My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now further considered on Report.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

Clause 53 [Power of council to alter years of ordinary elections of parish councillors]:

[Amendments Nos. 66 and 67 not moved.]

Clause 54 [Amendment of existing provisions about schemes for ordinary elections]:

[Amendment No. 68 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 69:

moved Amendments Nos. 71 to 76:

moved Amendment No. 77:

My Lords, we had a long debate on this in Committee and I just want to reiterate that our views accord very much with what the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, said. The trouble with the Bill is that it is far too prescriptive. The Minister suggests that it gives lots of flexibility; it does not at all, especially in structures, with which we will deal under later amendments. There were a number of reasons for having an election, but one was to have seen the back of this Bill, which would have dropped very nicely under those circumstances. But there we are; we are left facing it. We have discussed this and the Minister knows our views. On these aspects, we are very far from where we want to be in local government.

My Lords, we indeed debated much of this in Committee at great length and with some passion, and we return to it today. Amendments Nos. 77, 84, 86, 88, 91 to 93, 114 and 133 to 135 are intended to allow any council to operate alternative arrangements. That is the burden of them. That is to say, they would allow unitary councils and district councils with a population of 85,000 or more, based on the Registrar-General’s estimate on 30 June 1999, to operate alternative arrangements. That would be to move back from an executive model to local government by committee—arrangements that for very good reasons we have allowed for smaller councils under the 2000 Act, because of their very different circumstances and limitations.

At root, the amendments would completely overturn the purpose of the Bill as it relates to council governance. Councils in future would be able to give up having executive arrangements and adopt a committee-type structure—the alternative arrangements, in short. The important point is that not only would that return local government to the position that it was in before the Local Government Act 2000; the amendments also reject the changes that are being made, on the basis of evidence and consultation, to strengthen and focus leadership of local government and to ensure that the best practice under the 2000 Act will in future be replicated everywhere.

The noble Baroness invited me to explain why we are doing what we are doing. I hope that I can persuade her of the veracity and purpose behind it. Simply, all that the White Paper and the Bill have sought to do is to build on the work which was started in 2000 and which has been very successful in councils. The 2000 Act required all but one council to have executive models of government. In the Bill, we have strengthened the leader and Cabinet model in three ways: first, by making provision to allow the leader to appoint his or her executive team; secondly, by creating a presumption of a four-year term of office for leaders who are directly or indirectly elected; and, thirdly, by vesting executive powers in the leadership, so that it has the freedom to delegate powers and to make arrangements that will strengthen leadership and direction.

At the same time, the Bill removes the one anomaly that existed in the Local Government Act 2000, which allowed a large council such as Brighton and Hove to continue to operate without an executive. Following the enactment of the Bill, Brighton and Hove will be required to move to a new-style leader and Cabinet executive.

We are also offering councils a third choice of executive model through the introduction of the elected executive model—which we shall debate in a little while—and the removal of the requirement for a council to hold a referendum before moving to a mayor and Cabinet executive model. We will debate that later, too.

In contrast, the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness would overturn what we—and, I believe, the generality of local government—see as the settled and successful position that the 2000 Act established. We have had 18 months of dialogue with local government representatives throughout the country. The message that came through that consultation process, which was open and protracted, was that there was no appetite for a return to the committee system. On the contrary, successful councils, such as Kensington and Chelsea, are already doing what we want all councils to do. That is the purpose of what we are doing. We want to generate best practice. With certain exceptions, all authorities must have executive arrangements.

The noble Baroness would take us back. Hers is a retrograde if not a reactionary step. It would also fly in the face of the evidence that we now have which confirms the benefits of executive arrangements. I will quote this evidence now; I hope not to quote it again in successive debates, but it is important to put it on the record. The Evaluating Local Governance five-year evaluation of new council constitutions, which we commissioned shortly after enactment of the Local Government Act 2000, showed, in its interim report Does Leadership Matter?, published in June, that the two main current models of executive arrangements involving directly elected mayors or leaders and Cabinets clearly demonstrate the facilitative leadership, in terms of visibility, accountability and a streamlined focus for decision-making, that are needed in modern local government. That research also says that the executive arrangements proposed in the local government White Paper, and subsequently in the Bill, are likely to deliver the leadership that favours this facilitative style.

The final report, which we published on 5 October, says:

“There is general agreement that the aim of enhancing effective leadership has been met and that the new executive arrangements have bedded down well, thus providing more visible and effective leadership and quicker decision-making which is in turn associated with better service delivery”.

Crucially, the independent ELG report found that councils operating executive arrangements that vested increased power in the leader—allowing leaders to take decisions themselves and to appoint and allocate portfolios—gained higher CPA scores between 2003 and 2006 and performed better with the 2005 and 2006 direction of travel analysis. Those are the changes that we want to see in all local government because, as the report said in its conclusion:

“Taken together our findings show a consistent relationship between on the one hand, authorities with stable political leadership and authorities that have over a period of time given the full range of powers to their leaders and, on the other hand, better service performance and greater citizen satisfaction”.

I am sure that noble Lords do not oppose that conclusion, not least because, although I do not doubt or dispute that particular councils may wish to return to the committee system of leadership, more than one-third of the small councils eligible to operate alternative arrangements have opted to move back to executive arrangements. The noble Baroness raised the example of Babergh. I understand that officers of Babergh District Council have been in touch with DCLG officials to discuss moving from alternative arrangements to executive arrangements. That is an example of how the benefits of executive arrangements are being perceived locally; it is an instant and interesting example of how things are moving.

The bottom line is that the committee system served well for a long time, but the analysis that preceded the 2000 Act made it clear that, crucially, people did not know who was in charge or who was accountable. They did not know whom to praise or blame. They did not know how decisions were taken or on what basis. Ultimately, they did not know whom to go to if they had a problem. The Cabinet system identified, motivated and energised people. I do not see it as a default mechanism for councillors who are unable or unwilling to take part in the full business of being a councillor—a ward councillor or representative councillor serving on area committees, overview and scrutiny committees and policy committees.

There is a range of ways in which councillors should be and are active. It is a counsel of despair if we suggest that the leader and Cabinet system debilitates the role of councillors. That is part of the problem that Jane Roberts will look at in her commission. It is part of the problem that we across this House should engage collectively in addressing, whether it is looking to stimulate people coming forward to local councils, educating young people in the role and importance of local government or doing a range of things besides. It is compatible with better leadership. I take the point made in Committee that we are talking not about stronger leadership alone, but about better leadership. I believe that this Bill is about better leadership. It is not the Government being perverse. It is based on the solid evidence and experience of seven years of progress and outstanding councils.

Some amendments in this group seek to retain the mayor and council manager model, which I should like to address briefly. Noble Lords are aware that the mayor and council manager model was introduced by the Local Government Act 2000. Since that time, only Stoke-on-Trent City Council has operated that model. It adopted the new model following a referendum triggered by a public petition under provisions in that Act. Noble Lords will know that the provisions in the Bill now require Stoke to move away from this model. A governance commission was launched last Friday to assist it in deciding to which model to move.

We put forward governance models with the aim of delivering better leadership. In 2000, this innovative model was based on the analogous model of the private sector, where the mayor would resemble a non-executive chairman of a company and the council manager its powerful chief executive. Local authorities need improved, accountable leadership in order to deal with the constant change. The evidence on the operation of this model was that it was not capable of delivering that. It has been stated that, as the executive consists of just two people—an elected mayor and an appointed council manager—who take all the day-to-day decisions, this has resulted in too much power being placed in the hands of an unelected council manager.

There is dissatisfaction across Stoke about the failure of the model. The council is clear that it does not want to continue with it. There have been public campaigns requesting change and there are no voices in support, which is why we have moved to set up a governance commission. Plans have been developed in consultation with Mark Meredith, the elected mayor of Stoke. The commission will consider options about future governance arrangements and will report to Ministers and the council with its recommendations by May 2008.

Learning from that experience, we have proposed a package of governance arrangements. It will strengthen overview and scrutiny, which will ensure that executive and non-executive councillors are able to deliver improved services for their areas. It will deliver increased accountability through the increased availability of directly elected models and councillor calls for action, which we will debate in Part 5. On the evidence, we do not believe that the mayor and council manager model will deliver the better leadership that we are seeking, which is why we want to get rid of it.

With that explanation on the latter part of the group, plus my response to the earlier parts of the case put forward by the noble Baroness, which were powerfully argued, I hope that she will withdraw her amendment.

My Lords, does the Minister accept that she has made my noble friend’s case extremely well? She advocates the leadership models. Will she accept that these amendments would still leave a “menu”—as modern jargon would probably have it—from which local authorities can choose? In part, she seems to have characterised a move back to previous models to the exclusion of the Government’s proposals.

My Lords, that is not how I read the amendments. To reiterate the case, the leadership models offered in the 2000 Act are enhanced in the Bill. This is the right way forward for the reasons that I have given.

My Lords, before the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Needham Market, responds, how does my noble friend square the idea that she wants to promote leadership in councils with a return to the committee system? Those of us who have experience of that system—

My Lords, I remind the House that this is the Report stage and noble Lords do not normally speak after the Minister has sat down.

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness. For about half my adult life I have been involved in local government. People who do that do so for a number of reasons, but it usually comes down to a sense of wanting to deliver for the area in which they live. Differences of opinion arise over how improved services and outcomes are delivered to the people whom they represent. While I was leader of a council group in Suffolk, we moved to the executive model, and did so before the legislation came in. We thought that that was right for Suffolk, and local outcomes show that we were probably right. But that was a decision that we made about Suffolk. The Bill makes the decision for everyone, regardless of the circumstances. That is the difficulty that I have with it. Like the noble Baroness, I am not convinced that the committee system was the best for every local authority, but the system is still being operated by many authorities either because they are small or because they are Brighton and Hove and they are doing very well. My question to the noble Baroness is this: if the outcomes are good, why make authorities change? However, we have such a philosophical difference on this that clearly there is no point in discussing it further.

I want to raise one or two other issues. We have left in the councillor manager model not because we think that it is a good model, but simply because if a local authority wants to use it and thinks that it can work, it ought to be able to use it. I am intrigued that the noble Baroness says that it cannot work because all the power devolves to two people. Under the directly elected executive model, the minimum size specified is two people. Although it can be larger, nevertheless the minimum is two, so I do not see the consistency in that argument.

In later amendments, we shall turn to the problem of what happens in authorities where there is no overall control. That is where my real worry lies. The models offered here may work and be consistent with strong leadership in areas where one political party is in control but, as we shall examine in later amendments, it is difficult to see how they would work in the one-third of councils with no overall control. A significant number of people would be affected.

Lastly, I make the point that having this drive towards so-called strong leadership—with the sense that old governance models in which councillors are elected and serve on committees that are involved in decisions are somehow inimical to good decision-making—is akin to saying that the democratic process is a nuisance and gets in the way of speedy decision-making. That is profoundly dangerous, as is the principle that power should be concentrated in the hands of a few people. The principle of democracy is worth upholding and I see the practicalities of this becoming much more difficult in the future.

We have had two good debates about this and, although I do not agree with the noble Baroness, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 78:

My Lords, I am interested in the genesis of the amendment. I am aware of leaders of the majority party who have lost the confidence of their group as a result of bad performance and who have been changed by its members. It has been within their power to do that. The amendment would diminish the ability of the party system to continue to govern the situation. The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, shakes his head, but I fail to see how the amendment would strengthen the present situation. The raison d’être of the Bill is to create a system of strong leadership, by people who are able, endorsed and competent, carrying out the will of the people. Power comes to the leader through the grassroots of his party. I do not argue against the noble Lord, but I am puzzled by why he thinks that the present system, which allows complete freedom to each party and each council to do as they wish, is unsatisfactory.

My Lords, the noble Lord is completely wrong in his reading of the Bill. If it is enacted in its present form, and if a leader of a council who is the leader of the majority group is elected for four years, and if the majority group on the council loses confidence in the leader halfway through, it will be unable to remove him if he does not want to go, unless it can get a motion to remove him through the council, which it may not be able to do. If one of us was leader of the majority group and we had fallen out with our own group and joined forces with the opposition, the opposition might keep us in office and refuse a vote of no confidence. The only way in which the majority group could remove its leader within the four years would be either by persuading that person to resign, which they might not do, or by moving a vote of no confidence in them at a council meeting. Expecting a majority group to move a vote of no confidence in its own leader at a council meeting is a step too far. If a majority party has no confidence in its leader, it should be able to change them and the leadership of the council as it can now. The Bill would prevent that. I beg to move.

My Lords, Amendment No. 79 raises the same issue as has been raised by my noble friend Lord Greaves; that is, the leader changing the cabinet. Forty-one per cent of councils that operate the leader-and-cabinet model do so as a matter of choice. The noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, said that that model is used in Kensington and Chelsea. However, 59 per cent of authorities that operate that model have decided that the council should choose the member of the executive. The Minister explained when addressing previous amendments how councils which have moved to the leader-and-cabinet model have improved their performance. If they have improved their performance under a system where the council chooses the cabinet, why does she feel the need to force the majority of councils to change the way in which they operate?

There are two potentially unwelcome outcomes. First, in councils in which one group is politically dominant, there is a danger that the loyalty and focus of the Executive will be to the leader as an individual and not to the council as a whole—to their colleagues and their group—because the blunt truth is that they will owe their jobs to the leader and not the council as a whole. That will have a quite a marked effect on the dynamics of the council.

More significantly, I am concerned about the situation in which councils are in no overall control. The noble Lord, Lord Graham, spoke about the will of the people. In many areas the will of the people is that no one party controls a local authority. When a council is in no overall control, it has to be pragmatic about how it finds a way to move the council forward. That may mean all sorts of devices must be used, such as shared leadership or one party being leader for one year and another party taking the leadership for another year. A whole variety of models is in place. The difficulty is, when no one has overall control and two political parties are working together, a leader of one party will appoint members of another party to the Cabinet, which is politically unacceptable. In the councils that I know, that would be, in presentational terms, impossible to justify. However councils have got round it in the past has been a matter for local choice—and this measure will rob them of that.

A similar issue arises on four-year terms, which is the subject of my noble friend’s other amendment. I support him very strongly in this because, again, in councils with no overall control it is very unlikely that a minority party in joint administration will put another party leader in place for four years. The result of that may very well be that more councils will be run by minority control, which would be much less stable and would work against the strong leadership that the Minister seeks to achieve.

My Amendment No. 130 deals with new Section 44C and the removal of a leader. The two new subsections make provision for a local authority to remove the executive leader by resolution but do not refer to resignation and what happens should a leader resign.

Finally, my Amendment No. 245 is a tidying-up amendment, removing Schedule 5, which refers to the transitional arrangements for a move to new models. If the other amendments were passed, Schedule 5 would have to go too.

My Lords, I have been in almost total agreement with my noble friends on the Liberal Democrat Benches up to now, so I have not felt compelled to join in with the debate. However, I do not agree with the proposal in Amendment No. 79 that the executive leader should not be able to appoint executives to his or her Cabinet. I hold a diametrically opposed view: if a council wants to elect the executive, that is for it to decide, but there is a lot to be said for the leader being able to appoint people with whom he knows he will be able to work, who have a similar outlook on how things should be done and who will work harmoniously for what is likely to be four years to help the council through. So I am not in favour of that amendment. There are problems with no overall control, as the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, highlighted. However, in this particular aspect there are great advantages when the leader appoints his own Cabinet, which we see at the moment in most or many councils, and I feel that he must be entitled to continue doing so.

My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Baronesses for their comments and to the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, for moving the amendment. We welcome him back. We missed him on Monday. He would have enjoyed the debates we had then, particularly that on a referendum. It is good to see him in his place. I realise that he has made a heroic effort to be here and we hope that he will be well enough to be present throughout our discussions on the Bill.

I fear that in some ways the case I have made has been somewhat parodied. As I tried to explain on the previous amendment, I do not believe for one moment that leadership is the opposite of democracy or that democracy is in any sense a nuisance. After many years of an evolutionary system of local government, we are trying to equip it with a sharper set of tools which will allow it to facilitate people to work together in leadership teams but with leaders who have the autonomy and scope to do what is necessary. We are facing challenges that 10 years ago we could not have put a name to. The obvious one is climate change. There is a dramatic need to take tough decisions on where and how we build or how we organise our waste disposal. These decisions do not mean that ordinary members of a council have no view or no value—far from it—but ultimately it now behoves us to organise our arrangements so that we have stronger leadership. That is all that the Bill is leading to, but as I keep saying, it certainly does not diminish the notion of co-operation, debate and discussion throughout the range of activities that a council has to continue to do.

Amendments Nos. 78 and 79 would remove the requirement that the leader must appoint the Cabinet and would instead provide for the full council to appoint all the members of the executive. In the same vein, Amendment No. 83 would ensure that responsibility for executive functions remained with the whole executive rather than being vested solely in the leader. The noble Baroness, Lady Scott, asked why we think that this is an important move. I turn again to the evidence, which applies to some of the other amendments too, particularly Amendment No. 245, which is rather a general amendment. I have referred to the evidence before. It demonstrates that councils operating executive arrangements, which allowed leaders to take decisions themselves and appoint and allocate portfolios to their Cabinet, gained higher CPA scores in the three years between 2003 and 2006. It clearly shows that there was a positive and statistically significant relationship between the proportion of citizens who were satisfied with council performance and the number of executive freedoms, which included selecting members of the Cabinet. That was already the case for the mayoral models. All we are proposing is to place all leaders on the same footing, including indirectly elected executives and the strengthened leader and Cabinet model.

The noble Baroness suggests that somehow loyalty will switch from the council to the leader in that situation. However, the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, who speaks from great experience—she spoke in Committee and again today—said that it was important for the leader to have confidence in his or her executive team. She spoke about the advantages that the model brings in being able to say to your colleagues, “I would like you to be part and parcel of my team. You have the skills that we need to deal with this particular set of challenges and circumstances”. I heard nothing to suggest that that loyalty to the leader does not mean that there is an equal loyalty to the performance of the council. There is a vested interest in seeing the council succeed. That is why one stands for election. One does not stand in order to fail, either personally or as a member of a council. It seems to me that if we set up these straw dogs or straw animals, we are creating problems which do not exist and we are saying to councils, “You may do this but it comes with an awful lot of problems attached”.

My Lords, I understand a great deal of what the noble Baroness said and I understand that in practice things will be worked out pragmatically, as they often are; but if a council does not have a provision in its constitution for removing the leader, and if there is clear will on the council—for whatever reason—that the leader has to be changed, how can it do that?

My Lords, I have to say that I do not know. It seems to me that every council in the country might have to address that in its constitution-making powers. I will have to take advice because I have never come across that situation—or perhaps I have. My note looks like it says, “arrest the constitution”, but I think the position is to “amend the constitution”. That seems sensible.

My Lords, I thank everyone who has taken part and the Minister for her response. I would never describe myself as heroic. I shall ponder on that. The answer to my question that I would have given the Minister is the one that she has now given. The council would have to start by amending its constitution to allow itself to change the leader. That is not an easy process nowadays. You cannot just table a motion and do it. You must have discussions with the monitoring officer or whatever and go through various processes. My point is to ask why that kind of convoluted, difficult and time-consuming process has to take place. If there is a clear view on the council that the leader needs to be changed, the council should be able to do that as a matter of course. I honestly do not understand why the Minister is resisting this pragmatic amendment.

Some of what I and my noble friend Lady Scott have been saying is a matter of principle. We do not agree with what the Government want to do and the way that they want local government to work. We think that local government will work better and more democratically in a different way—certainly not in the present way or the past way. We must accept that there is a difference of principle across the Chamber. Some of my amendments are an attempt to make the system that the Government want to work in practice. This is a pragmatic attempt to set out in a council’s constitution exactly what happens once a leader loses confidence before the four-year term is up. I ask the Government to continue thinking about this, because they have not got it right.

Equally, what we have put down and what my noble friend said about councils with no overall control is a genuine attempt to allow them to continue to operate well, despite the political situation that they are in. We are not trying to be awkward. I would like to wreck a great deal of what is in the Bill, although I recognise that I am not going to do that, but if it is going to go through, I would like it to work in a practical, sensible and pragmatic way. I hope that the Minister understands that we are moving some of the amendments in that light.

The Minister referred to the CPA scores and to what she believes is evidence that more concentrated leadership gives better leadership. There is a problem with the CPA. From the Government’s point of view, what they would describe as strong, clear, centralised decision-making is a good thing and a good way to run councils. You get higher CPA scores if you run the council in that way, and so I believe that the CPA scores on which the Minister relies are to some extent circular: people find things that they are looking for, they score those highly and then they use that as evidence that that is a good way of running things. I do not know how far that is the case but I am certain that it is the case—at least in practice.

The Minister said that she would take away and consider the fact that councils do not know what is being proposed. I have talked to a lot of councillors, a large number of whom, I admit, but by no means all, are from my party. I think that if they had known about this a few months ago, we would have heard a lot more protest from local government as the Bill went through Parliament. People do not know about the proposal, but we are where we are and we have to work with that.

I should like to have votes on all these matters but I think that I would be wasting everyone’s time if I pressed this to a vote, so I shall beg leave to withdraw the amendment. However, in doing so, I want to say that I do not think these issues will go away. Many people in local government will not like what they are being told to do. In councils with no overall control, the normal processes of politics will take over. There will be a lot of negotiation and discussion, and sensible councillors will end up running their councils in the way that they think is best within the framework of the legislation. I think that it was Phil Woolas in the Commons who said that many councils will not change because they will find ways round the legislation, but that is not the way that things should be done. The problem is that, as my noble friend said, those processes of negotiation take place behind closed doors. Nowadays, the rooms are no longer smoke-filled but there are still lots of non-smoke-filled rooms where all this negotiation takes place. We are trying to bring the process into the open and have it done openly at council meetings, but that is not the way that things happen nowadays.

Therefore, with a sense of sadness but with a belief that local government will nevertheless struggle on, despite what is being imposed on them, and probably do it fairly well, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 79 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 79A:

My Lords, I have tabled a whole raft of amendments in this group—Amendments Nos. 102, 104 to 106, 108, 119, 123 to 125, 127 and 136—each of which would remove from the Bill any reference to an elected leader and Cabinet. The noble Baroness, Lady Scott, beat me to it by mentioning it first, and I very much support what she said.

We had a long discussion in Committee about this proposal, and many of the points that the noble Baroness has raised today were put forward then. But like her, the more I have thought about the proposal since Committee, the more daft it has seemed. It is rather like asking the current Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, whether he would stand for election with all his Cabinet at the same time and leave all his MPs shafted, to be elected on their own while he took what he thought was the cream of Parliament for a separate election. Of course, if he did so he would have to do it against the chance that the Conservative Party would do the same—and in the light of all the recent joy, he would probably end up with a Conservative Cabinet and a few Labour Members of Parliament.

The proposal does not make sense. In local government elections, local people will not be asked to vote for a party despite the fact that that is what they do. The noble Lord, Lord Graham, has waxed lyrical about the value of party groups. The electorate vote for a person within a party and that party wins. It is now proposed that, as part of that process, a lump of people—either those who are already going to stand as members of the council or a completely disparate and separate group—will be put forward. One can imagine a leader identifying somebody in the community whom they would like as the Cabinet member for finance and bringing them in. It will not necessarily be someone with experience of local government; it could be someone whom the leader thought was quite outside local government. That person could be brought in and put on top.

If we are not careful about this, we could remove the need for councillors per se. There is a logical progression in these proposals for an elected Cabinet: one could create a smaller system consisting of a leader and a number of people to support him, an election for them, and a shafting of the rest. One can see how it would progress. There is ever less need for a large number of councillors because all the power is being vested in the Cabinet, and the Bill is doing nothing to lessen that. Although the council would have the choice of whether to implement this, I think that it would be the straw that broke local government’s back and that it would not do what the Minister believes it will, which is to increase the council’s authority. Everyone would be so baffled and bemused by the proposal that they would probably stay at home in droves, and that would give the council no legitimacy at all.

We are as strongly opposed to the proposal as the noble Baroness and her party. If she presses the amendment to a vote, we will support her.

My Lords, I support my noble friend on the Front Bench. When somebody explained to me what was going to happen, I said, “That cannot be right. Nobody could have put that into a Bill. They must have got it completely wrong”. I still think that that is the case. If you explain to anybody outside this Chamber what is being proposed, they will simply say, “It’s mad”.

I have a specific question. I talked earlier about reorganisation and transitional councils. Can the Minister tell me at what point in the process of a council making the transition from a group of districts to a unitary authority this question would be raised, and how the decision would be made? There is some confusion about that. In Northumberland, those making the two submissions decided that they would go for this option. They thought that they might be able to get their submissions through because the Government thought that this was a good idea. Now they are backtracking like mad after realising exactly what is involved. I would be grateful for that information.

My Lords, I have a brief point to add to the excellent speeches of my noble friend Lady Scott and the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham. This is different in kind from other proposals about the internal organisation of councils because this is not fundamentally about the internal organisation of councils but about the method of council election. That is why the dangers put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, stare some of us firmly in the face.

My Lords, I can see that nothing much has changed over the summer despite meetings and letters, and I cannot say that I am terribly surprised. However, I continue to be a little disappointed by the combination of dire predictions and the fact that the noble Baronesses opposite want to remove choice—and those are the Benches that are always pro-choice. The Government are always accused of not being serious about choice. Here we are trying to offer a third choice of executive model to local government but the parties opposite want to stop us doing so. It is rather paradoxical.

Where did the idea come from? It was not invented by the Government. As we were developing policy around the models last year and the year before, the predecessor to the present Secretary of State, Mr David Miliband, was talking to local councillors and to the council in Stockton. The discussions were prompted by a resolution of Stockton council at its meeting on 14 December 2005 which instructed the chief executive to write to the Minister seeking the Government’s support to develop the elected executive model. So the idea came from local government, and it is not a dead issue. The council, in its discussions with officials, is still interested in this model. In all fairness, all we are trying to do is to put this option in the Bill so that councils are able to consider it in the future if they want.

The noble Baroness, Lady Maddock, asked at what point in the transition process it will happen. It will happen when the joint implementation committee which will be set up by the order meets to decide how it wants to take the new structures forward.

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for giving way. So the decision cannot be made before the Bill is passed and the joint committee has a statutory basis?

My Lords, that is true.

I ask the noble Baronesses opposite whether they really want to remove choice from the Bill. It is not just Stockton, and it is not an unproven model. As I wrote to the noble Baronesses during the Recess, other countries and regions have this model. It is also not unknown for the sort of mixed political economy which was described also to be in place. In fact, international experience in some parts of the world suggests that it is possible to have an executive controlled by one party and an Assembly controlled by another. It is another model. As we have always said and explained, the model is innovative. Innovations are sometimes challenging in terms of credibility but this model is working in other countries.

The model essentially involves putting powers in the hands of a team. Everyone who is in politics is familiar with the notion of a slate, and slates are constructed for different reasons. This team—this slate which will stand for election while individual members also stand as individual councillors—embraces the democratic possibilities of being a local councillor while at the same time standing with a body of people who share the same values and skill-set and who can be recommended to the electorate on that basis. That is all I want to say about why the model should be in the Bill as a matter of choice.

The model includes a complete separation of powers between the executive and the front-line councillors. However, I do not regard that as undermining the possibility that front-line councillors will increase the challenge that they pose to the executive. On the contrary, I see it as an opportunity for councillors to pick up a challenge because they would be faced with an executive that has chosen to stand collectively and that presents itself as such. So I do not think that there is a diminution of democratic activity or responsibility.

We have discussed the matter in great detail and I believe that the noble Baronesses’ predictions are dire in the extreme. If the model was adopted I believe that it would be managed sensibly in relation to, for example, how by-elections are managed and the choices available to the executive about whether to run with a smaller council if people lose their seats or whatever. There is not much to be gained by reiterating the detail. I simply return to the argument that the Bill is about a choice of models and that this is one of the models. The parties opposite insist that we consider whether we want to go down this road. We are offering choice but they seem to be rejecting the opportunity to include this as a choice, and it is paradoxical. I hope that they will reconsider.

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, will she confirm that those who will be standing for this slate do not have to be councillors at all?

My Lords, that is correct.

My Lords, so they need have no experience of operating in a council?

My Lords, they would stand as councillors as well as being on the slate.

My Lords, but that could be their first experience of being councillors?

My Lords, it could well be.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her comments, but I just want to make a few remarks in closing. She has taken us to task for removing a choice. We may have taken a different view about leaving this appalling proposal in the Bill if it had been part of a much wider menu of choice, but the fact is that the Government have limited local authorities to three options. There is a danger that if they are not very keen on two of them, they may choose this one as the least worst without fully understanding just how damaging and difficult it could be.

I am intrigued that the noble Baroness said that because Stockton-on-Tees has put this forward, it has to be in the Bill. Brighton and Hove are desperately keen to keep their current arrangements but the Government have not listened to them, so what does Stockton have that Brighton does not? I am intrigued to know why the wishes of one local authority are considered so important that an entire model is constructed around it. My inquiries show that the proposal does not have the support of Stockton council as a whole, it does not have multi-party support. That is simply not the case. To include a model in the Bill to be one of only three choices on the basis of some conversations with one local authority where not everyone is in support is highly dangerous.

Finally, all the way through debate on the Bill, we have heard that the Government are seeking to create a framework for strong and accountable local authority leadership. The public in an area will have gone out to elect a Cabinet and to elect their councillors. They may find that they are from different political parties. If the budget does not get passed because the Cabinet puts it forward and the council has exercised its right not to pass it, who is accountable then? Who do the public see as having the clear line of responsibility then? That is creating neither strong leadership nor the sort of accountability that the Government seek. From that point of view, I can see this being highly damaging and absolutely not achieving the Government's stated aims.

I am not satisfied with the response that I have had today and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

moved Amendment No. 82:

moved Amendment No. 87:

My Lords, we have an intriguing situation here. The Minister has just lost the clause. As I understand it, directly elected executives have been ruled out of the Bill through the vote by the House of Lords. How can we amend something that we have just lost?

My Lords, I believe that it is perfectly possible to proceed with these government amendments. If necessary, we can make arrangements at later stages of the Bill, should that be necessary. Perhaps the noble Baroness is teasing me, but she indicates that she is not. If she will forgive me, I shall plough on.

Amendment No. 117 makes it clear that where there are references in legislation to a member of a local authority or a councillor of a local authority, they do not include a mayor unless the legislation specifically states that a reference to a member or councillor should include a mayor. Amendment No. 118 makes similar provisions for elected executives. Through these amendments, in future both an elected mayor and a member of an elected executive will be treated as a member or councillor if either regulations or another enactment expressly provide for this. My noble friend Lady Morgan has already spoken to amendments that expressly state that an elected mayor and a member of an elected executive can vote on resolutions passed under Parts 2 and 3 of the Bill.

Amendments Nos. 229, 231 to 244 and 255 make the necessary consequential amendments to the remainder of the Local Government Act 1972 and, along with Amendment No. 226, make it clear that a reference to a member in the 1972 Act includes an elected mayor or a member of an elected executive. So in answer to the specific query of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, a mayor and a member of a directly elected executive are not to be treated as members of a local authority unless the legislation or regulations specifically provide for it. This was the approach used in the Local Government Act 2000. The Secretary of State will be able to make regulations under the 2000 Act specifying when the mayor or a member of an elected executive are to be treated as a member or councillor of a local authority. Again, that was the approach taken in 2000.

The group contains a number of further technical drafting amendments that need to be included in the Bill. I hope that I have explained to the House why the technical issues need to be resolved. To refine what I said earlier, we still need these government amendments for mayors but they will not now apply in relation to elected executives. I beg to move.

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for responding to the points that I made the other day on Amendments Nos. 117 and 118. I commented that I could see that there might be a little confusion as to when a member was or was not a member, and some authoritative explanatory note at the end of this process—depending, of course, where we end up—could be quite helpful within the trade.

My Lords, another point has just occurred to me which I do not think that we cleared in Committee. The Minister may wish to think about it if she is unable to respond immediately. If there were elected slates—I know that there are not going to be now, but if there were elected people—would they be supernumerary to the number of councillors? The number of councillors is set by the Electoral Commission or the Boundary Commission—I am never quite sure which—as a proportion of the electorate. If there were to be anyone on top of or in addition to those, that would put the proportions out. Is that the situation?

My Lords, they are indeed supernumerary. They are extra to the number of councillors.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 88 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 89:

My Lords, I stand not as an opponent to the weapon of a referendum but as someone who wants it to be used sparingly. I fully support its application where it has been applied, but I am wedded to the idea that every four years, or whenever, the best referendum in the world takes place—an election. People might tell me that they know of a referendum in which the turnout exceeded the number of people who vote in a local election or anywhere else, but I doubt it. A referendum on a particular narrow issue is capable of being hijacked by interest groups that have a purpose in mind.

I give way to the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, for his in-touchedness with local government matters. I speak only from my own experience, which is nothing like as wide or as deep as his, but what, after all, do you elect a council for? By whatever method you elect it, you give it the authority to continue to govern. If it decides that it wishes to change, the mechanism already exists to do so. However, if it wants to change but the change is then subject to a referendum, I can see that being a hostage to fortune. Already we are talking about too much bureaucracy, interference and being told what to do by Whitehall.

My days on a council—I still attend group meetings of various kinds—mean that I have every faith in the sagacity and integrity of those who ultimately become elected councillors. We must bear in mind the fact that they are elected on a manifesto. They tell the people of the locality what they believe in and how they will do it, and they are open to criticism. The councils regularly take care, most of them with public relations officers or through some other mechanism, to ensure that people understand what is going on. I have every sympathy with what the noble Lord continues to do: that is, to find a means of making a properly working democratic system work even more democratically. That is a laudable objective, but I do not see any need to do what he proposes in this amendment.

My Lords, we have a new word in the great British lexicon: “in-touchedness”. It is charming and well applied, and we shall have many opportunities to use it. I thank my noble friend for his powerful comments. They echo a point that I will make later in my reply.

It is in the context of leadership that we discuss the amendment, which would require an authority that proposes to change its executive arrangements to a mayor-and-Cabinet executive to hold a referendum. As champions of their communities, local authorities should be able to propose the executive arrangements that enable them best to deliver strong and effective leadership, which was the burden of my noble friend’s argument. However, I make it clear to the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, that that does not mean that local people will no longer be able to have their say about executive arrangements. The Bill proposes not to do away with local voice or local choice, but to give a locally elected council a power that it does not, and should, have; that is, to propose a move towards a mayoral model if it resolves to do so. The 2000 Act did not permit a decision on moving to a directly elected model to rest solely on such a decision. That may have reflected the novelty at that time of the directly elected option.

The Government are not anti-referendum, but pro-council. There is no reason why a referendum on a mayor should not take place. I shall explain the conditions in which it would apply. First, as the noble Lord said, subsection (5) of new Section 33E will allow authorities to choose to make their proposals subject to a referendum. They will continue to have that choice. They will be aware of their electorate and be cautious of the matters that the noble Lord mentioned.

Secondly, local people will still be able to petition their local authority to hold a referendum on its executive arrangements where they feel strongly about it. That ability is not being taken away. It could be a referendum for a mayor-and-Cabinet executive and all other models.

The third condition applies to all the executive models. Wherever an executive model is put in place following a referendum, local authorities will be required to hold a referendum on any proposed change to a different model. They would be able to implement the change only where the proposals were supported by the referendum.

However, if none of those situations was to apply, the council would still be unable to move to a mayoral model without inviting the views of local people. A new model could not be foisted upon them without consultation. Local authorities which intend to change their arrangements will be required to consult their electorate and any other interested parties in their area, such as businesses and the voluntary sector, before drawing up proposals.

Where councils go on to draw up proposals, they will be required to make them public by making available for inspection at their principal offices a document that sets the proposals out. People will be not only consulted at the beginning of the process but informed as it goes through. Ultimately, as my noble friend Lord Graham of Edmonton said, if the council goes ahead against the wishes of the people, the people will certainly have their say at a subsequent council election.

In short, the change that we are proposing will provide an important additional option whereby a council can move to a directly elected mayor if it resolves to do so. It is right for the democratically elected representatives of an area to be able to take such a decision. They decide local taxes; they create an area’s sustainable community strategy. I do not understand the rationale for their not being able to decide the form of local governance for their area. I am sure that all noble Lords share our belief and confidence in representative democracy, the case for which was well put by my noble friend Lord Graham.

I understand the intention behind the noble Lord’s amendments, which seek to give the public greater say over executive arrangements. However, as I have set out, significant new and existing opportunities for the public to express their views are available.

My Lords, I think that when the Minister reads what she has said she will realise that she was digging great holes for herself, at least in terms of logic. She said that she was not sure why a council should not decide its model of government, but we have spent a lot of this afternoon being told by the Government that councils are not allowed to decide their own model of government but are allowed to choose only between some very narrow, restrictive models of government laid down in great detail from above. That is the whole basis of our deep concern about this Bill. The arguments that the Government are using are being used, once again, in favour of the things that the Government want but are not being used when other people put forward things that they do not want.

The noble Lord, Lord Graham, said some interesting things. He talked about people making a choice every four years at a general election. I am not quite sure what general election votes have to do with whether you have an elected mayor. However, I understood what he said about referendums. I am not a great fan of them—

My Lords, it is not just that, broadly, every four years we have a general election—which of course is not the field that we are discussing—but that every four years people vote locally. That is what I meant to imply.

My Lords, in our area people vote every year locally, and long may we continue to do so. I say “we” because local elections are ones in which noble Lords are allowed to take part. We are not banned from them as we are from general elections.

The question that has to be asked is that if the Government are saying that there is no right to a referendum on a proposal for an elected mayor, why have people got that right now and why have they had it for the past seven years? Why was it thought suitable seven years ago and what has changed? None of this has been explained in any way. We do not in general have a presidential system in this country; we have a democratic system of electing legislatures; the elected bodies, the legislatures and councils, then choose the leaderships. When you move to an elected mayor at a local level, you move to a presidential system. It is not just a question of how the council works and makes decisions but a fundamental matter of the distribution of power in the local community. That is why it is probably right that there should be a referendum on such things. I do not want to get diverted into whether referendums are good or bad and in what circumstances they are but, in my view, the more local and specific they are the more relevance and value they probably have.

The Minister said that if the people do not like the decision that the council makes they can have their say at the next election, but that will be too late because the whole system of electing the council and mayor will already have changed and it will be irrevocable in most places. The Minister said that she was pro-council—

Phone!

My Lords, I do not think that it is mine. If it is, it has come on by itself.

Your number is up.

My Lords, my number is up. I do not understand these things. I think that there are buttons on it that turn it on when you pat your pocket.

The Minister said that there is no reason why a referendum will not take place. I have to ask her to consider those words. The reason a referendum may not take place is that a council decides not to have one. If a council proposes an elected mayoral system under this Bill and decides not to have a referendum, there will be no referendum. I accept that there will be a referendum in some cases but when the noble Baroness says that there is no reason why a referendum will not take place, the reason is that the council will decide not to have it.

I forecast that there will be bother in some places as a result of this and I shall not enjoy watching it. I hope that it is not anywhere near me. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 90 to 93 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 94:

My Lords, I do not see the provision of resolution periods as a draconian attempt to impose central control. By making this framework in this way, we are simply trying to provide a predictable, limited and orderly window within which an authority can resolve to change its governance arrangements, because a resolution is required before there can be a change in governance arrangements. I argue that, by removing this framework, the noble Baroness’s amendments would constitute a far greater recipe for chaos. However, I shall run through the argument for the permitted resolution period set out in new Section 33P(5). It provides for a time-limited resolution period from the day after the council’s annual meeting until 31 December in the year before the relevant election when the change will be implemented.

My Lords, the persuasion and the withdrawal are not necessarily cause and effect. I was slightly thrown by the fact that one of my amendments appears to have changed between the first Marshalled List, which is the one on which I had made notes before Monday, and the revised, second Marshalled List. However, these mysteries continue to make life interesting. It does not affect the argument. I was grateful to the Deputy Speaker for reading out the amendment, because that alerted me to the fact that it had changed.

The real point is whether local authorities are to be trusted. I thought that we had heard today from the Government that local authorities should be trusted. In my book, if you trust someone you have to put up with them making the occasional mistake as you see it. It might not be a mistake as they see it. But trust cannot be artificially constrained.

As I said, it is not cause and effect. I am not persuaded, but I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 95 not moved.]

moved Amendments Nos. 96 to 101:

moved Amendment No. 103:

My Lords, I must advise your Lordships that if the amendment is agreed to I will be unable to call Amendments Nos. 104 to 106.

My Lords, I am happy to respond to the noble Baroness’s invitation because we did have exchanges during the summer, but it is important to put this on the record. The amendment seeks to remove new Section 33O which Clause 64 inserts into the Local Government Act 2000. The amendment removes the requirement on local authorities operating mayoral or elected executive models to seek the written consent of the mayor or executive leader prior to any variation within their existing model of executive arrangements. Similar provisions already exist for mayors in secondary legislation made under the Local Government Act 2000. New Section 33O simply extends these provisions to elected executives and places them in the Act.

I wrote to noble Lords on 1 October clarifying what the clause meant, and I set out that the written consent of mayors or elected executive leaders is needed only where a council is already operating one of those models and proposes a variation in relation to that current model—for example, changing the executive from seven to six members, which is a variation under new Section 33B. It does not mean that the written consent of mayors or elected leaders is needed to move to a different form of executive—for example, a move under new Section 33A.

The effect of the amendment would be to enable an authority to make changes to the authority’s constitution, such as changes to the allocation of responsibility for functions as between the full council and the executive, without needing to ensure beforehand that the executive was content with this. We cannot accept the amendment because we believe it could undermine the stability and accountability of executives.

I hope that with that explanation the noble Baroness is content that we have dealt with the problem that she thought the clause created and that she is now clear that it is perfectly sensible. I therefore hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

My Lords, I am grateful for that clarification and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 104 to 109 not moved.]

moved Amendments Nos. 110 to 113:

moved Amendment No. 115:

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for explaining why she is concerned and how her amendments reflect the concern that here we have another example of the Secretary of State’s “authoritarian powers”. I hope to be able to prove to her that that is not the case and that the provision is necessary and very specific.

Amendments Nos. 115 and 116 remove the provisions within Sections 35 and 36 of the Local Government Act 2000 which provide for the Secretary of State to require an authority to undertake a referendum in relation to its executive arrangements, whether by direction or by order. The amendments would limit the Secretary of State’s directions or orders for referendums to the question of whether an authority operates executive arrangements, of whatever kind, rather than to the question of whether it cannot adopt a particular form of executive arrangements.

There is an implicit suggestion that this power might be used to force a referendum on an authority for, for example, a mayor and Cabinet, but I want to show that that is not the case. The retention of the power is necessary in situations where the Secretary of State believes that the authority has failed to pay due regard to the results of its consultation. I can explain that in relation to some specific examples, and I reassure the noble Baroness that there is nothing sinister about this; it is very sensible. Under the Local Government Act 2000, we have had to exercise this power in relation to an authority that in the Secretary of State’s opinion was ignoring the wishes of its community and had failed to pay due regard to the results of its consultation. Perhaps I may explain.

Under the 2000 Act, authorities were required to consult their communities on executive arrangements and, in submitting their proposals to the Secretary of State, had to show that they had taken the results of the consultation into account. The majority of authorities acted appropriately and took the results of the consultations into account but some did not.

In 2001, therefore, the Secretary of State issued a direction under the provisions in Section 35(1) to the London Borough of Southwark requiring it to hold a referendum on whether to adopt a mayoral form of governance. It was issued on the grounds that it had failed to pay due regard to the results of its consultation on which new governance arrangements to adopt where the results of that consultation favoured a mayoral option. It was left open to the council to decide which of the two mayoral models available at the time it would run in the referendum. The Secretary of State has been minded in the past to issue directions to hold a mayoral referendum in three other authorities—Birmingham, Bradford and Thurrock—in 2001 on similar grounds to Southwark. However, in June 2002, Ministers announced that they would not be using their powers to intervene and direct a referendum in these three areas.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I cannot remember whether Southwark did hold a referendum in the event. I think that it did. It seems to me that the authority got it right and the Secretary of State got it wrong, as that referendum must have got lost. It is not operating a mayoral model. We come back to trust in local authorities. Goodness knows how much that cost unnecessarily because the Secretary of State was not willing to believe the local authority in its assessment of its own consultation. As I said before, persuasion and withdrawal are not necessarily connected. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 116 not moved.]

Clause 66 [Elected mayors]:

moved Amendment No. 117:

moved Amendment No. 118:

moved Amendment No. 119:

moved Amendment No. 120:

My Lords, I do not understand this amendment as it seems to me that the size of the executive should relate to the functions of the authority. The size of the authority does not affect the number of functions. What roles will the people on the executive play that we need more of them? One Cabinet member will be responsible for children’s services. The fact that it is a bigger authority will not mean that we need more than one. Surely there will not be Cabinet members on an executive for different parts of an authority. It seems that we should look at the whole area as one. If the executive is to have people playing real roles in the authority, size does not matter. Ten seems to be perfectly adequate for most large authorities for which we now have executives. Under this scheme my council could probably go up to an executive of 50 or 60, but there are not that many executive roles. Will we have executive members with no portfolios just to have more people being paid executive allowances? Size is not everything. We should just make sure that the executive is doing a real job; we do not need more people to do it.

My Lords, these are early days for the present system. It was a novelty. I have to tell your Lordships that not only being old Labour but of the old school and the old method whereby local government was administered, I took a rather jaundiced view of the changes that came about a few years ago. But that is all it was. It is far too soon to begin to tinker or interfere with something that may or may not be seen as a workable model in time.

What faces the council and the people who elect it is the opportunity of being governed by a much more focused group of people. When I was the leader of a council in the London Borough of Enfield many years ago, of course there were a lot of young Turks, old lags and people with ambition, but some just wanted to serve on the council. They did not wish, nor were they able, to take a higher position than that. That is all very well, and my noble friend Lord Smith has put his finger on a part of it. We could always find people to fill places if the number was more than 10. That is not a magical figure but it is the one that we have at the moment. It provides opportunity for those who have ambition, ability and capability to aspire to be one of those Cabinet portfolio holders. As such there is a bit of excitement.

I have been to one or two meetings where there is opposition and disagreement internally within a group about the persons, but I dislike the idea that if you cannot satisfy a proposition by, for instance, 10, you should extend the number so that you subsume into the enlarged number all of those who are either able or ambitious. That does not denigrate for a moment what is behind the amendment. It is a reasonable amendment if one never believed in the system in the first place. But if we believe in the system and want to be fair, we have to allow a reasonable time to operate. The present system elevates the stature and eminence of the people who are portfolio holders. They are very proud; I shall not say they are arrogant, but they know that they are one of the chosen few, chosen by a variety of methods. They do a job and get paid for it. They have responsibility and they have to be accountable. There is no benefit in the amendment and I hope that it will not be pressed.

My Lords, I was not going to speak to the amendment but was encouraged to do so by the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Leigh. We thrashed out the details of the amendment in Committee, so I will not go through that again.

The noble Lord, Lord Graham of Edmonton, said that the present system has not been going very long. It has been going seven years, which is a long time by modern standards. In the old days, things went on for 30 or 40 years; now, with the sort of Maoist revolutionary ethos we have about the place, everything has to be reformed every two years. The only thing that has survived in reasonable form so far has been the House of Lords. Perhaps it is next in line. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Graham. Some of our concerns over the Bill are that the Government are again messing about too soon with structures which have only really been operating effectively for perhaps four to six years. They are still bedding down, and people are still finding out how to work them—particularly things like overview and scrutiny.

The reason I want to comment on what the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Leigh, said comes back to something I say from time to time: even with all the detailed, top-down centralised control the Government try to impose on local authorities nowadays, they are still diverse and different. It is not just the diversity between a great, far-flung county like North Yorkshire and a little shire district in Lancashire, or big cities like Manchester and Birmingham; it is diversity between what, on the face of it, look like quite similar authorities. How the executive system works is also diverse.

Some councils have quite small executives, others have 10 members on theirs. There is not much relationship between how many people are on the executive, the type of council or the extent of their powers; it is to do with how that council wants to run its own affairs. There are councils where a large amount of decision making is devolved to individual members of the executive, so the executive member for—I was going to say education, but it is probably “children’s services” nowadays—actually takes a huge number of decisions personally. That seems to be the system, for example, in Lancashire County Council. There are councils where no powers are devolved to individual members of the executive—although they will have portfolios and get heavily involved—and the decisions are taken collectively by the executive. There are councils where executive members are all virtually full time; in fact, some of them I know are far more than full time, spending their entire lives on it. There are other councils where executive members are still traditional part-time councillors, who do their council work in their spare time. I do not know what the executive allowances are in Wigan, and had probably better not inquire. In my council, in Pendle, we have an executive of 10 but the allowances are very small indeed. All those 10 people have got valuable jobs to do. It is all a question of how you work it out, divide it up and organise it. I would argue strongly for councils to be able to do it in as diverse a way as possible, according to what they think is best for their circumstances.

If we had the ability, we would increase the size of our executive because we would give non-portfolio positions to the leaders of at least two of the opposition parties. They would want that, because we want them to discuss things with us because we think that discussing things in an open executive with the press there is a good way of thrashing out the issues and coming to decisions. Other councils would not want to do that at all. But, unless they are actually members of the executive, with that status, they will not come. I am really arguing along wider lines than my noble friend: let us have more diversity and more ability on the part of councils to do their own thing. It is only through diversity that you find out what works. If everybody does the same thing, you find out whether it works, but not whether all the other ways of doing it work. That is the practical argument in favour of diversity. I speak in favour of my noble friend’s amendment, and counsel the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Leigh, to accept that the world is not all the same as Wigan.

My Lords, we would no doubt say “More’s the pity”.

I have always wanted to belong to a Maoist revolutionary Government—I have tried to keep this fact from the Prime Minister—and was intrigued by the presentation of the current Government in that form. Essentially, however, we are having an important debate, and I am grateful for the contribution from my noble friends Lord Smith and Lord Graham and their powerful accounts of why size is not everything and should be limited to function.

The amendment means that councillors would have the freedom to increase the size of their executive up to 15, or one-quarter of the membership of the council, whichever is smaller. When we debated this in Committee—he returned to this argument a moment ago—the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, told us that we were trying to squeeze people into a limited number of models, and that an amendment of this sort might enable single-party executives to involve opposition groups. That seemed to me then, and seems to me now as he restates it, to threaten to reintroduce the committee system by the back door.

I agree with the noble Lord on the clear need to respect and reflect diversity. However, I would argue that there are a number of different ways that councils can do that without expanding the executive: how they choose to operate their executive arrangements, for example; developing their area or advisory committees, which I know the noble Lord applauds with good reason. They are so effective and play a key role in councils.

We will not have to look to the single instrument of the council size and membership itself to do this important job. There is a lot of evidence for the benefits of having a small, coherent leadership group at the heart of the council. I gave that evidence in Committee, and have not heard a case challenging it. I remind noble Lords that The New Council Constitutions: The Outcomes and Impact of the Local Government Act 2000 report I quoted earlier supports Parliament’s judgment in the Act that executives of up to 10 members are right for delivering visible and effective leadership. We stand on a point of evidence and it is supported by experience, certainly by the powerful cases of my noble friends. I regret that we cannot accept the amendments. They would put back the clock. Rather than, as the noble Lord described it, “messing about”, the Government are simply seeking to build on what the 2000 Act has delivered, not to unpick it. I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

My Lords, when the reference to a Maoist Government was made, I wrote down, “Maoist—don’t shoot the messenger”. Perhaps I should not defend the Minister’s remarks in that way.

Interesting points have been made. There might be a role for children’s services south, for instance. There might certainly be the non-portfolio roles to which my noble friend has referred. The point is that we should not be standing in SW1 attempting to design what goes on in—I have no idea what the postcode for Wigan might be—other parts of the country.

The noble Lord, Lord Graham of Edmonton, said that it was too soon to be tinkering with the 2000 Act. That was rather where we on these Benches started when we opened this Bill. I think that we have lost that argument, or at least we are not going to persuade the Government of it. We do believe it is too soon. The noble Lord also suggested that there might be all sorts of reasons for increasing the size of an executive. In Wigan I am sure that allowances would not be a reason to include people in an executive. I hope that that was not directed at anybody in this Chamber. There are sometimes good reasons in the management of a group to include people in a tent rather than to leave them outside. However, I am not making progress on this. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 68 [Other elected executive members]:

moved Amendment No. 121:

My Lords, this is a slightly surreal point given the circumstances. I am not entirely certain that I will be able to give the noble Baroness a huge amount of detail on the precise point that she has raised. I may end up writing to her about this. However, I will run through the impact of the amendments.

Essentially, Amendment No. 121 would allow the leader of a directly elected executive to remove members of the executive before the end of their four-year term. Amendment No. 122 would ensure that any member of an executive who was removed from office would be unable to claim compensation. We understand that the noble Baroness is seeking to make modifications to the directly elected executive model. We have listened carefully to the comments. On Report in another place, we tabled amendments to clarify the provisions following concerns raised by the Liberal Democrats in Committee.

This set of amendments would undermine some fundamental principles. The directly elected executive allows the electors of an area to vote for a slate of members. All members who appear on a slate will have a direct mandate from the electors to serve a four-year term. On those grounds, we do not believe in principle that a member of an elected executive should have their term of office cut short. They have been elected. That is the whole point. The leader will be responsible for ensuring that the members of the slate are all people with whom he can work. The dire prediction made by the noble Baroness about falling out with someone and then keeping them in post with nothing to do is rather far-fetched. Where disagreements arise, the executive would have to resolve them and concentrate on delivering a high standard of public services for the area. If it was unable to do that, obviously that would be something on which the electorate would reflect.

An option would be for the elected executive member to resign if they felt that they could no longer work with other members. My main point is that they have a direct mandate from the electorate. We cannot conceive of a situation in which anyone other than the electorate should remove them from office. The noble Baroness extrapolates from that a possible constructive dismissal. I simply do not know enough about employment law to say anything on that. I appreciate that she may well have given me prior warning of this, but I cannot say anything more at the moment. I will have to write to her on that point.

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. That was exactly the point: that resignation might be claimed to be constructive dismissal. I hope that in the best of all possible worlds this is never an issue, but there we go. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 122 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 123:

moved Amendment No. 124:

moved Amendment No. 125:

moved Amendment No. 126:

My Lords, it has been one of my lifetime’s ambitions to debate voting systems with the noble Lord, and now I have the opportunity. I am afraid that it will be rather short, because we had quite a long debate in Committee and my noble friend Lady Morgan then explained that every voting system has advantages and disadvantages. The noble Lord has explored some of those advantages and disadvantages this evening. I agree with him about the need for appropriate systems. I was surprised that he is still having to do research on the supplementary vote system. I thought that he gave an absolute masterclass on the supplementary vote system in Committee, but I listened with interest to what he said.

We acknowledge that there are arguments both for and against the various voting systems. I do not need to go on a great deal, because the noble Lord will know that the reason why we have proposed using the supplementary vote system for the elected executives is that mayors are elected by the supplementary vote system. It was as simple and consistent as that; we believed that it was appropriate to use the same voting system. I have no argument in my text about the alternative vote system because, as I said, we made the decision.

All that I want to put on record is that we commissioned the review. The result will be announced before the end of the year. It will consider the experience of new voting systems used in the UK since 1997, which is why it includes the London Mayor and the supplementary vote system. The noble Lord would be extremely surprised—probably bewildered—if I attempted to pre-empt the findings of the review by encouraging the introduction of further changes to the electoral system. He spoke very seriously about those different ways of voting. It is an important part of the democratic process that we get the right system for the job in hand and I appreciate that his remarks are on the record. I am sure that he looks forward to receiving a copy of the review. We will no doubt pore over it together but, in the mean time, I hope that he will withdraw his amendment.

My Lords, that is an offer that I cannot refuse. I will withdraw the amendment. I must tell the Minister that I had not really discovered the supplementary voting system or looked at it in any detail until it appeared in the Bill. That is what launched me on this path and I promise her and the Government that I shall return to it vigorously, but not under the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 127:

moved Amendment No. 137:

moved Amendment No. 138:

My Lords, I ought to thank the Minister for the titbits that I have been thrown. Sometimes, when noble Lords go home to their own communities, especially if they are far away, people come up and ask, “When you go down to that London, what do you do in that Lords place? Is it any use? Do you ever achieve anything?”. In future, I will always be able to reply, “Yes. I am responsible for the word ‘unparished’ being incorporated into the law of England”. There we are. At least it shows that the Minister and her team considered the amendments that we moved, even if they rejected 99 per cent of them.

I was flabbergasted when I discovered that there were another two full pages of stuff about alternative styles in the Bill. I return to what I said in Committee. This approach is a good example of how lawmaking nowadays is far too detailed and takes up far too many pages in the Acts. I blame computers, because they make it all possible. I do not understand the difference—I do not think that there is any—between the ability of parish councillors in future to call themselves neighbourhood councillors, community councillors or village councillors and the ability that they have now to call themselves town councillors if they wish. That seems to be an identical provision with identical effect, yet in 10 lines Section 245(6) of the Local Government Act 1972 gives parish councillors the right to call themselves town councillors—I think that that was introduced as an amendment as the Bill went through. There are two or three more subsections to allow them to change back if they want to, but the basic provision takes up 10 lines. We have a whole chunk of the Bill for that.

The way things are done nowadays is ridiculous. It means that poor old parish clerks will have to spend hours reading the Bill, trying to understand it to tell their councillors what it means, when it is really dead simple. If they want to call themselves a neighbourhood, a village or a community, they will be able to do so, just as they can now call themselves a town. That could all have been done in 10 lines.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendments Nos. 139 to 145:

moved Amendment No. 145A:

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, for his amendments. I endorse his underlining of the importance of the annual parish meeting. As a former councillor, I understand the importance of that. We are sympathetic to what appear to us to be the underlying principles of the noble Lord’s amendments. In Committee, I gave a number of assurances about our intentions for the regulations. In particular, I said that we have it in mind to limit the term of any appointment to one year, to which the noble Lord has referred. Appointments will have to be reconfirmed at the annual parish meeting of the parish council and will automatically end at an ordinary election. The first new provision suggested by Amendment No. 145A is broadly consistent with that. We have no difficulty in accepting the idea that reappointments should not go on ad infinitum. However, there are some technical issues with the amendment to do with timing and there is a certain amount of ambiguity which would be best addressed in regulations for which this clause provides. Given the assurance that we accept the general thrust of these amendments and that we will consider the extent to which we can include them in regulations, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment

My Lords, I am rather more pleased to withdraw this amendment than some of my previous amendments. Obviously, one reason to table the amendments was to invite the Minister to make the kind of statement that she has now made, which is very welcome. I look forward to seeing the regulations, as, I am sure, do all noble Lords. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 146:

My Lords, I hope that I shall be able to give the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Needham Market, the assurances she is looking for. We talked about this issue to some extent in Committee. One group who may perhaps see themselves as appointed councillors would be young people between the ages of 16 and 18. They would not come within the normal range of co-opted councillors, but could be appointed because they may have views on affordable housing in rural areas or suggestions about making the social life of their community more exciting. That is one group which may come under the umbrella of appointed councillors. It would also cover those who would not automatically think of themselves as people with a local government role, but whom the community and the council see as having a valuable contribution to make, even if only for a short period of time. In Committee I gave the noble Baroness the assurance that appointed councillors would be subject to the code of conduct, and I am happy to repeat it.

While the National Association of Local Councils has some doubts about this clause, it has also expressed considerable enthusiasm for the idea of using it as a way of bringing young people into local government; that is, 16 to 18 year-olds. Using the measure for this purpose is an exciting innovation, and I am a little disappointed that the noble Baroness is not as excited about it as I am. After having expressed doubts in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, said that the suggestion was interesting and that noble Lords would certainly want to go away and think about it.

My Lords, will the noble Baroness explain why such young people, with all they have to offer, could not be co-opted?

My Lords, I may have to write to the noble Baroness about that. Obviously there is a rational reason why they would fall into this category, but I shall write to her with the answer.

My Lords, the Minister has invited me to give her the results of my thoughts. If you want 16 and 17 year-olds on parish councils, why not extend the qualification to be members and to stand for election to 16 and 17 year-olds? Surely that is the more democratic and less patronising way to do this.

My Lords, perhaps not for this Bill, but it is certainly another way of approaching the issue. While opposing the principle of the clause, in Committee the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, tabled amendments probing our intentions for the regulations that would flow from this clause, and I believe that we gave detailed assurances on the points he raised. I think I made it clear that obviously 16 year-olds cannot stand for election, while co-opted members can. At present we regard co-opted members as those able to stand for election. While I shall write to the noble Baroness, I see that as the main difference between co-option and appointment.

The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has expressed doubts about using the negative procedure for making regulations, and in particular recommended that any exercise of the power which permits a majority of parish members to be appointed or enables an appointed member to be treated as an elected member for the purpose of the chairmanship or vice-chairmanship should be subject to the affirmative procedure. The assurances I gave in Committee made it clear that we have no intention of allowing these circumstances to arise; that is, those about which the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee had doubts. We have here an opportunity to put new energy into the operation of the most local level of local government. It is not a major part of the Bill but we think it would be a useful step forward. It is an enabling measure which does not require parish councils to do anything they do not want to do. We have given clear assurances that the regulations will be framed so as to prevent misuse.

The fact that already a great many parish and town councillors are appointed by co-option, while many more are elected unopposed, means that on the purity of local government argument, quite frankly the pass has already been sold by the reality. As I have said, we already have a large number of co-opted and elected unopposed councillors. This measure will give parish councillors a little more freedom to ensure that they can be as effective as possible. It opens up possibilities for engaging young people, which the sector has warmly welcomed, and for engaging hard-to-reach groups, which the Commission for Racial Equality has welcomed. Regretfully, therefore, I continue to resist the amendment and commend the measure to noble Lords.

My Lords, will the Government be monitoring the use of these powers, should they become law? If I were to ask a question in a couple of years’ time—if we are all spared until then, as a House or otherwise—I wonder if I would be told that this information was not collected centrally or if there would be a sensible answer saying how many there were and under what circumstances they had been appointed.

My Lords, I rise to give the noble Baroness a little more thinking time before she answers that question. Perhaps I may ask her about ethical standards and conduct, a point raised by my noble friend. The Local Government Act 2000, which introduced the new conduct regime, states in Section 41 that the Secretary of State may by order specify the principles which are to govern the conduct of members and co-opted members, so that the order is about the principles. A co-opted member is defined as someone who is a member of a committee or sub-committee, or represents the authority on a joint committee and is entitled to vote. It seems to me that an appointed member does not fall within that definition. Is it the use of what will be new Section 16A(3)(e) which allows for regulations as to the,

“purposes for which a person appointed is to be treated as an elected councillor”?

I may appear to be labouring the point, but if we are to have a new class of person, not only should we have an assurance that the standards regime will apply to them but we should understand how it does.

My Lords, I have given an assurance to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that the full standards regime will apply to appointed councillors. I will write to her with more detail on the chapter and verse of what the standards regime currently provides for co-opted and unopposed councillors.

The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, asked about monitoring. While the department will not monitor directly, it will of course be working closely with the sector.

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to this short but important debate. The Government intend to introduce a new category of people into local government—people who will have been appointed and not elected. I do not think we should lose sight of that; it is a very important departure from the principles of local democracy.

I was accused earlier of a counsel of despair and negative thinking. But the noble Baroness’s assertion that because it is not always easy to find people to stand we should just give up and start appointing people really is a counsel of despair. If it extended to other tiers of government, it would be desperately worrying.

My Lords, I did not say that we just give up. I said we use this as an opportunity, given the reality of where we are.

My Lords, the noble Baroness used the expression that the pass has already been sold and I took that as a gloomy prognostication for parish councils.

My noble friend Lord Greaves asked the Government how this will be monitored. The Government do not even know how many parish councils there are. I have been told this by the national association. There is not a list held of how many there are, where they are and what their names are. It has never been known. It is not only this Government who do not know; no Government have ever had this information. So if the Government do not know that, they are not going to know how these powers are being used. The proposal may be full of good intentions and considered a way of bringing in 16 and 17 year-olds, but it will be interesting to see how many of these young people are appointed. As far as I can see, other than that category, every other person who could be appointed to a council could be co-opted under current procedures.

I remain totally unconvinced by this proposal and I beg leave to test the opinion of the House.

My Lords, I beg to move that further consideration on Report be now adjourned. In moving the Motion, I suggest that the Report stage begin again not before 8.23 pm.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.