moved Amendment No. 22:

My Lords, I will find myself repeating what I said in Committee, and I hope that I can do so with greater clarity, because I thought that I had given reassurance on this issue. However, I am happy to put the noble Lord’s mind at rest. I offer my reassurances again and hope that the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment.

The amendment seeks to address a concern that any change in the statutory functions of the London Transport Users, Committee—London TravelWatch—could lead to a significant increase in the budget requirement for the Assembly and adversely affect the ceiling by which the Assembly may increase its budget by amendment. With the GLA budget-setting process at the forefront of our minds, I presume, I would like briefly to set out the background.

Clause 13 inserts into Schedule 6 to the GLA Act 1999 new paragraph 5A(9), allowing the GLA’s chief finance officer to direct that specific amounts should be left out of the calculation for determining the ceiling beyond which the Assembly cannot amend its own budget. That is intended to deal with unusual, one-off or occasional items, such as the Olympic precept. The London Transport Users’ Committee does not come into this category. Placing a duty on the chief finance officer to have regard to the functions of the Assembly and the LTUC in issuing a direction relating to the Mayor’s budget would, therefore, have no bearing on its content.

Aside from that, there is no need for the type of safeguard that the noble Lord wants, because under Clause 12 the LTUC budget forms part of the Assembly’s component budget. But the LTUC budget is such a small proportion of the Assembly’s budget—less than 20 per cent—that any change in the LTUC’s functions and, therefore its budget requirement, is very unlikely to have a significant bearing on the overall Assembly budget.

A further important point is that primary legislation would be needed to make any change to the LTUC’s statutory duties. In that case, it would be appropriate to consider any funding issues resulting from such changes at the same time as legislation is being taken forward. That would be a much bigger requirement.

To fulfil a promise that I gave to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, following our debate in Grand Committee, I reiterate an assurance about the Assembly budget. It is clearly within the spirit of the changes set out in the Bill that the Assembly is able to decide how best to allocate its budget within the agreed total of that component budget. Section 34 of the GLA Act enables the Assembly to do anything incidental to the exercise of its functions and provides the legal basis for the Assembly to take such decisions. I hope that that will help noble Lords. Returning to the amendment, I hope that I have been able to reassure noble Lords that there is no case for them to be concerned about and that the noble Lord, Lord Hanningfield, feels able to withdraw the amendment.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that answer. Obviously, I am disappointed that she did not go further. I think that she recognised the importance to the people of London of the London Transport Users Committee; she said that in Committee and today. It looks as if we will have to be satisfied with that rather than get the amendment that we want. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 23:

My Lords, that will certainly be part of my argument. We rehearsed some of the issues on the budget as a whole in the previous amendment. I was not convinced in Committee that there was a need for any additional statutory safeguards. I am now more convinced than ever that such a change would be counterproductive for the reputation of the Assembly.

Basically, I have three quick arguments. First, there is an inconsistency at the heart of this amendment. The central question is why the Assembly should be permitted to amend one part of the GLA consolidated budget—the Assembly component budget— by a simple majority while other component budgets require a two-thirds majority. What is the argument for that? I have heard no convincing case for giving the Assembly preferential treatment or preferential safeguards at the expense of the other component budgets. The usual democratic processes can promote and defend the Assembly’s budget—and the Assembly’s wider interests—within the budget-setting procedure set out in the GLA Act. I am serious about the risk to the Assembly’s reputation. This will be the first time that the Assembly has had its own budget. The effect of the amendments would be to single it out for special treatment and protection but not the budgets for the GLA Group’s front-line services such as transport and policing. Where is the rationale in that and where is regard for the Assembly’s reputation? It is a perverse argument which will not be terribly welcome to Londoners.

Just as my noble friend Lady Morgan made clear in our earlier debate on confirmation hearings, establishing special arrangements for the Assembly would send a rather uncomfortable and inappropriate message to Londoners: that neighbourhood policing or the fire service are somehow less important than the administration of the Assembly. I do not think that noble Lords should be comfortable in sending that message.

There is an element of realpolitik and a challenge for Assembly Members to take a different approach to their budget-setting role. However, with regard to the Assembly not being able to protect its budget, it seems to me that it should be far easier to achieve a consensus against a Mayor who proposes an excessively low Assembly budget than it would be, say, to reach a consensus on policy issues. The Assembly should be given the chance, as well as the dignity, to try to make the current system work without moving the goalposts as proposed in the amendments. It is a question of confidence and maturity, and it is also a fair and consistent approach. On those grounds, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

My Lords, speaking of maturity, I am getting older by the minute. Why? Because it is the Assembly’s budget. It is not directly comparable with, for example, the Transport for London budget. If the Assembly is able to set its own budget, that could be the answer.

Real politics involves very polarised political groups. I can well envisage a new Mayor wanting to make a big political statement with a number of Assembly Members—the big political statement will be more important than the scrutiny work that will be carried out over the next four years—and that group blocking the required majority. As to the reputational risk, the Mayor is left to protect his reputation and I think that we should let the Assembly take care of its reputation. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 24 not moved.]

Clause 14 [Substitute calculations]:

[Amendment No. 25 not moved.]

[Amendment No. 26 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 27:

My Lords, I have the same problem with this amendment as with a number that we have discussed this evening. There is an attempt here to write in powers that the legislation never intended the Assembly to have. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has said that this is not a veto, but it looks very like a veto to me:

“Before issuing a direction … the Mayor shall act in accordance with the following subsections”.

That is before he issues the direction. This was not envisaged in the original legislation, which was deliberately designed to give the Mayor very large powers, as we all know. Everybody seemed to agree with that at the time. Now we have attempts to undercut and chip away at those powers in a way which would restore some of the powers of the GLC, which it was never intended the Assembly should have. The Assembly’s function was quite different. I do not know whether the Minister agrees with that, but I am really unhappy about this wording because it is not in line with the intentions of the original legislation or the Bill before the House.

Quite right.

My Lords, I support the amendment. In fact, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, we had a similar one in Committee, which the Government rejected. She has improved it, of course, because the Government said that 21 days was too long; she has now gone down to 14. That must be a reason for the Government to accept it now.

The Government keep bringing up the notion of a veto as a rather frightening ploy, but it is a red herring. There is no veto at all. I will repeat, as I have done several times, that the GLA should have a worthwhile job to do. It consists of democratically elected people who should have the right to scrutinise properly and who should have the right powers to do so. Otherwise, why bother to have it at all? I would not want to be a Member of it as it stands; I would not mind being Mayor, perhaps, but I shall not go down that route. There is a lot of sense in the amendment.

My Lords, objection is being taken to our interpretation of the word “veto”. At the moment, the Mayor has a power to issue a direction. Under the amendment, he would not have that power until certain things had happened. That is a veto. You may run away from the meaning of the words, but that is what it is.

I was here in 1998 and 1999 when these debates took place. The issue boils down to this: Parliament took the view that we needed to have in the office of the Mayor a man or woman with powers that were not dreamt of before. The people who are saying many of the things that we are hearing have been much closer to the action than I have been—they have the scars to prove it—so I hesitate to be too critical. But if the concept of having a strong Mayor is accepted, and if the Mayor has an urgent need that, if met, could avoid a catastrophe or disaster, to suggest that he must wait 14 days—and 14 days after that, so possibly 28 days—before he can act is a bit too much. This is a question of trust; we must consider a situation in which something so outrageous happened that not only parliamentary colleagues but people all over London would petition that this power should not be operated.

Although I live in Loughton, within the bailiwick of the noble Lord, Lord Hanningfield—and it is a very nice place, too—I know London and its politics and politicians. I cannot believe that there is such uproar at misuse of power that there is a need to curb it in this way. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was on the verge of giving us an interesting illustration of directions that had been issued, but a number of colleagues shook their heads and said, “Oh no, please don’t”. When she replies, I would like her to say, given her experience, knowledge and foresight, which directions she takes grave exception to and which it would not be possible to proceed with later.

This is a straightforward battle between the Assembly and the Mayor about who shall carry the weight. When the Bill was conceived—not easily—the balance came down that ultimately, and absolutely in the eyes of the electorate, the Mayor carries the weight. I see no objection to that, unless we are given incontrovertible evidence that there has been a misuse of power. I can understand the movers of this amendment being sensitive and wanting a situation where the Mayor is powerless until the Assembly has the opportunity to tell him how he should proceed. I read the words carefully: the Mayor has only to issue his reasons for the application of the direction, not necessarily not to proceed with it.

I am concerned because we know what has happened in London with terrorists in the past few years. We know the mood and we know that terrible accidents can happen. We know what can happen in respect of a great many other things that would be impacted. I hate to think that this amendment would stymie the Mayor so that he could not take the actions that he wanted to take. It is a good try, but I hope that it does not succeed.

My Lords, I feel that we are getting this amendment a little out of proportion. Nobody, least of all my noble friend who moved the amendment, has suggested that there is a disaster or that a power struggle is going on in the GLA. It was suggested that this amendment was not in accordance with the intention of the original Act. That may be so, but that is surely why we have an amending Bill before us. After seven years’ experience, the Government are wisely suggesting that some amendments and adjustments need to be made, and we agree. There is no suggestion that the Assembly is trying to usurp the Mayor’s power. We accept—some of us more reluctantly than others—that we have an executive Mayor and that power rests with him. That is as was intended, and many would say that that is as it should be. We are trying to get the system to operate more fairly; our intention is not to give more power to the Assembly but to make it more effective. That is an important difference.

It has been suggested that this measure would be a veto. That came as a surprise to me. I reread the amendment and nothing in it suggests a veto; nothing in it would prevent the Mayor giving the direction that he was minded to give. The amendment says that he must give his reasons for doing so. If he rejects a contrary or amending view from the Assembly, he must say why, but that does not prevent him rejecting it. We are getting this a little out of proportion. This is an important but relatively small amendment that will make the democratic functioning of the Greater London Authority—which is the Mayor, with his proper functions, and the Assembly, with its proper functions—better, fairer and more transparent. I support this amendment.

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Graham of Edmonton and Lady Turner for exposing the significance of this amendment. This is an amending Bill, but it does not amend the fundamental model that was agreed in the original Act, which was based on the principle that this is a unique model. It is a strong mayoral model—a strong executive Mayor with an Assembly holding him to account. The amendment is a serious attempt to weaken that and water it down. I take the point that the amendment would provide for a call-in period of 14 days to the Assembly, which is shorter than what was originally proposed, but that does not deal with the principle that we are defending. We cannot accept the amendment because it shifts the basic building blocks of London governance.

The powers to issue direction and guidance to the functional bodies—TfL and so on—are one of the most important levers available to the Mayor to ensure the delivery of his priorities and objectives. They play an equally important role in ensuring that functional bodies are politically accountable to the Mayor. They also enable him, where necessary, to act quickly and decisively on day-to-day operational performance. The Mayor's powers are analogous to the statutory powers of direction that Secretaries of State have over many non-departmental public bodies, such as RDAs or English Partnerships.

Given the importance of mayoral directions, it is obviously right that the Assembly should be able to scrutinise the Mayor’s decision to issue a direction. That is a vital aspect of the Assembly’s role of holding the Mayor to account. Very well established mechanisms already support such scrutiny. There is the periodic report to the Assembly. We have strengthened Clause 22, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said.

However, it is right and proper that that scrutiny should be retrospective. Given the way in which the model works, it would be inappropriate for the Assembly to have a formative power—the power to deliberate and make recommendations to the Mayor in advance of the issuing of a mayoral direction to a functional body. That is basic; such a power would blur the line between executive responsibility and scrutiny. As I said, the power to issue directions is very much part of the Mayor’s oversight of his functional bodies and their performance. He must be able to act firmly and decisively.

I made the analogy with NDPBs. Ministers do not normally consult Parliament on such directions and guidance before they are issued, but clearly Parliament, if it wants, can scrutinise any direction or guidance after it is issued. No doubt, if it is controversial, there will be parliamentary scrutiny after it is issued. Why should the Mayor be different?

Even the shorter period of 14 days still cramps the Mayor’s ability to issue urgent directions, which may be necessary in rapidly changing circumstances. Although many of the Mayor’s directions to functional bodies may not have been time critical to date, there could be time-critical directions in future.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, pointed out, the amendment spreads out to the London boroughs. It would affect not just directions to functional bodies but the specific and limited powers of direction that the Mayor has over London boroughs in relation to transport, planning and waste, which are often time critical.

As we discussed in Committee, that is especially important in relation to planning and strategically important planning applications. The amendment would make that power of direction unworkable because, under the Mayor of London Order 2000, the Mayor has only 14 days to issue a direction of refusal to the borough. The amendments would drive a coach and horses through that.

To reiterate my main point, although I have listened carefully to what the noble Baroness said, I believe that extending the Assembly’s power of scrutiny to decisions that the Mayor intends to make is a retrograde step. It would fundamentally alter the balance of powers within the GLA. It would prevent the Mayor from acting in a strong and decisive way on behalf of Londoners. It would fetter his mayoral discretion to act quickly in response to unforeseen circumstances. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

My Lords, again it is suggested that the amendment was tabled because of the current incumbent of the office. This may come as news to my noble friend, but I would still seek this power of direction if he were Mayor. Mind you, I think that he is going to say that he never will be. I expect that he would seek the same power if I were Mayor, although I never will be.

I wish that some of the more thoughtful members of the Labour group on the Assembly were here, because I think that they would argue exactly the same thing—not to take us back to the GLC or to alter the fundamental model, but, as the jargon goes, to put another item in the toolbox for the Assembly to exercise its function of holding the Mayor to account. The amendment would be entirely consistent with that. This is not about having scars to prove anything; it is about considering the possibilities in the future. Indeed, that is the role of Parliament. I will resist the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Graham, that I read out the two pages in my hand. I shall refer instead to the new point made about Section 30 of the existing Act by the Department for Communities and Local Government following Grand Committee. It said that the authority—that is, the Mayor—

“has power to do anything which it considers will further any one or more of its principal purposes. The principal purposes are … economic development and wealth creation … the promotion of social development … the promotion of the improvement of the environment”.

We will come on to climate change later. This has the potential to be very wide indeed. The amendment is thinking ahead. It is not about uproar over anything that has happened; it is trying to anticipate where there might be difficulties.

On the question of something being so urgent that it cannot wait for 14 days, I am grateful to noble Lords, because I now have an idea for an amendment at Third Reading that is along these lines but would require a monitoring officer to be able to certify that the matter was so urgent that the Assembly should not be able to call it in in advance. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 28:

My Lords, I support the amendment. Before the Government had even announced their intention to review the powers of the GLA, the London Assembly and the Association of London Government, which is now London Councils, jointly set up a commission on London governance. I was one of the members of that commission. We examined a wide range of issues that related not only to the GLA but to London governance, and included the functional bodies and Transport for London. The commission comprised all five parties represented on the London Assembly and the three parties on the ALG. It did not specifically include the City of London. It was the unanimous view of the five parties on the Assembly and the three parties on the ALG that, in terms of its governance structure, the fire authority worked best. In terms of governance, Transport for London, by a wide margin, worked least well—in fact, it was bad. That unanimous view was shared by the Labour Party, the boroughs, the Assembly and all of us.

My Lords, I think that noble Lords will agree that many—if not all—aspects of this Bill, in spite of today’s amendments, will improve on what we have achieved so far. I do not think that I will be able to give the reassurance for which the noble Lord is looking. I will continue to resist these amendments. I appreciate that noble Lords welcomed the proposed removal of the prohibition on holders of political office sitting on the TfL board. I also recognise the noble Lord’s point that it is the permissive nature of the proposal, rather than a binding requirement on the Mayor, that causes concern.

However, it is important that the Mayor is able to nominate the candidates best able to represent the interests of those living and travelling in London. Clause 18 would allow the Mayor to appoint Members of either House; the European Parliament; the devolved Administrations; crucially, Assembly Members, which I think chimes with what is being said; and councillors from the London boroughs. I am pleased that in our previous debates, noble Lords have recognised the great advantages of being able to draw on such talent and experience.

I recognise the wish of noble Lords to bring such talent to the TfL board, but this amendment tips the balance too far in requiring the board to be made up wholly of elected Assembly Members and councillors from the London boroughs. I appreciate the arguments that are being made, but in this Bill we are building on the 1999 Act and talking about change. This amendment removes the discretion of the Mayor to appoint the best candidates to the TfL board and severely limits his ability to ensure that board members have relevant experience in transport; finance; economics; national and local government; management of organisations, as I have said before; or trade unions.

In Committee, Members said that TfL must be strategic and local, drawing local people into the decision-making process. Again, I support the broad thrust of that argument and I have sympathy for the view that the work of TfL could be improved by increasing the number of local representatives from boroughs, which Clause 18 seeks to do. I do not believe that you balance the local and the strategic by constituting the TfL board wholly of Assembly Members and borough councils. There is a real danger that TfL could be drawn into vested local interests and lose its wider strategic focus. Such a position would not be in the interests of Londoners, those travelling in or across London or Transport for London.

Amendment No. 28 would also remove the Mayor from the TfL board, where he has significant powers over TfL. The Mayor’s effective chairmanship, I believe, has served London well. It is wholly appropriate that he is able to chair the board or can appoint the chair, should he wish, to provide political and strategic direction to the body.

I recognise that in tabling this new clause, the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, and the noble Lord, Lord Hanningfield, are mostly concerned by a lack of democratic accountability, as they perceive it. But as a functional body of Greater London, as has already been expressed, TfL will continue to be held accountable by the Mayor and closely scrutinised by the Assembly, which is made up of 25 elected members. The Assembly is the appropriate safeguard on the manner in which the Mayor exercises his powers, including his powers of appointment. We should be prepared to let that scrutiny regime continue.

So, on that basis, I shall continue to resist the amendment. The proposal for removing the ban on elected representatives is a good one and I hope the noble Lord will consider withdrawing his amendment.

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for that answer. Obviously, we are not terribly happy with it because she has not accepted our amendment. This is one of the more important amendments and we should keep thinking about it. The noble Lord, Lord Tope, made an important point: he said that TfL is considered the worst body in London and the Fire Authority one of the best. As we all know, transport in London is one of the biggest problems. The Minister said that she thought the Mayor had done a good job, but that is not necessarily reflected by public opinion when you talk to people in London.

I am disappointed in the Minister’s response. We shall reflect on this one—it needs further consideration—and we shall probably bring it back at Third Reading. I hope the Government will reflect on it because we might have to take it further at the next stage. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment today.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 21 [The Health Adviser and the Deputy Health Advisers]:

moved Amendment No. 29:

My Lords, my intervention will be simple and short. The Minister wrote to me and other noble Lords following Committee. In dealing with whether the Assembly could summon the health adviser, she wrote that,

“the Adviser will advise the Authority”—

with a capital “A”—

“and is as much an adviser to the Assembly as she is to the Mayor”.

It would be helpful if the Minister were able to repeat that sentence from the Dispatch Box, as it would then be on record for the world. I can pass her a copy of her letter if she does not have it to hand.

My Lords, I am pleased that we were able to meet, and I am sorry that the noble Baroness is still not convinced. I hope that by responding to this short debate I might be able to help.

I am happy to do as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, suggests and put on the record the comments I made in my letter. However, the most senior public health appointment in London is the regional director of public health. I believe strongly that this is the right person to advise the Mayor on health issues. Because of their professional position, the experience they have had in order to get to that point and the work they do, they occupy the best position in terms of public health within London, and they are therefore the best person to advise the Mayor. I feel that quite strongly.

Amendment No. 30 would to replace the provisions of the Bill relating to the appointment of the regional director as health adviser with the requirement that she should be an employee of the Authority. I strongly resist that, because if they were an employee of the Authority, by definition they would not be the most senior public health professional in London. Someone else would be doing that.

My Lords, the Minister alluded to the health adviser as regional director working with the Assembly. Will she repeat the words in her letter, which I have now handed over to Hansard, about the adviser being as much an adviser to the Assembly as to the Mayor?

My Lords, I may have just done that, but I shall do it again. I can confirm that the health adviser is as much an adviser to the Assembly as to the Mayor.

My Lords, the Minister has done as much as she can to help me with this. She has gone to great lengths to make clear the reason why the regional director is the health adviser and that is now being formalised. I am not sure that I will get any further in pursuing this, because all that I would probably get is the same answer each time. However, it has been useful to establish exactly the role of the adviser.

I rather suspect therefore—I should have asked the Minister earlier—that the regional adviser will be involved in the next part of the Bill, which relates to the reduction of health inequalities. When one has specific areas such as strategies, other people may need to be involved. Therefore, the Assembly’s role in these strategies becomes even more important.

I thank the Minister and her officials. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 30 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 31:

My Lords, when the Bill was originally written, it paid attention to health inequalities in London. Therefore, although I understood what the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, said about public health generally, I would not like to see reference to health inequalities removed from the Bill entirely, which is what her Amendment No. 33 would do. It would mean taking out “health inequalities” everywhere and substituting “public health”. It is clear that there are very large health inequalities in London; there are parts of London where they are really quite obvious. When I asked some questions in the House about stroke, I was in touch with the Stroke Association, which provided me with a lot of information about the way in which strokes affected people from ethnic minorities particularly. I am not referring only to stroke, of course; there are other diseases from which ethnic minorities suffer more than others. In the briefing that I have received from the Mayor of London, he referred to health inequalities and referred to the differences between life expectancies in various parts of the capital. Those differences are quite remarkable. You have a much better chance of a long life if you live where I do, for example, in West Hampstead, than if you live in a less salubrious place, such as a run-down housing estate.

These are important issues. I should not like to see health inequalities removed entirely from the Bill, no matter what has been said about public health—which I quite understand. To remove them from the Bill would be quite wrong.

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, will not be surprised that we are not with her on this one. The issue of health inequalities is hugely important and fits well with the current mayoral powers. I am interested in what is perhaps an unintended consequence of her amendments: giving the Mayor a role in public health gives him more powers than if the matter were confined to health inequalities.

We shall come to a government amendment, Amendment No. 40, which would add borough councils and the City to the list in new Section 309E(5) as relevant bodies. I am grateful, I think—I say that with a degree of caution, for a reason that I shall explain in a moment—to the Government for taking up a matter that I raised in Committee. I said then that the amendment was gently probing, because I felt that it was entirely right that the boroughs should be on the list of consultees for the purposes of the health inequalities strategy, but I was concerned that as another unintended consequence the Mayor might have increased powers and control over the boroughs.

The new Section 309E(4)(d), which is to the bottom of page 22, says that the strategy must,

“describe the role to be performed by any relevant body”.

This amendment would allow the Mayor to describe the boroughs’ role in health inequalities. I am concerned about the extension of mayoral powers in a way that might be too heavy-handed.

I assume that the Government are unlikely to give such extensive powers, because that would mean that they had given the Mayor the same powers over primary care trusts, the Strategic Health Authority and NHS hospitals. They are unlikely to have given away to the Mayor quite that degree of power. When the Minister explains government Amendment No. 40, could she explain what the effect of that amendment would be? I believe that it is broader than merely a consultative role.

My Lords, I wish to speak briefly to Amendment No. 40 in this group, to which the noble Baroness has just referred.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Darcy de Knayth for mentioning in Grand Committee—because I was abroad at the time—my support for the amendment, which prompted the Government to table this one. I now return the compliment and say that my noble friend would have been here to support the amendment but for the lateness of the hour.

As I say, I support the amendment to include London boroughs and the Common Council among the bodies whose role in the implementation of the health inequalities strategy is to be described, but first I want to say a few words about the health inequalities strategy itself. This is good news for disabled Londoners who are disadvantaged in each of the areas the strategy will cover: housing, transport, employment prospects, access to public services and lifestyle. Only last week at Question Time we discussed the DRC research which showed that people with a mental health problem or a learning disability receive poorer primary healthcare, suffer more chronic symptoms and die younger than other citizens. People with learning disabilities and people with mental health problems are more likely to suffer from major illnesses, to develop them younger and die of them sooner than other citizens. The DRC also identified major difficulties faced by people with a mental health problem or learning disability in accessing the primary healthcare services that would tackle these problems.

Despite the fact that people in these groups had a higher risk of ill health and were more likely to develop serious illnesses, they were less likely to receive the health checks and treatment which other patients with the same risk factors routinely receive. The health inequalities strategy will potentially provide a powerful vehicle for addressing these problems. I, too, take the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, made about public health, but I also agree very much with the noble Baroness who spoke from the Liberal Benches that it is important not to lose the focus on health inequalities.

The strategy is a particularly welcome development for people with visual impairments. Every day 100 people begin to lose their sight but 50 of them need not. Half of all sight loss is avoidable. In the first place, the illnesses that most often cause sight loss are bound up with general health inequality, lifestyle and other factors. This may be why visual impairment is disproportionately associated with learning disability. Secondly, your chances of successfully avoiding sight loss due to glaucoma or diabetes depend on early diagnosis, yet a third of people have not had their eyes tested in the past two years. In its Open Your Eyes report last year, the Royal National Institute of Blind People, in respect of which I declare an interest as chairman, called for a major campaign to promote the need for regular eye tests. I hope very much that the strategy will help to promote regular eye tests; otherwise, we fear that the number of blind people will double in the next two decades as a result of increasing longevity. Blindness is closely correlated with old age. Indeed, 90 per cent of blind people are over pension age.

Early diagnosis is nothing without rapid treatment and, indeed, effective rehabilitation for those for whom sight loss cannot be avoided. I was pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, referred in Grand Committee to the duty of London boroughs and PCTs to make joint strategic needs assessments of the health and social care needs of their local populations. Different populations around London have very different risk profiles for diseases that cause sight loss so it is right to involve boroughs in targeting the response. On these grounds, therefore, I very much welcome this important amendment.

My Lords, I am very pleased to support the government amendments in this group and to follow on from the very clear and communicative explanation of the noble Lord, Lord Low, of how important a health inequalities strategy is for disabled people living in London. I also thank my noble friend for her support on this issue. We need to be clear that the Bill is not about giving the Mayor of London additional powers in relation to the delivery of NHS services, and I think we have made that clear, so I am not going to go on about it. I will respond to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on her point about mayoral control, particularly over boroughs. The Mayor has no power over the boroughs as a result of the health inequalities strategy, as described in the Bill. He will, all being well, implement the health inequalities strategy through persuasion, influence and negotiation.

Amendments Nos. 40 and 46 respond to the amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in Grand Committee. Amendment No. 40 adds the London boroughs to the list of bodies and persons whose role in implementing health inequalities strategies on behalf of the Mayor must be described by the Mayor. This is a sensible change, because the boroughs will have an important role in implementing any health inequalities strategy. Including boroughs on the list means that they will be consulted at the early stages of the development of the strategy, which I think is what the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Low, were keen to achieve.

Amendments Nos. 43 and 45 clarify the definition of health determinants. The amendments result from concerns that were raised in Committee, and move the qualifying words,

“that are or may be harmful to health”,

to a different position in the clause. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, was concerned about the clause, and I hope that we have addressed that concern and that Amendment No. 44 will not be necessary.

Amendment No. 33—an important amendment—and its series of consequential amendments change the name and scope of the strategy. That is a significant change, and the suggestion from the amendments is that the changes would result in a strategy that covers the whole of public health. I make no apology for stressing the importance of the Mayor’s strategy on health inequalities. We must not look at the health inequalities strategy in isolation, because the Mayor has other health-related responsibilities, which I will address in a moment.

As we have heard so eloquently from the noble Lord, Lord Low, and my noble friend Lady Turner, health inequalities within boroughs and among different groups are stark. Right here in Westminster, you can expect to live nine years longer if you are fortunate enough to live in one of the borough’s more affluent wards than if you happen to live in one of the poorest. Boroughs and PCTs are working to address health inequalities, but they could do a whole lot more with the support that a formal health inequalities strategy from the Mayor would bring. Employment, for example, is known to improve mental health. Pan-London work supporting local efforts to get people with mental health problems into work, with the London Development Agency and employers, is therefore welcome. For that to be further promoted by the Mayor has to be positive.

The Mayor already has broader health duties set out in the 1999 Act. That is why it is very appropriate that we are now adding to that Act and bringing in a new focus on health inequalities. Little would be gained from a broader public health strategy, because many of the pan-London strategies for other public health issues which I know the noble Baroness is concerned about, such as emergency planning, pandemic flu, TB and sexual health, already exist. I hope that I can reassure the noble Baroness that that work is going on. She almost knew that I would say that, in fact, the regional director is responsible for many of these strategies and, through her relationship with the Mayor as health adviser—which will soon be formalised, we hope—she has ensured that the Mayor has been involved where appropriate. She has also supported the Assembly playing a part in the scrutiny of these strategies, because she advises the Assembly as well as the Mayor. If the Mayor were to have a broader public health strategy, it would mean widening his responsibilities to include areas currently led by the NHS and other bodies. I do not think that that is what we are talking about today.

Amendments Nos. 46H and 46J are in line with proposed amendments to remove the focus on health inequalities from the strategy. I resist those amendments. I have already explained my justification for the focus on health inequalities and why we need to make changes to health determinants. I hope that, given that further explanation, noble Lords will not press their amendments.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her detailed reply, which more or less replicated what she said in Committee, but was much enhanced following my further discussions. I am happy to leave this aspect alone. All I say is that the Mayor must also take account of the strategies implemented at local government level, which have been there for a long time and which local authorities have had to implement. Many strategies and explanations have already been dug out, arranged, and implemented. That aspect is important. I fully accept the fact that public health is a wider issue and that the Mayor has some involvement in it.

I welcome the Government’s Amendment No. 40 which includes the borough councils and the Common Council in the list set out in Clause 22. Amendment No. 43 takes out the wrong bit—my concern has always been “behaviour or lifestyle”. I do not think that I can take that issue any further. There has been no understanding of my concerns on that. That amendment will not do any harm, but it does not do any good. However, we have taken this issue as far as we can, so I shall not press the amendments in my name. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 32 not moved.]

Clause 22 [The health inequalities strategy]:

[Amendments Nos. 33 to 39 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 40:

moved Amendment No. 43:

moved Amendment No. 45:

moved Amendment No. 46:

moved Amendment No. 47:

My Lords, we support almost everything that the noble Baroness seeks to do in this group of amendments. The exception is her opposition to Clause 26, on allowances. That would involve the chair and vice-chair of the “Fire etc Authority”—the “etc” refers to the mere matter of emergency planning—receiving allowances. Those officers have substantial responsibility and carry out important work. In Grand Committee we raised our concern that similar provisions should be brought into effect with regard to the police authority in different sets of primary or secondary legislation, but we would not like to see that go.

On the major issue of the composition of the fire authority, the noble Baroness is absolutely right, and she referred to comments made by my noble friend. As I said earlier, this is not the place to debate particular actions taken by a particular Mayor, but one must be informed by knowledge of what is possible. Whether or not it is possible is also a matter for debate because, as I said earlier, it appears that the Mayor’s actions are wrong in law. So far as I can see from the statement that he issued this evening, we still have no London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority. It now seems not to exist—it has no membership.

I use this opportunity to put on the record that I do not support how the Mayor has dealt with this matter. Certain of his concerns are not wrong; for example, those about representation and diversity, which are hugely important matters. I extend that not just to gender and ethnicity, or perhaps what is called “visible ethnicity”—belonging to a visible ethnic minority community—but to all the other factors with which we are familiar when dealing with issues of diversity and equality, including age, sexual orientation and religion. However, this is a big issue.

I am falling into the trap that I am warning against—relating what is going on at the moment to the provisions in the Bill—but I have realised perhaps more starkly than I ever thought possible what might happen, and the noble Baroness is absolutely right to ask the House to consider whether this is really the way forward. I do not want to become involved in the question of whether the Mayor’s powers should be limited because of the way that the current officeholder exercises those powers, but it is very hard not to be affected by what is going on at the moment.

My Lords, let us examine the precise changes proposed in the Bill. There would be no change in the total membership but a rejigging of the constituent parts. As I see it, there is to be a board of 17 members, with eight Assembly Members instead of nine—not a revolutionary change—seven London borough nominees instead of eight, and two people nominated by the Mayor.

The Bill is all about powers. It proposes a shift in powers from one quarter to another to strengthen the powers of the Mayor. The argument that I have heard advanced for that is that the Assembly Members and the representatives of the London councils are elected. That is the democratic base. A wedge has opened up for the Mayor. In the light of his experiences or his predilections, the Mayor is able to nominate two further members. The two nominees could represent other interested parties, such as the business community, minority-ethnic groups or people with relevant fire and resilience expertise.

There are others on the margins who would need to be scrutinised and justified as bringing to the table a special quality, be it gender, ethnicity, business acumen or professional expertise. I see nothing wrong with that. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has sought, very successfully, to divorce those matters from the principle, but I see nothing wrong with that principle.

I certainly want the Bill to go through as it is. I am sure that the genesis of all this has been consultations with the Mayor, the Mayor's office and the Government. The Bill shifts the balance of power and allows the Mayor a toehold into this very important sector. Fire and emergency planning are matters that deeply affect everyone who lives and works in London, and the Mayor is ostensibly there to represent the power base of those who live and work in London.

I understand the reticence of Members opposite to accord to the Mayor's office and to the Mayor marginally more power than he has had in the past. Time after time, Members opposite see a great deal of harm in shifting power from one quarter to the office of the Mayor. I see no harm in that. I believe that the opposition amendments should be rejected and that the Bill is for the good of the people of London.

My Lords, it is a pleasure for once today to follow the noble Lord, Lord Graham, rather than the reverse. He is right to say that the proposals in the Bill are not a revolutionary change, but they are a step in the wrong direction. On an earlier amendment I said that a broadly agreed view across London political life is that the fire authority as presently constituted is the best governed of all the functional bodies. At the moment, it is a wholly elected body. The predecessor body, the London Fire and Civil Defence Authority, which operated from the abolition of the GLC in 1986 up until the creation of the GLA in 2000, was similarly a wholly elected body, comprised of a representative from each of the London boroughs—for some years I was one of those representatives—plus the City of London. That body, which, by general consensus, has worked well for more than 20 years, is now being changed—not in a revolutionary way, but why? I really do not understand it.

I might feel slightly better if the proposed appointments by the Mayor were in addition to the elected members. However, to reduce elected representation in favour of appointed representation is a step in the wrong direction. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Graham, has been a genuine democrat all his life, so I do not understand how he can see this proposal as an improvement. It is a move in the wrong direction. He speaks of increasing the Mayor’s influence there. Since the creation of the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority, the Mayor has appointed the chair of the authority. To have two nominees, appointed but not elected, is surely enough influence for the Mayor to have a real and important say in the running of the authority. We can speculate about the nominees’ background, but the Bill does not propose to prescribe the sort of background they have. Any future Mayor can choose whoever they like, to a point. I see no purpose in this. I particularly see it as a retrograde step if it is being done at the expense of the elected and democratic representation on the authority.

My Lords, would the noble Lord not concede, through a dispassionate overview of the qualities brought to a body which is democratically elected but could be devoid of some of the special qualities I mentioned—representation of business, ethnic minorities, gender balance and all the rest of it—that if the opportunity can be taken in the Bill to provide someone with the power to make that adjustment, it is surely a good thing? There is no question of diluting the combined political strength of either the London councils or the Assembly Members. On the margin, the move is well thought- out and I certainly support it.

My Lords, I am not sure whether that was a rhetorical question or one that I now feel moved to answer. I do not want to encourage the dialogue here, but why is that particularly and peculiarly the case for the fire authority and not, for instance, the police authority? Why would we not extend this to every council in the land? Because it is against the democratic principles on which we run our public bodies. We elect people to run them. We do not appoint them because of any particular experience or accident of birth, and so on. It is a retrograde step.

My Lords, it might be easier for the Minister and time-saving if I said that I do not intend to move Amendment No. 48B.

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether this was the way forward. Absolutely; I see this as the way forward. The purpose of Clause 25 is to give the Mayor wider powers in the appointment of LFEPA members.

For all the reasons that my noble friend has already highlighted, the changes will ensure that the Mayor is provided with a degree of mayoral influence which reflects his budgetary responsibilities. The Mayor is accountable for the budget of LFEPA. However, despite that responsibility, his influence over the authority’s elected members is currently limited to approving the appointment of London Assembly Members and councillors to LFEPA. Enabling him to appoint two members to the board through his own nomination will—alongside the Clause 27 provision to which I will refer in a moment—provide more effective recognition of these responsibilities and benefit the communities that LFEPA serves.

Amendment No. 47, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, proposes that the provision for the Mayor to appoint two members by his own nomination be left out. I cannot accept that amendment, nor can I accept Amendment No. 48, which the noble Baroness said she will not move. There is a growing realisation that the composition of the LFEPA board does not truly represent the diverse communities which make up the extraordinary city of London. A public body such as LFEPA needs to represent groups such as women and black, Asian and ethnic minority Londoners. As noble Lords will be aware, at the end of last week the Mayor refused to approve the nominations of five London Assembly Members and four councillors on the grounds that the board would not be sufficiently representative of those groups. I do not propose to comment on the merits of the Mayor’s actions as his decisions on whether to appoint those nominees are a matter between him, LFEPA, the Assembly and the London boroughs. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, summarised that approach by saying that this is not the place to debate particular actions of particular mayors.

However, I am happy to clarify the provisions under which he made that decision. Under Schedule 28 to the GLA Act 1999, the Mayor appoints nine Members of the Greater London Assembly and eight members of London boroughs councils nominated by the boroughs. Subject to the requirement to ensure political balance, the appointment is within the Mayor’s statutory discretion. The current position is that he has appointed eight Assembly and borough members to LFEPA in accordance with paragraph 10(3) of Schedule 28. The quorum is five, of which at least one must be an Assembly representative and one a borough representative. As a result, LFEPA remains in operation. Appointments have been made to the board, the quorum is achieved and therefore LFEPA exists.

My Lords, this takes me back to the days when we regularly went on late. We all had an eye on the clock because we all wanted to get just beyond 10.40 pm, so I do not feel guilty for intervening. It might assist the process.

I said earlier that this current porridge of a situation has been described to me as “QCs’ paradise”. That might appeal to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, who has an appropriately cynical view of the way that the legal profession goes about these things, seeking a variety of views and extending the debate on them. It sounds as if the Government’s legal advice is entirely contrary to that which has been received in other quarters.

As I understand it, the requisite numbers under Schedule 28 have to be appointed, and the Mayor has declined to make those appointments. It confuses the appointment of Assembly Members, from a limited pool, with the appointment of borough representatives who are nominees of the borough councils, which is a wider pool. I ask noble Lords’ forgiveness for reading from a piece of modern technology, but it has enabled me to receive this statement. It says that it is for that reason that the Mayor has asked two groups to come up with a revised list of nominations. That sounds to me as though he has still not made the appointments. It is not a matter of a quorum because the appointments have not been made to enable the authority to exist. However, the QCs will go on arguing about that point. As it is almost 20 minutes to 11, I should give the noble Baroness the opportunity to finish her speech, but I felt, having that piece of information, that it was important to add it to the record of this evening’s debate.

My Lords, it is important to reiterate the point that I made a moment ago, which is that I do not propose to comment on the merits of the Mayor's actions. I appreciate that the noble Baroness has electronic equipment operating in her favour. My quill and parchment here conflict with her interpretation. I have been advised that we do not have a statement that takes us any further concerning the information to which she refers. As I said, it is not appropriate for me to go any further on that.

Let us return to the matter of this debate. Allowing the Mayor to nominate two members of the board will have the effect of enabling a wider stakeholder membership of the authority, in terms of both community representation and relevant experience. It is envisaged that the two mayoral nominations might represent other interested parties, such as the business community or people with relevant fire and resilience experience, as well as people from ethnic minorities or other under-represented groups, all of whom can usefully inform the risk-management planning process, which every fire and rescue authority uses to determine its strategic spending.

When the Government formally consulted on GLA powers in November 2005, the proposals to broaden representation on the LFEPA board in such a way were received supportively, including by bodies such as the Fire Brigades Union, other trade unions, volunteer groups and groups representing black and ethnic minorities. So this is not completely out of the blue.

As I mentioned earlier, by tabling Amendments Nos. 47 and 48, noble Lords seek to deprive the Mayor of the ability to make nominations to the LFEPA board. Their amendments would reduce the membership from 17 to 15. There are no sensible grounds for simply reducing the authority's membership in that way. I think that we can all agree that 17 members has proved to be the right number for LFEPA to create a strong and effective leadership board.

We discussed Clause 26 in Grand Committee. The question of expenses has already been widely discussed. We think that that clause is very important. I have already referred to the fact that, although the Mayor is responsible for setting LFEPA’s budget, he has little say in the strategic leadership provided by the body. The new provisions under Clause 27 will enable the Mayor, where necessary, to direct the body on both operational and non-operational matters. That will give the Mayor more influence over delivery, with a view to achieving greater efficiency and effectiveness, thus reflecting his mandate as an elected city-wide Mayor. An example that comes to mind of the type of direction that he might—I say “might”, not “will”—make is ensuring greater diversity and equality in the workforce, perhaps by directing more resources to recruitment from certain sectors of the community. He might direct to ensure that community safety resources are properly targeted at those sections of society that are most vulnerable, or perhaps even ensure that fire and rescue initiatives have due regard to the wider GLA environment agenda—I say that because I know that my noble friend Lord Rooker is sitting behind me, ready to deliver a 25-minute speech in a moment.

At the same time, there are clearly defined parameters within which the Mayor can make any directions. There is a requirement that the Mayor's direction should be consistent with the fire and rescue national framework or fire safety enforcement guidance published in accordance with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. I am sure that noble Lords will be reassured by that.

In summary, Clause 27 will give the Mayor the same due recognition of his accountability as fire and rescue budget holder as is given to budget holders across the country with similar responsibilities, and within the same parameters. I therefore urge the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, to withdraw her amendment.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply, although I remain totally unconvinced by it. As the noble Lord, Lord Tope, said, if it ain’t broke, why fix it? This authority has worked, and does work, extremely well in the current circumstances. It has always been made up broadly of elected members. No explanation of any real merit is given to justify why these two appointed positions should now go to the Mayor, and the problem that arose on Friday over the elected members’ appointments, which should have gone through without any controversy on the part of the Mayor, is, I am afraid, a lesson in what happens once one starts to tinker with what is there.

I hear what the Minister says. I shall look at the matter again and we will see how things progress in the current rather unhappy situation. For today, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 48 and 48A not moved.]

Clause 26 [Allowances]:

[Amendment No. 48B not moved.]

Clause 27 [Directions etc by the Mayor]:

[Amendment No. 49 not moved.]

My Lords, I beg to move that consideration on Report be now adjourned.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House adjourned at 10.46 pm.