I am grateful for the opportunity to resume the debate on the amendment. It was a good idea to break, because I understand noble Lords’ frustration when some of the details of the Bill are not explicable. It is a complex Bill and we are talking about an innovative model. I am happy to explain it and hope that I can answer the questions that have been raised. I shall certainly take advice if I cannot.

I shall go into a little more detail on how the model works. The nomination system for slates is the same as is used for mayors. Parties will submit their nomination papers with relevant supporting signatures 19 days before polling. Nominations from corresponding ballot papers will clearly identify the prospective leader and contain between two and nine executive members, as provided for in the council’s constitution.

There is a limit of 10 members for such an executive, as laid down in the 2000 Act. The minimum number laid down in the Bill is three. The statutory boundaries of the slate, therefore, are three and 10, but the council can decide to vary them to four and nine. There is definitely scope, therefore, for the elected executive to vary in size, which will govern what triggers by-elections.

Voting takes place by the supplementary vote. I am sorry to say that to the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, but that is the position. It is the same with mayors. The whole area of the council votes for the slate.

The elections will take place at the same time as either whole-council elections or by thirds and halves, but the slate is elected for four years. That is the common thread which goes through the three models.

Individuals can stand for election to the slate and for ward councillor. As I have said, if they are elected for both, they have to resign as ward councillor and a by-election is held for the resulting vacancy. It is necessary to allow candidates to stand for both positions; otherwise, there would be hardly any incentive for those who fail to secure an executive post to stand in the first place. The alternative would be to allow for a dual role, but, as I said, the model creates a sharp distinction between the role of the executive and the role of the ward councillor as scrutineer and challenger.

The successful slate can be made up of ratepayers—it can have a ratepayer mayor, for example. Members of the slate will take office for a fixed term of four years, four days following the election. The leader will allocate portfolios and appoint a deputy, who can also have portfolio responsibilities. If the executive leader dies or resigns, a by-election for the whole slate must be called. That is essentially because the slate is branded with the leader: they stand and fall together.

If a cabinet member dies or resigns, the executive leader decides whether to hold a by-election or to continue with a smaller executive, subject to the executive remaining above the effective minimum as specified in the council’s constitution. Perhaps I may explain that in a little more detail. The leader chooses, except in certain circumstances, what happens. The leader can decide to carry on with a smaller executive, or he has to call a by-election where the size of the executive is reduced to below the effective minimum. Therefore, if it is below three, he has to have an executive or if the council has set a non-statutory minimum of four or five, then as soon as it drops below that, it has to have a by-election. That introduces some stability. The detail is set out in Schedule 4. Therefore, there are provisions which are designed to prevent constant turmoil.

Will the Minister say where from Stockton this letter came? Was it generated by the elected members or the officers?

It came from the elected members. That puts a little more substance around what I can see noble Lords have understood to be innovative but also speculative. It also raises some important questions which I have tried to answer. However, if there are some outstanding issues, I am happy to attempt to answer them further.

We are grateful for that and will have a good read of it. We will come later to parts of the Bill that relate to this. I have one question and one request. Am I right in thinking, from what the Minister has said, that different candidates could be standing for election at any given time with different size slates within the minimum and maximum? The noble Baroness nods at that, so the answer is yes.

The request picks up a point made by the noble Baroness just before we broke for dinner. She referred to this not being an entirely new concept and she referred to other models, which I understood to be overseas models. I ask the noble Baroness to write to noble Lords giving more detail. Where does this come from and will the issues identified by noble Lords, such as the by-elections, arise with those models? Noble Lords are concerned by the knock-on effect of some proposals. Therefore, if I may say so, to be told that this is not novel is not a complete answer to those concerns.

It is novel in our experience in the UK. However, there are examples from Switzerland and Portugal, where they have similar arrangements, but I will do my best to substantiate that.

Regarding the different size slates, it is worth bearing in mind that if the council opts for this process, it is going to have to set out, in its constitution, what it wants to see happen. Therefore, different sized slates could stand if that is what the council decided in its constitution. As I said, there is scope in the size of the slate—the minimum and maximum—to have points at which by-elections are triggered. Those could be different for each arrangement.

Will the Minister delve a little more deeply into what the other members of the elected council will do? The councillors in the elected-member part of the council and this elected executive on top of it may or may not come from the same party; they may or may not have anything to do with their majority. Will they have a leader of the scrutiny part of the council? Who will actually govern them? If they are not from the same party as the executive, it will be a recipe for complete disaster. A whole raft of elected councillors will feel resentful that they have no hope at all of reaching a cabinet position; that they are very unlikely to be given anything to do other than overview and scrutiny; and that unless they can be persuaded to stand on the slate they will never reach a position of authority within the council. How will this split be dealt with? It could be a very uncomfortable situation.

The noble Baroness is right that the executive could be of a different party from the council composed of all the councillors. If the council opts for this it will have to understand what it is doing and collectively make that choice. Those who are committed to the council’s business will have to see this in the round and make a decision accordingly. I do not think that it denies the councillors a role; they will have a very challenging role as back-bench councillors holding the executive to account. I think that this model gives more force to the notion of scrutiny and challenge than some other models do. Their role will be extremely clearly defined. They will also be slightly enhanced ward champions, a very definable and accountable role. So I do not agree with the noble Baroness's dire predictions. Apart from anything else, the matter would have to be worked out in consultation before the decision was taken.

It is interesting to imagine how such a council might work. The Minister is eloquent in describing it but I cannot get my head round it at all. As for the idea that ward councillors would in these circumstances have a “challenging” and enjoyable role and act as ward champions, I do not know how it would work. It seems to me that they will just be cut out of everything. There will probably be massive frustration and an inability to do very much at all. However, those are matters that can be discussed.

I have a few questions. First, under this model of the elected executive, who and what body will decide the annual council budget? Secondly, although the noble Baroness explained how the competition between slates of different sizes would work, she did not explain why it was a sensible arrangement where three people might be standing against seven, nine or whatever number of people. I do not understand why that is a sensible arrangement at all or how it will help people better to understand how local government is run. Thirdly, the Minister said that it might be possible not to have by-elections if people were elected to the council through both the ward and the executive and the council size was not very great. In such circumstances, however, would not the ward or wards concerned be a councillor down, which would not be a good idea?

The budget process will be the same as now; the council as a whole will still have charge of it. If the leader presented a budget that the council did not accept, then, as currently happens, the council would have to summon a two-thirds majority to overturn it. That is what happens.

Why two-thirds?

It is modelled on the elected mayor.

There may be two-thirds if there is an elected mayor. If there is a normal executive and cabinet operation, the council decides the budget—full stop, no two-thirds.

Absolutely, but this is modelled on the elected mayor. There are so many parallels of a DEE with an elected mayor, and this is one of them.

Why the variable sizes? Again, it would be up to the council to choose. We have tried to enlarge the scope for the council to make its own choices. You could have two or even three slates of variable sizes, and get different configurations of leaderships and executives, one of which might appeal more to the local electorate than another. You might be able to show that, with four people on the executive, you could focus the work and do it properly. That would be entirely up to the council. It is about allowing scope.

On the ward by-election point again, if you are elected on the slate and you stand as a ward councillor and are elected, then you have to stand down as a ward councillor. However, whether there is a by-election depends on the arrangements that the council has made about the size of the executive and the trigger point for those by-elections. Shall I put that in writing for the noble Lord?

I understand that very well, but it does not seem very sensible. Single-member wards might end up not having a councillor for the rest of the four years, which would not seem sensible at all.

I will just ask about this business of slates of different sizes. A slate of four people might say, “Just four of us—we can galvanise, we can get together”. Eight people would say, “No, we represent more of the district or county, so we are a better slate”. Should local elections be about that kind of organisational structure—about which structure of an executive is the best way to run a particular county, borough, district or whatever? Should elections not be about the services that are going to be produced and about differences between the slates or candidates on projects in the area—what people will provide—rather than this rather arid structural thing? We are not going to get people to vote on that, are we?

The noble Lord and I are at one in thinking that this has to be about better services and better ways of delivering things for people. As I said before, this will be tested against notions of effectiveness and efficiency as well. The point is that the people will decide whether this slate is convincing enough to be elected. They will do that on the basis of what they think would provide better services, not on what they think is a better structural arrangement. He and I are agreed.

I apologise to the noble Baroness and to the Committee—I followed the earlier debate, but maybe my point has already been dealt with and I missed it. I am concerned about the principle of accountability under this model. I admit that my experience was in a county council where there was no overall control. This model may be so inappropriate to that situation that the Minister will say that it would not be acceptable in those circumstances. However, I cannot for the life of me see to whom precisely the executive, under this model, are accountable. Are they accountable to the elected leader? If so, what happens if, during the four years of that leader’s office, there is a change in the whole colour and tenor of the council? Such a change in political control can happen very easily these days, maybe as the result of by-elections. Particularly with low turnouts—incidentally, I think that this will lead to very low turnouts indeed—I do not think that it will be clear what responsibility people will have if elected. That will be at the root of the problems related to this subsection.

I am reminded that in all the discussions last week—the Prime Minister’s Statement, the Green Paper on better governance—there was a clear intention that we should seek to develop schemes that give more authority, responsibility and accountability to our local government, as to our central government. But this seems to be a recipe for confused accountability. The noble Baroness must explain how this model will ever operate in those circumstances and give to the people more sense of responsibility and accountability. If, in fact, the model is never taken up by any authority and will never be a model with which any authority believes it can provide that system of local governance, it is a waste of the time of this House and Parliament.

The noble Lord asked an important question for which my answer is simple, because it is consistent with the White Paper published last week. The elected executive are accountable to the people.

I am sorry; I must pick that up. The people elect the executive for four years, and do not like what the executive are doing. They do not follow their manifesto. They run the council into all sorts of problems. Who gets rid of them? Does there have to be a referendum? How do you get this elected executive out of the system? Irrespective of whether they are there for four years or whether there are elections by thirds or by halves, there seems to be no concept that the elected executive could go wrong or run awry. I know the argument regarding elected mayors who run their own operations—they are in the hands of the electorate after four years. I do not believe that we can talk about allowing an executive to run a council for four years, with full responsibility for every service and every penny of the council, with no way of getting rid of them until the next election.

We have brought in four-year terms, not just for this model but for others as well, to introduce some stability. If the council gets into trouble, that will bring the role of at least the Standards Board into play—if it is that sort of trouble. Parts of the executive body will always be susceptible to that. It is part of the model. I listened closely to what the noble Lord said and we will think about these arguments because, clearly, we are not familiar with this model. He mentioned detailed conflicts and we are happy to think about them. However, that is the system implicit in this model. My note from the Box has just reinforced my case.

That was the most encouraging thing that I have heard in the past two or three hours: the Minister said that the Government were thinking about these things. That is good news, because there are so many questions and potential problems that all we can ask the Government to do is to think. We hope that their thinking comes up with something that is a bit better.

Returning to the question of what I keep calling aldermanic by-elections, but are actually elected executive by-elections, let us assume that there is an executive of six members. It is likely that they will be on the ballot paper in six wards. Assuming that they are all fairly prominent people in their party’s leadership on the council—the sort of people who would get on the executive if the existing executive arrangements applied—they will be standing for different wards and will probably be leading their tickets in each of those, say, three-member wards. There will be a lot of by-elections—it is not just a question of one or two. It is not like an election for a mayor, involving one person and in which one ward has a by-election. There will be a mini-general election for that authority. We are not raising trivial matters, of which it can be said, “The by-elections will happen and who cares about a few by-elections?”. If the election is for a bigger executive of, say, eight people, half the wards in an authority such as an ordinary district council could have by-elections five or six weeks after the ordinary May elections. It could change control, but perhaps it would not matter because the elected executive would have total power.

Secondly, I want to pick up the point the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, raised about what to do if things go wrong, because things will go wrong. You cannot design structures which guarantee utopia. You cannot design structures which guarantee adequate leadership, never mind excellent leadership. There will be people who are the wrong people, cannot cope, or for whatever reasons go off the rails. What does the council do under those circumstances? At the moment there are checks and balances within the council that allow something to happen. The majority party may sort it out and come up with a fresh leadership. Maybe a wider group of people on the council say that things have to change, and perhaps the next time they meet things will have changed. This system, as the noble Baroness said, is going to produce rigidity—a lack of flexibility—over four years. If everything is going wonderfully, there is no problem, but systems should not be designed for when things go wonderfully; they should be designed to cope with difficulties.

Finally, the Minister said that in order to get such a system, a council would have to show that it will secure continuous improvement. That seems to me to beg the whole question of elections. Whether councils bring continuous improvement or any other sort of improvement will depend on who gets elected. You cannot design systems to guarantee continuous improvement. It all depends on who gets elected, who is running it and who is in control. There seems to be the fallacy at the heart of what has been proposed that you can get continuous improvement by imposing structures from above. You cannot.

I will reply very briefly. On by-elections and ward councillors, if this model is adopted, people will understand the implications and common sense will prevail. We have to bear that in mind in terms of who chooses to stand as a ward councillor as well as an executive. Of course, a lot will depend on the leader and the way the process is constructed.

On continuous improvement and what happens if things go wrong, things have gone wrong with councils over the past 10 years and various strategies have been employed to assist, intervene, support and change. That is one reason why we have had continuous improvement in our councils. This council is not going to be any different from any other council in that respect. The normal checks and balances will remain, not least the strategic powers—the quasi-judicial powers, for example, which continue to rest for the planning committee in terms of the relative role of the leader. I have listened to noble Lords, and I will read Hansard very closely and reply to anything I have not been able to reply to.

I am sorry to come in again but I think it is useful to keep clearing these issues out of the way, even if there are people in this Chamber who wish we would move on.

First, on planning, presumably it is the executive who lead on plan-making even if there is a quasi-judicial committee which deals with development control matters. Secondly, am I right in thinking that because the budget is a decision for the whole council, subject obviously to negotiations—there are provisions about putting a budget in place by a certain point in the year—the non-executive part of the council could stymie the executive’s proposals for the budget, which might be a particular possibility if it is of a different political complexion from the executive? Therefore, the executive have wide executive powers, but they are limited in relation to the budget and the executive would have to take the council with it.

As I understand it, that is correct. Did the noble Baroness ask another question?

Do the executive have the powers to make the plan, rather than it being a matter for the whole council?

Yes; the noble Baroness is right.

This has been an extremely useful discussion. I am not sure that the Minister wanted it to go on quite as long as it did, but we are very grateful for her patience in defending what seems to us to be a parlous state on a fairly sticky wicket. As she promised to do and asked us to do, we will read Hansard carefully and I hope that we will all understand the situation a little more when we have done so. I have no doubt that we shall return to this matter at a later stage but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 116:

Our Amendment No. 159C is grouped with Amendment No. 116 and has exactly the same effect. I hope that it is reassuring that we are coming up with the same points without rehearsal. That shows consistency on our Benches, at any rate.

Our Amendment No. 149A concerns what is to happen for there to be a move to a new form of executive prescribed by the regulations to which my noble friend has referred. Under new Section 33L(3), the resolution to make the change requires a two-thirds majority. I suppose that I should own up to having sat through the passage of the 2000 legislation, but, if at that point a two-thirds majority was not thought necessary, what has happened to require one now and why is it needed for this particular restructuring? I am sure that there is a good reason, but it is not immediately obvious.

Amendments Nos. 116 and 159C would amend the Local Government Act 2000 and remove the Secretary of State’s powers to make regulations providing for new forms of executive. Amendment No. 149A removes the reference in Section 33L of the Act, as inserted by Clause 64, to the procedure for moving from directly elected leadership arrangements to new forms of executive arrangements provided through Section 11(5) of the 2000 Act. In short, they would remove the Secretary of State’s regulation-making power, provided for in Section 11(5) and (6) of the Local Government Act 2000, which enables the Secretary of State to make regulations prescribing different forms of executive arrangements.

We have just concluded a lively debate about executive arrangements, but the amendment would narrow the range of choices and executive arrangements that we can make available to authorities. The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, believed that our proposal to allow local authorities to choose to operate a directly elected executive would render superfluous Section 11(5) and (6) and asked why they were necessary. They provide for new forms of executive, including where some or all of the executive members are directly elected. He is correct that they provide for new forms of elected executive arrangements. However, they also allow for any new executive arrangements.

We set out the three models in the White Paper, but other models may come forward in due course. It is important to retain the powers in Sections 11(5) and (6) so that we can respond to any local authority that feels it has a better idea or something that would facilitate better leadership. If we do not leave the power where it is, the only opportunity a local authority would have would be to wait for the next bout of primary legislation. The powers under the Act provide for flexibility, and I am sure that noble Lords would want that.

I understand that the requirement of a two-thirds majority reflects that the council would be adopting a model that was wholly innovative and which had not been specified in the Bill. That brings the opportunity to innovate as well. I hope that that answers the question.

Removing the power would reduce flexibility and future choices.

Rather as my noble friend Lady Scott said, I am slightly hesitant in making a point about reducing choice. But if something is so innovative that it requires the unusual step of needing a two-thirds majority, it calls into question even more the Henry VIII powers to which my noble friend referred and which some of us allowed to go through in the 2000 Act. I am not asking for a response to that, but I felt the need to say it.

I can explain it a little more clearly now. We are obviously content that a council that wishes to move to a governance model as set out in the Bill should do so by a simple majority. The model will have been set out in primary legislation, and everyone would have been able to read the intention. A model set out in the regulations under Section 11(5) of the Local Government Act 2000 would not have been through the same debate and process of contest. Therefore, we think that a two-thirds majority of the council should be required before adopting a model that is derived from regulations. That is the full explanation.

The Minister puts her finger on what alarms me about the situation. I am less alarmed that the provision has been there for seven years and nobody has done anything about it—perhaps it will be there for another seven without anybody doing anything—than by the fact that the new model of elected executives, which is set out in great detail here and clearly leads to all kinds of questions and problems, could have been provided for in a regulation under the 2000 Act.

Having said that, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 117 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 118:

I warmly support my noble friend. My local county council in Cornwall is currently engaged—successfully, I hope—in seeking unitary status. As a result, I hope that it will be taking on extra responsibilities. In those circumstances, the size of the executive could be extremely important, and it could become impossible for a number of councillors to serve on it because they would simply have too much responsibility to cover all the levels of service required in a council of that size.

There is also the issue of geographical spread. In a geographically large county such as Cornwall, if a very small executive is effectively to take power on behalf of the whole authority, it will inevitably mean that members from a small number of geographical areas will be perceived to be taking full responsibility for all council services. Therefore, a little latitude on the Government’s behalf to enable the total on the executive to increase to one-quarter of the council membership would clearly give the flexibility that, in fairness, the noble Baroness was supporting so enthusiastically just a few seconds ago.

I am delighted that the noble Lord is so supportive of our attempt to create unitaries. I am so sorry he was not here for the first day of our Committee debate, when I could have welcomed that support. Yet I am afraid that I cannot agree with him on this amendment, which would distort what we intend to do via the models that we are putting forward.

Let us think about what it would mean in practice. For example, Birmingham City Council has 120 members today, so the city’s executive would swell to 30 members under these proposals. I suggest that that is not an executive but a leadership group of a fairly significant size—more of a big committee. It leads me to wonder whether the noble Lord is trying to reintroduce the committee system by the side door, as it were. We have already set out in evidence the benefits of a small leadership group. That is not new: a maximum of 10 for such a group was set out in the 2000 Act. I have not heard evidence as to why that should be changed. On the contrary, The New Council Constitutions on the outcomes and impact of the Local Government Act 2000, the independent evidence that I quoted earlier, also said that executives of up to 10 members are right for delivering visible and effective leadership. I take the noble Lord’s earlier point that we should perhaps be talking about better leadership rather than stronger leadership. However, this research looked at the functions and attributes of leadership and talked about better leadership, too. I am afraid that the amendments would put the clock back and unpick the 2000 Act, so I reluctantly conclude that I cannot accept them.

I am disappointed by that. It is horses for courses. What will work well in one area might be quite different from another area. It is okay to say that it would be ridiculous in Birmingham. I accept that there should perhaps be a maximum size; perhaps it should be “a quarter but not more than 15”, or something like that. That would be quite reasonable.

There are councils whose executives are very small, operating with a tightly knit group of people with enormous, inordinate and unnecessary power. Those councils must have different arrangements from the rest of the councils if not just the scrutiny but the involvement of people in making decisions are to work. It is no good saying to councillors, “You can champion this or scrutinise that”. Councillors need to be involved in making decisions. Good councillors will always have ways to do that, such as through pre-decision scrutiny or through working groups working to executive members, a model which works in some places. Some councils have got around the legislation by effectively having advisory committees to executive members, who take the decisions but do what the committee wants.

All sorts of models exist; the Government need to realise that local government is very diverse. Every council is different, with a different culture. Even councils that from the outside appear to be operating the same models are different. I sit on an executive of 10 and ask myself what the difference is between that and a committee. I do not know; it operates as a committee. You can have an executive of six to 10 people that meets to discuss agenda items—it does not rubber-stamp them—where the public and councillors who are not on the executive can take part, making points on behalf of their ward, town or other interests. Is that a committee? Is it an executive? Is it a bird? Who knows?

The Government are making unnecessary, tight, rigid distinctions which do not exist in the real world. There are people at the extremes, perhaps operating very well, and everybody else in the middle with their own way of coping with the system. I am disappointed by the Minister’s response but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 119 to 121 not moved.]

Clause 62 agreed to.

[Amendment No. 121A not moved.]

Clause 63 [Discharge of functions]:

[Amendments Nos. 122 and 123 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 123A:

I can give the noble Lord a positive answer on Amendment No. 123A, which aims to ensure that the amendments made by Clause 63 in respect of the discharge of the function do not prevent executive functions being delegated to an area committee established under Section 18 of the Local Government Act 2000. Amendment No. 123B relates to arrangements for the discharge of an executive’s functions by an area committee, by the executive of another local authority, or by another local authority. It also relates to the joint exercise of an executive’s functions with another authority or executive. The amendment would require such joint arrangements to be approved by the full council.

I reassure the noble Lord that Amendment No. 123A is unnecessary because Clause 63 does not interfere with Section 18. The changes being introduced by the Bill do not prevent the sort of arrangements he was describing in the excellent work of area committees. That being the case, councils will have just the same ability to delegate functions to area committees as at present. I hope that that will reassure him.

I am afraid I cannot agree so wholeheartedly with the noble Lord’s second point in Amendment No. 123B. That essentially would provide that decisions about discharging functions under arrangements made under Section 18 should in effect be subject to approval by the full council. That obviously contradicts what we are trying to do in concentrating executive arrangements and focusing executive functions. That must lie—this includes the methods by which they are discharged—with the executive. In our new arrangements, as we will probably discuss, all the executive functions are to be vested in the leader of the executive. To provide that, if the leader or the executive wished to discharge certain of their functions in a particular way, they must have the support of the full council is obviously contradictory to the concept of executive functions.

It is worth reminding noble Lords about the limits to executive functions. Under the 2000 Act there are specific areas that are not executive functions, and those are the major strategic decisions: the budget; the council’s sustainable community strategy; and quasi-judicial matters such as planning and licensing. It is absolutely right for the council to take those strategic decisions, particularly in relation to quasi-judicial decisions. They should not be in the hands of a small executive. All the other functions of an authority rightly lie with the executive and in future, in the first instance, with the leader. That includes decisions about how the executive functions are to be discharged.

I hope that the noble Lord will welcome the reassurance on Amendment No. 123A and forgive me for not being able to accept Amendment No. 123B.

I am not sure whether it is one cheer or two, but it is not three. Any cheers are welcome at this time of night on these matters, so “Thank you” to the Minister for that reassurance on the first part. The second part probably does not make any difference in practice if the council is adopting a normal leader and cabinet arrangement, even under the new proposed arrangements, as they will be part of the negotiations about how the council will be run when that leader and cabinet is set up. It causes me some alarm in the case of some of the other arrangements like elected executives, but perhaps they are castles in the sky anyhow.

I will read carefully what the Minister said and hope to continue reporting to the House about the exciting times that I have on area committees for a long time to come. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 123B to 125 not moved.]

Clause 63 agreed to.

[Amendment No. 126 not moved.]

Clause 64 [Changing governance arrangements]:

moved Amendment No. 127:

My Amendment No. 128A would do exactly the same as the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham. We have had a long debate on this issue today, and I do not need to say too much, save to once again urge the Government to reconsider their adherence to the principle that we must have what they describe as strong models, which should be limited to three. At the moment, local authorities will have only three models available, and one of those is fairly unworkable, as we have discovered, and will be taken up by very few authorities.

Given the different political situations, the different cultures, the different histories that obtain in local authorities in this country—from small rural district councils to the largest metropolitan areas and all the variety in between—the idea that there should be only three models of governance available for them to choose from is not one that a healthy democracy should have. I urge the Government to reconsider this.

I have three amendments in this group, but I am happy not to pursue them and to support the proposals of my noble friend Lady Scott and the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham.

The executive arrangements that the Government want are designed for councils in which one group has a clear overall majority. They are not designed for councils with no overall control and, particularly, they are not designed for small district and rural councils that may consist of several groups and a number of independents. Such arrangements in those councils simply do not work properly. They are designed for a situation where there is a party that can get a grip on it. They may work in more political urban councils or big county councils where perhaps two parties can work together well; they do not work well in smaller councils where there is a larger variety. They have to be made to work and people make them work, but they are not designed for them. We urgently need more flexibility for such councils to design arrangements that suit their own circumstances.

There is a temptation, which I shall certainly resist, of having the debate we had when we opened the Committee stage today. This is very much a discussion about the way in which we see leadership operating and the way we want to enable it.

Amendments Nos. 127, 128A and 132 to 134 have all the effect of enabling any council, regardless of size or type, to operate any form of governance arrangements they see fit. I am slightly puzzled by the suggestion that somehow we are imposing uniform options on councils. There are three models but within the leader and cabinet models, for example, there are different ways of making this work. Many councils adopt leader and cabinet models now and they have not sacrificed their individuality or their local characteristics. While I understand what noble Lords are saying—clearly it is one of this country’s great strengths that it is so diverse—we must be careful not to exaggerate that or to exaggerate the impact this measure will have.

I thank the Minister for that not totally unexpected reply. This group of amendments brings us almost to the conclusion of this discussion, although maybe not quite. There is a terrible irony that here we are in July 2007 discussing the modes of governance of local councils, when we were discussing that in 2000. Seven years later, the thing still has not settled down. There are still concerns about the way the governance is being regulated and directed. Perhaps we need a bit more flexibility than we have now. Still, I have heard the Minister’s response and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 128:

My Amendments Nos. 128B and 153 would achieve the same ends as those tabled by my noble friend Lord Greaves. Amendment No. 128B is another amendment designed to increase the flexibility of the model. It would allow councils to change from one model of governance to another if it becomes clear that there are problems and that the system no longer has the confidence of the public.

The Minister will be aware of the situation that has arisen in Doncaster, where the Doncaster Fair Deal campaigners have drawn up a petition to change from the elected mayor and cabinet system currently in operation. Using the provisions of the Local Government Act 2000, more than 11,000 people signed a petition requesting a referendum on changing the system of governance. It was taken to full council and won.

I understand that the authority subsequently refused to take action on the basis that the current five-year rule will be rendered null and void by the Bill in front of us. This Bill will leave current arrangements in place for 10 years, so Doncaster and any other authority where arrangements appear not to be working and are no longer wanted will be stuck with an unpopular system of governance for a decade. That is far too long where the system has self evidently lost the confidence of the public.

Amendment No. 153 is another attempt to remove the ludicrous requirement that in order for change to happen the existing elected mayor or leader has to assent. If I were visiting another country to look at its system of governance and found that the only way you could get rid of someone was if they themselves agreed to be got rid of, I would report that back as an outrage and a sham of democracy. It is quite extraordinary that it will be part of the Bill.

This group of amendments makes amendments to Clauses 62 and 64 which deal with local authorities changing their governance arrangements by inserting new sections into the Local Government Act 2000. Amendment No. 128B would enable a council to vary its executive arrangements more than once. The effect of Amendment No. 128 would be to deny authorities the ability to change their executive models from one to another. The effect of Amendment No. 153 would be to enable changes between models of executive to occur during the term of office of a mayor or leader of a directly elected executive without their permission. I heard what the noble Baroness said, but the amendments seem to cut down on the scope and the democratic powers of local government.

Clause 64 enables local authorities operating executive arrangements to change their governance arrangements, including the adoption of a directly elected form of executive. It cannot and would not be our intention at all that a council could never change its mind about the model that it had chosen. It is obviously sensible for a council to be able to move from one model to another if it finds, after a period with one model, that it can now see the benefits of another. Surely, by removing Section 33A and preventing a council from changing that model, we would be doing a major disservice to that council. Clearly, we believe that councils should be able to change if they believe that it is appropriate. We want to keep that flexibility.

We believe that Amendment No. 128 is unnecessary. The Bill as it stands provides that councils can vary their executive arrangements any number of times that they choose. I hope that that will satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Greaves. A council that after the enactment of the Bill adopts the leader and cabinet executive model can, if it so chooses, subsequently decide to adopt the elected executive model. Thereafter, at a later date, it could adopt the mayor and cabinet model or alternately it might revert to the leader and cabinet model. So it can go backwards and forwards between the three models if it so chooses—and there are processes and timetables for doing that which make it consistent with the council’s election. The Bill sets that out.

Amendments Nos. 128 and 153 are where the perversity comes in. If we passed Amendment No. 128, there would be no flexibility to move between models and, if we passed Amendment No. 153, there would be no flexibility to modify the executive arrangements. We believe that flexibility is essential. Obviously, local authorities may be able to identify improvements that make the model that they have chosen more effective in providing strategic leadership, but it is only right that the changes to the governance arrangements of mayors and cabinet executives or elected executives must have the specific consent of the mayor or the elected executive leader, both of whom have a direct mandate from the electorate of the whole council area. To prevent this from happening would actually be undemocratic. I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

I cannot say that I understood all of that at the first go, so I shall read it carefully in Hansard. The technical details of the amendments may be defective, but the basic principles behind what we are saying stand, and we may want to come back to this matter later. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 128A and 128B not moved.]

I must point out to the Committee that if this amendment is agreed to I shall not be able to call Amendments Nos. 129A to 133, for reasons of pre-emption.

moved Amendment No. 129:

We at least owe it to the Minister to thank her for explaining that, rather than “Changing governance arrangements”, this is the “Brighton and Hove” clause. I was utterly confused by how one could become ineligible when one had the same population or possibly a difference of one person, and one was looking at the same estimate. We will not pursue our amendments on this matter, although that does not detract from our view that, however good, bad, large or small Brighton and Hove is, it like any other authority should be free to choose the so-called alternative arrangements from the many that are available to it.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendments Nos. 129A to 135 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 136:

As Amendment No. 136 has been agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 137 for reasons of pre-emption.

[Amendment No. 137 not moved.]

I beg to move that the House do now resume.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House resumed.