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Grand Committee

Volume 691: debated on Thursday 10 May 2007

Grand Committee

Thursday, 10 May 2007.

The Committee met at two o’clock.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (VISCOUNT SIMON) in the Chair.]

Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Bill [HL]

Clause 1 [Prohibition against forcing another into marriage]:

On Question, Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill?

I oppose the Question whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill. In doing so, I will speak to government Amendment No. 1, which contains 19 new sections to be inserted into the Family Law Act 1996, and to government Amendment No. 14, which amends the Long Title of the Bill.

Many noble Lords will be familiar with the history of this policy. In September 2005, the Government launched a consultation on whether a specific criminal offence of forcing someone into marriage should be created. Many respondents worried that criminalising forced marriage would force the issue under ground, leaving victims even more isolated and vulnerable. Others commented that reconciliation with family members would be prevented if criminal action were taken, and that victims would be less likely to seek help if there were a risk that their family might be criminalised.

The noble Lord, Lord Lester, deserves great praise for the approach taken in his Bill, which empowers victims to seek protection through civil remedies. Since the Bill’s Second Reading, the Government have worked closely with the noble Lord to fine-tune its provisions to make them more effective, and our amendments today largely follow that approach. The Bill’s aim remains to protect victims by preventing and deterring forced marriage, and to provide protection for those who have already been forced into marriage. It is hoped that by looking to the civil, rather than the criminal, courts for a solution to this problem, we can minimise, if not entirely eliminate, the risk that, by coming forward to seek protection, the victim finds that they have driven a wedge between themselves and their family. Similarly, we hope that more victims will feel able to come forward and seek protection, knowing that the courts have the means to help them without criminalising members of their family.

The Bill puts the civil remedies available to a potential victim of forced marriage on a statutory footing and extends the jurisdiction to county court level, which provides for a more effective enforcement mechanism through the power of arrest. The Bill provides a clearer and more accessible remedy to those who need it. The provisions do not create a new statutory claim for damages. In the case of forced marriage, a claim for damages may be particularly unsuitable, as it prolongs adversarial contact between the victim and the respondent, who in many cases will be a close family member. The Bill’s focus is on protecting victims in a way that enables and assists them to preserve family links wherever possible. I highlight the fact that the Bill in no way affects an individual making other claims for compensation to which they might be entitled; for example, for assault, injury or wrongful imprisonment.

The main amendment takes the form of a new Part 4A to the Family Law Act 1996. As such, it goes one step further than the original Bill by embedding these new provisions even more firmly in the family jurisdiction. I hope that this will send out an important signal about how the Bill should be approached. Amending the Family Law Act in this way places forced marriage more robustly in the wider context of violence against women. Many of the problems facing those confronted by forced marriage are similar to those facing victims of domestic violence. Both the Government and the voluntary organisations with which I have been privileged to discuss this want forced marriage to be put into mainstream domestic violence legislation and not dealt with as an entirely separate issue. As a result, forced marriage will enjoy a central role in the Government’s national anti-domestic violence delivery plan.

There is also a clear practical advantage to this approach in that it has links to other statutes. In dealing with cases of forced marriage involving children, the courts may also make use of powers under the Children Act 1989. For example, if the court is concerned about the welfare of the child, it can make an interim care or interim supervision order and instruct the local authority to investigate the situation. Where domestic violence is involved, the courts will also have in mind the relevant provisions of the Family Law Act 1996 to provide adequate protection for the victim. Although the Bill does not change the law of nullity, it will enable victims to annul their marriages with the benefit of an order providing for their protection.

As we have drafted our amendments, I have had the opportunity to consult with senior figures in the judiciary who are experienced in hearing these cases. I am pleased to say that they have expressed their support for this approach. I would also like to reiterate the important point made by many speakers at Second Reading that forced marriage does not affect just one part of our society, but women and men from all races and religions.

The practice and threat of forced marriage engages human rights; most notably the Article 8 convention right to respect private life and personal autonomy. Article 8 includes the right to form relationships and to live as a family. The state is under a positive obligation to see that steps are taken to ensure the enjoyment of these rights is real and substantial. Noble Lords will know that I have the privilege of being the Minister responsible for human rights within government.

Forced marriage also engages Article 12, the right to marry, as marriage requires free consent. Marriage against someone’s will is a violation of that right. It is clear that this Bill represents a positive for the protection of human rights. The problem of forced marriage is undoubtedly complex, but I hope that we have struck the right balance with the approach we have taken with the Bill. Our aim is to provide the courts with powers that will enable them to deal effectively with these cases and to offer protection to those faced with the prospect of a forced marriage, without driving the practice further under ground and making the situation worse for those we aim to protect.

I accept that there are always risks in any approach one might take, but I believe that the greater evil would be not to take steps to tackle this problem. I have had meetings with several organisations in the voluntary sector. They have years of experience of dealing with this problem. Their support for what we are trying to do has strengthened this view. I put on record my thanks to the Southall Black Sisters, Imkaan and Newham Asian Women’s Project and the many other voluntary organisations which do such excellent work in this area for their contribution in shaping and improving these amendments, and, of course, the Forced Marriage Unit in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office which does such excellent and sterling work.

I will now turn to the detail within the proposed new clause. Proposed new Section 63A enables the court to make an order to prevent a person from being forced into marriage or to make orders to protect a victim who has already been forced into marriage. It is very important to remember that not only must we work to prevent forced marriages occurring but that we must offer some means by which those who have already been forced into marriage can extricate themselves from their plight.

The provisions require that the court should have regard to the need to secure the health, safety and well-being of the potential victim, and must have regard to the victim’s wishes and feelings. That enables the victim to have a voice and to let the court know what they believe will be best for them. Many victims want to ask for help but are afraid of the consequences for their family. They rarely want them to get into trouble with the law. A key advantage of the civil legislation of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, is that victims need not be put off from using it by fears over reporting their close relatives for committing criminal offences.

The legislation makes clear that a person is forced into marriage if they are forced by another person to enter into that marriage without having given their free and full consent. These provisions give the court wide discretion to consider any case where a person is in danger of being forced into marriage or who has already been forced into marriage, ensuring that we do not leave any potential victims out of scope. The force used can be verbal, physical or mental. We are not dealing necessarily with cases where victims are physically beaten; often the force is much more subtle. There may be threats of violence, actual violence or mental pressure. The force may not even be directed against the victim; it can be indirect, against a third party or on the perpetrator themselves. For example, there have been cases where pressure is put by a mother on her daughter by threatening physical harm to herself. She may say, “I will kill myself if you don’t go ahead with this marriage”. All these actions are harmful and would fall within the scope of this clause, so the court would have the power to offer protection to the victim.

New Section 63B provides that a protection order can contain any terms the court considers appropriate, including prohibitions, restrictions or specific requirements. Again, these provisions give the court wide discretion to select and tailor an order to suit the needs of the case, bearing in mind the wishes of the victim. The kind of orders that may be made are those prohibiting violence or requiring a person to surrender a passport for as long as appropriate to protect the victim. The provisions can relate to conduct outside of England and Wales, which will be crucial as many cases involve an overseas element. The order can also apply to those who have assisted or encouraged a person to force another into marriage. Noble Lords will be aware that often whole families may be complicit in forcing a person into marriage.

New Section 63C details who may apply to the court for a forced marriage protection order. It provides for both the victim and a relevant party to apply without leave. A relevant third party is a person or class of persons that the Lord Chancellor may specify. For example, the Forced Marriage Unit, to which I have already paid tribute, could one day be a relevant third party. Any other person wishing to apply would need to seek leave of the court, and the court would consider what connection the victim had with them and the ascertainable wishes of the victim. I have already made it clear that it is essential that the court considers the wishes and feelings of the victim. Under our proposals, the court will therefore be required always to take these into account where they are ascertainable. One of the harmful results of forced marriage is that it takes away the victim’s power to control their own life, and it is vital that we do not disempower them further, but engage them in the process wherever possible. Importantly, the courts can also make an order without there being an application. This may arise if the courts are already considering another family proceedings matter related to the case.

New Sections 63D to 63L are modelled on Part 4 of the Family Law Act 1996 and provide the mechanics of this clause. As the framework behind these provisions is already established within the domestic violence provision of the 1996 Act, I do not intend to go through each one of them at length, but I hope that noble Lords will allow me to say a few words about them.

New Section 63D concerns ex parte orders, so that in emergencies orders may be made without the respondent being notified of the proceedings. In deciding whether this is appropriate, the court will consider the risk of significant harm to the victim or a third party if the order is not made immediately. If the order is made, the respondent will still be given the opportunity to make representations on an order as soon as is just and convenient. This ensures that there is a balance between protecting someone in need of immediate help and providing access to justice for the respondent concerned.

New Section 63E provides that the court may accept an undertaking from the respondent as an alternative to making a protection order. A court would not accept an undertaking if the respondent had previously used or threatened violence in relation to the matter concerned. In these cases, it is clear that an undertaking would not go far enough. However, it is important to note that an undertaking is enforceable, as a breach would be a contempt of court and punishable by committal proceedings.

New Section 63F provides that an order may be made for a set period or may run until another order is made. Again, this gives the court flexibility in dealing with each case.

New Section 63G provides that orders and undertakings can be varied or be discharged on application by the victim or any party affected by the proceedings. The court may also vary or discharge an order without application.

New Section 63H deals with powers of arrest and provides that the court must attach a power of arrest if it intends to make a forced marriage protection order and considers that the respondent has used or threatened violence against the victim, a third party or the respondent themselves. The provision to attach a power of arrest if threats or violence are directed to a third party is a departure from Part 4 of the Family Law Act 1996 where powers of arrest are available only if the violence is addressed to the applicant or a relevant child. However, I consider this to be vital in dealing with those cases which can so often involve indirect threats. The ability of the court to attach a power of arrest to injunctions will provide an important further protection for victims in these circumstances and act as a strong deterrent against further actions by those covered by the order.

New Section 63I provides that a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if they have reasonable cause to suspect that the person has breached an order. Again, this goes beyond Part 4 of the 1996 Act as it would allow the power of arrest to be used to arrest a third party who is in breach of the terms of the order, not only the respondent of the original proceedings. This is a necessary departure as cases can involve whole families or communities working together to force a marriage.

New Section 63J provides that where an order had no power of arrest attached, the victim or person who applied for the order may apply for the issue of a warrant of arrest if he considers that the person has failed to comply with the order or is in contempt of court. The court must issue the warrant only where it has reasonable grounds for believing that a person has failed to comply with the order or is in contempt of court. For the same reasons as I have previously explained, this goes beyond Part 4 of the Family Law Act 1996 as it would allow a warrant to be issued against someone who was not a respondent to the original proceedings.

New Section 63K provides that an arrested person may be remanded if the matter is not dealt with when first brought before the court. Conditions may also be imposed on bail such as those necessary to ensure witnesses are not interfered with. New Section 63L provides for remands for the purpose of enabling a medical examination and report if there is a reason to consider a medical report is required.

New Sections 63M and 63N are not modelled under the Family Law Act 1996. Section 63M reserves forced marriage protection orders to be heard in the High Court and county court. New Section 63N provides that the Lord Chancellor, after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice, may extend jurisdiction to magistrates’ courts by affirmative order. This provision is in preparation for a single family court. However, there are no immediate plans to extend to magistrates’ courts. It is instead intended that expertise be built up in specialist county courts and High Courts.

Proposed new Sections 63O and 63P are again modelled on Part 4 of the Family Law Act 1996. Members of the Committee may be aware that where a person is found to be in contempt of court, he or she may be committed to prison for up to two years under the Contempt of Court Act 1981. New Section 63O provides that the court’s powers in relation to contempt may be exercised by the same level of judge who made the original forced marriage protection order. The intention is that the same level of court will deal with a breach as dealt with the original order. New Section 63P enables the Lord Chancellor, in consultation with the Lord Chief Justice, to make provisions for appeals concerning the transfer of proceedings and orders in respect of the management of the case.

New Section 63Q makes provision for the Secretary of State to issue guidance to public bodies on how to deal with cases of forced marriage. At Second Reading, there was much debate about the need to work with the many organisations in the voluntary sector to ensure that this Bill makes a real difference to those threatened with forced marriage. Ensuring that all agencies are working together is crucial and guidelines, such as the one currently issued by the Forced Marriage Unit, for social workers, teachers, police officers and doctors are a key part in ensuring this. There was also discussion at Second Reading about putting this guidance on a statutory footing. This provision will give a statutory home to guidance on dealing with forced marriage cases. It requires that public authorities should have due regard to any guidance produced under it which would ensure that they are followed.

New Section 63R signposts the protection which may be available from the High Court, criminal law, Protection from Harassment Act 1997, Family Law Act 1996, a civil claim for damages and a claim in the Children Act 1989. New Section 63S defines important terms used in the Bill. One significant definition is that given to marriage, which makes clear that when we refer to “forced marriage”, we are referring to both religious and civil ceremonies whether or not they are legally recognised. Some religious ceremonies may not have legal recognition in the United Kingdom, but a person will still be treated by family and the wider community as though they were married, so the effect is just as damaging. It is vital therefore that we provide for this.

Finally, government Amendment No. 14 amends the Title to make it clear that the aim of the Bill is not just to provide protection against people being forced into marriage, but also to protect those who have already been forced into marriage. I beg to move.

I support the Government’s amendments, to which I have added my name. At Second Reading on 26 January, the Bill received remarkably widespread support across the House, including support from noble Lords who are present today. At that stage, the Minister—who I congratulate on becoming a Justice Minister—was benignly neutral and open-minded about the Bill. I indicated that it would require co-operation on all sides if we were to see the Bill taken further and translated into practical reality.

I am delighted that the Government are now giving wholehearted support to the Bill. A Private Member’s Bill has no real prospect of being translated into law unless it has government support. It has been a great pleasure and a privilege to work with a fine team of civil servants, under the Minister’s energetic direction, to design amendments that are well drafted—in fact brilliantly drafted—and make significant improvements to the original design, which I did in only four pages. I am also delighted that the Bill has the support of the Official Opposition and that the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, is leading for her party on this issue. It is also supported by my party, and it has support that goes well beyond the main political parties. It is very important that the amendments are thoroughly discussed in the context of the probing amendments that have been tabled by the Opposition, which I greatly welcome.

As the EOC notes in its helpful briefing for the debate,

“The Bill provides greater protection to people affected by forced marriage and sends a clear message to all communities that forcing someone into marriage is unacceptable. We believe that this will empower vulnerable women and men and will act as a deterrent in our communities”.

The EOC briefing also rightly notes that the Bill will need to be backed up by resources to enable victims to have access to support structures and services, and that strategies for empowering women through education and employment are also needed to achieve a reduction in the incidence of forced marriages. Those are important issues, but at this stage what matters is to secure the Bill’s passage, so that we have an adequate legal framework.

We have consulted widely. Before Second Reading we held a public meeting in Parliament that was attended by, for example, the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. We invited key interested individuals and organisations to discuss the Bill. We also discussed the Bill with leading members of the family law Bar who have had significant experience and expertise of forced marriage cases. We discussed the Bill with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and I am delighted that she is here today. We drew on family law extensively in drafting the original Bill, and the Government, as we have just heard, have continued to do that in designing the amendments.

After Second Reading, we conducted a public consultation on possible ways to improve the Bill in the light of suggestions made by interested organisations and Members of the House. We published a consultation paper on 7 February and distributed it widely among interested organisations and individuals, including those who had responded to the Government’s original consultation on whether to criminalise forced marriage. We asked some 14 questions about ways in which the Bill could be amended and improved. To assist understanding of the changes, we distributed a mock-up version of how the Bill might look if the changes were made. It is important to go into the question of consultation briefly, because of the importance of making sure that one has widespread support. We received 29 responses from a wide range of groups and individuals, including women’s groups, women’s refuges, religious groups, social workers, family law practitioners, the Bar Council, the Association of Chief Police Officers, the EOC and the CRE. That was in addition to the briefings on the Bill by several groups for the Second Reading debate, including Liberty, the Children’s Rights Alliance for England and the NSPCC.

The consultation process demonstrated overwhelming support for the Bill and for many of the changes envisaged by the consultation. We published a summary of responses received, which I have placed in the Library of the House together with the initial consultation documents, which are also available on the Odysseus Trust website. We have also had discussions with those seeking to protect victims of forced marriages and with the victims themselves. I met staff of Karma Nirvana and survivors when I went to Derby to launch Jasvinder Sanghera’s book Shame, and the Minister and I recently visited Ashiana Network, an Asian women’s organisation and refuge in Leystonstone. I met councillors in Tower Hamlets, with the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, and I spoke to hundreds of women at a meeting convened by the Drug and Alcohol Action Programme in Southall. I have been greatly assisted by Khatun Sapnara in discussing with the government team the amendments now tabled on behalf of the Government. She is a leading member of the family law Bar, and about to become a recorder. She has great practical experience in representing victims in the High Court.

As noble Lords have heard, the Government have built on the basic principles of the Bill and improved their contents in important ways, already explained by the Minister. I will briefly single some out. First, the Bill would now be incorporated as new Part 4A of the Family Law Act 1996. That will ensure that the problem of forced marriage will be viewed within the wider legal framework around domestic violence, something which many women’s organisations and the EOC were keen to see. The amendments incorporate features of family law which did not appear in the original Bill, such as provision for ex parte orders, scope for undertakings instead of orders and the possibility of attaching the power of arrest to orders.

Secondly, while removing the explicit prohibition on forced marriage contained in Clause 1 of the original Bill, the amendments retain the force of the message. It is clear from new Sections 63A and 63B of new Part 4A that wide-ranging orders can be sought to deal with physical and mental coercion not only by immediate family members, but by any who aid, abet, counsel, procure, encourage or assist another person to force or attempt to force a person into marriage. Respondents to our consultations stressed the importance of covering third parties, extended families and family friends, who frequently play a role in forced marriage cases.

Thirdly, in line with the overwhelming support expressed in responses to our consultation, new Section 63Q puts the forced marriage guidance issued by the Forced Marriage Unit—to which I pay tribute—on a statutory footing. It does so in a less prescriptive and bureaucratic way than our own mock-up version of the redrafted Bill. Although she is not here today, that was in response to discussions with the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, on that subject. New Section 63Q also contains a powerful directive to those exercising public functions to have regard to the guidance. There was strong support for that approach in our consultation. Many respondents praised the guidance issued by the Forced Marriage Unit, but expressed concern that many agencies and professionals remain unaware of it. We hope that this amendment will ensure that the guidance published by the Forced Marriage Unit is disseminated more widely and taken more seriously by public authorities and others.

Fourthly, the amendments “signpost”—to use the Minister’s word—the available grounds for redress for loss and damage suffered by victims of forced marriage. My original Bill had sought to create a new right to damages as a secondary remedy where preventive relief had failed. We had a lot of discussion about this and I was initially wedded to my original design, but was persuaded that I was mistaken. New Section 63R pursues the preferable course of drawing attention to the existing remedies under the law of tort, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the Children Act, and other parts of family law, including the law of marriage, among others. As the Minister has explained, that conforms to the general approach of family law, which does not award monetary compensation.

I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, is here, because of his leadership on the Forced Marriage Unit, which is supported by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office, and the extraordinarily valuable work done by the high commissions in the sub-continent and elsewhere in giving consular protection and other help. As I am sure the noble Lord knows, there is real interest in the Bill in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, which extends to Ministers and law-makers. That is important because one cannot really tackle trans-national problems like this unless one seeks to harmonise both law and practice across countries. I hope, if the Bill becomes law, that it will serve as a model for further legislation in south Asia and beyond, as well as within the Council of Europe. There have been moves within the Council of Europe to criminalise forced marriage, an approach which the Government rightly rejected. I hope that the civil approach may be followed up in Europe, where the Minister has an important role, as well as the sub-continent. For all of those reasons, I fully support the government amendments.

I strongly supported this Bill at Second Reading. I had some worries about the meaning of “coercion” but they have now evaporated because there is a much tighter definition of it in the Bill. When I came in, I thought that I would not speak because I did not think that I had any questions to ask, but a couple of things occurred to me during the Minister’s exposition of the Government’s position. First, this may be in the Bill and I have not seen it, but what is the status of someone who is found to have been forced into a legal marriage, not just a religious one? Is there a change of status? Is he or she then rendered single again? What is the status of the marriage relationship after a finding that the person has been forced into marriage? Secondly, if the immigration status—for want of a better way of putting it—of the person who is found to have been forced into marriage is linked to the fact that they are married, where does that leave that person in relation to their legal rights in this country?

I hope that the Minister will permit me to answer the noble Lord’s first question, if that is not inappropriate. I totally support the Bill and say, without any disrespect to the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that it is greatly improved. I am absolutely delighted that the provision will be inserted after Part 4 of the Family Law Act, which is where it should be, and embedded in English law. That sends out a very valuable message.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Plant, that, as I understand it, the person who has been forcibly married remains married until a court decrees that that person is no longer married. Therefore, I expect that there would be a petition for nullity based on the lack of consent. I can say from my previous incarnation that those petitions are very sympathetically considered. I very much hope that it will be possible for such hearings to be held in private, which has certainly happened from time to time. As I understand it, this Bill will not deal with the annulling of a marriage, but of course its provisions would constitute a very strong movement in that direction. A person, particularly a girl, who says, “I should never have been married in the first place and I have an injunction from the county court”, has strong grounds for having her marriage annulled as soon as possible.

I hope that the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Lester, will forgive me if I have to leave to carry out other duties but I wanted to come today to support this amended Bill.

I have one question for the noble Baroness in relation to the religious side of the marriage. If a religious marriage had taken place as well as the legal marriage, what would happen as regards a religious divorce? Would the court have the power to instruct someone to enforce a religious divorce?

Oddly enough, I know a bit about this because I introduced another Private Member’s Bill, which someone else took over, which concerned the problem of Jewish religious marriages where, owing to an extremely narrow interpretation of the Book of Deuteronomy in the 12th century where Moses Maimonides adopted a liberal view but subsequently, unfortunately, Jewish sages adopted a narrower view, there was the problem of the chained wives. The problem was that if a Jewish man wanted to marry another woman and had had a religious marriage, he could have a civil divorce but not a religious divorce. Under Jewish traditional law, as under Muslim family law, the woman would remain married to him. If she remarries her children would be stigmatised as illegitimate and so on. The noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Hendon, was a particular supporter of that Bill.

It was pointed out that my Bill dealt only with Jewish marriages; it was discriminatory and needed to deal with, for example, Muslim marriages. A power is included in the Bill to allow the provision to be extended to Muslim marriages and to give power to the family judge to refuse to give a civil divorce to a man in such a position until he is given the religious divorce. I very much hope that that point will be taken up. It has not been yet. So the answer is that there is not much that a civil judge can do at the moment about the religious wedding and divorce in that context, but there is a power for the Lord Chancellor to extend the law. That is amazingly learned and boring, but I thought I should just mention it to answer the question.

I support where we are today. It is a great honour and privilege to be here. I pay tribute to the way the noble Lord, Lord Lester, and the Minister have taken us onward in this journey. I also pay great tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, for the dedication with which she has pursued the matter over a long period.

I do not want to bore the Committee, but I want to take the opportunity to make a few points. I hope that noble Lords will bear with me. I welcome very much the framework within which we are approaching this issue. As noble Lords present at the discussion in January will remember, I think that I was the only one who cautiously welcomed this legislation. I have been reminded about that on more than one occasion by numerous colleagues and noble Lords. That note of caution was very important. It was based not on my personal opinions but on what I had heard, and on experiences of talking to women and women’s groups.

We have arrived at the very important process of looking at this fundamental human rights issue. We have arrived where my noble friend Lord Ahmed and I wanted to be all those years ago when we proposed the need to embrace and embed protection against forced marriages within the mainstream framework of family law in the Family Law Act. I remember saying that on many occasions. This is not the time to say “I told you so” because I did not go far enough then to take on the labour of love which the noble Lord, Lord Lester, clearly did. I greatly welcome that.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lester, about new Section 64R in particular as it embraces everything I hope I have argued for. As has been acknowledged, forced marriage is a complicated issue. It is very important to give courts and professionals these wide-ranging powers and the ability to deal with the issue and to provide services and protection to women and individuals or families who are involved. Without it, the idea that we need to empower women in order for us to address some of these complicated issues would not be addressed. It would be remiss of me not to remind Members of the Committee once again that I welcome forced marriage being embraced within the mainstream law, but that a loss of status for women, especially if they have come here already married—forced or otherwise—needs to be addressed. It must be addressed within the main framework of the law.

Although this may not be the time to ask the question, it needs raising: once a woman has left the home, where does she go? What does she do and who will provide the support and services for her? Those of us who have been more sceptical see a fundamental difference. Questions have been raised about domestic violence, child protection, family breakdown and a number of other issues. I therefore hope that guidance and instructions to local authorities and institutions will be explicit, providing a statutory obligation to support women. I welcome the amendment on which I had intended to make only a few comments—and I hope that they were only few.

I have been looking at the proposed new section on guidance and the provision that persons exercising public functions will have a duty. I remember that when I was principal of Somerville College and I visited schools, there came a time in the mid-1980s when I no longer found Muslim girls in sixth forms. I was told that it was because they were being withdrawn from school at 13 and were often then taken back to their villages where a marriage took place. I used to say that that seemed to be breaking the law because those girls had a right to education and we have a duty to provide it. If that, among other things, could be enforced, it is much easier for people to cease to do something bad if there is a perfectly respectable reason not to do it, which has nothing to do with marriage or anything else. If it could be known in the community that girls could not be withdrawn legally until they were 16, that might begin to start a measure of protection for the peculiarly unprotected very young.

I would like to comment on that. There is a widely advertised case of an 11 year-old girl who was taken out of school and has been rescued. I do not know the circumstances and it is difficult to make one case apply to all. I would urge Members of the Committee not to make a general assumption that all 13 year-olds are withdrawn from school. That used to happen and it still does, and we should all be ashamed about it. We should ensure that all possible protection is available. However, a significant number of girls from different backgrounds continue in education. All of us have worked so hard to put this legislation into the mainstream framework and I hope that families will not feel as though it is against them, their cultures and their religions and that they will encourage young girls in particular to continue their education. This is an important process.

On the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Park, when I went to Derby to visit Karma Nirvana, I was convinced that the guidance needed to be statutory. In particular, I learnt that some schools were not willing to put up information about a helpline or anything else because the local education authority in a particular area felt that it would be undesirable to do so. Although this is a sensitive matter, it is obviously important that guidance is given and had regard to—without the cumbersome business of litigation if you do not have regard, although I am not suggesting anything of that kind—to ensure that public authorities like education bodies provide such basic information.

I turn to the other point about immigration raised by the noble Lord, Lord Plant—and I am glad that I am not the Minister having to deal with it. The issue is complicated. Certainly my wife, who is an immigration and asylum judge, has told me about the difficult problems she has in cases where it may be that there is some evidence of coercion for immigration purposes, or even for asylum, and having to try to establish the truth from the victim who is party to the proceedings. The Home Office also does its best, but this is a difficult matter. One way in which the Government have responded to this—I am not sure that I altogether agree with it because it may suffer from the very vice of broad generalisation referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin—is to raise the age at which someone may come into the country to marry to 21. I do not know whether that is necessarily the correct approach. The immigration implications are not dealt with either by my Bill or by the government amendments, but they will need to be addressed as a matter of immigration policy.

I had no intention of speaking this afternoon because I came in just to support all that the Minister is going to say, but I rise again because of the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Park, in relation to young boys or girls who are taken away from school. It would be difficult to monitor young people going to visit their relatives, attending funerals or weddings, or going on holiday. To issue guidance just for people of a different colour or from a different culture would be wrong.

On the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, in Derby, I can assure the noble Lord that my noble friend Lady Uddin and I, along with the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, and many other distinguished Members of the Committee went around the country and created a huge debate. We gave the community a lot of information, including saying that forced marriage is wrong. Ministers such as Mike O’Brien and others used phrases like, “Forced marriage is wrong, and cultural sensitivities are no excuse for moral blindness. One forced marriage is one too many”. We repeated that message. As a result, I was greeted with tomatoes in Sheffield. It is a difficult issue, and that is why raising awareness and having this debate within communities is so important. That is how we will get the message across, not by legislating against young people leaving school and taking a plane to wherever they want to go.

I should like to make a few general comments. First, I was in the Chamber when the noble Lord, Lord Lester, presented his Bill and I congratulate him on his presentation of it. I have looked through the amendments and I think that they are excellent. To that end, I commend the Minister, her advisers and her civil servants who prepared them.

We must recognise that the problem of forced marriages does not restrict itself to people from the sub-continent; it is one that affects many different communities. I have heard it talked about in relation to Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and so on. It must be appreciated that it applies to all the communities. Therefore, I welcome the fact that the amendments extend the Family Law Act rather than the provisions standing alone. I congratulate the Minister and her advisers, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lester, for his participation in making this a power under family law. There are issues concerning domestic violence, which may be the result of forced marriages.

The amendments are quite comprehensive. They refer to protection orders, undertakings and power of arrest under warrants. I agree with the interpretation and I notice that marriages are covered whether or not they are legally binding, because some of them are not. I am a Muslim whose marriage is not recognised by law unless we have a civil ceremony. I spoke to the Minister earlier about problems occurring overseas. I am pleased about the Forced Marriage Unit’s involvement, because I have heard one or two horror stories from overseas. The unit does an excellent job overseas and there must be guidance as well as legislation. We need to look into those issues. Certainly, the amendments have my support. I will do all that I can to make sure that the legislation is not only enacted but also that its principles are put into practice.

I thank the Minister for her introduction to this amendment. This Bill has had an interesting passage so far. It has undergone its metamorphosis from a Private Member’s Bill to government legislation in the blink of an eye. We on these Benches congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, on persuading the Government not only to bring forward these new amendments but to support what will be a new government Bill in the proper way with a fully equipped Bill team.

My noble friend Lady Anelay regrets that she is unable to be here. I thank the Minister for arranging for us to meet before the debate. I should also like to thank the Bill team, which has provided prompt and ready assistance and has liaised most effectively with my office. I pay particular tribute to the work that it has managed to do in such a short timeframe. I regret only that a rather rushed procedure has categorised this Bill in recent weeks. It is a shame that due to its previous status as a Private Member’s Bill without government support, the supporting framework is, through being understandably under-resourced, deficient in public Bill standards. It would have been more appropriate to have been able to have had sight of the individual responses to the consultation, as is the case when requested with government consultation. While the Government have consulted on this issue with regards to introducing a criminal offence, as this is civil law that consultation does not have direct relevance.

While I emphasise again that I am most grateful to the Bill team for its hard work in organising an initial regulatory impact assessment, I note that this was produced only on request by myself and colleagues, and that it is only in its initial stages. Taken together, it is my concern that this lack of formal preparation could impair the scrutiny of the Bill in your Lordships’ House. I hope that this may be improved on before consideration in another place. I should be grateful if the Minister would clarify whether she believes that the handling of this Bill, including the extension of the Long Title under Amendment No. 14, will set a precedent for Private Members’ Bills.

We on these Benches very much welcome the form that the Bill will take following the Government’s amendments. We believe that it is right that it will mirror Part 4 of the Family Law Act 1996 and that, by and large, the penalties for breach of orders are appropriate. In order to ensure that the Bill is subject to appropriate scrutiny before reaching another place, we have tabled amendments to probe the future implementation of orders, the potential future effect of the Bill on the communities it targets, the appropriateness of the Secretary of State’s powers and the substance of the orders themselves. I will have further questions to put to the Minister following the invaluable advice that I have been grateful to receive in the past few days.

I am sure that noble Lords will appreciate that the time for consultation on the amendments, although it has been extended, has been somewhat limited. It is right in principle and right in practice to try to prevent forced marriages from taking place. At Second Reading of the previous version of the Bill, my noble friend Lady Anelay noted that to be in a position where one is forced to make an application for nullity after having been forced into a marriage is invidious. I support that statement, and I follow it with a few questions to the Minister.

The Bill will allow action to be taken on an attempt, rather than waiting for a marriage to occur and then applying for an annulment. I note that government Amendment No. 14 will allow for forced marriage orders to apply after a marriage has been entered into. I highlight for noble Lords that the High Court, as is evident in Justice Munby’s judgment in NS v MI, is already able to deal with the problem of forced marriage within the current framework of the law. I note that in paragraph 12 of his judgment, Justice Munby refers to Justice Bracewell’s exposition of current procedure in the order in R v R. He goes on to say that,

“criminal law already provides protection from and punishment for the crimes that may be committed when forcing someone into a marriage, whether in this country or abroad”.

On civil law, he states that forced marriage will also expose the perpetrators to civil remedies for such torts as trespass to the person and false imprisonment. I reiterate that I support the legislation, and I raise these matters to elicit a response from the Minister that will detail how this legislation will add to the panoply of existing law.

While I welcome everything that was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, there were bits of what she said that were a bit grumpy. I would like to say something about the grumpy bits.

First, it is very rare for a Private Member’s Bill to have government support and to reach the statute book. I can think of the Great Reform Act 1832, which started as a Private Member’s Bill. I can think of Roy Jenkins’s Obscene Publications Bill, and Sidney Silverman’s Bill to abolish capital punishment. I think that homosexuality ceased to be a crime because of a Private Member’s Bill, and there was David Steel’s Bill on abortion. It is very rare, and therefore when it happens it does not really create precedents. For example, there has never been a Private Member’s Bill in the Moses Room in Grand Committee before. That is a sort of precedent, and it is a very desirable one in this case, which I do not suppose will be emulated for many other Private Members’ Bills unless the Government show their support.

Secondly, when my inadequate four-page Bill was published, it was supported by the shadow Cabinet of Her Majesty’s Official Opposition, which considered it; and that was made clear on Second Reading. There was only one very minor bit that the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, queried, which has been dealt with. I do not believe that the government changes have changed any of the principles of the Bill, nor do I believe that there has been a lack of support. So far as consultation is concerned, I have put it in the Library and on the web, and it is all available. I am only a private Member, I am not the Government, but we have done a pretty good job on consultation. I hope that those words will remove grumpiness.

Can I just come back on that? I did not mean to sound grumpy throughout this. We have always shown support, but we have always said that there are areas where we would like further scrutiny.

I did not think that the noble Baroness was at all grumpy. It is completely right and proper—I am looking forward to our discussions on the probing amendments that follow—that we show how much we have scrutinised this legislation. It is very important to me that it is done effectively and properly. It has been a great privilege to work with the noble Lord, Lord Lester, and the noble Baroness, Lady Verma. I pay tribute to my noble friends Lady Uddin and Lord Ahmed, who have done incredible work over the years on this subject. This is a humbling moment for me as we try to tackle what is an important issue in society and beyond.

I, too, express my gratitude for all the help and advice I have been given. I have met some extraordinary people in the past few weeks, not least the victims of forced marriage, who were generous with their time and gave me good advice on how we should approach the Bill. I also thank the judiciary. Earlier today I met Mr Justice Munby and Mr Justice Singer to talk this through, and I know that they are deeply enthusiastic that this reaches the statute book. We also have the support of the Prime Minister. On discovering the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, he is very keen that I work as fast as possible to tackle the issue in the right way.

My approach has been to talk to as many people as possible. I know that many of them are listening to the debate and I have already paid tribute to their organisations. They, too, have been extraordinarily generous. I approached the legislation on the principle that we would not do it if it was clear that it was not wanted or needed. People have queried aspects of it, and rightly so. My noble friend Lady Uddin was absolutely right to say at Second Reading that the Bill is not enough on its own; it is a tiny part of what needs to be done. Education and support are also critical, and I shall say a little more about that, too. This is a real team effort. I hope that those who read the report of our deliberations will see what I consider to be the House of Lords at its best, as well as the Government responding at their best. I had the privilege of responding to noble Lords at Second Reading and it was obvious that the quality of speeches and the level of support from everyone who participated meant that the Government should respond, and we have.

I also pay tribute to my officials, who have been nothing short of magnificent. We gave them an almost impossible time limit because we wanted to do this as quickly as possible. My goodness, they have worked incredibly hard and they have done extremely well. I have paid tribute to the Forced Marriage Unit. There are six people in the unit, and I have visited them. They spend their weekends meeting victims in motorway service stations, often having spent months talking to them before they reach that point. They are dedicated and generous, and they do their work with a happiness that is quite extraordinary to see. I know that one of the consequences of our raising the profile of this issue is that their work will increase. They received 5,000 calls last year, which is a huge number, and many hundreds of those callers have been supported and helped.

I also agree with my noble friend Lady Uddin that there is a real heroine behind all this in the shape of my noble friend Lady Scotland, who was working on this issue long before we dragged her into government and away from the legal profession. On Tuesday, my noble friend Lord Triesman and I were privileged to witness the launch of The Survivor’s Handbook, an incredibly important document offering support to people who need practical advice about what to do if they find themselves in this position. This returns me to the point made by my noble friend Lady Uddin about the need to think about this issue in the round. This is about educating people, giving advice and information, and providing support. We must let the courts play their part, but see that as part of a spectrum of support. We must also ensure that we give victims the highest possible quality of support after the event. Some of them may be living a long way from their families because that is unfortunately occasionally a consequence. They need to be helped and supported either through education and training or into work. Again, I pay tribute to the organisations doing such valuable work.

Before she left, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, responded to the point made by my noble friend Lord Plant about nullity. We are not affecting current law. That is a much bigger area, which the Government could look at if they wanted to. This whole question is one of the things that will inform our decision whether to do that. The law of nullity therefore remains as it is, but it is an important part of enabling people to get out of what may be a forced marriage. We cannot, of course, intervene to change the immigration status of spouses who are abandoned in the UK, but we try to offer them advice and put them in touch with organisations that might be able to help them. Those who have been victims of domestic violence, which includes forced marriage, may be able to apply for indefinite leave to remain under the domestic violence provision of immigration law. I completely accept the broader point, which is well made, that this is part of a whole range of work that needs to be done, such as considering immigration issues. My noble friend Lady Uddin is perfectly entitled to say “I told you so”. Both she and my noble friend Lord Ahmed have been telling us that there will be a lot to do for some time. Hopefully this will be a small contribution to that.

The noble Baroness, Lady Park, raised the question of education and her experiences with schools. When I was chair of the governing body of a primary school, we had children from all sorts of backgrounds: Brazil, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Poland, Germany and so on. I can probably say this now that I am no longer an education Minister: I encouraged parents to take their children back “home” to enable them to understand and develop the culture from which they came. Many families who had come from a long way away and were not well off could do one big trip, perhaps the only one they would make in 10 years. They took their children for quite long periods of time. As a chair of governors, my view was that that was completely reasonable, providing we were able to support them in an educative way. The education they would receive in doing that was important. Our parents responded magnificently. The children came back with scrapbooks they had compiled about where they had been, and would give presentations to the rest of the school when they were only six or seven years old. They benefited from the experience hugely. Done properly and done well, it is completely proper.

The issue arises when children do not come back. The Crown Prosecution Service reported in 2006 that in Bradford some 250 girls aged between 13 and 16 left the school roll and did not return: all from one place in one year. So there is an issue. Not all of them may be doing anything other than going to live in another country and not informing the education authority. That happens in every area. I suspect that some of them, however, may find themselves in a difficult position. We must be mindful of that. There is a balance.

I also agree that the quality of information and guidance coming out of education is important. The Forced Marriage Unit is working with the Department for Education and Skills on improving the situation for children missing from the education register, ensuring that we identify missing children and looking at how we can deal with that. The Forced Marriage Unit tells me that 30 per cent of the victims they deal with are under 16.

To the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, I say that we are not setting a precedent for a Private Member’s Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, confirmed. I hope that we are setting a precedent for taking forward issues where we clearly have a strong consensus, not just within your Lordships’ House—although getting a consensus in the House is a pretty good indicator of the importance of the issue—but also outside. We are talking to organisations such as the Metropolitan Police, the Forced Marriage Unit, voluntary organisations, judges, lawyers, individuals and, in particular, victims. When you get that kind of consensus, it is right and proper for the Government to move, and to do so speedily.

As I have already indicated, the work of my officials has created a new part of the Family Law Act of extremely high quality. That does not mean that there might not be areas where noble Lords have suggestions for how we might improve the wording here and there as we take the Bill through your Lordships’ House and beyond. Indeed, when I met members of the judiciary this morning, there were two or three areas where they suggested one word rather than another. We will examine all of that, but the principal thing is that we are on our way to getting this into law.

On the difference between the judgments of Mr Justice Munby which the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, read out and what is new in this, there is, first, greater access to the county court, enabling judges—properly trained and resourced, of course—to deal with and tackle the issue speedily. There are also powers of arrest, better enforcement and statutory guidance, which we will discuss shortly. The importance of that, certainly in education, has already been addressed, not least by the example of the experiences of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, in Derby.

It also sends a clear message from Parliament, which is important. This is about the empowerment of our citizens and ensuring that they all enjoy the human rights which we value so much in this country. It is one, small way in which we demonstrate that. It raises the profile of the issue of forced marriage, enabling victims, their friends and family to come forward, and sends that clear signal. This is an important moment, with a lot of support. I am grateful for all the comments that have been made, and we will now have the privilege of discussing some of the detail.

Clause 1 negatived.

1: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—

“Protection against forced marriage: England and Wales

After Part 4 of the Family Law Act 1996 (c. 27) insert—

“PART 4AForced marriageForced marriage protection orders63A Forced marriage protection orders

(1) The court may make an order for the purposes of protecting—

(a) a person from being forced into a marriage or from any attempt to be forced into a marriage; or(b) a person who has been forced into a marriage.(2) In deciding whether to exercise its powers under this section and, if so, in what manner, the court must have regard to all the circumstances including the need to secure the health, safety and well-being of the person to be protected.

(3) In deciding that person’s well-being, the court must, in particular, have such regard to the person’s wishes and feelings (so far as they are reasonably ascertainable) as the court considers appropriate in the light of the person’s age and understanding.

(4) For the purposes of this Part a person (“A”) is forced into a marriage if another person (“B”) forces A to enter into a marriage (whether with B or another person) without A’s free and full consent.

(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) it does not matter whether the conduct of B which forces A to enter into a marriage is directed against A, B or another person.

(6) In this Part—

“force” includes coerce by threats or other psychological means (and related expressions are to be read accordingly); and

“forced marriage protection order” means an order under this section.

63B Contents of orders

(1) A forced marriage protection order may contain—

(a) such prohibitions, restrictions or requirements; and(b) such other terms;as the court considers appropriate for the purposes of the order.(2) The terms of such orders may, in particular, relate to—

(a) conduct outside England and Wales as well as (or instead of) conduct within England and Wales;(b) respondents who—(i) aid, abet, counsel, procure, encourage or assist another person to force, or attempt to force, a person to enter into a marriage; or(ii) conspire to force, or to attempt to force, a person to enter into a marriage; as well as (or instead of) respondents who force, or attempt to force, the person to enter into the marriage.63C Applications and other occasions for making orders

(1) The court may make a forced marriage protection order—

(a) on an application being made to it; or(b) without an application being made to it but in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (6).(2) An application may be made by—

(a) the person who is to be protected by the order; or(b) a relevant third party.(3) An application may be made by any other person with the leave of the court.

(4) In deciding whether to grant leave, the court must have regard to all the circumstances including—

(a) the applicant’s connection with the person to be protected;(b) the applicant’s knowledge of the circumstances of the person to be protected; and(c) the wishes and feelings of the person to be protected so far as they are reasonably ascertainable and so far as the court considers it appropriate, in the light of the person’s age and understanding, to have regard to them.(5) An application under this section may be made in other family proceedings or without any other family proceedings being instituted.

(6) The circumstances in which the court may make an order without an application being made are where—

(a) any other family proceedings are before the court (“the current proceedings”);(b) the court considers that a forced marriage protection order should be made to protect a person (whether or not a party to the current proceedings); and(c) a person who would be a respondent to any such proceedings for a forced marriage protection order is a party to the current proceedings.(7) In this section—

“family proceedings” has the same meaning as in Part 4 (see section 63(1) and (2)) but also includes—

(a) proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to adults;(b) proceedings in which the court has made an emergency protection order under section 44 of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41) which includes an exclusion requirement (as defined in section 44A(3) of that Act); and(c) proceedings in which the court has made an order under section 50 of the Act of 1989 (recovery of abducted children etc.); and“relevant third party” means a person specified, or falling within a description of persons specified, by order of the Lord Chancellor.

(8) An order of the Lord Chancellor under subsection (7) may, in particular, specify the Secretary of State.

Further provision about orders63D Ex parte orders: Part 4A

(1) The court may, in any case where it considers that it is just and convenient to do so, make a forced marriage protection order even though the respondent has not been given such notice of the proceedings as would otherwise be required by rules of court.

(2) In deciding whether to exercise its powers under subsection (1), the court must have regard to all the circumstances including—

(a) any risk of significant harm to the person to be protected or another person if the order is not made immediately; (b) whether it is likely that an applicant will be deterred or prevented from pursuing an application if an order is not made immediately; and(c) whether there is reason to believe that—(i) the respondent is aware of the proceedings but is deliberately evading service; and(ii) the delay involved in effecting substituted service will cause serious prejudice to the person to be protected or (if a different person) an applicant.(3) The court must give the respondent an opportunity to make representations about any order made by virtue of subsection (1).

(4) The opportunity must be—

(a) as soon as just and convenient; and(b) at a hearing of which notice has been given to all the parties in accordance with rules of court.63E Undertakings instead of orders

(1) The court may, subject to subsection (3), accept an undertaking from the respondent to proceedings for a forced marriage protection order if it has power to make such an order.

(2) No power of arrest may be attached to an undertaking given under subsection (1).

(3) The court may not accept an undertaking under subsection (1) instead of making an order if a power of arrest would otherwise have been attached to the order.

(4) An undertaking given to the court under subsection (1) is enforceable as if the court had made the order in terms corresponding to those of the undertaking.

(5) This section is without prejudice to the powers of the court apart from this section.

63F Duration of orders

A forced marriage protection order may be made for a specified period or until varied or discharged.

63G Variation of orders and their discharge

(1) The court may vary or discharge a forced marriage protection order on an application by—

(a) any party to the proceedings for the order;(b) the person being protected by the order (if not a party to the proceedings for the order); or(c) any person affected by the order.(2) In addition, the court may vary or discharge a forced marriage protection order made by virtue of section 63C(1)(b) even though no application under subsection (1) above has been made to the court.

(3) Section 63D applies to a variation of a forced marriage protection order as it applies to the making of such an order.

(4) Section 63E applies to proceedings for a variation of a forced marriage protection order as it applies to proceedings for the making of such an order.

(5) Accordingly, references in sections 63D and 63E to making a forced marriage protection order are to be read for the purposes of subsections (3) and (4) above as references to varying such an order.

(6) Subsection (7) applies if a power of arrest has been attached to provisions of a forced marriage protection order by virtue of section 63H.

(7) The court may vary or discharge the order under this section so far as it confers a power of arrest (whether or not there is a variation or discharge of any other provision of the order).

Arrest for breach of orders63H Attachment of powers of arrest to orders

(1) Subsection (2) applies if the court—

(a) intends to make a forced marriage protection order otherwise than by virtue of section 63D; and(b) considers that the respondent has used or threatened violence against the person being protected or otherwise in connection with the matters being dealt with by the order. (2) The court must attach a power of arrest to one or more provisions of the order unless it considers that, in all the circumstances of the case, there will be adequate protection without such a power.

(3) Subsection (4) applies if the court—

(a) intends to make a forced marriage protection order by virtue of section 63D; and(b) considers that the respondent has used or threatened violence against the person being protected or otherwise in connection with the matters being dealt with by the order.(4) The court may attach a power of arrest to one or more provisions of the order if it considers that there is a risk of significant harm to a person, attributable to conduct of the respondent, if the power of arrest is not attached to the provisions immediately.

(5) The court may provide for a power of arrest attached to any provisions of an order under subsection (4) to have effect for a shorter period than the other provisions of the order.

(6) Any period specified for the purposes of subsection (5) may be extended by the court (on one or more occasions) on an application to vary or discharge the order.

63I Arrest under attached powers

(1) Subsection (2) applies if a power of arrest is attached to provisions of a forced marriage protection order under section 63H.

(2) A constable may arrest without warrant a person whom the constable has reasonable cause for suspecting to be in breach of any such provision or otherwise in contempt of court in relation to the order.

(3) A person arrested under subsection (2) must be brought before the relevant judge within the period of 24 hours beginning at the time of the person’s arrest.

(4) In calculating any period of 24 hours for the purposes of subsection (3), Christmas Day, Good Friday and any Sunday are to be ignored.

63J Arrest under warrant

(1) Subsection (2) applies if the court has made a forced marriage protection order but—

(a) no power of arrest is attached to any provision of the order under section 63H;(b) such a power is attached only to certain provisions of the order; or(c) such a power was attached for a shorter period than other provisions of the order and that period has expired.(2) An interested party may apply to the relevant judge for the issue of a warrant for the arrest of a person if the interested party considers that the person has failed to comply with the order or is otherwise in contempt of court in relation to the order.

(3) The relevant judge must not issue a warrant on an application under subsection (2) unless—

(a) the application is substantiated on oath; and(b) the relevant judge has reasonable grounds for believing that the person to be arrested has failed to comply with the order or is otherwise in contempt of court in relation to the order.(4) In this section “interested party”, in relation to a forced marriage protection order, means—

(a) the person being protected by the order; or(b) (if a different person) the person who applied for the order.63K Remand: general

(1) The court before which an arrested person is brought under section 63I(3) or by virtue of a warrant issued under section 63J may, if the matter is not then disposed of immediately, remand the person concerned.

(2) Schedule 5 has effect in relation to the powers of the court to remand a person by virtue of this section but as if the following modifications were made to the Schedule.

(3) The modifications are that—

(a) in paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 5, the reference to section 47 is to be read as a reference to this section; and(b) in paragraph 2(5)(b) of the Schedule, the reference to section 48(1) is to be read as a reference to section 63L(1).(4) Subsection (5) applies if a person remanded under this section is granted bail under Schedule 5 as modified above.

(5) The person may be required by the relevant judge to comply, before release on bail or later, with such requirements as appear to the relevant judge to be necessary to secure that the person does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice.

63L Remand: medical examination and report

(1) Any power to remand a person under section 63K(1) may be exercised for the purpose of enabling a medical examination and report to be made if the relevant judge has reason to consider that a medical report will be required.

(2) If such a power is so exercised, the adjournment must not be for more than 4 weeks at a time unless the relevant judge remands the accused in custody.

(3) If the relevant judge remands the accused in custody, the adjournment must not be for more than 3 weeks at a time.

(4) Subsection (5) applies if there is reason to suspect that a person who has been arrested—

(a) under section 63I(2); or(b) under a warrant issued on an application made under section 63J(2);is suffering from mental illness or severe mental impairment.(5) The relevant judge has the same power to make an order under section 35 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c. 20) (remand for report on accused’s mental condition) as the Crown Court has under section 35 of that Act in the case of an accused person within the meaning of that section.

Jurisdiction and procedure63M Jurisdiction of courts: Part 4A

(1) For the purposes of this Part “the court” means the High Court or a county court.

(2) Subsection (1) is subject to any provision made by virtue of subsections (3) and (4).

(3) Section 57(3) to (12) (allocation of proceedings to courts etc.) apply for the purposes of this Part as they apply for the purposes of Part 4 but as if the following modification were made.

(4) The modification is that section 57(8) is to be read as if there were substituted for it—

“(8) For the purposes of subsections (3), (4) and (5), there are two levels of court—

(a) the High Court; and(b) any county court.”63N Power to extend jurisdiction to magistrates’ courts

(1) The Lord Chancellor may, after consulting the Lord Chief Justice, by order provide for magistrates’ courts to be included among the courts who may hear proceedings under this Part.

(2) An order under subsection (1) may, in particular, make any provision in relation to magistrates’ courts which corresponds to provision made in relation to such courts by or under Part 4.

(3) Any power to make an order under this section (including that power as extended by section 65(2)) may, in particular, be exercised by amending, repealing, revoking or otherwise modifying any provision made by or under this Part or any other enactment.

(4) The Lord Chief Justice may nominate a judicial office holder (as defined in section 109(4) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4)) to exercise the Lord Chief Justice’s functions under this section.

63O Contempt proceedings: Part 4A

The powers of the court in relation to contempt of court arising out of a person’s failure to comply with a forced marriage protection order or otherwise in connection with such an order may be exercised by the relevant judge.

63P Appeals: Part 4A

(1) The Lord Chancellor may, after consulting the Lord Chief Justice, by order make provision as to the circumstances in which appeals may be made against decisions taken by courts on questions arising in connection with the transfer, or proposed transfer, of proceedings by virtue of an order made under section 57(5) as applied by section 63M(3) and (4).

(2) Except so far as provided for in any order made under subsection (1), no appeal may be made against any decision of a kind mentioned in that subsection.

(3) The Lord Chief Justice may nominate a judicial office holder (as defined in section 109(4) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4)) to exercise the Lord Chief Justice’s functions under this section.

Supplementary63Q Guidance

(1) The Secretary of State may from time to time prepare and publish guidance to such descriptions of persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate about—

(a) the effect of this Part or any provision of this Part; or(b) other matters relating to forced marriages.(2) A person exercising public functions to whom guidance is given under this section must have regard to it in the exercise of those functions.

63R Other protection or assistance against forced marriage

(1) This Part does not affect any other protection or assistance available to a person who—

(a) is being, or may be, forced into a marriage or subjected to an attempt to be forced into a marriage; or(b) has been forced into a marriage.(2) In particular, it does not affect—

(a) the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court;(b) any criminal liability;(c) any civil remedies under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (c. 40);(d) any right to an occupation order or a non-molestation order under Part 4 of this Act;(e) any protection or assistance under the Children Act 1989 (c. 41);(f) any claim in tort; or(g) the law of marriage.63S Interpretation of Part 4A

In this Part—

“the court” is to be read with section 63M;

“force” (and related expressions), in relation to a marriage, are to be read in accordance with section 63A(4) to (6);

“forced marriage protection order” has the meaning given by section 63A(6);

“marriage” means any religious or civil ceremony of marriage (whether or not legally binding); and

“the relevant judge”, in relation to any order under this Part, means—

(a) where the order was made by the High Court, a judge of that court; and(b) where the order was made by a county court, a judge or district judge of that or any other county court.”.”

2: After Clause 1, leave out lines 16 to 19

The noble Baroness said: I need not repeat my introduction to the series of amendments I will move today. The majority are merely probing and I look forward to the Minister’s response to the questions I will raise.

Amendment No. 2 probes the meaning of “wishes and feelings” in proposed new Section 63A, which has provoked a number of questions. The phrase “wishes and feelings” strikes me as somewhat infelicitous—I am happy to be corrected—as it seems to be setting up an objective test of the value of a person’s wishes and feelings. Subsection (3) states that when deciding a person’s well-being for the purposes of deciding whether to make a forced marriage protection order,

“the court must, in particular, have such regard to the person’s wishes and feelings … as the court considers appropriate”.

At what level does the consideration of a person’s wishes and feelings cease to be appropriate? Does the Minister believe that consideration of wishes and feelings implies the need for an objective judgment on the value of those wishes and feelings?

I have a few more questions with regard to the implementation and effects of orders made under new Section 63A. Does the Minister envisage that when an order is made under that section, it will encourage, or be of especial assistance to, individuals who make an application for nullity? If a forced marriage protection order is made, will that suffice as evidence under new Section 12C of the matrimonial proceedings Act 1973 that a marriage shall be avoidable on the ground that either party of the marriage did not validly consent to it?

I am grateful for the advice of Alicia Collinson of 2 Harcourt Chambers on many aspects of these amendments, in particular on the effect of the Bill on the concept of duress. The Bill appears to replace the concept of duress with prohibition against forced marriage. I am concerned about that for two reasons. First, recent interpretation of duress in the courts has been wide enough to meet the purposes of the Bill; and, secondly, it could result in certain legal precedents of duress not being applicable to future forced marriage cases. I hope that the Minister can reassure me on these points.

The regulatory impact assessment estimates that under the Bill there will be five to 50 applicants a year. Has the Minister considered that the number could be larger, given that many divorce cases among the targeted communities arise out of forced marriages—or, to put in another way, that there are more forced marriages than the Government have estimated? Has she considered that in future many more victims of forced marriage will seek to use this legislation than is estimated by the Forced Marriage Unit? Has the Minister also considered the implications of the extra cost in this regard?

I am grateful for advice on the Government’s amendments from Usha Sood, a family barrister in Nottingham for 40 years who has specialised in cases of forced marriage. She notes that the number of petitioners could be far greater than the Government’s estimate, given that many cases are dealt with in the quickest way possible and often out of court within the community or in the divorce courts as opposed to applications for nullity. Her main concern, which I share entirely, is that there is no explicit definition of forced marriage in the Bill. It is her opinion that a failure to provide any definition of forced marriage—even an open-ended definition that could be subject to the interpretation of the courts—will send to communities precisely the wrong message: that legislation is being introduced that could threaten arranged marriages. I hope that the Minister will be able to take this suggestion away and consider an amendment to make it clear that the legislation in no way seeks to trespass on the acceptable cultural practice of arranged marriages.

I refer the Minister to the judgment of Justice Singer in Re SK, as quoted in paragraph 15 of Justice Munby’s judgment in NS v MI, where he states:

“There is a spectrum of forced marriage from physical force or fear of injury or death … through to the undue imposition of emotional pressure … and that a great area then separates unacceptable forced marriage from marriages arranged traditionally which are in no way to be condemned”.

In order for it to be effective, it is vital that this legislation is respected by and integrated into communities. Indeed, I am surprised that it is not being conducted in tandem with the Department of Communities and Local Government. The integration of new laws can be achieved to a certain extent through concerted effort within communities, but it is vital in the first place that legislation is unequivocal in its purpose.

I wonder whether the Minister has considered how this legislation may be presented to communities in the context of existing cultural laws. Usha Sood recalled a case presided over by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, where two girls, after having annulled their forced marriages, were able to apply for a religious nullity or faksh from the Sharia Council that bolstered their dignity in the eyes of their own community.

I believe that the message that needs to be conveyed to communities is that this Bill will not threaten arranged marriage and that, in the words of Justice Singer,

“arranged may become forced but forced is always different from arranged”.

I beg to move, as an amendment to Amendment No. 1, Amendment No. 2.

We need to define what we mean by “forced”, because there is a distinction between “arranged” and “forced”. If you look at the marriage ceremony itself, strictly speaking consent must be obtained from both the bride and the groom. The minister conducting the marriage ceremony asks the bride as well as the groom if they consent. It is difficult to establish whether force has been applied. We need to be clear about this because in certain religions consent is essential for the marriage to be valid.

I wish to make a couple of points which may not necessarily enlighten the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, but I note that there is some dissension on this issue on the Opposition Benches that did not exist at Second Reading or during the past few years. It might have helped those of us who are not grumpy but cautious about this matter, and might have helped tighten the legislation, if some of the noble Baroness’s points had been raised somewhat earlier. I understand what she is trying to say, but I should hope that we have done enough work over the years to be able to make a clear distinction between arranged and forced marriages. I hope that there is no concern about the fact that duress is definitely a factor in this. We have reached the point that we have in the mainstream legislative framework, and I am very comfortable with that. However, some of the points that she made should have been raised much earlier. Moreover, I believe that some of them have been addressed.

Even my mother would not claim that I was a family lawyer. Therefore, what I am about to say will be subject to correction. As I understand it, duress is a concept used in relation to annulment and there are difficulties about it which may or may not be dealt with as a matter of law reform in a wider context than this Bill. The concept of duress is not appropriate as the sole concept. In my original Bill, I defined “force” and “forcing” to include any physical or psychological coercion. I think that the Official Opposition were content with that definition at that time. There is now a better definition in the Bill, which I am not sure the lawyers who were consulted have noticed. Proposed new Section 63A(6) states that,

“‘force’ includes coerce by threats or other psychological means”,

which encapsulates the original idea. It is quite different from “voluntary arranged marriage”, and that is its purpose.

I hope that noble Lords will indulge me just a few more words. “Force” was defined by the victim just as she or he sought to define it. We were very clear and categorical about that from day one of the Working Group on Forced Marriage.

The noble Baroness, Lady Verma, began by saying that these are probing amendments, and it is absolutely right to test these issues. All of the issues being raised today have been the subject of a great deal of discussion with officials, the judiciary and other organisations. We have gone through in detail a series of questions and concerns, so the opportunity afforded us by the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, enables me to say a little about those discussions for the benefit of those who cannot be with us but who take a great interest in this matter, not least Members of another place who will want to see that we have dealt with them properly. I take the amendments in the spirit of being the key to understanding these issues.

I shall begin by explaining a little about the “wishes and feelings” part of the legislation. In my remarks earlier, I referred to the overarching nature of our approach. One of the questions raised by the Forced Marriage Unit, by victims themselves and the organisations working closely with them, and indeed by the judiciary and the legal profession, is that the disempowerment of an individual is almost absolute in this context. Individuals feel that they have lost control of their own lives. The “wishes and feelings” part of this is to ensure that we do not further disempower them and that we are not doing things to them; rather that we are involving them as much as possible so as to understand what they want.

I used to be an Education Minister, and I was involved in the passage of two children Bills through your Lordships’ House. I can remember many discussions about wishes and feelings, particularly in the context of children. We have to make sure that we provide an opportunity to listen to them. The court is able to instruct the family to bring a young person before it, and it is right and proper if the third party bringing forward the action is able to do that. The court service CAFCASS can be available to those children. CAFCASS officers are experienced in talking to young people in an appropriate way, often not anywhere near a courtroom, but in a place where children feel comfortable. CAFCASS officers can then report back.

Equally, the courts can ask social services representatives to talk to adults to ascertain as far as possible their wishes and feelings. Indeed, one of the areas that we have discussed only today, which I know Mr Justice Munby considered in one of his judgments, is vulnerable adults. Noble Lords will know that I am responsible for the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act, and I can confirm that there is an issue about those who are adult but vulnerable because they lack capacity in some form or have learning difficulties. It is important that the courts are able to use professional support to ascertain wishes and feelings.

However, we have had to be clear in our own minds and in the legislation that this may not always be possible. Given that, the courts need to be able to act on the best information they have, at least on a temporary basis, while they find out as much as they can. We know in the context of children’s legislation and issues of contact and custody orders following divorce that there are real questions about children saying what they think they ought to say. Again, it is important that the courts are able to take the circumstances into account when weighing up how far expressed wishes and feelings really do reflect what the young person wants rather than reacting to what might be said as a result of all sorts of pressure. That is why the legislation is framed in this way. Based on previous experience and after undertaking wide consultation, I believe that we have the balance right. However, we must leave it in some part to the courts to take into account all the different issues, which again points to the need to provide the best possible advice, training and support to the judiciary. I hope that answers the questions put to me about the value placed on wishes and feelings.

Does the question of forced marriage help in terms of evidence of nullity? Yes, it does.

What kind of training will be given to the judiciary, bearing in mind that there are religious issues here which will need to be determined?

We will be discussing that with members of the judiciary, such as the president of the Family Court. I am meeting the members of the judiciary, whom I met this morning, again, I hope, next week. The Judicial Studies Board will be involved. All of them will put together a package—because they are the experts—which will be supported by the Government. The members of the judiciary whom I have spoken to have indicated the need to involve organisations with experience. They are keen that the organisations that have been working on this issue are involved in ensuring that it is well understood.

We are fortunate that some members of our judiciary now have a great deal of experience, hence my wishing to involve them in the legislation. They will also provide practical support to other members of the judiciary to do so. That will be established formally and properly when the Bill passes. I will keep noble Lords informed.

The Minister’s point about learning disabilities and so on reminded me of a question that I was asked by a family considering the marriage of their autistic child. I think that the case is before the court at the moment, so I shall not mention any particular details. As the Minister has embarked on discussions with various organisations and institutions, can she assure the Committee that she has also undertaken some discussions with the Disability Rights Commission? If not, will she do so? There is obviously a great deal of discussion yet to be had. As an advocate of disability rights, I believe that every disabled person has the right to marriage, love and everything which accompanies that. There are many difficulties when communication and learning disabilities are a problem. I would try to avoid that all being encompassed in some kind of cultural misunderstanding, put away and not addressed.

I have not had discussions with the Disability Rights Commission. I take the point, and I will talk to it in more detail. The Forced Marriage Unit is issuing guidance for social workers dealing with vulnerable adults on these issues. The noble Baroness is absolutely right: everyone is entitled to a happy, loving relationship and marriage.

Thinking of adults with a different kind of vulnerability, we have also been in discussion with those involved with gay and lesbian people who find themselves forced into marriage. We have put a particular group in touch with Stonewall, who I hope will work with it to provide support and advice. That is, again, an area where we must think about the range of people who must be supported and taken into account. We will talk formally to the Disability Rights Commission and report back to the noble Baroness and Members of the Committee as the Bill goes through Parliament. We are in touch, and it is an important issue.

On the definition, we have deliberately not defined it. I hear what the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, says about Mr Justice Singer, and I agree with what he says; it has the range and the spectrum. When we looked at this—and we had many discussions with the noble Lord, Lord Lester—we talked to the judiciary and got the advice that we could. The elements within the concept of forced marriage are varied and different in different circumstances. To try to define it always creates a potential difficulty; by defining it, you narrow the definition.

I could not agree more that this has nothing to do with the long established and successful tradition of arranged marriage. That communication which needs to go out—alluded to, if not explicitly said, by the noble Lord, Lord Sheikh, and the noble Baroness, Lady Verma—is critical. The judiciary is clear about that, as are we. We would not wish this in any way to be interpreted as being about any individual or community, or about a practice that has worked extremely well. This is about something entirely different: being forced into something you do not want to do. That is the fundamental difference: there is no consent. I agree that we need to do more, however.

The Department of Communities and Local Government, like every other government department, has been consulted on the Bill. It is our practice to ask all departments to endorse the legislation coming before them from the Government, and it did so wholeheartedly. It was part of the process of thinking through what we need to do and it fully supported that. As I have said, this is not about being anti any community. We need to stress over and over again that forced marriage applies in all communities; it is wrong in all communities; and we need to work with those communities to ensure that we deal with it properly.

Finally, I will say a little about costs, as almost inevitably money plays an important part, and the volume of cases. The noble Baroness, Lady Verma, was right to ask what we thought the number of cases might be. We have an estimate of between five and 50 cases from the caseworkers within the Forced Marriage Unit. They say that they deal with about 300 cases every year; two-thirds of which would not include circumstances covered by the Bill; and about 100 that would. They considered that as few as five of these might necessitate an application to the courts. But it is guesswork at this point.

The senior members of the judiciary dealing with cases of forced marriage in the High Court have estimated that in the past 12 months about 30 cases of forced marriage have come to the High Court. One of the things that will happen when we have this civil remedy is that, because of the publicity and the fact that we have made the point that there is a civil remedy, the number of cases will increase. There are three elements to costs which I want to put on the record. First, there are legal aid questions. My honourable friend Vera Baird, who is responsible for legal aid, is at the moment considering how she might take that forward. Secondly, there are the important costs around the judicial processes, which we will be looking at, and the training and support for the judiciary as they take this issue forward. We will talk with the Judicial Studies Board about that. We are very aware that we need to ensure that this works effectively, and that there is proper training and support.

Thirdly, there will be an impact on all the organisations which currently work with victims of forced marriage. Any publicity, anything new or different, means that their work will grow. I think I have said to all of them that I am very mindful of that and that it will be for government to seek to try to respond to that properly. Those are the three areas.

I raise a point that has been mentioned to me regarding legal aid. Will the Minister amplify the legal aid criteria? Will they be the normal criteria or something different?

They would be the normal criteria. I shall inform the noble Lord if there is anything further to add to that.

In deference to the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, about ascertaining the wishes of the victim, it arises because of third party intervention in particular and the importance of this being victim-led and not inconsistent with the wishes of the victim, which is why it is important to do one’s best. The Minister dealt comprehensively with the position regarding children.

As to adults, it is my understanding that the High Court has noted that the court can direct the Official Solicitor, if he agrees to carry out investigations to ascertain the wishes and feelings of a vulnerable adult in this jurisdiction who has capacity to marry. Mr Justice Munby in a case called Re SA (Vulnerable adult with capacity: marriage) described a vulnerable adult as,

“someone who, whether or not mentally incapacitated, and whether or not suffering from any mental illness or mental disorder, is or may be unable to take care of him or herself, or unable to protect him or herself against significant harm or exploitation, or who is deaf, blind or dumb, or who is substantially handicapped by illness, injury or congenital deformity”.

The judge went on to say that the court has the power to make whatever orders and to give whatever directions are needed to ascertain the true wishes of a vulnerable adult. I understand that steps can also be taken to ascertain the wishes and feelings of a vulnerable adult who is outside the jurisdiction. I say that for completeness.

The noble Lord is absolutely right. I was referring to three groups of people. The first were children and how CAFCASS plays a central role. The parents can also be directed to bring in the child both in this jurisdiction and beyond. Secondly, I said that social services can be involved with adults. Again, if appropriate, the adults can be requested to come to the court. Thirdly, there are vulnerable adults. The noble Lord adds on to what I said, and I am grateful to him. The role of the Official Solicitor is very important as regards the Mental Capacity Act. If appropriate, we would encourage that role.

My point was that there are other ways to ascertain such things when dealing with professionals. My noble friend made a very good point that the Disability Rights Commission also has a central role to play in this.

I return to the question of costs. My noble friend mentioned the judiciary and the training requirement. I want to bring forward the concerns of women’s organisations, refuges and specialist provision that have continued to support women under a great deal of duress and struggle. We do not have any idea at this stage of the numbers of women and men who will be seeking support and assistance as a result of the Bill. It would be seeking a fool’s paradise to ask the Government to ring-fence some money, as that is not going to happen. How does my noble friend suggest that we ensure that the requirement for extra resources will be considered seriously?

It is a serious issue. The cost of creating a new remedy, if we have 50 applications, is about £180,000 a year. It is arguable that in the realm of government budgets that is doable. We will need to consider the resources of the Forced Marriage Unit. The issue will not be raised in my department. Across the Government, in talking about the legislation, I have made it clear that there will be an impact that we need to be aware of. The issue will be addressed properly as we consider this and talk to organisations and as they get access to the departments that will be able to support them. At this point, whether that means that departments are able to give additional resources is not for me to say. The assurance that I am giving is the recognition that this is something that we will have to deal with. I am not in a position to say how at this stage, not least because, as my noble friend knows well, the difficulty is that we do not know precisely what impact there will be.

The estimate that we have done of the number of cases is based on the best information that we have, and we can cost that; £4,100 is an average cost of a domestic violence case. Therefore, we have used that as our ballpark figure. We have talked with those who have dealt with these cases in the courts. That is an estimate, and we will have to examine it. The point about the Government doing the legislation is that we recognise that we will have to deal with it, not least in terms of the training and support that is needed.

The Minister referred to children. A case was reported in the papers last week in which an 11 year-old girl was rescued from a forced marriage situation in Bangladesh. Obviously, in some overseas countries a boy or girl does not have to be 16 to be married. Can the Minister make any comment regarding situations such as this one where children are taken abroad, perhaps under a pretext, and a forced marriage arises?

Yes, I can. I was in India last week, and forced marriage was one of the issues that I discussed with the Government and with the National Commission for Women. To give the noble Lord an indication, over the next few weeks the High Commission in India will be visiting 700 villages in the Punjab with posters, copies of which I can show the noble Lord, to raise the issue and to invite people, where UK nationals are involved, to come forward to get support from the High Commission. In India last year, some 10 UK nationals were returned as a result of some element of forced marriage. As the noble Lord will know, in Bangladesh and Pakistan we have people who bring back UK nationals involved. I mentioned those three countries because I have information on them, not to try to identify them as being the only countries where we have issues.

The noble Lord, Lord Lester, referred to the fact that I am the justice Minister who sits on the Justice and Home Affairs Council in the European Union. I hope to raise this issue with my colleagues across the European Union and with the European Commission in Brussels. The importance of the work that we do internationally should not be underestimated for a moment. The Forced Marriage Unit deals with this in an exemplary fashion, and it gets a lot of co-operation from Governments. There are issues in terms of the judicial systems in other Governments, and we are talking to the judiciary about how to encourage and promote better relationships through government discussions. When I was in India, the Indian Government were keen to raise particular issues that they were worried about. A good dialogue has been established, and we will continue that. Good work is already being done. Obviously I cannot comment on individual cases; the noble Lord would not expect me to do so. We need to enhance the good work that is being done and ensure that we are working government to government and judiciary to judiciary. We also want to ensure that we offer practical support on the ground for those whom we wish to bring home.

I was alluding more to the minors who have been taken abroad. In this country, such an event is a criminal offence.

Indeed. As I think I have indicated, 30 per cent of the cases which the Forced Marriage Unit deals with involve young people, largely girls, who are under 16. There is an issue about minors, but we do have some success in returning them to this country.

May I supplement that answer? First, there are the child abduction arrangements, which I believe the Republic of India is now fully signed up to. Secondly, proposed new Section 63B on the contents of orders is very broad. It empowers the court to make an order with,

“such prohibitions, restrictions or requirements; and such other terms; as the court considers appropriate for the purposes of the order”.

It continues:

“The terms of such orders may, in particular, relate to—conduct outside England and Wales as well as (or instead of) conduct within England and Wales”.

It therefore has a reach beyond this country, but of course it will not work completely unless there is matching legislation, which can be enforced—this is also key—in other countries such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. There is real interest in all three countries. Two of those countries have recently passed some amending legislation, which is not the same as this legislation, but I am encouraged by the moves that are being made there.

I should clarify that India has not yet signed up to the child abduction arrangements, but has indicated to me that it plans to do so very shortly. I am the Minister responsible for our duties under the Hague convention.

I thank noble Lords for their responses. I am grateful to the Minister for her response. The noble Lord’s response gave rise to some questions that I may wish to return to at a later date. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment No. 2, as an amendment to Amendment No. 1, by leave, withdrawn.

3: After Clause 1, leave out lines 123 to 136

The noble Baroness said: Amendment No. 3 would leave out proposed new Section 63E, which allows the court to accept an undertaking from a respondent that he will in effect abide by the terms of an order without actually being subject to one. Although I appreciate that this may function as an effective light-touch measure that will enable the respondent to avoid the shame of being subject to a court order, while giving the petitioner some reassurance, I have a few concerns with the way in which the order is set up. Proposed new Section 63E(2) states that no power of arrest may be attached to an undertaking, but it goes on to say that an undertaking given to the court is enforceable as if the court had made an equivalent order. There seems to be some contradiction inherent in the making of the orders.

I appreciate that undertakings cannot replace orders that would otherwise have had a power of arrest attached to them, but I notice that if an order without a power of arrest attached is breached, it is still subject to the existing law of contempt of court under proposed new Section 63O, which, unless I am mistaken, comes with a power of arrest. So either there is a power of arrest attached to an undertaking, in which case there needs to be some amendment to clarify this in the Bill, or I am mistaken and there is no power of arrest. If so, I confess that I do not see how effective such an undertaking would be in practice.

On the powers of arrest attached to the orders, proposed new Section 63H(2) states that the court need not attach a power of arrest to an order if,

“it considers that, in all the circumstances of the case, there will be adequate protection without such a power”.

Can the Minister say what she thinks will constitute “adequate protection”?

On varying orders to include a power of arrest retrospectively, what will occasion such a reaction from the courts, apart from an application to a judge? Will respondents be monitored once they are subject to an order? Perhaps a description of how orders are followed under Part 4 of the Family Law Act 1996 would give us an idea of how this may function.

In the event that a respondent is arrested, the power to remand, as indicated in new Section 63K, and consequentially in Schedule 5 of the Family Law Act 1996, seems to be open-ended. I refer to paragraph (3) of that schedule, which states that the court may enlarge a person’s recognisance to a later time. Can the Minister give an indication of the maximum remand time that she expects a respondent to be subject to? I hope noble Lords will forgive me for these lengthy questions, but it is important to tease out every detail at this stage, so that this Bill goes to another place with a clean health check.

The real issue here is the effect that these various orders, undertakings and powers of arrest will have on the communities that the Bill will target. I refer to paragraph 5 of the regulatory impact assessment, which estimates that the legislation is likely to impact on,

“individuals, in practice particularly those from South Asian cultural and ethnic groups”.

My experience in working with those groups is extensive. I have, sadly, witnessed the pressure put on young girls in families where family honour and respect are constantly cited as reasons for these matches. The high level of emotional stress is unremitting and the complete feeling of isolation inflicted is quite impossible to imagine. These incidents are on the rise, particularly with the social and political climate increasingly making it more difficult for people in some communities to feel confident and sure about the wider world. Those who seek help in these circumstances must be confident that no system is then going to fail them; as the consequences of failure could, sadly, in some cases prove fatal. My concern is that even with light-touch legislation, the threat of orders and arrest could drive the practice of forced marriage underground and overseas. I echo the concerns of my noble friend Lord Taylor of Holbeach in his excellent speech at Second Reading, when he raised the question of overseas jurisdiction.

I quote the response of the Minister, who acknowledged that in the consultation:

“The overwhelming majority felt that families might take advantage of lack of overseas jurisdiction, taking their children overseas to circumvent laws in the UK”.—[Official Report, 26/1/07; col. 1363.]

I do not oppose the Government’s amendments to the Bill on those grounds, as I believe that the orders and undertakings could be put to good use. Rather, I seek reassurance from the Minister that this legislation will not result in either having too little success for the people it seeks to protect by way of inadequate powers of enforcement, or have the unintended consequence of alienating the very communities that it seeks to assist.

For example, what evidence does the Minister have that closed communities will accept this legislation without taking action deliberately to avoid it? What monitoring will there be of orders and undertakings? Will the social services be involved, and will there be special liaison officers appointed in local police forces to deal with victims of forced marriage, in the same way as there are for victims of rape? What extra training could that involve? At this stage, I am purely probing the Government’s thinking on this and the plans that they have in place. I did not note in the RIA that any supporting structure was to be put in place or that any costing had been carried out. If there are such plans, what is the estimated cost, and where will the money come from? I know that noble Lords have raised such questions under my previous amendment, but there is further probing to be done on this. I look forward to the Minister’s response. It may be that she will need to write to me on some of the points, and I would be happy for her to do so. I beg to move, as an amendment to Amendment No. 1, Amendment No. 3.

I have a couple of comments on the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Verma. Given that it is a probing amendment, I can understand some of her comments. My experience of raising certain points on a number of occasions makes me empathise with some of her points.

There are always difficulties with legislation in terms of how strong it is and how much impact it will have. Any legislation that comes out of all our work and effort must ensure that criminals are dealt with in the harshest way possible. If we seek to deal with these issues within the framework of family law covering domestic violence and so forth, particularly with regard to children, there should be no ambiguity about the pursuit of justice and ensuring protection for young people and children. In any case there is a danger that this legislation could be perceived as uneven-handed and specifically targeted at certain communities. Although I believe that we have done enough work along the way to alleviate some of those fears, we have not continued to protect vulnerable young people in the way in which they should be protected. If we had dealt with this within the statutory framework of domestic violence law and child protection, we would have made a better job of preventing some of the heartache created by this problem.

I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, that the weakness in our discussions is that we do not necessarily penetrate to the heart of the communities where deep suspicions remain. The way to tackle that is to make a serious commitment to empowering women and delivering the message again and again that we want to deal with criminals, not criminalise communities. We will tackle those who seek to abuse the rights of individuals. We must be clear about that from the outset so that there are fewer opportunities for misunderstanding.

Consistency is not necessarily always desirable, but sometimes it is. I do not think that the Official Opposition can make the point that the Bill would drive the practice overseas or underground unless they were opposed to the legislation, which they are not. The same objection could be made to any legislation that sought to tackle forced marriage. That is an important point of principle and is not really a probing point. The aim of the legislation is to offer some kind of effective protection, so the argument about driving the practice underground cannot seriously be pursued.

On the matter of undertakings, again the whole point is to provide a sensitive, private and non-adversarial way of coping with the problem. Again I should have thought that that would be consistent with the Opposition’s approach.

I am grateful to noble Lords. We have had an interesting debate. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, is right to say that undertakings are incredibly useful because they do not ask people to admit to the allegations being made against them, but enable them to say, “I will not do that”. I see that my noble friend Lady Uddin agrees. A point that has driven our discussions right the way through from the original consultation on the criminal offence, which was rejected, is that of recognising the importance of family in this. The family courts can hear things in private and handle the issues very sensitively. They can ask simply for an undertaking without requiring someone to admit to having done anything. It is an important tool that will help a family to stay together.

Our ambition here is that young women and some young men become empowered. They should feel that they can make choices, but that they can also keep their families. If we can go some way towards achieving that in this legislation, we will have achieved a real success. Anything we can do to enable the sensitivity and flexibility of the courts to come into play is important. That is what an undertaking in this context would do.

In answer to the points put by the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, although an undertaking can achieve a great deal, if someone breaches it, they will have breached something that has been put to them by the court. At that point an undertaking can be enforced as if it was an order. If I give an undertaking to the court that I will not coerce another individual to do certain things without admitting that I have ever done so, the court will say that that is fine. If I go on to do so, I am in breach and the court may act.

The noble Baroness asked me about remand. The remand period is eight days, unless the parties consent to it being longer or because some medical examination needs to take place.

The provisions in the proposed new section are used in Section 46 of the Family Law Act, which deals with cases of domestic violence. We have approached this by replicating those provisions. The charge of contempt of court is available if the undertaking is not carried through. It carries a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment.

Would the undertaking need the involvement of police, or would the person apply to the court? Obviously, in certain situations the police do not always wish to co-operate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Verma, asked about adequate protection and what that would mean. We have deliberately left that for the courts to decide. They have to look at the circumstances. One of the big questions we discussed with a number of organisations and individuals was about making sure that flexibility was available for the court to take the particular circumstances into account. In other words, what is the definition of “force”, how do people behave, and what force is used? The courts can then take account of all the circumstances and say, “We believe that in this set of circumstances in this particular case, adequate protection is available”. That is the way in which we should approach it, rather than seeking to define it. Those members of the judiciary who have been involved with these cases are well versed in what they are looking at and for. They will be involved in making sure that we pass on the training, advice and guidance, and, indeed, how we involve other members of the judiciary. But I think we are right to leave it with that flexibility.

The noble Baroness, Lady Verma, asked me about special liaison officers and so on. I think that I have already indicated in my earlier speech that we want to incorporate part of this into existing domestic violence provisions in the national strategy. Domestic violence provisions will be put in place locally where liaison officers are available. That will be incorporated into their work. There is not a plan to have a separate group.

I have given as much information on costings as I can at this stage. As the noble Baroness will know, we are required to give an initial regulatory impact assessment by the Better Regulation Executive in the Cabinet Office. She will also know that we continue to work on it; it is not the final version. It is the version that we have been able to produce at this stage. It continues to be updated and the figures refined ahead of implementation of the Bill, and of course we make sure that Parliament is informed of the changes made.

We are working with each other on the different elements of the Bill to get the best possible information, including on costs. It is not that we have been lax or have not taken this matter seriously; but it is ultimately an area where we have to make assumptions. It is critical to make the best assumptions that we can and to be prepared to refine them. Hence, it is part of the national domestic violence policy to look at the costs for the individual cases and at judicial training and so on. I would not like to second guess what the Judicial Studies Board will want to say about the level of training it wants to put in place at this stage. It is for it to tell me.

The noble Lord, Lord Lester, is right that enforcement abroad was raised with me at Second Reading by the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach. Noble Lords know that, because we have discussed it before, we have the European Union regulations, international conventions and the 1980 Hague child abduction convention, which has already been referred to. We seek enforcement of decisions across national borders. We also seek enforcement through both codified and informal judicial legal co-operation through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Lord Justice Thorpe, the deputy president of the Family Division, spends an enormous amount of time looking at judicial co-operation and helping me with my work in making sure that we have the right level of co-operation between the judiciary and the Governments.

The second way in which we deal with this is through protocols between the UK and Pakistan, for example, where liaison judges in both countries seek to communicate with each other on child abduction cases, ensuring that each is aware of the court orders in the other’s country. It has been extremely valuable, and has helped to ensure the return of abducted children from Pakistan to the UK. I had the privilege of meeting, in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, those involved with child abduction cases. We continue to liaise and work closely with other countries where we can.

The Minister has gone a long way to reassure me about several of my concerns. Some questions still need greater discussion. I will leave that to Report, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment No. 3, as an amendment to Amendment No. 1, by leave, withdrawn.

4: After Clause 1, leave out lines 281 to 295

The noble Baroness said: The amendment probes the potential powers of the magistrates’ court. I appreciate that powers are not yet extended to the magistrates’ courts, but would still like to ask some questions about how this would be implemented. I refer particularly to Schedule 5 to the Family Law Act 1996, which allows the High Court or a county court to remand a person under proposed new Section 63K. A magistrates’ court would be unable to carry out such powers under Part 4 without amendment to the Magistrates’ Courts Act. If and when jurisdiction is extended to magistrates’ courts under proposed new Section 69N, will the magistrates’ courts have the same powers as the High Court or the county court—that is, jurisdiction to deal with contempt of court in respect of a breach of a relevant order with imprisonment of up to two years?

Should there be provision for summary offences in England and Wales? I suspect that this may not be necessary, because the High Court and the county court have wide powers to deal adequately with a breach of order, but I look forward to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for the amendment. An important part of what we sought to do within the Bill is to make it easier for those threatened with forced marriage to get the protection they need within the civil courts system. The possibility of extending jurisdiction is an important part of that. The key reason for the magistrates’ courts being included within the legislation, and the power to extend, is that we are increasingly moving towards the concept of a single family court, as noble Lords will know, enabling issues and cases to be dealt with by the appropriate judge and making movement between the courts easier. We have published our strategy to create a single family court where magistrates and district judges will become the first tier of the new court. To ensure that we do not leave ourselves with a difficulty in primary legislation should that come to fruition, the power is in the Bill to ensure that we can move to single family courts effectively.

The magistrates’ courts and the High Court do not have the same powers, which I think is the answer the noble Baroness was keen to hear. We will not extend beyond the county courts until we are confident that we can do so. There have been discussions with the Magistrates’ Association, and some magistrates would be keen to be involved. That may well be appropriate in the future, perhaps through a ticketing system, but we are nowhere near there yet. At this point, it is important to ensure that we can get the right training and experience into the judiciary at the county court level to ensure that these complex cases—which need careful handling, not least with community sensitivity and understanding of what is meant by a “forced marriage”, and so on—are dealt with properly and appropriately.

Magistrates have the powers to remand as set out in the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, which would apply. Power of contempt for magistrates would also apply, which I think is Section 63 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act. The purpose of taking this within the legislation, however, is to allow for single family courts and to ensure that, if and when it were appropriate, we could involve magistrates without having to return to primary legislation, but could do so through secondary legislation.

Given that we are talking about cases going to court and very distressing circumstances, would the Minister like to comment on the delay aspect and the fact that it will take a little while for such cases to be heard?

We do not, wherever possible, want delay. I believe that that is the answer the noble Lord is looking for. There is a genuine desire to avoid it. We have discussed with the judiciary how to ensure that action can be taken very quickly if necessary. As the noble Lord will know, there are issues about the geographical jurisdiction within which county court judges and High Court judges operate and how we might ensure that those involved can talk to each other. Those issues are under discussion. The noble Lord’s principal point is right; these are distressing circumstances. Again, within the overarching strategy on domestic violence, it is important that these issues can be dealt with as quickly and properly as possible. There must be a balance between the two when giving information to the judiciary so that they can act properly. As I understand it, there is an emergency remedy and powers of arrest can be used within 24 hours, so we have already some of the necessary measures. The noble Lord is right that it is absolutely critical to ensure that this is done properly, effectively and speedily.

I thank the Minister for her response, and the noble Lord, Lord Sheikh, for his crucial question. We may revisit this on Report but, in the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment No. 4, as an amendment to Amendment No. 1, by leave, withdrawn.

5: After Clause 1, leave out lines 316 to 324

The noble Baroness said: I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 5A and 12A. Amendment No. 5 would delete proposed new Section 63Q on the grounds that it is too broad a power of guidance. I was concerned that the guidance given under it could extend to guidance given by the Secretary of State to the judiciary, thereby severely compromising the judiciary’s independence. I am grateful to the Bill team for meeting my noble friend Lady Anelay and me to discuss this matter in advance of today’s debate and, as a result, I am pleased that the Minister can support Amendments Nos. 5A and 12A in my name today. I am grateful for her contribution to them.

Amendments Nos. 5A and 12A would achieve the same objective. Amendment No. 5A would apply to England and Wales, and Amendment No. 12A would apply to Northern Ireland. They would prevent the Secretary of State in the case of England and Wales, and the Department of Finance and Personnel in the case of Northern Ireland, from issuing guidance to any court or tribunal. I understand that this definition would prevent the Secretary of State from issuing guidance not only to courts and tribunals but to the judiciary as a body. I look to the Minister for reassurance on this matter, as these amendments have been produced hand in hand with her.

Pending the Minister’s agreement that the amendment will not compromise the independence of the judiciary, and pending her acceptance of Amendments Nos. 5A and 12A, I would be content to withdraw Amendment No. 5. In the mean time, I beg to move.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I have to say that it is a privilege doing business with her. I will try to give the assurances that she seeks so that she can withdraw Amendment No. 5. I am perfectly comfortable with accepting Amendments Nos. 5A and 12A. I shall say a little about the purpose of the guidance, and shall address the particular point that the noble Baroness makes about the judiciary.

As noble Lords may have seen, the Forced Marriage Unit has produced extremely good and helpful guidance and advice on such things as how to distinguish between an arranged marriage and a forced marriage, and what the motives, legal position and aggravating factors might be. Guidance has also been produced on how to keep accurate records and maintain confidentiality, the potential dangers of mediation, and what advice to give if someone has been taken overseas. Noble Lords know how important guidance can be to assist professionals to identify a forced marriage and to help them to take action. Key to this is profession-specific guidance. The noble Baroness, Lady Park, who is no longer in the Room, talked about education. Education professionals need information on how to discuss forced marriage in the context of the curriculum. For the police, there is advice on missing persons. For others, there are practical ways in which we can offer guidance and advice. In practice, this is the kind of guidance that will be issued on a statutory basis if proposed new Section 63Q is enacted. It requires public authorities to take due regard of any guidance produced under it, and we should ensure that it is followed. The Forced Marriage Unit believes that this provision will significantly enable it to promote the importance of its work.

It is possible that someone may want to seek a judicial review of a public body for failure to act in relation to enforced marriage which arose from its failure to take account of guidance or from a decision to disregard it. If the guidance were relevant, the court would be able to consider the legality or reasonableness of the decision of the public in the light of that guidance in reaching its decision, because it would be statutory. The noble Baroness, Lady Verma, moved her original Amendment No. 5 because of her concern about the infringement of the independence of the judiciary, saying that it would run contrary to the provisions of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. That Act places the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, other Ministers of the Crown and all those with responsibility for matters relating to the judiciary, or otherwise to the administration of justice, under a duty to uphold the continued independence of the judiciary. Provisions in that Act that already make express provision to ensure the independence of the judiciary are relevant to this clause. In particular, paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the 2005 Act expressly refers to guidance about the application or interpretation of the law and the making of judicial decisions. The Lord Chief Justice alone may give directions regarding these. It is in no way the intention for guidance issued under this section to be used to influence judicial discretion in determining a case.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for Amendments Nos. 5A and 12A, which seek to put the matter beyond doubt. Amendment No. 5A clarifies that the provision for guidance in new Section 63Q does not permit the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State to give guidance to any court or tribunal, while Amendment No. 12A makes the same clarification in respect of guidance which may be issued by the Department of Finance and Personnel in Northern Ireland. The use of the term “court or tribunal” in this amendment encapsulates the judiciary and magistrates, and covers the notion of the judge or magistrate making a decision. The use of this term is in line with other statutes and rules where the term “court” is defined by reference to the judiciary. For example, the definition of “court” in the Family Proceeding Rules 1991, which set out procedures for the county courts and the High Court when considering family proceedings, provides that a court is either the judge or the district judge. Thus the clause will also prevent any guidance being issued to the judiciary as a body generally.

Section 81 of the Courts Act 2003 sets out that the Lord Chief Justice has the power to make practice directions in relation to family proceedings, and this power uses the same reference to the courts rather than the judiciary. I hope that that clarifies the position completely for the noble Baroness, and I welcome Amendments Nos. 5A and 12A.

I understand what my noble friend has said about ensuring guidance for the judiciary. Does she accept that it is a little more problematic when it comes to ensuring that guidance is comprehensive in terms of educational material? Has any thought been given to how such guidance will be produced? For those of us who are passionate about this issue and therefore interested—I am expressing my interest right now—in the nitty-gritty of the detail, can she give an assurance that we will be able to view such guidance during its early development?

I am sure that the Forced Marriage Unit would be more than happy to discuss it with my noble friend. I know that she has immense experience in this area. Work is currently going on in the drafting of potential guidance in consultation with practitioners. I am sure that the unit will be happy to indicate in writing for the benefit of noble Lords in this Committee who is involved in those discussions. The unit will not mind me making that offer on its behalf. It would be fantastic if my noble friend were able to spare the time to look at the draft guidance and give the unit the benefit of her opinion.

We are seeking to give more weight to the work being undertaken by the Forced Marriage Unit in terms of guidance. It is something which I know that both the Foreign Office and the Home Office are keen to see being developed. Further, it will enable us to discuss with our colleagues across government, particularly in education but also elsewhere, how to ensure that schools are given proper guidance. Because it will have the weight of being statutory guidance, it will be dealt with properly in terms of the curriculum, which is aimed at young people.

The victims mentioned that they talked to their friends about this matter. They also said—this was very important for my understanding of this issue—that they did not necessarily talk to friends from their own community. Many did not want to talk to members of their own community because they were not sure how they would react. It is important that young people understand how this issue affects different communities and are given good advice on what to do if their best friends are caught up in this situation. We need to get schools involved in this through the curriculum and the work that we are doing on human rights. Teachers often know that something is going on with the young people in their care and wish to help. It is important to give them advice and support.

My noble friend makes a good point and one which I always labour. We must not allow the notion to exist that difficult decisions taken within cultural or religious contexts must be hidden or that difficult issues cannot be discussed within a community. If these issues were discussed, they would not be demonised. I hope that these discussions will enable Asian, African and Jewish women, or women of whatever culture or religion, to gain ownership of some of these problems and to discuss them openly. A victim should not feel that he or she is unable to discuss these problems with members of their own community or with their peers.

We need to send out a clear and categorical message that this is not acceptable behaviour. Young people should be able to raise these issues with whoever they feel comfortable with. Such matters should not be demonised or enclosed in a little box and discussed separately, as has been the case with domestic violence, child sexual abuse, incest and many other complicated issues. We have arrived at the point where we should be able to raise these issues with parents, even very harsh parents. We need to empower young people to speak out and say that certain practices are wrong. They should have the ability and the right to raise these issues with whoever they wish without feeling subject to cultural constraint.

An important part of Mr Blair’s legacy is the Constitutional Reform Act which makes it quite clear that there is a separation of powers between the judiciary on the one hand and the Executive on the other. I added my name to Amendment No. 5A although I do not think that it is technically strictly necessary because I believe that the Constitutional Reform Act would trump any attempt by a Minister to give directions to a court or tribunal. However, I regard Amendment No. 5A as beneficial for the avoidance of doubt. That is why I support it.

It is extremely important that Ministers refrain from telling judges how to deal with cases, and I am sure that they would not dream of doing so. On the other hand, there is a need for judicial training in relation to this Act, especially to translate the wisdom of some expert High Court judges down to the county courts. That is the direct responsibility not of Ministers but of the Judicial Studies Board. I had the privilege of taking part in that training on the Human Rights Act, when the board carried out great work for two years. It is directly responsible for training full-time and part-time judges, and is under judicial control. The Judicial Studies Board has a family committee and an equal treatment advisory committee, both of which would have a role in ensuring that judges received training on the Bill, just as they currently receive training on other parts of the Family Law Act. The board has prepared written material and publications, such as the Family Bench Book. That is the right way forward. I therefore support Amendment No. 5A and am grateful to the Minister for her response.

I am again grateful to all noble Lords for their responses. I am grateful to the Minister for her reassurances. She has gone a long way to allay the many concerns which a lot of us had. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment No. 5, as an amendment to Amendment No. 1, by leave, withdrawn.

5A: After Clause 1, line 324, at end insert—

“(3) Nothing in this section permits the Secretary of State to give guidance to any court or tribunal.”

On Question, amendment agreed to.

On Question, Amendment No. 1, as amended, agreed to.

6: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—

“Protection against forced marriage: Northern Ireland

Schedule (Protection against forced marriage: Northern Ireland) (protection against forced marriage: Northern Ireland) has effect.”

The noble Baroness said: I also speak to Amendment No. 11. The amendment inserts a new clause and schedule into the Bill, providing parallel provision for Northern Ireland. As the aim of the clause and schedule is to replicate provisions for Northern Ireland, I will be brief, except in the areas where the drafting may differ somewhat.

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the right honourable Peter Hain, sought inclusion of Northern Ireland in the Bill, as he considers it important that potential victims in Northern Ireland receive the same level of protection as others in the United Kingdom. As noble Lords will be aware, the Northern Ireland Assembly has been reinstated at Stormont from 8 May, which I am sure noble Lords will agree is a most happy development for Northern Ireland. The subjects of the amendment are of course transferred matters under the Northern Ireland Act 1998, and therefore within the competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Minister for Finance and Personnel in Northern Ireland, Mr Peter Robinson, MLA, has indicated that he is content that I move these amendments today, as he wishes to see the protections provided by the Bill available to the people of Northern Ireland.

Noble Lords will no doubt be aware that there exists a convention that Westminster will not normally legislate on devolved matters except with the agreement of the devolved legislature. Due to timings, it has not been possible to seek that formal agreement prior to today, but the Northern Ireland Executive Committee will consider the inclusion of Northern Ireland in the Bill on 24 May, and the Northern Ireland Assembly will debate the same on 11 June. It may seem unusual to proceed with the inclusion of Northern Ireland before the agreements have been reached but, as I have indicated, the Minister for Finance and Personnel in Northern Ireland is anxious that the inclusion of Northern Ireland in the Bill does not delay the Westminster parliamentary timetable. I am therefore delighted to move these amendments today, so that the people of Northern Ireland can be afforded the rights which the Bill will confer.

Turning briefly to the areas in which Northern Ireland drafting may differ from that of England and Wales, in paragraph 4 of the schedule the wording is slightly different to new Section 63D of the main amendment, as it follows the wording of the Family Homes and Domestic Violence (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, as amended by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Northern Ireland) Order 2005. That reflects the decision of Higgins J in the case of Re Sloane in 2001, which identified the need to clarify that a date for a full hearing should be specified at the ex parte hearing. There is no equivalent of new Section 63E in the schedule relating to Northern Ireland because there is no statutory provision for undertakings in respect of domestic violence in the Family Homes and Domestic Violence (Northern Ireland) Order 1998. It was considered that the same approach should be used for forced marriage protection orders as already existed for domestic violence in Northern Ireland.

Paragraph 7 of the schedule creates an offence for breaching a forced marriage protection order. Based on the penalty contained in the Family Homes and Domestic Violence (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 for breaching a non-molestation order or combined non-molestation order and occupation order, a person who contravenes a forced marriage protection order without reasonable excuse is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £5,000 and/or a term of imprisonment of up to six months. This offence is intended to be an alternative to contempt proceedings, not to punish behaviour which may result in a forced protection order being sought. I beg to move.

I am delighted by the amendment. My Bill originally extended only to England and Wales, to respect the devolution settlement. It is very important, because just as we have been talking about what to do in the sub-continent, so it is desirable that we have common standards in the United Kingdom that can deal with a social evil that extends beyond England and Wales. It is therefore very good news to know that the new Administration in Northern Ireland wish this to happen. We cannot deal with Scotland at the moment, but I would be very surprised indeed, whatever Administration comes to pass in Scotland, and if the legislation applies to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, if the Scots were not also to introduce matching legislation.

I support the amendment. I am pleased that Northern Ireland is going to be included. Having been to Belfast a couple of times, I know that there are ethnic minority families there. I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Lester, said, that perhaps similar legislation can be introduced in Scotland. The Minister has my support.

I, too, welcome the fact that this provision is being extended to Northern Ireland. I want to raise a couple of points. Northern Ireland is perhaps not a jurisdiction that we have control over now, but it appears that we have some control over its future destiny, which looks very bright; I welcome that. Last year, we undertook with some Muslim women a discussion with women in Northern Ireland. They are great champions of women, and they have moved the discussion of women’s issues far ahead. I have enormous confidence that women’s organisations exist. However, I am not quite sure how far work has progressed on race discrimination and religious discrimination, given Northern Ireland’s history.

I know that I share with the Committee the particular concern that the number of hate attacks, particularly against Asians, have tripled over the past few years in Northern Ireland. That is a great concern. I would worry about such legislation being simply in a vacuum, with not enough work being done to raise awareness of this issue. Perhaps there is a lack of knowledge in this area compared to how fortunate we have been in this country in terms of awareness. I hope that, with the message that the Minister takes forward to the Assembly, people there will welcome some of the work that we have undertaken here, and maybe there will be opportunity for proper discussion and debate. I welcome that there will be a discussion on 24 May. I know that there may be others who, like me, would be interested in contributing to some of the development phases of what looks like a common standard.

I rise to speak to Amendment No. 12, which would leave out paragraph 7 of the new schedule in Amendment No. 11. It is a technical point. I note that paragraph 7 provides for an offence on contravening the forced marriage order in Northern Ireland, which does not seem to tally exactly with the power of arrest in new Section 63I to L, which attach to the contravention of an order in England or Wales. I want to establish that this is a technical difference which in no way gives the police in Northern Ireland powers of remanding an individual that are in excess of their counterparts in England and Wales.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I understand entirely that she wishes to explore why the Bill provides that breach of a forced marriage protection order is an offence in the schedules dealing with Northern Ireland when it is only contempt of court in the parts relating to England and Wales. I will try to clarify the difference. It is indeed owing to differences between domestic legislation of Northern Ireland and England and Wales respectively.

The Northern Ireland provisions are based on the penalty contained in the Family Homes and Domestic Violence (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 for breaching a non-molestation order or a combined non-molestation order and occupation order, which states that such a breach is an offence. Northern Ireland has been using a criminal offence as a first enforcement option for breach of domestic violence orders for the past nine years. That approach has worked successfully there in relation to domestic violence and it is now widely accepted. It is supported by key stakeholders in Northern Ireland, including the judiciary, magistracy and the voluntary sector. This is a different situation from that in England and Wales where all experience up to now of dealing with breaches of domestic violence orders has been through use of the contempt jurisdiction.

The same approach has therefore been taken with regard to forced marriage protection orders. Under this provision, a person who without reasonable excuse contravenes a forced marriage protection order is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £5,000 and/or a term of imprisonment of up to six months. That provision is not intended to punish behaviour which may result in a forced marriage protection order being sought. The rationale is rather that in Northern Ireland this is the best approach to send a clear message to perpetrators that their actions are serious and will not be tolerated. I hope that that gives the concise answer to the noble Baroness’s question on Amendment No. 12.

My noble friend Lady Uddin has been consistent in saying, “This is all fine, as long as you make sure that education, training and support go alongside it”. It is very important that we have awareness raising, particularly in the Muslim community. I understand that there are 3,000 members of the Muslim community in Northern Ireland who should be afforded the same rights as in England and Wales. I understand that hate crime is taken increasingly seriously in Northern Ireland. The Police Service of Northern Ireland has extensive policies to raise awareness and to try to increase reporting.

The noble Baroness made an important offer on making sure that the right quality of advice is given. We will, if we may, pass that information to the Minister concerned in Northern Ireland as part of reporting back our discussions in Committee. I hope that that will enable the noble Baroness to engage with that process and make sure that others who can appropriately give support are also engaged.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clauses 2 to 10 negatived.

7: After Clause 10, insert the following new Clause—

“Consequential amendments etc.

(1) Schedule (Consequential amendments) (consequential amendments) has effect.

(2) The Lord Chancellor may by order make such supplementary, incidental or consequential provision as the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate for the purposes of section (Protection against forced marriage: England and Wales) or in consequence of that section.

(3) The Department of Finance and Personnel may by order make such supplementary, incidental or consequential provision as the Department considers appropriate for the purposes of section (Protection against forced marriage: Northern Ireland) and Schedule (Protection against forced marriage: Northern Ireland) or in consequence of those provisions.

(4) An order under subsection (2)—

(a) may contain such transitional, transitory or saving provision as the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate; and(b) is to be made by statutory instrument.(5) An order under subsection (3)—

(a) may contain such transitional, transitory or saving provision as the Department of Finance and Personnel considers appropriate; and(b) is to be made by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573 (N.I. 12)).(6) Any power to make an order under this section may, in particular, be exercised by amending, repealing, revoking or otherwise modifying any provision made by or under an enactment (including any Act passed in the same Session as this Act).

(7) No order is to be made under this section—

(a) by the Lord Chancellor unless a draft of the order has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament;(b) by the Department of Finance and Personnel unless a draft of the order has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, the Northern Ireland Assembly.(8) Subsection (7)(a) does not apply to an order which does not amend or repeal any provision of an Act and an order of the Lord Chancellor under this section which does not amend or repeal any provision of an Act is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(9) Subsection (7)(b) does not apply to an order which does not amend or repeal any provision of an Act or Northern Ireland legislation and an order of the Department of Finance and Personnel under this section which does not amend or repeal any provision of an Act or Northern Ireland legislation is subject to negative resolution (within the meaning of section 41(6) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954 (c. 33 (N.I.))).

(10) In this section “enactment” includes Northern Ireland legislation.”

The noble Baroness said: I am very grateful to the Deputy Chairman who knows what is going on. As ever, he has expertise of a rare and wonderful sort. In speaking to Amendment No. 7, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 8 to 10 and 13. These amendments are simply mechanical changes necessary for the Bill to have effect. Amendment No. 7 inserts a new clause and introduces a new schedule. The new clause provides a power for the Lord Chancellor or, in Northern Ireland, the Department of Finance and Personnel to make any supplementary, incidental or consequential provisions which are necessary for the implementation and operation of the Bill.

This clause provides that any new provisions must be made by way of statutory instrument and where the provision amends or repeals primary legislation that provision must first be approved by both Houses using the affirmative resolution procedure. This will ensure that any significant changes receive adequate scrutiny in both Houses. Members of the Committee will know that the Delegated Powers Committee reported and said that these were proper uses of the powers.

Government Amendments Nos. 8, 9 and 10 replace existing Clause 11. They retain the Short Title set out in the original Bill. They also state that the provisions of the Bill will be brought into force by an order made by the Lord Chancellor or, in the case of Northern Ireland provisions, by the Department of Finance and Personnel. That order will be made by statutory instrument.

Amendment No. 13 inserts a new schedule, which contains minor consequential amendments for England and Wales, and Northern Ireland, necessary for the implementation of the Bill. These amendments also set out the extent of each of the provisions in the Bill. I beg to move.

Amendment No. 7 introduces consequential amendments that allow the Lord Chancellor to amend any Act by order for the purposes of any of the new sections to be included under Amendment No. 1. Will the Minister indicate how far these orders will go, and confirm that they will be subject to the affirmative procedure in both Houses, as proposed new subsection (7) of Amendment No. 7 seems to suggest?

I place on record my deep concern that the scrutiny of the Bill has been pushed for time and has been light on resources. I confess that I was deeply surprised that the Government would have happily introduced these amendments with only four working days’ notice to debate them—three days under the accepted minimum tabling time for government—and that they would have been happy to curtail the scrutiny of your Lordships’ House so easily. As things stand, we have been able to scrutinise the amendments, albeit, I fear, minimally. I hope that it has been sufficient, but I am prepared to undertake further scrutiny before Report, and will urge my colleagues in another place to do the same before it reaches their House.

I register again my thanks and congratulations to the Bill team, who have, in the circumstances, done a marvellous job in turning the Bill around. I hope that their efforts will be rewarded by the Minister when she considers the best ways in which to improve the Bill further.

I must say that as soon as the Official Opposition indicated that they wanted much more time to consider the Government’s amendments, it was, I understand, instantly agreed that this should be done today, and on another Committee day a week from now if that proved necessary.

So far as the amendments are concerned, we have the benefit of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report. The Department for Constitutional Affairs, as it was, gave that committee a detailed and extremely useful account, which figures in its report, explaining precisely what was proposed. There are several pages of detail, all of which I have read. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee considered all that, including the scope of delegation, and concluded that there was nothing that needed to be drawn to the attention of the House. I am all in favour of probing, and even of grumpiness, but it is not fair to criticise the Government for undue haste. The amendments have been carefully prepared and are now available to be considered today, and, if necessary, on another day in Grand Committee, as well as on Report. Given the almost unqualified welcome that was given to my four-page Bill, one would hope that the Opposition will continue to be enthusiastic at later stages of the Bill, here and in the other place.

I merely want to ensure that the Bill has been scrutinised in every possible way and that, when it goes to the other House, it stands a very, very good chance of getting through. I assure your Lordships that this is not grumpiness. I really appreciate all the efforts that the Minister has made. It is simply that I really do think that something as serious as this needs real scrutiny.

I should like to add to what my noble friend Lady Verma has said. I read it only this morning so I have not had time to study it. However, in principle, I agree with what has been said, although I would prefer more time for further scrutiny.

I have taken the probing amendments to be what they are, but I have to confess that I am a little surprised by the intervention made by the noble Baroness, Lady Verma. We laid the amendments on 19 April and were asked by the Opposition if more time might be allowed in order to study the Government’s proposals. On that basis, we cancelled the Grand Committee on 25 April, despite the fact that my understanding from your Lordships’ House and the other place was that everyone who was involved at Second Reading and supported the principle behind the Bill proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Lester was extremely keen for us to move at a good pace in order to enable us to get this Bill on the statute book. Members of the Committee will be aware that in my meetings this morning, the question about which there is most concern is when this will become law.

We cancelled the Grand Committee on 25 April and made a date two weeks later to give more time. The Committee will know that I was in India last week, but the Bill team met with the noble Baroness, Lady Verma. We made every opportunity we could to provide information to the Opposition. I take on board what the noble Baroness said about the work that we are trying to do. But I do not wish anyone reading the reports on this Bill to have any impression that the Government have not done their absolute best to make available to anyone interested as much information as possible while fulfilling the undertaking that we thought was wanted. If I now discover that it is not wanted by the Official Opposition, we will look again. My understanding was that we should get on with this and that, while we had consent and a strong view that this is important, we should do it properly.

I absolutely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, that it is important to scrutinise properly, which is why we have set aside the time. I think that we have not done a bad job today. The probing amendments have really teased out some of the issues. In conclusion, I always say in every Committee that I am always available to Members of the Committee who wish to have more information. The officials would be equally pleased. The Forced Marriages Unit would be only too delighted if Members of the Committee want to pay it a visit, because that would also be of great benefit. Within that context, we are doing our very best to do something really important and I am grateful to Members of the Committee for their support.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 11 [Amendments consequential on sections 8 to 10]:

8: Clause 11, page 5, line 3, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(2) Section (Protection against forced marriage: England and Wales), section (Consequential amendments etc.) (1) (so far as relating to Part 1 of Schedule (Consequential amendments)) and Part 1 of Schedule (Consequential amendments) come into force on such day as the Lord Chancellor may by order appoint; and different days may be appointed for different purposes.

(2A) An order under subsection (2)—

(a) may contain such transitional, transitory or saving provision as the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate; and(b) is to be made by statutory instrument.(2B) Section (Protection against forced marriage: Northern Ireland), section (Consequential amendments etc.) (1) (so far as relating to Part 2 of Schedule (Consequential amendments)), Schedule (Protection against forced marriage: Northern Ireland) and Part 2 of Schedule (Consequential amendments) come into force on such day as the Department of Finance and Personnel may by order appoint; and different days may be appointed for different purposes.

(2C) An order under subsection (2B)—

(a) may contain such transitional, transitory or saving provision as the Department of Finance and Personnel considers appropriate; and(b) is to be made by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573 (N.I. 12)).”

9: Clause 11, page 5, line 5, leave out “This Act extends” and insert “Section (Protection against forced marriage: England and Wales) and Part 1 of Schedule (Consequential amendments) extend”

10: Clause 11, page 5, line 5, at end insert—

“(3A) Section (Protection against forced marriage: Northern Ireland), Schedule (Protection against forced marriage: Northern Ireland) and Part 2 of Schedule (Consequential amendments) extend to Northern Ireland only.

(3B) Section (Consequential amendments etc.) and this section extend to England and Wales and Northern Ireland only.”

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 11, as amended, agreed to.

11: After Clause 11, insert the following new Schedule—

“Protection against forced marriage: Northern IrelandPart 1Forced marriage protection ordersForced marriage protection orders1 (1) The court may make an order for the purposes of protecting—

(a) a person from being forced into a marriage or from any attempt to be forced into a marriage; or(b) a person who has been forced into a marriage.(2) In deciding whether to exercise its powers under this paragraph and, if so, in what manner, the court must have regard to all the circumstances including the need to secure the health, safety and well-being of the person to be protected.

(3) In deciding that person’s well-being, the court must, in particular, have such regard to the person’s wishes and feelings (so far as they are reasonably ascertainable) as the court considers appropriate in the light of the person’s age and understanding.

(4) For the purposes of this Schedule a person (“A”) is forced into a marriage if another person (“B”) forces A to enter into a marriage (whether with B or another person) without A’s free and full consent.

(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) it does not matter whether the conduct of B which forces A to enter into a marriage is directed against A, B or another person.

(6) In this Schedule—

“force” includes coerce by threats or other psychological means (and related expressions are to be read accordingly); and

“forced marriage protection order” means an order under this paragraph.

Contents of orders2 (1) A forced marriage protection order may contain—

(a) such prohibitions, restrictions or requirements; and(b) such other terms;as the court considers appropriate for the purposes of the order.(2) The terms of such orders may, in particular, relate to—

(a) conduct outside Northern Ireland as well as (or instead of) conduct within Northern Ireland;(b) respondents who—(i) aid, abet, counsel, procure, encourage or assist another person to force, or attempt to force, a person to enter into a marriage; or(ii) conspire to force, or to attempt to force, a person to enter into a marriage;as well as (or instead of) respondents who force, or attempt to force, the person to enter into the marriage.Applications and other occasions for making orders3 (1) The court may make a forced marriage protection order—

(a) on an application being made to it; or(b) without an application being made to it but in the circumstances mentioned in sub-paragraph (6).(2) An application may be made by—

(a) the person who is to be protected by the order; or (b) a relevant third party.(3) An application may be made by any other person with the leave of the court.

(4) In deciding whether to grant leave, the court must have regard to all the circumstances including—

(a) the applicant’s connection with the person to be protected;(b) the applicant’s knowledge of the circumstances of the person to be protected; and(c) the wishes and feelings of the person to be protected so far as they are reasonably ascertainable and so far as the court considers it appropriate, in the light of the person’s age and understanding, to have regard to them.(5) An application under this paragraph may be made in other family proceedings or without any other family proceedings being instituted.

(6) The circumstances in which the court may make an order without an application being made are where—

(a) any other family proceedings are before the court (“the current proceedings”);(b) the court considers that a forced marriage protection order should be made to protect a person (whether or not a party to the current proceedings); and(c) a person who would be a respondent to any such proceedings for a forced marriage protection order is a party to the current proceedings.(7) In this paragraph—

“family proceedings” has the same meaning as in the Family Homes and Domestic Violence (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/1071 (N.I. 6)) (see Article 2(2) and (3)) but also includes—

(a) proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to adults;(b) proceedings in which the court has made an emergency protection order under Article 63 of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 (S.I. 1995/755 (N.I. 2)) which includes an exclusion requirement (as defined in Article 63A(3) of that Order); and(c) proceedings in which the court has made an order under Article 69 of the Order of 1995 (recovery of abducted children etc.); and“relevant third party” means a person specified, or falling within a description of persons specified, by order of the Department of Finance and Personnel.

(8) An order of the Department of Finance and Personnel under sub-paragraph (7) may, in particular, specify that Department.

Ex parte orders4 (1) The court may, in any case where it considers that it is just and convenient to do so, make a forced marriage protection order even though the respondent has not been given such notice of the proceedings as would otherwise be required by rules of court.

(2) In deciding whether to exercise its powers under sub-paragraph (1), the court must have regard to all the circumstances including—

(a) any risk of significant harm to the person to be protected or another person if the order is not made immediately;(b) whether it is likely that an applicant will be deterred or prevented from pursuing an application if an order is not made immediately; and(c) whether there is reason to believe that—(i) the respondent is aware of the proceedings but is deliberately evading service; and(ii) the delay involved in effecting substituted service will cause serious prejudice to the person to be protected or (if a different person) an applicant. (3) If the court makes an order by virtue of sub-paragraph (1), it must specify a date for a full hearing.

(4) In sub-paragraph (3), “full hearing” means a hearing of which notice has been given to all the parties in accordance with rules of court.

Duration of orders5 A forced marriage protection order may be made for a specified period or until varied or discharged.

Variation of orders and their discharge6 (1) The court may vary or discharge a forced marriage protection order on an application by—

(a) any party to the proceedings for the order;(b) the person being protected by the order (if not a party to the proceedings for the order); or(c) any person affected by the order.(2) In addition, the court may vary or discharge a forced marriage protection order made by virtue of paragraph 3(1)(b) even though no application under sub-paragraph (1) above has been made to the court.

(3) Paragraph 4 applies to a variation of a forced marriage protection order as it applies to the making of such an order; and, accordingly, references in that paragraph to making a forced marriage protection order are to be read as references to varying such an order.

Part 2EnforcementOffence of contravening an order7 Any person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes a forced marriage protection order, commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction—

(a) to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale;(b) to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months; or(c) to both.Part 3Jurisdiction and procedureJurisdiction of courts8 (1) For the purposes of this Schedule “the court” means the High Court or a county court.

(2) Sub-paragraph (1) is subject to any provision made by virtue of sub-paragraphs (3) and (4).

(3) Article 34(3) to (10) of the Family Homes and Domestic Violence (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/1071 (N.I. 6)) (allocation of proceedings to courts etc.) apply for the purposes of this Schedule as they apply for the purposes of that Order but as if the following modification were made.

(4) The modification is that Article 34(8) is to be read as if there were substituted for it—

“(8) For the purposes of paragraphs (3), (4) and (5), there are two levels of court—

(a) the High Court; and(b) a county court.”Power to extend jurisdiction to courts of summary jurisdiction9 (1) The Lord Chancellor may, after consulting the Lord Chief Justice, by order provide for courts of summary jurisdiction to be included among the courts who may hear proceedings under this Schedule.

(2) An order under sub-paragraph (1) may, in particular, make any provision in relation to courts of summary jurisdiction which corresponds to provision made in relation to such courts by or under the Family Homes and Domestic Violence (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/1071 (N.I. 6)).

(3) Any power to make an order under this paragraph (including that power as extended by paragraph 14(3)) may, in particular, be exercised by amending, repealing, revoking or otherwise modifying any provision made by or under this Schedule or any other enactment.

(4) In sub-paragraph (3) “enactment” includes Northern Ireland legislation.

(5) The Lord Chief Justice may nominate any of the following to exercise the Lord Chief Justice’s functions under this paragraph—

(a) the holder of one of the offices listed in Schedule 1 to the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 (c. 26);(b) a Lord Justice of Appeal (as defined in section 88 of that Act).Contempt proceedings10 The powers of the court in relation to contempt of court arising out of a person’s failure to comply with a forced marriage protection order or otherwise in connection with such an order may be exercised by the relevant judge.

Appeals from county courts11 (1) An appeal lies to the High Court against—

(a) the making by a county court of any order under this Schedule; or(b) any refusal by a county court to make such an order;as if the decision had been made in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Part 3 of the County Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1980 (S.I. 1980/397 (N.I. 3)) (original civil jurisdiction) and the appeal were brought under Article 60 of that Order (ordinary appeals in civil cases).(2) But an appeal does not lie to the High Court under sub-paragraph (1) where the county court is a divorce county court exercising jurisdiction under the Matrimonial Causes (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1045 (N.I. 15)) in the same proceedings.

(3) Provision must be made by rules of court for an appeal to lie (upon a point of law, a question of fact or the admission or rejection of any evidence) to the Court of Appeal against—

(a) the making of any order under this Schedule; or(b) any refusal to make such an order;by a county court of the type referred to in sub-paragraph (2).(4) Sub-paragraph (3) is without prejudice to Article 61 of the County Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1980 (S.I. 1980/397 (N.I. 3)) (cases stated).

(5) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1), the High Court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal.

(6) Where an order is made under sub-paragraph (5), the High Court may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.

(7) Any order of the High Court made on an appeal under sub-paragraph (1) (other than one directing that an application be re-heard by the county court) is to be treated, for the purposes of—

(a) the enforcement of the order; and(b) any power to vary, revive or discharge orders;as if it were an order of the county court from which the appeal was brought and not an order of the High Court.(8) This paragraph is subject to paragraph 12.

Appeals: transfers and proposed transfers12 (1) The Lord Chancellor may, after consulting the Lord Chief Justice, by order make provision as to the circumstances in which appeals may be made against decisions taken by courts on questions arising in connection with the transfer, or proposed transfer, of proceedings by virtue of an order made under Article 34(5) of the Family Homes and Domestic Violence (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/1071 (N.I. 6)) as applied by paragraph 8(3) and (4) above.

(2) Except so far as provided for in any order made under sub-paragraph (1), no appeal may be made against any decision of a kind mentioned in that sub-paragraph.

(3) The Lord Chief Justice may nominate any of the following to exercise the Lord Chief Justice’s functions under this paragraph—

(a) the holder of one of the offices listed in Schedule 1 to the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 (c. 26);(b) a Lord Justice of Appeal (as defined in section 88 of that Act).Part 4SupplementaryGuidance13 (1) The Department of Finance and Personnel may from time to time prepare and publish guidance to such descriptions of persons as the Department of Finance and Personnel considers appropriate about—

(a) the effect of this Schedule or any provision of this Schedule; or(b) other matters relating to forced marriages.(2) A person exercising public functions to whom guidance is given under this paragraph must have regard to it in the exercise of those functions.

Orders14 (1) An order made by the Department of Finance and Personnel under paragraph 3(7)—

(a) may make different provision for different purposes;(b) may contain such incidental, supplemental, consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provision as the Department of Finance and Personnel considers appropriate;(c) is to be made by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573 (N.I. 12)); and(d) is subject to negative resolution (within the meaning of section 41(6) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954 (c. 33 (N.I.))).(2) An order made by the Lord Chancellor by virtue of paragraph 8(3) and (4) or under paragraph 12(1)—

(a) may make different provision for different purposes;(b) may contain such incidental, supplemental, consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provision as the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate;(c) is to be made by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573 (N.I. 12)); and(d) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament in the same manner as a statutory instrument (and section 5 of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 (c. 36) applies accordingly).(3) An order made by the Lord Chancellor under paragraph 9—

(a) may make different provision for different purposes;(b) may contain such incidental, supplemental, consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provision as the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate;(c) is to be made by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573 (N.I. 12)); and(d) is not to be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.Other protection or assistance against forced marriage15 (1) This Schedule does not affect any other protection or assistance available to a person who—

(a) is being, or may be, forced into a marriage or subjected to an attempt to be forced into a marriage; or(b) has been forced into a marriage.(2) In particular, it does not affect—

(a) the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court; (b) any criminal liability;(c) any right to an occupation order or a non-molestation order under the Family Homes and Domestic Violence (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/1071 (N.I. 6));(d) any civil remedies under the Protection from Harassment (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 (S.I. 1997/1180 (N.I. 9));(e) any protection or assistance under the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 (S.I. 1995/755 (N.I. 2));(f) any claim in tort; or(g) the law of marriage.Interpretation16 In this Schedule—

“the court” is to be read with paragraph 8(1);

“force” (and related expressions), in relation to a marriage, are to be read in accordance with paragraph 1(4) to (6);

“forced marriage protection order” has the meaning given by paragraph 1(6);

“marriage” means any religious or civil ceremony of marriage (whether or not legally binding); and

“the relevant judge”, in relation to any order under this Schedule, means—

(a) where the order was made by the High Court, a judge of that court; and(b) where the order was made by a county court, a judge or district judge of that or any other county court.”

[Amendment No. 12, as an amendment to Amendment No. 11, not moved.]

12A: After Clause 11, line 245, at end insert—

“(3) Nothing in this section permits the Department of Finance and Personnel to give guidance to any court or tribunal.”

On Question, amendment agreed to.

On Question, Amendment No. 11, as amended, agreed to.

13: After Clause 11, insert the following new Schedule—

“Consequential amendmentsPart 1England and Wales1 In paragraph 3(f)(i) of Schedule 1 to the Supreme Court Act 1981 (c. 54) (distribution of business in High Court: family division) after “Part IV” insert “or 4A”.

2 In section 58A(2)(f) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (c. 41) (conditional fee agreements: supplementary) for “Part IV” substitute “Parts 4 and 4A”.

3 (1) The Family Law Act 1996 (c. 27) is amended as follows.

(2) In section 63(2) (interpretation of Part 4: family proceedings), after paragraph (b), insert—

“(ba) Part 4A;”.(3) In section 65 (rules, regulations and orders)—

(a) in subsection (3) after “5(8)” insert “, 63N”; and(b) in subsection (4) after “5(8)” insert “or 63N”.Part 2Northern Ireland4 In Article 2(3) of the Family Homes and Domestic Violence (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/1071 (N.I. 6)) (interpretation: family proceedings), after sub-paragraph (h), insert—

“(i) Schedule (Protection against forced marriage: Northern Ireland) to the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007.”5 In Article 39(2) of the Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 (S.I. 2003/435 (N.I. 10)) (conditional fee agreements: supplementary), after sub-paragraph (g), insert—

“(h) Schedule (Protection against forced marriage: Northern Ireland) to the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007,”.”

On Question, amendment agreed to.

In the Title

14: In the Title, line 2, after “consent” insert “and for protecting individuals who have been forced to enter into marriage without such consent”

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Title, as amended, agreed to.

Bill reported with amendments.

The Committee adjourned at 4.45 pm.