My Lords, I think your Lordships would expect me to say something about the changes which have taken place in the House during the Recess. Noble Lords opposite, and indeed all your Lordships, have lost a shepherd who has led and driven and looked after us for two and a half years. I hope that our situation will not be as the prophet observed: "I saw all Israel scattered over the hills as sheep without a shepherd." I have known the noble Lord for nearly 30 years. We have looked at each other from opposite sides of the House for three decades. He has not changed my views nor I, alas!, his, but I can truthfully say that despite our political differences we are personal friends. Particularly, therefore, I regret, though I understand, his wish to resign his position as Leader of this House.

It is comparatively easy to be Leader of the Opposition when there is a Conservative Government, but to be Leader of the House when faced with a large Conservative, Liberal and Cross-Bench Opposition is a very difficult task indeed, one calling for a mixture of tact, resolution and exceedingly nimble footwork. If he placates the Opposition too much he will infuriate his own supporters. If he does not placate them at all, the Leader of the Opposition will, if it does not seem too far-fetched to your Lordships, become a little unfriendly.

The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has steered an admirable course to the general approval of all of us, and that is a considerable tribute to his skill. Perhaps more important, however, the Leader of the House is not primarily a Party Leader; he is the Leader of all of us, representative of our interests, guardian of our privileges and spokesman and defender of this House against the predators down the passage. He must take us to task if we offend against the rules; he must suggest delicately that we sit down when we have talked too long; and all this with no power but with only the influence that he has as Leader of the House.

The noble Lord has never taken a Party line on all this. He nearly did so once, but under considerable provocation—and nobody can provoke more splendidly than my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham. Lord Shepherd has invariably stood up for all of us, whether it be for our customs, our expenses, our peculiarities or our rights, and we are very grateful to him. On this, his 58th birthday, we tender him our warm good wishes and thanks for a job well done.

Perhaps it would not be amiss, too, to say something about the noble Lord, Lord Peart, who, your Lordships may not know, has hurt his leg. In spite of that, he has just completed the course without touching a fence, though I must tell him that we do not usually genuflect to the Lord Chancellor. He, too, is an old friend. His interests—and I hope I do not misrepresent him—are agriculture and defence. No man who has those two interests can be wholly bad. I should know. We welcome him warmly. He will find us different from another place. He will find us courteous, kindly and extraordinarily quiet—not adjectives which immediately spring to mind when describing the House of Commons. He will have the good will of all of us. He will know from Lord Shepherd of the tightrope that he walks. He will, I know, walk it with grace and agility, and we wish him well.

My Lords, in fully endorsing the tribute which has just been paid to the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, I should like to put on record from these Benches our sense of very real regret at the decision of the noble Lord to leave the Government, though we fully appreciate and understand his reasons for doing so. We are indebted to him during his tenure of Office as Leader of the House for the staunch way in which he has upheld the conventions and practices of the House without assuming the regulatory role performed by the Speaker in another place. It has not been an easy task, nor an easy period in which to discharge that particular function. We should all be very grateful to him for the way in which he has carried it out. We should also be grateful for all the work that has been done by Lady Shepherd over the long period in which the noble Lord has served this House. She has established herself as an ambassador in her own right among the Commonwealth and other representatives of overseas missions in the capital of the Commonwealth.

To the new Lord Privy Seal, the noble Lord, Lord Peart, whom many of us have known for many years, I add my congratulations on his appointment. We pledge him full support in upholding the practices and conventions of this noble House—when he has discovered what they are! From these Benches we promise him the most vigorous opposition to the contentious legislation with which he has had the ill luck to be lumbered at such short notice.

My Lords, I am very pleased that it should be my first duty as Leader of the House to acknowledge the generous tributes which the noble Lords, Lord Carrington and Lord Byers, and other noble Lords have paid to my noble friend Lord Shepherd and to associate my noble friends behind me with everything that they have said. We all feel a real sense of loss at his retirement from the Front Bench and my noble friends are truly sorry not to see him in the place he has occupied for so long. For my own part, I have been able to admire his wise leadership and his political skill from a different standpoint as one of his colleagues in the Cabinet for the last two years. During that time I have been most impressed by his deep knowledge of this House and his concern for it. I am delighted that he is here today on the Bench below the gangway and I am confident that, with his love for the House, he will go on giving valuable service here for many years to come.

As for myself, I am deeply honoured to be taking his place as Leader of the House, and I am conscious of the very heavy responsibility that rests on my shoulders. It is extremely rare for someone to make his maiden speech from the Dispatch Box as Leader of the House. I believe that the only precedent is Disraeli, who came to this House in 1876 as the Earl of Beacons-field. I realise that I shall need even more than the usual indulgence which your Lordships so generously give to maiden speakers.

My task will be difficult both in earning my position as Leader and in earning the respect and good will of the House. I was, of course, Leader of the House in another place from 1968 to 1970, but I recognise only too well how different the two Houses can be. I shall try to make use of my experience in that office, but I shall also remember that the role of Leader here has no parallel and that I am really starting from scratch. I hope that I can count on the support of all Members of the House to guide me and to see that in our debates the conduct of the House is as sensitive as it was under my noble friend Lord Shepherd.

I can assure the House that I come here with real humility and a recognition of the problems that lie ahead. I shall therefore make it my business to be available to all noble Lords, wherever they sit, and I want to be accessible at all times. I have no doubt that I can rely on the usual channels and particularly my noble friend the Chief Whip to keep the House running smoothly but, if things are not always as they should be, I hope that I shall be the first to know and that I can play my part in resolving any difficulties. I have already expressed the honour that I feel at being made Leader of the House. I shall now try, through this appointment, to maintain the honour and the traditions of the House and to further the interests of your Lordships in every way I can.

My Lords, nobody can speak for the Cross-Benches. Unlike the noble Lords, Lord Carrington and Lord Byers, we are not members of the Opposition; everyone speaks for himself. However, I feel that, on this occasion, someone from the Cross-Benches ought to express to the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, our admiration for the distinguished way in which he has carried out his office and our good wishes to the new Leader of the House.

My Lords, as an ex-Leader of the House, I rise to express my sadness at the fact that my noble friend Lord Shepherd is Leader no longer, but at the same time to express every possible good wish to my noble friend Lord Peart. My noble friend Lord Shackleton, who was as intimately associated with Lord Shepherd as I was for many years, wishes to say that he does not feel that endless ex-Leaders ought to address the House, but he would like his own sentiments to be fully understood.

I sat next to my noble friend Lord Peart in the Cabinet for a time and I thought he possessed many qualities to make him an excellent Leader of the House—`friendliness, courtesy and a capacity to suffer fools gladly. I am not saying that that will come in useful here but once or twice in the Cabinet of those days—and I shall not say to which Party that belonged—it helped. So I am sure, as are Lord Shackleton and all of us, that he will be a great success here.

Speaking personally, I must pay my tribute to my noble friend Lord Shepherd for all he has done. In a personal sense, I benefited from his kindness and helpfulness so greatly when I was Leader of the House and he was Chief Whip, and on many other occasions. In my time, counting the noble Lord, Lord Peart, we have had 11 Leaders of the House. I do not know what they would look like if they ever went, so to speak, in to bat, but we now have 11 Leaders and ex-Leaders. I would say that there has never been a Leader who was more effective or more acceptable than the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. I can say that without saying that he was better than anyone else.

Some of the older Members of this House will remember the song, "I want to be happy, but I can't be happy unless I make you happy, too". Well, I feel that that was the signature tune of the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. I am sure that no Leader was ever quite so happy, so obviously happy, as Leader of the House, and he made us all very happy accordingly. Therefore, with everybody else here, I want to join in most heartfelt tributes to him.

My Lords, I did not think it was going to be quite so difficult to respond to what I believed to be the feeling of the House towards me during my period as Leader of your Lordships' House. I am overwhelmed by the generosity of what has been said, which has been supported by very many letters written by Members from all parts of the House—and, frankly, I have no idea at all who some of them are. They signed their letters with their Christian names on House of Lords notepaper, and I am sorry that I could not identify them. But I have been more than grateful for all that has been said. As a result of those letters I should like to deal with two misconceptions, on behalf of myself and I believe, the House. There were some who wrote to me feeling that I was ill, that I was resigning on grounds of ill-health. I hope I can dispense with that particular fear. Secondly, it was felt by some that my departure was a consequence of creating a facility for a Cabinet reshuffle. My Lords, there is no truth in that whatsoever.

My decision was taken last May. I have always recognised the nature of your Lordships' House; that none of us can genuinely be professional politicians, and that one day I would return to industry and commerce. Last May I was asked to return to an interesting and demanding post. I gave it very great thought indeed. At the end I decided that this is what I should do—that I should go back—and I informed the Prime Minister at the end of July. I had only two dates in mind. The first was that I could be released by the 1st January 1977, the second that I might remain until the end of this Session, recognising the very heavy burden that my noble friends on the Front Bench would have to bear during the spill-over period. But one can well understand the Prime Minister's difficulty. Mr. Roy Jenkins was due to go to Brussels. A Cabinet reshuffle is never an easy thing and, therefore, one can understand why the Prime Minister wished to make the change in one go. I fully understand it, but I must say that I have a sense of regret that I cannot be with my colleagues at the end of this Session, with the programme completed. But, my Lords, I am quite happy to leave that credit to my noble friends Lord Peart and Lady Llewelyn-Davies.

I should like to add my congratulations to those already extended to my noble friend Lord Peart upon his appointment as Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House. I think the House knows the qualities of leadership involved here. I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, touched upon this point quite well. My noble friend has led the House of Commons with distinction. Above all else, he was a very popular Member of another place. I think that these two qualities are the qualities which will see him through, not only during this particular difficult period, but during the years in which he is called upon to be Leader of the House.

I should like to express appreciation to the Clerk of the Parliaments and to the Clerks who sit at the Table, and to all the many officials who have given not only to me, as Leader, but to all Members very sound, sensible advice. I should like to express my appreciation to Black Rod and to all those who work under him. Without them, Parliament, your Lordships' House, could not work. I should also like to express appreciation to Paul Hayter, who was my Private Secretary; and I am glad to see that he is to advise my noble friend Lord Peart. I should also like to express appreciation to three people who, during my period as Lord Privy Seal, served me well: Nick Gurney, Louise Chanter and Richard Pratt. They were three civil servants who were to be found in Whitehall at eight o'clock in the morning most days of the week.

I should like to thank my noble friends on this side of the House. Their loyalty has never been questioned. As I said to the Prime Minister, I hope that the sense of duty, the sense of loyalty, which they have given to the Party will one day be fully appreciated by our Party as a whole. I wish to pay a special tribute to the usual channels, to my noble friend Lady Llewelyn-Davies and to the noble Lord, Lord Amulree. But if I were to single out the noble Earl, Lord St. Aldwyn, it would not be because he is Chief Whip of the major opposition Party, but because he and I have served together in the usual channels for very many years. The noble Earl has, perhaps, done more for your Lordships' House than have those who speak with great regularity from the Front Benches. I say this because without the usual channels, without the spirit of co-operation and understanding, and sometimes sympathy, whether it be a Conservative Government or a Labour Government in Office, the business of your Lordships' House could not be conducted with the spirit, the understanding and the precision with which it is.

My Lords, my last words of gratitude must be to every individual Member of your Lordships' House. My noble friend Lord Longford said that I was always happy. By nature I am happy, but I could well imagine under certain circumstances that one's happiness could be less. But I have enjoyed every moment of my time, not only as Leader of the House, but in undertaking the various other functions in which I have been involved. This House has always risen to the difficulties of the day. It has sometimes risen with a touch of asperity, particularly from the noble Lord, Lord Carrington; but that asperity has often helped to get a movement forward and an agreement reached upon the arrangements of business.

My Lords, there is one thing I shall take with me, and that is a sense of friendship and happiness which time will never erase; and if I can in any way repay all that has been offered and given to me, I hope it will be by continuing to remain a Member of your Lordships' House and doing what I can to ensure that this House plays its proper part within the constitution and life of our country.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, at the plenary meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which was held from 30th March to 9th April, careful consideration was given to the way in which the ECE might play the fullest possible role in the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Act. With this in mind, the members of the Commission, including ourselves and our partners, put forward many proposals for the work programme. These are now being put into effect by the subsidiary bodies of the Commission.

My Lords, while thanking the Minister for that reply, may I ask him whether he is able to tell us in some degree the proposals which are now under consideration? Would he not now agree that, while the criticism of the Soviet Union in its treatment of dissidents is justified, the instrument of the Helsinki Act was economic co-operation? Is it not the case that in June the Soviet Union proposed a discussion on pollution, transport, power and engineering, and has not COMECON proposed closer co-operation with the ECE? Will there be a response to both those initiatives?

My Lords, it is indeed true that some months ago the Soviet Union put forward interesting proposals for, as they call it, pan-European conferences on three subjects. The Final Act signed in Helsinki, however, specifically names the Economic Commission for Europe as being the proper vehicle for the development of such European co-operative policies. It has seemed to us and to a great many other signatories of the Final Act that the right and proper course to take is to involve the ECE increasingly in the consideration of such proposals. Since last April, that is exactly what has happened. In addition, the plenary meeting held in April instructed the executive secretary of the ECE to write a report specifically on the Soviet proposals.

My Lords, in view of the fact that the review conference is to be held in June next year, may I ask the Minister whether it is not possible, between now and then, to seek implementation of these proposals, which were the very heart of the Helsinki Act and about which, because of delay, very little has been done?

My Lords, that, in fact, is happening, as I indicated in my first reply. Subsidiary bodies, as they are called, of the ECE are now working on a number of practical matters on which they will report as soon as possible. It so happens that a plenary meeting of the ECE is due to be held early next year—that is, in 1977—and I should imagine that that would be a very useful run-up indeed for the review conference which is to be held somewhat later that year in Belgrade.

My Lords, in view of the constant breaches of the Helsinki Agreement which the USSR are committing in relation to people who are being detained by them, imprisoned by them and maltreated by them, may I ask my noble friend whether he will see to it that they fulfil that side of the Agreement as well as any other aspect of it?—because from a humanitarian point of view there is no doubt that that side of it is most important.

My Lords, certainly it is our policy and intention that all signatories of this very hopeful agreement in Helsinki shall implement it in toto and not selectively.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, I am afraid the noble Lord, Lord Tranmire, is misquoting me. I did not state that the band could have insured its instruments for £23,000. What I did say was:

"…the regiment could have insured its instruments properly and it did not.—[Official Report, 25/5/76; col. 254.]

This is rather a different matter, since the band's own estimate of the cost of buying new instruments to replace those which they lost was about £15,000 only, not about £23,000. The additional £8,000-odd was, according to the regiment's original claim, for replacing uniforms, helmets, accoutrements and music scores. I am being rather meticulous about this because I do not wish to mislead your Lordships.

I confirm that Her Majesty's Government have been advised that the band could have insured its instruments in June 1974 for a sum which would have enabled the lost instruments to be replaced by similar, new ones.

My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for this attempt to clarify the issue, may I ask him whether he still agrees that, just as he could have insured his life for a quarter of a million pounds, he said the band committee could have insured their instruments and equipment for any value they wished: and, as that is contrary to both the opinion of the insurers and the opinion expressed by the Prime Minister, is there not need now to reconsider that attitude?

My Lords, we have been advised by Lloyd's that the band could have insured its instruments for agreed replacement value. That, I believe, confirms the point that I made, that the regiment could have insured its instruments properly and it did not.

My Lords, could the noble Lord tell us this? Surely, to a band, instruments are just as much part of their equipment as a rifle is to a rifleman. Are they expected to take out insurance on other parts of essential equipment, or is it only bands which have to be insured?

My Lords, the rifle is the property of Her Majesty's Government: the band's instruments are the property of the regiment.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, prior to our debate on the 21st June discussions were already proceeding within the Government about Ordnance Survey costs and revenues, including the royalty charges to map publishers. These discussions have continued, and the Ordnance Survey are of course a party to them. I hope that it will be possible within the next few months to make a Statement about the future pricing policy.

My Lords, while thanking the noble Baroness very much for that reply, I should like to ask her, first, what consultations are now taking place; secondly, whether she thinks that a Statement by the price policy reviewing body will be made by 1st January 1977, when the next increase is likely to take place; and, thirdly, whether she has any news on the educational side of the map publishing industry?

My Lords, discussions have already taken place with the map publishers. We are at the moment arranging interviews with Lord Shackleton and some of his colleagues to get the view of the geographers, and these discussions are continuing all the time. I cannot anticipate, my Lords, when the Statement will be made, but I should be very surprised if it was not made before 1st January. So far as the educational books are concerned, the noble Lord will know from the letter which I have sent him that the Ordnance Survey already intend that, where the map extract material does not exceed 20 per cent. of the total content of the publication, a lower rate of charge, the category A rate, which is about 25 per cent. less than the facsimile rate, should be made; and this is to be made retrospective to the 1st January of this year.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, the vote on this particular amendment, which was introduced while Committee 1 of the Conference was in session, was cast on the basis of the delegation's understanding of the attitude taken by Government Departments concerned to the legal issues involved. An explanation of vote, a copy of which I have now placed in the Library, makes clear that the delegation was concerned about the vague drafting of a principle which might ultimately have to be carried into United Kingdom law.

My Lords, somewhat reassured by that Answer, may I ask this? Is it not a fact that this Amendment was carried by 37 votes to 2; that Japan was the only Government which voted with us on this matter; and that our Western Allies were absolutely stunned that the British delegation should have voted against this humanitarian proposal? Will the Government seize the opportunity, in April 1977, when an amendment in the same sense, to delete Article 67(2) dealing with the application of the Convention is discussed, to put the matter right?

My Lords, it is a fact that 37 Governments represented on this Committee voted in favour of that draft and that 11 were opposed, two of which saw fit to vote against and nine others to abstain. It is, after all, a very important principle as well as a question of practicality in implementation that drafting is properly carried out at the right stage. We failed during the Committee to get the draft we needed. We still feel that the humanitarian purport of this amendment, which we fully understood, is not well served by the draft which the great majority felt that they could accept; and we shall continue between now and the plenary meeting next year to amend that draft. For instance, what is meant by "a mother"? Is it the natural mother only or a guardian? Shall we be restricting the humanitarian effect of this amendment if we do not define more precisely the categories who are to be protected? Similarly, what is a "young child"? We need to define that. I hope that I have said enough to my noble friend, whose concern about these matters equals my own, to make it clear that the British delegation, as always, was concerned with two things: to achieve the humanitarian objective of the amendment but also to get the proper drafting so that when possibly our own Parliament needed to legislate it could do so on firm grounds of definition.

My noble friend also asked about what we intend to do at the plenary meeting. I am glad to assure him that having made our point, although we shall persist on this question of drafting, which is very important in this field, hoping to get Protocol 2 properly drafted so that whatever internal legislation we pass can be implemented properly, we shall not oppose the draft if there is still a majority in favour of it among the members of the Committee. I am bound to tell him that it is my duty to ensure that the right kind of drafting is achieved.

My Lords, can the Minister explain what he said about changing legislation in this country? Surely the United Kingdom have a record better than any country in the world for not having the death penalty in on any ground, regardless of whether or not a mother has a child. Surely it is not a question of drafting legislation in this country. Can the Minister say to what extent this refusal to support the amendment reflects the thinking of the Home Office on this issue?—and, presumably, that is the Department responsible. Thirdly, can the Minister say why, if they were afraid of the drafting, the delegation could not have abstained on the voting and not voted against? There are ways of dealing with these matters without being one of the two countries to vote against an important amendment reflecting humanitarian laws throughout the world.

My Lords, on the last point, it is a question of judgment on the spot when an amendment is moved without much notice. It is a matter of how strongly a country and its delegation feel about the importance of the drafting rather than the principle of the amendment. On the point of departmental concern, as the noble Baroness knows, more than one department would be concerned with a matter which involves not only internal legislation (as certainly this would) but also international agreement. On the third point, the question of the inclusion of the drafting in our own law, we would need in an international instrument of agreement to ensure that the drafting was such that, if there were consequential legislation in our own country, it would be as firm and secure as possible.

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Goronwy-Roberts will shortly make a Statement on Rhodesia.

May I intervene briefly to tell your Lordships that dinners will be available every night from Monday to Thursday each week until further notice?

With permission, my Lords, I wish to make a Statement on Rhodesia. When I last spoke on the question of Rhodesia in this House on 6th July, it was to explain why it would be to the advantage of the Europeans in Rhodesia to accept the principles set out in the Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister on 22nd March.

It was therefore with satisfaction that Her Majesty's Government greeted Mr. Smith's acceptance, in his public statement on 24th September, of the proposals put to him by Dr. Kissinger as the basis for a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia. His acceptance of majority rule within two years represents a major step forward. So, too, does his willingness to meet immediately with Rhodesian nationalist leaders to discuss the formation of an interim Government. It was a realistic statement.

At their meeting in Lusaka which concluded yesterday the five African Presidents issued a communique. There are some points in this communique which need to be clarified, but it appears that the Presidents have accepted the principles of a transition to independence on the basis of majority rule and the need for early discussions to establish an interim transitional government. Her Majesty's Government welcomes the statesmanship shown by this decision. The Presidents also called on Britain to convene a meeting outside Rhodesia to discuss, among other matters, the structure and functions of a transitional government and the establishment of such a government. Britain is ready to play a constructive role in the process of establishing an interim government.

My right honourable friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary have been in urgent consultation with the African Presidents over the weekend. Messages have been sent to Presidents Kaunda, Khama, Machel and Nyerere to say that the British Government are prepared to help organise a meeting or conference to consider the structure and functions of such an interim government; and that we wish to learn from the parties concerned how and where this conference could be arranged and especially who the participants should be. Our joint aim is to work for an independent government that will be truly representative of the people of Zimbabwe. My honourable friend the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Relations has put forward his departure for Botswana and is leaving tonight. In the course of his visit to Africa he hopes to have full discussions with those concerned.

While there are points arising from both Mr. Smith's statement and the communique of the Conference of African Presidents which need to be resolved, we feel that these matters should and can be dealt with in the coming negotiations. The important thing is that the essential requirement for majority rule has been met. This provides the necessary framework and it is vital that we do not delay in building on it. It would be tragic if we failed to take advantage of the opportunity that has been created. It should now be possible for Africans and Europeans to work together to lay the foundation for peace and prosperity in an independent Zimbabwe in which all races can live in harmony. The end of guerrilla warfare and the lifting of sanctions are important to progress, and should take place after the formation of the transitional government.

Assuming that all goes well, we will at the appropriate time take such legislative action as is necessary to meet the requirements of the situation. This would initially include action to establish the transitional government. We would also at the appropriate stage, and paying due regard to United Nations procedure, revoke the existing sanctions legislation.

In conclusion, my Lords, I must appeal to you not to press me to comment in detail on issues which are likely to be the subject of delicate negotiation in the coming weeks. The concern of all of us must be to create the right climate for negotiations to begin. It will not help matters to indulge in recrimination or speculation one way or another. I am sure we can count on the support of men and women of good will everywhere in seeking a definitive and happy solution to this long-standing problem.

My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, for making this Statement. I think it is very difficult at this moment to assess the likely course of events. No one, though, can deny that there has been movement due, I think, in great part to the vigorous diplomacy of Dr. Kissinger, whose intentions I applaud and whose vigour seems to be lacking on the part of Her Majesty's Government. I think that on this occasion the attitude of Dr. Vorster was even more important than that of Dr. Kissinger in causing such a sudden change of heart on the part of Mr. Smith. It is to me sad to reflect on the wasted opportunities of the last decade, opportunities which Mr. Smith has allowed to go by. If he had accepted the offers made to him in "Tiger" and "Fearless", and even later by my noble friend Lord Home, and the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, he would have had much better terms; and over these past years there would have been growing up in Rhodesia a multi-racial State on the way to harmonious majority rule.

But it is no good looking back. The African Presidents' reactions have been disappointing but not entirely unexpected. It is very difficult for us to know exactly what is happening since only Mr. Smith, curiously enough, has interpreted what are said to be the Anglo-American proposals. Nevertheless, it seems that there has been no outright rejection by the African Presidents. I am very glad that the Government have accepted the idea of a constitutional conference. I am glad that the Government have been prodded into a rather more active role than they appeared to be willing to play in the past. Your Lordships will remember that we on this side of the House have been advocating just such an initiative as Dr. Kissinger has made over these past months.

There are two further things that I should like to say to the noble Lord. I would remind him—if the Government need to be reminded, and I do not think they do—that when the constitutional conference takes place they have a duty to safeguard the interests of the Rhodesians and not allow extremists to ignore the rights and contributions of the white community. Secondly, I would ask the noble Lord to elaborate a little more on the Statement he makes that the end of guerrilla warfare and the lifting of sanctions should take place after the formation of the transitional Government. I would have hoped that we should begin to lift sanctions as an evidence of good faith to Mr. Smith, who has come a long way. We need not proceed with that if the negotiations break down. More particularly, I am worried at the Government's statement that they do not expect the end of guerrilla warfare until after the transitional Government has been set up. I should have thought it totally unacceptable after Mr. Smith's intentions, and after the speech he made, that there should be a continuation of murder and warfare in Rhodesia on behalf of the Africans. It seems to me so unlikely to lead to the atmosphere in which good will and a settlement can exist, that we particularly, and I hope Her Majesty's Government, should insist that part of the price for a constitutional conference is the ending of guerrilla warfare.

My Lords, we on these Benches certainly hope that this is the beginning of the end of UDI and, to that extent, if it proves to be so we shall be grateful to Dr. Kissinger and those who have been associated with him for everything that has been achieved. The situation to us is still somewhat obscure; a great deal has to be done before we can be certain that we have a lasting solution. I should like to put two points to the noble Lord, but I do not press him for an answer if he feels the matters are too delicate. First, have we any idea what the timetable is likely to be? When will the form of constitutional talks be agreed and announced in some form or another? Secondly, following on the point that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, made, what part, if any, is it intended that representatives of the guerrilla forces shall play in those talks? I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, that it is inconceivable that we should go on with sanctions and hostilities while these talks to form a transitional government are being undertaken. The sooner we can get rid of hostilities—and, for that matter, sanctions—the better. One way to do that might be to get representatives of the guerrillas in at the beginning so that they are locked into the negotiations.

My Lords, I am very grateful to both noble Lords for the way in which they have commented on what is, after all, an interim Statement. If I may deal with one or two points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, it is difficult at this moment to forecast the likely course of events. The key event is the meeting, as I call it (in contradistinction to the more formal "constitutional conference"), which should, we hope, get under way as soon as possible, and at which representatives of all sections of Rhodesian opinion, whatever colour, creed or background, are represented. We are very willing, indeed enthusiastic, to take part. From that will flow the necessary setting up of the interim or transitional government. As to the speed with which sanctions are lifted and guerrilla warfare is ceased, success with that first crucial decision would make it pretty certain—automatic—that the other two results would follow. I certainly take note of what both noble Lords said about the need for consideration of these points.

I will not go into detail about some other points which have been raised. It will indeed be the intention, if I may refer to the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Byers—and we have repeated this more than once—that all representative attitudes in Rhodesia, however repugnant to one person or another they may be, including the guerrilla fighters, should indeed be brought into discussions so that there is no potential implacable minority who can claim not to have had any responsibility in what augers well to be a reasonable final settlement. We regard this settlement as one which, if it comes about—and the difficulties are still very considerable—will not only give Rhodesia a better future but will possibly give to the whole of Central and Southern Africa something like a model of how these things can be done without recourse to force.

I cannot part with my noble friends without replying to Lord Carrington's damnation with very faint praise for the role of Her Majesty's Government in all this. They have been working very hard over this matter during the last few years and it is not for me necessarily to deliver encomia to the present Prime Minister and his predecessor, as well as to the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel, for the honesty of purpose and the determination they have all shown in trying to solve this intractable problem, especially since I notice that both Dr. Kissinger and President Ford have done so already in very eloquent terms.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that he has not answered the question which was addressed to him by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Byers?—namely, why should they proceed with the creation of a transitional government before there is a definite decision that hostilities should cease? Why should they permit guerrilla warfare, bloodshed and violence to continue in the meantime while they are creating the transitional government? At the same time, would my noble friend be good enough to explain when responsibility for Rhodesia was transferred from the United Kingdom Government to Dr. Kissinger? Is not the responsibility specifically that of the United Kingdom Government? Was there any consultation, or did Dr. Kissinger intervene without consulting the United Kingdom Government or even the United Nations, which has not specific responsibility but an overriding responsibility?

My Lords, the answer to the second question, is, of course, by consultation. The answer to the first question is that the only way to end guerrilla warfare and get a speedy ling of sanctions is to introduce an interim government based on the aim of African majority rule.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that while one recognises the conciliatory nature of his Statement, one can be forgiven for thinking that at this time someone appears to have retreated from an implied agreement? If it is that the new alliance between America and Britain seems to be succumbing to that sort of pressure, then it will mean that the whole Western World will be demoralised as to what sort of stand we make. One would have thought that the interpretation of the agreement, as it has been presented so far, would make certain that the guerrilla fighting would cease and that there would be a sympathetic look at whether the whole of sanctions should be proceeded with. Anything short of that may be put into words which sound fair but which will not have the impact as regards getting back real justice to the world which should be the aim of all of us.

My Lords, I certainly do not disregard the import of the noble Lord's statement. It is a difficult and delicate situation. What we say is this: if we can move now quickly and decisively by means of this agreement to an interim Government, that more than anything will lead to the speedy raising of sanctions and the speedy cessation of guerrilla warfare.

My Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that one reason why the freedom fighters will not lay down their arms is because when Mr. Smith has previously agreed to proposals submitted to him he has found an opportunity to escape from them? Is the noble Lord satisfied that in this instance the safeguards to ensure that this agreement is carried into effect are adequate to prevent Mr. Smith from sliding out from under it yet again?

May I ask the noble Lord one non-controversial question about the proposals? Does he agree that with the transfer of power there will have to be a tremendous acceleration of education and training of the Zimbabwe Africans who are to take over key positions in politics and the economy? What contribution are the United Kingdom Government prepared to make in making available additional places at our universities, polytechnics and technical colleges for this purpose?

My Lords, I think the whole House, and indeed Parliament as a whole, would agree with the noble Lord that a tremendous effort must be made not only to sustain and strengthen the Rhodesian economy, but also to engage in large-scale and far-reaching training programmes in order to make an equitable reality of majority rule. Our own contribution, I hope and believe, will be very substantial and, of course, we shall be glad of the support and help of friends because this is rather more than a bilateral matter. It involves the whole question of the stability and peace of a Continent—a crucial Continent—and this is one reason why Her Majesty's Government have been in consultation with influential friends as to the best way to carry forward these discussions. As to the first question put to me, of course I agree with the purport of what the noble Lord said.

My Lords, would the noble Lord clear up one ambiguity? Did Dr. Kissinger claim that the terms of his package deal had been accepted by the five Presidents before they were published?

My Lords, I am not too sure whether I have quite followed the noble Lord's supplementary question. The package deal was put to Mr. Smith and resulted in his broadcast speech, accepting it in those terms. Those terms presented some difficulties, but I would not say that they were necessarily insurmountable, as one or two noble Lords have suggested. They are not. The same description of the package was, of course, imparted to the five African Presidents who, like Mr. Smith, have commented upon them. They have, in no way dealt with them any differently from Mr. Smith in that they have expressed, as we see it, broad agreement and acceptance, with certain reservations. Those reservations we do not regard as of now as being in any way impossible to surmount. We strongly suggest that we move immediately, or as fast as we can, to the preliminary conference—or to the meeting, as I call it, of all concerned, including this country—so that those reservations can be accommodated in the discussions which will, of course, finally be aimed at setting up as soon as possible an interim or transitional government.

My Lords, the Minister in his Statement has commented on what was said by my noble Leader, who emphasised two points; that is, the cessation of guerrilla warfare and the lifting of sanctions. With regard to the first, because it involves a wider range than the second, it is understandable that it is difficult to make a statement today; but on the question of sanctions, since the Press have for long reported that Britain has been more vigilant and more energetic in applying the intentions of sanctions than any other, and since in this period our commercial competitors have gained by our inaction, can the Minister perhaps remember, as has been said in the past several years when we have discussed the question of sanctions as the order has come around, that there are circumstances in which initial action by Britain would be justified? Can he perhaps consider, remembering the terms which were put forward as giving a possibility of action, whether there can now be swift action, because commercially and industrially there are a lot of orders to go out for the infrastructure of Rhodesia in any development or solution? Delay and inaction must be very inconvenient and difficult, and because of our past action it would seem that we now have a right to emphasise that there must be initial and swift action on the lifting of sanctions.

My Lords, I agree that it would be in the interests of everybody concerned that sanctions should be lifted as swiftly as possible. I repeat that the key to this is the meeting, of which everybody seems to be in favour, to set up the interim government. I believe that the objectives of the noble Lord and of others will be achieved all the more certainly and more swiftly once we have done that.

My Lords, will the noble Lord clarify two points with which he has already dealt? I am sorry to trouble him again. First, as I understand it, he regards the agreement reached with Mr. Smith as binding on Mr. Smith's part in the case of the headings enunciated by him in his broadcast. If this is so, does he also regard it as binding on Her Majesty's Government, on the Government of South Africa and on the Government of the United States? Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Tranmire, asked what was the position of the African leaders in the neighbouring States. I understood from the papers—it may not be correct—that they were consulted prior to the negotiations, and that they had agreed to the terms. Can the noble Lord say whether or not that is correct?

My Lords, I have some difficulty in identifying the two points—I think there were two separate ones—made by the noble Marquess. I hope I am not misleading him in any way when I say that certainly we, and the Americans, will regard the proceedings of the meeting leading to the setting up of the interim government as binding on everybody concerned. The package which the noble Lord, Lord Tranmire, mentioned will, of course, be the basis—and some of it is quite essential—for those discussions. We will take a full part in that essential meeting and we hope to emerge from it with the others fully bound by it. I hope that the noble Marquess will forgive me if I ask him whether he will either repeat his second point now, or have a word with me on the margin, as it were, afterwards.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

moved Amendment No. 1:

Page 2, line 1, leave out ("he cannot show to be") and insert ("is not").

Since the noble and learned Lord has been good enough to refer to the speech which I made on Second Reading perhaps I may say one or two words on this first Amendment, and particularly on the philosophical point which he has raised, which I suppose ought to have been part of the Second Reading debate, to the extent to which we believe the law has a role to play in preventing racism as opposed to tackling it by other means.

I think it must be fairly obvious to your Lordships that the noble and learned Lord has always been quite consistent in wanting less law, while some of us, including myself, have been equally consistent in wanting more law. If one looks at the various countries where a spectrum of extent of the law has operated we find that most experts and most of those who have given some consideration to the subject believe that the role of law can be very much more extensive than we may have thought it to be ten or thirteen years ago. We are not now dealing with the situation which we faced in 1965 and 1968, to which the noble and learned Lord referred. We find, with the benefit of hindsight, that generally speaking the law has been beneficial, and I believe it is by no means coincidental that, as the noble and learned Lord said, we find that discrimination to some extent has been reduced, both in this country and elsewhere, as a result of, and not merely coincidentally with, the operation of the laws that we already have. We find that in many cases the law has not been effective, and that is why we are trying to strengthen it now. I do not think it helps to refer to one individual case—that of Mr. Relf—which I think I am right in saying was a case under the 1965 Act and not the 1968 Act.

No, it was under the 1968 Act.

I accept the correction. The noble and learned Lord appears to think that just because Mr. Relf was able successfully to defy the 1968 Act this means that we have too much law and, as I understood him, instead of dealing with this Bill now his general principle is that we should be thinking of dismantling some of the existing apparatus of legislation which we already have. With great respect, he did not erect any alternative sophisticated and more coherent philosophy, which he said ought to be the task of those who maintain either that there should be more or less law. I do not really think we can see him as having constructed that edifice in his speech, nor do I believe one can limit such a coherent philosophy merely to questions of the burden of proof.

May I examine the criteria which the noble and learned Lord suggested ought to be applied in looking at this burden of proof. National emergency obviously does not enter into it at all, but the second criterion he mentioned might enter into it in certain circumstances. He said that if a matter was particularly within the knowledge of the accused and perhaps nobody else, then Parliament was justified in shifting the burden of proof. In this Amendment we are concerned with a situation in which a man has applied to someone else a requirement or a condition which he would apply equally to persons not of the same racial group. That is a matter of fact, as I think the noble and learned Lord will agree. We have to establish first that the person who is being accused has discriminated and then, having done that, it is for him to say, "The reason why I was discriminating was nothing to do with the man's colour, race, nationality or ethnic and national origin; it was something totally different, and I can show to the court that there were perfectly valid reasons why I did not grant this person the job for which he was applying".

To give an example which was discussed in another place when this clause was under consideration, if an employer said that in any of his factories he was not going to have as storekeepers persons wearing headgear, one would imagine that was directed against the Sikhs because they wear turbans and religious considerations prevent them from taking off their turbans at a place of work, or indeed in any other public place. But if an employer should come forward and say, "Yes, I do refuse to grant storekeepers who wear headgear employment in my factories, but there is a perfectly good reason for it", and he satisfies the court that there are reasons connected with the nature of the work in the factory and nothing to do with race or ethnic origin, then of course the court would acquit him of that offence. In the circumstances, I dare say your Lordships might think that if there was a good reason of a non-racial character, the case would never get as far as the courts of law.

But in the nature of things it is very difficult to show absolutely that an offence has been committed for racial and no other reasons, and the shifting of the burden of proof in the way we have it in this Bill will be helpful in establishing complaints that no one would doubt are justified; and if one looks at the volume of complaints which have been made under the Acts one must come to the conclusion that they represent only the tip of the iceberg. Just recently I was sent the report of the West Midlands Conciliation Committee, and I noted that during the year under review about 140 complaints were taken into consideration by the Committee, 30-odd of them were withdrawn, leaving just over 100 in the whole of the year which were properly examined. This, in a community where, according to the 1971 Census there were 68,000 people belonging to ethnic minorities, that is to say, people who were born in the New Commonwealth or one or both of whose parents were born in the New Commonwealth. It passes the belief of anyone who has studied these matters that only 100 cases of reasonable complaint could arise in a community of as many as 68,000 during a period of twelve months. The obvious reason for so few complaints is that it has so far been very difficult to substantiate them. The strengthening of the law as we have it in Clause 1 is vital and necessary, and I hope that the Committee rejects the Amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone.

Before I come to the point of this particular Amendment—and I am bound to say that my conclusion is that of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, that it would be a retrograde step to pass it—I will, if I may, respond briefly to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, said at the beginning of his speech. As always, the noble and learned Lord spoke with force and persuasiveness. He outlined the wider considerations affecting him in discussing not only this Amendment but others that he and his noble friends have put down to the Bill. He said he was doing this in order to avoid the risk of repeating himself, which is an admirable objective, and I, too, will do the best I can to avoid repeating myself. But I think both the noble and learned Lord and I may find this exceptionally difficult during the debates we have this week.

The noble and learned Lord spoke about the belief that the law, in a matter of this sort, could cure the entire problem. Of course, I entirely agree. It clearly cannot, and I said so on Second Reading. I am bound to say that I think it is going far further than the facts would dictate to say that the law does not have an absolutely crucial role to play in the field of race relations. If one looks at the experience of the United States of America, where there is first of all the protection of the United States Constitution, that did not prevent the Kennedy and, indeed, the Johnson Administrations from feeling it necessary to bring forward significant civil rights legislation. I do not believe it would be possible for us today to pretend that without that legislation the civil rights situation in the United States would have improved, as improved it certainly has, over the last decade or so.

May I interrupt the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, in order not to repeat myself? Would the noble Lord be prepared to admit that it is very dangerous to make comparisons between the situation in this country and the situation in the United States of America? In the United States they have a written Constitution. The black population came as slaves into the country, not as willing guests coming to work; not as citizens to the country in which they were arriving, but merely as machines for labour. The black problem there has lasted for much longer, and is a much larger problem than we have here in this country. So would the noble Lord not agree that to export solutions that were possible in the United States may well be much more of a recipe for disaster than for success?

No, I would not agree that this is a recipe for disaster; that is a gross over-statement. There are substantial differences between the two countries for the reasons the noble Lord has given. But it would be quite impossible, in a debate of this sort, for us to ignore the American experience, albeit that they have a totally different background from ours to their racial situation. But, having said that, it is absolutely essential to recognise that the legislation which has been enacted by Congress, which buttresses the United States Constitution, has had the most significant effect in the development of race relations over the past 10 years in the United States.

Having outlined my answer to the particular point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, may I come now to the particular Amendment which we have before us. As the noble and learned Lord rightly pointed out, this Amendment gives us the opportunity of discussing the whole concept of indirect discrimination in the Bill. If I may, I will explain just for a moment how the definition works. Under Clause 1(1)(b) the Bill defines as discrimination for the purposes of Parts II and III, which actually render discrimination unlawful, treatment which is equal in a formal sense but unjustifiably discriminatory on particular racial groups. The treatment concerned must, for the purposes of the definition, involve the application of a condition or a requirement which has to be satisfied before a particular benefit such as a job can be obtained or a detriment avoided. The condition or requirement must also be such that it has operated to the disadvantage of the complainant; it must be such that the proportion of members of his racial group who can comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of people not of that group who can comply with it. All this is for the complainant to show. When he has done so, under Clause 1(1)(b) as it stands, it is for the respondent either to rebut the evidence which the complainant has adduced, or if he cannot, to show that the condition or requirement is justifiable, having regard to all the circumstances in which it is applied.

If I may turn to the Opposition Amendment, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, has pointed out, this shifts the burden of proving that a condition or requirement is justified from the respondent to the complainant. Clause 1(1)(b)(ii) is as it is because the Government consider, as Parliament considered in relation to the Sex Discrimination Act, that the question of whether or not a condition or requirement is justifiable is one which the person applying it is in the best position to know. Indeed, the noble Lord who has just spoken pointed out the validity of this particular argument. There is a great difficulty in proving a negative, yet that is precisely what we are being asked to impose upon complainants in indirect discrimination cases. It would surely be an exceptionally heavy burden for a complainant to have to discharge if he were to have to prove that a particular requirement or condition was not justifiable. Presumably he would have to go through all the possible justifications he could think of, and then dispose of them one by one. He would have to show in each case that it could not be sustained, or could not be regarded as reasonable. I do not think that this would be in the interests of justice. Indeed, I believe this Amendment would wreck the entire concept of the indirect discrimination provisions in this Bill.

We believe on these Benches that it is not unreasonable to require a person who has applied a condition or a requirement which can be shown to have operated disproportionately to the disadvantage of a particular racial group in general, and to the member of that group in particular, to attempt to justify that condition or that requirement. If he cannot do so, he should cease to apply the condition or requirement, or should be required to do so. This is achieved by Clause 1(1)(b) taken with Parts II and III of the Bill.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, referred to the inherent justice of this Amendment, and cited provisions of the kind to which he objects in this Bill, and which he fears have had an increasing part in legislation in the last few years. He cited a number of instances where he thought a provision of that sort, where you change the burden of proof, would be justifiable. The noble and learned Lord mentioned a situation of national emergency; he referred to certain licensing questions, and referred to cases where moral guilt did not apply. I began by saying that I hoped I would not repeat myself, but unfortunately I am going to make this point on a number of occasions during the passage of this Bill.

I am bound to say I did not quite understand why a number of noble Lords indicated their warm approval of the speech of the noble and learned Lord, given the fact that 12 months ago they did not take this point in relation to the Sex Discrimination Act. Of course, the noble and learned Lord is quite right in saying, as he did on Second Reading, that there are a number of issues where there are going to be significant differences in these two pieces of legislation. I entirely accept that point. But I am bound to say that I do not understand why, if it is right to do this in the case of the Sex Discrimination Act, it can be objectionable in the case of this Bill. I hope the Committee will support the Government and reject this Amendment.

I rise to support wholeheartedly the noble and learned Lord's Amendment, because if Clause 1(1)(b) is not tightly circumscribed I believe that at least two and possibly more of our basic freedoms will be in jeopardy. The first is the freedom of the denominational schools to stipulate that their pupils shall adhere to a particular religious faith. So far as Jewish schools are concerned, the proportion of Africans and Asians who can comply with this particular condition is certainly likely to be considerably smaller than the proportion of persons of European or Near-Eastern origin. So far as Roman Catholic or Anglican and Methodist foundations are concerned, the proportion of Asians—excepting the Goans and South Indians, who can so comply—is also likely to be extremely small in relation to other nationalities and races.

The other freedom which is in jeopardy, in my opinion, is the freedom of a person to decide whom he wishes to admit to his own home. If a man is unexpectedly sent abroad on business for six months and has not got time to canvass privately to obtain a tenant but has to advertise, he is caught by the provisions of this Bill. If he wishes to let his home on a furnished basis, which would normally be the case, and if he tries to insert a restriction into the lease, a perfectly reasonable restriction in my belief, forbidding the tenant from using highly-spiced cooking materials—as noble Lords know, excellent though this food may be to eat, over a period of time the cooking smells permeate curtains and other soft furnishings—he would be caught by this provision as it stands, because a small proportion of certain groups could comply with this.

If the Amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord is not carried, it is quite likely that a headmaster might be called before the Commission to explain why in present day circumstances an Anglican foundation insists upon its pupils practising the Anglican faith; in the second case, why in this day and age a person cannot get used to the fact that people cook using exotic materials, and so on and so forth. I believe the Amendment will go some way towards improving the subsection and I hope it will be supported by the Committee.

I had no intention of intervening in the debate on this Amendment, or indeed intervening in the discussion on this Bill in Committee at this stage. But I think it would be cowardly on my part if I did not declare that I am convinced that the noble and learned Lord is right about this matter. It is perhaps appropriate that I am delivering this speech somewhere in the passageway between the Benches on my left and the Benches on my right.

Come over into Macedonia.

Nothing would discourage me more in making a further movement towards the right than the invitation of the noble and learned Lord. Seriously, the noble and learned Lord appears to me perfectly right. It seems to me incontrovertible—and indeed the noble Lord the Minister agreed with this—that the effect of these words which the noble and learned Lord seeks to alter is, at a certain stage in the proceedings, to throw the burden of proof that he is innocent upon the accused. I am very reluctant to allow the defence of the basic civil liberties of this country to be left either to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, or to the Tory Party. I think this is a serious breach of this basic principle.

My noble friend Lord Avebury took as an example of how this might work in practice the case of an employer who advertises to take on staff but provides that they shall not wear certain headwear. He said the situation is quite safe and satisfactory because what will happen is that the prosecution will establish the fact that he did make this requirement in the advertisement for the job, and then it is quite right that the obligation of showing that there was not any discriminatory purpose should fall upon the defendant.

What is the consequence of that? The consequence is this: the noble and learned Lord will correct me if I have got it wrong. Once the prosecution have proved the fact that he imposed this condition upon the taking of such a job, then the court before whom this matter comes have got to ask themselves, "Has the defendant nevertheless satisfied us and shown that this was justifiable irrespective of matters of race and the like?" Supposing the court is in doubt. Supposing the court says, "We really do not know. We have listened to the prosecution, who have said that this is obviously discriminatory. We have listened to the explanation given to us by the defendant, and he says it was not intended to be discriminatory but was imposed for quite different reasons". If they should come to the conclusion that the burden of proof has not been satisfied by the defendant, then they are obliged to convict. That is the inescapable conclusion.

If the noble Lord will forgive me, he uses the term "innocence" and he raises the question of "conviction". He will, of course, realise that we are talking about civil law at the moment.

Certainly. I use the word "conviction" which is a perfectly comprehensible expression used in regard to civil proceedings. In point of fact—I say this by way of parenthesis—I would have thought this question of what constitutes discrimination might well arise in criminal proceedings of all kinds. The question will arise: was this discrimination within the meaning of the Act? The argument I am addressing to the Committee covers the question of criminal as well as civil proceedings.

I come back to this point. The noble and learned Lord has pointed out that if a person who is "convicted" is found to have discriminated, if I may put it like that, very serious consequences might flow, particularly under Clause 12, as the noble Lord said. A person who had been convicted because he could not demonstrate positively that he was innocent might be excluded from taking part in a profession. These are the appalling consequences which might flow if we once take the dangerous course of departing from what the noble Lord described as the well established and well proven principles of law upon which the legal administration of this country has so long been conducted. I do not think the Minister gave any adequate reply to the arguments which the noble and learned Lord made, and if this matter is taken to a Division, even if I am at odds with my colleagues, I shall feel bound to go into the Contents Lobby.

Before my noble friend concludes his remarks, I wonder whether he could address himself to one question which he does not seem to have answered. If the employer has applied a rule which discriminates against a particular ethnic minority, and this is established to the satisfaction of the courts, but he has done so for reasons which are connected with the employment—as I suggested, it might be for reasons of safety—why should he not come forward to the court, if it gets that far, and say, "I had to impose that requirement not because it discriminates against Sikhs, or West Indians, or people from Kashmir, or whatever it may be; I did this for reasons connected with the employment, and here they are"? What is to stop him from giving the simple and true explanation if it has nothing to do with discrimination?

This presents no problem. I am sorry that I failed to convey to my noble friend what I was trying to convey. I said that if you get a case of that kind and the prosecution prove the fact that for example, the employer said "You can only have a job with me so long as you do not wear certain types of headgear" and they say that that was discriminatory against Sikhs, there is nothing to stop the defendant from coming forward and saying, "I did not impose the condition for that reason at all. I imposed it for the purposes of safety." There is nothing to stop him. But the complaint I make is that the court then have to decide whether they think that the intention was discriminatory or not, and in making that vital decision the burden of proof is on the defendant. One can think of many circumstances in which it might not be possible for the defendant in that sort of case to prove positively that he had not discriminated.

The noble Lord said earlier on that the justification of this was that it is very difficult to prove a negative, but that is exactly the burden that you are throwing upon the individual in the case which my noble friend has posed. The noble Lord the Minister shakes his head. Let us look at the wording which the noble and learned Lord wants to amend. It specifically says:

"which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of … race"

et cetera. What is that except proving the negative? The clause itself says that in certain circumstances the burden of proof will fall upon the defendant, and the burden will be to prove the negative.

It is always a pleasure to debate with the noble Lord, Lord Harris. He always is both courteous and reasonable. But I think this is a perfectly clear question of principle, and I shall only be very short indeed in what I have to say in commenting on the various speeches. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, is quite wrong in thinking that I necessarily want in this field either no law or less law. It is not a question of quantity, it is a question of quality. He is quite wrong also to suggest that at Second Reading, and on I think at least a dozen occasions when the former legislation was going through the House, I did not put forward a perfectly coherent view as to the circumstances in which legislation is valuable and the value, if any—and it varies—of American experience. What I endeavoured to do at the outset of this debate was to show the philosophy upon which my Amendments in this Committee stage was based. I was not going outside that sphere. All I was doing was to say that I want three or four criteria which I have sought to apply to the Bill. One is to eliminate the unintelligible; one is to eliminate the unenforceable; one is to try to take, if it can be shown to be justifiable, the ordinary well-established and proven principles of English law and apply them to this Bill, and the other is to eliminate the oppressive. Those are the four criteria I apply, and I think they form a coherent view to which all my Amendments are intended to conform. Whether they do or not we can only see as the Committee stage proceeds.

Having said that both to the noble Lord, Lord Harris, and the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, I come to look at the substance of this clause. My Amendment is certainly not intended to be wrecking. This is not my idea at all. But I would venture to say to the noble Lord, Lord Harris, and to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, that they really should take to heart what the noble Lord, Lord Foot, has just said, because I agree with every word of it. This is not because it happens to coincide with my opinion but because quite independently I have formed the same view. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, is making a profound confusion of thought—and so is the noble Lord, Lord Harris, with respect— when he says that this can be subsumed behind the general exception to the burden of proof that a matter which is within the accused's own knowledge should be a matter which he should establish a prima facie case about. As the noble Lord, Lord Foot, said, and what is really quite incontrovertible, is that when you have a case of the kind which the noble Lord posits in which an employer says "I impose this restriction for reasons of health, or reasons of safety", if the tribunal is left in doubt they have got to find against the accused.

Of course, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, pointed out, there is a difference between crime and tort, or delict, if we are dealing with Scottish law; but the difference is not one of principle, it is one of the standard of proof which is required. In crime it has got to be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution if the general rule applies, and in tort it has to be proved on the balance of probability. I quite agree that in the main we are here talking about delict or tort and not about crime, but that does not alter or invalidate what the noble Lord, Lord Foot, said, that if the tribunal is left in doubt it has got to find against the accused, if I may use the word "accused" as did the noble Lord, in inverted commas. The consequences can be disastrous, and not merely at the time, but thereafter under Clause 12 and the other clauses to which I referred, Clauses 65 and 66 among others. In theory, at any rate, they can wreck the man's whole life.

What the Committee has really to make up its mind about is whether it is prepared to see that those consequences flow from an evenly balanced case where the tribunal is left in doubt and has to decide on the burden of proof alone. I am not so prepared. I must just say that the headgear case is, as a matter of fact, a very good one. The whole of the construction industry has to wear helmets in certain circumstances, and it is very reasonable for an employer to require it. It is not intended to apply against Sikhs, but of course in individual cases there will be doubt as to whether it ought to be applied, and in what cases. The Government got themselves into terrible hot water about motor cycles on this very point.

May I interrupt the noble and learned Lord?

Just let me conclude the point. I will of course give way if the noble Lord wishes to intervene, but I just wantto conclude this point on headgear. The Government got themselves into terrible trouble about motor cycles. This has not really been resolved by just giving in, because firms, like those we see running about London at the moment with private despatch riders, have exactly the same problem. The employers' liability will be entirely different if a construction industry man does, or does not, wear a helmet. I do not know of course whether the Sikhs' turban is equally good. I was shown by a Sikh today a turban which he said had resisted the blow of a hammer from a thief, so they may be in the right. But it so happens that the argument is a good one. I was going to add a point, but I will now give way to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury.

I was going to tell the noble and learned Lord, since I am presenting Mr. Bidwell's Bill next week that I have had the opportunity of some discussions with the Sikhs not only about motor cycles but also about the construction industry. They tell me that some of the biggest firms allow Sikhs to appear on construction sites with the turban while other people are required to wear helmets. I do not know whether I can tell the noble and learned Lord that it is as safe as a helmet, but the practice which is followed by the construction industry is to allow the turban, and if there is any alteration in that practice then of course one would say that discrimination had come into it.

The only point I am making, and the noble Lord has illustrated it, is that this is a matter about which opinions differ. There are statutory regulations which demand the wearing of helmets and there is an Act which compels

Noble Lords will have observed that Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 have been marshalled in the wrong order. I will therefore call Amendment No. 3 first.

moved Amendment No. 3:

Page 2, line 2, after ("race") insert ("religion or creed,").

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this matter. Let me begin on a happy note, because I am afraid that the Government are not persuaded that a proposal on the lines that the noble Baroness has suggested would be right for the present Bill. I start by saying that I agree with the noble Baroness on one of the fundamental points she has made—that is, that discrimination on the grounds of a person's religion is in no way less offensive than is racial discrimination. But before concluding that we ought to take the opportunity of this Bill to make religious discrimination unlawful, we ought to think very carefully whether this is the right step to take.

The first place which comes to mind when religious discrimination is mentioned is obviously Northern Ireland. This Bill does not extend to Northern Ireland—with all its other problems, the one thing that can be said is that racial discrimination is not a problem in Northern Ireland. In the very different circumstances of Northern Ireland, it is necessary to pass special legislation directed specifically at the problems arising there. Fortunately, those problems do not face us in Great Britain. So far as Great Britain is concerned, we can surely agree that religious discrimination, important as it is, is not a problem of the dimensions of racial discrimination. It has been suggested that the Irish situation might spill over into Britain, giving rise to some discrimination on religious grounds here. That, fortunately, remains an entirely hypothetical situation. But even if it did happen, would race relations legislation necessarily be the right vehicle for counter-measures? Our Bill does more than just make certain forms of behaviour unlawful. The discrimination provisions go hand-in-hand with the enforcement provisions. And an integral part of the latter is the Commission for racial equality, with its wide powers of law enforcement and promotional activity. The new body has a major task before it in tackling the complexities of race relations and I do not think it would be prudent to add to its already substantial burden of work a new area of activity—the highly sensitive subject of religion.

There is another, I believe in some ways arguably more telling argument against the noble Baroness, much though I sympathise with the thought behind her Amendment; that is, that it would certainly not be sufficient—and I am sure that the noble Baroness would agree with me on this—simply to make the Amendments now under consideration. Religious discrimination is in general an undoubted evil, but organised religion does at the same time give rise to many distinctions based on religion which would have to be protected in the Bill were the Amendment to be carried. Clearly, the appointment of clergy, priests and office holders may rightly be restricted to membership of the religion concerned. Similarly, we should not want the Bill to interfere with established patterns of religious schools and religious associations and organisations. It would thus be necessary to incorporate a range of carefully drawn exceptions to preserve the special basis of religion in our society. I think the noble Baroness will appreciate that, even if this Bill were the right vehicle to do this, given the time scale under which we are now operating, it would be very difficult, if not quite impossible, to envisage the sort of detailed negotiation that would be necessary with a very wide range of interest groups between now and the time when we hope that the Bill will go on to the Statute Book.

Therefore, as I have indicated, though we certainly have much sympathy for the intentions behind the Amendment of the noble Baroness, I do not believe that, at this stage, it would be at all prudent for us to insist upon an Amendment of this sort. I very much hope that for the reasons I have given, the noble Baroness will not press the Amendment.

When, 25 years ago, I introduced in another place a Bill against racial discrimination, I included religious discrimination. That Bill also extended to Northern Ireland and I have some regrets that the present Bill does not do so. What I want to say is that it is perfectly true that there is not in this country the religious antagonism that there is in Northern Ireland. However, it is there. It exists in Liverpool; it exists in Glasgow. This was illustrated only last Sunday, when there was opposition by a group to an Anglican Bishop speaking together with Nonconformist representatives supporting the magnificent Women's Movement for Peace in Ireland. Therefore, it is not quite true that religious discrimination does not occur in this country. There are potentialities of it.

Therefore, I should have liked to see in the Bill not merely action against racial discrimination, but also against religious discrimination. I appreciate the difficulties, which have been indicated by the Minister, in all kinds of problems which arise from different religious denominations and the appointment of representatives in those organisations, in either clerical positions or in other posts. But I would put it to the Minister that it is not beyond legal definition to include in the Bill a clause against religious discrimination which would at the same time avoid the kind of practical difficulties which he presented, and I hope very much that that may be the case.

Let me say this in conclusion. I am also considering the Jewish community. Often any antagonism to the Jewish community is on the ground of race, and it would be covered by the Bill—but not entirely. There is some opposition to the Jewish community on the ground of religious views, and I believe that it would be to the advantage of toleration in this country if we could include in the Bill action against religious intolerance in broad principle, which could at the same time avoid the practical difficulties which the Minister has indicated. I hope that the Government will be able to look at this matter again.

I should like to add my very strong views to those expressed by my noble friend Lord Brockway, and of course by definition therefore to those expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Vickers. In my long experience, living as I do in an Anglican-Jewish atmosphere, it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish between that which is called racial and that which is called religious. So many of my Jewish friends in this country deny that they are of a different race, and indeed they have every reason to so deny. They have lived here for as many generations as the rest of us—and scratch any of us and you will find somebody else. But they either practise a different religion, or even where they do not practise it they are assumed to be of it.

With great respect to the Minister, it seems to me quite unreasonable to try to make this distinction between the two, because if one does one will inevitably leave at risk some who should not be because the racial issue does not arise at all. The Minister gave us—and he is sufficiently an old friend of mine to forgive me for putting it fairly bluntly—a list of bureaucratic objections which no doubt were written down for him by a number of fellows who would find themselves put to much trouble to try to put the consequences right. As a man who has had longer Ministerial service than the Minister has yet chalked up—though it must be said that he is not doing badly—I have therefore longer experience of checking this kind of almost mechanical objection. Usually the answer to it is that one looks the fellow straight in the eye and says, "Well, old boy, I am going to give in. Just find out how easily can I." One will be very surprised how easily they can so find it.

I believe that something will be missing from the Bill if one leaves out religious discrimination, because one is never then quite sure what the discrimination is about. One can get at the Jews for being racial, then the Jews prove that they are not—they have been here so long—but they are still Jewish. Therefore one then gets at them for being religious. I have lived so much of my life in this atmosphere in South-East and East London. I know how easily the enemies switch from one accusation to another. I am by extraction, by derivation, Irish. I happen to be, I think, racially totally British. But when they could not think of anything else to say to us they used to say, "You are Catholics", to which I have to answer, "Yes, I am a Catholic." One then gets into a terrible argument about Romans and Saint Augustine and the original Church.

I honestly think, if I may say so to the Minister, that he is stopping halfway down the road if he does this. It is to be discriminatory on both racial and religious grounds that is wrong. If the noble Baroness pushes her point, I hope she wins it. If she does press it I shall most certainly vote with her. But in view of the argument which the Minister put up, which was much too bureaucratic to carry weight anywhere, I hope that he might feel able to say, "We will take another look at it and see whether we cannot do it."

I should like to say something at this stage. I think that my noble friend Lady Vickers has put her finger on a very great defect of the Bill. The question is whether it is a curable defect. During consideration of the earlier Amendment the noble Lord opposite twitted me—for the sake of brevity I did not reply—for not having made my Amendment gleichgeschallet with the Sex Discrimination Act, and the noble Lord, Lord Avebury (who has now nipped out), started to present an enormous argument based on turbans for Sikhs. I did not point out the weakness of that argument at the time because it was not relevant to what I was saying, but I now do so. I have been defeated by successive Labour Governments in the past, and I will probably be defeated now, but I have always said that what is really wanted are not these silly little Bills about sexual discrimination and racial discrimination, but a Bill about discrimination, because until you have got a philosophy, though you have thought your problem out, you will not get a coherent piece of law. That is what I believe. When the Bill was going through the Commons in 1968, I tried to add sex and religion to it. I was ruled out of order by the Table, no doubt at the instigation of the Government; but, at any rate, that is what happened. Again, I did not play a part in the race discrimination Bill. We had a number of noble Baronesses here batting for us even better than anybody else could have done. But the fact of the matter is that you want a Bill about discrimination, and not a Sex Discrimination Bill; you want a Bill about discrimination, and not a race discrimination Bill; and you want a bill about discrimination, and not a religious discrimination Bill.

My point is not the point which the noble Lord, Lord Harris, put; that is, that we cannot deal with it in this Bill. The point is that you cannot separate it—and this is the point in favour of what my noble friend has said. I now come to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, and the Sikhs. The turbans have nothing to do with race; they have nothing to do with nationality; they have nothing to do with racial origin. In fact, they are part of the Sikh religion. That is what it is; and if you discriminate against turbans for Sikhs you are discriminating, not on racial grounds but plainly on religious grounds.

Now Jews, if the noble Lord, Lord Janner, will forgive me, come all shapes, sizes and colours. There are black Jews called Falashas in Ethiopia; there are yellow Jews called something else in China; and there are white Jews with fair hair and blue eyes, with the best Aryan characteristics, in Europe. They come all shapes and sizes. They are not a race, and it is folly to believe they are. But some of them—not all of them, I am sorry to say, but some of them—have a religion. If you want to discriminate against Jews, it is no use discriminating against people with long noses: you must discriminate against people who will not eat bacon—and that is a religious discrimination. The truth is—and this is part of the folly of all this legislation which the Labour Government will habitually try to put through—that the Government will not think about the problems, and they try to solve them simply from a vote-catching point of view. They think they will get the immigrant vote, and so they put in something about race; they think they will get the women's vote, and so they put something in about sex; and they will not think the thing through.

Now why am I not going to press my noble friend to divide on this? I will tell her quite frankly. Naturally enough, after having said what I have just said, people will realise that I thought very seriously about putting this Amendment down myself; and the reason I did not was the second of the two reasons which the noble Lord, Lord Harris, gave, which is that you would have to tinker with this Bill from beginning to end to make sense of it. It is all very well for the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, to say what he did—and may I say in passing, if it will not waste the time of the Committee, how glad we are to see that he has recovered sufficiently to play a part in our debates; we were all very sorry to see that he had been ill, and we are very glad to see him among us again—but it is not good enough, when you are dealing with legislation, to say that all these objections are bureaucratic. The truth is that the Government have produced a most detailed piece of legislation, tens of pages long, which is geared to race, just as they put forward a piece of legislation, nearly 70 pages long, geared to sex; and you cannot, just by shoving religion into the first clause of the Bill, make it into a Bill about religion, because it is not. It is inherently and structuarily a Bill about race. So, with great respect to my noble friend—and I agreed with almost every word she said; in fact, I think I agreed with every word—I still cannot recommend the Committee on my side to divide on it. I think it is just an illustration of the bad thinking of the Government.

Several references have been made to the Jewish religion, of which I happen to be a member, and I think it would be proper for me to say a word or two about this particular Amendment. I need hardly say that in so far as religious discrimination is concerned I, and I am sure the Jewish community, are dead against it, as is the noble Baroness who spoke. I hope that an opportunity will arise soon, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, has already said, when this will be considered in a way which will enable appropriate legislation to be introduced. The question in so far as the Jewish community is concerned obviously arises because from time to time attacks are made on Jewish people on religious grounds, and for my part I should like to see something effective done which could deal with that position. But I see the point which has been made here. It is a difficult position in so far as the immediate passing of this Bill is concerned. My fear is that if this matter is pressed to a Division there will be some people who will be voting in a way which might be entirely misinterpreted, because I am quite sure that everybody in this Committee would want to see to it that religious discrimination is put down in an effective way. In these circumstances, I think that perhaps the best course to take at the present time is to pass on without actually provoking a Division, which might create that entirely wrong impression. I, for my part, should of course like to see a proper Act passed soon which would supplement what is in the present Bill to deal with this particular issue.

Perhaps I could briefly speak again to say a few things. First of all, it is important to celebrate the fact that on one particular matter the noble and learned Lord and I are in agreement. It may not be often thus, but certainly it is right to welcome this fact. Secondly, I should like to join with the noble and learned Lord in saying how glad we are to see my noble friend Lord George-Brown back among us again. Could I say one thing to him? My noble friend said—and the noble and learned Lord picked up this particular point—that the points I had made were simply bureaucratic objections, and that if one had the officials round and spoke to them very severely and said one was going to insist on having these religious provisions written into the Bill, all would be well. But unhappily that is in fact not so, and it is not so for the reason given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham. It is quite impossible, a few weeks before the end of this Session of Parliament, to involve oneself in what would be a major restructuring of this entire piece of legislation. It is a formidable Bill, and to start at this stage to go through all the detailed exceptions which would be necessary in order to write the religious provisions into this Bill would, in my view, make it quite impossible to get this piece of legislation on the Statute Book. For that reason, I very much hope that the noble Baroness will not press her Amendment.

I am not at all satisfied with the reply. It seems to me very unfortunate that this issue has not been thought about before. It also seems to me to prove how badly this Government arrange their business that we should be forced, as the noble Minister has just said, not to consider a very important matter because there is not time. This is a Bill which is going to affect so many people throughout the land. In view of what my noble and learned friend, with his expert knowledge, has said, I will not press it on this occasion, but I hope that this will be borne in mind in the future because—and I did support my noble and learned friend in the other place on this question of sex—we could have done without another Bill completely, the Sex Discrimination Bill, if we had only got that one word in the Bill we were considering at that time. With your Lordships' leave I beg to withdraw the Amendment.

moved Amendment No. 2:

Page 2, line 2, leave out ("nationality").

To anticipate that point, an alien cannot be a police officer in this country.

I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. Clause 11 applies to trade unions and there is nothing in trade union law to stop an alien from being a member or taking office in a trade union. If you had sufficient pressure groups it would be perfectly possible for aliens to be voted, in the normal and proper procedures of trade unions, to take control of any particular union. I am not saying they will, but you have to envisage these things now long term. We have seen before what happens when we do not envisage things in the long term. I do not think an alien being in control of a union is necessarily in the interests of this country, though it may be so. It sounds unlikely that this could happen today but, as with many things that we have not foreseen in legislation before, at least the attention of the Committee should be drawn to this point.

Another point which is of considerable concern is in Clause 29 regarding advertisements. Perhaps the noble Lord the Minister will say whether it is correct that under Clause 29 in keeping in the word "nationality" as grounds for non-discrimination, it will no longer be possible for anyone to advertise for British subjects or use the word "British" in any advertisement. This is something which would not be acceptable to many people. I am not thinking in any jingoistic or any other view, but many foreign companies—particularly when they set up their businesses in this country—may wish to have British subjects as representatives here. An enormous amount of investment comes into Britain which keeps British people employed. One of the things we need most in this country is investment in order to create new jobs. Many foreign companies would wish to employ British subjects in various capacities regardless of colour, race or national origin. I must ask the Committee to think seriously before proceeding on this Bill whether it is common sense to eliminate from our vocabulary in terms of advertisements the word "British".

In particular, I should like to refer to the Second Reading speech of the Home Secretary when he introduced the Bill. He gave the principles on which the Bill was built and the reasons for it. He said, in column 1547 of the Official Report of another place, on 4th March this year:

"The first principle upon which the Government's policy is based is the clear recognition that the vast majority of the coloured population will remain permanently in this country, and that a substantial and increasing proportion of that population belongs to our country in the fullest sense of being born and educated here as fellow citizens."

I beg to move.

I should like to support the Amendment of the noble Baroness, for slightly different reasons from the ones she advanced. The other day I heard about a well-known actor (whose name I had better not mention) who was captured in Singapore in 1942 and was sent to a prisoner-of-war camp. His experiences at the hands of the Japanese were so horrible that to this day this man cannot even travel in the same lift as a person who is, or appears to be, Japanese. I have only the happiest memory of those Japanese whom I have met, and I would have no objection whatsoever to employing somebody of that nationality, if the occasion arose, and no doubt most other noble Lords hold the same view. But there must be a body of people in this country who have had very different, unhappy experiences. Would it not be the height of cruelty to say to these people, if they refused to employ such a person in a close relationship like personal assistant or secretary, or did not wish to let their house to them, that the full rigour of the law would descend upon them?

There must be many—not all, of course—among the Jewish and Polish communities in this country who feel equally reluctant to employ or let their house to people of German nationality or, indeed, Russian nationality. One may think of similar tensions between Greeks and Turks or, in some cases, between Indians, Bangla Deshis and Pakistanis, or between Syrians and Palestinians, Gibralterians and Spaniards, and so on. One must allow for human nature in these circumstances and not force people to do things which are so much against the grain so far as they personally are concerned. For that reason, I strongly support the Amendment of the noble Baroness.

I hope the noble Baroness will agree that I begin on a not too niggling point, and that it is necessary for me to point out that the provision which we have been debating in this Amendment, the principal provision dealing with this matter, does not come under Clause 1(1)(b)(ii). It admittedly contains the first reference to this. The principal clause in which this issue arises is Clause 3(1) where this question is laid out in rather more detail. Having said that, perhaps I could explain, as the noble Baroness has, the background to this particular matter. She covered some of this ground very fairly. The formula of discrimination on grounds of colour, race or ethnic or national origins appeared in the 1968 Act. That seemed to include discrimination on grounds of nationality. This is not, for that reason, a new issue. It was assumed, on the basis of the 1968 Act, that nationality was covered.

We then come of course to the decision of your Lordships' House sitting in a Judicial capacity in the case to which the noble Baroness referred, Ealing London Borough Council v. Race Relations Board in 1972, when they said that "national" in the reference to "national origins" did not cover nationality. That decision has therefore thrown up the policy question of whether the legislation should cover discrimination on the grounds of nationality. The Government have concluded it should, not least because of the anomaly which results if such a discrimination is not covered. Paragraph 56 of the White Paper—and the noble Baroness referred to this—says that it is not now unlawful under the 1968 Act to discriminate against someone because he is of Indian nationality, but it is unlawful to discriminate against him because he is of Indian national origins—that is, of Indian descent. This seems to be a lacuna in the law. For that reason, we think it is right in this Bill to clear it up; certainly for us it is a matter of principle.

The noble Baroness went through a number of points and asked questions concerning the position of foreign nationals when this Bill is on the Statute Book. I will deal with one small point first and then come to the substance of the matter. She talked about people being here illegally, and asked herself the rhetorical question: In such a situation, why should there not he discrimination? The answer is that if somebody is here unlawfully, the most obvious way of dealing with that is by using the law to remove that person. It is not to be used as a justification for discrimination against people who are not of British and United Kingdom nationality. She made the point about the police force and I answered that at the time. Of course there are going to be substantial differences between citizens of this country and citizens of other countries once this Bill is on the Statute Book. Of course that will be so. The right to vote is an obvious example, and there are other questions concerning health and education benefits and similar matters.

It is also necessary to bear in mind—and here I would refer to the police example raised by the noble Baroness—that Part I of the Bill, which is what we are now discussing, is largely concerned with definition. What acts constitute unlawful discrimination can be discussed only by reference to Parts II to IV of the Bill. Protection covering the sorts of distinctions made by the noble Baroness is given, for example, in Clause 41, which deals with acts done under statutory authority, and in Clause 75. which deals with the general question of the Civil Service. For these reasons I think it would be unreasonable to exclude nationality from this Bill. It was clearly the intention and belief of Parliament on the last occasion that nationality was covered by the Bill. As a result of the decision of your Lordships' House sitting in its judicial capacity, we discovered that it was not. That has given rise to the sort of anomaly to which I referred a moment ago. That being so, I think the reasonable step which this House should now take is to confirm the original intention of Parliament. I hope therefore that the noble Baroness will not press her Amendment.

I listened with great interest to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, and of course he has illustrated how deeply the Government have fallen into a pit from which they are finding it extremely difficult to extricate themselves. When citizenship and nationality arise, the pit is not entirely—I must be fair—of the Government's own making, because the absence of clear law about citizenship and nationality has been with us for a very long time. I should like to put several questions to the Government. and the first is this: the Home Office, I understand, have been conducting a review of the British law on citizenship. I should like to ask how far that review has got and whether the results will be published before this Bill completes its stages through Parliament. If the review will not be published before that is done, how can we legislate for nationality or citizenship when we do not know what the Government want either nationality or citizenship to be, and whether they may indeed be proposing serious changes about these matters very soon?

Perhaps the noble Lord would tell us, first, when the Government are going to give us their views on nationality and citizenship, and, secondly, whether they have been consulting with the various members of the Commonwealth and those countries which have British protected persons, British subjects and all the other 57 varieties of British subjects as to who will and will not be a British citizen, subject or national.

Even if it is incorrect procedurally, I think it must be sensible to link citizenship with nationality in our discussions because in Clause 3(1), the interpretation clause, it is said that "nationality" includes citizenship. I do not see how "nationality" can include citizenship, because British citizenship is a very much larger category than British nationals, however one chooses to define nationals, and certainly if one uses the definition of "national" as was appended to the Treaty of Accession to the EEC.

The category of British nationals is much smaller than that of British subjects or British citizens. That is a quibble, of course; but what it illustrates is the difference between citizenship and nationality. The Government say that "nationality" must include citizenship. The two are inherently different. Citizenship is a matter of allegiance, and British Common Law has evolved from the feudal tradition of loyalty to the lord or to the Crown, and has also been fertilised by the Roman and Greek ideas of citizenship and the city state. Nationality is something quite different: a much more modern idea—18th century at the earliest—connected with the growth of the nation State. It is of a quite different nature. British law has got itself into a tangle between the two, and by spatchcocking the idea of nationality into this Bill we are giving grounds for preposterous persons to make this Bill appear much more preposterous than it should be, because the whole concept of nationality is very unclear.

There are various aspects of this confusion to which I could refer, hut perhaps the one in which I am most interested concerns the impact of our membership of the European Economic Community on our law concerning nationality and citizenship. If one examines what membership of the Community has done to the already confused state of our nationality and citizenship law, one can only conclude that it is very rash to introduce nationality as one of the criteria at the core of this Bill. When we joined the Community the fact of our membership made some serious alterations to our law. It was astonishing to read that during the Committee stage in another place no mention whatsoever was made of this from either Front Bench, I am ashamed to say. To take it at its most fundamental, certain Articles of the Treaty of Rome entitle citizens of Member States of the Community to certain rights above and beyond nationals of any other country, whether or not they be British subjects. Those who are defined as "nationals" of Member States have a whole series of privileges conferred upon them by the Treaty of Rome. For example, Member States are not allowed to discriminate between Community workers on grounds of their nationality but must afford to them the same rights of employment, trade union organisation, entry, welfare benefits, residence and the accompaniment of their dependent relatives, on exactly the same basis as the citizens of their own countries.

I should like to know whether the Government have considered the relationship between this legislation we are now considering and the Treaty of Rome. If a national of a Community country feels he has been discriminated against on the grounds that he is foreign and he has certain rights under the Treaty, how does the Treaty relate to this Bill we are now discussing? Of course, I understand that the Treaty of Rome takes precedence, but could the noble Lord give us some idea of the Government's thinking about this, and also as to whether associate Member States of the Community, such as the MAHGREB countries, Turkey, Greece and Portugal, whose citizens have certain rights in the Community, are themselves protected by the Treaty of Rome? How would their position be affected by the legislation we are now considering?

I will sit down now rather than bore your Lordships any further with the interminable complications of our nationality and citizenship law, but the mere fact that it has taken the Government over two years to consider the whole matter and that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had to withdraw one of their Written Answers in reply to a Question from me because they themselves had got the answer wrong as to who was and who was not a British protected person illustrates the dangers that one can be led into by introducing the concept of nationality into this Bill.

May I just say something at this stage? Of course, I am very anxious not to divide on questions where no great issue of principle is concerned, but I confess that I was not quite happy about the answer of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, because among my objectives in these Amendments is to remove the unintelligible. What is meant by "nationality"? I can understand what is meant by "citizenship"; that is a question of law. Either you are a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or you are not, and you can understand where you are. But what is "nationality"? "National origin" is even more bewildering, as the House of Lords found in its judicial capacity.

But we are discussing only nationality. What is nationality? Are the Scots a nation? Let us suppose that somebody discriminated against a Scotsman under this Bill. I think everybody would agree that the Scots are not a race, but they would claim—at any rate, the Scottish Nationals would claim—that they are a nationality. Is it lawful or unlawful under this Bill to discriminate against a Scot because he is a Scot, or against a Welshman because he is a Welshman? Are the Welsh a nation? I do not know, but they are very ancient inhabitants of this island. Are the Jews a nation? In my opinion, they are not a race but they may be a nation.

What is nationality? Let us see whether the Bill tells us. We look at Clause 3(1) to which the noble Lord, Lord Harris, referred, and we see these splendid words:

"In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—…'nationality' includes citizenship."

That tells you only that it includes citizenship. It does not tell you what else it includes. It says nothing about the Scots, the Welsh, the Jews, the Hottentots or, for that matter, the Bushmen who, if there are any left, are South African citizens. What is nationality? That does not tell us. Even odder, we look at Clause 78 and we see the splendid words repeated without alteration that,

"In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires"

—I am reading from page 50—

"'nationality' includes citizenship".

Why do we have two clauses in the Bill saying exactly the same thing? It is a doublet. Who has been drafting this extraordinary measure, and what is the poor Lord Harris expected to do when it is drafted like that?

I shall not ask the Committee to divide on this, even though my object is to remove the unintelligible. But I seriously ask the noble Lord, Lord Harris, to undertake to the Committee to consider what has been said by my noble friend Lady Elles and the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, and what I have just said about this extraordinary definition clause repeated in two different parts of the Bill, as well as what I have said about the Scots and the Welsh, and come back and tell us why he wants "nationality" included in the Bill. when it comes back on Report, because I really do not think that it has been properly thought out.

There are two points which I should reply to at this stage. The noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, asked a number of questions about our responsibilities to associate members of the EEC. As he will appreciate I could not give an answer this afternoon, but I will gladly write to him before the next stage of the Bill. Also, he has perfectly reasonably continued his campaign for getting some announcement of when the Government's intentions will be made clear on the earlier point he raised. I am not in a position to add anything to what I have previously said, but again I will let the noble Lord know whether the situation has changed.

In answer to what the noble and learned Lord said in his engaging intervention, I do not think the Parliamentary draftsmen would join me in applauding his speech. Nevertheless, I take the point he has made. There is, of course, a point of substance here, as he will realise. We could not possibly—and I would not in any way suggest that it would be right for us to do so—reconsider the issue of principle here for the reasons which I outlined in my earlier contribution. Nevertheless, the noble and learned Lord asked a number of questions to which he is entitled to have answers and he will have them by the next stage of the Bill.

Before the noble Lord sits down, can he give us his answer to the problem of the emotions and the strong feelings of the ex-prisoners of war, and of some of the Jewish and Polish communities which I cited?

I agree that many people have very strong feelings. Some people do not like black men. Some people do not like Germans. I am afraid that these are very disagreeable traits in the human character. That is one of the reasons why we are discussing this Bill today. This is one of the arguments which was adduced during the earlier discussion of the European Communities legislation, that there was a deep and passionate dislike of some of our fellow members of the European Community. I am afraid the answer is that we live in a rational society, and that being so we must try to repress motives of this kind which disfigure our society.

Surely, there is another and even simpler answer to the noble Lord, Lord Monson, that if you left out "nationality" all the discrimination to which he refers would be covered by "national origin", which is already in the legislation that we are amending. What I think the noble Lord, Lord Harris, will tell me at Report stage is exactly what is added by "nationality", and what he says about the future of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, who has been sitting here so patiently listening to our discussion although he could have contributed so much, and whether I am entitled to discriminate against him because he is a Welshman.

I should just like to reply to something that the Minister said when he referred to the fact that the question of nationality comes in Clause 3. It is important to point out that Clause 1 contains the definition of "discrimination" which goes right through the Bill and you discriminate if you do so unjustifiably,

"… irrespective of the colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins ".

I should have thought that at this stage it was extremely important to know whether you were going to discriminate against somebody of one nationality or another, and it was on those grounds that I raised the point at this stage. The noble Lord will realise that I am not particularly satisfied by his answer, and that feeling has been compounded by my noble and learned friend in a much more amusing and light-hearted but more effective way in hoping to get a more satisfactory answer from the Government at Report stage.

Before asking leave to withdraw this Amendment, I should like to ask the Minister if he will reply to my question whether under Clause 29, by retaining the word "nationality" in the Bill, it will no longer be legal, with certain exceptions which are admitted in that clause, to use the word "British" in any advertisement.

I will look into that point.

On those grounds, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

moved Amendment No. 4:

Page 2, line 2, leave out ("or ethnic").

I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, would give way for one moment. I do not know whether he looked up the etymology of "ethnic" as well, but I believe that it is important to leave in the word "ethnic". Without wishing to delay the Committee, let us consider gypsies. A good deal of discrimination is taking place because of the natural opposition of very respectable people to the mode of life of gypsies who form an ethnic group. I consider that throughout the world the ethnic problem of gypsyhood is fundamental. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will not press his Amendment to a Division.

If I may continue, I was going to conclude with the point that whether the Scots or the Welsh are nations or nationalities, I am sure that they consider that they are ethnic groups. There will be ethnic groups in the various parts of Wales and Scotland and, no doubt, in the rest of the country—for instance, all over the West Country and certainly in other parts of England. Therefore the same questions apply. I hope that the noble Lord can give us a comprehensive answer as to what the Government think that "ethnic" means.

The amusing and detailed arguments we have had on this subsection show how ridiculous it is to try to make amends by passing legislation. Almost all of the religions of the world, and certainly those who have no religion but a moral code, believe in the precept that you must love your neighbour like yourself, but to try to embody that precept in legislation leads you into the most ridiculous back alleys. I can instance one anomaly already. In years to come there will be considerable businesses built up in this country by people whose origin was the Indian sub-continent. Some of these businesses may be built up by Hindus, Sikhs or Moslems, and those Moslems may come from what is now India, not from Pakistan. They are all of the same ethnic origin; they are all of the same colour; presumably they are all of the same race. However, I shall be very surprised if the Hindu businesses employ any Moslems, or the Sikhs, either—and vice-versa.

Other businesses which are owned by Cypriots probably exist today in parts of the East End of London. I do not know what are the habits of Cypriots, but I shall be rather surprised if Greek Cypriot businesses at the moment are employing Turkish Cypriot employees. Therefore the whole question is riddled with nonsense before we start. The major areas of discrimination, which the fond supporters of this type of legislation imagine to be the Aryans against black men, will not take place at all. The major area of discrimination will take place between the various creeds and ethnic origins of the people who have emigrated to this country. This Bill will do nothing to stop that discrimination.

Tempted though I am to reply to that speech, it goes a little wider than the Amendment which has been moved by the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, so I will come back to the noble Lord's speech on a more appropriate occasion. If I were to limit myself to the general question which has been raised by the noble Lord in his Amendment, I think it would be for the convenience of the Committee.

In his Amendment, the noble Lord asked me a precise question regarding the meaning of the term "ethnic origins". Certainly similar questions have been asked in the past. The columns of the Official Report for the proceedings on the 1965 and 1968 Acts bear witness to the fact that there has been a formidable amount of discussion on this precise issue. They also bear witness to the difficulty which attends any close textual analysis of the formula "colour, race or ethnic or national origins". The formula has been modified to include "nationality", and we have just been discussing this very issue.

The formula "colour, race or ethnic or national origins" was taken for the purposes of the 1965 Act from what was at that time the current draft of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination. However much we may question the particular formula, I think we should hear in mind that, leaving aside the question of nationality, it has stood the test of time remarkably well. It has been the cornerstone of race relations legislation for the last 10 years and, again leaving on one side the question of nationality, so far as I am aware it has given rise to no difficulty at all. I cannot give any guarantee so far as the next 25 years are concerned, which is what the noble Lord asked me to give, but on the basis of what we have experienced in the last 10 years I should have thought that the prognosis was a fairly hopeful one.

To understand the formula, it may be helpful to consider the nature of the evils that this legislation is designed to tackle. It is easier to identify these practical examples than it is to define them, which of course is what Clause 1 of the Bill is designed to do. The basic evil is one person treating another less favourably because that other is—and here are just a few examples—German, black, African, Pakistani, English, not English, white, Asian, European, Anglo-Saxon, Nordic, Latin, Sikh.

Obviously the definition cannot spell out all these examples in a clear-cut term. "Colour" is an obvious generic term for the definition, as I think is "race", as used in ordinary parlance. "Colour" and "race" by themselves, however, may not cover all the examples I have given. I am not at all sure, for instance, that to be English is to be a member of the English race or that to be Pakistani is to be a member of the Pakistani race. We simply do not speak in such terms in this country. It is necessary, therefore, to cover the examples which do not fit comfortably into "colour" or "race," and "ethnic or national origins" served—at any rate, until the decision in the Ealing London Borough Council case which was mentioned in the White Paper and which was touched on in the debate we had a few moments ago—to fill the gap. It has done so satisfactorily, and for that reason, I would suggest, it gets away from the idea of physical characteristics which inform the words "colour" and "race" and introduces the idea of groups defined by reference to cultural characteristics, geographical location, social organisation and so on.

I hope that your Lordships will appreciate from what I have said the reason why it is difficult to give a clear definition of "ethnic origins", which is what the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, has asked me for. The point is that the overall formula, "colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins", encapsulates a wide variety of ideas—sufficiently wide to cover all the various manifestations of racial discrimination. For that reason we think it is reasonable to keep it in the Bill.

I would advise the Committee to give the noble Lord the benefit of the doubt contrary to his general attitude in this matter. But I do not think "ethnic" adds very much to the joy of nations or to the clarity of legislation in this particular case. The word from which "ethnic" was derived in Greek was used by the Jews to represent anybody who was not a Jew, and was translated in the Bible as "Gentile". The word in the New Testament means anyone who is not a Christian and hears no relation to race whatever. As regards race, I do not think there is a Pakistani race: I do not see how there can be. These were the inhabitants of the Indian Continent who at one time or another, from different racial origins, embraced the Islamic and the Moslem religions and who lived in a particular part of India. The gypsies are not a race although they are of Indian national origin, as anybody can see from the Daily Telegraph today, because they use the word parni for water. There is a hotel in Glencoe which says, "Positively no Campbells", and if you have the misfortune to have the name which is borne honourably by my noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy you cannot get into that hotel. I wonder whether the noble Lord thinks that that is illegal under the Bill? I think it would be illegal at English common law, but fortunately in Glencoe the English writ does not run so I am not in a position to judge.

What does it all mean? I frankly do not know. I am not unfriendly to the Government on this, so I propose to give them the benefit of the doubt while expressing very considerable doubts.

While not wishing at all to disagree with my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham, I feel that the term "ethnic grouping" or "origin" has a certain meaning. I have no particular knowledge of this, but I have travelled a little in Africa and I think it is strongly felt there that there are, in Francophone anyhow, a number of ethniques which are ethnic groupings. There are also quite a number of countries in Africa who are carrying out or contributing to the study of the history of Africa. I understand, too, that there are about one thousand African dialects. There is also the question of negritude which is highly important in a number of countries, of which for instance Senegal is one of the leaders, and for that reason it seems to me that this question of ethnic grouping is very important to countries, at least in some of the developing countries of Africa. Personally, I think it would be a great shame if, in effect, the word "ethnic" or national origins of a person were taken out of the Bill. If it is possible, I should like the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, to give the feeling of the Government on the question of the ethnic origins of certain African people because I think they feel rather strongly on this.

As I have said, I have set out with some care the Government's position on ethnic origins. As I have indicated, it has worked tolerably well for the last ten years. If I may say so, I hope to carry the noble and learned Lord with me on this point at least: that if in fact we have a very difficult definition in an extremely complex area of our law, something which has worked and which, so far as I am aware, has given rise to little offence, I think it is right to keep it as it is and on this occasion only I am, with the noble and learned Lord, a legal Conservative.

Before the Amendment is withdrawn, may I ask why it is that in the clause which we are discussing we have reference to "colour, race, nationality, ethnic or national origins" and so on, and when we turn to Clause 70 which is the proposed Amendment to the Public Order Act, we there find that a person commits an offence if he publishes written matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting or he uses such language in a public place in a case where, having regard to all the circumstances, hatred is likely to be stirred up against any racial group. Surely, the logic of the case is that at that stage we ought to have the words inserted: "hatred is likely to be stirred up against any coloured person, racial, national or ethnic group". But I ask why the offence is limited under the Public Order Act to stirring up racial hatred as opposed to ethnic or national hatred?

I will gladly deal with that when we come to Clause 70.

Surely there is a very simple answer contained in subsection (6) of Clause 7.

I am not really any clearer as to what "ethnic" by itself adds to this definition, but I understand that it is like garlic in a recipe in that it makes the whole concoction more acceptable, and in that mood, as we are just coming up to dinner time, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

moved Amendment No. 5:

Page 2, line 8, leave out ("segregating") and insert ("separating")

And O'Hagan.

It also covers the situation whereby somebody is actually separated from the others. It is not merely the act of forbidding somebody to be a member of a particular group, but it also is the more positive act of forcibly associating a variety of people together, so it is a word that attempts to cover two separate activities. Is it satisfactory to have this rather unpleasant word describing two separate, and readily identifiable as separate, unpleasant activities? Would it not be better to express it slightly more elaborately in the words that I have suggested? I beg to move.

This Amendment invites your Lordships to substitute "separating" for "segregating" in Clause 1(2) and some of your Lordships—though not, I suspect, the noble Lord—will recall that Section 1(2) of the 1968 Act which is practically identical with Clause 1(2) of this Bill, was put into the Bill as the result of an Amendment moved in this House by my noble friend Lady Gaitskell.

During the debate on that Amendment and on an Amendment which had a similar effect tabled by my noble friend, Lady Birk, there was a good deal of discussion of the relative merits of the terms "separating" and "segregating". Parliament accepted the latter, and it has been on the Statute Book since then. This deals with a particular point raised by the noble Lord, so far as I am aware giving rise to no difficulty of any sort whatever. For that reason, we would obviously prefer the Bill to remain exactly as it is.

If I may now turn to the second Amendment moved by the noble Lord, I am afraid we are not particularly attracted to this one either. The fundamental principle upon which the Bill is constructed is that less favourable treatment on racial grounds should be unlawful. I emphasise "less favourable treatment". Clause 1(2) defines "segregation on racial grounds" as less favourable treatment. If I may discuss the question of associating people together on racial grounds, I can understand the suspicion of the noble Lord if he has it, and objections if he does have that suspicion, to social engineering of this kind informed by racial considerations. I can see the point that people should be treated without any regard being paid at all to their colour or race. However, I cannot regard with equal disapproval on the one hand racial separation, racial segregation, call it what you will, with all its connotations of racial superiority, apartheid and the like, and on the other hand, association on a racial basis with its connotations of integration and harmony. In other words, I cannot accept association on a racial basis, irrespective of whether any materially less favourable treatment is involved, should itself be defined as less favourable treatment. For that reason, I very much hope that the noble Lord will not push his Amendment.

Is the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, quite right about the last thing he said? This is a very difficult field of legislation. Supposing I wanted to discriminate against someone on racial grounds. Supposing, for instance, I did not like blacks, or Cypriots. One of the ways in which you could do so, if the Bill is unamended, is by associating him with people of another race who did not like blacks either. To give an example which someone gave a few moments ago, supposing you do not like Cypriots and you are forced by the new authority to have one; one of the ways to discriminate against a Greek Cypriot is to make him work next door to a Turkish Cypriot—and this is a good way of discriminating against both. And the same can be true of quite a number of racial groups. We are very apt to think in terms of a white man discriminating against a black man. One says, "Well, in the interests of harmony let them work together", but it may create the very disharmony we want to avoid. If you deliberately, as a matter of racial discrimination, put someone of an identifiable race or national origin against someone you know to be particularly hostile to that race, or in between two people of such a kind, in fact you will make his life intolerable to him.

This is not just imagination on my part. Only a few months ago I was hearing proceedings in my judicial capacity in the Privy Council. It arose in an Australian factory and this is exactly one of the things which happened. A man of an alien racial origin had been put next to two people of a different racial origin who particularly disliked him on his racial grounds. He suffered an accident of which he will bear the marks until his dying day. So I just wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, is not being a little easy about this. If you are going to legislate about racial discrimination, we must make a good job of it. I do not in any way think my noble friend Lord O'Hagan ought to press this to a Division, but I just wonder whether the noble Lord opposite would look at it again.

I would be delighted to do so. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, has raised an interesting point. I will gladly look into it before the next stage of the Bill.

With that undertaking, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

The debate so far has been concerned with the definition of racial discrimination which we are using in the Bill. The views of the Government on this matter were set out originally in paragraphs 54, 55, 56 and 57 of the White Paper. The first issue with which the first Amendment of my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone dealt with was that contained in paragraph 55—the onus of proof. My noble friend Lady Elles in her Amendment covered the same topic as is covered by paragraph 56. I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, to turn his mind for a moment to paragraph 57 and to answer two questions from me on that point.

Paragraph 57 begins by making the point that it is equally unlawful to practise reverse discrimination as it is to practise racial discrimination; that is to say, it is unlawful to discriminate in favour of a racial minority. I think we would all agree with that. Paragraph 57 then goes on to make the point that that is a principle which, and I am quoting from the paragraph, ought not to be adhered to

"so blindly…as to ignore the handicaps preventing many black and brown workers from obtaining equal employment opportunities ",

and so on. The paragraph then goes on to say what should be done for such groups by which I take it to mean the black and brown workers. Generally speaking, we can see what the Government are getting at.

However, I would put the point to the noble Lord that if you take some limited areas, smaller than the United Kingdom as a whole, or smaller even than whole cities, you will find that this opportunity—indeed, the necessity, the desirability—to practise a form of modified reverse discrimination will apply, or should be applied, in favour of any group that finds itself at a disadvantage. For instance, take a small area occupied to a large extent by the Chinese, who we would perhaps in a form of shorthand describe as brown.

Yellow.

Think of the disadvantages faced by the Scots and Jews there. Or think of a large area like Brixton, and the bus garage there, where it would be the Irish or the Cypriots, for instance, who would find themselves at a disadvantage, viz-a-viz the West Indians. I would like the noble Lord opposite to confirm my understanding that this permission, which is all that paragraph 57 is talking about, to practise modified reverse discrimination in favour of minority groups can operate not just in favour of black and brown workers, but any racial group which, in a particular area, finds itself at a disadvantage. That is the first question.

The second question is, if the noble Lord agrees with that understanding—and I hope he will—by what means is his right honourable friend the Secretary of State going to give guidance to the Commission in applying their judgment as to how to operate this? A great deal will depend on the way in which the geographical boundary is drawn around these particular areas where one particular racial group has established a majority. Is it to be by guidelines? If not, by what other means is the policy of the Government—which I am sure they must have—in this matter to be applied?

May I follow that up by asking how the transferred responsibility for the inner city to the Secretary of State for the Environment is going to tie up with what my noble friend has said? I understand that the Home Office is primarily responsible for expenditure under Section 11 of the 1965 Local Government Act. I may be wrong about that, but that is what I understand. I also read in the papers that the Secretary of State for the Environment is to have some new co-ordinating role for the problems of the inner city. Could the Minister tell us which Government Department will be mainly working with the new Commission in this area? Will it be the Home Office or the Department of the Environment?

The Home Office is the answer to the noble Lord's question. As the noble Lord rightly says, the Department of the Environment has a substantial and increasing interest in this area, but obviously this is a Home Office Bill and this new organisation will be responsible to the Home Secretary.

On the particular question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, on paragraph 57 of the White Paper, I think the answer to his question is that any group requiring special attention because they have special difficulties will be covered by the Bill. As he will recall, at the end of the paragraph it announces that the Bill will contain provisions allowing but not requiring employers of training organisations—this is giving one example—to provide special training facilities to members of such groups and to encourage them to take advantage of opportunities for doing particular work. This is particular groups who have difficulties over getting a job or whatever it may be, and in some cases being able to utilise a whole range of educational facilities in the most advantageous way. Where there is a special problem there will be provision to deal with it. I think the intention of the Bill and the White Paper are set out fairly clearly in that respect.

With great respect, it is the fact that this is not set out clearly in the White Paper that led to my question. Although it is quite true about the paragraph at the end, the middle of this paragraph specifically says it is only black and brown workers and such groups who are receiving the benefit of this permission to operate modified reverse discrimination. I do not want to take up the time of the Committee now. In view of the noble Lord's assurance, I think we can see that this is not always going to be the case and in some smaller areas it will apply the other way round. The noble Lord still has not answered my question about how the operation of this permission is going to be applied and by what means the Secretary of State is going to guide the Commission.

We have confidence in this new organisation, which is headed by a new and distinguished chairman, to carry out the responsibilities entrusted to it by Parliament. This is not particularly a geographical question, which was the point made by the noble Lord; it is a question of a number of groups in our society—primarily black and brown but not exclusively so—who will have special problems, particularly in regard to education, and it is right that there should be reverse discrimination in matters of this sort. If there are other special problems affecting other special groups, of course it would be unreasonable to deny those groups the privileges set out in this Bill.

Before we pass this clause I would want to ask the Minister if he could tell us whether, if the clause is passed in its present form it will be illegal, for example, to require foreigners to go through a separate guichet when they come into immigration? Since racial grounds include grounds of nationality, it would seem that that would be regarded as discrimination.

I will gladly find out the answer to that question.

I think we have now to make up our minds. This is likely to be quite a substantial debate. Shall we adjourn for a brief moment now before it begins? The general understanding was that we should work to 7 o'clock. It is a matter of convenience for the Committee. Shall we start on this now? But if we do I would like to commit ourselves to finishing now. If, on the other hand, we are not going to finish it. I would like to leave off now and start afresh.

Yes, that would be acceptable to us. I suggest that the Committee should halt now in order to take the Scottish legislation. If that is acceptable to your Lordships, I beg to move that the House do now resume.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

moved Amendment No. 1:

Page 1, line 6, leave out ("which has been").

moved Amendment No. 2:

We are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill, for explaining this redrafting. I have noted that this and the other substantial Government Amendments result in most of the Bill being redrafted. I say straight away that I certainly have no objection, nor do my noble friends on this Bench, when the Government have second thoughts at such an early stage of a Bill and listen to proposals that are put to them and come forward with such a large change in the wording of the Bill. I understand that it was the assessors who particularly asked for simplification of the procedure and we, for our part, would not wish to object to these changes. I think that your Lordships' House is a place where such revision is entirely appropriate. All I would add is, provided that enough notice is given to Members of this House to have time to consult those affected who are outside Parliament. There was enough time in this case, and just enough, so I make no complaint, but when changes are made at short notice it is of course difficult. The noble Lord has listened to representations which have been made to him; the result is this change, and a further one to which we shall be coming, and I would recommend it to the Committee.

I should like to raise a point on whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill. The Government's object is to prescribe for exemption all subjects connected with the offshore oil industry. They made this clear at Second Reading of the Bill. I must again declare the interest in your Lordships' House which I have declared before, in that I work as a consultant to the oil industry. When the petroleum revenue tax was being introduced in the oil taxation Bill—and I am very glad to see the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, here, because if I remember rightly he was connected with those items of legislation going through the House at the time; he was certainly the Minister of State for the Scottish Office, if not the Minister piloting the Bill through—and when those matters affected by the petroleum revenue tax were being considered, there was no suggestion that the oil industry would also be subject to local government rates. If there had been, the Government, and certainly we on this side, would have taken that into account when we were considering both the petroleum revenue tax royalties and corporation tax and their impact on the industry.

What the Government are now aiming to do is to remove at an early stage the oil industry from assessment where its installations are below the low water mark. There are some questions which need to be raised. First of all, is it the Government's intention—and I hinted at this at Second Reading, so I hope that was enough to give the Government notice—to cover everything connected with the oil industry in this exemption? For example, there can be construction being carried out by what are normally building companies three miles offshore. For example, at the moment on the West Coast of Scotland there is a structure being assembled as a purely building operation—oil companies are not engaged in the actual work—and that structure is eventually going to be towed several hundred miles away to the other side of Scotland to East of Shetland. While the structure is three miles offshore—it is going to be there about a year—will it be exempted simply because it is related to the oil industry? I hope that it will be, because I think that it is the Government's intention that everything connected with the oil industry should receive this exemption. But it should be made clear at this stage, because the operation of constructing what is eventually going to be a platform is a building industry operation and not an oil industry operation.

Then I come to activities which are not connected with offshore oil or gas, because the Government have made it clear that these will not necessarily be exempted from rating. Hitherto piers, estuarial bridges, and undersea coal mines, for example, have been entered in valuation rolls and at Second Reading the Minister stated that fish farms would continue to be rated and not exempted, as on land agriculture is. Where salt water fish farms arc concerned there can be equipment and installations below the low water mark, and as I believe that this is likely to increase as an activity it will be important to know on what principle the boundaries between local authorities will be projected seawards.

I have given the example of fish farms but there are other installations connected with shipping which could also be rated. Where they are offshore near the boundary between local authorities there could be a dispute as to whose area they fall in. Could I ask whether there has been progress in Government thinking on this? It is not an academic point. There will be increasing activity, as I am sure all your Lordships will agree. in the waters off our coasts. There is a principle which was accepted internationally for the North Sea, whereby the boundaries between countries were projected in order to meet median lines. That is one system that could be adopted. My question is what progress has been made in this, and whether the Government have yet reached a conclusion.

I should also like to note the procedure in subsection (6)—and here the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, was very much concerned at the time—because this stipulates a procedure where private interests are affected in some special way in an order which is made under this Bill and where that order is hybrid. In this Bill there is the special 28-day system. That was proposed to save time in the Offshore Petroleum Development (Scotland) Act early last year. The system was formulated and agreed in your Lordships' House and the original text of that Act was altered after your Lordships had realised that not to give private interests a reasonable time to petition to a committee would have been a serious diminution of the right which had previously been available to them, and the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, took a leading part in that.

The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, accepted for the Government that procedure, which I notice reappeared in the Industry Act later, and here it is again, this accelerated procedure, repeated in this Bill. I draw attention to it because the Government have clearly adopted something which we worked out in your Lordships' House as an improvement on what had originally been proposed. I have put some questions to the Minister, and if he cannot reply to them all now I hope that he will find an occasion on which to do so.

The noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, has posed a number of questions which I will attempt to answer in so far as I have been able to link them in the course of his remarks. I think I should start by saying that the exact scope of the exempting order will be settled following consultations, and informal approaches to oil interests have already been made. I come immediately to the vexatious question of seaward boundaries. This seems to the Government to be indeed a complicated issue. As I understand the position, in England and Wales the limit of a local authority's area is, with certain special exceptions, the low water mark, and provision exists for accretions from the sea to be added to the appropriate local authority area. The Scottish position is very different.

By the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 the new regions and islands areas are defined solely by reference to the boundaries of the abolished authorities, mostly deriving from those of the ancient parishes. Difficulty rarely arises over determining the common boundary between the two local authority areas but their seaward limits appear for most purposes to be totally undefined. The Local Government (Scotland) Act 1929 transferred the functions formerly administered on a parish basis to county councils and boundary changes in subsequent local government reorganisations have defined new administrative areas by reference to pre-existing boundaries. Subjects which extend below the low water mark, such as coal mines, piers and estuarial bridges, have been held by the courts to be rateable. The boundaries between authorities is, I understand, a matter for determination by the process of law.

Lord Campbell asked whether I would comment on the Government's view as to the derating of marine fish farms. The legal position concerning the rating of fish farms is complicated. During discussion of the Rating Act 1971, Amendments were moved in both Houses of Parliament which would have had the effect of derating buildings used by fish farmers. Those Amendments were rejected on the grounds that they were inappropriate to a Bill strictly limited to agricultural purposes. Subsequently the definition of "livestock" used in both the English and Scottish parts of the Act has been interpreted differently in England and Scotland. In Scotland, the Lands Valuation Appeal Court has ruled, in Wallace v. Assessor for the Joint County of Perth and Kinross, that fish are not livestock within the meaning of the Act. That decision is final for Scotland. In England and Wales, however, it has been held by the Lands Tribunal, in Jones v. Bateman, that fish do fall within the Act, so that the trout farm in question was exempt from rates. When an opportunity arises, the Inland Revenue may of course seek rejection of that decision. Both of those decisions relate to inland fish farms but they would presumably apply in principle to marine fish farms. The Government's attitude therefore is that the claim of fish farms to be derated cannot be substantiated by presumed analogy with agriculture. Any claim for financial assistance for the industry by way of derating or otherwise must, in the Government view, be based on its merits.

The noble Lord then asked: what would the Government's view be as to the possible uses of the exempting powers? It is likely that a number of interests may continue to urge that the use of the order-making powers to exempt particular classes of property, for example yacht marinas, should be more seriously considered by us. The Government's view is that the exempting powers are being sought in the first place in order to deal with the two particular problems clearly itemised in the Bill. While the powers sought are of course of much wider potential application, the Government do not have a present intention of extending their use. After the Bill is enacted problems will be considered as and when they arise. I have covered the points, as I understood them, raised by Lord Campbell. They were of course of a detailed nature and if my reply is not totally comprehensive I will communicate with him.

I had not intended to intervene until some interesting points were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, about sea lochs. At least, I had not intended to intervene until later, when I would have done so to congratulate my noble friend on the fact that when he started to make drafting Amendments to a Bill he did not stop half way. It is perhaps a step to be commended to the Committee that when a Bill is obviously capable of being put into better language, the Minister concerned does not hesitate to get his skilled men to do that job, and for that reason my noble friend deserves our congratulations.

On the question raised by Lord Campbell about sea lochs, obviously it would be totally permissible, in terms of the way in which the Bill is drafted, for a Secretary of State at some time in the future to amend the order which he will be making under the Bill to bring fish farming in sea lochs into the category of non-rateable subjects or derated subjects as the case may be. Quite obviously no Government would do that unless it was intended to go the whole hog because it would be quite improper for fish farming in sea lochs not to be rated whereas fish farming inland, which is more likely to play a prominent part in our fish stocks in the future, were not to be dealt with at the same time. So, while I should have liked to envisage the possibility that the Minister might, in some months, issue an amending order to make fish farming a little more likely in sea lochs, I have no doubt that he will not be doing so, particularly when, in reference to the conflicting decisions taken in England, in, I presume, Wales and in Scotland, he went on to say, "the Inland Revenue will be taking steps to have this amended". I presume that, in saying that, he was not talking about the Scottish provision being altered. It would be the English one which would be changed.

The words were, "might be taking steps".

Oh, well, perhaps we may yet hope that, if the Government decide to let the English decision stand, even those who, like the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, and myself are not perfervid Scottish Nationalists will claim justice for Scotland in that respect. Perhaps the attention of the noble Baroness, Lady Emmet of Amberley, who is not here at the moment, should be drawn to this, because she is the House's strongest exponent of fish farming, but I doubt very much whether the Minister is really offering much hope to either the noble Baroness or myself in this matter. I conclude by repeating that my noble friend the Minister has acted very wisely and generously in the way in which he has amended the Bill.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, it had not been my intention to intervene in this part of the debate, but I am afraid that I cannot refrain from rising to the bait used by my noble Lord friend Lord Campbell of Croy when he came to the problem of fish farming. I feel that I should be very wrong were I not to adjure the Government to reconsider this matter and to bring in legislation that could put Scotland on a par with England in this respect. It would be relatively simple to do and, indeed, it might have been done in this Bill. However, we are hopeful that there are other means by which this may be achieved. I would just say this: in view of the major preoccupation regarding Scotland at the present time, if Scotland had its own assembly, that assembly would almost certainly de-rate fish farming.

May start by saying that, like the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, I am grateful that the Government decided to make this major redrafting at this early stage of the Bill. I am not sure whether the noble Lord Lord Hughes, was here to hear me say that on Amendment No. 2, but I expressed approval of the Government not feeling that they should be inhibited in coming forward with a major redrafting at this very early stage of a Bill introduced into this House. So I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, that, when Governments have second thoughts because of representations which are made to them, your Lordships' House is eminently the place where this can be done. We on these Benches will support them where it is a simplification for those who will have to operate the Bill.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving me an answer about the rating offish farms. This was a point which I raised on Second Reading and he has kindly used this opportunity to give us the results of considerable research, including the fact that fish arc recognised as livestock on one side of the Border and not on the other side.

The point which I was making at this stage was that of the projection of bounderies and I gave fish farms as an example of the kind of establishment which might be subject to rating well out at sea and where the location of the boundary line drawn between local authorities would be important. I am grateful to the noble Lord for having used this debate on the Question, That the clause stand part of the Bill, to make the statement that he did.

moved Amendment No. 3:

After Clause 1, insert the following new clause:

The remarks which I made on Amendment No. 2 also apply to this Amendment, where the Government have taken the opportunity to revise the original text in order to simplify the procedure at the request of the Assessors, and I would commend it to the Committee.

moved Amendment No. 4:

After Clause 2 insert the following new clause:

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, that Amendments Nos. 4 and 6 should be taken together. As he has indicated, we have been in serious correspondence about the very point which he raises this evening. For my part, I have been in equally serious discussion with my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland, and indeed with the other Departmental Ministers whose concern this matter very properly is. I have to say to the Committee that this subject is one of considerable complexity. Nevertheless, I have been in serious discussion and I want this evening at least to make the following statement to the Committee.

The Government are obtaining legal advice urgently on the effect of the Brodie and Vandyk cases on Section 8 of the Valuation and Rating (Scotland) Act 1956 and on the corresponding provision for England and Wales; that is, Section 45 of the General Rate Act 1967. In the light of this advice, and consultations with relevant interests, we shall consider what changes are necessary in order to meet judicial criticism of the legislation and to simplify its operation, while at the same time ensuring sympathetic treatment for the disabled. Consideration will therefore extend to the whole field of application of the two sections; that is, to institutional premises as well as to dwelling houses.

Researches so far have revealed fresh complexities and this, in my view, indicates the danger of being tempted to an easy or quick solution which at the end of the day might even add to the problems of disabled people. It is not yet possible, therefore, to be specific about the Government's proposals, but I give an undertaking that any necessary legislation will be introduced as soon as possible.

I ant grateful to the noble Lord for what he has said—that the Government are treating this as an urgent matter—but naturally I am disappointed that he could not say more at this stage. I can only tell him that I and some of my colleagues—noble Lords here and colleagues elsewhere—will certainly wish to pursue this point. As the Minister knows, this is a matter of concern to all parts of the Committee, not simply to those on this side, and it will be raised on other occasions.

Nevertheless I am grateful that the noble Lord has agreed that this is an urgent matter. I am sorry that new complexities are becoming apparent, but I hope that this will mean that the Government will tackle these problems with renewed vigour. At this stage I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

moved Amendment No. 5:

Page 3, line 15, leave out from second ("the") to end of line 19 and insert ("lowest point to which the tide ebbs at ordinary spring tides and includes any estuary, arm of the sea and the waters of any channel, creek, bay or river seaward of that lowest point;")

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

moved Amendment No. 1:

Page 1, line 14, at end insert ("or the end of the school term in which he attains the age of 65, whichever is the later.")

As I made clear at Second Reading, the Government's aim in bringing forward this Bill is to make a contribution to the reduction of unemployment among newly-qualified teachers by fixing the statutory retiring age at 65. The Amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, proposes, would run counter to this aim, since it would defer, in some cases by two months or more, the date on which a newly-qualified teacher could replace a teacher who has reached the age of retirement. Nor would the Amendment produce comparable benefits for all the individuals affected. For example, a teacher whose 65th birthday fell at the beginning of a term would benefit far more than a teacher whose birthday fell towards the end of a term. I think I should point out here that the length of a school term is not statutorily fixed. Education authorities are free to fix whatever terms are appropriate to local circumstances, and to vary them from year to year, provided that they meet the requirement of the Schools (General) (Scotland) Regulations 1975 that schools must be kept open for a minimum of 200 school days in a school year. So a teacher with a birthday falling at the beginning of a long term would benefit more than one whose birthday fell at the beginning of a short one. A teacher whose 65th birthday fell during a school holiday would not benefit at all.

The Government's proposal, on the other hand, is in my view more equitable in that it treats all teachers alike, regardless of the length or date of the school terms, the school holidays, or the school year. Nevertheless, the Government realise that there may be circumstances where the needs of the school or of the indivdual teacher would justify employment after the age of 65. The Bill therefore provides that a teacher may be re-employed in a non-promoted post for periods of up to a year at a time; and a promoted teacher may be retained for up to three months in the promoted post he held at the time of his retirement. This should allow sufficient time for a smooth handover of responsibilities. I trust, therefore, that the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, will accept that the Government's proposals aim to give equitable treatment to all who will be affected, while leaving a reasonable amount of flexibility in the hands of employing authorities. I hope that, in view of what I have just said, the noble Lord will not seek to press his Amendment.

May I ask the Minister a question about this? If you said that a teacher must retire at the age of 65, which might well be in the middle of term, your chances of filling that vacancy in the middle of term with somebody who wants, let us say, a promoted post are very poor. I was chairman of an education committee for years, and I know that what happened was that you could not fill a vacancy in the middle of a term unless it was a case of illness or some such thing, or you put in a temporary person, because when you are employing full-time teachers on a job they want to begin at the beginning of a term. Therefore, if you allow this provision to go through what will happen, or could easily happen, is that a teacher will be suddenly told in the middle of, let us say, the winter term, which we are now in, that he is aged 65 and he must retire. There may be somebody to follow on, but if there is not it will be very difficult to get somebody in November for a term which started at the beginning of September.

It would be much more equitable for the children if the teacher went on till the end of any term which he had begun and then retired, as the Amendment proposes. I think you will get much more complicated situations by having to shift teachers around in the middle of a term than if you say that such a teacher can stay until the end of the term, which may well be after he has passed the age of 65. This seems to me to be infinitely more satisfactory from every point of view. The idea of switching about because somebody's birthday happens to be in the middle of a term seems to be most unfortunate, and I do not think it will work at all.

As I emphasised on Second Reading, and as I mentioned again this evening to your Lordships' Committee, the principal reason why the Government have brought this Bill before your Lordships is to ease the chronic unemployment situation among young teachers in Scotland. Hence the definitive 65th birthday—which can be predicted anyway. I think authorities can foresee when teachers in their employ will reach the age of 65. The other point that the noble Baroness should keep in mind is this. Most education authorities of which I have had experience normally create their own promotion list in advance of promoting from the list to specific posts, and, of course, this is the safeguard against the fear which the noble Baroness has mentioned.

I had thought when listening to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, that his Amendment was one that I might urge the Minister to accept, until heard the explanation of my noble friend. I do not think the difficulties which have been indicated are likely to arise. In the case of the promoted post, if the man or woman is reaching the age of 65 at the beginning or at the earlier part of the term, then, as my noble friend indicated, it is not something which is going to be a matter of surprise to the local authority; for they know the ages of the teachers and can make arrangements accordingly. I should have thought that any prudent educational authority with a man reaching the age of 65 within a short time of the beginning of the term would arrange the appointment of a successor to take effect either from the beginning of the term or from his 65th birthday.

In the other case—and here I rather thought that the noble Lord had a point—where it occurs some way through the term, it would be a disadvantage to displace the teacher at that point. But if it is a promoted post, the provision to which my noble friend drew attention, that of being able to extend the employment for a period of three months, would, I think, in almost any case enable the employment to be continued to the end of the term thereby accomplishing what the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has asked for. I am not certain of the position in relation to the teacher occupying a post which is not a post of special responsibility. I think my noble friend referred to the possibility of those teachers being carried on from year to year. Would it be possible in that case for them to be carried on until the end of the term only; or must it be for a year? If the latter, that would be defeating the Government's object. It ought to be possible to carry on the ordinary post for a less period than a year if the authority want to do so.

Replying to the latter point raised by my noble friend, the position is that the non-promoted teacher can have his continuing employment reviewed by the employing authority upon an annual basis. It is within the discretion of the authority for what period they continue to employ him past the age of 65.

May I be clear in my own mind that, so far as the promoted teacher is concerned or the teacher occupying a promoted post, he can be continued for only three months at most in that post. The other one can be carried on from year to year but it is not necessary for the authority to re-appoint or to continue his appointment for the full year; it could be two months, three months or four months if they so wanted.

That is so.

In that case, Lord Drumalbyn's points are already covered in the Bill.

I think the debate that we have heard on this point is sufficient to show that it is fairly complex and is not going to be too easily understood. But I think that my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn has a very strong point in his Amendment. It will make it straightforward and clear that it is the interests of the children which is primarily the concern of the education machine and not necessarily that of the teachers. The teachers must be considered, but they are secondary to the vital interests of the children. Therefore, I strongly support my noble friend in his Amendment.

I was going to emphasise the point that my noble friend has just made. I would at the same time fully acknowledge the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hughes. The point really is a simple one. As I understand it, as the Bill stands the discretion is left in the hands of the employers as to whether they displace a teacher who reaches the age of 65 during the term at the point when he reaches that age of 65. They can make arrangements before or afterwards to mitigate or get over the difficulty; but they can do it. I say that this is bad for the pupils and if it is possible to avoid it should be avoided; and to make certain that any harm to the pupil is avoided there should be statutory provision for it.

I appreciate the purpose of the Bill in trying to create opportunities for young teachers, but I do not believe that this is the right way to do it. I think it is wrong to bring in a young teacher for the first time in the middle of term; just as I think it is wrong, if avoidable, to displace a teacher in the middle of term. Neither is for the benefit of the pupil. I would ask the noble Lord to consider this further. It is something which arose many years ago when I was in the Department of Education in Scotland and several changes have been made since. I still think this would be the right solution. I hope that the noble Lord will look at it again. I leave it in his hands. I will not ask for an assurance. I am sure he will look at it again.

Before the noble Lord withdraws the Amendment, may I ask the Minister whether it is not customary in matters of this kind for the Department to issue not directions but administrative guidance to local authorities. Assuming that the Bill remains as it is—which makes it possible to do exactly what Lord Drumalbyn wants—would the Minister consider drawing the attention of the education authorities to the fact that they can do this; that it would be a proper exercise of the Bill to extend a teacher, promoted or otherwise, either for three months or to the end of the term in the case of the second case if this is in the interests of the education of the children?

As to the latter point raised by my friend Lord Hughes, I will give some consideration to it without giving him at this time an unequivocal assurance. I can only say that I cannot add to the remarks that I made earlier. My position is somewhat different from that of Lord Drumalbyn, and I hope he will not press his Amendment.

As I know this must have been a question of negotiation with the IES and other bodies, it is rather difficult to amend without further negotiation. In the circumstances, I feel it right to ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.

moved Amendment No. 2:

Page 1, line 24, leave out from ("part-time") to end of line 25.

At present Section 16 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1969 gives employers discretion to retain a teacher in employment after retiring age. Section 16(2), which deals with non-promoted teachers, prescribes a retiring age of 70 unless the employing authority otherwise determines. There was no apparent limit to the exercise of this discretion, and in areas of teacher shortage I am sure that employing authorities used it widely.

However, as I reminded your Lordships during the Second Reading debate on 27th July, we are now in a situation of teacher unemployment and such unlimited discretion is, in the Government's view, no longer appropriate. Nevertheless, it is not the Government's view that no teacher aged 65 and over should be employed. The Government accept that in certain circumstances continued employment may be necessary; for example, where it is otherwise impossible to find a teacher able to teach a particular subject or perhaps to take account of the teacher's personal circumstances. But in the present situation of teacher unemployment it is important to ensure that where a teacher is re-employed after retiring age that re-employment is on a short-term basis. The period of one year proposed in Clause 1(2)(a) does not mean that the individual is limited to one re-employment period of one year. If the authority think fit and the teacher is willing, there could be several successive re-employment periods but each one must not exceed one year. The effect of this is to ensure that at yearly intervals the employing authority re-examines the justification for keeping that particular teacher in employment.

I expect that the authorities will consider the individual circumstances of the teacher as well as the general teacher supply position in coming to a decision. The Amendment which the noble Lord has proposed would remove the obligation on employing authorities to re-examine the cases of re-employed teachers regularly, and would also leave those re-employed teachers in some measure of uncertainty. Given the present situation of teacher unemployment and the need of employing authorities to consider the circumstances of individual teachers and individual schools, the proposal in the Bill achieves the best compromise.

As the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, said, he has been in correspondence with me about a specific case, in particular about the case of the teacher with added years for pension purposes and his need to purchase these additional years by additional contributions while still teaching. The noble Lord pointed out such service might not be completely paid for by the time the teacher reaches the age of 65 or is already over 65 by 1st January 1977. I have explained that such a teacher will not be deprived of the additional years for pension purposes, but that instead of continuing to pay for them by additional contributions, any outstanding payment will be deducted from the lump sum element of his superannuation benefits.

It would be appropriate to mention that the Educational Institute of Scotland, with whom we have been in consultation, take the view that the Government's proposals could not reasonably be resisted at a time when so many newly-qualified teachers were unable to find work. I hope that in view of what I have said the noble Lord will not press his Amendment.

May I say a few words. In other vocations, when there is pressure of unemployment, it is not unusual to make arrangements for retiring older people. Is it not the case that there is always some form of compensation, some financial recognition of the special early retirement? Is there going to be none in cases such as my noble friend raised?

In the terms of the question put to me, there would be no financial recompense. Within the structure of whatever pension and superannuation agreement with which the teacher is concerned, there would be full entitlement depending upon years of service and time of entry to the profession. Those would obtain.

As the question of pensions has been raised, there are two questions (of which I have given the Minister notice) which I should like to put. First, I should like to inquire whether a teacher retired in the terms of this Bill and who is then re-employed in the terms of this Bill continues to draw a full pension as well as the remuneration for the re-employment? Secondly, will the Minister give an assurance that the potential pension due to a retired teacher will not be adversely affected by a retirement at 65 instead of at 70, as in many cases at present? Looking after the young entrant is a laudable thing to do. I support the Minister in what he says and the principle of this Bill. But it must not be done at the expense of those teachers at the other end of the scale.

I should like to thank the noble Lord for giving me advance notice of these questions. In reply to the first question, the answer is, No, during the period a teacher is re-employed, the pension may be abated or withheld according to the level of earnings. In response to his second question, promoted teachers must already retire at 65. For Non-promoted teachers, there could be some adverse effects because pensions depend essentially on length of service. The Bill gives scope for re-employment which could earn additional pension after retirement.

Might I suggest to the noble Lord that with regard to the abatement of the superannuation for retired teachers when they are re-employed, this might be an opportunity to put right this long-standing grievance of the teachers in Scotland. It would go a long way to compensate for the loss of pension they would otherwise have if they stayed on longer.

I am pleased to note that the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, acknowledges that there has been a longstanding grievance from the point of view of the teaching body. Certainly there was no compensation in 1969, when promoted teachers were reduced or retired at the age of 65. However, I could not undertake at this time to press an initiative in the manner suggested by the noble Lord.

I must confess to being a little disappointed that the noble Lord the Minister was not able to be more forthcoming on this matter. I am speaking of teachers who came into the teaching profession late in life as a result of appeals from the Government of the day to help to meet the shortage of teachers that then existed. The fact that they have only a certain number of years' pensionable service to their credit arises because they came in late in life at a time when they were very badly needed.

My noble friend Lord Drumalbyn pointed out that in many other professions there is some compensation when a change like this is introduced into a profession or business and people are asked to retire earlier. Far from there being compensation, in this case it is clear that such teachers are not going to receive all the emoluments which they had anticipated because they cannot go on for as long as they expected, though the pension rights, as the noble Lord said, are indeed protected.

Might I ask this? My understanding is that if this is going to be settled as the result of a lump sum payment and the £400, for example, the teacher I mentioned will find himself doing that because the superannuation fund is going to be dealt with as part of a lump sum. Am I right in thinking that a teacher in that position will suffer from a tax point of view more than if he had continued to teach, received his salary and continued to pay a percentage of his salary into a superannuation fund? To that extent, far from getting compensation, the teachers will be penalised to some extent as a result of this Bill. If I am right, could the noble Lord tell us whether the Government are applying their minds to that question and whether they can make any changes in the law that may be necessary to ensure that teachers in that situation do not suffer as a result of the tax situation?

If I may for a moment revert to the earlier point made by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, I should like to remind your Lordships that the special group scheme was intended primarily for applicants under the age of 45, although in practice some teachers were over 50 when they finally qualified. In publicity about the scheme, no mention was made about the possibility of remaining in post until the age of 70—and, of course, we are now dealing with the age group 65–70 this evening. The most recent brochure describes, for example, the benefits of retirement at or after age 60, with a minimum of five years' service. Other teachers who have re-entered teaching late in life may or may not have taken a refund of pension contributions when they left the teaching service. Those who did not will be able to aggregate, as we discussed, all their teaching service for pension purposes. Others, if they wish, may buy back their earlier service and thus bring their pension to a level which reflects their total teaching service. As to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, about the disadvantage a teacher may suffer as a consequence of a change in the tax position, I should require notice of that point. I will, of course, examine it and contact the noble Lord.

I am grateful for the undertaking given by the noble Lord, and we can return to this at a later stage. I agree with the noble Lord that in the scheme of some years ago no retiring age was stipulated, but in the case of the teacher I mentioned who entered into this undertaking to buy back added years, he entered into that arrangement only four years ago and, of course, he had no indication that he would not be able to go on teaching until the age of 68. That is the kind of teacher we need to consider, who did come into teaching late in response to appeals from the Government.

I ought to say, of course, that at no time was a guarantee given beyond the age of 65. As the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, will know from his own experience at the Scottish Office, there have been ebbs and flows in the teacher supply position in Scotland. This Bill primarily relates to a chronic shortage of jobs for newly qualified teachers and it has relevance only to those teachers who are aged 65 and above. In the circumstances I would have thought it was a most realistic Bill.

The noble Lord is almost saying that anybody over 65 is incapable of teaching. I am not prepared to accept that. I am saying that this is a change in the conditions of service which is unfortunately going to have an adverse effect on some teachers who had no warning that this was going to happen. It will affect the pattern of their lives over the next four years, as it is coming into effect so soon. However, shall not detain your Lordships further on this point. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

moved Amendment No. 3:

Page 2, line 5, leave out ("three") and insert ("six").

Section 16(1) of the 1969 Act prescribes a mandatory retirement age of 65 for promoted teachers, but gives employing authorities discretion to determine otherwise. At the time of the 1969 Act, in a situation of teacher shortage, it was important to allow employing authorities a good measure of discretion, but, as I have already pointed out to your Lordships, in a situation of teacher unemployment the Government do not consider that such unlimited discretion is appropriate.

As I indicated at Second Reading, the Government accept that automatic retirement of promoted teachers on their 65th birthday could cause difficulty or disruption in a particular school, especially if the 65th birthday fell during the middle of a period of preparing pupils for a special examination. That is one of the areas we have already touched on. However, in an admittedly uncertain world, I made the point in earlier discussion that birthdays can be fairly clearly foreseen, and I would expect that most education authorities would be able to arrange for the successor to such a promoted teacher to take over his responsibilities with a minimum of disruption. Nevertheless, there is a need for an element of flexibility, and the period of three months was determined as being that period which would enable the teacher to stay in post until the next following natural break in the school's activities, such as the middle or the end of a term, which would then be an appropriate time for the teacher's successor to take over.

To extend the period to six months, as the noble Lord's Amendment proposes, would allow a measure of discretion and flexibility which is not, in the Government's view, in present circumstances necessary and, indeed, could well be undesirable. As I said during the Second Reading debate, this is a time of rapid development, excitement and awareness in the world of education. It is clearly sensible that when an individual reaches retiring age his successor should take over from him as quickly as possible and with the minimum of disruption to the school timetable, and in the Government's view our proposals achieve that end. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, will not feel that he needs to press the Amendment.

I asked the noble Lord whether he could explain why, when a teacher is retained after the three months, he then has to go down to another post and cannot remain in a post of special responsibility.

Because, quite clearly, a teacher in a position of special responsibility will not be able to teach beyond the age of 65 within that post. There is a need for movement as between posts at that age, and I believe that that is the thinking behind the Government's position.

Perhaps we could pursue that at a later stage. I now beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.