rose to ask Her Majesty’s Government what lessons have been learnt from the comments made by the coroner in the case of Sergeant Steven Roberts.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity for this debate. Many of the events in Iraq since British forces were first deployed there in early 2003 have been distressing to those directly affected and give more general cause for public concern. These two elements, personal distress and shortcomings in public policy, come together in the case of Sergeant Steven Roberts.

Although certain facts were initially withheld or disputed, it would finally appear that more or less the whole story has now emerged. That that is now the case is due to the determination of the young widow of Sergeants Roberts and to the systematic persistence of the coroner. From that whole story it is evident that there were lessons to be learnt and to be applied. Noble Lords will remember that Sergeant Roberts commanded one of the tanks sent to form a road block in the very earliest days of the campaign. In the proper course of his duty, he dismounted from his vehicle. Shots were fired—I put that in neutral terms—and he was killed. It was more or less immediately apparent that if he had been wearing body armour, the shots might not have been fatal. But he was not wearing it, and that was because the set issued to him had been deliberately called back from him to be reissued to someone else because of severe shortages in the number of sets available. He was sent into battle, as the coroner observed, without,

“the most basic piece of equipment”.

We know this because he told his wife that this had happened.

As early as September 2001, a key equipment issues list had identified that, if enhanced combat body armour were to be required for a military campaign, there was no way that the holdings as they then stood could be sufficient. A year later, in September 2002, an urgent operational requirement was directed to the Secretary of State, but there followed an unacceptable eight-week delay between the request for the kit being made and authorisation being granted. At the time Sergeant Roberts was killed, 2,200 servicemen lacked ECBA kits.

David Williams, the director of capability, resources and scrutiny at the MoD, reported that the equipment was not ordered when it was requested because the Government did not want to telegraph the fact that Britain was preparing for war with Iraq. It was clear also that Ministers did not want to alienate Labour MPs. The inescapable conclusion is that Sergeant Roberts died unnecessarily as a result of political expediency. This was despite the strong likelihood of military action.

Two fundamental points arise from that conclusion. First, the political justification was itself flawed. The stated intention at the time was, and should have been, to make it abundantly clear to Saddam Hussein that if he did not comply with UN resolutions, he would face military retribution. It is therefore astonishing that the Government consciously attempted to keep their position as equivocal as possible; doing so was counterproductive and fatal. The second point—this is the wider lesson that the Government must not brush off—is that it can never be right for the Government to place political considerations above their duty of care to the Armed Forces. Their obligation is to minimise as far as possible the risk to the lives of service men and women. We do not disagree for a moment with the powerful conclusion of the coroner in this case. His words deserve repetition:

“To send soldiers into a combat zone without the appropriate basic equipment is, in my view, unforgivable and inexcusable and represents a breach of trust that the soldiers have in those in Government”.

Does the Minister accept that the decision to delay ordering essential sets of enhanced combat body armour was not a military one but was taken by the Secretary of State?

The shortage of body armour was not the only example of defects and deficiencies in equipment, doctrine and training that emerged from the examination of the case. There is the matter of the revolver, the sergeant’s personal weapon, that jammed. There is the machine-gun on the tank that also failed. There is the absence of a second soldier protecting him. There is the trajectory of bullets fired from the tank’s gun and its unsuitability as a weapon at short range. The board of inquiry looking into the case recommended that in future all gunners should be trained on the gun’s shortcomings, and criticised what it described as “inadequate” procedures. There is the question of doctrine and practice in mounting road blocks with tanks in such circumstances.

Beyond those specific defects and deficiencies, there are also important general lessons which we should pay attention to and hope to see acknowledged and remedied. First is the inaccurate initial assessment as reported that the sergeant had been shot by an Iraqi rather than by his own side. This is a significant dimension of the concerns we all feel about the lethal impact of “friendly fire”. The second lesson is the deliberate attempted exclusion of the sergeant’s widow and next-of-kin from the inquiry process. It is a shortcoming in military attitudes that may be changing, but neither sufficiently positively nor sufficiently quickly.

The third reason—this is not the least important in that it seems to affect all too many cases of different kinds—is the unconscionable length of time between the tragic happening and the eventual clarification. I am inclined to wonder whether we would have got the disclosure we have if it had not been for the determination of Samantha Roberts. She deserves not only our sympathy for her loss but also our admiration and appreciation for her determination to see this whole thing right—or at least as right as it can be in the circumstances.

I believe that I have said enough to demonstrate that there are important lessons to be learnt from this. Some of the points that I have raised, such as the jamming of the revolver, have already been followed through as far as it is practicable to take them. The tragic unfolding events in March 2003 can never be reversed, but what assurance can the Minister give that these lessons have been learnt, will stay learnt and are being applied?

My Lords, I am sure that all Members of your Lordships’ House are very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, for raising this issue and for the way in which he has paid tribute not only to the process that the coroner undertook but to the very important role that Mrs Samantha Roberts and other members of the family took in making sure that this issue did not die with the death of Sergeant Roberts. I entirely concur with the noble Lord’s conclusions.

Sergeant Steven Roberts came from my then constituency of North Cornwall, from the town of Wadebridge. He was the first British casualty after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and, sadly, his death and its aftermath have been symbolic of the tragic mistakes and the avoidable loss of life there ever since.

Within days, Sergeant Roberts’s family was in touch with me because they had been informed by letter from an officer in his unit of the stark details of his death: first, the malfunctioning weapon was well known then; secondly, it was fairly clear that the fatal shot was almost certainly from a colleague and was therefore friendly fire; and, thirdly, there was a very strong suggestion that he would not have died had he been wearing appropriate enhanced combat body armour. So, on behalf of the family, throughout 2003 I sought confirmation and information from the Ministry of Defence. I can only describe its attitude as being like a brick wall; it was very defensive.

On 18 December 2003 I set out in some detail the alarming lack of reliable information in a speech in the other place. Obviously it would not be appropriate for me to deal with that in detail but if I indicate the areas of concern that were already apparent three and half years ago I hope your Lordships’ House will recognise just how long this process has been dragged out. I said:

“First, why was Sergeant Roberts not wearing appropriate enhanced combat body armour? Was he ordered to pass on his reinforced flak jacket to other troops thought to be more vulnerable? Secondly, exactly who fired the fatal shot or shots? Thirdly, did Sergeant Roberts’s weapon perform correctly?”.—[Official Report, Commons; 18/12/03; col.1753.]

I drew attention to a report that had just been issued from the National Audit Office, which stated:

“200,000 sets [of ECBA] had been issued since the Kosovo campaign in 1999, greatly exceeding the theoretical requirement, but these seem to have disappeared”.

For something like that to disappear when the United Kingdom was preparing for hostilities was quite extraordinary in itself. I pointed out then that the audit trail the Ministry of Defence prides itself on surely was not operating effectively in those circumstances. The inevitable conclusion must be that the Ministry of Defence’s incompetence, or inadequate preparations despite the very long build-up before hostilities began, led to an entirely avoidable death in the case of Sergeant Steve Roberts. Faced with that irrefutable evidence, one can dimly imagine the added trauma faced by his widow, his mother and his family.

I give credit to the then Secretary of State, Mr Geoffrey Hoon, that he then invited Mrs Samantha Roberts and Steven Roberts’s mother and brother to meet him in January 2004. But that meeting—and I understand the reasons—was a waste of time in the sense that all the Secretary of State could say was, “It is going to take some time to get to the bottom of this”. But he implied that it would be a matter of weeks, not months, let alone years.

When, later in 2004, we had the board of inquiry report, which made specific reference to the failure of supply as being a matter of political constraints—nothing to do with military command, with no blame attached to the commanders on the ground—I felt the matter needed further attention. It was quite extraordinary that immediately after the board of inquiry there was no further attempt by the Ministry of Defence to ensure that more action was taken not just to remedy that fault in the system but to accelerate the process of inquiry, investigation and report to the family.

Then we come to the coroner’s report, which the noble Lord has referred to in such detail. I endorse everything he has said about that process. My only comment is not about the coroner himself but the fact that it took so long to get to him: three and a half years after Sergeant Roberts’s death, which, I think all Members of your Lordships’ House would agree, was a very unfortunate effect of the process. This exposed the muddle in the ministry. We were then given conflicting explanations about what exactly had happened. Even after that period, it was still not possible to get to the truth.

On 10 January this year in your Lordships’ House I tabled a Starred Question, which was answered by the Minister. I asked why there was a delay of more than eight weeks between 30 September and 30 November 2002 in ordering essential sets of enhanced combat body armour for troops deployed to Iraq, with the result that 2,200 troops were not fully protected, including Sergeant Steven Roberts. The burden of the Minister’s reply was as follows: at the time the United Kingdom was deeply involved in diplomatic activity endeavouring to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in Iraq, and no decision to commit a UK land force to any potential operation had been taken. The judgment was that to place orders for equipment, which would have indicated preparations for the deployment of a large land force, would have risked undermining that diplomatic effort.

The noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, a former Secretary of State for Defence, pounced. It was he who pointed out at that moment what a ridiculous answer that was. It was essential at the time that Saddam Hussein fully understood that this country was preparing for possible invasion. The noble Lord, Lord King, said:

“The Government’s strategy at that time was to try and convince Saddam Hussein that if he did not comply with UN resolutions, he would face military action. So the right action to take was to give convincing evidence that military action was likely to take place, including preparing our forces for action if it came to that”.

He concluded:

“I cannot accept the answer the Minister has given”.—[Official Report, 10/1/07; col. 227.]

It might have been, as the noble Lord, Lord Astor, implied, that in the particular circumstances of autumn 2002 the Government did not wish to indicate the full extent of their preparations, not for any military or international reasons but simply to keep their own Back-Benchers quiet and not look as if they were conferring with the Conservative Front Bench, who wanted a pre-emptive strike at that stage. Nevertheless, it was an extraordinary explanation, as the noble Lord, Lord King, indicated.

What is even more extraordinary is that I had tabled a Written Question at much the same time that received a totally different Answer. On 8 February 2007 I asked:

“When the shortage of enhanced body armour was first identified in the preparations for the invasion of Iraq in 2002; and when the Secretary of State for Defence was first advised of the need to supplement the available stock”.

The Answer came back:

“On 13 September 2002, the then Secretary of State for Defence was asked to approve a request to approach industry so that timelines and cost of a potential order for additional enhanced combat body armour (ECBA) could be identified. This was part of an extensive package of equipment request put to the Secretary of State as part of the overall preparation for operations. He was advised at the time that there were some 13,000 existing sets of ECBA in stock, which was judged sufficient to equip the fighting echelon, based on plans at the time”.—[Official Report, 8/2/07; col. WA 147.]

The Minister cannot have it both ways. Either there was a deliberate delay so as not to send the wrong signals and therefore, although the Ministry of Defence knew that it needed the order, it delayed it, or, as the Minister said, it knew that it did not need it and was confident that it had enough. That is why, even after all this time, having seen the comments of the coroner and heard the exchanges in your Lordships' House and in the other place, so many people do not have confidence that the lessons have been learnt. That is why I concur so strongly with the noble Lord.

I had the interesting experience today, as I know the Minister did, of hearing the Secretary of State speak at today’s Press Gallery lunch. He laid great emphasis on the need to look after service families, which I am sure all noble Lords agree with. For me, that includes the welfare of ex-service personnel, Gulf War illness victims and the bereaved families from hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular.

At its most practical level, this has a major effect on service recruitment and retention. If service families are not treated honourably by this country, this Government and this House, it sends out a very damaging message. Morally, it is even more essential. The sorry saga of the unnecessary death of Steven Roberts and its long aftermath shows the Ministry of Defence in the worst possible light when it comes to dealing sympathetically and speedily with the concerns of bereaved service families. For far too many of those families, MoD has come to stand for the ministry of dither, delay and deceit.

My Lords, I, too, am extremely grateful to my noble friend Lord Astor for giving us the opportunity to discuss not only the appalling facts of this case but also the wider ramifications. It also gives us the opportunity to discuss the general lessons which should have been—and, we hope, have been—learnt from the death of Sergeant Roberts. The noble Lord, Lord Tyler, stressed that—I agreed with virtually everything he said—as did my noble friend.

I also hope that this debate will again make it clear to the Armed Forces that this House believes that the families of service men and women must be treated with that overused term “respect”. Ultimately this, almost more than anything else, will determine the morale of our troops. That would help reverse the rapidly falling number of troops happy to return for second and third tours of duty and improve the retention rates of our Armed Forces, which are currently so alarming. That does not mean just paying lip service to the great sacrifice our troops are making; it means the Government taking action to mitigate troops’ grievances.

The expression that came to mind while listening to my noble friend was, “justice delayed is justice denied”. It is fundamentally wrong for the families of those who put everything on the line to have to wait so long for the results of an inquest or for the conclusion of a court martial or an inquiry. As I am afraid we all know, this is by no means an isolated incident.

The long-drawn-out, thoroughly unsatisfactory nature of the Sergeant Roberts case has had a serious impact on the morale of other soldiers, particularly those in the field, who know that they and their families might find themselves all too easily in the same situation. The insensitive treatment of our forces’ families is matched by the lack of responsibility accepted by those in the Government who have contributed to their misfortune. I emphatically do not include the Minister in that assessment. We feel that he is invariably realistic in his appraisal of government actions, for which we in this House are most grateful. However, is not the failure of the former Secretary of State for Defence to resign following the death of Sergeant Roberts yet another example of Ministers not accepting responsibility for actions that occur on their watch?

The Minister will no doubt say, as he has in the past, that the lessons have been learnt. We would appreciate reaffirmation that that is, and will continue to be, the case.

In a reply to a Written Question tabled by my noble friend Lord Astor, the Minister claimed that delivery of the remaining 5,000 Osprey body armour sets would take place by the end of January. Will he now confirm to this House that the remaining sets have been delivered as promised and are now in use in the field? On the subject of equipment shortages, is he able to update the House on what progress has been made in delivering the rest of the extremely effective vehicle integrated personal role radios, given that he promised in another Written Answer that the remaining 278 kits would be delivered by this month? Are they now in operation in the field?

Will the Minister confirm to the House that the Government have responded to the comments made by the board of inquiry in the Sergeant Roberts case, to which my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, referred? The criticisms made by the inquiry could not have covered a broader range of targets: from the department, for its failure to pay “timely attention” to kit shortages, to the faulty equipment itself, the inadequate training given to the troops for the situation that they faced and the operational guidelines given to the commanding officer—in this case there was a lack of operating procedures for Challenger tank units manning vehicle checkpoints. As we all know, Challenger tanks were designed for fighting Soviet tanks across the plains of Europe, and are suitable for manning vehicle checkpoints only where there is co-operation with infantry.

In short, there was barely a stage in the whole process that the inquiry could not find fault with. We understand fully what the Minister has described in the past as,

“the risks in the real world”.—[Official Report, 10/1/07; col. 226.]

and we agree, unfortunately, that certain tragedies are sadly unavoidable in war. I hope very much that the Government have done all that they can to ensure that these mistakes never occur again and I look forward to the Minister’s response to this short, but none the less important and worthwhile debate.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Astor, has raised an important issue in the House this evening: the death of Sergeant Steven Roberts. It is important not only because his death is a loss to his family, friends and the Ministry of Defence, but because out of that tragic event there has been a board of inquiry and an inquest by the assistant deputy coroner of Oxfordshire, both of which highlighted areas where the MoD needs to learn important lessons. I believe that the Ministry of Defence has learnt those lessons, and this evening, with the indulgence of the House, I will go through in some detail what has been done.

We expect that the actions that we have taken will reduce the risk of such an incident occurring again. We have also looked more widely at the whole issue of force protection, which is our top equipment priority—as the Minister of State for Defence Equipment and Support, it is my top priority. I will cover that issue in some detail. Our overriding aim is to ensure that the Armed Forces are successful on operations and that they have the equipment, the doctrine, the tactics and procedures that they need to ensure that those operations are successful, at the minimum risk to our personnel. But I know that this House recognises that, whatever action we take, these operations can never be made risk-free.

I welcome the contributions of the noble Lords, Lord Luke and Lord Tyler, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, because over a considerable period he has pursued these issues on behalf of Steven Roberts’s family, to his great credit. He has spoken many times on this matter, here and in another place. I will try my best to answer the points that he made.

To briefly summarise what happened in this case, Sergeant Roberts of 8 Troop Cyclops Squadron, 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, was killed in Iraq while manning a vehicle checkpoint on the night of 23 to 24 March 2003. Sergeant Roberts was dismounted from his tank and deployed to stop and search traffic for militiamen and weapons, when a local man, Mr Zaher, approached the vehicle checkpoint and began throwing rocks and stones at Sergeant Roberts, some of which hit him in the head and stomach. Mr Zaher continued to advance and attack Sergeant Roberts, leading to a chain of events which resulted in members of the troop opening fire with a machine-gun in an attempt to protect him. Tragically, this resulted in Sergeant Roberts’s death.

A board of inquiry was convened to establish the circumstances that led to Sergeant Roberts’s death and to identify lessons to prevent a similar tragedy in the future. All noble Lords who spoke asked what lessons have been learnt from the comments made by the coroner. In his narrative verdict, Andrew Walker said:

“Sergeant Roberts’ death was the result of delay and serious failings in the acquisition and support chain that resulted in a significant shortage within his fighting unit of Enhanced Combat Body Armour and none being available for him to wear”.

The board of inquiry had already identified these issues in its key findings and recommendations. It made six recommendations. All six were accepted and action was taken to implement them. The noble Lord, Lord Astor, will recall that I answered a number of Questions from him on these very issues in January.

I shall go through the recommendations and the action that we have taken in detail. The board’s first recommendation concerned the provision and use of enhanced combat body armour. All personnel deployed to operational theatres in Iraq and Afghanistan are provided with enhanced combat body armour, or ECBA, and are informed of the importance of correctly fitted ECBA, as are unit quartermaster staff. As ECBA is not an individual issue item to all soldiers, training in its use is not yet included in annual individual training. Meanwhile, the military chain of command has instructed that ECBA must be worn for live-fire tactical training. This means that all British Armed Forces will use ECBA in their pre-operational training, part of which ensures that soldiers are educated in the ballistic capability of the high-velocity plates as well as the importance of the correct sizing of ECBA.

In relation to the Question that I was asked earlier in the year, the noble Lord, Lord Luke, asked whether all the Osprey sets of body armour had been delivered. The answer is that they have. As regards whether all the delivered equipment is in use, the implementation of this will finish this month, as has been announced.

The second recommendation was for the headquarters of the Director Royal Armoured Corps to lead the development of doctrinal notes for the employment of armoured fighting vehicles at vehicle checkpoints. These notes will apply to both war-fighting and peacekeeping scenarios and to both Royal Armoured Corps training and combined arms pre-deployment training. Doctrinal notes for the employment of Challenger 2 at vehicle checkpoints covering both war-fighting and peacekeeping scenarios were made available to all armoured regiments in December 2006. Doctrinal notes were already in place for combat vehicle reconnaissance (tracked) Scimitar/Spartan, Warrior and Fighting Vehicle 430 prior to the related recommendation by the board of inquiry into the death of Sergeant Roberts.

The third recommendation was that the headquarters of the Director Royal Armoured Corps should review the content of Royal Armoured Corps crew courses and ensure that crewmen at all appropriate levels understand the significance of gun-sight coincidence on armoured fighting vehicles and the inherent risks of employing weapons systems below the computed minimum range.

The Royal Armoured Corps delivers gun crew courses for Challenger 2 and the combat vehicle reconnaissance (tracked) Scimitar. Following the board of inquiry, changes have been made to all Challenger 2 crew courses to include training on the risks of employing weapons systems below the computed minimum range. All Challenger 2 crewmen are now conversant with the implications of firing weapons systems below the computed minimum range. Royal Armoured Corps crews expecting to deploy on operations are instructed by gunnery staff on these matters and individuals likely to conduct short-range shooting receive a formal machine-gun shooting lecture as part of their pre-deployment training. The other arms and services that use armoured fighting vehicles are being directed to make the necessary changes to all courses, including pre-deployment training. That is required to ensure that personnel at all appropriate levels understand the implications of using armoured fighting vehicles weapons systems at short range.

Recommendations four, five and six concerned the supply chain and asset tracking. Significant progress has been made in improving our consignment tracking capability. Specifically, our core tracking system, VITAL—visibility in transit asset logging—has now been integrated with deployed inventory systems, and improvements to training, policy and process make it easier for troops to understand what they have to do and how they are to do it within the system. Further improvements to VITAL are planned. That means that we are much better equipped to track demands from initial despatch to arrival in the unit, which is dramatically improving our knowledge of the location of particular items as they move through the supply chain. That, in turn, has significantly improved the confidence of unit quartermasters that items that they have ordered will arrive on time, particularly as they now have the ability, through the Ministry of Defence intranet and the joint demand tracking system, to track the progress of their own demands directly.

When I visit operational theatres, one of the areas that I look into personally is how well the system is working, and the feedback that I have had from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is that the system is working much better now. The noble Lord, Lord Tyler, asked about the difference, as he sees it, between the answers that he was given relating to the number of body armour. That relates to a misunderstanding about the causes of the lack of a set of body armour in Sergeant Roberts’s case. Two problems were occurring at the same time. First, as he said, and as was said in the answer given to him, there was sufficient body armour for the troops potentially to be deployed on active operations; 13,000 sets, which he mentioned. But there was not sufficient also to equip the support troops that were also regarded as necessary for protection under a potential operation.

The decision not to go forward with the request to industry was for those further numbers of body armour relating to the potential deployment, and to include the sets needed for the frontline fighting elements of the force and the support elements. One of the things that we have learnt on operations is that, whereas during the Cold War the forward-fighting elements would be the forces that required force protection in terms of armour and so forth, now all elements of the supply chain are a potential target, and we have to provide force protection to them.

The other issue related to the logistics tracking system. Despite the large amount of body armour provided in theatre, the system then, unlike now, was not sufficient to ensure that the body armour could be tracked through the supply chain to ensure that it was available to the individuals who needed it. That led to the decision that was taken in the case of Sergeant Roberts. Those two problems were occurring at the same time, both of which we have addressed.

Noble Lords have rightly raised the delays, the length of time this takes and the effect that it has on families. The Ministry of Defence has taken all those points on board and has taken action to address them. For example, there are many more personnel in the Ministry of Defence to speed up both the board of inquiry process and the inquest process.

The noble Lord, Lord Astor, reminded us that the coroner said that the families had waited too long for the inquest to be heard. However, I remind the House that the timing of a coroner’s inquest is not dependent on the availability of a board of inquiry. Some inquests are held without a board of inquiry. Many coroners prefer to wait until a board of inquiry has concluded to assist their investigations, but it is not necessary for the process to operate in that sequential fashion.

In the case of Sergeant Roberts, however, the Army could not conduct its board of inquiry before the conclusion of the Metropolitan Police investigation. Noble Lords have not mentioned that today. The circumstances of this case led to considerable efforts that took time in the difficult circumstances relating to the investigation. That had a significant impact on timing. The Attorney-General announced on 27 April 2006 that none of the individuals present when Sergeant Roberts was killed should face criminal charges. The board of inquiry was convened on 17 May 2006, once its terms of reference had been established and agreed and appropriate board members had been identified. The board of inquiry’s findings and recommendations were ratified by the Army’s chain of command on 26 July 2006 and published on 31 July 2006. The coroner’s inquest reconvened on 11 December. A board of inquiry cannot be convened until after all criminal investigations have been completed and any possibility of a prosecution has been discounted.

All noble Lords have highlighted the issue of force protection. The Oxfordshire assistant deputy coroner said that to send soldiers into a combat zone without the appropriate basic equipment was unforgivable. I agree. That is why I said in my opening remarks that our over-riding aim—my aim—is to ensure that the Armed Forces have the equipment to achieve success on operations, and our top equipment priority on operations is force protection.

We are spending very large sums of money to protect our people from a wide variety of potential threats. The threat profile is also changing rapidly, as noble Lords will appreciate. We have spent more than £750 million on urgent operational requirements for the theatres in Iraq and Afghanistan, including further developments beyond ECBA body armour—the noble Lord, Lord Luke, mentioned Osprey—ballistic eye protection, protection upgrades to vehicles on operations, a fleet of new protected patrol vehicles, many types of defensive aid suites and survivability enhancements.

It is important to realise that equipment is only one part of the solution. We also develop our tactics and training, and procedures to complement them. As threats evolve, we alter our methods of operating to ensure that we respond in the most effective way to the threats as they change. When we get it wrong, or an enemy overcomes our preparations and, regrettably, service personnel are injured or killed, the board of inquiry process enables us to learn lessons and to make further improvements.

I noted the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, about his impression that the Ministry of Defence was putting up a brick wall and I will do everything I can to address that, so that noble Lords never again will get that impression.

I shall touch briefly on the issue characterised by the noble Lord as political expediency. On this we fundamentally disagree, as I said in answering Questions earlier this year. The Government made a judgment, taking into account the diplomatic situation. Our prime objective was to avoid having to use military operations, and our judgment at the time was that it would not be helpful to what we were trying to achieve to indicate to Saddam Hussein, or any members of the international community, that we were preparing to go to war. I understand noble Lords disagreeing with that judgment, but it was made in best faith based on the information that we had at that time. The decision relating to the time taken for us to begin our work on body armour, which would have indicated such preparation, was made on that basis. We have to disagree on that fundamental point.

The death of Sergeant Roberts and of any member of the Armed Forces is tragic. What is most important, as all noble Lords have highlighted quite rightly this afternoon, is that the Ministry of Defence properly investigates, learns the lessons and implements solutions in a robust way. The processes that I have described following the board of inquiry recommendations and the comments from the coroner’s inquest have, I believe, done that. That is not to say that it is not an area where we need to maintain effort. In my role as a Minister, I will ensure that that is carried out. All the recommendations have been acted on and carried out. The narrative verdict reinforces these findings and the Government are committed to ensuring that we do everything we can to prevent such an occurrence in future.

House adjourned at 6.22 pm.