Monday, 26th July, 1976.

The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Derby.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in view of the cutting down of the services in acute hospitals, they will state what action is being taken to reward family doctors for the considerable extra work they will have to undertake including the treatment of the increasing number of old people needing care in their homes.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is discussing a treaty about the moon, whether the United Kingdom is a party to these discussions, and whether a copy of the present working draft can be placed in the Library.

2.45 p.m.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government, in view of the increase in crime in all categories, and the overall deficiency of 5,208 officers of the Metropolitan Police for the year 1975, as stated in the Report of the Commissioner of Police to the Home Secretary (Cmnd. 6496, June 1976), what steps are being taken to bring the force up to approved strength.

2.50 p.m.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government what communications have been made by the Soviet Union to the other signatories of the Montreux Convention of 1936 about the passage through the Bosphorus of the warship "Kiev", which appears to be an aircraft carrier and thus debarred by the Convention from passing.

2.58 p.m.

The Ecclesiastical Committee of Parliament has by a majority resolved that this Measure is expedient. Having received a number of objections to the Measure—and there are always more people ready to express their dissatisfaction than there are those who are vocal in support of any measure—the Report of the Ecclesiastical Committee devotes the greater part of its attention to the criticisms of the Measure and pays rather half-hearted tribute to the immense amount of care and labour which has been devoted by the Church Assembly and by the General Synod to the subject of the remuneration of the clergy over a period of many years. In a moment I hope to put before your Lordships the broad, positive principles which underlie this Measure, and the reasons why it is so important for the welfare of the Church and of the clergy that it should become law.

There are, however, three matters in the Ecclesiastical Committee's Report to which I must refer specifically, since otherwise misunderstanding may arise. The first concerns the last words of paragraph 17. The Committee is here considering the guaranteed annuity of up to £1,000 a year. The report states:

"…in considering the principle involved the Committee has proceeded as though this Measure provided that after the next vacancy the benefice will cease to have any income representing its old endowment income".

It is not clear why the Committee considered that it should proceed on this assumption, since it is patently not the case. The figure of up to to £1,000 is provided for the important psychological reason of ensuring a link between the old endowment and the new pay structure. So it must not be thought that on a vacancy a benefice will cease to have any income representing its old endowment income.

In fact, as Appendix II shows, 8,282 parishes out of the total of 10,595, having at the present time under £1,000 of endowment income, will continue to be guaranteed for their incumbent exactly the same sum as exists at present. The other 2,313 benefices with endowments over £1,000 will receive this guaranteed annuity plus the personal grant to a sitting incumbent equal to any excess over £1,000 per annum of net annual endowment income to which he is entitled so long as he holds that office. These facts are important and they should not be forgotten.

The second point which requires comment is contained in paragraph 18 where the report is dealing with the relevance of charity law. The report refers to Clause 11(2) of the Endowments and Glebe Measure which states that property held on trust by private trustees may be transferred to the Church Commissioners only with the consent of the Charity Commissioners. This refers of course to trusts of comparatively recent origin. What the Measure is dealing with in the main are those endowments, often of very ancient origin, conferred on the Church. Their administration was entrusted by Parliament some 140 years ago, not to the Charity Commissioners but to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. This body was given its own legal framework within which it exercises its responsibilities. Accordingly, over the years legislation has increasingly dealt with them as endowments of the Church as a whole and not as endowments of individual charities as they would have been under the ordinary charity law. This measure is entirely consistent with this trend.

Thirdly, I must mention the issues raised in paragraph 22 on page 10. The argument is often used that the possession of endowment by a particular parish may protect it from being the object of pastoral reorganisation. The report quite rightly points out that there is no substance in this assertion. I have been a diocesan Bishop for 21 years and I have been involved both as a Bishop and as a member of the Board of the Church Commissioners with innumerable schemes for pastoral reorganisation. I cannot remember a single one in which the diocese hesitated in setting forward a scheme for pastoral reorganisation because one of the parishes was heavily endowed. Nor can I remember a single case in which the Church Commissioners either refused or agreed to forward a scheme because this issue was involved. Pastoral reorganisation is purely a matter for the statutory pastoral committee of the diocese and it exercises its responsibilities within the powers of the Pastoral Measure.

I come now, my Lords, to the broad principles of reform which the Measure seeks to establish. In the main, if approved by Parliament the endowments attaching to certain parishes will be pooled subject to certain safeguards and used for the benefit of the stipends of the clergy generally, and the ownership of glebe will be transferred from individual clergy to the Diocesan Board of Finance for a similar general use. Stated thus baldly the Measure sounds to be rapacious and ruthless. I confess that at one time I myself thought it to be so. I have a strong historical sense and I did not like the idea of detaching from individual benefices endowments which had been allocated to them by benefactors in the past. But I have studied the issues with care and I have come to appreciate that the Measure intends to do the right thing and I believe that it does so and therefore I am able to commend it wholeheartedly to your Lordships.

As the Legislative Committee's Report points out on page 17, Church legislation of this sort is not new. The Ecclesiastical Commission, created 140 years ago, deprived some of the great Sees such as Canterbury, York, London, Durham and Winchester of their vast emoluments and removed the incomes of many Cathedral Chapters and sinecure offices for the creation and augmentation of the Commissioners' General Fund. You will remember, my Lords, that this led to a certain amount of acrimonious correspondence on the part of Sidney Smith at the time. I remember when my father, some 40 years ago, was made a prebendary in St. Paul's Cathedral he claimed that as a result of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners he had been deprived of some £38,000 a year for doing absolutely nothing. Thus it was an extremely unpopular move when the Ecclesiastical Commission was set up. But as my great predecessor Bishop Blomfield, the chief architect of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners remarked:

"They now blame me for these measures, but they will hereafter confess that those very measures have been the saving of the Church".

And he was right.

Nearer to our own time the radical Benefices (Stabilisation of Incomes) Measure 1951, passed by this House, provided that money endowments held by the Commissioners in trust for individual benefices were to be transferred to their general fund with a fixed annual payment, so that any income growth would be available not to the benefice but for the benefit of the clergy generally. The Pastoral Measure passed by this House in 1968 authorised by a scheme or order the diversion of part of the endowments of a benefice to the Diocesan Stipends Fund for the benefit of all the clergy without requiring the consent of the incumbent concerned.

This Measure therefore stands in a long line of enactments designed to provide a more just and equitable distribution of the Church's endowments for the benefit of the clergy generally. It is the Church's commitment to minister to the whole nation, both in the town and in the country, and it is no part of this Measure to take the clergy away from the country, as has sometimes been suggested. On the contrary, what we want to be sure of is that the clergy are placed right throughout the whole nation and that in any place, whether they be in town or the country, they have enough to live on.

The substance of this Measure has been under discussion for well over 10 years. Following a report entitled Partners in Ministry which was published in 1967, a questionnaire which went out to the dioceses revealed that 85 per cent. of the replies favoured a more uniform system of remuneration and nearly 60 per cent. favoured the pooling of endowment and glebe income. The Terms of Ministry Committee, which was set up to advise on the best way forward, recommended, and the General Synod accepted in 1972. that benefice endowment income and glebe income should he pooled and the glebe transferred into diocesan ownership. This Measure is the outcome.

Subject to the safeguards I have already mentioned, we should ask: does this Measure impose any injustice on anyone? I can confidently assert my belief that it does not. I ask your Lordships to note how small in fact is the immediate impact of this Measure. All dioceses have accepted a minimum stipend for incumbents of £2,400 a year, plus a house which is rate and rent free. Thus, Appendix II reveals that there are only 413 parishes out of 10,595 which have endowments sufficient to meet this modest target. All the rest must he subsidised from central funds. Again, out of the 4,846 benefices which receive income from glebe, 4,622—that is all but 224—receive less than £1,000; and they are going to be granted a guaranteed annuity of up to £1,000.

I can state that as a result of this Measure no clergyman will be worse off than he is at present, and progressively many will be far better off. All that will happen is that the present incumbents will continue to enjoy the equivalent of the existing income from endowments and their successors will have a guaranteed sum of up to £1,000 and for the rest will be brought up to the diocesan standard from central funds and parochial giving. If the incumbent owns glebe, he will no longer be able to manage it himself (a task of which many would be gladly rid) and he would not be the beneficiary of any increase of income from the glebe if, for instance, it were to be sold for a large sum. But neither is he such a beneficiary today, since it is always open to a diocese to promote a scheme under the Pastoral Measure for a diversion of the income of a benefice to the Diocesan Stipends Fund even without the consent of the incumbent if, as a result of fortuitous circumstances, the benefice income is inflated beyond the general standard of diocesan remuneration.

But, my Lords, is it offensive to natural justice to take away from some benefices sources of income which were allocated to an incumbent at the time of his institution? The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, clearly thinks it is, since in his Amendment he seeks to persuade your Lordships to refuse an Affirmative Resolution to the Measure on the grounds that:

"contrary to natural justice, it removes from certain incumbents the ownership of lands lawfully bestowed on them."

I confess that it is a surprise to me that such an Amendment should emanate from the Benches of a radical Party devoted to reform, as I had looked for support from that quarter for a Measure which is so clearly forward-looking and progressive. The noble Lord uses the term "natural justice", and I am advised that in English law it is used only in limited contexts, such as a failure in a judicial tribunal to give each party the opportunity to state their case or to fail to decide a dispute honestly and without bias. I am advised that in law there is no breach of natural justice if property is taken away from a person by the due processes of law. We all have a good deal of our property removed by taxation; some of us have had property removed by compulsory purchase. None of us enjoy the process, but we submit because such action is taken by Statute in the interests of the nation as a whole.

It was this principle which was at work when there were transferred to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners the estates lawfully bestowed on bishops, deans, chapters and other ecclesiastical corporations in the last century by Statute, for the benefit of the Church as a whole. It is this principle which is at work in the Pastoral Measure today, because if in the process of promoting the scheme of pastoral reorganisation it is necessary to do so, a clergyman can be deprived not merely of income but of the benefice itself, so long, of course, as he is properly remunerated and compensated. This Measure continues this process, and I submit that there is no breach of natural justice.

My Lords, in the broadest terms, this Measure is one further step in bringing the Church of England out of the 19th century and into the 20th. Rightly, we no longer tolerate a Bishop of Barchester living in luxury in his palace and Archdeacon Grantley enjoying his wealth at Plumstead Episcopi, while Mr. Quiverful and Mr. Crawley of Hogglestock eke out a miserable existence on a few pounds a year. We still need to get away from the picture of the parson as a landowner, relying for much of his income on the proceeds of his glebe. The establishment of the Church Commissioners as the Central Stipends Authority has at long last brought us nearer to a uniform system of payment for all the clergy. We have a long way to go to provide a proper standard for the payment of the clergy, but if we are to go to the laity and ask them for a greatly increased standard of giving we must be able to assure them that the Church is using its resources justly and efficiently. We shall be able to give that assurance if this resolution is passed by this House today.

The Measure is, as I have reminded your Lordships, the outcome of many years of thought and consultation by the Church and there is no ground whatsoever for saying that there has not been enough consultation. It received final approval in July of last year by a vote of 229 in favour and 34 against, with five abstentions. I trust that your Lordships will endorse the judgment of the General Synod, and help us go forward in the demanding task of rewarding the clergy adequately. My Lords, I beg to move.

Moved, That this House do direct that, in accordance with the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919, the Endowments and Glebe Measure be presented to Her Majesty for the Royal Assent—( The Lord Bishop of London).

3.20 p.m.

I believe it is right that the Church of England should, within very broad limits, have control of its own affairs and if it is argued, as indeed it is argued by some of my colleagues, that the price for that should be disestablishment, I, for one, would not flinch at paying that price. Therefore, I should not, in the normal way, seek to persuade your Lordships to obstruct a Measure coming from the Synod to Parliament, however much I disagreed with, or disapproved of, what it had to say. But there is an exception to this rule, and I suggest that we have such an exception before us today. I think that the Church should have control over its own affairs, in the same way as any other body has control over its own affairs; that is, within the limits of the law of the land and the bounds of what I, however inaccurately, persist in calling natural justice; for, whatever the specialised meaning of the term, I have no doubt that most of your Lordships understand what I mean.

Although as a nation we are used to the idea of compulsory purchase, it is not one which we have handed over indiscrimately to other bodies, apart from the Legislature and those which are obviously immediately dependent upon them, such as local government. Therefore, there is a very distinct difference between the compulsory purchase as it is usually employed in this country today, and the compulsory purchase which we are asked to approve in the House this afternoon. So when the Church comes to this House and asks us to allow it to expropriate the rights of individuals in a manner which no other body would be allowed to do, and which, if the Church were self-governing, would be disallowed by the courts, I think we have an absolute right to object, for here we are not interfering with the legitimate self-government of the Church; we are being made use of by the Church to allow it to do something which would otherwise be illegal and which I certainly believe to be immoral. If I can show to this House that this Measure does exactly that, and that it is oppressive of the rights of certain citizens, I hope that it will send it back to the Synod to look at it again.

Some of your Lordships who will be speaking today, and a large number of people outside this House, believe that this Measure is ill-conceived. Although I realise that this is a very difficult problem, I am broadly in sympathy with the aims of this Measure. I welcome the efforts of the Church, which the right reverend Prelate has so well described, to deploy its own resources to the best possible advantage. As a member of the Church Assembly, as a religious journalist and as what I might call an ecclesiastical activist, I have campaigned on that side of the argument for a large number of years. Therefore, it is all the more painful to me that this Measure contains one matter which I would not fight for, and which I must oppose; that is, it removes from present incumbents, during their own incumbency, their right to the ownership of the glebe land which was inalienably, as all thought then, bestowed on them when they were inducted into their benefices.

I do not believe there is any need at all for this. When it was first put forward, the original scheme allowed incumbents to opt out for the period of time when they had their benefices, and the glebe land would naturally fall in before the next incumbent took over. It may be argued that that would still have been unjust to the parishes, but, nevertheless, there was then no injustice done to an incumbent who had been given the ownership of this land. That, indeed, was what happened when, as has been quoted before, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners took over the land of the Bishops and other land in the last century. Individual Bishops were given the right to opt out until their tenure of the See ended.

We have not really been told why this has been done, why it has been neglected to put in a clause, as was originally suggested, to the effect that incumbents could opt out of their own right, and I suggest that it is merely for administrative tidiness. So far as I can see, there is no precedent for such a thing in the history of the Church. I am told, indeed, that even when the Dissolution of the Monasteries occurred, there was a voluntary deed of surrender on behalf of the abbot or prior concerned. What pressure was used to exact this voluntary deed, I do not think we need go into. But, at least the forms of law appear to have been preserved on that occasion, and I think we are entitled to know why ownership of the glebe may not transfer as incumbencies fall in.

I am quite prepared to be told that this is a very small point, and obviously to a large number of people it is. The Ecclesiastical Committee—I think rather unfortunately—did not even consider it. We shall be told that there is very little glebe, and that is true. We shall be told that most incumbents would prefer to get rid of it. I am sure that some of them do. We do not know how many, because they have not, on the whole, been asked; at least, those who have written to me to protest about this Measure have told me that. We are told that they receive compensation. They receive money for money, and I am the first to acknowledge the fairness of the monetary considerations the Church has laid down in putting forward this Measure. But those of them whose pride and pleasure it has been to have a stake in the country, and to have the ownership of some of the land going with their parish, receive nothing for that. Indeed, there cannot be any monetary compensation for that pride and pleasure and that link with the countryside being taken away from them, out of the blue, in the middle of their incumbency, which, as I said, was given to them inalienably when they were inducted.

We may well be told that to send a Measure back for such a small matter would cause chaos, but I think that that can be easily overstated. It is one small matter to which I am objecting and, although it means that the Measure would have to go through many stages again, it would presumably be able to go through them rather quickly. But, even if it were true that it would cause a lot of trouble, I do not think it would matter; for what are we here for? We are not an instrument of the bureaucracy of either Church or State. Among our duties as part of the High Court of Parliament, one of the most important is the protection of the rights of individuals, no matter how few those individuals are, no matter how unimportant their rights may seem to us, no matter how worthy are the people who are expropriating them, no matter how inconvenient our actions may be; for if we do not protect the individual rights of these people nobody else will. My Lords, I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name.

Moved, as an Amendment to the above Motion, to leave out all the words after ("House") and insert ("declines to direct that the Endowments and Glebe Measure be presented to Her Majesty for Royal Assent on the ground that, contrary to natural justice, it removes from certain incumbents the ownership of lands lawfully bestowed on them".).—( Lord Beaumont of Whitley.)

3.31 p.m.

3.39 p.m.

3.44 p.m.

3.58 p.m.

4.7 p.m.

4.16 p.m.

4.22 p.m.

4.25 p.m.

4.44 p.m.

Division called.

Amendment negatived accordingly.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

4.55 p.m.

The first clause gives legal power to dispense with certain legal statements that have to be made, either when a man is about to be ordained or at the time when he is instituted. Thus, for instance,

one of the things that is required is what is known as Si Quis, which is a document which has to be read in the parish of the man who is being ordained in order to discover whether there is anybody there who knows of any impediment against his ordination. Nowadays, when we have such very careful training and selection of men for the ordained ministry, when it is known who they are and when they have been through the mill of examination, it is really no longer necessary that that document should be solemnly read.

Again, there is another very mysterious declaration which a clergyman has to make before he can be licensed or instituted, which is called the declaration against simony. It is an exceedingly complicated legal document, and, in fact, is so unintelligible that most bishops require that it should be said in the presence of the churchwardens in the vestry before the service, because it really does not conduce to a worshipful atmosphere within church. I believe that it was originally required to prevent clergymen buying themselves into a particular post, or otherwise to prevent a father from buying a rich advowson when his son was born and putting someone in on the clear understanding that in 23 years or more he would resign, and then putting his son in, where he would enjoy for the rest of his life the emoluments of the benefice. I know of no other employment (though there may be one) in which the person who is about to be appointed has to make a solemn statement that he has not got the job by any underhand or improper means; and it seems to be rather strange that a clergyman, whom one would expect to have reasonable standards of behaviour, should be required to make this solemn statement.

Clause 2 clears away a doubtful point as to whether a bishop is legally entitled to license a clergyman for a limited period as for an unlimited period. There are some posts to which he might want to ask a clergyman to go for a limited period of time, and all that this clause does is to give the bishop power to set a term to the licence.

The third clause extends the area in which a bishop can delegate his authority when he is ill or when he is absent from his diocese. There are certain occasions when it is valuable that he should be able to give what we might call a power of attorney to somebody else, but there are certain things which a diocesan bishop alone can do, and this extends the power whereby be can delegate his authority. Moreover, if the Archbishop cannot act then this clause gives the senior bishop of the province power to appoint a person as a deputy to a diocesan bishop—and, as I am the senior in the Province of Canterbury, I can assure your Lordships that I have no personal interest in this particular clause.

Clause 4 removes the legal obligation which some cathedral statutes lay upon the bishop to conduct a formal visitation of his cathedral from time to time. Some statutes do not lay any sort of obligation of this kind; others say that the bishop "shall" conduct a visitation of his cathedral, say, every three years. I believe that my right reverend friend the Bishop of Rochester is under one of these obligations. A formal visitation of a cathedral is a very complicated and sometimes very expensive operation. It may be necessary from time to time, but it is undesirable, in our view, that the bishop should have to conduct a visitation of his cathedral at stated intervals.

Clause 5 makes it possible where there is a vacancy, to allow the remuneration of lay workers as well as clerks in Holy Orders. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, is not here to hear that clause which is in favour, and to the advantage, of lay people. Clause 6 extends the right of burial in a churchyard not only to parishioners who are resident in the parish but also to parishioners who are there by virtue of being on the electoral roll. It sometimes happens that a person does not live in the parish but takes a full part in the life of the parish, and that his name is on the electoral role; and when he dies, his family would like him to be buried in the churchyard of the parish which he has served most of his life. This clause makes that legally possible. It also clears up some doubt as to who has the authority to allow other people who are not parishioners to be buried in the churchyard. The minister has to take general regard to the opinion of his parochial church council in giving a decision.

Finally, my Lords, we come to the Burnley Rectory Act of 1890 which ties the suffragan see of Burnley in the diocese of Blackburn to the parish of Burnley. If the Bishop of Blackburn wishes to have a suffragan bishop, one of his being the Bishop of Burnley, then he must also be the rector of Burnley. In these days the demands made on suffragan bishops are such that it is difficult for a suffragan bishop to have as well the charge of a big and important parish; so that this clause separates the rector of Burnley from the office of suffragan bishop. These are the matters contained in this miscellaneous provisions Measure, and I hope that they will meet with your Lordships' approval.

Moved, That this House do direct that, in accordance with the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919, the Church of England (Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure be presented to Her Majesty for the Royal Assent.—( The Lord Bishop of London.]

On Question, Motion agreed to.

5.3 p.m.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 3^a .—( Baroness Birk.)

On Question, Bill read 3^a with the Amendments.

Clause 26 [ Provisions supplementary to s.25]:

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment designed to make subsection (1) of Clause 26 consistent with subsection (1) of Clause 24. Both subsections deal with the entry of authorised persons on to land in connection with the exercise of powers in the Bill (in the case of Clause 24 for the purpose of making a dangerous tree safe). It is clearly desirable that in both clauses the person entering on the land should not only be authorised but be authorised in writing.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, with the leave of the House I beg to move Amendment No. 2 and at the same time to speak to Amendment No. 3. Amendment No. 3 (which is the substantive one) remedies a potential injustice regarding the compensation payable to persons having an interest in land on which works have been carried out to enclose dangerous excavations. Amendment No. 2 is consequential. The Amendment arises from discussions that have taken place between my Department and the Lord Chancellor's Office following the insertion of this clause at Report stage. Its purpose is to remedy a potential injustice where compensation to persons having an interest in land on which works have been carried out is concerned; for example, where the edge of the excavation comes so close to the boundary of the land in question that it is necessary to erect a fence on the adjoining land. The Amendment therefore has the effect of permitting compensation to be paid to a person having an interest in land, on which works are sited when the excavation itself is situated on other land.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Page 36, leave out lines 43 to 45 and insert:

("( ) No compensation shall be payable by virtue of the preceding subsection, to any person having an interest in the site of the excavation in question, in respect of damage attributable to the presence of permanent works on any land other than damage attributable to interference with an easement or profit.").

On Question, Amendment agreed to,

Clause 27 [ Alterations of supplemental provisions of Public Health Acts];

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, subsection (6) of Clause 27 makes it clear that the repeal by this Bill of Sections 295 and 314 of the Public Health Act 1936 does not affect any order made under those Sections which may still be in force. It is possible that orders made under Section 313, which is also repealed, may still exist and these should also be allowed to Continue. These orders amend or repeal local Acts as necessary on the passing of the Public Health Act 1936. Without the Amendment the repeal of Section 313 would allow them to lapse with the probable result that any amended local Act provision would revert to its original, unacceptable form. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 33 [ Restoration or continuation of supply of water, gas or electricity]:

5.7 p.m.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is an Amendment to the new clause inserted into the Bill—and for which I am enormously grateful. It is a clause which comes to the rescue in the limited class of case where a tenant has electricity, gas or water supplied to his premises paid for by him inclusive with his rent and his landlord defaults in payment of the electricity, gas or water bill. The innocent occupier, the tenant, has his supply of electricity gas or water cut off. This clause comes to his rescue in this limited case. At the Report stage a further Amendment was introduced by the Government which took care of these cases not only where there had been a cut-off but even where a cut-off was contemplated; so that the tenant could, in suitable cases, be rescued by the council without going through the tiresome procedure of cutting off the supply and reconnecting it.

This Amendment arises from the horror with which I learned from the speech of the noble Baroness in Committee—and although we have discussed this question since on Report, I still have this feeling of horror—that, since the contract is between the statutory undertaker and the landlord, there can still be cases where the tenant, the occupier, only discovers that something is wrong when he arrives home to find his gas, electricity or water supply actually has been cut off. It seems inhumane in a civilised country like this that a perfectly innocent person can arrive home to find that his electricity supply has been cut off without any warning that that was going to occur.

May I explain that the Amendment requires that a statutory undertaker in these cases shall give not less than three days' notice in writing of their intention to cut off the supply if they are to qualify themselves to recover payment from the local authority. One finds in the clause that the occupier, in order to avail himself of this opportunity to be rescued by the local authority when he suspects a cut off, has to give the local authority notice in writing that the electricity is about to be cut off. If he is to give the authority notice in writing, then as night follows day, he must be given notice that he is about to be cut off. What the noble Baroness said about this on Report stage is quoted at column 203 of Hansard for 13th July:

"…in those cases where an occupier had some intimation, or guessed, or heard by chance or found out, that the supply was likely to be cut off, we could act there."

I should have thought that was a hopelessly haphazard way of approaching a

serious matter of this kind. It sticks out a mile that these occupiers were entitled to notice that they were going to be cut off. That alone amply justifies this Amendment but that is not my main point. My main point is the inhumanity being inflicted by a monopoly undertaking which is supplying a vital commodity to a user who has done absolutely nothing wrong. The noble Baroness said at column 202 of Hansard in the same debate on 13th July:

"…statutory undertakers do not want, nor do they feel it is their job, nor do they feel they have the resources, to act as welfare authorities."

I should not have thought it could be called an act of a welfare authority merely to give somebody notice his supply of electricity was about to be cut off if the electricity bill was not paid.

Furthermore, I should have thought it was thoroughly bad business for the statutory undertaker not to give notice because when the landlord defaults, it is the tenant who is much the best risk against whom next to try to extract the money to pay the account. The tenant is in the strong position, if he has the money or can raise a temporary loan, to pay the bill and deduct the money from future payments of rent to the landlord. If the local authority is going to bail out the tenant and seek to recover from a landlord who has already been defaulting in his dealings with the statutory undertaker, in a large number of these cases the ratepayer is going to he landed with the bill and the defaulting landlord is going to get away with it.

The noble Baroness said at Report stage that this Amendment was defective. She used these words at column 203 of Hansard:

"The point is that his Amendment does not impose a new obligation on the statutory undertaker. The only way he could bring about the result he wants is by imposing an obligation on the statutory undertaker."

I did not follow that argument then and and I do not follow it now. I should like to cite the parallel case of the houseowner who applies for an improvement grant to improve his house. The law provides that the local authority may at its discretion provide an improvement grant on condition that the owner pays his share of the cost of the improvement. There is no legal obligation on the houseowner to contribute to the cost of the improvement. He need not if he does not want to.

If he does not contribute his share, he does not get the grant. That is a parallel case and this Amendment cannot be called defective upon that ground.

If, my Lords, you are thinking purely in terms of people's obligations, you do not always get very far. I am under no legal obligation to stretch out my hand and save a child that has fallen into a lily pond; but I am expected to act with some decent humanity. Likewise, the monopoly statutory undertakers are expected to behave with some humanity to their users who have done nothing wrong. The noble Baroness said at Report stage that there might be administrative difficulties. I can see that in a very limited class of case, where the landlord and his tenant both live in the same building in separate flats and the electricity board are not sure which flat the landlord occupies and which flat the tenant occupies, there can be difficulty. In those few cases the board could take the precaution of sending the printed notice addressed to "The occupier" just to make sure that they brought themselves within this clause.

I have to admit that strictly in theory a statutory undertaker which took the view that they were determined not to issue the notices to occupiers and were determined to disqualify themselves from going to the local authority for payment of their bills, in those cases the Amendment would work against the interests of the occupier and would prevent the local authority stepping in and helping him. Those cases would be infinitesimal in number and any statutory undertaker which behaved in that way would quickly find public opinion mounting up against them. They would quickly put themselves in a position where they did not disqualify themselves from going to the local authority for payment when the landlord had failed. In those circumstances I trust that this Amendment will be found acceptable. I beg to move.

5.19 p.m.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.25 p.m.

Prescription of signs, etc., on certain buildings

"—(1) This section applies to any substance which in the opinion of the Council is likely to involve special hazard to persons engaged in operations for fire-fighting purposes.

(2) The premises to which this section applies are any building or place in the area for which the Council is the Fire Authority used for the manufacture or storage of any substance to which this section applies (including any part of such a building or place) and any premises of which such a building or place forms a part.

(3) The Council may in relation to any substance to which this section applies and in respect of any premises to which this section applies:—

Provided that the power of the Council to make requirements in respect of the manner of such storage shall extend only to requirements for the purpose of reducing any special hazard to which in the opinion of the Council persons engaged in operations for firefighting purposes may be subjected by reason of the nature and properties of any such substance or the proximity of any such substance to any other substance whether or not it is a substance to which this section applies and in making such requirement the Council shall have regard to good custom and practice and to the reasonable needs of any undertaking, trade or business carried on in those premises.

(4) The Secretary of State may give directions as to the warning signs to be prescribed by the Council under paragraph ( a) of the last foregoing subsection and the Council, in exercising their powers under that paragraph shall comply with any such directions for the time being in force.

(5)( a) Where requirements have been made under sub-paragraph (ii) of paragraph ( b) of subsection (3) of this section in respect of any premises to which this section applies no alteration which results in a contravention of those requirements shall be made in the manner of storage therein of any substance to which this section applies.

( b) Where it appears to the Council that requirements made under subsection (3) of this section are no longer appropriate for the purpose for which they were made the Council may from time to time, by notice given in writing, vary or revoke such requirements or make such further requirements as they consider necessary and any reference in this section to requirements made under the said subsection (3) shall include a reference to those requirements as varied under this paragraph or to any further requirements made by virtue of this paragraph.

( c) A notice served under the last foregoing paragraph which varies any requirement made under paragraph ( b) of subsection (3) of this section or which makes further requirements shall specify a reasonable time (not being less than 21 days) within which the requirements of the notice shall be complied with.

(6) Any person who is aggrieved by any requirement made under paragraph ( b) of subsection (3) of this section which relates to the manner of storage of any substance to which this section applies, may, within a period of 21 days beginning with the date on which such requirement is notified to him, require the Council to deliver to him a certificate stating the grounds for the making of such requirement and he may appeal to the Secretary of State within 10 days after the receipt of the certificate.

(7) Every appeal to the Secretary of State under this section shall be made in writing asking that the requirement may not be made or may be modified in such manner and to such extent as may be set forth in the appeal, and shall be accompanied by the certificate of the Council given under the last foregoing subsection.

(8) Where an appeal is brought under this section the Secretary of State may confirm, vary or quash any requirement which is the subject of the appeal and his decision on the appeal shall have effect for the purpose of any requirement as if it had been made by the Council.

(9) Before determining any appeal made to him under this section, the Secretary of State may, if he thinks it necessary or desirable, cause an inquiry and report upon the matter to be made to him by such person as he may appoint for the purpose and shall forward to the appellant (whether in person or by counsel, solicitor or other representative) and to the Council, if either so desire, an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by the person so appointed.

(10) An officer of the Council authorised by the Council for the purposes of this section shall have the like powers of entering premises for the purposes of this section as are conferred upon authorised officers of councils by section 287 (which confers powers to enter premises) of the Public Health Act 1936 and accordingly:—

(11)( a) Any person who:—

shall, subject as hereinafter provided, be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £100 and to a fine not exceeding £20 for each day on which the defence is continued after the conviction therefor:

Provided that no offence under sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph which involves a failure to comply with such a requirement as is referred to in subsection (6) of this section shall have been committed by any person until the end of any period within which an appeal under this section may be made by him in respect of the requirement in question, and, where such an appeal is duly made, until seven days after the appeal has been withdrawn or determined.

( b) In any proceedings for an offence under this subsection, shall be in defence for the person charged to prove that he took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of such an offence.

( c) If in any case the defence provided by the last foregoing paragraph involves the allegation that the commission of the offence was due to the act or default of another person or to reliance on information supplied by another person, the person charged shall not, without the leave of the Court, be entitled to rely on that defence unless, within a period ending seven clear days before the hearing he has served on the Council a notice in writing giving such information identifying or assisting in the identification of that other person as was then in his possession.

(12) Any person who, without reasonable excuse, removes a warning sign which is for the time being affixed in or on any premises to which this section applies in accordance with the requirement made under subsection (3) of this section shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £100.

(13) During such time as any substance to which this section applies is stored in any premises to which this section applies being premises which are for the time being regulated by or under:—

and the manner of storage of that substance in those premises is controlled by or under any of those enactments, the provisions of this section shall not apply to that substance so far as they relate to its manner of storage.

(14)( a) The foregoing provisions of this section shall not apply to any premises to which this section would otherwise apply if the interest of the occupier of those premises is a Crown interest or a Duchy interest, but if it appears to the Council that satisfactory arrangements for reducing any special hazard to persons engaged in operations for fire-fighting purposes may not have been made in or on any premises exempted from the said provisions by virtue of this subsection by the display of suitable, practicable and appropriate warning signs relating to any substance to which this section applies or by reason of the manner of storage of any such substance, they may report the circumstances to the appropriate authority, who if satisfied after due enquiry that there is cause for complaint, shall cause such arrangements to be made as the appropriate authority may consider to be practicable to make adequate provision in respect of the matters aforesaid.

( b) The fact that there subsists in any premises to which this section applies a Crown interest or a Duchy interest shall not prevent or affect the application of this section to those premises or to anything done thereon so long as that interest is not the interest of the occupier of the premises and the provisions of this section shall have effect accordingly in relation to those premises and anything done thereon and that and all other interests therein.

( c) The provisions of this section shall have effect in relation to any premises to which this section applies which are occupied for the service of a visiting force as if the interest of the occupier of those premises were a Crown interest and those premises were under the control of the appropriate authority by arrangement with whom those premises are occupied.

(15) In this section:—

"the appropriate authority", "Crown interest" and "Duchy interest" have the meanings assigned to them in subsection (7) of section 266 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971;

"the Council" means the County Council;

"fire-fighting purposes" has the same meaning as in the Fire Services Act 1947;

"the Secretary of State" means the Secretary of State for Employment;

"visiting force" means any such body contingent or detachment of the forces of any country as is a visiting force for the purposes of any of the provisions of the Visiting Forces Act 1952 and includes any headquarters or organisation for the time being designated by an Ordering Council under section I of the International Headquarters and Defence Organisation Act 1964, for the purposes of that Act; and

"warning sign" includes a warning symbol or notice."

The noble Lord said: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Gisborough and myself, I beg to move this Amendment. I must apologise in so doing that, on the face of it, this is a very long Amendment running into several pages. But when I explain that in fact it is taken from another Act of Parliament (that is, the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1975), with only very minor amendments, I think your Lordships will appreciate that it is part of an existing Statute and bears very close examination.

The difficulty about this particular Amendment, which relates to the prescription of signs on certain buildings in relation to fire hazards, was particularly noticeable when we discussed my previous Amendment on 13th July during the Report stage of this Bill. At that time, we had an Amendment which my noble friend and I adduced, which was based on the Teeside Corporation Act, 1971. At that stage, the Government considered that the Amendment was defective, and they further believed that the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 provided sufficient powers. In fact the noble Baroness said about it on 13th July at column 212:

"The most important point I can make is that the Chairman of the Health and Safety Commission has been advised that these powers are adequate to make regulations covering the provisions proposed in the clause."

Since discussions were taking place with the Health and Safety Commission at that time in regard to these powers, there was an element of dubiety about the existence of the powers, which relate to Section 15 of the Health and Safety Act, and derive from that section. This dubiety is still in the background: nevertheless, I should very much welcome the noble Baroness's clarifications later in this debate.

We believe it can be claimed that this Amendment is correctly drafted, that it has no defects in it and that, far from duplicating the situation, it provides a safety net. I believe the noble Baroness may well claim that it is unnecessary duplication; and if she can demonstrate to your Lordships that duplication will exist, may I suggest to your Lordships that perhaps this Amendment might be accepted on the grounds that the Secretary of State, using his powers in the earlier part of the Bill, may order that this section may not be operative. If, however, the noble Baroness is totally convinced that full powers exist, then this will be entirely satisfactory. I am entirely satisfied that our aims are totally parallel. Although we may have different approaches to improving the legislative situation in so far as signs are concerned, our aims are ultimately the same.

Finally, in regard to bringing in the regulations, it was understood on 13th July that it could be a year before they were drafted. That added a greater spur to this Amendment, since preliminary arrangements are already in hand in certain parts of the country for carrying this out. Nevertheless, the problem is to some extent remedied, because I understand that the Health and Safety Commission are now able to proceed at once and I hope the noble Baroness will be able to confirm that that is the position. My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.41 p.m.

" Extension to parish and community councils of power to provide nature reserves. 1949 c. 97.

(". The powers conferred on a county council and district council by sections 21 and 99(6) of the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, shall, with the approval of the Nature Conservancy Council, also be exercisable by a parish council or community council and references in those sections and section 23 of that Act to a local authority shall be construed accordingly.")

The noble Earl said: My Lords, originally I put down an Amendment to Clause 18 which had much the same intention as this Amendment, but the noble Baroness opposite and the Nature Conservancy Council suggested that that was an inappropriate place since it would put nature conservation with recreation. This Amendment has the same intention, but goes right back to the provisions of the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act and is almost the ipsissima verba of the clause which first gave local authorities the power to set up nature reserves.

I should remind your Lordships that under the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act the larger authorities—the county councils and county boroughs—had absolute power to set up nature reserves. Although the smaller authorities—the rural and urban district councils—had that right, it was subject to the consent of the Nature Conservancy Council. It seems then to have been thought that it was likely to become a major local authority function and fairly elaborate provisions were made to settle squabbles between a county council and a district council, both of which wanted to set up a reserve on the same piece of land.

In the event, however, that has not happened; not many local authorities have set up nature reserves. Most nature reserves have been set up by the Nature Conservancy Council, the Naturalists' Trust and other voluntary bodies like the RSPB. Those authorities which have set up nature reserves have almost invariably done so—indeed, invariably so far as I know—in co-operation locally with the Naturalists' Trust which provides the expertise. Among them have been a number of urban district councils but not, so far as I have been able to find out, any rural district councils. This is largely because a rural district council was an administrative unit concerned only with administration, whereas the urban district councils, which had a good deal of civic pride, were anxious to see maintained the remaining natural habitats and their associated fauna and flora, such as wetlands created by mining subsidence and interesting parts of the neighbouring coastline; and those they have turned into nature reserves.

When the Local Government Act 1972 was passed, the smaller authorities ceased to exist; they were all thrown into the new district councils, which are administrative units like the old rural district councils. The urban district councils, which had shown such enthusiasm for nature conservation, became parish or community councils. That came about quite fortuitously but, as I have said, setting up and managing reserves has not become a major local authority function. It has become almost a personal function in these very personal rural areas. It has not grown to be, nor, indeed, of any necessity need it grow to be, a major function; nor is there any necessity for it to be administered over a wide area like education, roads or housing. As I have said, the necessary expertise is available locally through the Naturalists' Trust.

I have sent a copy of this Amendment to the Nature Conservancy Council who have made the following statement:

"The Nature Conservancy Council are in sympathy with the proposal that parish councils should be able to establish nature reserves. It is their understanding that this is already being done at one level—i.e. by the acquisition of small parcels of land, e.g. parish copses".

In parenthesis, may I say that they are, I believe, referring to the Open Spaces Act 1906. The Nature Conservancy Council go on to say:

"Additionally, under existing legislation county and district councils can establish statutory local reserves on behalf of parish councils".

That is a fact under the Local Government Act. Finally they say:

"Departure from this position would have important and wide-ranging implications which the Nature Conservancy Council have not yet had the opportunity to assess in detail".

That is the statement of the Nature Conservancy Council. They welcome the intentions which lie behind the Amendment but they have not yet considered the method proposed.

The Open Spaces Act allows a parish council to acquire open space, which is defined as being used for the purposes of recreation or lying waste and unoccupied. It seems curious that it should be recommended in that way, although I am grateful for the recommendation. It shows parish councils what they can do. The Local Government Act allows a local authority to exercise its functions through another local authority. The Act also allows local authorities to make such arrangements between themselves as they find mutually convenient in arranging who should pay for the carrying out of the function.

Both of those meet certain of my points, but the last is the one which the noble Baroness may think is not altogether satisfactory. We know that the district councils do not possess the expertise to do this job. This means that they do not possess the expertise to judge whether or not the proposals of a parish council are sensible. The Nature Conservancy Council have that expertise. Our Amendment—when I say "our" I am not referring to my noble friends who are of the same political complexion but to those who are of the same commonsensical outlook on nature reserves as myself—means that it seems to be better to leave the decision to the Nature Conservancy Council who know what they are about than to the larger local authorities which, ex hypothesi, do not.

I hope the Government will be prepared to accept this Amendment. I find it difficult to see how they can possibly find any reason against it, and with hopeful anticipation I beg to move the Amendment.

5.59 p.m.

6.2 p.m.

carry out one of the provisions of the 1972 Act; under that Act a certain amount of legislation will run out, both in 1978 and in 1984, and it is essential, therefore, that it should be re-enacted in this Bill. Two general principles govern the Bill. One is that the legislation should be precedented and the other is that it should be non-controversial.

So far as the noble Earl's Amendment is concerned, I think we might all agree that this may be a very good thing to do. But the fact is that it is not precedented, and if it were accepted it would be altering the functions as laid down in the 1972 Act. I should think that it was outside the terms of this Bill, and we should get ourselves into considerable difficulty if we agreed with it. For that reason I feel unable to support my noble friend, although I have sympathy with the point of view that he is trying to express.

6.14 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 7) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided:— Contents, 53; Not-Contents, 56.

Resolved in the negative and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

Clause 38 [ Use of spare capacity of computers of local authorities]:

6.22 p.m.

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this Amendment corrects defective wording in the clause. Our attention was drawn to this by the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, to whom we are grateful, because the clause is much better drafted now than it was originally. Noble Lords will remember that the object of the original Amendment was to ensure the sale of surplus computer time by local authorities at a rate not less than another undertaking, notably a commercial firm, would charge. The intention was the same in my original Amendment, but the way it has now been redrafted makes it very much better and more positive and not quite as inverted. I beg to, move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 48 [ Licensing of private hire vehicles]:

6.24 p.m.

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 9, and at the same time speak to Amendment No. 10. I appreciate that this again is a course that we have been round several times on this Bill already, but I put down these Amendments again, the principle of which we have debated before, because they are ones on which those who have an interest in private hire cars believe to be of considerable importance.

I have read with great care what the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said on Report. As I understand it, under what is now Clause 48 a district council, if it so wished, could agree that a private hire firm could indicate the name of the proprietor upon it. What my Amendment seeks to do is to make this something which would, under Statute, happen in all controlled districts. The one point which the noble Lord did not answer last time was that although a subsection similar to my Amendment is included in the Plymouth City Council Bill, and as the whole of this Part of this Bill is taken almost precisely from the Plymouth City Council Bill, why has it not been included in this Bill?

As I understand it, it was included in another place and then was taken out. I further understand that there have been no difficulties about the working of this subsection of the Plymouth City Council Act in Plymouth. The major objection raised to it is that members of the public would be misled into believing that a private hire car was similar to a hackney carriage and was therefore plying for hire. But, as the wording of my Amendment makes clear, it is not my intention that there should be any element of deception at all, which I think would be quite wrong, and that the signs should be such as would not lead a member of the public to believe that the private hire car was a licensed hackney carriage. I believe that this would be for the convenience of the public. I beg to move.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 53 [ Drivers' licences for hackney carriages and private hire vehicles]:

6.36 p.m.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, I do not think there is as much difference between myself and the Front Bench opposite on this Amendment as there was over the last one we discussed. The Amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, moved on Report was intended to cover the cases which I have specified in this Amendment. The only reason I have tabled this Amendment is because, to be frank, the administration of some of our new district councils is a very long way from the small parishes, and I should like it made abundantly clear to them that this is one of the reasons they must have under consideration if they decide to reduce the fees. I do not think I need add more in moving the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 75 [ Saving fir certain vehicles etc.]:

6.44 p.m.

Page 72, line 5, at end insert—

("( ) apply to a vehicle used in pursuance of a contract fot the hire of the vehicle for a journey not wholly within a controlled district;").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is an Amendment to Clause 75 which provides saving for certain vehicles et cetera. Its purpose is to confine the application of the whole of this Part of the Bill to journeys which take place wholly within a controlled district. The reason for the Amendment is that, without it, the position of the multiple car hire firms which undertake long-distance journeys will be made very difficult because they will be travelling, for instance, in and from uncontrolled districts into and through controlled districts. Even as between one controlled district and another there may be no uniformity because there are numerous places in this part of the Bill where the particular local authority is allowed to impose its own terms and

conditions. This will make the business of the multiple car hire firms extremely difficult.

I do not think that I need apologise for putting down this Amendment again having done so on Report. At that time, the noble Lord, Lord Harris, thought that this point was dealt with in his subsequent Government Amendment and, as so often happens on these occasions, spent so much time describing the merits of his Amendment that he ran out of time or out of steam and never got round to telling me the demerits, if any, of my Amendment.

So, here we are, discussing it again. If it is adopted, presumably it will work satisfactorily because, after all, since, as we know so well, the whole of this part of the Bill is practically copied out from the Plymouth Local Act, it was presumably worth while introducing it for Plymouth and Plymouth clearly had no power to impose it on any other outside district. Of course, we do not know how many local authorities will adopt this part of the Bill and it is entirely up to them whether or not they do so. Some will. As a result, we shall have, so to speak, a number of "Plymouths" dotted about the country, each operating a control which Plymouth presumably finds satisfactory for its purposes. So, in putting forward the Amendment, I suggest that for those reasons it ought to work satisfactorily.

When we come to the Government Amendment put forward on Report as supposedly meeting the case, that was the Amendment which is now enshrined in the clause as subsection (2). Of course it does not meet the case because subsection (2) only deals with vehicles operated from within a controlled area and does not apply at all to vehicles operated from an uncontrolled area. So there is a lacuna there. Therefore, I put it to your Lordships that the Amendment is required.

While we are discussing subsection (2), I hope that we shall be told how this will work: what is to happen to those operators who operate from what is now an uncontrolled area? Of course they will want to have the protection given in subsection (2) and will want to become licensed in some controlled area so that they will get the resulting protection. How are they to achieve that? In the early stages, there will not be all that number of controlled districts, so what are these operators to do? They will have to find a controlled district and they will be strangers from outside that district applying to the local authority for licences.

Does that not make nonsense of the whole system of local licensing operations? Surely, local authorities issue licences to people whom they know something about or about whom they can easily find out because they are local people. If a large number of operators come into a district from outside to apply for licences in order to obtain the protection of subsection (2), will they be welcomed by the local authority and will the latter be at all happy about dishing out licences to these people from outside about whom it knows so much less than it does about its own local people? I just do not know how this system is to operate. Perhaps we can be told. However it is to operate, I suggest that we require the Amendment in any case to save this embarrassment to the long distance operators. I beg to move.

6.56 p.m.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

7.2 p.m.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, we are discussing this separately although the Minister chose to give me his views upon it in advance, which should be to my advantage, of course. This is an Amendment to paragraph ( a) of subsection (1) of the saving clause. The clause saves those vehicles used for bringing passengers within a controlled district from outside—to them the whole of Part II does not apply—but it does not apply in the case of journeys for taking those people outside a controlled district from within it. The purpose of this Amendment is to bring those people within the saving clause, so that, whether people are being brought into a controlled district or are being taken out of it, they are saved from the provisions of Part II.

This, again, is a matter which is not covered by the Government Amendment which has become subsection (2), because—and I must say it again—subsection (2) applies only to vehicles operating from within a controlled district, and to those many which will be operating from an uncontrolled district it will not apply. To take an example of how this matter is going to work out in practice as the position is under the Bill at present, without this Amendment, if a noble Lord who lived in an uncontrolled district had a daughter and wanted to send her to a dance in a neighbouring district, which was a controlled district, by hire car, he could send her in a car supplied by an operator whom he knew and in whom he had confidence because he would be sending her within a controlled district, and the operator could operate because that would save him from Part II. But suppose your daughter went straight to the dance from her work in London, and there she was, in a controlled district, and you wanted to fetch her to your home in an uncontrolled district. Could you send the hire car of the firm that you knew to collect her? As the Bill stands you could not, because you would be taking the car into a controlled district to bring somebody out. So the consequence of this would be that the girl would have to find, in the district where she was, a car hire firm, about which she might not know anything, she would have to negotiate the fare, and so on. What an absurd situation this would be, and what useful purpose would it serve?

This matter cannot be of any interest one way or the other to the car hire firms, because over any period of time, surely, the journeys undertaken by an operator in one district are going to cancel out with the journeys undertaken by an operator in the district next door. So it is not going to affect them at all. This is merely going to make the most frightful nuisance and difficulty for members of the public, who will be pointlessly restricted in hiring cars from the firms that they know in order to take members of their family from one place to another. It is really quite stupid, and that situation will be cured by this Amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

Clause 80 [ Interpretation of Part II]:

7.13 p.m.

Page 74, line 28, leave out from beginning to end of line 30 and insert—

(""operate "means in the course of business to invite and accept bookings for a private hire vehicle and to control or arrange the journey to be undertaken by a private hire vehicle whilst on hire under section 46 of this Act.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, we now come to Clause 80 which is the definition clause. We have been round this course twice before. The definition of the word "operate" is one which has concerned us for some time. As we have been discussing, on Clause 75, the question of operators and how they act in particular circumstances, the definition of the word "operate" becomes of even greater significance. On two previous occasions, my noble friend and, subsequently, myself suggested that it was to be recommended that the definition be widened. We believe that by adding the second half of the sentence and drawing attention specifically to Clause 46 of the Bill, it acts as a definite signpost and has merit in itself. We believe that the definition clause in many Bills can be widened and improved with benefit. We cannot see why the Government feel that this is to be rejected.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 2 [ Enactments repealed.]:

Page 81, line 51, column 3, at end insert—

("In paragraph 11 of Schedule 8 the words" and 170".")

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, with the leave of the House I will speak to Amendments Nos. 16, 17 and 18 together. These are drafting Amendments to tidy up the repeal Schedule. All these repeals are references to enactments which are repealed or replaced by clauses in the Bill. The first relates to Section 170 of the Housing Act 1957 which is superseded by Clause 15 and the second and third to Sections 271 and 323 of the Public Health Act 1936, both of which are repealed by Clause 27. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

7.24 p.m.

Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—( Baroness Birk.)

7.30 p.m.

On Question, Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.

7.33 p.m.

Your Lordships will recall that under the community land scheme a stage will be reached when it will become the duty of all land scheme authorities to acquire all land needed for all relevant development. It will then be possible to introduce the final stage of the scheme, the second appointed day, brought in by order under the Community Land Act. As from the second appointed day, the basis of compensation for a land transaction will be current use value—broadly the value of the land in its existing use, taking no account of any increase in value conferred by the grant or hope of a fresh planning permission.

But in the interim period until that stage is reached, compensation will be assessed in accordance with the rules laid down in the Land Compensation Act 1961 (or, in Scotland, the Land Compensation (Scotland) Act 1963), under which compensation is essentially market value. The arrangements for securing the development value of land for the community will lie in the Development Land Tax Act, which received Royal Assent on 22nd July and which comes into operation on 1st August. Under the Development Land Tax Act, Community Land Act authorities, certain other local authorities and some other public bodies which are both exempt from development land tax and which possess compulsory purchase powers in relation to the land being acquired, will deduct from the consideration or compensation on an acquisition from a private owner an amount on account of any development land tax for which the private owner may be liable on the disposal. In short, in this interim period, certain public authorities will buy land net of development land tax.

I should like to make one further background point perfectly clear. The order is concerned entirely with transactions between certain public bodies. It does not affect private transactions or transactions between the public and private sectors, for which the arrangements for the application of development land tax to the market value basis of compensation, which I have just described, will apply.

Turning now to the intention and contents, the order has been laid under the powers contained in Section 26 of the Community Land Act and requires the approval of both Houses if Parliament. The purpose of Section 26 is to apply the principle of the net-of-tax system to land transactions between the bodies specified in that section, that is to say where land belonging to a local or new town authority, the Land Authority for Wales, the Peak Park Joint Planning Board, the Lake District Special Planning Board or any joint board which may be established under Section 2 of the Community Land Act, is acquired by one of those bodies or by a Minister. The draft order also proposes, in Article 3, to add certain other bodies to that list. I will deal with those in a moment.

Your Lordships will realise that an arrangement of this kind is necessary simply because when one authority empowered to buy net of development land tax is buying land with development value from another such authority (which, by definition, is exempt from paying the tax), the problem arises of which authority is to have the tax benefit. They cannot both have it, and a choice has to be made. The choice proposed in the order is that the benefit should go to the acquiring authority. The proposal is founded on the principle that, in the same way as if the land were in private ownership, the benefit of being able to acquire land net of development land tax should go to the public body which is to develop the land or bring it into development. The selling authority will retain part of any increase in value which may have been due to their own activities, but on the other hand there will be little or no difference for the acquiring authority between buying from another authority or the private sector. For example, where a district council is buying from a county council land which the district council need for council houses, the price assessed under the land compensation rules would be the open market value of the land as a housing site. Under the rules as modified by the order, the price will be reduced by approximately the amount of development land tax which would have been due if the land had been in private ownership. The actual cost would be somewhere between current use value and market value depending upon the factors which have to be taken into account in an actual development land tax calculation, such as the original cost of acquisition by the county council and any expenditure on improvements.

If I may now deal with the technicalities, it was explained at the Committee stage of the Community Land Act that the financial basis for transactions between local authorities is the Land Compensation Act 1961 or the Scottish Act of 1963. Although the 1961 Act governs compensation for compulsory purchase—and compulsory purchase between public authorities is almost unheard of—the practice is to apply the rules to acquisition by agreement; and it is in this context that the provisions of the order will be most relevant.]

It was, of course, impossible to provide in the Community Land Act, since it preceded the Development Land Tax Act, for a net of development land tax formula to apply to these transactions. Hence the Act made provision in Section 26 with the intention of enabling what one might call a "net of notional tax" basis to be applied by order. Article 4(2) of the order achieves the desired "net of notional tax" result, by modifying the compensation rules to provide that the compensation shall be assessed as the difference between the normal open market value and the amount of development land tax which would have been deductible if the land were being acquired from a person liable to the tax.

Since no actual tax liability is involved certain assumptions, set out in paragraph ( b) of the modified rule (2), have to be made: first, that the selling body was not totally exempt from development land tax; secondly, that the time of the disposal is the date at which the compensation is to be assessed; thirdly, that the consideration (from which the calculated amount of "notional" tax falls to be deducted) was the open market value; fourthly, that the selling body's cost of acquisition—for the purpose of calculating notional tax—did not include any tax deducted by that body when it acquired the land. Without that assumption the benefit of the reduced price system would not be passed on to the acquiring body as intended; and, fifthly, that no development value had previously been realised by the vendor body (so that in every case no notional tax deduction is made in respect of the first £10,000 of realised development value, 66⅔ per cent. of the next £15,000 is deducted, and 80 per cent. is deducted from any amount in excess of £160,000).

Article 4(3) has the effect that the modified basis—the "net of notional tax" basis—does not apply where the land being transferred was acquired by the selling body before 1st August 1976, the date from which the development land tax operates. The reason for this is that, by and large, most land in the possession of land scheme authorities was acquired before the development land tax system was made known—let alone introduced—and these acquisitions were carried out without the benefit of the net of tax arrangements. It was therefore thought right that the proposals, now embodied in the order, should apply only when the vending authority acquired the land in the first place after the operative date of the Development Land Tax Act, 1st August.

If I may turn back now to Article 3, this specifies five additional bodies to whom the modified basis of compensation will apply. I have already explained the relationship of the order to the development land tax system, and if noble Lords have been studying the Development Land Tax Act they may have noticed that these five bodies are among those specified in Section 11(2) as being exempt from development land tax. But they are also authorities who may be authorised to purchase land compulsorily, and they will therefore deduct tax when acquiring land from a person liable to pay it. They are also bodies having functions and responsibilities which are broadly similar to those of the land scheme authorities themselves; namely, to develop land, or arrange for it to be brought into development, for the benefit of the community. The comparability of these bodies with local authorities has been recognised for Community Land Act purposes by including them in the Community Land (Outstanding Material Interests) Order 1976 which came into operation on 6th April. It is therefore appropriate to bring them within the circle of bodies to which the net of notional tax arrangements apply. My Lords, it is a complicated order, but I beg to move.

Moved, that the draft Compulsory Acquisition by Public Authorities (Compensation) Order 1976, laid before the House on 15th July, be approved.—( Baroness Stedman.)

7.45 p.m.

7.47 p.m.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

7.49 p.m.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 2^a .—( Lord Chelwood.)

7.58 p.m.

8.2 p.m.

On Question, Bill read 2^a , and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

8.8 p.m.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 2^a .—( Lord Terrington.)

8.28 p.m.

8.26 p.m.

8.44 p.m.

8.50 p.m.

On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

Reported with Amendments.

Reported from the Select Committee without amendment, and recommitted to an Unopposed Bill Committee; a Special Report made and to be printed.