secretary of State to publish a technical standard for a machine-readable digital watermark, which would allow rights holders to label their content for the purposes of licensing.

As the House is aware, these amendments relate to matters that are at the heart of the government’s approach to AI and copyright. Indeed, the recently closed consultation sought views precisely on these issues. I commend my Conservative colleagues on the spirit of these amendments, but ask that they not be pressed at this time. I hope we can have further discussions on how we move forward on Report. While the amendments may indeed offer useful steps for the Government to take in solving issues of AI and copyright, proper analysis and policy development is likely to take longer than the proposed timeframes included in the clauses, given the 11,000 responses we received to the consultation. In addition, we would not wish to pre-empt the consultation, which some of these proposed clauses may do.

That said, I hope that I can discuss the issues raised by the amendments further with Members from both Opposition parties, to discuss whether we might be able to agree on similar proposals as we move forward. As I say, we take these issues seriously. As I am the Minister for Creative Industries and a Minister in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, I take a special interest in this and agree with the spirit of what these amendments seek to achieve, but I ask that new clauses 17 to 20 not be pressed at this stage.

Equally I thank the Minister for the spirit in which he has conducted this debate. It is an important one, which has captured the focus of a great many people, not only those in the creative and AI sectors whose livelihoods absolutely depend on us getting this right, but all of us who love and benefit from the products of the UK creative industries.

I will discuss clauses 135 to 139, which the Government are seeking to remove, before I speak to the new clauses that stand in my name and those of other Opposition Members. While there are problems with clauses 135 to 139, they do reflect the creative industries’ well founded and much publicised concerns about the manner in which AI developers conduct data mining activities to train their models and for generative activities. I should declare an interest; I recently attended the Brit awards with my wife with support from the British Phonographic Industry, so I received hospitality in the last couple of weeks.

10.45am

I want to recognise the tremendous efforts of the noble Baroness Kidron in the other place in bringing this incredibly important issue to the forefront of the minds of lawmakers and the public. My right hon. Friend the Leader of His Majesty’s Opposition has been clear about the importance of growing our domestic AI industry. These technologies have the potential to improve our lives and stimulate economic growth. That need not and must not come at the expense of our creative industries. Music, especially live music, is one of my passions. I know that the Minister shares my passion for our creative industries; indeed, his efforts to incorporate a thespian flourish into the debates we have had over the past few months do not go unappreciated —by some.

And are hated by others.

The Minister can interpret that how he wishes. We must ensure that our creative industry is supported to thrive while harnessing the technological and economic benefits of growing our domestic AI capability. The amendments in this area from the other place touch broadly on a number of important principles, which we support. They include the application of copyright law to data mining and AI-generative activity, which is covered in clause 135; the need for high transparency in how AI models are trained and the materials used for that purpose; and the importance of identifying sound technical solutions so that copyrighted content can be identified by web crawlers and AI models excluded from training and generative activity.

However, these matters and their solutions are complex from technological, legal and societal perspectives. We totally recognise the challenges of legislating in this area. Our international counterparts face the same challenges in trying to strike an effective balance between supporting our AI industries and supporting our creative sector. It is not a zero-sum game. There is clear scope for collaboration and mutual benefit if we get this approach right. As the shadow Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, my hon. Friend the Member for Havant (Alan Mak), stated in the Chamber, creative industries are telling us that the Government’s solution—set out in their consultation as their preferred option—is “not fit for purpose”. We need to engage carefully with the feedback received from industry stakeholders to come up with the right solutions in this area.

As the Minister mentioned, new clauses 17 to 20 recognise that putting together a specific plan in great detail on how to solve this problem needs to be done by chewing through the information from the ongoing consultation and through extensive engagement with the people who are actually going to do this stuff and the people who will be affected by it. In effect, the proposals are end-point clauses, about the world we want to see in the future, where our AI and creative sector can work together and we get all the benefits from both. It is where we want to get to. It is a bit less about putting together the journey plan of how we get there, with the exception of the fact that the Government need to crack on and sort this out—[Interruption.] Well, he’s the Minister. It comes with the job.

New clause 17 is intended to require the Government to confirm the application of existing copyright law to creative content mined by AI web crawlers and models in the same way that it would apply to other offline content. The Opposition feel that there is no ambiguity about the application of copyright law in this context. However, the Government have consistently suggested, in their consultation on copyright and artificial intelligence and elsewhere, that the legal position is unclear. In effect, that has created ambiguity and given rise to significant concern and objection from the creative sector. It deters smaller AI enterprises and start-ups from developing their products.

Running counter to that is the near existence of a possible future opt-out. I have heard evidence that AI companies are now thinking, “Let’s hang on before we buy licensed content, because we might get it for free anyway if this applies going forward.” If the aim was to give confidence to the AI sector, as was dealt with by the consultation, that has not happened either.

Clarity is needed for both the creative and AI industries, but not in the form of a wholesale exemption from copyright law for development and generative activity undertaken by AI models. The Government should make a clarificatory statement about the existing application of copyright law in this area. That certainty is the foundation block of sound policy aimed at supporting the creative industries to harness the economic value of their work, so I commend new clause 17 to the Committee.

New clause 18 requires the Government within three months of Royal Assent to lay before Parliament a plan to put forward proportionate and effective measures to ensure transparency in the use of copyright materials in training, development and generative activities of AI models, with emphasis on the proportionate and effective nature of the measures. At a high level, ensuring transparency in this area will help to ensure that information is available for rights holders to discern where and how their work has been used, and seek payment for the use of their work where appropriate.

New clause 18 seeks to address the widespread concerns of creative rights holders that they do not know when their material is being used, which acts as a block to any form of enforcement of their rights or licensing going forward. However, the approach to transparency must be proportionate. In particular, transparency obligations should not be so onerous that they stifle the market for AI start-ups and smaller enterprises in their infancy, when these entities should form the lifeblood of our future technological economy. One could envisage a situation where, if we get the legislation on this wrong, the recording and storing of information that has created a model, in its extreme triviality, could in effect become a bigger dataset than the set used in the first place— hence the focus on the importance of proportionate and effective measures.

The timing of the action to be taken by the Secretary of State under the new clause—within three months of Royal Assent—is intended to give the Secretary of State a proper opportunity to consider the feedback of the creative and AI industries and other stakeholders received under the recently concluded consultation on copyright and AI. I am ambitious for the Minister and the Government. I know he slightly deprecated his ability to get on and try to put something together, but I have faith in him to drive this forward. The feedback should help to formulate a plan that is both effective and workable, so I commend new clause 18 to the Committee.

New clause 19 requires the Secretary of State within three months of Royal Assent to lay before Parliament a plan to reduce barriers to market entry for start-ups and smaller AI enterprises, specifically in relation to access to data to train their models. The Government’s now concluded consultation on copyright and artificial intelligence specifies that one of its key aims is to support wide access to high-quality material to drive the development of leading AI models in the UK.

The AI opportunities action plan commissioned by the Government made a series of recommendations relating to the need to unlock public and private datasets to enable innovation by UK start-ups and researchers in order to attract international talent and capital. Although the imbalance in access to resources between established companies and start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises is in the nature of markets, failing to address that in this context risks reinforcing a situation where AI development activity remains the preserve of a relatively small number of established operators. I am thinking particularly of those that have been able to set up now, using datasets that have not had to comply with whatever provisions will eventually be put in place to regulate this area.

The Prime Minister indicated in his response to the action plan that DSIT would look at how to take this policy area forward. New clause 19 calls on the Government to put their money where their mouth is, and come up with a proper plan to turbocharge not only growth in our AI sector, but diversity and competition among operators of all sizes, by coming up with a plan to reduce the barriers to market entry that the accessibility of data presents.

Given the increasing adoption and use of AI by digital Government and the mechanisms of the state, it is critical for our national security and our national resilience to have a functioning domestic AI market that we can draw on for our use. The timescale for the Secretary of State to publish his report provides an opportunity for industry and stakeholder feedback to be taken into account when developing effective plans. For those reasons, I commend new clause 19 to the Committee.

Finally, new clause 20 requires the publication of a technological standard. I hope that the previous three new clauses are relatively uncontroversial, and I particularly hope that this new clause is the most uncontroversial of all. It is based on an amendment that was moved by my noble Friend Viscount Camrose in the other place, but which was withdrawn on receipt of reassurances from the Minister. The new clause requires the Government to publish a technological standard for machine-readable watermarks for the purpose of identifying the licensed content when it is encountered by web crawlers and AI models.

The development of such a standard would greatly enhance the ability of rights holders to protect their work, and to support enforcement of creative rights by creating a record of where and how content has been used. The development of a technological standard will be incredibly useful, even if the Government decide to take forward the flawed opt-out proposals and even if they are not ultimately adopted. This technological standard would be used in whatever situation we find ourselves in over the next few years in this industry.

This proposal would provide web crawlers and AI models with clear signposting that the content is not available for training or generative activity. Where that is properly deployed and observed by AI models, it will reduce the need for rights holders to take action to seek compensation for infringement of their copyright. The new clause does not ask the Government to commit to a specific solution, and nor should it, but it requires them to commit to identifying such a solution within a reasonable period. Let the industry sort it out. One of the challenges that has been going through my mind when exploring this area is why, from a point of principle, the market has not fixed this in the first place, and why we are where we are now in trying to resolve these issues. The new clause will promote transparency and certainty for the creative and AI industries, and I commend it to the Committee.

I have found these discussions among Members across the House about AI and copyright to be a delightful exchange about the creative industries that we love. I understand the Minister’s comments about there being different spaces for that debate and that this may not be the place for that, but I would like to speak to the new clauses that were proposed in the other House.

To highlight one of the creative industries that I love, this weekend I went to The Rex cinema in Berkhamsted, one of the best cinemas in the world—if any Members want to come, they are all very welcome. Sitting there, watching “A Complete Unknown”— about Bob Dylan and his songs—in a local movie theatre reminded me just how important it is to ensure that the creative industries can maintain their creativity, because it speaks to our soul and our society. They are beyond machine learning. They are humans who actually understand us and help to tell our stories in different ways.

That is why the Liberal Democrats welcomed new clauses 135 to 139 that were tabled in the other place. We also welcome the consultation from the Government and are pleased to hear that there have been over 11,000 responses. Members will find responses from us in there, because we wanted to make sure that the Liberal Democrats made representations at every stage. It is disappointing that the change that the Government have set out means there is an “opt in by default” provision, and the message has come across from the creative industries that they are calling for an open consultation, so we can make sure that their views are heard. We support their voices being heard and, indeed, striking that balance where the creative industries can work with innovation, as they have been. This is about getting that right. We are proud of those industries in the UK. We must work together and truly listen to those thousands of voices up and down this country. That is what we stand for, and we will support the Government moving forward in that way.

First of all, I commend both hon. Members on their contributions. Let us face it; this is very difficult. It is a classic case of difficulty for the Government because, as the previous Government found, two sectors are really important to UK growth. The creative industries are one of the fastest-growing sectors in the UK and are representative of our future growth. Somebody put it to me the other day that there was a time when our economy relied on selling industrial products, then it was services, and, in the new era, perhaps one of the things that we are exceptionally good at is selling experiences, and a large part of that is through intellectual property from the creative industries.

11.00am

As part of our industrial strategy, we have identified the creative industries as one of our key sectors and we definitely want to build on that. But, at the same time, we are one of the biggest markets in the world for AI. We have some of the best AI small start-ups and developers, and we want to build on that, not just as a key part of our economic growth, but as part of delivering productivity and efficiency within so much of our public services, within industry, and within so much of the way we live our lives.

As the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge says, we do not believe that this is a zero-sum game; we believe that it is possible to get to a situation in which the AI companies can flourish in the UK, and the creative industries can do so at the same time. Indeed, I would argue that to say anything other than that would be, in the words of the Sugababes,

“a one-way ticket to a madman’s situation”.

I want to make a few points that I think are important here. First, on new clause 20, yes, we are very keen to get to a place where there are technical solutions. As I said when I introduced the consultation in December, there are some very clever people out there who know how to do some extraordinary things with IT, and there must be some very clever people who know how to ascertain the copyright of the material that they are using.

If we could get to a technical solution to rights reservations, so that AI companies have the security of knowing what material they are using—that they are scraping or ingesting—and creative industries know that their work is being used and can either say, “No, you can’t use it,” or, “If you are going to use it, you are going to remunerate me,” whether that is individually or as part of a collecting society, that would be a significant advance for us. That is one of the key things that the Secretary of State has repeatedly said we are trying to do. I am not sure that the precise way in which new clause 20 suggests we should bring forward a technological standard is the right way of doing it, but I am very happy to have further conversations with the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge before we reach Report.

One thing that I think has been significantly difficult for everybody is trying to make a proper economic impact assessment of what each version of these outcomes would look like. How do you assess the value of future growth in AI in the UK against future growth in creative industries in the UK? It is very difficult to judge, and that is one of the things that I think that we need to address.

It is also true that many creative industries use AI all the time, either as part of their business processes or as part of the actual creative process, whether by editing a song so that it can use voices of people who are no longer with us, through CGI, by dubbing films, or through a whole series of different things. Indeed, I was really struck when I went to Stratford last week to see a magnificent production of “Edward II” at the Royal Shakespeare theatre. They are talking there about creating a new video game that is based on “Macbeth”, called “Lili”, and, of course, that will use a lot of artificial intelligence. A lot of tech companies are part of the creative industry, so I honestly do not think that these are two worlds that are completely apart.

I am tempted, because we both clearly share a love for the Sugababes, to just draw a reference to that. Of course, the creative industries also have quite a lot of experience of using other creative materials licensed from other producers. For the Sugababes song “Freak Like Me”, I am fairly sure that the sample is directly taken from Gary Numan’s “Are ‘Friends’ Electric?”, and presumably they came to some sort of arrangement in organising that. This sharing of data is not unusual for the creative sector.

I have often wondered whether Kylie’s song “Padam Padam” is a reference to Edith Piaf’s “Padam padam…” because they are also quite similar. This is, of course, a well traversed space for people working in the copyright sphere: trying to make sure that people are not passing off or using other people’s work without permission. The economic and moral rights of rights holders are well established in UK law. We started the process of legislating for that in 1709, under Queen Anne. Dickens had an ambition to make sure that people could not just take copies of his books to America and sell them for free without any payment to him, which is part of why we ended up with an international copyright regime. We do not want to undermine that.

Transparency is key, and it was one of the elements that we put into our consultation. We need to be careful about precisely how that transparency works out. The hon. Gentleman referred to proposed new clause 18, which he wants us to do something on within three months. As ambitious as he may be for me, that is a remarkably short period of time for parliamentary drafting. After all, a version of the Bill was first introduced four years ago, yet it still does not have Royal Assent. He refers to the terms “proportionate and effective” in that proposed new clause. To go back to “Hamlet”, aye, there’s the rub. What do proportionate and effective mean, and how do you balance the two? Different sectors will have difficult and competing sets of agendas and we may, in some shape or other, have to arbitrate.

The hon. Gentleman is right to say that no one, anywhere in the world, has come to a proper settled position on this issue. In the United States of America, for instance, a lot of AI companies have been relying on fair use, under the slightly different copyright system there, but the most recent federal case found in favour of Reuters against an AI company—the court said that scraping material was not fair use. The EU has not yet fully developed its proposals and has not decided how to implement its transparency requirements. It could be argued that that is one reason why there has not been much additional licensing, which was one of the EU’s declared goals.

There is also the question of how to enforce transparency. The clause—in a provision tabled by the admirable Baroness Kidron—specifically gives that enforcement power to the Information Commissioner. I am not sure that is the right place to put that power, or that the Information Commissioner has the expertise or resources for it. Undoubtedly, if there are to be new transparency requirements, we must have some form of enforcement.

All those things suggest to me that it is not right to put this power as an addendum to this Bill. The matter should be seen in the round, after a consultation, and there should be a proper primary legislation process, which may not happen for another 12 to 18 months, or even two years. I do not know.

The Secretaries of State for Culture, Media and Sport and for Science, Innovation and Technology, and myself, are keen to get to a place where there is more licensing of copyrighted material by AI companies. I do not think anybody expects that the labour of others should be handed over to third parties without recompense or control. That, in itself, is not simple. It might be simple for the Design & Artists Copyright Society to do all the licensing for artists and photographers, but how could that be done for people who works as individuals, rather than as part of a collecting society? That is another set of issues that need to be addressed.

I know there are places in the world where one can buy an AI-generated book, and it might be perfectly readable. We might all have authors who we think have worked in that way in the past. But when I read a book, watch a film, or listen to a piece of music, I want to know that it has a human involved in it. Human creativity is a vital part of what renders that process of creativity so important. I think of humans as fundamentally social beings. One of the worst things that can be done to a human being is to put them in solitary confinement, because that denies our fundamental social being. What is so special about all the creative industries is that they enable a connection from human being to human being. I am passionate about not losing that or the value inherent in that.

Amendment 22 agreed to.

Clause 95, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 96 to 103 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 10 agreed to.

Clauses 104 to 108 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 11 agreed to.

Clause 109 to 112 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 12 agreed to.

Clauses 113 to 115 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 13 agreed to.

Clause 116 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Kate Dearden.)

11.18am

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting)

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Wera Hobhouse, † Karl Turner

† Anderson, Callum (Buckingham and Bletchley) (Lab)

† Aquarone, Steff (North Norfolk) (LD)

† Beales, Danny (Uxbridge and South Ruislip) (Lab)

† Bryant, Chris (Minister for Data Protection and Telecoms)

† Collins, Victoria (Harpenden and Berkhamsted) (LD)

† Dearden, Kate (Halifax) (Lab/Co-op)

Entwistle, Kirith (Bolton North East) (Lab)

† Fortune, Peter (Bromley and Biggin Hill) (Con)

† Josan, Gurinder Singh (Smethwick) (Lab)

† Juss, Warinder (Wolverhampton West) (Lab)

† Kumar, Sonia (Dudley) (Lab)

Macdonald, Alice (Norwich North) (Lab/Co-op)

† McIntyre, Alex (Gloucester) (Lab)

† Obese-Jecty, Ben (Huntingdon) (Con)

† Pearce, Jon (High Peak) (Lab)

† Robertson, Joe (Isle of Wight East) (Con)

† Spencer, Dr Ben (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)

David Weir, Kevin Candy, Sanjana Balakrishnan, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 11 March 2025

(Afternoon)

[Karl Turner in the Chair]

Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords]

2.00pm

On a point of order, Mr Turner. I want to make a point about new clause 30, which I know was not selected for debate. Many will be familiar with the story of the constituent of my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson), Ellen Roome, who lost her 14-year-old son Jools in 2022. Jools was a happy boy. He died in tragic circumstances. In her search for answers about the circumstances leading up to Jools’s death, Ellen has come up against outdated laws and social media giants taking an intransigent approach to sharing data that should naturally be hers as a bereaved parent. We are talking about things that, in the past, she would have been able to find out by looking through her child’s bedroom—things that might have been in wardrobes, stored under the bed or in scrawled notes. These days, those bits of data could be on multiple social media accounts, but parental access is denied.

That is the subject of new clause 30, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson), Ellen’s Member of Parliament. The change to the law would be known as Jools’ law, in his memory. It would give parents access rights to their deceased child’s data automatically, with certain safeguards to respect third parties, so that other grieving parents will never face the challenges and the huge legal costs that Ellen has had to endure. I know that this new clause has not been chosen for discussion, but I would welcome a meeting with the Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham to discuss the issue further.

Further to that point of order, Mr Turner. The reason new clause 30 has not been selected is not that anybody has wanted to rule it inadmissible; it is simply because we are cracking through the Bill at such a speed that, although it was anticipated we would still be sitting on Thursday, it seems likely we will finish today, and new clause 30 therefore cannot be reached today because of its late tabling.

I know that Ellen is in the room, and I am very happy to facilitate a meeting with her, which I think is still outstanding with the Department. We will make sure that happens before the Bill gets to Report stage. If the hon. Member for Cheltenham or other Members want to be present at that meeting, I will make sure that happens. This is not a slight of any kind; it is just an accident of fortune in terms of the tabling of amendments.

I am grateful to the hon. Lady and the Minister for their points of order.

Clause 117

The Information Commission

I beg to move amendment 21, in clause 117, page 149, line 11, at end insert—

“(5A) In Schedule 13, paragraph 1(1), at end insert—

‘(j) advise the Government on measures relating to data ownership, and individuals’ rights and freedoms, in the delivery of its Data Vision and Strategy.’”

This amendment amends the functions of the Information Commission to allow it to advise the Government in the delivery of a Data Vision and Strategy.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 10—Data Vision and Strategy—

“Within six months of Royal Assent of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish a ‘Data Vision and Strategy’ which outlines—

(a) the Government’s data transformation priorities for the next five years; and

(b) steps the Government will take to ensure the digitisation of Government services.”

New clause 11—Departmental Board Appointments—

“(1) Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed—

(a) Government departments;

(b) NHS England; and

shall appoint to their departmental board or equivalent body at least one of the following—

(i) Chief Information Officer;

(ii) Chief Technology Officer;

(iii) Chief Digital Information Officer;

(iv) Service Transformation Leader; or

(v) equivalent postholder.

(2) The person or persons appointed as under subsection (1) shall provide an annual report on the progress of the department or body towards the Government’s Data Vision and Strategy.”

This new clause would require digital leaders to be represented at executive level within Government departments and other bodies.

New clause 16—Data use in Public Service Delivery Review—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, every 12 months, lay before Parliament a ‘Data use in Public Service Delivery Review’.

(2) The Data use in Public Service Delivery Review shall include, but is not limited to assessment of the steps being taken to—

(a) improve the Government’s use of data in public service delivery over the previous 12 months;

(b) expand the use of data to support increased and improved digital services in public service delivery;

(c) improve expertise and digital talent within Government departments to help expand the use of data for public service delivery; and

(d) facilitate and regulate for better use of data in the delivery of public services.”

This new clause would require an annual assessment by the Secretary of State to examine the steps being taken to facilitate and regulate the use of data in the delivery of public services using digital and online technologies.

New clause 10 requires the Government to bring forward a data vision and strategy within six months of the passing of the Bill, and amendment 21 would add a new function to the Information Commission to allow it to support the Government in the drafting and delivery of that data vision and strategy. New clause 11 seeks to ensure that all departmental boards and NHS bodies have senior staff with data and technology expertise at the highest level. Finally, new clause 16 would require the Government to publish annual reviews of the use of data in the delivery of public services, including updates on the progression of a number of key goals.

I turn first to new clause 10. In previous speeches in the House, I have tried my best to emphasise the transformative power of data in our era. It can be seen as similar to the discovery of fire, gold or oil, such is its value and ability to totally reshape how we approach the world. I think the most accurate comparison is with Edison’s harnessing of the power of electricity. I invite you, Mr Turner, and the Committee to imagine that Government is like a 19th-century factory. Prior to electricity generation, a factory had to be organised around a single power source—usually a steam engine—with every machine that needed power connecting directly to the central driveshaft above. Components could be made but then had to be transported elsewhere to be assembled, usually by hand. By harnessing electricity, it was possible to pipe power anywhere on the factory floor. That meant the machines could be placed wherever they were needed, becoming more precise, more efficient and more specialised, and it led to mass manufacturing of the product as the central organising principle of industry.

What does this have to do with modern government? The data revolution that has been under way since the 1990s means that the structures and organisation of government can themselves be transformed in the same way that industry was in the 1890s. We can use data to shift from archaic practices and government functions, some of which occasionally feel like they might still run on steam power, and shift towards public services that make the citizen experience their central organising principle. With the true free flow of data through government, we can bring services to people, make them easier and more efficient to use and radically improve how people interact with government. However, to do any of that, the Government need to develop key principles to enable them to seize that opportunity. Creating a data vision will show what the future could be for data use across government, setting out where we want to get to, how we want services to run and what the ideal citizen experience will be. From that vision, which I hope would be ambitious and wide-ranging, the Government could design a strategy to deliver on it, outlining how they are going to seize data’s transformative power to improve the state’s workings and ultimately deliver a better experience for all our constituents when they come into contact with government or the state.

A national data strategy was, in fact, published under the last Government. It was consulted on during 2019 and published in 2020. It is clear that the world is very different from the world in 2019. The pandemic made Government rapidly re-evaluate and improve their relationship with available data to handle a national emergency and there are lessons to be learned from that. It also forced a change in many people’s habits and expectations. We are prepared to act far more digitally now, but also expect that businesses and corporations and Government will be more adept in the experiences they provide for us. Although much of what was in the last data strategy was on the right track, I am sure that, with a new world, this new Government would want to make their own mark and fully harness the data revolution.

A comprehensive data vision and strategy also empowers the Government when they need to move quickly, to adapt and react to the ever-changing technological landscape. When we need swiftly to harness new technologies or developments, we risk missing out and needlessly delaying, if we drive ourselves back to the legislation table each time. Although I am greatly enjoying the Bill Committee, if we go through a full set of legislative processes every time we want to use the latest innovation, we will move far too slowly. An overarching vision gives confidence to the Government in how to react to new developments by assessing how they can match up with the long-term strategic goals that they want to achieve.

Our slow adoption of the power of data has allowed many other countries to be leaps and bounds ahead of us, despite not having the resources, the expertise or the talent that our country has heaps of. Let us make sure that, for the next step of digital transformation, people look to us as leaders and trailblazers.

I hope that the Government will take inspiration for the data vision and strategy from the last 25 years in Estonia. As I told the House on Second Reading. Estonia has made the astonishing transformation from a poor post-Soviet state to a leader in digital government and data leadership. Its national drive to improve digital literacy and access, along with pulling their public services into the digital age, is an example that many other nations, including ours, should seek to follow. It has made 100% of public services available digitally, developed the fantastic X-Road data-sharing platform and delivered millions of euros in efficiency savings. It is a completely realistic goal to make the UK a digital leader in digital government and data efficiency, just like Estonia. That is the goal that I would write in the Government’s data vision. I hope that the Minister, if he were authoring it, would be just as ambitious.

I also think the Government could take lessons from Denmark, which has come top of the UN’s e-government rankings. It has embedded core principles of digital inclusion into its data and digital transformation journey. Those principles include being aware of the consequences of digitisation, providing usable alternatives and designing solutions for all citizens. This quote from its “Principles for Digital Inclusion” publication is particularly pertinent:

“It is a democratic problem if the digital transformation becomes a barrier to participating in the welfare society.”

The Minister and I have spoken about and shared concerns about digital exclusion. It is something that our constituencies and constituents both have in common. I hope he would be as keen as me to see that inclusion principle made a key tenet of the future of digital governance and data use.

Amendment 21 also ensures that, in drafting and delivering the strategy, the Government can rely upon the expertise of the Information Commissioner. The rights and freedoms of citizens and their data ownership must be core to a future data vision and strategy. The amendment enshrines the ability of the Information Commissioner to act as a source of advice and guidance in bringing that forward. The Government and Departments will need to be ready to implement the data vision and strategy, and the radical transformation that it will require.

I have therefore tabled new clauses 11 and 16. New clause 11 would require the NHS and Government to ensure the appointment of someone with a senior data, information or technology role to their boards. A helpful inspiration in the drafting of the new clause was the Government’s own “State of digital government review”, published only a couple of months ago. It is nothing short of excoriating in its assessment of the state of digital government, as well as the Government’s digital talent and culture. The review states that

“non-digital public sector leaders with sizable delivery responsibilities have insufficient technical expertise or training”,

and that

“Digital leadership is not a consistent priority.”

My new clause 11 would ensure that a chief digital and information officer, a chief information officer, a chief technology officer or a service transformation lead is present on the boards of all Departments. As it stands, none of those roles is present on the executive committee at any of the following Departments: Business and Trade; Housing, Communities and Local Government; Health and Social Care; Education; the Home Office; the Cabinet Office; NHS England; and the Treasury. I could keep going, but I think everyone gets the point.

That is in the Government’s own review, published by the Minister’s Department, and I am using it to draw attention to the problem. It criticises the problem that new clause 11 seeks to remedy. I invite the Minister to accept the new clause to fix something that his own Department has highlighted and that I would not have known about without its helpful review. I do not blame him one bit, of course, because his party inherited this situation from the Conservatives, who were guilty of failing for almost a decade to address the problem, but I hope that he can put it right by accepting new clause 11.

Turning back to the review by the Minister’s Department, it also states that 47% of central Government services and 45% of NHS services still lack a digital pathway. The report says:

“The UK is under digitised”,

and I wholly agree. I hope that new clause 16 could take steps to fix that. I would look forward to the Secretary of State coming to Parliament with his review each year to tell us about the great leaps that the Government are making towards improved data use in public service delivery and improving their digital talent and culture.

If the Government are serious about pushing forward digital transformation with the power of data, new clause 16 provides them with an annual victory lap. If things are falling behind, if the problems that the “State of digital government review” identified are not being rectified, this measure would ensure that they can be scrutinised and held to account. We cannot let the Government fall again into the state that their review found them to be in. I hope that my new clauses could fire the starting gun for a Government that is ambitious and innovative about their data use and digitisation in future.

The Minister heard me make many of the same arguments on Second Reading. I was pleased with the warmth of his reception then, as well as the broad understanding of his Department that we need to do more and do it better. I hope that he can provide me with some commitments today on the issues that I have raised, for the benefit of the citizen’s experience and of everyone we represent. I will end by quoting from the conclusion of his Department’s review—I am grateful to the Government for publishing those findings—which sums up the points I have made excellently:

“Digital is one of the most powerful forces for public service reform, and when it is successful, it changes lives and the public experience of government…However, our approaches to leadership, structure, measurement, talent and funding do not yet do justice to this potential: it is time to transform and reform the way we do digital.”

I note that before the break we had the Sugababes, and that now we have “The Tempest”—I think the hon. Gentleman managed to get in a very brief quote, or I guess his version of it: O brave new world that has such data in it.

The hon. Gentleman excoriates the Government for moving too slowly and for not taking enough powers to be able to move faster, and yet several of the amendments that the Liberal Democrats have tabled have been ones that insist that we should have more accountability to Parliament and a slower process, and should not have such regulation-making powers. It is often difficult to decide between those two because we want enough parliamentary scrutiny, but in an area of rapid technological change it is important that legislation is able to move fast enough to adapt. The hon. Gentleman rightly refers to digital inclusion as a key aspect of the Bill. If we are going to take forward a digital nation and a digital Government plan, we have to factor in the fact that some people will simply not be able to take part unless we take radical action to include them digitally.

2.15pm

Amendment 21 places a duty on the information commission, new clause 10 sets out a data vision and strategy, new clause 11 insists that Departments must have somebody who is able to bring forward a data vision and strategy, and new clause 16 insists that the Secretary of State produces an annual review. I have not counted the number of annual reviews for the Secretary of State to produce in amendments that the Liberal Democrats have tabled, but it is quite a large number already. It may be a good idea if we produce just one annual review for the whole sector.

The blueprint for modern digital Government, which we laid before Parliament on 21 January, addresses some of the concerns raised by the amendment and new clauses. It aims to unify public services, strengthen digital and data leadership, create a national data library and ensure transparency. A key commitment is the publication of a Government digital and AI road map this summer to drive public sector reform. It will probably look remarkably like a data vision and strategy, so I think the hon. Gentleman is going to get what he wants; it will just not have his title on it—I mean his title, not his name. We are basically doing what he wants us to do, so if we were to add his proposal to the Bill, it would simply duplicate the work.

We have also committed that the road map will be developed in the open, and that we will seek input and collaboration from colleagues across central Government, the wider public sector, civil society and tech companies. That will include engaging with the information commission, as amendment 21 proposes. We therefore believe there is no need to create a statutory obligation on the new information commission to provide advice.

On new clause 16, the Government are dedicated to delivering data-powered public services that are built around users. Privacy notices and data-sharing agreements ensure transparency, protecting individual rights while enabling efficient public services. The Digital Economy Act 2017 gives the Government powers to share data across organisational boundaries to improve delivery of public services, subject to privacy safeguards. There are many transparency measures that support this framework.

The hon. Gentleman is right that we have gone far too slowly. It would be good if a data Bill had been on the statute book several years ago, although we nearly managed to get one over the line just before the general election. I am just not sure that an annual review of the use of the public service delivery data-sharing power, presented to the board and Ministers for endorsement, would be particularly valuable.

I hope I have shown that this addition to the Bill is unnecessary, so I hope the hon. Gentleman will not press his amendment to a Division.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 52, in schedule 14, page 242, line 33, at end insert—

“(1A) The appointment of the Chair of the Information Commission must be subject to approval by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This amendment seeks to strengthen the regulator’s independence by subjecting key appointments to Parliamentary approval.

Schedule 14.

Clauses 118 to 120 stand part.

I rise to speak to clause 117, the first clause in part 6, on reforming the information commission. Part 6 sets out provisions to abolish the Information Commissioner’s Office and transfer its functions to a new body, the information commission, with a chief executive and board of directors. His Majesty’s Opposition welcome the fact that the Government are substantially taking forward some measures on reform of the ICO envisaged in previous iterations of this Bill, including the previous Government’s Data Protection and Digital Information Bill. Indeed, the ICO has said that the changes under the Bill will bring its governance structure into line with that of comparable regulators. Given some of the challenges and opportunities that our data-driven economy will present, the new information commission must be set up in the right way to perform its regulatory functions as effectively as possible.

There is no doubt that the scope of the information commission’s role will grow, commensurate with the changes brought in by the Bill—for example, the obligation to have regard, in the performance of its role, to factors such as promoting innovation and competition. We are supportive of those aims, but it would be helpful if the Minister could briefly address some of the concerns raised by my noble Friend Lord Holmes of Richmond in the other place, particularly the Minister’s strategy for ensuring that the information commission is provided with clarity as to its responsibilities and obligations when it comes to economic growth, and how he will ensure that that remains consistent with the information commission’s primary functions relating to data protection.

I will speak only briefly about amendment 52, but I would like to think that after all the Liberal Democrat interventions today, no one will have any doubt that we take data very seriously. I realise that we have outlined a lot of proposals, but they are all in the spirit of helping to shape the data vision and of saying how important we feel it is. Amendment 52 is about the questioning of scrutiny. I am happy not to press the amendment, but again it is important to make sure we have trust in line with innovation.

The Government are, of course, committed to the independence of the ICO. As the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge said, the recommendations about changing the structure were entirely ones that were advanced in the previous version of the Bill and supported by the previous Government. We think that it will just make it more efficient, more effective and more transparent.

As I have said, we are committed to the ICO’s independence; it is a vital part of its role. That is why the new role of the chair of the information commission will be appointed by His Majesty, by letters patent— the same approach taken for the current Information Commissioner role. Furthermore, the Secretary of State has agreed with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster that the role of chair will be listed as a significant appointment with the Commissioner for Public Appointments and be subject to pre-appointment scrutiny by the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee.

The shadow Minister’s questions about how the Information Commissioner can balance those two requirements are perfectly legitimate. I think that they are questions for the Information Commissioner, and they are the kind of questions that could legitimately be asked in a pre-appointment session with the Select Committee. I do not, therefore, believe that the amendment from the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted is necessary.

However, I would like to put on record that the Government intend to maintain the title of the Information Commissioner in respect of the chair of the information commission, acknowledging the fact that the identity and brand of the Information Commissioner is valued and recognised domestically and internationally. We do not want to lose that, so we intend to preserve it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 117 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 14 agreed to.

Clauses 118 to 120 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 121

Information standards for health and adult social care in England

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 3—Health and social care data records—

“(1) A person processing health and/or social care data for research purposes must maintain a record of the basis on which that data was shared or accessed.

(2) Such a person must make available a description of—

(a) the categories of data used,

(b) the intended research purpose,

(d) how individuals can exercise their data subject rights under Article 13 to Article 22 of the UK GDPR.

(3) The Secretary of State must by regulations set out requirements for how the record set out by subsection (2) must be published.”

This new clause would require researchers using health/social care data to keep and publish records explaining what data is used and for what reason.

Government amendment 14.

Schedule 15.

Clause 121 and schedule 15 make clear that information standards published under section 250 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, as amended by the Health and Care Act 2022, will include standards relating to information technology or IT services used, or intended to be used, in connection with the processing of information related to the provision of health and adult social care in England.

For the health and adult social care system to work effectively, data needs to be processed in a standardised way using common specifications, which goes to some of the points made by the hon. Member for North Norfolk in quoting Government publications. These provisions are an important step towards creating a modern health and adult social care service, where systems are integrated and staff have quicker access to patient data, freeing up time that can be spent with patients.

In previous debates, several Members have referred to physical records, and I have referred to one hospital in Doncaster that employs 42 members of staff solely to carry around physical records. There are still departments in many parts of the NHS in England that are producing more physical, handwritten notes every day of the week. That must be nonsense; it must make it more difficult for us to deliver connected services in future and it cannot be in the interests of the patient, because we would want the patient to be able to hold in their hand an app with everything that relates to their own medical health, almost like a medical passport of their own. That simply is not possible if all the different bits of the NHS in England cannot work together. Government amendment 14 is a technical change to ensure that any personal data processed in the exercise of the public censure power, set out in schedule 15, is subject to the relevant existing data protection legislation.

New clause 3 would require researchers to keep and publish records about the health and social care data that they have processed for research. There are already extensive transparency requirements for health data, and the Information Commissioner’s Office provides detailed advice to the public on their data rights. The law only allows confidential patient information to be used for research without consent when it has been approved by the Health Research Authority. There are detailed arrangements for this approval, based in law, and the transparency arrangements include published registers of approved applications showing what data is used for what purpose and by whom. I hope therefore that the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted will accept that this means her new clause is not necessary.

This part of the Bill is a concatenation of different provisions relating to data, which is one of the reasons why I think the Bill is so glorious; it covers such a wide scope of things to sort out. I will speak to some of the deeper debates that we will have later, but I am quite glad to start off by speaking to clause 121. As a former doctor—my wife is a doctor too—I particularly welcome these provisions and the opportunity they provide to ensure that health data can be shared properly.

I would say to the Minister that the issue is not merely carrying around patient notes; certainly, in my experience the issue is whether patient notes turn up in the first place at all. As somebody who does not work in the health service any more, I see the other side, where the burden is quite often on the patient to provide their notes or to give information repeatedly that different parts of the system already have. That is a wholly inefficient way of doing things. One of the benefits of having the NHS set up as it is must surely be the ability to have coherent approaches to the sharing of data, so that we do not have this situation with notes.

It is not merely an inconvenience. Patients can be exposed to repeated tests and repeated imaging, all of which have a degree of iatrogenic harm and risk, plus delays to progressing. My former field of work was psychiatry, and the places where I worked were very quick to adopt electronic patient records, noting not only the importance of data sharing, but the risk of retraumatising people when repeated disclosures of traumatic events are required—in part, I worry, because that data is not shared as effectively as it could be.

I raised the point on Second Reading that changes in this area will need to be supported by ensuring that hospitals and healthcare settings have access to IT of sufficient quality to support the new systems. Can the Minister provide an update on his strategy—although I recognise it is not precisely his strategy; it is shared with the Department of Health and Social Care—on renewing NHS IT infrastructure and ensuring that the necessary kit is put in place so that the provisions can be rolled out to maximum advantage? This is about not merely the sharing of data, but the fact that faxing information is no longer required, and we must have the computer infrastructure necessary for data sharing.

2.30pm

I will speak specifically on new clause 3. On the question of trust, I know that even the British Medical Association has highlighted concerns over transparency and ensuring that we unlock that innovation and bring that data—in other words, that people are willing, ready and happy to be part of this. New clause 3 therefore highlights that health and social data, when used for research, should have clear data categories that are properly recorded, and that individuals have a right to understand how their data is used. However, I appreciate the comments from the Minister, and I am happy not to press the new clause.

The hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge nearly caught me out because I had to look up “iatrogenic”. Basically, I think it means that when someone is being treated for something, it can lead to harmful effects. I am worried about that, because I have a PET CT scan tomorrow afternoon and an MRI scan on Saturday, so I am worried that I am being subjected to more risk because of all this imaging.

The truth of the matter is that a patient wants to be able to access as many of their records as possible—whether it is their blood tests or whatever else. That is a significant change that has happened in the last few years. It is about putting the patient back in a key role in the NHS, and them being able to manage their own data, but that simply cannot happen unless we pass this legislation and roll out changes across the whole of the NHS.

The hon. Gentleman asked me a specific question, although he admitted that it is not really my plan to develop these things; I might have to get the Department of Health and Social Care to write to him to lay some of that out. That is part of the work that we need to do at the moment. This is not in the Bill, but as a Welsh MP, I would like us to have shared standards across the whole of the United Kingdom, because there are people using different parts of the NHS across the different nations. That would make simple, common sense.

I also worry sometimes about cyber-security, with every different part of the NHS buying its own systems, and whether those systems all have the necessary cyber-security to make sure that data is preserved safely. I believe that the Bill will enable us to get a much more secure set of data provisions on the way health information can be shared between different parts of the NHS in England.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 121 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 15

Information standards for health and adult social care in England

Amendment made: 14, in schedule 15, page 255, line 35, at end insert—

“(5) This section does not authorise the processing of information if the processing would contravene the data protection legislation (but in determining whether it would do so, take into account the power conferred by this section).

(6) In this section, ‘the data protection legislation’ has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 2018 (see section 3 of that Act).”—(Chris Bryant.)

This amendment provides that information may not be processed for the purposes of new section 251ZC of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (public censure of relevant IT providers) if that would contravene the data protection legislation.

Schedule 15, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 122 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 16 agreed to.

Clause 123 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 124

Retention of information by providers of internet services in connection with death of child

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 29—Compliance with Section 124 of this Act and Part 3, Chapter 2 of the Online Safety Act 2023—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on provisions of Section 124 of this Act.

(2) A report published under subsection (1) must include an analysis of the level compliance to notices requiring social media companies, including Category 1 services under the Online Safety Act 2023, to preserve data relating to the use of specified regulated services by children where that information may be needed to respond to an information notice issued under s.101 or to produce a report under s.163 of the Online Safety Act.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a report assessing compliance with Section 124 of this Act and Part 3, Chapter 2 of the Online Safety Act 2023.

Clause 124 delivers on the Labour manifesto commitments to further support coroners, and procurators fiscal in Scotland, to access information held by online services after a child’s death. This is a very sensitive issue, and we have tried to address it as such. The provision will require Ofcom, when informed by a coroner, to issue a data preservation notice to specified online service companies. That will help to ensure that those online service companies retain all the relevant data they have on a child so that it will be available on request should a coroner later require it as part of an inquest into a child’s death. The clause demonstrates the Government’s commitments to keeping children safe online and supporting families that have endured unimaginable losses. I am conscious that some might want us to go further; further to the conversation we had earlier, we might be able to have a fruitful discussion on that before we reach Report.

On new clause 29, I reassure the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted that there are already strong powers to ensure that companies comply with data preservation notices. Those include the power to issue fines for non-compliance of up to £18 million, or 10% of qualifying worldwide revenue, and the ability to hold senior managers criminally liable for non-compliance. Those sanctions will help to ensure that online services comply with any notice issued under section 101 of the Online Safety Act 2023. Under a provision in that Act, the Secretary of State must already review the effectiveness of the Act’s regime, including the data preservation measures, between two and five years after it comes into force and must produce a report detailing his findings, which will then be laid in Parliament. I therefore hope that the hon. Member will not feel the need to press her new clause to a vote.

This is not the appropriate place to discuss new clause 30, but I hope that there will be ample opportunity on Report for further discussion of the broader issue, which is of great importance.

Clause 124 concerns the retention of information by internet service providers in the deeply tragic event of a child’s death. It rightly acknowledges the potential need to access such data for crucial investigations and to understand the circumstances surrounding such a loss. However, mere provision for data retention is insufficient without a mechanism to ensure its effective implementation in line with broader online safety efforts. That is why we have proposed new clause 29, which ensures Government oversight by requiring the Secretary of State to publish a compliance report within 12 months. The report will assess whether social media platforms, including category 1 services under the Online Safety Act 2023, are preserving data when needed for investigations, regulatory actions and legal proceedings. I appreciate the comments from the Minister.

Although it is not in this Bill, this is an opportunity to highlight the Liberal Democrat’s belief that category 1 services should not be linked to the size of online platforms alone and that platform functionality and other characteristics should determine whether a regulated provider is classed as category 1 or 2. We know that harmful content, abuse and illegal activity leave a digital footprint but, without enforcement, key evidence may be erased before authorities can act. The new clause ensures that platforms are held accountable, preventing data from being lost if needed. It is about not just policy, but ensuring that social media companies meet their legal obligations and that enforcement is transparent and effective. Once again, I appreciate the open discussion of these issues that the Minister has put forward.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 124 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 125 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 126

Retention of biometric data and recordable offences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 54, in clause 127, page 161, line 36, at end insert—

“(6A) An authority which retains biometric data under this Part must—

(a) review the necessity and proportionality of retention every 12 months, and

(b) erase the biometric data unless continued retention is strictly necessary for a lawful purposes, the reasons for which must be recorded and reviewable by the Information Commission.

(6B) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on the retention and use of biometric data under this Part, including statistical data on the number of records retained, the time period of retainment, and the purposes of retainment.”.

This amendment would introduce mandatory periodic reviews of retained biometric data, requiring erasure unless the authority can demonstrate ongoing necessity. It also would mandate annual transparency reporting to Parliament on biometric use and retention.

Clauses 127 and 128 stand part.

I did not realise that we would be debating all these amendments today. I appreciate that my voice is probably being heard loud and clear, which was not the original intention, but these are important issues. Clause 126 addresses the sensitive issue of biometric data retention, particularly for law enforcement purposes. Amendment 54 strengthens safeguards by requiring judicial review methods before data can be retained beyond a defined period. That is where we are raising the alarm to ensure that there is a defined period, and that there is cause to ensure that data is not kept beyond that. It is a crucial protection to prevent undue encroachment on civil liberties.

The use of biometric data must be carefully regulated to prevent misuse and overreach: while we acknowledge the role of such data in tackling crime, we must ensure that retention policies are both proportionate and necessary. Amendment 54 aligns the UK’s approach with best practices, ensuring that security does not come at the cost of fundamental rights.

The hon. Lady has tabled another amendment that calls for the Secretary of State to report to Parliament. I hope that I am proving that the requirement to put those reports in the Bill is unnecessary.

The amendment would introduce a new duty on the police to review the retention of biometric data under clause 127, and a duty for the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the use of that data. Clause 127 does not alter the existing duty in the Data Protection Act 2018, which ensures that the police retain only personal data, including sensitive personal data such as biometrics, as long as it is considered “necessary and proportionate”—precisely the terms that she advocated.

The biometrics commissioner already has independent oversight of biometric data retained under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, and has a statutory duty to report to Parliament annually. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation also has statutory oversight of all the powers in the 2008 Act, and reports annually to Parliament. For those reasons—without doubting the hon. Lady’s intent—I hope that she will not press the amendment to a vote.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 126 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 127 to 134 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 135

Compliance with UK copyright law by operators of web crawlers and general-purpose AI models

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 4

Clause 135 disagreed to.

Clause 136

Transparency of crawler identity, purpose, and segmentation

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 5

Clause 136 disagreed to.

Clause 137

Transparency of copyrighted works scraped

2.45pm

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 6

Clause 137 disagreed to.

Clause 138

Enforcement

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 7

Clause 138 disagreed to.

Clause 139

Technical solutions

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 8

Clause 139 disagreed to.

Clause 140

Data dictionary

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

I propose that the clause does not stand part of the Bill. Clause 140, which was tabled in the House of Lords, is a regulation-making power that would enable terms relating to core personal data attributes to be defined consistently across data held by public authorities. The intention behind this measure is that the power could be used to define the term “sex”. We seek to overturn this clause for the following reasons.

The Government believe that public sector data, including data about sex and gender, should continue to be collected based on the specific data requirements of those collecting the data, and their users, which differs across contexts. That is in line with the data minimisation principle set out in the data protection legislation. We do not think it is appropriate to have core personal data attributes defined in regulations in the way that is proposed.

Furthermore, setting out such definitions using secondary legislation could create confusion where terms are already defined in legislation, and so—depending on the approach taken—could cut across the existing definitions. For example, defining sex could cut across the existing legal framework and undermine protections in the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the Equality Act 2010.

I am, however, keen to reassure the Committee that the Government recognise the importance of harmonising data and have already commenced important work on standards across Government—via a cross-Government working group led by the Data Standards Authority—to define the core attributes of a person. Last year, the Office for Statistics Regulation published guidance on collecting and reporting data about sex and gender identity, and in December 2024 the Government Statistical Service published a work plan for harmonised standards in this space.

The Government’s belief is that such matters are crucial and more appropriately considered holistically outside the Bill. The intention of the Bill is not to define or remark on the definitions of sex and gender, or other core personal data attributes. I therefore recommend that the clause does not stand part of the Bill.

As the Minister noted, the clause is a provision that was introduced in Committee in the other place, along with clause 28(3) and (4), and clause 45(6), which have now been removed from the Bill pursuant to our decisions in Committee.

Clause 140 aims to ensure the accuracy of data underpinning digital forms of verifying identity, and more broadly. To a degree, it is ironic that we live in a world where we have to debate data dictionaries when it comes to the definition of sex, but I think the point about data dictionaries more generally, over and above the focus on sex data in this debate, is nevertheless sound.

We are aware of the Government’s argument that the clauses inserted in the other place pertaining to data accuracy—in particular, clause 45(6)—are not compatible with certain provisions of the European convention on human rights and the Gender Recognition Act 2004. I am grateful to the Minister for writing to the Committee on that, among other matters, but I do not think that his explanation gives any rationale for the removal of clause 140.

We strongly disagree with the Government’s position for the reasons I set out last week, but I will not rehash those arguments now. Rather, I want to make a simple argument in favour of retaining the clause on data dictionaries that the Government intend to remove. Clause 140 grants the Secretary of State the power to make regulations establishing the definitions and associated metadata for core personal data attributes. The Secretary of State may require that those definitions are used for, among other things, personal data recorded by public authorities, under subsection (1)(d), and the digital verification service, under subsection (1)(a).

My noble friend Lord Lucas compellingly stated the case in support of his data dictionary amendment in the other place, saying that

“if we are to live in a data-rich world, we really need a set of well-understood, good definitions for the basic information we are collecting.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 28 January 2025; Vol. 843, c. 237-238.]

It really is that simple: giving the Secretary of State the power to define those core personal data attributes so that a consistent approach can be taken across the board by public authorities and entities engaged in digital verification services.

My question for the Minister is, therefore: what is the objection to the Secretary of State having that power to clarify the meanings of those essential terms, which we need to define data attributes? A clear definition of data attributes, and in particular the meaning of sex, is a foundational building block that will help to ensure that the data we collect can be harnessed for good-quality research on which sound public policy decisions can be based.

In the other place, the DSIT Minister, the noble Lord Vallance of Balham, acknowledged the need for data to be “based in truth” and “consistent and clear”. However, he opposed this clause on the basis that the Government would prefer to consider the matter of data accuracy and consistency holistically, outside the scope of the Bill. In that regard, he pointed to ongoing research in the field, including the Sullivan review of data, stats and research on sex and gender, which was commissioned by the previous Conservative Government, and the findings of which this Government would like to take into account in developing their policies in the area.

I welcome the fact that the Government intend to take a closer look at the importance of data accuracy, especially in relation to the collection of sex data, but there is no need to kick the can down the road. The clause compels the Secretary of State to do nothing—well, not in an active sense—[Interruption.] If only. It does not compel the Secretary of State in an active sense, but it does give him the important power to put definitions of core personal data attributes in place once the important Sullivan review and other studies have been published and considered. As we have mentioned a few times, the Bill has gone through many iterations and a long legislative period. We believe that this clause will be useful, if not essential, for resolving some of these issues.

Getting those basic definitions right is essential. If we do not, there could be mistakes that could become entrenched in the records of public authorities. That could lead to skewed research findings on important societal matters, such as health disparities and outcomes across the sectors, as well as employment opportunities and equal pay. For those and many other good reasons, let us take this opportunity to get the basics right.

In that regard, I encourage the Minister to heed the timeless words of Julie Andrews with which he opened Committee stage. As far as definitions for core data attributes are concerned,

“Let’s start at the very beginning,

A very good place to start.”

Mr Turner, I have confidence in confidence alone; I have confidence in you—if we are going to do Julie Andrews.

This is obviously a serious matter. The clause pretends to be just a regulation-making power that would allow the Government to publish a data dictionary by regulations. It is framed as a means to promote data consistency, but its actual intent is to push the Government to set a single definition of the term “sex” through a public authority data dictionary that public authorities would need to have regard to when processing data. As I have said several times in debates already, that is inappropriate. The whole purpose of data is that it is set within a context and that that context changes. For instance, the data that is required for the running of a hospital or prison is different from that required for the hiring of a car or the purchase of a property. That is why we think it is important that we do not go down this route.

The Opposition are again trying to give the Secretary of State more powers to do things by regulation, but it would be completely inappropriate to develop this data dictionary by secondary legislation, which would be unamendable and therefore subject to only minimal debate. I completely agree with the noble Lord Vallance that data has to be consistent and accurate, but it also has to be in the context for which it is being used. That is the key determinant that some Members have not understood in the Government’s argument. I still suggest that clause 140 does not stand part of the Bill.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Division 9

Clause 140 disagreed to.

Clause 141

Creating or soliciting the creation of purported intimate image of adult

I beg to move amendment 28, in clause 141, page 173, line 27, leave out

“or soliciting the creation of”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 29.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 29 to 48.

Clause stand part.

The amendments are the result of considerable discussion between officials, who have suddenly joined me as my inspiration, and the noble Baroness Owen. As promised in the other place, we have tabled further amendments relating to the offence that was included in the House of Lords. Recognising how crucial time limits are in this sensitive area, we made a commitment that is fulfilled by amendment 38, which would extend the statutory time limits to enable prosecutions to be brought at any date that is both within six months from when sufficient evidence comes to the prosecutor’s knowledge to justify prosecution, and within three years from when the offence was committed. By doing that, perpetrators will not be able to get away with creating a deepfake just because no one knew about it in time for the prosecution to commence within six months.

Amendment 31 will ensure that the law comprehensively criminalises asking someone to create a deepfake, regardless of where they are based or whether the image was made. We absolutely agree with the policy rationale put forward by Baroness Owen, which is why we did not oppose the amendment on solicitation. Our amendments replace the term “solicitation” with a new requesting offence, which has been drafted to ensure that it is comprehensive and functions as it should, and that it is clear to the courts how it should be understood and applied in practice within the wider criminal law framework.

3.00pm

Amendment 30 reinstates a defence of reasonable excuse to the creating offence. That was part of the original Government amendment, and part of the noble Baroness Owen’s original amendments. We believe that a defence is necessary for both the creation and the solicitation or requesting offence. We are clear that we do not wish abusers to be able to evade justice by using spurious excuses, but the definition of images in this offence includes wider intimate images, such as those showing someone in underwear or using a toilet, even where these are not pornographic or sexual in any way and were not created to abuse a victim.

This is a new offence, tackling relatively new behaviour, and this defence is needed to ensure that only culpable behaviour is criminalised and where it is in the public interest to do so. I assure hon. Members that the defence of a reasonable excuse is a common aspect of many criminal offences. Offenders will not be able to use it to escape justice. They cannot simply assert an excuse, and that will be deemed reasonable. They will need to prove, with evidence, that they had such an excuse. The courts will then interrogate that to decide whether, in fact, the excuse was reasonable. Furthermore, it is our view that a defence of reasonable excuse is important to ensure compliance with freedom of expression principles.

Clause 141 already ensures that in civil courts, deprivation orders will be available in respect of intimate image deepfakes where their creation constitutes an offence under proposed new section 66E of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Amendment 40 ensures that this will be the case within the service justice system.

Clause 141 delivers our manifesto commitment by ensuring that those who create a deepfake intimate image of an adult without their consent or a reasonable belief in their consent can be prosecuted. There is no need to prove any motivation. This offence will carry a maximum penalty of an unlimited fine, six months imprisonment or both. The clause will also ensure that the courts have the power to deprive offenders of the images they have created and the devices containing them. Creating intimate image deepfakes is a truly demeaning and disgusting form of chauvinism. We believe that clause 141, as amended, will tackle that behaviour. We are sending a very clear message to the perpetrators, putting them on notice that they will face the full force of the law. I command the clause and the amendment to the Committee.

I start by congratulating my noble Friend Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge for her hard work and tenacity in raising the profile of the harms caused to victims of sexually explicit deepfakes, and ensuring that clauses criminalising that activity were inserted into the Bill in the other place. We very much welcome the Government’s engagement in this important area, and we broadly support their amendments, which substantially deliver the changes to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 that Baroness Owen sought in the other place.

In particular, we welcome Government amendment 31, which substantially reflects the offence of solicitation under clause 141, but could the Minister put a bit more flesh on the bones of the reasoning and necessity behind substituting the term “requesting” for “solicitation”? Does he regard those terms as having equivalent meaning in this context? If not, what is the material difference in the approach to terminology?

I am thankful for the Minister’s comments on the “reasonable excuse” defence, but I have some questions about what exactly a reasonable excuse looks like in this context. Does he have any examples to aid our understanding of what constitutes a reasonable excuse in these circumstances? Based on that, do the Government intend to publish guidance on the scope of this defence and its explanation?

We are pleased to see the inclusion of Government amendment 38, inserting among other things an extended limitation period of three years from the date of creation, or request for creation, of a purported intimate image for bringing criminal charges. This will increase the scope for victims to seek justice where these images come to light some time after creation.

The Liberal Democrats very much welcome clause 141 and action taken on violence against women and girls in particular, including online. However, the clause talks about creating or soliciting the creation of purported intimate images of adults, but it does not necessarily deal with the sharing of them. How do we hold to account those who are sharing intimate images that they should not be?

I should have put on the record, as the shadow Minister did, my gratitude and congratulations to Baroness Owen for her tenacity; that point was absolutely right.

Hear, hear.

Excellent: we all agree that Baroness Owen has done a great piece of work for us, and we are grateful. Incidentally, I am also grateful to Ministry of Justice officials who worked with DSIT officials on the amendments before us today, which provide a more comprehensive version of what was originally argued for.

The hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge asked me about the difference between solicitation and requesting. Often, it is considered that solicitation would require some form of exchange of money. Obviously, that would not necessarily be the case in this context, which is why we have “requesting”, a broader category than solicitation. A request includes doing an act that could reasonably be taken to be a request—for example, nodding or otherwise indicating agreement in response to an offer or complying with conditions of an offer. It also includes both making a request directed to a particular person or persons and making a request available to one or more people, or people generally, without directing it to a particular person or people. In other words, that is broader than what solicitation would have required. I think Baroness Owen agrees with us that this is therefore a more comprehensive offence.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the “reasonable excuse” defence. Let us say that a software developer wants to ensure that he or she—probably “he” in this case—has developed the right safeguards in his software to stop people generating intimate deepfakes without the consent of the person depicted. In some circumstances, he will have a reasonable excuse where, in the course of the testing to ensure that the software does not create such images, he creates a purported intimate image. That might be an instance of a reasonable excuse. I do not want to lay out what reasonable excuses might be, because the courts are so used to dealing with the concept of a reasonable excuse. There are many offences to which it applies, and the courts, as I have said, are used to dealing with them.

The hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted asked me about sharing—is sharing a deepfake an offence? Sharing a deepfake intimate image without consent is already an offence under section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. I hope that, without further ado, we can agree the amendments and the clause.

Amendment 28 agreed to.

Amendments made: 29, in clause 141, page 173, line 35, leave out from beginning to end of line 8 on page 174.

This amendment removes a new offence of soliciting the creation of a purported intimate image of an adult. For a replacement offence, see Amendment 31.

Amendment 30, in clause 141, page 174, line 26, at end insert—

“(7A) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for creating the purported intimate image.”

This amendment adds a defence of reasonable excuse to the new offence of creating a purported intimate image of an adult.

Amendment 31, in clause 141, page 174, line 29, at end insert—

“66EA Requesting the creation of purported intimate image of adult

(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—

(a) A intentionally requests the creation of a purported intimate image of another person (B) (either in general or specific terms),

(b) B does not consent to A requesting the creation of the purported intimate image, and

(2) A person (A) commits an offence if—

(a) A intentionally requests that, if a purported intimate image of another person (B) is created, it includes or excludes something in particular (whether relating to B’s appearance, the intimate state in which B is shown or anything else),

(b) B does not consent to A requesting the inclusion or exclusion of that thing, and

(3) References in this section to making a request (however expressed) include doing an act which could reasonably be taken to be a request (such as, for example, indicating agreement in response to an offer or complying with conditions of an offer).

(4) References in this section to making a request (however expressed) are references to—

(a) making a request directed to a particular person or persons, or

(b) making a request so that it is available to one or more persons (or people generally), without directing it to a particular person or persons.

(5) References in this section to consent to a person requesting something are—

(a) in a case described in subsection (4)(a), references to consent to a request being made that is directed to the particular person or persons, and

(b) in a case described in subsection (4)(b), references to consent to a request being made so that it is available to the person or persons (or people generally), as appropriate.

(6) An offence under this section is committed—

(a) regardless of whether the purported intimate image is created,

(b) regardless of whether the purported intimate image, or the particular thing to be included in or excluded from such an image, is also requested by another person, and

(7) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for making the request.

(8) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).

(9) In this section, references to a purported intimate image, to creating such an image and to a person shown in an intimate state have the same meaning as in section 66E.”

This amendment makes it an offence to request the creation of a purported intimate image of an adult without consent.

Amendment 32, in clause 141, page 174, line 30, leave out “soliciting” and insert “requesting”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendments 29 and 31.

Amendment 33, in clause 141, page 174, line 32, leave out “section 66E” and insert “sections 66E and 66EA”.

This amendment provides that the definitions in new section 66F of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 apply for the purposes of new section 66EA of that Act (see Amendment 31) (as well as for the purposes of new section 66E).

Amendment 34, in clause 141, page 174, line 33, leave out “the creation of a purported intimate image” and insert “an act”.

This amendment, and Amendments 35 and 36, adjust the definition of “consent” in new section 66F of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 so that it works for the purposes of new section 66EA of that Act (see Amendment 31) (as well as for the purposes of new section 66E).

Amendment 35, in clause 141, page 174, line 34, leave out “of creation”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 34.

Amendment 36, in clause 141, page 174, line 35, at end insert

“(and see also section 66EA(5))”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 34.

Amendment 37, in clause 141, page 175, line 10, at end insert—

“(8) The “maximum term for summary offences” means—

(a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, six months;

(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.”

This amendment explains what is meant by the “maximum term for summary offences” in new sections 66E and 66EA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. (New section 66EA is inserted by Amendment 31).

Amendment 38, in clause 141, page 175, line 10, at end insert—

“66G Creating, or requesting the creation of, purported intimate image of adult: time limit for prosecution

(1) Notwithstanding section 127(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, a magistrates’ court may try an information or written charge relating to an offence under section 66E or 66EA if the information is laid or the charge is issued—

(a) before the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the day on which the offence was committed, and

(b) before the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which evidence which the prosecutor thinks is sufficient to justify a prosecution comes to the prosecutor’s knowledge.

(2) A certificate signed by or on behalf of a prosecutor stating the date on which evidence described in subsection (1)(b) came to the prosecutor’s knowledge is conclusive evidence of that fact.”

This amendment extends the period during which a person may be prosecuted for an offence under new section 66E or 66EA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (creating, or requesting the creation of, purported intimate image of adult).

Amendment 39, in clause 141, page 175, line 12, after “66E” insert “, 66EA”.

This amendment provides that references to an image of a person in new section 66EA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (see Amendment 31), like references to such an image in new section 66E of that Act, do not include an image of an imaginary person.

Amendment 40, in clause 141, page 175, line 12, at end insert—

“(3A) In the Armed Forces Act 2006, after section 177D insert—

‘177DA Purported intimate images to be treated as used for purpose of certain offences

(1) This section applies where a person commits an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is an offence under section 66E of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (creating purported intimate image of adult).

(2) The purported intimate image to which the offence relates, and anything containing it, is to be regarded for the purposes of section 177C(3) (and section 94A(3)(b)(ii)) as used for the purposes of committing the offence (including where it is committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring).’”

This amendment provides that deprivation orders can be made under the Armed Forces Act 2006 in connection with an offence under new section 66E of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (creating purported intimate image of adult).

Amendment 41, in clause 141, page 175, line 12, at end insert—

“(3B) In Part 2 of Schedule 3 to the Serious Crime Act 2007 (offences to be disregarded in reckoning whether an act is capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence: England and Wales), after paragraph 38 insert—

‘Sexual Offences Act 2003

38ZA An offence under section 66EA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (requesting the creation of purported intimate image of adult).’”

This amendment provides that a person cannot be guilty, under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, of encouraging or assisting the offence under new section 66EA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (requesting the creation of a purported intimate image) (see Amendment 31).

Amendment 42, in clause 141, page 175, line 17, leave out

“or soliciting the creation of”.—(Chris Bryant.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 29.

Clause 141, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 142

Power to make consequential amendment

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 143 to 146 stand part.

Government amendment 16.

Clause 147 stand part.

I will speak only to Government amendment 16, which is highly technical—there will be a test on it afterwards. It removes the privilege amendment inserted at Lords Third Reading to clause 147, which was necessary given the Bill was introduced in the Lords.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 142 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 143 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 144

Extent

Amendments made: 43, to clause 144, page 177, line 25, leave out “141” and insert

“141(1) to (3) and (4)”.

This amendment, and Amendment 44, are consequential on Amendments 40 and 41.

Amendment 44, in clause 144, page 177, line 26, leave out “extends” and insert “extend”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 43.

Amendment 45, in clause 144, page 177, line 26, at end insert—

“(d) section 141(3A) (amendment of the Armed Forces Act 2006) extends to—

(i) England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland,

(ii) the Isle of Man, and

(iii) the British overseas territories, except Gibraltar;”

This amendment provides for the amendment of the Armed Forces Act 2006 made by Amendment 40 to have the same extent as that Act.

Amendment 46, in clause 144, page 177, line 26, at end insert—

“(d) section 141(3B) (amendment of the Serious Crime Act 2007) extends to England and Wales and Northern Ireland only.”

This amendment provides for the amendment of the Serious Crime Act 2007 made by Amendment 41 to have the same extent as that Act.

Amendment 47, in clause 144, page 177, line 26, at end insert—

“(5A) The powers conferred by section 384(1) and (2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (powers to extend provisions to the Channel Islands and to make provisions apply with modifications as they extend to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and British overseas territories other than Gibraltar) may be exercised in relation to section 177DA of that Act (inserted by section 141(3A) of this Act).”—(Chris Bryant.)

This amendment provides that the new section inserted in the Armed Forces Act 2006 by Amendment 40 may, like the other provisions of that Act, be extended to the Channel Islands and modified as it extends to those Islands, the Isle of Man and British overseas territories other than Gibraltar.

Clause 144, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 145 and 146 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 147

Short title

Amendment made: 16, in clause 147, page 179, line 10, leave out subsection (2).—(Chris Bryant.)

This amendment removes the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords.

Clause 147, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 2

Impact of this Act and other developments at national and international level on EU data adequacy decision

“Within three months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must carry out an assessment of the likely impact on the European Union data adequacy decisions relating to the United Kingdom of the following—

(a) this Act;

(b) other changes to the United Kingdom’s domestic frameworks which are relevant to the matters listed in Article 45(2) of the UK GDPR (transfers on the basis of an adequacy decision);

(c) relevant changes to the United Kingdom’s international commitments or other obligations arising from legally binding conventions or instruments, as well as from its participation in multilateral or regional systems, in particular in relation to the protection of personal data.”—(Victoria Collins.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to carry out an assessment of the impact of this Act and other changes to the UK’s domestic and international frameworks relating to data adequacy.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second Time.

It will be no surprise that the Liberal Democrats support greater collaboration with our European partners. Local people and businesses across Harpenden and Berkhamsted, as well as up and down the country, continue to highlight the importance of working with the EU and for ever closer union.

New clause 2 seeks to ensure that any changes in our data laws or international commitments do not jeopardise our data adequacy, which is due to be reassessed by the EU in June this year. The Minister may be pushing through the Bill to ensure that we get our adequacy in line with that requirement, which is crucial, because the UK’s ability to transfer data internationally underpins business, research and security partnerships.

Data adequacy is what allows personal data to flow freely between the UK and the EU without the need for costly and complex additional safeguards. A report by the New Economics Foundation put the cost of data inadequacy with the EU at between £1 billion to £1.6 billion for British businesses, highlighting the importance of aligning with our European neighbours on this. The UK is also party to various international agreements and conventions relating to data protection.

New clause 2 ensures that we assess how our international commitments may impact the EU’s view of our data protection framework. If we fail to maintain strong data protections, we risk losing our EU data adequacy status, an outcome that could cost billions in compliance burdens, disrupt cross-border operations and hinder UK businesses from accessing global markets. That would be a hammer blow to the UK businesses, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, that rely on seamless data exchange with our European partners.

Supporting new clause 2 is about ensuring that Britain continues to lead on data governance, innovation and global collaboration. Data adequacy is not just a legal issue; it is a fundamental element of maintaining economic growth, international trust and our competitive edge. We welcome assurances—and indeed the discussions I have already had with the Minister—on data adequacy with Europe being maintained.

3.15pm

I just want to make two points. I was a bit confused by the timings in this new clause. I think we all agree on the importance of data adequacy, but my understanding is that, by three months post Royal Assent, we will already have to have a data adequacy agreement in place, given the time that it will take to achieve Royal Assent.

The other point I wanted to make was that I think this might be the last time that I get to speak on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition in this Bill Committee, so I want to thank Members, officials and the Chairs for taking part in our proceedings. I look forward to further debate on Report.

First, I should have also thanked the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones), because she has been intimately involved in bringing forward the measures that we debated in the last group. My apologies for forgetting that, Mr Turner.

On new clause 2, I completely agree that EU data adequacy is vital, but I completely disagree with the new clause, because I think it is technically deficient. One reason for that is the timeline that it lays out of three months, by which time I hope we might be able to have made progress. I also think that it undermines the independence of the process that the European Commission has to go through. The European Commission has already confirmed that its review of its two adequacy decisions for the UK are currently under way—ahead of the deadline, which is good. As Lord Vallance stated in the House of Lords, DSIT and the Home Office have dedicated teams supporting the European Commission’s technical review, as required.

I acknowledge the unilateral nature of the adequacy assessment made by the European Commission. For that reason, it is important to provide the European Commission with the discretion needed to complete its process, which I am afraid new clause 2 would undermine. So, for that reason, I am resisting the blandishments of the Liberal Democrats.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 6

Public-interest data trusts and communities

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of this Act being passed, lay before Parliament a strategy for promoting data trusts and community data governance models for the public interest (referred to in this section as ‘data trusts’).

(2) That strategy must include—

(a) a definition of data trusts or data communities which prioritise ethical and responsible use of personal data,

(b) mechanisms for ensuring meaningful participant control and governance over shared datasets,

(d) safeguards to protect individuals’ rights and freedoms when data is shared,

(e) requirements for transparency in data trusts’ decision-making, including governance arrangements and any commercial partnerships,

(f) arrangements for ongoing independent oversight and review, and

(g) an assessment of how these models might advance innovation, economic growth, and data-driven research in socially beneficial areas such as health, climate resilience, and energy.

(3) The Secretary of State must consult the Information Commission, UK Research and Innovation, relevant civil society groups, and such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate prior to laying the strategy under subsection (1).

(4) The Secretary of State must, at least once every three years, publish a progress report on how data trusts and data communities are being used and how they have contributed to the public interest, including any recommendations for further legislative or policy changes.”—(Victoria Collins.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to develop a formal strategy for data trusts and to report periodically on progress. Encourages innovative but responsible data use.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 25—Promotion of public-interest data trusts and communities—

(2) That strategy must include—

(a) a definition of data trusts or data communities which prioritise ethical and responsible use of personal data;

(b) mechanisms for ensuring meaningful participant control and governance over shared datasets;

(d) safeguards to protect individuals’ rights and freedoms when data is shared;

(e) requirements for transparency in data trusts’ decision-making, including governance arrangements and any commercial partnerships;

(f) arrangements for ongoing independent oversight and review; and

(g) an assessment of how these models might advance innovation, economic growth, and data-driven research in socially beneficial areas such as health, climate resilience, and energy

(3) The Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Information Commission,

(b) UK Research and Innovation,

(c) relevant civil society groups, and such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate prior to laying the strategy under subsection (1).

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to develop a formal strategy for data trusts and to report periodically on progress. Encourages innovative but responsible data use.

New clause 28—Public-interest data altruism—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of this Act being passed, establish a framework to recognise and register ‘data altruism organisations’ that manage personal data voluntarily contributed for public-interest objectives.

(2) A data altruism organisation registered under this section must—

(a) demonstrate enhanced governance, transparency, and accountability measures;

(b) publish clear terms on how personal data is used or shared; and

(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations—

(a) provide for eligibility criteria and the application process for data altruism organisations;

(b) specify ongoing compliance and auditing requirements;

(4) In developing the framework under this section, the Secretary of State must consult the Information Commission, data subjects, civil society organisations, and such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(5) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”

This new clause would require creation of a statutory framework for data altruism allowing organisations to register as data altruism organisations where they collect and process personal data for public-interest purposes under enhanced transparency, governance, and accountability standards.

This is my last intervention, which I am sure the Committee will all be very sad about, and it is on data. I know that we have talked a lot about public trust, but I also want to highlight that, as Liberal Democrats, we are also excited about unlocking the opportunities from data. These new clauses speak to that.

New clauses 6, 25 and 28 together would ensure that we harness the benefits of data while upholding fundamental rights. Too often, data is seen as something that happens to people rather than something that they have a say in. We have an opportunity here to unlock even more opportunities, not just in Government data systems but in how data is used across research, public services and wider society.

New clause 6 calls on the Government to develop a clear strategy for public-interest data trusts and community data governance. That means allowing individuals and communities to contribute their data for socially beneficial purposes while retaining meaningful control. Imagine if patients suffering from rare diseases could securely share their data for medical research, knowing that it would be used solely for public good, not commercial gain; that is a future we can build.

New clause 25 would ensure that the Government take a proactive role in shaping public-interest data governance, setting clear ethical guidelines for how data can be shared securely and fairly. This is about moving beyond reactive regulation. Instead, we should actively create frameworks that allow innovation to flourish while protecting those rights. If we want the UK to be a leader in responsible AI and data stewardship, we need clear structures that allow businesses, researchers and civil society to work together with confidence.

New clause 28 would establish a framework for data altruism, ensuring that those who wish to donate their data for public interest projects can do so safely and transparently. Consider a family in my constituency of Harpenden and Berkhamsted who want to contribute to a dementia research project. Right now, there is no clear framework guaranteeing that their data will be protected from misuse. By formalising ethical data-sharing models, we can enable research and innovation without compromising trust. These new clauses share a simple principle: data must serve people, not the other way around. We must strike the right balance, harnessing data to drive innovation while ensuring that public confidence and ethical standards remain at the core of our approach.

We have a huge economic opportunity. The UK has led the way in setting high regulatory and Government standards in sectors such as fintech, law and insurance, where trust, transparency and compliance are critical. We should build on those strengths and apply the same principles to emerging fields such as AI, healthtech and responsible data sharing. By learning from what works and setting clear guidelines now, we can unlock investment, support start-ups and ensure that the UK becomes a hub for innovative, data-driven businesses. That is why I urge colleagues to consider new clauses 6, 25 and 28, as well as the principles put forward in them, to ensure that we build a data-driven future that is transparent, accountable and a gold standard for responsible innovation and public involvement.

I listened carefully to the hon. Lady’s comments, and I want to reflect on one point. She presented, or at least seemed to present, a tension between public interests and the commercial use of data. It is really important that we recognise that a lot of health research, particularly pharmaceutical development, is for commercial purposes, with a huge amount of benefits for health as a consequence.

I do not think it is to right to try to sabotage the use of data for commercial purposes, because it has huge benefits for the care and treatment of people. We depend on pharmaceutical companies to spend the risk money, for which a state organisation would never have the appetite, to develop the new drugs of the future. It is important to be quite careful when one is thinking about commercial interests versus non-commercial interests for scientific research.

The hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted said that this is her last contribution to the debate, so in the words of the “The Little Mermaid”, I suppose we are poor, unfortunate souls. I thank her for tabling these new clauses, and she raised issues that were also discussed in the other place.

On new clause 6, as my noble Friend Baroness Jones noted in the House of Lords, the Government support giving individuals greater agency over their data and a robust regime of data subject rights. We have already announced our intention to publish a call for evidence on the potential role of data intermediaries. It is important that we establish a firm evidence base before we make any changes to people’s data rights, so I hope that that makes new clause 6 unnecessary.

On new clause 25, as I have just said, we have already published a call for evidence on the potential role of data intermediaries, which is why we need to proceed carefully before going down the route offered by the new clause. Finally, on new clause 28, the Government acknowledge that there are various models of data intermediaries, including those that manage voluntarily contributed personal data for the common good, such as data co-operatives and trusted research environments.

We have already announced our call for evidence, which will seek views on various aspects relevant to data intermediaries, including the delegation of data subject rights to third parties, barriers preventing data intermediaries from operating at full capacity and risk factors associated with significant growth in their activities. This will also include views on different models of data intermediaries, including those focused on data altruism, as the hon. Lady mentioned. Given that we have already announced our intention to act in these areas, I very much hope that the hon. Lady will be content to withdraw the motion.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 9

Right to use non-digital verification services

“(1) This section applies when an organisation—

(a) requires an individual to use a verification service; and

(b) uses a digital verification service for that purpose.

(2) Where it is reasonably practicable for an organisation to offer a non-digital method of verification, the organisation must—

(a) make a non-digital alternative method of verification available to any individual required to use a verification service; and

(b) provide information about digital and non-digital methods of verification to those individuals before verification is required.”—(Steff Aquarone.)

This new clause would create a duty upon organisations to support digital inclusion by offering non-digital verification services where practicable.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Division 10

New Clause 17

Statement on application of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to activities by web-crawlers or artificial intelligence models

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Division 11

New Clause 18

Report on regulation of web-crawlers and artificial intelligence models on use of creative content

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Division 12

New Clause 19

Report on reducing barriers to market entry for start-ups and smaller AI enterprises on use of and access to data

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Division 13

New Clause 20

Publication of a technological standard

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Division 14

New Clause 21

Age of consent for social media data processing

“(1) The UK GDPR is as amended as follows.

(2) In Article 8 of the UK GDPR (Conditions applicable to child’s consent in relation to information society services)

After paragraph 1 insert —

(1B) For the purposes of paragraph 1A ‘social networking services’ means any online service that—

(a) allows users to create profiles and interact publicly or privately with other users, and

(b) facilitates the sharing of user-generated content, including text, images, or videos, with a wider audience.

(1C) Paragraph 1B does not apply to—

(a) Educational platforms and learning management systems provided in recognised educational settings, where personal data processing is solely for educational purposes.

This new clause would raise the age for processing personal data in the case of social networking services from 13 to 16.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Division 15