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Indemnity Bill

Volume 41: debated on Monday 9 August 1920

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Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.— (The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question. Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The EARL OF DONOUGHMORE in the Chair.]

Clause 1 agreed to.

Clause 2:

Right to compensation for acts done in pursuance of prerogative and other powers.

2.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing section restricting the right of taking legal proceedings, any person not being a subject of a state which has been at war with His Majesty during the war and not having been a subject of such a state whilst that state was so at war with His Majesty—

  • (a) being the owner of a ship or vessel which or any cargo space or passenger accommodation in which has been requisitioned at any time during the war in exercise or purported exercise of any prerogative right of His Majesty or of any power under any enactment relating to- the defence of the realm, or any regulation or order made or purporting to be made thereunder, shall be entitled to payment or compensation for the use of the same and for services rendered during the employment of the same in Government service, and compensation for loss or damage thereby occasioned; or
  • (b) who has otherwise incurred or sustained any direct loss or damage by reason of interference with his property or business in the United Kingdom through the exercise or purported exercise, during the war, of any prerogative right of His Majesty or of any power under any enactment relating to the defence of the realm, or any regulation or order made or purporting to be made thereunder, shall be entitled to compensation in respect of such loss or damage;
  • and such payment or compensation shall be assessed on the principles and by the tribunal hereinafter mentioned, and the decision of that tribunal shall be final:

    Provided that—

  • (i) The provisions as to the statement of a case in any enactment relative to arbitrations shall not apply to any such tribunal, but if either party feels aggrieved by any direction or determination of the tribunal on any point of law, he may, within the time and in accordance with the conditions prescribed by rules of court, appeal to the Court of Appeal, or as respects Scotland to either division of the Court of Session, and the decision of the Court of Appeal or Court of Session on any such appeal shall, with the leave of that Court but not otherwise, be subject to appeal to the House of Lords;
  • (ii) nothing in this section shall confer on any person a right to payment or compensation unless notice of the claim has been given to the tribunal in such form and manner as the tribunal may prescribe within one year from the termination of the war or the date when the transaction giving rise to the claim took place, whichever may be the later.
  • (2) The payment or compensation shall be assessed in accordance with the following principles:—

  • (i) Where under the Defence of the Realm Regulations or any order made or purporting to be made thereunder, any special principle for assessment of compensation or the rate thereof, is contained in the Regulation or order, compensation shall be assessed in accordance with that principle or rate: Provided that nothing in this provision shall prevent the tribunal in assessing compensation from taking into consideration any circumstances which, under the regulation in question, it would have been entitled to take into consideration.
  • (ii) Where the payment or compensation is claimed under paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, it shall be assessed in accordance with the principles upon which the Board of Arbitration constituted under the proclamation issued on the third day of August nineteen hundred and fourteen has hitherto acted, which principles are set forth in Part I of the Schedule to this Act.
  • (iii) In any other case, compensation shall be assessed as follows:—
  • (a) If the claimant would, apart from this Act, have had a legal right to compensation the tribunal shall take that right into consideration, and in assessing the compensation shall have regard to the amount of the compensation to which, apart from this Act, the claimant would have been legally entitled, and to the existence of a state of war and to all other circumstances relevant to a just assessment of compensation: Provided that this subsection shall not give any right to payment or compensation for indirect loss.
  • (b) If the claimant would not have had any such legal right, the compensation shall be assessed in accordance with the principles upon which the Commission appointed by His Majesty under Commissions dated the thirty-first day of March nineteen hundred and fifteen and the eighteenth day of December nineteen hundred and eighteen (commonly known as the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission) has hitherto acted in cases where no special provision is made as to the assessment of compensation, which principles are set forth in Part II of the Schedule to this Act.
  • (3) Where before the fifteenth day of April nineteen hundred and twenty any claim for compensation has been made and disposed of by award or agreement, or has been rejected, or any payment (other than a payment expressed to be made on account) has been accepted in respect thereof, no claim for compensation or further compensation under this section shall be brought without the leave of the tribunal, and the tribunal shall not grant such leave except on proof of a material change of circumstances or new evidence not previously available being adduced.

    (4) The tribunal for assessing compensation shall, where by any of the Defence of the Realm Regulations any, special tribunal is prescribed, be that tribunal, and in cases where the claim is made under paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section be the said Board of Arbitration, and in any other case be the said Defence of the Realm Losses Commission.

    (5) A judge of the High Court of Justice or, in cases where the claim is in respect of interference with property or business in Scotland, a judge of the Court of Session shall be president of the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission, which Commission shall hereafter be styled and known as the War Compensation Court.

    (6) A person may be compelled to attend and give evidence or produce documents in proceedings before the said Board of Arbitration or War Compensation Court in like manner as in proceedings before an arbitrator, and the Board or War Compensation Court shall have power to require any person appearing before them to give evidence on oath and to authorise any person to administer an oath for that purpose.

    (7) The War Compensation Court may sit in more than one division at the same time, and in any such case anything which may be done to, by, or before the Court may be done to, by, or before any such division of the Court.

    3. Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall—

  • (a) affect or apply to proceedings in any prize court as respects any matter within the jurisdiction of the court; or
  • (b) affect the application of the Defence of the Realm (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1916, or the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, or the Corn Production (Amendment) Act, 1918, in any case where apart from this Act any of those Acts would apply;
  • (c) affect the application of section sixteen of the Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, or of section eight of the Ministry of Transport Act, 1919.
  • moved, in subsection (1) (b), to leave out "direct" [sustained any direct loss or damage"]. The noble and learned Lord said: This is an important Amendment, because it raises the basis on which compensation or payment is to be assessed under the terms of the Bill when either goods have been requisitioned or lands taken for Defence of the Realm purposes. In order to make it clear perhaps I may read the paragraph without the word "direct." It would state that a person would obtain compensation—

    "who has otherwise incurred or sustained any loss or damage"
    The words "loss or damage" are limited by the subsequent phraseology—
    "by reason of interference with his property or business in the United Kingdom through the exercise or purported exercise, during the war, of any prerogative right of His Majesty or of any power under any enactment relating to the defence of the Realm. …"
    Therefore if my Amendment were carried the result would be that the person affected would be compensated in respect of loss or damage referable to those conditions. I am not desiring that indirect loss and damage should be compensated for under conditions of this kind.

    The easiest way of dealing with the question, I think, would be to give two concrete illustrations, and they are those to which the noble and learned Lord referred in his speech from the Woolsack on the occasion of the Second Reading. I take first of all the case known as the de Keyser hotel case. I am not going to discuss it upon the point on which it was discussed in your Lordships' House acting in its judicial capacity, for that does not arise here. What the Duke Commission did in that case was this. As the hotel was unoccupied at the time When the requisition was made any claim for rental was disallowed. In other words, where a person is deprived of his property which is occupied for Government purposes it was denied that he had any right to a rental value or a value assessed on any other basis in respect of the occupation. I want to know whether a principle of that kind is really maintainable. I think in all cases where the State interferes with private property it is most important that you should have a proper, reasonable, and recognised system of payment or compensation, and when the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack gave the very large figures to which he referred—I questioned at the time whether they could be accurate or not—they might, of course, denote the extent to which the Bill was unfair, if it be true, as he stated, that something like £1,000,000,000, to which under ordinary legal principles the owners, either of property or goods affected, would be entitled, would not be obtained by them under the provisions of this Bill.

    I think there must have been some mistake in regard to the assessment of those figures. They must have included the principle of indirect loss or damage, and I wish to say at the outset that I think no claim ought to be made for what is known as indirect loss or damage. But it is entirely different when you apply the insurance principle as against the indemnity principle. In the case of the de Keyser Hotel, for however much it was insured, you could not have made a claim against the Insurance Company. As regards all compensation claims and all payments, you do not provide for them on the insurance principle, but seek to ascertain reasonably and properly what is the actual loss or damage sustained by reason of the factors which have to be taken into consideration, and to that amount the claimant or owner is entitled. As I said the other day, it is a very serious matter, in my view, to introduce in a Bill of this sort a wrong principle as regards compensation or payment. If there is one body which ought not to ask for a wrong principle as regards compensation or payment, it is the State itself, because it really means that you are relieving other persons at the cost of a particular individual. What you ought to ensure, if possible, is this. You ought to have equality as between the person whose goods are requisitioned or whose property is damaged or taken and any other member of the community, and you cannot have that unless, in the first place, you make sure that the amount of compensation paid is proper, reasonable and in accordance with legal principles.

    The other illustration which the noble and learned Lord took also shows, I think, what might be a very unfair case. It was the case of the rum at Newcastle. If I recollect aright a Newcastle brewing company were concerned and the case was put as though they were making an exorbitant claim against the State in respect of the requisitioning of their property. I am not now, of course, dealing with the question of the figure. It may be exorbitant or not: that is a matter with which the assessing tribunal has to deal. But what they said was this. "You took certain rum which we wanted in connection with out business and which was essential for business purposes. As regards that rum we paid what is a reasonable and proper price. You requisitioned it at a price lower than the controlled price and, as a matter of fact, we cannot replace it for our business purposes except at a very largely enhanced figure." I am not saying what the exact figure ought to be, but why should not a claim of that kind be properly ascertained and considered? The learned Judge, before whom the case was tried and who held that the Regulation 2 B was ultra vires and beyond the powers of the Defence of the Realm Act, laid down the ordinary principles. He said that they were entitled to be compensated or paid on the basis of market price as between a willing vendor and a willing purchaser, excluding, as you always would exclude in those cases, what I may call the exceptional, conditions which may have given an aggravated value at a particular date.

    All I wish is that these matters shall be ascertained in accordance with accepted principles, either as regards legal action or compensation claims. You should not introduce in a Bill of this kind a novel principle on the ground, as I understand it, that if the right principles were accepted there would be a large charge made against the State. I am not for a moment—I want to be very careful about that—considering what the amount is, because I do not believe that the difference in amount need be so considerable in any particular case, if the principle is properly applied and in a reasonable manner. I want to ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor two questions. Does he think that when buildings are requisitioned the owner should not be entitled to what would be a fair rental for use by the State—a fair rental based on what he might expect to obtain from an outside party? In circumstances of that kind premises may be requisitioned for an unlimited time, or for no definite time. I think in this case it was a year and a half or two years. Why, in such circumstances, should the owner be deprived of the entire use of his property? There is no such principle. As I said on the Second Reading this is a very dangerous time in which to introduce a new principle of this sort. It was never, so far as I know, applied in cases of this kind before. If the word "direct" were eliminated, although I am not enamoured of the drafting— that is a different matter—then either payment or compensation for loss or damage would be assessed on the ordinary legal or compensation principle. There is no fear of its being exaggerated in amount, becausè it is limited to loss or damage "by reason of interference with his property or business in the United Kingdom through the exercise or purported exercise, during the war, of any prerogative right of His Majesty."

    Amendment moved—

    Page 3, line 26, leave out ("direct").—(Lord Parmoor.)

    Before the noble and learned Lord replies, I should like to press him a little to consider whether it is important that this word should be retained. In common with the noble and learned Lord who has just spoken, I dislike very much the introduction of any new principle in the law of assessment of damage, but I suggest that he and the Government are quite sufficiently protected. If we look at the various paragraphs of subsection (2) which enumerate the principles on which compensation is to be assessed we find that where under the Defence of the Realm Regulations any special principle for assessment of compensation is contained in the Regulation or Order, compensation shall be assessed in accordance with the principles upon which the Board of Arbitration constituted under the Proclamation has hitherto acted; and according to (b) it is to be assessed in accordance with the principles set out and by the tribunal to be appointed. Clause 3 (a) might leave matters more open, but there is a clause, right or wrong, upon which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parmoor, has not touched, providing that this subsection shall not give any right to demand compensation for indirect loss. Therefore it would seem to me that the national funds are sufficiently protected without the addition of this word "direct," which, I confess, seems to me to be in itself an unobjectionable word.

    This Amendment the Government would be very unwilling to accept unless it were a decision of the House, who thereby took the responsibility for it. I do not take the view that these matters are disputable. I do not in the least agree with the view which Lord Parmoor, if I understood him rightly, put forward, that if we leave out the words "any direct loss or damage" we could exclude in all these cases the indirect loss which, in actual practice, has been excluded for the last six years. The proviso to which Lord Phillimore called attention is limited, of course, to the special matter of that subsection itself. That is the case where a claimant has a legal right to compensation.

    I stated that what I thought was that where cases arise under 1, 2 or 3 (b) there were Regulations already providing for the assessment, and that there was no reason to depart from those Regulations.

    I am much obliged to the noble and learned Lord, but I do not think the subsections to which he has called attention cover the whole case, or anything like the whole case. If they did, obviously the Amendment of my noble and learned friend would not be necessary, or would be innocuous. It is just because he thinks those cases are not covered by this Amendment that he presses the Amendment upon the House. I am bound to say to your Lordships that my clear view of the law, whether it be right or wrong, is that the effect of this Amendment would be to alter the whole method of compensation upon which we have proceeded during the last six years.

    What was that method? Broadly speaking, it was this. The Government for instance requisitioned the goods of A, and A was prevented from fulfilling a contract with B. Such a case has arisen frequently before the Duke Commission. Lord Parmoor's Amendment, in my judgment of its effect, would allow B to claim compensation in such a case. A further effect of the requisitioning the goods of A might easily be to prevent B from fulfilling his contract with C. In such a case, in my judgment, if this word "direct" were not inserted, C also would have a claim for compensation. Objection was taken—if I may say so with strong force—by Lord Sumner on the technical side in the Second Reading debate to the use of the word "direct." I think if that word were taken away the various compensation processes which have become necessary in this country since the year 1914 would be departed from.

    There might have been much to say for the adoption of another word if we were beginning again, but in fact this word was used first, so far as I know, in the terms of reference of the Royal Commission setting up the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission, and the terms were confined to "payment of compensation for direct and substantial loss or damage." We omit from this Bill the word "substantial," because it was thought convenient that small claims should not be excluded from a permanent system of compensation. But the word "direct" used in the terms of reference has been considered and construed by Lord Mersey's Commission, and it has been considered and construed over and over again by the Duke Commission, and the findings of both those experienced bodies are on record. The view would, I think, be taken by any Court that when Parliament used the term "direct" in the general Indemnity Act, passed after the war, it must be assumed to have accepted the term "direct" in the sense in which quite plainly it has been construed and acted upon for the past six years.

    There is no doubt that the Amendment moved by my noble and learned friend does open up a very important topic, but I at any rate am clear that the importance of it is as I stated in the Second Reading debate. I do not even gather now from the speech made by my noble and learned friend whether, in so far as his proposal introduces a change into the practice which has prevailed from 1915 to 1920, he would make it retrospective. Does he, for instance, suggest that where we are compensating persons who have claims against the Government from 1920 to 1926 those persons should be differently treated from those who have in fact received compensation from the year 1915? If the noble Lord's Amendment makes any difference at all, as I am quite clear it does, in the proposals of the Government, does he advise that its effect should be retrospective?

    We have to form our own estimates, and the noble and learned Lord does not agree, I gather, with our estimates or has doubts as to whether they are not exaggerated. He says that if these things are worked reasonably on the well-established principles of compensation it will be found that the estimate of the various Government Departments is grossly exaggerated. Holding, as I do, that the effect of the Amendment would be to include indirect damage, and holding as I do the view that it would be impossible to differentiate between cases not hitherto dealt with and those dealt with in the last five years, and instructed as I am that the resultant loss to the Treasury is represented in the immense sums which have been arrived at in consequence of the careful calculation which I gave to the House upon the Second Reading—not my own calculation but that of the Department—I am wholly unable to assent to this Amendment, and I have not the least difficulty in announcing that conclusion. The war made demands upon all sections of the community, and where so many sacrifices have been made by so many people it is asking too much to ask that a principle which has been adopted during this period should now be departed from.

    The noble and learned Lord did not grapple, if I may say so with respect, with the proposition I put forward. I will deal presently in a few words with the question of indirect damage, which was dealt with by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillimore. I put two very specific cases where there was no question of indirect damage, but where, as a matter of fact, payment of compensation had been refused by the Duke Commission. I put the case of occupied premises being taken. The premises were requisitioned and used. Is it right that a rental should be paid or not? The Duke. Commission held that no rental should be paid, but on appeal on other points that decision was upset, and I believe an arrangement has been made on the rental basis, which is right. There is no doubt that if you went back into particular cases you would find, as a matter of settlement, some might have been settled in one wav and some in another. But the question is, when you are laying down principles, are you going to deprive a man of the rental value of his estate, or of his house, or of his property, or whatever it may be, because it was requisitioned by the Government and used for Government purposes during the period of the war? Why should a particular person be placed under a disability of that kind? He is not seeking what I may call a privilege or an advantage against anyone else. Why should a particular owner of property be subjected to a disability of that character? It is exactly the same with the rum case. There were no questions of direct damage. It was a question of loss and damage in the ordinary legal sense of the use of those terms as applied to a matter of action or to a compensation claim.

    The objection which the noble and learned Lord raised was that the Amendment might introduce indirect claims. That was not my view, and of course if it was necessary to make that more clear the proviso to which the noble Lord, Lord Phillimore, referred on page 5— "Provided that this subsection shall not give any right to payment or compensation for indirect loss"— might be in terms added to this subsection (b). That is a mere matter of drafting. But it is a very much wider question to deprive owners of property or goods of what they are fairly entitled to just as much as any other subject during the period of the war, and to single them out and place them under a special disability and disadvantage. That is a precedent which is more honoured, I think, in the breach than in the observance. It is a prece lent that will be followed in the future on the grounds that if the majority of the people want to take property they are entitled to take it on terms which are injurious and damaging to the particular individual. I am sorry to say there is too much tendency in that direction on bureaucratic grounds at the present day. I am afraid it is hardly possible under the conditions to have a division upon a point of this kind, but I wish to utter my most earnest protest against a principle of this sort.

    The noble and learned Lord has complained that I did not answer an illustration he gave. I should be unwilling to appear negligent in such a matter. I did not reply to it because, with the greatest respect to the noble and learned Lord, I thought on the face of it it would not be helpful in the matter under discussion. The noble and learned Lord stated himself that in that case there was no question of indirect loss. If there was no question of indirect loss it seemed to me to be apparent that leaving the word "direct" out in this sub-paragraph would not help in such a case.

    You must assume that you have a competent and not an incompetent tribunal. Although the tribunal was not in fact incompetent then, it has been very much strengthened. I exclude myself from giving any opinion on the facts, because I have only one sentence in the noble and learned Lord's speech giving me any idea of what the facts were. But if the facts were that they refused to give damages which the noble and learned Lord says were not indirect, then it seems to me that they pursued a somewhat strange line of reasoning and arrived at a very foggy conclusion. The result is that you must have differences in cases of that kind if you are to have justice.

    On Question, Amendment negatived.

    moved, at the end of subsection I (b), after "entitled to," to insert "payment or," and in subsection 2 (i) to leave out "the Defence of the Realm regulation or any" and to insert "any regulation or." The noble and learned Lord said: These are drafting.

    Amendments moved—

    Page 3, line 34, after ("to") insert ("payment or").
    Page 4, line 18, leave out from ("under") to ("order") in line 19, and insert ("any regulation or").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

    On Question, Amendments agreed to.

    My Lords, the next four Amendments in subsection (2) (i) are purely drafting.

    Amendments moved—

    Page 4, line 19, leave out ("thereunder") and insert ("under any enactment relating to the defence of the realm")
    Page 4, line 20, after ("of") insert ("any payment (including any price to be paid) or")
    Page 4, line 22, after ("order") insert ("such payment or")
    Page 4, line 25, after ("assessing") insert ("the payment or").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

    On Question, Amendments agreed to.

    had an Amendment in subsection 2 (iii), to delete flour (a) "take that right into consideration" and to insert "give effect to that right but." The noble Lord said: That is to meet the point taken by Lord Sumner, to make it clear that the tribunal is to take the right into consideration and to give effect to it.

    I am very much obliged to the Lord Cbancellor for having given effect to what I said. I feel a little uneasy. I know that on the occasion of the Second Reading he was inclined to think, and indeed he stated in terms, that the practice which had been followed by the Commission should continue to be followed, it being a practice to treat the costs as part of the damages. I do not think it is quite satisfactory to increase a man's damages because he has to go to Court and incur a solicitor's bill, and I should certainly feel easier in my own mind if the words ran to give effect to the legal right with costs.

    There is undoubtedly a good deal to be said from the noble and learned. Lord's point of view. There are a great number of points of detail connected with this Bill which I have had to consider, and I do not think it was very pointedly taken in the Second Reading. I was rather under the impression that the answer I had made on that point had been accepted as not un-satisfactory. If the noble and learned Lord will be content with that assurance, I will send for those who are responsible for the fortunes of this Bill in another place and before the Report and Third Reading stage there will be an opportunity for amendment, and I will give my very close attention to this particular point.

    On Question, Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments moved—

    Page 5, line 20, after ("for") insert ("payment or")
    Page 5, line 23, after ("for") insert ("payment or")
    Page 5, line 24, after ("further") insert ("payment or")
    Page 5, line 29, after ("assessing") insert ("payment or").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

    On Question, Amendments agreed to.

    Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.

    Clauses 3 and 4 agreed to.

    Clause 5:

    Validation of sentences.

    5. Any sentence pushed, judgment given, or order made by any military court (other than a court-martial constituted in pursuance of any statute) in connection with the war, or by any court established by the authority administering any territory in the occupation of any of His Majesty's Forces during the war for the administration of justice within such territory, whether passed, given, or made during such occupation, or after such occupation has determined until the court has been abolished or superseded by such lawfully constituted authority as may hereafter be established for the administration of such territory, shall be deemed to be and always to have been valid, and to be and always to have been within the jurisdiction of the court.

    moved, at the end of Clause 5, to insert the following proviso—

    "Provided that any petition from a person upon whom a sentence has been passed by any such military court shall be submitted to the Judge-Advocate-General for his opinion and report in like manner and in the like cases as if the sentence were a sentence passed by a court-martial under the Army Act."
    The noble and learned Lord said: This Amendment expresses its own meaning. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Parmoor, also has an Amendment which I think was intended to carry out the same purpose

    The noble and learned Lord on reflection will recall that his Amendment was technically not very accurate, because the Judge-Advocate-General has no power to review any sentence. I think the Amendment proposed by me is the technical way.

    Amendment moved.

    Page 7, line 5, insert the said new paragraph.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

    On Question, Amendment agreed to.

    I am much obliged to the Lord Chancellor for having introduced this Amendment, and of course I do not move mine. I want to ask him one point upon his own form. It is provided that "any petition from a person upon whom a sentence has been passed by any such military court. …" Clause 5 of the Bill deals both with the military Court and any Court established by the authority, and so on. Does he mean to limit the power of reference to the Judge-Advocate-General to the military Court, to the exclusion of the other Court? I hope it may be general. It is a matter to which I called attention on the Second Reading. Clause 5 says—

    "Any sentence passed, judgment given, or order made by any military court (other than a court-martial constituted in pursuance of any statute) in connection with the war—"
    That is one part. Then it says—
    "or by any court established by the authority administering any territory in the occupation of any of His Majesty's Forces…."
    That is the other. It equally applies to both of them, although they may be outside the jurisdiction of the Court. I wanted what we called the possible appeal to be applicable in both cases. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord intended it only to apply in one case.

    Could the Judge-Advocate-General be asked to report about these Courts? Surely not. He could only be asked to report about a Court-Martial.

    But by Statute he might be asked to report. That was the suggestion made. I think the noble and learned Lord was not here on the Second Reading. Technically all the Judge-Advocate-General does nowadays is to advise the Secretary of State for War. His position is different from what it was in the old days. But, as regards this particular provision, I will not press it if the Lord Chancellor thinks it is not right, but I think it ought to cover both Courts.

    In fact it would be impossible without substantive statutory provision to bring any other Court than a military Court before the Judge-Advocate-General at all. It may reassure my noble and learned friend if I give him the result of my inquiry, which is that the second case to which he directs attention is extraordinary unimportant, having regard to the numbers of cases dealt with, and I think it would be quite impossible in the proviso to deal-with it.

    I entirely accept what the Lord Chancellor says, and I am grateful for the Amendment which he has introduced.

    On Question, Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 5, as amended, agreed to.

    Remaining clauses and schedule agreed to.