asked Her Majesty’s Government:
Whether the third United Nations Security Council resolution on Iran has been effective in ensuring compliance in respect of its uranium enrichment programme.
My Lords, I apologise for the difficulty in finding my Answer. I will have to make it up. Confronted with a missing Answer I have no choice but to say that we are confident that when there is an opportunity to review sanctions, the UN Security Council will, if necessary, strengthen them with regard to Iran’s nuclear programme.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his Answer. Let us hope that he is right. I hope that he does not look at his papers and find the opposite in a few moments’ time, but then it will be too late. Meanwhile, I am sure that my noble friend will agree that there is deep concern that Iran continues openly to defy the will of the international community. Indeed, earlier this month it announced the installation of 6,000 new centrifuges at its nuclear plant in Natanz, which doubled its previous capacity and ensured that it comes ever closer to possessing nuclear weapons. Given that, does my noble friend—whether he has his notes or not—share my great alarm, especially at the Iranian president's continuing anti-Semitic attacks on Israel, calling it “filthy bacteria” and questioning its right to exist? What specific measures will Her Majesty's Government now propose to the Security Council to increase the weight of sanctions imposed on Iran? Is my noble friend confident that there is sufficient consensus within the Security Council further to strengthen the sanctions so that they will become effective?
My Lords, I assure my noble friend that both I and my notes share his concern about Iran. The IAEA’s most recent report raised a number of issues of great concern about its compliance with the Security Council resolutions. We are appalled by the statements made by the President about Israel and its right to exist. As for the future, we have already seen the overwhelming support of the international community for the E3+3 dual-track policy reflected in four UN Security Council votes.
As for what happens next, much depends on how Iran chooses to comply or not with its international obligations, but we believe that if further measures are required, the international community will continue to support them.
My Lords, we all recognise the unpleasant nature of the current Iranian regime and the worrying question of nuclear weapons, but does the Minister accept that we will nevertheless not get constructive dialogue with that regime unless we broaden it out to a wider framework? In 2003, the Iranian Government asked for a wider discussion about security in the region. The United States vetoed that. Iran has been mildly helpful in Iraq and considerably helpful in Afghanistan. Is there not a case for a wider framework for discussions within which we can then make progress on the nuclear issue?
My Lords, obviously the noble Lord is aware of many who have thought to open various back channel communications with the Iranians. However, it is very difficult to reward non-compliance by formally broadening the dialogue at this point. If Iran complies with the Security Council resolutions, a broader dialogue will follow as part of the careful set of incentives that have been constructed to reward compliance.
My Lords, all that sounds a bit mystifying. Is not the right answer to the thoroughly justifiable unease and alarm expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Janner, that there is no consensus in the Security Council? Russia and China are not playing along with the aim to squeeze Iran; in fact Russia is trying to supply further nuclear equipment to Iran. Is not the basic economic reality that with $120 oil Iran is doing quite nicely thank you and the sanctions are having minimal and probably zero effect? Is not the need now, as the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, indicated, to bring the Russians and even the Chinese into the discussion, although it may be distasteful to our American allies, rather than trying to penalise them as well? Without those two, the chances of any serious global pressure on Iran are zero, and it is bound to head for both a civil nuclear and a weaponised nuclear programme.
My Lords, the noble Lord is aware that the E3+3 formation, which has led on behalf of the Security Council and devised these resolutions—the last of which I think was passed by 14 to zero—is China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States, in addition to us. China and Russia are part of this negotiation, and we hope that they are very much committed to this process.
My Lords, has the Minister seen the reports that, far from slowing down the nuclear enrichment programme, the mullahs have spread their nuclear weapons development programme across 12 sites in the country to make it harder for the IAEA to properly monitor them? They are stepping up the enrichment. Those reports come from the resistance body that told the world five or six years ago about the Iranians’ illegal nuclear activities.
My Lords, I am not aware of that specific report, but we are very concerned by proliferation-sensitive activity, such as uranium enrichment with no apparent civilian use. Iran hid aspects of its programme for nearly two decades. My noble friend is right that the IAEA inspectors still cannot get the access that they seek. Nevertheless, the very nature of this problem—a diversified, decentralised programme across Iran—does not lend itself to a military as against a diplomatic solution. We are convinced that the right set of incentives and punishments available diplomatically and through sanctions to force and encourage Iranian compliance remains the safest way forward, although it is certainly not assured of necessary success.