My Lords, I am told that it is not the practice of this Government or previous Governments to comment on intelligence matters. However, nothing in the NIE changes the fundamental problem that we face, which is Iran’s pursuit of a uranium enrichment programme that has, so far as we can see, no civilian application. That is despite the unanimous demand from the UN Security Council and from the IAEA that it should stop doing so. Accordingly, we will continue to act in the UN, in the EU and bilaterally to persuade Iran to change its approach and comply with its international responsibilities.

My Lords, none of us underestimates the potential threat of Iranian nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the National Intelligence Estimate seems to all of us to change the context in which we are negotiating with Iran, particularly since it confirms that in 2003 the then Iranian Government made a generous offer to negotiate directly with the United States, which the Bush Administration turned down. Should we not now be pursuing direct talks with the Iranians and pulling the Americans into those talks, which must include security guarantees and greater economic co-operation, particularly as we need Iranian co-operation in Afghanistan and Iraq?

My Lords, the noble Lord is correct that the NIE assessment has led to a lot of debate. I remind him that, for us, the two essential elements are that a programme of uranium enhancement continues, for which we can see no civilian purpose and that, secondly, this involves a Government who are rightly heavily distrusted by ourselves and others. Our position to the Iranians is clear: allow an arrangement that does not say, in the famous words of President Reagan, “Trust but verify”, but which says, “Verify so that we can trust”. If those conditions are met, negotiations on all outstanding matters involving Iran, with the United States among others, are very much on the cards.

My Lords, my noble friend has not commented on what is actually in the assessment with which we disagree. Could he do so?

My Lords, my noble friend heard me say in my opening reply that I am told that it is not appropriate for the Government or their predecessors to comment either on our own or other countries’ intelligence assessments.

My Lords, will the Minister consider the sharp differences between the 2003 and the 2007 National Intelligence Estimates of the United States’ intelligence agencies? There is a clear distinction between what in 2003 was thought to be the almost certain movement of Iran towards enrichment ending in a nuclear weapons programme, and the most recent estimate, which says with high confidence that, at least up until the publication of the estimate, there is no evidence of a weapons system being developed. Given that, will the Minister consider—because this is crucial to world peace—whether it might be appropriate for the Iranians to change to the agenda of the Baghdad talks, which he knows are going on and at which Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said that any issues that any member of those talks wishes to raise could be raised? Would it not therefore be wise to permit those talks to extend to regional security, which is at the heart of Iran’s profound concerns about the danger of being attacked?

My Lords, the noble Baroness is aware that the 2007 report concludes that there is a high likelihood that the programme has been suspended but not ended. An enrichment programme continues, so the ability of the Iranians to resume a weapons programme quickly remains a real risk. Secondly, and more generally on the Baghdad talks, the United States has said that the opportunities for Iraq and Iran to discuss their border and security issues, for the United States to participate through the Baghdad talks and for a broader regional set of actors to participate in different UN forums are all possibilities. I remind her that the United States has also been clear that general talks between the US and Iran on overall global issues between them must await a solution to this enrichment issue.

My Lords, how does the Minister square his statement that it is not the custom of this Government or previous Governments to comment on intelligence with the decision of the previous Government to publish a dossier of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq leading up to the war and the statement of the previous Prime Minister that he now wishes he had published the whole JIC assessment?

My Lords, this novice Minister was very much hoping that that particular noble Lord would not be in the House today. He will notice that I referred to the fact that I had been told that this was the practice. As someone who was out of the country at the time, I must say I scratch my head to reconcile this with the practice when the noble Lord was involved in these issues. I think that it is at least true to say that to comment on a close ally’s intelligence assessment publicly is probably not prudent.

My Lords, whatever the challenges—

My Lords, I think that we are all extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, for guiding us in this matter and for reminding us that these have been, with circumspection, matters for considerable and detailed public debate. The NIE assessment has been in every newspaper and has had a major influence on opinion here, in the rest of Europe and in Tehran. What, in the Minister’s evaluation, is the NIE report saying? What stopped in 2003? Was it weaponisation—the possibility of moving from enrichment, which continues, to weapons grade uranium and weapons manufacture? Were missiles stopped? Or should we regard this with the same value as we regard other intelligence reports that told us that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?

My Lords, we believe that the programme was suspended, not ended, and that, with enrichment continuing, the ability to resume a programme quickly remains open to the Iranians. On the value of the assessment, the noble Lord rightly points out that assessments change over time. I do not think that the authors of this assessment would consider it to be the last word on the subject.