My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The LORD SPEAKER in the Chair.]

Clause 26 [The Committee on Climate Change]:

moved Amendment No. 121:

I support this amendment because it takes forward a discussion in which I have participated on two previous occasions. I refer to the whole question of the triangular balance between the three organisations to which the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, referred.

At the weekend I watched our debates last week on the Parliament channel, in particular a debate held on the second day in Committee that I missed when I went for a cup of tea. In that debate the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, argued that he was passionately against the principle that the committee should be given the additional powers for which the Conservative Front Bench and I have been arguing. I have had time to reflect on his words and I understand perfectly where he is coming from. In the light of that speech, I have tried to work out another structure that might meet the concerns felt by some noble Lords on both sides of the Committee about the nature of this relationship.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for that useful explanation. I will go back through that before Report. I wonder whether we are talking about similar things, even though I am sure that there are differences. The National Audit Office is very useful, in that we on these Benches see a stronger role for the Committee on Climate Change than is in the Bill at the moment. We will, I hope, come to this amendment later this afternoon. The Committee on Climate Change should have a very positive role in auditing, assessing and judging the policies of the Government in meeting the budgets and targets that it has set itself. In that area, the Committee on Climate Change has a huge responsibility, one that is not in the Bill at the moment. The noble Lord will know all this far better than me, given his deeper experience.

The National Audit Office would not, therefore, take forward something in, for example, education, saying which policies are needed, and that we should go 100 per cent down the route of academies, or whatever. However, I do not see that as coming within the body’s role. It assesses what is going on, the areas of value and all those other areas where it might well disagree with government. In the end that has to be resolved. These Benches agree with that and may come back to that debate later this afternoon.

As regards the amendment, we have thought long and hard about this area. We fully agree with the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, about the need to strengthen the climate change committee in all sorts of ways. I regard the name issue slightly more subjectively and do not reject his analysis of the derivation of the word “commission” and the various rights that that normally confers. Over the weekend I put “commission” into Google, which came up with the Forestry Commission, the Gambling Commission, the Sustainable Development Commission, the Human Genetics Commission, the Low Pay Commission—noble Lords could probably do with its help occasionally—the Independent Police Complaints Commission and the Electoral Commission. One could compare the gravitas and fear of government that those bodies induce with that induced by the Monetary Policy Committee; I know which one has real power within the nation state of the United Kingdom—the Monetary Policy Committee has far more power than the others. It has a different style of governance to many of the commissions that I mentioned although they are extremely varied in that respect. Nevertheless, I consider that the Monetary Policy Committee has the most power, and certainly the most authority, of the bodies that I listed. The electoral—

Does the noble Lord agree that the full title of that body is the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England? It is of the Bank of England. The climate change committee is not a committee of anything. That is the inconsistency in its name that I am trying to point out.

I thank the noble Lord for that intervention. I clearly do not disagree with him but, as I said in my opening remarks, I am talking about gravitas, respect and a subjective view of how these things are looked at. From my early political days, when I thought of a UK commission I considered a royal commission. Royal commissions have a reputation for dealing with worthy causes that are kicked into the long grass. The word “commission” arouses such connotations in many cases. However, there are exceptions: for example, the Electoral Commission. Noble Lords may not be in awe of that body because they do not stand for election but that is not the case with people who do stand for election. Certainly, life Peers do not stand for election in this House; I apologise for having omitted the others.

The European Commission is extremely important and authoritative but does not operate in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, “commission” is French for committee and I believe that the climate change committee is the best title. The title of the Monetary Policy Committee does not in any way lessen that body’s authority. I accept that I speak from a subjective, political point of view but I do not like “commission”, which to me conveys within the British political culture the concept of long grass, arm’s length and a matter that government will ignore unless they really have to do otherwise.

Had the noble Lord been a commissioner of the Manpower Services Commission, as I was many years ago, I do not think that he would have said that. At that time, it was extremely important that the Manpower Services Commission was seen to be completely separate from the Department of Employment. When the Secretary of State for Employment came to the commission, he came because it had invited him or he had asked whether he could come and it had agreed to that. He could not just walk in because he was in charge of it and it was a committee of his department. I therefore, think that my noble friend has a point.

The public may be mystified by what “commission” means. That is not surprising because the noble Lord from the Liberal Front Benches made rather a muddle of his speech in that he mixed up the European Commission and much lesser bodies in this country, which all have separate functions. Politically, however, my noble friend has a good point and I look forward to hearing what the Minister will say. The Government ought to consider it seriously.

I hope the noble Lord, Lord May, will contribute—no, he has disappeared. The authority of the body is critical. If it is going to advise in the way described in this part of the Bill, it must have authority and must be accepted as having that authority. For that reason, my noble friend is making a good point.

I had not intended to intervene but I want to say that my noble friend made a very good point when he suggested that names matter. I share his doubts about the effectiveness of the word “committee”. Having listened to the noble Lord from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, I suggest—perhaps out of a sense of nostalgia—that if “commission” is not acceptable, we might consider “authority”. I was chairman of the National Rivers Authority. There were those who argued that it should not have been “national” because it did not cover Scotland, but it did give us an authority from the start that a lesser title would not have provided. I believe that, as a consequence, we proved to be a very effective organisation.

I support my noble friend’s amendment because it is important to strengthen the authority by giving it a more powerful name. When we come to Report, if there is some doubt about “commission”, I put forward a possible alternative of calling the body the “climate change authority”.

I realise that Amendments Nos. 121 and 122 refer only to the name, but both the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, and that of my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours went somewhat beyond that. I will do that myself because I feel that we have been with the Committee on Climate Change since we started the Committee stage, to be honest. As this is the first of the debates on the committee, I want to use the opportunity to set out our vision for the role of the Committee on Climate Change. The name of the body is relatively unimportant, but I realise that what is being bandied about here are different views on its function, which we will probably come to in other amendments.

We are establishing the Committee on Climate Change for two reasons. First, it is being set up to provide independent and expert analytical advice to the United Kingdom Government and devolved Administrations on the pathway to 2050. Secondly, the committee, with Parliament, will help hold the Government and, for that matter, the country as a whole, accountable for the progress we are making towards our 2050 target. Balancing all the factors that influence the optimum pathway to 2050 is a complex and technical task. The implications of the route chosen for the UK’s economy and society will be far-reaching; we have accepted that in our debates so far.

We are talking about big numbers; the impact assessment for the Bill talks about tens of billions of pounds. That is why it is important that the committee is able to provide independent, expert, transparent and credible analysis. That is also why it is so important that we get the balance of power between the different institutions exactly right. We have talked a lot so far about the relationship between the Government, the committee and Parliament; today we want to add the public to that list. If we do not have a system that is accountable to the public, we will have failed. I will come back to that point shortly.

First, I want to set out how we see the committee. It is an arm’s-length, advisory, non-departmental public body. By definition, therefore, it is independent of government. We have listened to the views of the Joint Committee of both Houses and others, and we have taken even greater steps to ensure the committee’s independence, as set out in our response to the pre-legislative scrutiny process.

Secondly, the Committee on Climate Change must be expert. Recruitment to the shadow body is well advanced. We are looking for world-class experts, who will be backed by a strongly analytical secretariat. We have increased the budget for the committee secretariat by about 50 per cent since the publication of the draft Bill less than a year ago. The quality of the committee’s analysis will be key to its credibility; it must balance all the relevant factors—scientific, social and economic—in coming to its advice.

Thirdly, the committee must be transparent. As I indicated in our discussions on Part 1, we are looking again at whether that can be strengthened further. We have already discussed the committee extensively during our previous discussions on Part 1, and it has become clear that in some important respects the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, takes a different approach to that of the Bill. I apologise for taking some extra time now, but I want to set this out clearly ahead of our debates on the rest of Part 2.

We need to ensure that the system that we design in the Bill is democratically accountable. The proposals put forward previously would mean that the Committee on Climate Change would essentially be responsible for taking decisions. The Government’s only options would be to do what the committee said or to do nothing at all. As I said previously, the decisions about how we reduce our carbon emissions will have far-reaching consequences and therefore, as the Joint Committee noted during pre-legislative scrutiny, it is only right that those are made by an elected body. Delegating such decisions to an unelected committee would undermine democratic accountability.

The history of the Bill demonstrates the importance of ensuring that we have a democratically accountable system that responds to public demand for action. If the Committee on Climate Change were responsible for taking decisions, how would it be accountable to the public? For instance, if the public wanted to reduce emissions more quickly than the committee, how would they ensure that the committee listened? Could they vote the committee out of office? Obviously not. For that matter, how would Parliament be able to hold the committee to account? We have well established mechanisms for Parliament to hold the Government of the day to account, and we would need to duplicate those so that Parliament could hold the committee to account. Ultimately, such decisions are for the Government of the day, who are accountable to Parliament and ultimately to the people of this country.

Would it be possible to call the committee an advisory committee?

It might be possible; it might mess up the nice ring of CCC. I am sure that all advice and suggestions are welcomed by the Committee and by the Government. I have made it clear that it is an advisory committee. I digress, but I remember that when ACAS was set up it was not called ACAS—I was on the Standing Committee in the other place—and the “A” was added during the course of the legislation. The suggestion made by my noble friend is welcome, but I cannot comment on it today.

The climate change committee’s role is to provide the best possible advice on the level of budgets and to hold the Government and the country accountable for progress towards them. The Government’s view is that the committee should not have a role in choosing the policy mechanisms most appropriate for meeting the budgets. I admit to agreeing with by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, when he said in last Tuesday’s debate that if the committee starts making major policy recommendations to government, it would not depoliticise the decisions but would utterly politicise the committee.

I will comment briefly on the contribution of my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours. With him, I had the privilege of serving on the Public Accounts Committee in the other place—the only Select Committee I ever served on, and I did so for two years—and our period on it overlapped. I much enjoyed it and learned far more about the machinery of government in two years on that committee than I learned in 16 years on the Opposition Front Bench. I freely admit. I am also a strong supporter of the NAO. One of the reasons why the Public Accounts Committee never has a Minister as a witness is that it does not do policy. There is that distinction about the role of the NAO and the PAC, which does not do policy, although I know it comes across in the media as doing policy. In fact, a Minister is nominally a member of the committee. I fully take on board the point of my noble friend about the agreement on the publication of the reports. It is an important point and one that is usually ignored and underrated by those who comment on the work of the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee.

As the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, there are already a number of bodies with expertise in specific areas to which the Government can look for recommendations on suitable policy instruments. What we need from the Committee on Climate Change—this is why we are creating it—is an entirely new body that provides independent, expert and credible advice on the science and economics involved and on how quickly, from a practical point of view, we can move towards our 2050 target.

For the advice to be credible, it must be formulated outside the political arena and therefore above decisions on the particular choice of policy mechanisms. We should also bear in mind that any attempt to depoliticise decisions about policies by delegating them to the committee, for example, would also—here again I am fully in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Teverson—de-democratise them. We could take, for example, the question of nuclear power. The Government have set out their position. We know that there are a range of views within the country on the issue but it is important that the Government are held accountable by Parliament and the people for their decisions on matters such as this. We would not want the Committee on Climate Change to be responsible for these sorts of decisions. We strongly believe that our vision of the role and the functions of the committee is right. We need a body that is independent, transparent and influential with a strong focus on analysis and evidence. I very much expect that is what we will be able to create. As I have said, we have raised the budget for support by 50 per cent. It will be almost if not directly equivalent to the backup provided for the Stern committee; the House of Lords and the country received its valuable report just over a year ago.

I turn to the amendments, which this debate hangs on. They involve simply changing the committee’s name. So far as the name is concerned—this is the advice I have received—there is absolutely no legal significance within the machinery of government in which it will operate or in the context of the Bill itself. I am almost saying that it does not matter; the argument might therefore be, “If it does not matter, do it”. However, noble Lords have hung on the proposed change of name things other than a change of name. There has been an attempt to hang changes of functions, of authority and of power—those involve going beyond the advisory role on the change of name. On that basis, of course, it is not an argument that the Government can accept. We believe that referring to the organisation—it is a non-departmental public body—as a committee is perfectly fine and we do not consider the amendment would add anything of value. I say that in the context of what we want the committee to do. If those who want to change the name are happy to accept the parameters of the vision of what we want it to do, that is one message. But that is not the message of the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Taylor: they are hung with changing the functions and the nature of the committee. We want to keep it as it currently is, and therefore do not believe that changing the name would add anything of value to our vision for the committee.

What, in principle, is wrong with the requirement that the committee agrees a report on facts, findings and recommendations of the Committee on Climate Change?

With respect, I have not really addressed my noble friend’s point; it went somewhat beyond the amendment, so I am not briefed on it. In principle, I suspect that there is nothing wrong with that. The argument is that the facts and transparency of the Committee on Climate Change are inevitably going to have to lead to an agreement. It is not reporting as the NAO reports; it is reporting on a specific department’s activities, looking at value for money, and economy, efficiency and effectiveness. In order to get the debate right, there must be some agreement on either the budget and how the money is being spent—or mis-spent. When the NAO report is published, we do not want, as my noble friend says, the accounting officer of the department saying, “Well, these conclusions and recommendations are all very well, but the facts in the report are wrong”. Well, no Permanent Secretary is ever in a position to say that, because the reports are only published after getting the department’s agreement.

I thank the Minister for his reply and noble Lords who participated in the debate, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, whose contribution went some way to recognising the argument from the Opposition Benches. It is interesting that the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis—in all innocence, I think—revealed the weakness of what the Government are seeking to achieve when he suggested putting the word “advisory” in the title. As the Minister rightly said, all the Government want is an advisory committee; they do not want it to have any executive power.

There is a real argument between the Opposition and the Government on this issue. I suspect that when the Bill was first proposed the climate change committee was probably seen as being much more executive and powerful than has subsequently been presented in the Bill and the words of the Minister. The Bill creates great difficulties for future Governments if it has a purely advisory body with no executive function. I suspect that driving climate change initiatives across all government departments will be a momentous task which will need authority and direction. That is why a climate change committee—or, as we prefer, “the commission on climate change”—is central to this purpose.

What would be the role of Parliament in that event?

All matters must come before Parliament for approval, as they do under regulations and statutory instruments to this day. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, has suggested that an ad hoc committee would constantly monitor the whole process of climate change and how the balance between the Government and the commission would actually operate. That is an effective role for Parliament. Government will need the authority of Parliament to bring in the fourth party to that equation—the people. It is as representatives of the people that they are party to this; it is in the name of the people that all of this is being done.

The Government have, for reasons of their own, somewhat funked the issue. Although I accept that my representations on the name are symbolic rather than substantial, I wish to test the opinion of the Committee.

moved Amendment No. 123:

I support what I believe are probing amendments at this stage, but I very much support the feeling behind the previous amendments. I understand the Minister’s difficulty: this is a new committee that will be meeting an objective that has not been set in political terms before, and there will be a range of vastly different views about how it should be set up. The Secretary of State will say that they picked the numbers and that any further changes will be almost as random as the original numbers.

There is a case for increasing the number of committee members. I have a slight issue with the selection of committee members from the Royal Society. It is an eminent body that has done an enormous amount of work in the area—I know that many noble Lords have been to its debates on climate change—but the world of science is multifaceted and there are areas that might not be represented by the membership of the Royal Society.

The role of political interference needs to be looked at. The membership of the committee, even though it is advisory, will affect vastly different areas within the business and social community. We need only look at the debate on the role of Heathrow at our previous sitting to realise that that will be the case. There might be a call for a member of the CBI to be one of the committee members; that would have its own consequences—maybe positive, maybe negative.

I know that the Minister will set out the reasoning on why some of these amendments will not meet his favour, but I hope that he can give one assurance. Most of the amendments are to sub-paragraph (1). However, paragraph 1(6) of the schedule states:

“Any such order is subject to negative resolution procedure”.

It is very tempting to table an amendment stating that there should be an affirmative procedure. I hope that, if the Government are to reject the amendments, this is an ongoing process that is to be looked at regularly. Although I would not table an amendment saying that there should be an affirmative resolution, I very much hope that, because of the unique nature of the committee, the Minister will commit at this stage that, on the first occasion when the negative resolution could be debated, the Government will make time for a debate about the membership of the committee. This is not the only Climate Change Bill that we will ever debate; I believe that we will come back to the subject extremely regularly. If the Government could give the assurance that government time may be made available to debate the membership of the committee, some of the concerns that we have set out in the amendments could be met.

I declare an interest as the current president of the Royal Society, and I would like to comment on the two amendments in which the society is explicitly mentioned. As the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, has emphasised, the authority and standing of the climate change committee is crucial. That will depend on the perceived quality and independence of its members. In particular, it must contain some members with real clout in the sciences of climate, environment and energy, along with the associated technologies—the technologies for adaptation and for mitigation.

The Royal Society is the UK’s main academy of sciences and it is routinely consulted by the Government on appointments to research councils and the like over the whole range of science and technology. Its involvement in proposing members of the committee would send a signal that the Government value independent input and expertise.

I have two provisos. First, it would not be reasonable to expect that a body such as the Royal Society could actually appoint members; its role could solely be to make nominations, to be consulted and to advise. That is the current situation with respect to appointments to research councils and similar bodies where the Royal Society is consulted. Secondly, if just one scientific body were singled out as an interface with government in this context, I think that the Royal Society would be regarded as the most appropriate one. It spans the whole range of science and technology. However, its expertise is spread thin in some areas. Were the society to be entrusted with any special role, it should consult not only among its own fellowship but also with the Royal Academy of Engineering, relevant professional institutions and specialised societies.

The motivation behind the amendment—that the Government should be obliged to draw on the best independent advice—would surely have the wide support of all of the scientific community, because the standing of the climate change committee is a pre requisite for achieving the Bill’s aims. But when the Bill comes back, the wording might perhaps spell out more explicitly that the national authorities should be obliged to seek and note the best independent advice, even if the society cannot be expected actually to make nominations itself.

As we have heard, the strength, expertise and independence of the climate change committee is critical. In many ways, this is the heart of the Bill. How we move forward depends a great deal on the effectiveness and power of the committee. I am very concerned about its composition. I simply do not see here a body that will take through what we are all asking of it. I hope that the Government will look carefully before Report at its composition. We are all trying to head in the same direction, but I have severe doubts as to whether the committee, composed as it will be at the moment, could possibly carry through all that we want. I was disappointed when I looked at its make-up. The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, spoke just now of a committee that is independent and transparent, with a strong focus on analysis and research—I think that he said the latter. Can this do it? I am not at all sure. We have just heard the comments about the potential role of the Royal Society, which is worth considering.

I strongly support my noble friend’s proposal that the size of the committee should be increased; that, indeed, was the recommendation of the Joint Committee, which, while accepting that there must be an upper limit, felt that the numbers proposed by the Government were inadequate.

I turn to the noble Baroness’s remarks. These issues were carefully considered by the Joint Committee, and I do not share her view that the committee will be inadequate. Various suggestions have been made during our proceedings on how it might be strengthened. I see no reason why, given the right resources, its analytical powers should have shortcomings. My own experience of chairing such a public body is, I am glad to say, that as soon as it is in position, its members become strongly independent, wherever the nominations came from, and come together to act as an effective body. I hope that the noble Baroness will be surprised at how quickly it will start to be an effective team, wherever the representations come from.

It is a great privilege, in a short debate, to follow the president of the Royal Society—and the master of my old college. We need to listen carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Rees, said about exactly how the Royal Society might perform its task. He made it clear that he does not think its role is simply to nominate, but that it can play an even more effective role by putting forward and consulting on the names in the manner that he suggested. We shall have to look carefully at his proposals before we come back on Report.

I have some doubt about only one of my noble friend’s amendments, the one that refers to the need for appointments to,

“be considered by a relevant select committee of the House of Commons”.

My doubt about that is simply one of timing. We are faced with an acute timing problem at present, because we all agree that there is an urgent need for the committee to get on with the tasks that it has been given. Indeed, if it does not get on quickly, it will not be able to fulfil some essential tasks in the timescales that we are setting. That is why it was such good news when we were told during the Joint Committee proceedings that an advisory committee was to be set up exactly as one was set up on the National Rivers Authority. I chaired that committee during the transition phase. I hope that the Minister will be able to tell us a little more about how we are getting on with the appointments and the advisory committee.

It will therefore not be possible, unless we seriously delay the proceedings in a way that might be very damaging, to have a great parliamentary approval process on this occasion. I can, however, see the advantage of building such a process into the legislation so that when further appointments are made in later years, Parliament has a role. That is my only qualification of the various amendments that my noble friend has tabled. I am absolutely certain that it is essential, if we are to have the kind of skills and knowledge that we need to be represented, to increase the size, as the Joint Committee proposed. I therefore hope that my noble friend will press the amendments to a vote at an appropriate moment, if not today.

Briefly, on the amendment that deals with a committee of the House of Commons, which committee is that? I have already identified six committees that would want to influence events, including the Transport Committee; the Trade and Industry Committee, with its responsibilities for energy; the Agriculture Committee; the Science and Technology Committee; and the environmental protection committee. All I am saying is that unless you create a new structure in the form that I suggested in my amendment last week—a sort of joint ad hoc Select Committee that combines all these committees, which are influencing this particular appointment, on the basis of the Quadripartite Committee in the House of Commons—some competitive differences might develop among committee chairmen in the other place.

More widely, the amendments are premature. I am not altogether convinced that the model—which this House appears to be approving at this stage—for the powers and the structure of this committee and the way in which it relates to other committees in the tripartite arrangement to which the noble Lord refers and which my noble friend has qualified as an almost quadripartite arrangement by bringing the public into the equation as well, will work. When the House of Commons deals with these matters, it may want to amend these areas—hopefully. If it does, the amendments as a series may look very different.

I have three points to make, but first I declare an interest as the immediate predecessor of my noble friend Lord Rees as president of the Royal Society. My first point is about numbers. In the Bill, the committee, if we include the chairman, is six to nine people. The inevitable social pressures will tend to make the number nearer the upper limit. If my arithmetic is correct, the amendment would make this eight to 13. This is not a make-or-break decision, but I am in favour of the smaller committee for a reason that is science-based. Many people think of Northcote Parkinson as a writer of comic prose; I think of him as one of the more substantial contributors to social science. One of the things that he did was to trace from the cabal to the Star Chamber and to Harold Wilson’s “kitchen cabinet” and outline the fact that as committees inevitably enlarged beyond about eight people, they began to condense out an inner core so that they could function. I strongly believe that “fewer is more” in this context but, as I say, that is a minor point.

My second point concerns the idea of embedding in the Bill the requirement for broad consultation on the constitution in putting together the Committee on Climate Change. One might think that this is already covered in the protocols for science advice and policy making that were issued way back in 1996 and that have gone through successive rounds of strengthening in the hands of the regimes of two Chief Scientific Advisers. These enjoin that in any enterprise such as this there should be such consultation with appropriate experts. Writing it down and doing it are two different things. A deliberately vague but none the less specific example is one really important committee that was put together not that long ago to deal with scientific aspects of a particular debate for which there was another committee dealing with the general public consultation. The putting together of this committee was in the hands of a junior official who consulted within the DTI and Defra. He put together a committee of 20 people—they were invited without any further consultation outside—on a subject for which genetics and ecological science were extremely relevant. In its first instance, the committee ended up with no geneticist and no really front-rank ecologist. As this was perceived, six people were added ex post facto, which, going back to my first point, made a committee of 26 people. I thank my stars that I was not part of it.

My third point is how you spell out this consultation. While I very much respect what my noble friend—my genuine friend—Lord Rees said, I do not think that it is a very good idea to mention any one institution, partly because that would not be totally appropriate even if we were to think of one institution. In this context, the science does not mean only physical and biological science; it also involves, importantly, and arguably more importantly, social and economic science. I derive a good deal of narcissistic satisfaction from the fact that during my presidency we somewhat enlarged the ambit of the Royal Society to begin to include the harder edges of social and economic science, but we still could not claim to be representative of it.

Beyond that, I am reluctant to see the society included like this. Although you could get round it by putting the Royal Academy of Engineering alongside us, whenever you take such action you are drawing a line that has a lot of dissatisfied people on the other side. I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, in whom I have faith in these matters, to take this under advisement and think about how most wisely to incorporate in the relevant place in the Bill a firm injunction for outside consultation. In the first instance of putting this together and tentatively beginning to think about it, even as the Bill goes forward, competent head-hunters have been consulting widely with the Royal Society and private individuals. We have made a good start, but let us make sure that it continues by appropriately and non-institutionally specifically spelling it out in the Bill.

The noble Lords, Lord Rees and Lord May, mentioned engineering as a subject which has not yet been raised as necessary to the expertise of the Committee on Climate Change, and it is a serious omission. Whether it can be corrected by incorporating a requirement for the national authorities to seek advice from the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering, or whether it would mean, as the noble Lord, Lord May, just said, that you then would have a queue of other very distinguished bodies asking why they were not included, I am not competent to say. But I urge the Minister that, if anything is written in the Bill about consultation, it should certainly be broader than the Royal Society and should include the Royal Academy of Engineering.

I think that we are all suffering from the same problem; namely, that we know the Government’s conclusions but we do not know what their thinking was or how they arrived at or derived their conclusions. None the less, the discussion is extremely interesting. Like the noble Lord, Lord May, I think that, on the whole, small committees are good when they are executive committees. When they are advisory committees, you want the widest possible circle of advice that it is reasonable to obtain. On balance, I am very much in favour of my noble friend Lord Taylor’s suggestion that the committee might be slightly larger, but, as I say, we do not know with any certainty what the Government’s thinking was. The important bit will come when the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, has to justify what is written in the Bill.

It is, as I say, difficult to know how the Government arrived at their conclusions. We do not know their thinking. I agree that to nominate just one body to have the right to nomination, however erudite and widely spread its membership might be, would probably be wrong. I like the comment by the noble Lord, Lord Rees, if I understood him correctly, that he felt that the appropriate role for the Royal Society is to advise the Government in this field. But, again, we do not know whether that was the Government’s thinking. Until we get those answers, we are all going to be wandering round with our own opinions. On that happy thought I am going to sit down.

I declare an interest as a fellow of the Royal Society and of the Royal Academy of Engineering. I have two minor points and one more substantive one. The first minor one relates to the size of this committee. I would give some support to the idea of having a slightly larger committee. This committee is going to have to have quite a lot of close, tight argument and discussion. On the other hand, it is going to have to cover a fairly wide area. I would have thought that both of those objectives could be met with the committee going up to about 12 members. I do not feel very strongly about this, but I think that there is scope for such a solution.

The second minor point is that I am slightly alarmed at the thought of a Commons committee scrutinising the composition of this committee. It is awfully reminiscent of confirmatory hearings, of which there is experience in the North American context, and there would be scope for some politicisation. Although it probably would not happen, the possibility is there.

My main point relates to the proposal, which has already been raised, for nomination by the Royal Society or other bodies. As soon as you have multiple bodies making nominations, you no longer have a team. This committee has to work as a team. If you have different bodies nominating different members, they will come to represent constituencies. That is not the way to establish a coherent body that covers the bases. It is extremely important that nominations are made as part of one coherent operation, with all the advice suggested by my noble friends and others Members of the Committee, but it will have to be a coherent whole to create a working team.

In responding to the issue of the size of the climate change committee, will the Minister indicate whether he sees measures of adaptation as part of the committee’s remit? If so, the size of the committee as currently proposed is almost certainly inadequate. I would suggest that the adaptation issues are of a different order, requiring different skills and different expertise, and that they are dealt with elsewhere, but it would help the Committee considerably to know whether the Minister thinks that that falls within the committee’s remit.

The noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, has put his finger on the point that I wanted to make, that we cannot settle on numbers until we know what the functions of the committee will be. He mentioned adaptation, and Amendment No. 129 will require the inclusion of another member of the committee. However, my feelings are more in line with those of the noble Lord, Lord May—the smaller the better. If you have two lawyers in a room you will get three arguments. I have no doubt that if you have nine scientists in a room you will have many fewer arguments than you would if you had 12 in a room together.

I come back, however, to the practicalities of some of the amendments before us. My question relates to what happens if the national authorities do not agree. At the moment they are due to appoint the chair. If the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, advises the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State that the ideal man to chair the committee happens to be very pro-nuclear power, what is Mr Salmond, the First Minister of Scotland, going to say to that? Will there be endless arguments? Given that, I support my noble friend Lord Taylor in saying that the chair must be appointed by the Secretary of State. However, where my noble friend may have missed a point is that if the national authorities are going to appoint the deputy chair, surely the Secretary of State ought to appoint that person as well.

I go back to my main point. Can the Minister tell us what is to happen in the case of a disagreement between the national authorities? Further, on Amendment No. 126, tabled by my noble friend, why should it be a Select Committee of the House of Commons? If it is necessary at all for there to be any parliamentary scrutiny, it should be undertaken by both Houses. However, I would prefer for there to be none.

I assume that I am the only Member on these Benches present who is not a fellow of the Royal Society. I rise to commend the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam. Later we will debate in a series of amendments what is to happen about adaptation as opposed to mitigation and how that is to be scrutinised independently. Although I certainly would not favour the climate change committee being given that role because I think that it should be dealt with by a small, focused and specialist committee, nevertheless if adaptation were to be given to the climate change committee in order to ensure that that important and growing element of climate change is given proper prominence, that would have an impact on the membership of the committee.

I stand with those who favour a larger committee. The Monetary Policy Committee has nine members and deals with one branch of one science. Given the breadth of scientific, social and economic issues that this committee will have to deal with, if the MPC requires nine members, it is almost certain that the climate change committee needs more.

I am puzzled that the original text of the Bill uses the word “appoint” while the amendment we are discussing uses “nominate”. That word usually means that someone puts forward a name and someone else decides it. I do not think that “nominate” is the right word if it is intended that someone else should have the right of choice. Either we should go back to the word “appoint” or not at all.

A further argument that has been put forward is that we are in such a hurry that if we believe in the principle of parliamentary approval of appointments—I am not sure that I necessarily do—at least the chair of the committee should be covered by it. We are engaging here in a 50-year endeavour and I do not believe that it can honestly be said that the few weeks which will be taken up by the approval process is material relative to the gain we believe that we will get from it.

Lastly, we have to remember that this is not all the work of these eight or 12 people. The committee will have a staff with a chief executive and will require experts in many disciplines—indeed, broken down into the subsidiary parts of those disciplines. The actual expertise of the body will not reside solely in its members, commissioners or whatever we like to call them.

I have counted some 14 speakers who have contributed to this debate, many of whom have made very valuable points. I should declare an interest in that while I am not a scientist, I am probably the most out-of-date engineer in the House. I still pay my subs, but it is a long while since I last practised. However, I still have that attachment. Some of the points that have been made jump ahead of where we are. In particular, the comments of my noble friend Lord Puttnam apply to Amendment No. 158. However, by and large we are talking about the numbers to make up the committee. I am not going to go to the stake on the size of the committee, but I shall stick to the line today.

It is a fair point. We want a smallish committee rather than a grand forum, and that is probably the thinking here. The thrust of the amendments, as has been said, is to increase the size of the committee. We are dealing with a couple of things here. The noble Earl, Lord Caithness, pointed out that this group of amendments takes away the input of the devolved Administrations into the appointment of the committee’s chair. The amendments also have an aim that relates to the nominations from the Royal Society. My noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours pointed out that the relevant Select Committee at the other end is not clearly available to everybody, whatever subject you look at, simply because the committee structure down there has changed over the years.

The practical effect of the amendments is to create a larger committee of between seven and 12—or eight and 13, as the noble Lord, Lord May of Oxford, pointed out—who have been approved or appointed. The intention of the amendments is to create a larger body with a focus on climate change, to reduce the discretion of national authorities and the role of the devolved Administrations, and to bring further transparency and rigour to the process by giving Parliament a role in approving the appointments. I am not in a position to discuss hearings for confirmation of roles. There is a role for that and I have my own views on it. They are not matters covered by the present arrangements in another place, although from time to time I hear ministerial colleagues complaining that people have been appointed to roles but are completely incapable of answering both to the media and concerned experts. Going before a committee of MPs might sometimes sort out whether someone can explain what they are doing. Half the battle is not the doing but the explaining and being accountable. That is an issue.

The Committee on Climate Change will be the first body of its kind to bring together different areas of expertise among its members, from the fields of climate science and policy, economics and, of course, business competitiveness and financial management. As I mentioned in a previous debate, we are talking about effects that run into tens of billions of pounds. The areas of expertise broadly mirror the matters that the committee is required to take into account in its advice on the level of the carbon budget, listed in Clause 10 of the Bill. The committee will have a chairperson and between five and eight members appointed jointly by the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers and the relevant Northern Ireland department. It will be a UK-wide body. There are plenty of examples I could give of UK-wide bodies like this that are now appointed with the devolved Administrations, where we have discussions and find perfectly acceptable solutions. I am unaware of major clashes. I have not come armed with a list, but the system of collective appointments has worked extremely well since devolution came on to the scene.

By definition, the approach in the Bill has been agreed with the devolved Administrations. I put this on the record. We certainly cannot accept Amendment No. 125, which would remove the devolved Administrations’ input from the process of appointing the chair. On Amendments Nos. 121 and 131, on the size of the committee, we think five to eight, plus the chair, strikes a balance between ensuring that the committee retains a good mix of relevant expertise and creating a committee that is focused and dynamic.

Should the committee, once established, consider it necessary to increase its size, we have made provision in the Bill for the Secretary of State to amend the number of committee members, with the consent of the devolved Administrations, recognising that the volume and type of work given to the committee is bound to vary over time. This is a long-term process and we do not see why the number of members needs to be changed now before the committee has even been appointed—I shall come on to that in a moment—or begun its work. Nor do we see why the flexibility to vary the size of the committee as its workload fluctuates over time needs to be removed from the Bill. I believe that Amendment No. 131 would take away the flexibility to change the size of the committee, so it must be a probing amendment by definition. The relevant subsection is in the Bill for that very reason—to take account of the committee’s workload over time.

On the point made by the noble Lord in referring to what my noble friend Lord Caithness said, paragraph 1(3)(d) of Schedule 1 states that the committee should have experience in or knowledge of,

“differences in circumstances between England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland and the capacity of national authorities to take action in relation to climate change”.

Does that mean the political possibility of doing so? I think that is what my noble friend was talking about. I cannot quite see what sort of person on the committee would be capable of helping it to implement paragraph 1(3)(d). Is it about the geography of different parts of the United Kingdom and their climatic conditions, or does it include the art of what is politically possible to implement? I do not quite understand what paragraph 1(3)(d) of Schedule 1 means. As politics in Scotland are diverging somewhat, I think that should be taken into account.

I do not have a detailed answer to the noble Baroness’s question but, because of the way it is written, one could make the same argument if one listed Northern Ireland. You cannot take any cognisance of the view and capacity of, for example, Northern Ireland ignoring the fact of the island of Ireland. It is a question of business and practicalities and goes way beyond the science. I am not saying that one person would encompass all that.

It is desirable to have as much of what is in sub-paragraph (3) as possible. The idea of having nominees is not necessarily the issue: the devolved Administrations need to have the comfort that this is not a London-centric or England-centric committee. One has to go wider than that. In other policy areas, we are having no difficulty with the devolved Administrations in making sure that their views and the differences within the United Kingdom, as indicated by England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, are taken into account.

I thank the Minister for the way in which he has covered all the ground in the debate. It is clear to us all that the amendments may have their imperfections. Nonetheless, they were directed at making sure that we have the right and best people to perform the tasks of this committee. Indeed, when one thinks of the quality of the contributions that noble Lords have made, what a fine Committee on Climate Change we would have if we could see many such individuals involved with the deliberations of the body. From engineer to president of the Royal Society, the House contains a distinguished range of talent that it can draw on to consider these matters.

In the circumstances, I am pleased to withdraw the amendment, but I say all strength to the Minister’s elbow in putting on pressure to get the name of the chairman of the shadow committee into the public domain. It will reassure many people if it is clear that the right sorts of people are being appointed to do this task. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 124 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 124A:

I have a great deal of sympathy with the point of the right reverend Prelate but I think he ought to consider the wording of paragraph 3, which states that the authorities,

“must have regard to the desirability”;

of experience of the factors listed in sub-paragraph (3)(a) to (i). His point does not exclude the Government from considering the experience of people involved internationally, but we are primarily considering domestic legislation. While there is an obligation on the Government to consider, as I have said, what is listed in sub-paragraph (3)(a) to (i), it does not preclude the Government from investing their experience in selecting somebody with wide international experience as well.

I fail to understand, therefore, why it is necessary to include this particular provision, much as I have sympathy with the points which have been raised.

I support the amendments. I am glad that they have been put down and also separated out, because this is a useful reminder of what the Bill is all about. As so many speakers made clear at Second Reading, and as the right reverend Prelate has said so effectively, climate change is likely to have the greatest impact on developing countries and is already doing so. Given that the poorest people are less able to withstand the additional pressures and shocks of climate change, they are at the forefront of the impact of climate change. It is therefore extremely important that what we do in Britain is also assessed on its impact on developing countries in terms of whether we are doing enough and what we are doing.

To address what the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, has just said, there has been some discussion in previous sittings about climate credits. These could be adopted as a way forward; they might benefit the United Kingdom in tackling climate change and meeting its targets but they might not have a beneficial effect on developing countries. Therefore, we need to look at this in an international context. Climate credits could be positive or negative in developing countries—there are examples of both. We need that expertise in international development on the climate change committee to take this into consideration and to be sure that we are doing that.

As I mentioned in the debate on the previous amendment, it looks to me as if this committee is rather weighted towards business, economics and industry. I worry about the depth and nature of its expertise; we addressed a number of those issues just now. To be honest I did not feel that that was totally addressed by the Minister in his concluding remarks. International development is also an area which the committee must address, and we need to see that represented on it. I therefore argue that a more balanced composition should include expertise on the impact of climate change in the developing world.

We will later come to the subject of adaptation, raised by the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, in the previous group. That is obviously extremely important and must be rapidly developed, particularly for the benefit of developing countries. Again, there are opportunities for us here in the United Kingdom, and the committee’s expertise must include that as well. That should benefit developing countries.

Having a committee member knowledgeable about climate impacts in developing countries might also help to provide a strong international perspective, which is clearly critical in what the committee is doing, to ensure that purely domestic economic factors do not dominate what the committee decides. It is of course not sufficient to suggest that climate scientists on the committee will themselves adequately address and safeguard this area; it would obviously depend entirely on the expertise and interest of those particular climate scientists and whether they had in interest in international development. The Bill is about a global problem. The climate change committee should undoubtedly have expertise in this area among its members.

I support the amendment from a specific perspective. I am fortunate in that, in my day job as president of UNICEF in the UK, I have the chance to travel and see the impact of things which are sometimes ill reported or not reported at all, as they affect young people in remote areas of the world. We decided last September to commission a report from Dr Catherine Cameron—one of the advisers to the noble Lord, Lord Stern, in the preparation of his report—on the likely impact of climate change on children in the developing world. It will be published in the spring and I suspect that it will make fairly grim reading.

I know that my noble friend Lord Clinton-Davies did not mean that this issue was peripheral when he referred to it as domestic legislation. It is important to remember that those opposing William Wilberforce’s Bill did so on the basis that domestic legislation was being used to impact on the lives of people who were not directly affected and should not be the object of domestic legislation. Not quite in this Chamber, but certainly in this building, the case was made over and over again: why on earth was parliamentary time being taken up for the benefit of those who were not UK nationals and not directly affected by UK legislation?

May I—

May I make my point? I know that that is not what my noble friend was referring to, but it cannot be said often enough that this is an international Bill. We are taking an international stance. We in UNICEF UK have taken a world lead in looking scientifically at the likely impact of climate change on young children around the world. I am enormously proud of that, and I hope the Committee is as well.

Does not my noble friend realise that the Government have a duty to do certain things, but that that does not preclude them from considering, where relevant, this particular issue?

To bring the discussion right down to the ground, would the committee have it in its power to discuss whether we should be growing more food here rather than bringing it from abroad? The noble Lord made the significant point that aeroplanes should not be included in the Bill. Whether green beans should be flown every day from Kenya or whether we should grow more beans here is a serious question. We do not know what the implications of, say, blueberries from Argentina are for the environment. Yet one has only to go into a supermarket and look around the counters to see where things are being imported from to realise that this is a huge issue. It is an international issue; the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, who made a very inspiring speech about it, is right.

Would the committee have it in its power to talk about that? Should that be included in the scope of the amendment or does it come under the social impact policy?

The noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy of Lour, had made an interesting and useful point on whether the committee has the power to consider the sort of thing that the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, referred to—that is, whether the activities that we undertake in the United Kingdom have a harmful effect on children overseas. If the committee is not empowered to consider that, should it be added to its functions? My view—I hope to convince the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, of this—is that the expertise mentioned in the amendment ought to be available to the committee to perform its functions, irrespective of whether we widen them in the sense that I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, would advocate.

I refer Members of the Committee to the speech made by the Prime Minister when he was Chancellor, in introducing last year’s Budget. He said that Britain would lead the way in helping developing countries address climate change and announced a £50 million scheme to prevent the destruction of the largest rainforest in the world, in the Congo basin of central Africa.

“Led by Nobel prize winner Wangari Maathai, it will help 50 million people … whose livelihoods are now under threat”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/3/07; col. 821.]

In the same speech, Mr Brown mentioned the Iwokrama project, which is an area of 360,000 hectares dedicated by the people of Guyana as a research station for the benefit of humanity as a whole, to be administered by the Commonwealth. This is a good example of the need for the committee to have knowledge and experience of international development. Although, as the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, has said, its duties are primarily concerned with emissions in the United Kingdom, it has a duty under Clause 27(1)(c)(i) to advise the Secretary of State on the contribution towards meeting the carbon budget that should be made by trading schemes. Although initially only the ETS is set for implementation, others which may be developed in the future will cover activities by the United Kingdom in developing countries. There are activities under the Kyoto Protocol’s clean development mechanism under which, according to the Government’s helpful briefing paper 5, $7 billion was invested in 2006 with another $25 billion in the pipeline.

It might be argued that, so far, rainforest preservation is not covered by the clean development mechanism, but in his reply to me last week, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said that the Government’s priority was to reduce emissions from deforestation and that, to achieve this, agreement had been reached at Bali for a framework of positive incentives. Deforestation accounts for between 18 and 25 per cent of global carbon emissions according to the Global Canopy Programme, and that has to be compared with the 3 per cent for which aviation is responsible, on which Members of the Committee rightly focused attention last Wednesday.

The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, also mentioned the Government’s review of financing mechanisms to reduce deforestation, which was announced last September and is expected to be fed into the next UN climate change conference in Copenhagen in 2009. Meanwhile, under Clause 30(2)(a), the committee might be asked to advise on the limits that are proposed to be set by any trading scheme that may be proposed involving measures to prevent deforestation.

I can well understand the reluctance to expand the remit of this committee so far that it becomes the conscience of the nation and embraces the whole of this very complex subject. Following the noble Lord, it seems quite clear that, even as it stands, the very particular duties assigned to the committee can hardly be undertaken without paying particular attention to this dimension of analysis and ensuring that the analysis is really sound.

The noble Baroness talked about food. Of course, food security is greatly affected by climate change. The Centre for Global Development has done some important research on the impact of climate change on declining agricultural productivity in a range of developing countries. This is obviously a vital part of any analysis of the weight of the dangers we face. There is the question of the analysis and its credibility. There is also the question of the very particular role that the committee is being given. For example, it is charged with not putting undue burdens on UK business or unduly reducing UK competitiveness. That is a proper role and object for the committee, but who will make the case for developing countries? Who will make sure that their safety is not risked by an inadequate reduction? There has to be a capacity to put that case strongly within the committee as it comes to its advice.

I listened very carefully to what the Minister said about the duties of the committee and I believe that even as it stands now the amendment is entirely consonant with what we have heard this afternoon about its role. I hope that as we all try to work to ensure that the UK has some international leadership role in this matter, we will strengthen that by being specific. It may well be that the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, is entirely right and that it is the Government’s settled intention to build this dimension into the membership of the committee. It would be good to have an indication from the Minister about whether that is the intention because this amendment would strengthen one of the purposes of the Bill, which is to confirm the international leadership of the UK.

Under Clause 2(2) the Secretary of State has to have cognisance of any,

“significant developments in … scientific knowledge about climate change, or … European or international law or policy”.

So it is irrelevant not to consider these issues. It is imperative that they should be included in this provision.

I entirely agree with the noble Lord that it is imperative that that dimension is considered. Having a look at,

“the desirability of securing that the Committee (taken as a whole) has experience in or knowledge of the following”,

it is clear that the international dimension is not spelled out in that list. I entirely agree with the noble Lord that it is very desirable that it should be. Therefore, by moving this amendment, we are looking for some assurance that it will be specifically in the membership of the committee.

The Liberal Democrat Front Bench strongly supports the amendment. I particularly agree with my noble friend Lady Northover that from a practical point of view, if we have carbon budgets and the buying of credits—which involve joint implementation and the clean development mechanism in Kyoto—which are focused on the developing world and developing economies, we need a dimension in the committee that fully understands that as well as the broader aspects of humanity that are clearly also fundamental.

All Members of the Committee agree that we cannot look at the UK’s management of its climate change policies without looking at the world as a whole. The questions are to what extent that has to be put in the Bill and to what extent this amendment is relevant. I support the amendment for reasons we have heard many times. I should declare an interest as the chair of the trustees of the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, which is generously funded by Defra, bearing in mind the contribution that British science, not just at Kew, but at many other institutes, can make in helping to protect biodiverse systems and to develop mediation towards climate change.

A lot of the work funded at institutions such as Kew recognises the seamless nature of the science in addressing these climate change issues. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, talked about the work in the Congo basin; that is not Kew work, but Kew is working in Borneo, Madagascar and many other countries. I find it inconceivable that the Committee on Climate Change would not be well plugged into this science. It may come under the category of environmental or climate change science, but there must be knowledge of how relevant these natural carbon sinks are, to what extent they are threatened and to what extent that therefore impacts on procurement or land management policies in this country, and much else besides.

The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, deserves credit for supporting Kew and other institutes in developing this international portfolio. He will recognise that it is inconceivable that the committee would not be aware of this work going on around the world and how we lock into it. I accept, with the right reverend Prelate, that as it is inconceivable that the committee would not be aware and have a degree of expertise in this, it should also be included in the Bill. That is why I support the amendment.

Sometimes one starts to say “it goes without saying” and it is then best to say it, just to get the thing clear. Noble Lords are right about the work of Kew. From my limited knowledge, it would be inconceivable that the climate change committee and its secretariat were not aware of the international work that goes on and is led from Kew. I honestly do not think that there is a great deal of difference between us on this. I will briefly set out comments on the amendment by explaining paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 1. It gives a useful context, because there are further amendments to the paragraph in the next group. Then I can avoid having to make the same speech.

Paragraph 1(3) gives a list, in alphabetical order, of the areas of expertise and knowledge that are desirable in the overall composition of the committee. As will be seen, the areas of expertise broadly mirror the matters set out in Clause 10, which the committee is required to take into account in its advice on the level of the carbon budget. The list of expertise is not meant to be exhaustive. It is the make-up of the committee “as a whole”, as it says in the Bill. It is the expertise and experience that are provided collectively that are important. The list of expertise is drafted broadly to provide scope for the national authorities and the chair to appoint members with specific expertise as the committee’s work demands. The list does not prevent national authorities appointing members with expertise in areas that are not on the list, if they and the chair believe that that will help the committee’s work. Specifically, Amendment No. 130A seeks to add international development to the list of expertise. I and my ministerial colleagues are sympathetic to the intention behind the amendment. I am conscious that while Clause 10, to which I have referred, requires the committee to take European and international circumstances into account, expertise of an international nature is not currently present in the list of desirable expertise for the committee, as set out in paragraph 1 of Schedule 1.

It is worth reminding the Committee that Clause 10(2)(h) makes it clear that the climate change committee can look at any issue it wants to. It is absolutely clear. It is there in the Bill. It is not left as us taking it as read that that is what it will do. It is written down. I humbly say to the Committee that it is not strictly necessary to be detailed on that.

Is it not open to the committee to consider evidence from relevant authorities?

Yes, as I said to my noble friend, there will be no restriction, no no-go areas for the climate change committee. The Bill makes that quite clear. But we need to consider the composition of the committee as a whole; let us not compartmentalise individuals. International relations are referred to in Clause 10—which says that the committee can look at anything that it wants—but that is not carried over to Schedule 1. We will look to see whether we can improve the wording of that between now and the next stage.

I am greatly encouraged by the Minister's response. It is very good to hear him say that there is not much difference between us. We are really encouraged that those points will be taken on board by the next stage. The debate has been important for recognising that domestic legislation has an international impact. We would like to see that explicit, not just implicit. We are greatly encouraged by the Minister's response and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 125 to 127 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 128:

I speak especially to Amendments Nos. 129 and 130. I absolutely agree with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach. How can we have this list here without the environment, however described, included? We are being completely consistent here. The Minister mentioned Clause 10, which has its own list. We tabled an amendment to Clause 10 to the effect that the committee had to consider the area of conservation of biodiversity, organisms, ecological systems, and so on. At that point, I remember that he admonished me, saying that it was already an obligation on all government departments and public bodies to consider that. If that is included in the list of attributes of the people on the committee, I am sure that it will help to ensure that any Secretary of State or future Minister is not subject to judicial review and will protect that area.

On transport, I have a background in the transport industry myself. I am very aware that it is easy to add more and more people to the list. That is a risk, and I shall be interested to hear the Minister's response. The UK's emissions are, very roughly, one-third from households, one-third from industry and one-third from transport. We also had a long discussion about aviation and shipping in their international as well as their national context. Although we might disagree about when the provision comes in and how it is counted, as I was reminded by the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, everyone was on board, including the Government, in making sure that it appeared at some point. It is therefore important that there is some expertise in that broad area of transport, whether passenger or freight, as well. The need to have that expertise on the committee as well deserves careful consideration.

I just add a very short contribution. Of the two amendments, Amendment No. 128 and Amendment No. 130, I greatly prefer Amendment No. 128, because it is a catch-all. I must agree that not having environmental science expertise is inconceivable, as I said in debate on an earlier amendment. At one stage, I wondered whether one should try to include expertise in land management on the committee. I recognise that that would sound too much like special pleading—as a land manager myself, I would have to declare all sorts of interests. I would be quite content, providing that there is expertise in environmental science, that that would include all such expertise and include under its umbrella land management.

This is an important area. We will come back in the adaptation measures to how we manage our carbon sinks and our forest cover in this country, let alone overseas, and how we manage our soils. Expertise in environmental science clearly needs a mention.

Perhaps I may make a slightly technical point as someone who might be described as an environmental scientist by profession. The difficulty with Amendment No. 128 is that for many professional scientists, climate science would be an example of environmental science. Therefore, there may be a taxonomy error in thinking of environmental science as a separate category. If one were going to add to the expertise in the spirit of the points made by others in this debate, I suggest that the term should be “ecology and conservation”, because those are the areas of expertise currently missing from the proposed committee.

Whatever may have been said about airlines and shipping in previous debates, nothing in the Bill as I understand it precludes people with experience of those trades being included in the committee we are considering. Such people would inevitably be included, and I want to hear what my noble friend says on that.

I apologise to the Committee for not having been present at the beginning of the debate on Amendment No. 123. I therefore do not know whether what I am about to say has already been covered, although from what I heard of that debate later it probably was not. I apologise also for not putting down a probing amendment on the subject that I am going to raise, and I hope that I am not covering old ground.

I am raising effectively the issue from that Sherlock Holmes episode, in the Silver Blaze case, of the dog that barked in the night. The significance of the dog was of course that it did not bark. The various listed paragraphs being debated, to which these amendments seek to add, cover different elements of experience, whether in industry, science or activity. They are comprehensive, and I have listened to the efforts to add to them.

Nearly 50 years ago, I was the first head-hunter in the United Kingdom, and in effect I can be held responsible, or guilty, for creating that profession in this land. When talking to our clients, one thing that preoccupied us from the beginning was the specifications that would underlie the purpose that the organisation sought to achieve by an appointment. The Minister may well tell me that it is not relevant to this list—although I would welcome knowing where else it might appear in the Bill, if it is not—but there is also the issue of being a change agent. Great organisations may require change from time to time: I cite as random examples the BBC or the National Health Service. On the whole, you would be making a mistake to embark on achieving those changes without having somebody who had previously been responsible for managing change involved in the process.

I realise the difference between the advisory role here and that of the Government, and it may well be that the Government feel that they have within their ranks that sort of person. I am not asking the Minister to repeat all that he said on the previous amendments about the rationale of the list. I also recognise that nothing prevents this particular quality from being added without it being mentioned in the Bill. However, does the Minister consider that experience, in human terms, to be desirable or even necessary? I would welcome knowing that. Secondly, how does the Minister think that it will work its way into the fabric of the process if we have nothing specific about it in the Bill?

I will take advice on the last point, but I fully accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke. It may be that change managers are involved in the practical effects of implementing advice from the Committee on Climate Change. I do not know that, but what I am about to say might satisfy the noble Lord. I want to make it clear that what is written in the Bill should, and must, be read in the broadest possible sense. We are not being prescriptive.

Amendment No. 128 proposes adding “environmental science”, but “climate science” is already included in the list of expertise. I am not certain whether environmental science would include climate science, and, on the point that the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, made, perhaps environmental science should have been there and not climate science, as it would have covered everything. In other words, the Bill is to be read in the broadest possible sense. That is not an excuse for not having an answer; that is just how the list has been put together. It looks at the make-up of the committee as a whole.

While I accept much of the argument that the Minister is making, we are talking about all-round action by government. Yet we are also talking about an independent body that has to have its own expertise to decide its policy. Within the debate on this part of the Bill, which is on the committee’s expertise, I do not see that the responsibilities of the Government and government departments are relevant here—although they might be embedded—because it is not up to people in those departments to influence the climate change committee. It is up to the committee itself to fulfil that function.

I am not saying that for one moment. It is not the job of the climate change committee to run the world. Nor, indeed, is it the Government’s. All I am trying to do is to put this into context. We are not starting with a clean sheet of paper. We are looking at the expertise and the role of the climate change committee. I am simply making the point that Amendment No. 130 seeks to embed in the Bill an effect on the devolved Administrations, but the climate change committee can advise on government policy and say, “By the way, we think things should change”. That is fine, but things are already going on now. It is not as though we are starting with a blank sheet of paper. We question whether these are issues which the committee would consider in a meaningful way in its advice on the overall level of the carbon budget, so we do not consider it necessary to have a member on the committee with expertise specifically in those areas. The committee as a whole can encompass that, but that is not to say that it is being ignored. That is the only point that I am making in respect of what is happening in government at present.

We do think that some of the issues will be more properly considered by the Government in the development and delivery of policies because the policies will be delivered by government and by business and not by the climate change committee. That leads into the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke. Change management means change in families as well as in businesses and government. Nevertheless, the climate change committee will have to take account of the changes in technology and advice and the practicalities of that advice, so it is a highly relevant question. I will probably get an answer to it at some point but I do not have one at the moment.

I thank the Minister for his response and noble Lords for their contributions. I hope that when I withdraw my amendment, the Minister will bear in mind the suggestion that the section on climate science could include the word “ecology” or something else that underlines the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Krebs. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 129 to 131 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 132:

The language used by the noble Lord is, if I may say so delicately, a little unreasonable. The Government have absolutely no intention whatever of stuffing this committee with anyone at all. I think he knows that.

It might be argued that the Government have no control over the committee—certainly not with the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments involved. Before I respond briefly, I should say that the point made is valid because, it may surprise Members to know, it is not normal practice to specify terms of appointment in a Bill. There is nothing in the Bill about the length of appointment. It is not there, and there is a reason for that, as I will explain.

A number of important issues need to be considered before the terms of appointment are agreed. Our current working assumption is that the first committee members should be appointed for a term of five years to marry with the carbon budget cycle. We are presently looking at how the appointments can be staggered to ensure that there is sufficient continuity between budget periods so that committee member appointments do not all end at the same time. Nor do we want the timing of members’ terms of office to affect the committee’s work on formulating advice on carbon budgets; that is another factor. Six years is a particularly long term for such an appointment. Public appointments are usually, although not exclusively, for three years. Whatever their duration may be, they are restricted to two terms in total, which cannot exceed 10 years. Much of this flowed from the work of the Nolan commission. This is another reason why we are still considering whether five years is appropriate.

I should also note that it is possible that the length of the carbon budgets may need to change at some point in the future. As I have said, it is important to build the flexibility to follow international practice into the working arrangements. There is therefore a risk to stipulating a precise term of appointment in the Bill. For instance, if the international community or the European Union were to switch to, say, an eight-year or four-year budget period, we would want to do this within our domestic system. Clause 18 allows us to alter the length of the budget period in these circumstances, so it is important that we retain the flexibility to alter the length of the committee members’ terms of appointment. This system is consistent with that of other committees, so there is nothing unusual about not having the length of appointment in the Bill. I hope that I have given enough of a flavour of our current thinking, which would of course be clear on the appointment of the members. The point about the appointments being staggered is obviously very important.

On that last point, the idea is that there is a continual rolling programme of appointments on to the committee. In other words, there are always a number of people on the committee who have been serving on it, new members come on to it and some go off it.

That would be the case, but I also mentioned the continuity of the budget period. I think I said that we do not want the timing of the members’ terms of office to affect the committee’s work on formulating advice on carbon budgets. There must be some marrying and a degree of flexibility. It must be transparent, and no one will serve for ever.

I thank the Minister for his remarks. I draw some comfort from the fact that the first members will be there for five years and that there will be some sort of staggering process. That will produce some continuity. The Minister went on to refer to Nolan and three years. Three years is too short because of the very nature of what we are trying to achieve with the committee, but no doubt he will take all that into consideration. I like the idea of having two terms. That will be very valuable, as will what the Minister said about the flexibility of appointing them. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 133:

With respect, Amendment No. 134 is quite absurd. It would cover any criminal offence. I think that the noble Lord is thinking of any criminal offence which is imprisonable, but that is caught by the provisions we are considering at the moment. I hope that we will not waste our time in considering these amendments.

First, I hope that the Committee will join me in sending our good wishes to my noble friend the Duke of Montrose and wish him a speedy recovery. We look forward to having him back on the Front Bench. Secondly, I have to say to my noble friend that, rather like the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, I could not support Amendment No. 134. If someone has had a criminal record and has served his time, that is it and life should go on as normal.

I must apologise, through the Committee, to my noble friend Lord Cathcart if he gave the reason for the word “reasonable” in Amendment No. 135. In terms of reading it as a text, I did not immediately understand what it meant and I wondered whether it was a misprint for the word “respective”, “relevant” or something similar. It may be a term of art and in that respect I have missed it.

I am not seeking to enter on theological issues, particularly in the presence of the two right reverend Prelates, but I must confess that I have long thought that the definition in Blackstone’s Law Dictionary of an act of God as being,

“an act which no reasonable man would expect God to commit”,

extremely neat.

I am delighted to respond to this short debate and to give the noble Earl, Lord Cathcart, some reassurances. However, before I do that, I should also say how delighted I am that the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, has been on his feet and has had his dictionary out. Last Wednesday, the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, asked me about the definition of the word “expedient” and I responded by choosing the third of his three options. I have never been good at multiple choice. Therefore, at the time I qualified that by saying I would take advice, have a little read of the debate and would come back to him if there was a problem.

I am using this opportunity to clarify that, in Clause 19, the definition of the word “expedient” we are opting for is:

“Conducive to advantage in general, or to a definite purpose; fit, proper or suitable to the purposes of the case”,

which I believe was option 2. I hope that the Committee will understand my desire to clarify that point now. Rather than writing to everyone, I thought that this would be more helpful, especially as we have had a mention of dictionaries again.

In resisting the amendments proposed by the noble Earl, Lord Cathcart, I hope that I can offer him the clarification he is looking for and pick up on a couple of other points that were made in the debate. As we have heard, paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 sets out the circumstances in which the national authorities may remove a member from the Committee on Climate Change. I should like to point out that this is a power which we would expect to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances, but it is important to make sure that the Committee on Climate Change is able to carry out its functions properly.

Amendment No. 133 adds little to sub-paragraph (a). I cannot see how “6 months” could be interpreted as anything other than a consecutive period. In the absence of any other definition, “6 months” should be interpreted through its natural and ordinary meaning, unless defined otherwise. Members of the Committee will be aware that it is not defined otherwise, so I resist Amendment No. 133.

Amendment No. 134 proposes an addition to the list of circumstances in paragraph 5. This amendment also would add little, because consideration of a relevant criminal offence—I emphasise the word “relevant”—already would be covered by the existing wording in paragraph 5(d); that is, the use of the phrase “unable or unfit”. We are emphasising there the use of the word “relevant” criminal offfence. Paragraph 5(d) states that members may be removed if, in the opinion of the national authorities, they are otherwise unable or unfit to carry out their duties. We believe that this wording already covers the situations outlined by the noble Earl, Lord Cathcart, but it picks up on the sensitivities highlighted by my noble friends with regard to time served and so on.

I shall also resist Amendment No. 135, which proposes that when forming an opinion that a member is unfit or unable to carry out his or her duties under paragraph 5(d), the national authorities must reach an opinion which is “reasonable”. This kind of discussion comes up quite often in your Lordships’ House. This amendment is unnecessary. It is a well established principle of public law that national authorities have a clear duty to act reasonably and, in this case, to form a reasonable opinion. It is therefore already implicit in this clause.

Amendment No. 136 relates to specific circumstances in which national authorities may remove a member and proposes to define the meaning of the words “unable” and “unfit” in the context of mental and physical obstruction. That is clearly an important clause which allows for a member to be removed in a number of very limited circumstances. It is important that we do not restrict these circumstances too much. This is a very standard clause. As I have already said, it is important for the proper functioning of the committee that any member who cannot fulfil his duties for whatever reason can be removed. But it will be exercised only where there is an inability to carry out the job. It is not a power to sack members on a whim. As we have already heard, it has to be used reasonably.

The words “unable” or “unfit” may cover certain circumstances which inhibit the member’s performance, such as serious health issues. However, it could mean others; for example, a conflict of interest that the member did not have when he was originally appointed. There may be other unforeseen circumstances. I therefore propose that this amendment should be withdrawn. I hope that I have given the Committee the reassurances that it seeks. These provisions must be used reasonably. These standard clauses are designed to ensure that the committee can function properly.

The Minister was good enough to clarify an opinion she gave at an earlier stage. Let me do the same for my noble friend Lord Cathcart. I totally misread his amendment.

I thank my noble friend Lord Brooke for that. I thank the Minister for clarifying and putting it on record that the six months referred to in sub-paragraph (a) are consecutive and that being convicted of a criminal offence is included in sub-paragraph (d). I also thank her for her clarification on what is meant by “unable” and “unfit”. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 134 to 136 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 137:

I am afraid that I cannot support this amendment although I see my noble friends have put their name to it. It is essential that the constituent parts of the United Kingdom should be happy with the chief executive of the committee. It seems to me very unlikely that there would be political wrangling about this. We are talking about a committee of experts. The time to resolve any problems is before the appointment. It will be difficult enough for the committee to think through its recommendations in such a way as to maximise the possibility that the different parts of the United Kingdom can happily carry them out. Some of these things will be very difficult politically for the different parts of the United Kingdom to implement. Some will be more difficult in one part, some in another. But it is absolutely essential that there should be contentment at the start with the person who is appointed as chief executive.

I think that this amendment is a great mistake and I hope my noble friends will not pursue it after this discussion. I do not know what the Minister is going to say but presumably, as the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, has said, the various parts of the United Kingdom have agreed to this and feel it to be wise. It is a case not of politicising the appointment but of depoliticising it by getting rid of any problems before the appointment is made. I cannot support the amendment.

I can see the political and diplomatic argument which underlies the wording which the Government have put into the Bill so far but I can also see that it effectively gives the national authorities a right of veto in terms of particular candidates. I acknowledge the Minister’s testimony in speeches on previous amendments to the Government’s success in reaching agreement with the various national authorities in putting together teams on issues such as this, but I would be interested in hearing how the Minister thinks approval of particular candidates will be secured under the present wording.

In the original draft Bill, the provision was for the Secretary of State to appoint the first chief executive. We discussed this in the Joint Committee. The argument is fairly concisely set out in paragraph 156. We recommended that that role of the Secretary of State should be removed from the Bill. I was therefore very pleased with the Government’s response on page 56 to our committee. They say:

“On reflection, we agree with the Joint Committee”.

It did not go on to state then that the appointment was to be subject to the approval of the national authorities. One of the key arguments deployed in the Joint Committee was that people on a committee should choose the chief executive. That carried the weight at the end of the day. To curtail that power of members of the committee would, to my mind, be very wrong.

We on these Benches support this amendment. As we have been saying, the committee should be genuinely independent. This process of approval by the national authorities of the chief executive diminishes its independence. Our motivation for having an independent committee is twofold. Not only does it ensure that the committee can make its decisions without regard to political expediency—and I use the word “expediency” again—but it is essential that the committee does not even appear to be making decisions that could be interpreted as political manoeuvres. The second reason alone should be enough to remove the provision for national authority approval. It should not appear that this choice was made in such a way that it would be politically palatable. The choice should be made resoundingly on the merits of the person for the job.

I do not think that we need to make a meal of this because it is not a unique arrangement; it happens with other bodies. My killer line is the fact that the chief executive of the climate change committee will be the committee’s accounting officer. Bearing in mind that the committee is a UK body but comes with the other bodies, leaving aside the appointment of the chair and the actual members, the other Administrations can take comfort in the accounting officer function anyway and the ability of a person to lead the organisation. There is nothing unusual about this. I have a couple of examples, but I think that they are both unsatisfactory because to the best of my knowledge neither is a UK body. That presents me with a bit of a problem.

I was thinking about the noble Lord, Lord Krebs. I cannot remember the details because it is so long ago, but I have a feeling that the same may have applied to the chief executive of the Food Standards Agency. It is a UK body but all the appointments are made in conjunction with the devolved Administrations. I am going to rest my case not on that, but on the fact that the chief executive will carry the accounting officer function for the climate change committee. It is not a veto and no politics are involved here. The climate change committee will make the appointment and simply get approval. It is not a question of the members working from a list of people who have been vetted by the authorities beforehand. It will not be like that at all because this is a normal process with other bodies. I am only sad that I do not have a list to present to Members of the Committee.

Could the Minister expand on that a little? What will happen if the committee recommends a certain person but the national authorities say no?

To be honest, I do not think that it would get that far. The committee will put together a shortlist, and presumably with the aid of search agents there would be a long-list as well. The committee would talk about the shortlist with the other bodies. To have someone on the shortlist who is not fit for purpose according to the other authorities would not make a lot of sense. It would probably be done at that point, and therefore the committee would choose from a perfectly acceptable shortlist. That is the practical way of doing it, but if I am wrong I will come back to the Committee.

I should like to give the Minister an example because he said that this committee is unique and would be difficult to replicate. The Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir David King, has pushed and won the argument in Government circles on the case for more nuclear power stations for climate change reasons. Of course, we on these Benches are not great advocates of nuclear power. If Sir David or someone of his standing was put forward, would that be acceptable to the Scottish Executive, which has just come out with a non-nuclear policy? I put that hypothetical example to the Minister because he said that that would not be the case. If the purpose of an amendment is to look at a case which could arise, in the example I have suggested, could the Scottish Executive have a veto on Sir David’s appointment?

With respect, we debated that an hour ago. We are now talking about the chief executive rather than the chairman or members of the committee. The chief executive will implement and run the organisation. The argument about what the candidates believe in and what their views are is irrelevant. The person will be appointed for managerial expertise and other factors. I do not know whether the noble Lord was in his place at the time, but I answered the questions put to me by the noble Earl, Lord Caithness. At that point I used the example because it was in my original speech.

As I have said, one of the reasons that the climate change committee is advisory is that as of last week, the Government have made their views clear on the issue of nuclear energy. It would not be a relevant factor in the process because policy decisions are made by the Government. The climate change committee is an advisory body. So that would not be fair in terms of the question asked by the noble Earl, but here we are discussing the appointment of the chief executive—the professional manager and administrator of the organisation. What the chief executive’s views are on particular policy issues are not, I think, the most relevant points for the national authorities to consider. They will be looking for competence, sound financial management, human resources skills and other professional factors required in the management of an organisation.

I will not take this any further, although I was under the impression that the chief executive would have to have a certain degree of expertise in order to run members of staff who will be writing the committee’s reports. However, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 138 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 139:

I briefly intervene only to follow up on a statement which I think my noble friend made at Second Reading when, on behalf of UNISON, which has taken a particular interest in the Bill, I suggested that there may be a role for trade unions in sub-committee work for the main committee. UNISON had in mind the provision in paragraph 1(3)(b) of Schedule 1, which refers to,

“climate change policy, and in particular the social impacts of such policy”.

They clearly would have to be evaluated. Can my noble friend further clarify to what extent trade unions might have a role if they were to be represented on a sub-committee with responsibilities under one of the headings dealing with social impacts? Of course, union members would be affected in a major way.

It is our view that the climate change committee will intelligently make decisions on how it goes about its business, so we do not see why we should stipulate which functions it can and cannot delegate. It will be appropriate for the committee to delegate functions to a sub-committee, member or employee, when it undertakes a special task or to facilitate the organisation’s governance arrangements. An example would be an audit committee arrangement. That is a perfectly standard model for non-departmental public bodies and there is nothing new about it.

It would be surprising if the committee were to delegate a principal function or a sensitive issue and we think that that is most unlikely to happen. The committee as a whole is responsible for how it discharges its functions. If, for example, it decided to delegate a core function set out in Parts 1 or 2, such as its annual report on progress, to a junior member of staff or a single member, it would risk the report not being very good. This relates to the nature of the committee. We have to believe that we will appoint quality people who run a quality organisation.

On the point made by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, it should be perfectly possible for the committee to have a sub-committee that deals with the interests he mentioned and to take advice on them in the way he elucidated. As I said at Second Reading, all that will be within the ambit of the climate change committee. However, I do not think that we should set down rigid rules for how it operates and manages its governance procedures. Again, there is nothing new about this. It is perfectly normal for a non-departmental public body to operate in this way.

I thank the Minister for that response. I emphasise that I was not suggesting for a moment that sub-committees were almost de rigueur. It is necessary and highly specialised work that they will be undertaking. My concern was that it should not use the structure of sub-committees to bypass its fundamental responsibility for the work of its sub-committees. Indeed, material presented to the Secretary of State or Parliament should come with the full authority of the Committee on Climate Change. Nothing specifically suggests that in this wording, so I would be grateful if the Minister could take note of what has been said in this brief debate. I hope there might be a form of words that could make that element clear so that we can be reassured on this matter.

I cannot make specific commitments, but I am happy to have this form of wording looked at.

In which case, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 140:

I intervene briefly to ask my noble friend to reconsider some words he used in response to a previous amendment. I think I heard the noble Lord correctly when he talked about the ability of members of the committee to relate to a parliamentary committee, in the sense of being able to put their case competently. I am a little worried about that idea being in the minds of those carrying out these appointments. In my lifetime I have found some of the most effective people to be the most inarticulate. Very often they find it hard to string two words together, yet they were brilliant. I would not like us to exclude from membership of the committee people who may well be scientifically superbly confident, but not particularly articulate. Competence is more important than presentation. I use this amendment to raise this for fear that wrapped up in this whole issue of effective public participation is the idea that only the articulate may be able to present a case on behalf of the committee. It might well be that the role of people who work within the Executive might be the means by which a lot of information from this committee is communicated to the wider public.

This amendment raises an important point. The effectiveness of the climate change committee will depend not only on its authority and expertise, about which we have heard very much, but on public confidence and trust in the committee, particularly the link between the advice provided by the independent committee and the action the Government take upon that advice. Openness and public engagement will be essential in building and maintaining that trust. However that is achieved by the committee, it is important that it makes its workings completely transparent. My own suggestion, based on my experience as chairman of the Food Standards Agency, would be for the committee to hold its meetings in public so that public engagement could be direct, with the public not only observing the deliberations and recommendations of the committee, but perhaps being able to ask questions at the end of, or during, committee meetings. This amendment raises a very important point about transparency and trust.

The noble Lord, Lord Krebs, is absolutely right in saying that this debate focuses on the very important question of the need for the committee to develop public confidence and trust. The example of the Food Standards Agency is a good one. The work that the agency has done in developing public engagement could provide some very interesting lessons for the secretariat.

We have also been engaged in very important debates about the independence of the Committee on Climate Change; with that in mind, I will make a few points. I stress that we want to consider Amendment No. 140, which calls for the committee to ensure effective public participation in exercising its functions. I agree that the committee is likely to benefit, as noble Lords have stressed, from engaging with the public, including those in business, industry and academia. I am confident that the committee will follow best practice in its dealings with these sections of society. It should be for the committee to decide when it might be appropriate to engage with the public. This is true for any independent organisation. However, as I have just said, I see the merits of the suggested amendment and agree that the committee should take reasonable steps to engage the public effectively. Therefore, we will consider this amendment further and bring forward some new thinking at the next stage.

Before I move on to the next amendment, I would pick up the point made by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours. I have some experience of working with the scientific community. I understand the anxiety over the trend to suggest that communication is somehow more important than expertise. It is absolutely right that a balance should be struck between all the necessary skills that my noble friend Lord Rooker has discussed in some detail with the House of Lords Committee. There should be a real balance between expertise and the need for executive skills, as the noble Lord suggested, to ensure that the work of the committee is communicated effectively. We are not unaware that scientific expertise does not necessarily embody communication skills, so a balance is required. Whether we are talking about triangular or quadrilateral relationships or a pyramid, emphasis has been placed today very much on the independence of the Committee on Climate Change. Therefore, it would be wrong to be prescriptive about how public engagement should be undertaken and the skills necessary to achieve that.

Amendment No. 141 would introduce a new clause which would give the committee a duty to make timely recommendations to the Secretary of State in relation to Part 1, and require it to consult the public on what recommendations should be made. This amendment seems to repeat a lot of the issues we have already discussed and I am therefore not sure what it would add. As we have just discussed in relation to Amendment No. 140, the Committee on Climate Change should engage the public in its work. In our discussions before Christmas the Government agreed to consider further the transparency of the work of the Committee on Climate Change, which is also covered by this amendment. The proposed new Subsection (1) of Amendment No. 141 would place a new duty on the Committee on Climate Change to make timely recommendations. However, noble Lords are probably well aware that Clause 30, which we shall come to shortly, already places a duty on the committee to provide advice, analysis, information or other assistance when requested by a national authority in connection with the authority’s functions under the Act or climate change generally.

Therefore, with the reassurances that I have given as regards looking further into public engagement and transparency, which we have already committed to look at, and taking into account the comments made by my noble friend and the importance that your Lordships' House’s Committee attaches to public engagement, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, will consider withdrawing the amendment.

Is the noble Baroness saying that the Government are not necessarily averse to having something in the spirit of Amendment No. 140 in the Bill? I rather hope that she is saying that. I suggest that the Government think fairly hard about the rather new situation we are in now where public consultation and relations with different parts of the United Kingdom sometimes involve people in different parts of the country holding different opinions, and the fact that some of these issues will become somewhat politicised. This is new. Living, as I do, north of the border, I see this possibility increasing. I am sorry about it but I think that it is increasing. If the Government are thinking of designing an amendment, they should remember that there may be problems when the committee engages in public consultation or information dissemination. I am sorry if I go on about this but I feel that the Government must pay attention to this increasing trend.

I thank the noble Baroness for that intervention and for giving me the opportunity to stress that we need to be clear about the kind of public engagement that we are talking about, and as regards whether we are talking about public engagement undertaken by the Committee on Climate Change or government consultation on new policies in the light of that committee’s advice. That is why we are taking this away to think about it. We do not want to muddle the various roles. The noble Baroness is absolutely right to draw attention to the need for clarity, particularly with the devolved Administrations.

I thank the noble Baroness for her response. This has been a useful debate on an important area of the committee’s activity. Therefore, I was very pleased to hear that it may well be possible to incorporate elements of Amendment No. 140 at some stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 140A:

I was intrigued by my noble friend’s amendment but surely it ought to include Members of the Welsh Assembly, the Northern Ireland Assembly and this Parliament.

I find this amendment rather curious. The noble Earl, Lord Cathcart, keeps drawing the long straw in moving all the amendments to which I object while his noble friend Lord Taylor of Holbeach moves the amendments that I support. I do not understand what is going on. However, if the expertise is there, we should not presume that politicians are not capable of taking off their political hats when they walk into a room. Some people are perfectly capable of doing that. If we get into the business of ruling out individual national Parliaments or Assemblies, what happens if someone in the House of Lords turns out to be precisely the person who we need to be on the committee? We will go down a very dangerous route if we start accepting amendments of this nature. I beg the forgiveness of the noble Earl, Lord Cathcart, but I have to oppose vigorously this amendment—not that I would want to be a member of the committee; no one would vote me on to it with my modest skills.

We are at an interesting point in Committee. I am afraid that I have to inform my noble friend that the Bill is designed to ensure that Members of the House of Commons, Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly and Northern Ireland Assembly are not allowed to be members of the Committee on Climate Change. Therefore, this probing amendment is very helpful because it gives me the opportunity to clarify that point.

What about a Cross-Bencher in the House of Lords?

Even though we in this House are somewhat independent of our political masters, if it is deemed inappropriate that Members should have a political affiliation, how far down the democratic chain is it proposed to take that because regional authorities still exist? There are county councils, unitary authorities, district councils and parish councils. Are we going all the way down that chain as well or are we making a distinction and having a form of segregation, which is not very PC but which I have to agree is probably sensible?

We are not going all the way down the chain. It is set out in the Bill. We are making use of the House of Commons Disqualification Act, which does not apply to the House of Lords. This means that Members of the House of Lords would be able to become members of the Committee on Climate Change. Paragraph 28 of Schedule 1 to the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 applies in this case and therefore does not disqualify Members of the House of Lords. Members of the House of Lords are therefore eligible to apply to become members of the Committee on Climate Change. However, all applicants to the committee will have to declare whether they have any political affiliation or are members of stakeholder groups. As we have already debated today and on previous Committee days, we see independence as being crucial. It is vital that the appointments process takes that into account. The way that the various devolution settlements work means that the disqualification aspects for the devolved legislatures come into play. To ensure that the committee is fully independent, MPs and Members of the devolved legislatures will not be eligible to be appointed as members of the Committee on Climate Change.

Paragraphs 28 and 29 of Schedule 1 make the necessary provisions to disqualify Members of the House of Commons, even though I agree with my noble friend that Members are capable of putting political allegiances aside. We are talking not just about the actuality of what is done but about the perception as well. Therefore, paragraphs 28 and 29 of Schedule 1 also apply to Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

The amendment tabled by the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose—I am very sorry to see he is not well and we look forward to seeing him back here when he is fully recovered—seeks to ensure that Members of the Scottish Parliament are also disqualified from becoming members of the Committee on Climate Change. I can confirm that Members of the Scottish Parliament will be disqualified from appointment to the committee. There is an established procedure for ensuring such disqualification. It is to be effected by means of an order under the Scotland Act 1998 and does not require to be stated in the Bill.

For completeness, I should also confirm—which I may have already done—that Members of the National Assembly for Wales will also be disqualified from becoming members of the Committee on Climate Change. That disqualification will be given effect by making an amendment order to the National Assembly for Wales (Disqualification) Order 2006. The amendment is therefore unnecessary. With the assurance that action is being taken, I hope that the noble Earl will withdraw the amendment.

I think I heard my noble friend say that, while Members of the House of Lords could be members of the committee, they would have to drop their political affiliation. They would not be able to remain members of a political party. Is that what my noble friend said?

I said that they would have to declare it.

I am very pleased that the probing was to such good effect. I did have doubts when the debate started, but I thank the Minister for her explanation and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

[Amendment No. 141 not moved.]

Clause 27 [Advice in connection with carbon budgets]:

[Amendment No. 142 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 143:

The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, will no doubt remember that we considered that point in the Joint Committee. I was just reminding myself of the evidence we received at the time from Mr Jonathan Brearely of Defra, who suggested that,

“the Committee needed to ‘make recommendations to the Government that are sensible and cost-effective’. This in itself would require a thorough examination of a policy mix. Nor can the Committee make sectoral recommendations, or carry out modelling work, without also evaluating the policies necessary to achieve the carbon reductions. It will need to analyse the effectiveness of existing policy and potential policy instruments and ways these might be improved”.

The committee went on to comment in paragraph 144 on page 48 of the report:

“There is no question that this sort of work will lead the Committee into areas which are more political than the current framework for the Bill provides for. When we put the prospect of the Committee having a policy role in this way to Jonathan Brearely, he replied: ‘I think the Committee on Climate Change are going to have to take into account existing policy, and what they are going to have to ask themselves is how much we think the existing policy is going to deliver’. Greater clarity in the statutory duty of the Committee on Climate Change would assist both the Government and the Committee itself. It is essential for the legislation to give the Committee a wider policy evaluation role, and therefore we recommend that the draft Bill include a power for the Committee to carry out an evaluation of current and potential policy when advising the Secretary of State”.

In a sense, the amendments—although they are specific and address particular areas—attempt to take us down this road. In light of the clarity of the Joint Committee’s recommendation on this point, this is perhaps an opportunity for the Minister to respond and to make clear how the Government react to that recommendation. I am not clear whether they have included anything in the Bill that covers that point. I, for one, would be grateful to know the Government’s attitude.

First, on Amendment No. 143, it is important in the process of consultation and advice on the carbon budgets not to lose sight of the overall goal of the budgets and of the Bill on meeting the ultimate targets. That the advice on the budgets should include some indication of whether the budgets will meet targets might be implied in the Bill. However, we support the amendment to give the Bill greater clarity on this point.

We also support Amendment No. 145. In our conception, the committee should not just set the budget and then watch from afar, perhaps altering the next budget to be in line with the success or failure of the Government’s policies; it should also give advice on the effectiveness of the Government’s actions. Once again, although this is perhaps implied in the Bill’s provisions on the committee’s role, we welcome the more explicit language.

I support the amendment. My point has been perfectly well put by the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, but I will go even further. The entire thrust of the Joint Committee’s recommendations was to ensure that the Government had at their elbow a committee that was sufficiently respected and sufficiently empowered to recommend things that may well not be electorally popular. It was a constant refrain in our committee’s discussions that it was important that the Government had support for, and sometimes could even hide behind, unpopular recommendations from the climate change committee. As I have listened to the progress of this Committee stage, I have genuinely come to believe that the Government may well be climbing on to the horns of a dilemma.

The noble Lord, Lord Taylor, has been extremely reasonable in consistently attempting to enhance the powers in respect of the committee’s responsibilities. I increasingly sense that the Government are resisting that, as they are entitled to. If that is the case, one would have to look again at what goes into the Bill. If we cannot rely on the credibility and authority of the Committee on Climate Change, we have to rely on the legislation. I suspect that on Report the Government may well come to regret that they did not enhance the powers of the Committee on Climate Change and will instead be required to take on board amendments that they are currently resisting.

First, I apologise to noble Lords for not being here earlier. I really wanted to be here but I was on a Select Committee that went on for a long time.

I support the principle behind what my noble friend Lord Crickhowell and the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said. If we lay a statutory duty on the Secretary of State in the long distant future, Governments will be tempted in the near future to say, “Oh well, actually we do not have to do this. Someone else can do it later and they can catch up”. This provision would help to stop backsliding. People are always tempted to backslide; it is the most comfortable thing to do as opposed to taking difficult decisions. This process will take a lot of difficult decisions. A duty is being laid on a Government in the quite distant future to do something, and this provision will help intermediate Governments to continue the process towards fulfilment.

I say at the outset that I am more than happy—as I have said on previous clauses and this is no different—to go back and look at the way in which the reporting mechanism is set out in the Bill. I cannot accept particular amendments, but we want to get this as clear and precise as possible. We are happy to look at aspects of the amendments, particularly regarding the way in which the reporting mechanism works.

Clause 27 in some ways gets to why we are setting up the Committee on Climate Change in the first place. We are asking the committee to provide the Government with independent advice on the level of the carbon budget to strengthen transparency and accountability on how to reduce emissions in the UK. The committee’s advice on the level of the carbon budget will be a key element in assisting the Secretary of State in making decisions on the level of each carbon budget. The committee will have to give advice that is fit for purpose to the Government, so the committee will have to make an assessment on the best trajectory to meet the 2020 and 2050 targets and give advice on budget levels that are consistent with that trajectory.

However, Amendment No. 143 would require the committee to advise on whether the 2050 target will be met through a budget. As we discussed earlier in relation to Amendment No. 43 to Clause 8, the decision on the level of every carbon budget must be made with a view to meeting the targets in the Bill. So there is already a statutory requirement on the Government to set budgets in such a way that it leads to the long-term targets being met. But as I have said before, it is not possible for a single budget to deliver the target. We are not talking just about the budgets for 2018-22 or for 2048-52 but about all of the budgets in between as well. Therefore, Amendment No. 143 does not enhance the framework set out in the Bill.

Amendment No. 145 would seem to ask the committee not only to provide its advice on budgets but to assess whether the Government were on track to meet them. Amendment No. 151 proposes an identical requirement through the committee’s annual progress report. We are not clear why the committee is being required to provide the assessment twice, possibly within six months. In terms of the committee’s advice under Clause 27, we see this as a focused task—the committee will be required to look across the economy in providing its advice on the level of carbon budgets. This will not be a simple matter, and we therefore think that under Clause 27 the committee should focus on advising on the most appropriate level of carbon budgets needed to achieve the long-term goals.

Amendment No. 151 relates to the committee’s annual reporting function under Clause 28. We agree that, when carrying out this role, we should ensure that the committee has sufficient discretion to report on matters that it considers appropriately within its remit. We should not underestimate the strength of the existing reporting provisions in the Bill. The committee’s annual report to Parliament under Clause 28 is required to set out the committee’s views on the progress made towards meeting both the carbon budgets and the 2050 target. In writing its annual report, the committee will inevitably take the Government’s report under Clause 11 into account and form its own view on the proposals and policies that it contains. If the committee’s annual report to Parliament says that the UK is currently off-track, we would expect that the Government of the day would be under huge parliamentary and public pressure to say what they are going to do to get the UK back on track.

We will also discuss the committee’s report under Clause 28 in greater detail under another group of amendments that we will come to shortly. As I indicated earlier, we are willing to look at ways of strengthening the reporting requirements in the Bill. We will consider the best way to do this before Report, taking account of the debate that we have just had on this group, including Amendment No. 151, and the debates to come. I hope that, with that assurance, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

I thank the Minister for that response, which I think was fairly positive. I know that we have had this debate about final targets and meeting each one, but, as I said, Clause 1 makes absolutely clear what we are talking about. What we on these Benches are looking for at a strategic level is a duty and a responsibility—which is in this general section of the Bill—on the climate change committee to assess policy in relation to outcome and targets. I understand and welcome what the Minister said and I think that this is a move in the right direction.

Before the noble Lord withdraws the amendment, I would like to put another couple of points on the record in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell. I regret that I did not make them earlier but I can do so now. I am sorry that I did not complete the answer but I made a note.

The noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, specifically asked about the committee’s role on policies. Although I alluded to that in what I just said, I have a specific note which may be useful in our deliberations. Our view is that the committee should look at progress overall in reducing emissions. As part of that, it will need to look at emission trends—whether they are going up or going down. However, we do not expect the committee to recommend future policies. The committee might say that more needs to be done, but it will be for the Government and the other authorities to decide how to fulfil it. This comes back to the issue which others have raised about nuclear energy: it is for the Government to decide how to get back on track. As I said, however, we are willing to look at Clause 28 to see how this can be achieved.

There is a role for the committee on policies, but its role would not be to recommend future policies. The committee has to have a role in the assessment of the overall effect of reducing emissions and the effect of policies, but we do not see that its role would be to recommend future policies. It will be for the Government to come up with policies to give practical effect to advice from the Committee on Climate Change.

The Minister reflects my own views entirely in that area. I particularly welcome his last comment about the committee’s duties. We certainly do not want to let this issue slide and we will come back to it at Report. But, given those positive remarks, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 144 and 145 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 146:

I have an excellent two-page speaking note on this narrow amendment and a one-page question and answer sheet. I am going to ask and then answer the question as I think that it goes to the heart of what the noble Lord has just said. The question is: will the Committee advise on how much different sectors of the economy should do? The answer is: the committee will advise on the correct distribution of effort across time of the carbon budgets to meet the 2050 targets, and between the sectors of the economy covered by trading schemes, taken together, and other sectors, taken together. The committee’s assessment of effort across the economy will focus on the balance of effort between sectors of the economy in trading schemes and other sectors. It will also advise on the spread of effort between reductions in UK emissions and reductions in overseas emissions.

The committee will be expected to assess where carbon savings might be made to keep emissions within budget and on course to reach the legislated targets. However, this will not be tantamount to suggesting specific carbon budgets for specific sectors. There is likely to be a great deal of flexibility about where cost-effective abatement may occur. It is up to the Government to take on board the committee’s advice and ultimately to develop policies to achieve savings in particular sectors. Making significant carbon reductions is a process which, while cost-beneficial in the long term, will require some tough political choices, as I think everyone understands. The committee’s role is to shine an independent light on the analysis informing these choices.

I think that that is a much better answer to the noble Lord. He asked a specific question, and that is more precise than my actual note.

That is a very interesting and informative response. In order to give its advice on the trading sectors as a whole, as opposed to the non-trading sectors, the committee and its back-room staff would have to form a view about the way in which the overall trading sectors broke down. Surely the credibility of the advice it gave would depend on the support it gave by indicating the kind of areas that it would expect to come about over the next five to fifteen years. I understand entirely the slight dilemma that that would create for a Government faced by the breakdown provided by the climate change committee. After all, the breakdown is only advice and indicative and the Government might not pursue it exactly in its policies.

It is likely that the climate change committee’s overall budget projections would lack credibility in the eyes of both the public and the relevant key sectors if this were all subsumed under two very broad figures. I wonder if the Government have set their mind against this or whether it is something that the climate change committee may eventually be able to reflect on and discuss with them.

I say to my noble friend that the committee’s advice on the budget will be based on, for example, a certain level of emissions savings coming from the traded sector, for which an absolute emissions cap can be set, and a certain level of emissions savings from the non-traded sector. I hope that I again made the distinction in my initial remarks between the committee’s role in providing overall analysis and the Government’s role in deciding on the precise policy mix to take advantage of the potential to reduce emissions. It must be for the Government to make the decision on the right mix of policies for setting caps for emissions trading schemes and for other policy measures as well. We do not want the committee to duplicate effort or to go into the detail of what the Government’s policy should be on individual issues, such as whether a policy on renewable heat needs to be different, as that would dilute the committee’s core function, on which we want it to concentrate, which is to advise on the level of the carbon budget as a whole.

We are back into an area where there seems to be a dichotomy of view between the opposition Benches and the Government. I see the whole project of trying to reduce carbon emissions as trying to build a house with rather rough stones of different sizes. We are not talking about wire-cut bricks, but dealing with situations in which there will be certain areas of the economy—certain sectors—where progress can be made quite quickly and things will move fast, and other areas where things will be more stubborn. There will be no one-size-fits-all solution. If the Committee on Climate Change is to have any credibility, it must have a sectoral approach built into its whole thinking process and into its dialogue with the Secretary of State, the wider public and Parliament. It will need to have a position on these matters. I do not see that as duplication. I see the climate change committee as the place from which all this originates. However, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 147 and 148 not moved.]

Clause 27 agreed to.

Clause 28 [Reports on progress]:

[Amendments Nos. 149 to 151 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 152:

Part of this is clearly in line with the previous group of amendments which we tabled. I again make the point that what still worries me is that it moves the clause into recommendations on government policy. One of the key characteristics of climate change policy is that there is no one policy mix, no one route to get to where you want to be. The balance between different energies, between energy production and energy saving, between technological standards and all these other areas of a very complex policy mix leads as near as possible to an infinite range of possibilities. We on these Benches find it difficult to understand how the climate change committee could then say, “This is the way you must move forward from here”.

We back the amendment on the basis of the Government’s justifying a gap between aspiration and actual performance. However, on policy, we find it difficult to understand how the climate change committee could come down to particular recommendations on how to move forward.

This group of four amendments would substantially rewrite part of Clause 28. To get the good news out of the way first, Amendments Nos. 153 and 155 will certainly be taken away to be looked at again. We cannot accept the other two for reasons which I have given before, because they go into policy recommendation.

As I said, we are keen to ensure that the overall framework of the Bill is transparent, and the system of annual accountability through the committee’s progress report to Parliament and the Government’s response is an important part of that. The provisions in Clauses 28 and 29 will help to ensure that there is a well-informed public and parliamentary debate on our progress towards the 2050 target. Before Christmas, during other stages, I made it clear that we did not support annual targets but were willing to look again at how the annual reporting provisions in the clause could be strengthened. We will therefore look at the two amendments in the same way. We will also look at Amendment No. 151, which was just discussed. I am happy to give detailed reasons for that if required.

We oppose Amendment No. 156 because it has a policy recommendation aspect. That is consistent with what we have been saying. Anything else I have to say would duplicate what I said previously. It is two you win and two you lose on this one, I am afraid.

It is a draw.

Win two, lose two: it is better than nothing. I am sorry that the Minister is unable to take away Amendment No. 156, but that is consistent with what he has said in the past. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 153 to 157 not moved.]

This may be an appropriate moment to break. I suggest that the Committee stage begin again not before 8.30 pm. I beg to move that the House do now resume.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House resumed.