Skip to main content

Employment Bill [HL]

Volume 702: debated on Monday 2 June 2008

Read a third time.

Clause 18 [Exclusion or expulsion from trade union for membership of political party]:

[Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 not moved.]

3: Clause 18, page 16, leave out lines 34 to 36 and insert “after subsection (4B) there is inserted—

“(4C) Conduct which consists in an individual’s being or having been a member of a political party is not conduct falling within subsection (4A) if membership of that political party is contrary to—

(a) a rule of the trade union, or(b) an objective of the trade union. (4D) For the purposes of subsection (4C)(b) in the case of conduct consisting in an individual’s being a member of a political party, an objective is to be disregarded—

(a) in relation to an exclusion, if it is not reasonably practicable for the objective to be ascertained by a person working in the same trade, industry or profession as the individual;(b) in relation to an expulsion, if it is not reasonably practicable for the objective to be ascertained by a member of the union.(4E) For the purposes of subsection (4C)(b) in the case of conduct consisting in an individual’s having been a member of a political party, an objective is to be disregarded—

(a) in relation to an exclusion, if at the time of the conduct it was not reasonably practicable for the objective to be ascertained by a person working in the same trade, industry or profession as the individual;(b) in relation to an expulsion, if at the time of the conduct it was not reasonably practicable for the objective to be ascertained by a member of the union.(4F) Where the exclusion or expulsion of an individual from a trade union is wholly or mainly attributable to conduct which consists of an individual’s being or having been a member of a political party but which by virtue of subsection (4C) is not conduct falling within subsection (4A), the exclusion or expulsion is not permitted by virtue of subsection (2)(d) if any one or more of the conditions in subsection (4G) apply.

(4G) Those conditions are—

(a) the decision to exclude or expel is taken otherwise than in accordance with the union’s rules;(b) the decision to exclude or expel is taken unfairly;(c) the individual would lose his livelihood or suffer other exceptional hardship by reason of not being, or ceasing to be, a member of the union.(4H) For the purposes of subsection (4G)(b) a decision to exclude or expel an individual is taken unfairly if (and only if)—

(a) before the decision is taken the individual is not given—(i) notice of the proposal to exclude or expel him and the reasons for that proposal, and(ii) a fair opportunity to make representations in respect of that proposal, or(b) representations made by the individual in respect of that proposal are not considered fairly.””

The noble Lord said: My Lords, on Report I said that the Government planned to bring forward proposals at Third Reading to implement the approach to the ECHR judgment in the ASLEF v the United Kingdom case which was specified in Option B in last year’s consultation document. I also said that our proposals would contain texts on the three types of safeguards which, among others, the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, and my noble friend Lord Morris of Handsworth had sought. These proposals are set out in Amendments Nos. 3, 8, 9 and 10. I shall speak also to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, and the noble Lord, Lord Henley.

I shall first speak to Amendments Nos. 3, 8, 9 and 10. The European Court’s judgment in the ASLEF case is clear: the issue centres on balancing the conflicting rights under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the freedom of assembly and association—that is, between the right of an individual to belong to a trade union and the right of a trade union to determine its membership. The current wording of Clause 18 implements Option A in last year’s consultation, which was deregulatory and removed all references to protected conduct from Sections 174 and 176 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.

Many Members have expressed concern that Option A tips the balance too far in favour of the trade unions and so, having listened to the arguments over the months, and in a spirit of compromise, we have decided not to pursue Option A. Through consultation with Peers of all parties and on all sides of the House, we have sought to find a wording which secures the correct balance in response to the court’s judgment. Amendment No. 3 therefore restores the provisions relating to protected conduct which the current version of Clause 18 repeals.

The amendment also inserts new subsections (4C) to (4H) into Section 174 of the 1992 Act. Together these new subsections set three conditions which a trade union must meet if it wishes to expel or exclude a person on the grounds of that person’s membership of a political party. These three conditions in effect provide three types of safeguard when viewed from the standpoint of the individual concerned. The first safeguard is set out in new subsections (4C), (4D) and (4E). It specifies that the membership or former membership of a political party must be contrary to a rule or objective of the trade union. A union’s rules are well known and easily accessible—indeed, there is a statutory duty for a union to supply a copy of its rules to any person whether or not they are a union member—but union objectives are usually different in character. There may be many of them, they may change more frequently over time and they may be found in many different documents, and individuals cannot be expected to be able to access or understand them all. The amendment therefore provides, in new subsections (4D) and (4E), that it must be reasonably practicable for a person to ascertain the objectives in question. New subsection (4D) sets provisions in the case where a person is expelled or excluded for their current party membership. New subsection (4E) sets the corresponding provisions where the person is excluded or expelled for their former membership.

We recognise that a person’s ability to ascertain an objective depends on whether they are a member of the trade union at the relevant time. Obviously, trade union members should be able to know more, so we set different tests in relation to each group. For those who are or were trade union members at the relevant time, the test is whether it is reasonably practicable for a member of the union concerned to ascertain the objective in question. For those who are not or were not trade union members at the relevant time, the corresponding test is whether a person working in the same trade, industry or profession as the expelled or excluded individual could reasonably ascertain the objective.

Those provisions are deliberately based on the current wording of Section 176(1D) of the 1992 Act. We feel that consistent wording would assist union understanding and help unions comply with the law. However, we have decided to use a different comparator test for non-union members from that which is currently found in subsection (1D). To achieve consistency, the amendment therefore realigns the test in Section 176(1D).

The second safeguard is that a union’s decision to exclude or expel must be taken fairly and in accordance with its own rules. In other words, this condition relates to procedural fairness, a matter that particularly concerns the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, as well as other noble Lords. The relevant provisions are set out in subsections (4F), (4G)(a) and (4G)(b). Subsection (4H) specifies what is meant by an unfairly taken decision. These mirror the basic tests of procedural fairness that the courts apply in common law, the significance of which has been stressed in the House on several occasions. We have not set wider or more general tests of fairness in order to attempt to avoid overcomplicating the law and to avoid giving significant scope for mischievous or vexatious litigants to challenge union decisions.

The third safeguard is found in new subsection (4G)(c). It provides that the decision to expel or exclude on these grounds must not lead to a loss of livelihood or other exceptional hardship because of the resultant loss of union membership or a failure to obtain union membership. “Exceptional hardship” is the term used in the ASLEF judgment and in other ECHR cases. It will mostly occur where a person loses his or her job, but it may conceivably occur in some other limited cases where an individual suffers another substantial detriment. We do not believe that exceptional hardship is a real threat to most workers because other laws in this country outlaw the closed shop, but we cannot say for certain that such substantial hardship will never occur in any circumstances. Hence, this extra safeguard is included.

Amendments Nos. 9 and 10 flow from Amendments Nos. 3 and 8. They make consequential changes to Clause 21 and the repeals schedule respectively. Clause 18, as it now is, has aroused strong opinions and passions. At the outset we had hoped to simplify the law in this area through deregulation. We strongly advocated that approach in Grand Committee and elsewhere. However, our arguments have clearly not found favour around the House. Recognising the will of the House, we have therefore come forward with this alternative approach in, as I have said, a spirit of compromise. I thank all those who have taken part in these debates at all stages of the Bill for devoting their time to assisting us in identifying the alternative. I am particularly delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Lester, who cannot be with us today, has added his name to the government amendments.

We have been mindful of the views of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on this issue, and our amendment reflects all three safeguards that it advocated. I cannot claim that our amendments will necessarily simplify the law—we are, after all, adding six new subsections to Section 174—but we have tried to draft the provisions in a way that goes with the grain of union practices and existing law. We have tried to be as precise as we can to avoid creating room for mischievous litigation.

It should be remembered that the net effect of all these changes is to provide greater autonomy for trade unions provided that they act responsibly. They will enjoy greater freedom than they have now to expel or exclude persons whose political party membership is in opposition to the union’s political beliefs. We are therefore convinced that our approach is consistent with the ECHR judgment. I beg to move.

4: Clause 18, line 2, leave out “or having been”

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 5, 6 and 7. I thank the Minister for writing to me on 22 May about Clause 18, on which he has just spoken. Sadly, I received the letter only when I arrived in the Lords this morning, because, for once, the excellent delivery systems of this House did not manage to forward it to my home in the country. I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation in that letter of what the Government were up to. I would have responded to him last week and said that I was in effect satisfied with what the Government were proposing. I would then have given him the assurance that, although I wanted still to table these amendments, I did not intend to divide the House on them. I can now give him that assurance.

As the Minister said, the Government have in a spirit of compromise gone a considerable distance in trying to come up with a deal that might satisfy us, the Liberal Democrat Benches, the noble Lord, Lord Morris and others who have expressed concern about the clause both in Committee and on Report. The Government have tried to find a compromise that is nearer to, as the Minister put it, Option B than to the original Option A which the Government seemed to favour in their consultation process. For that reason, we will accept it, although we would like to have gone a little further, which is why we have put down the amendments. They are similar to those which we tabled on Report. We might even have discussed something similar in Committee.

The amendments highlight our concern, first, that only membership of registered political parties is considered excludable. There are many political organisations and pressure groups, membership of which should continue to be exempt. Secondly, we strongly object to former membership being held against a trade union member. That smacks of retrospective punishment, even if the resignation from an objectionable political party had been recent. Such a resignation would show that membership of the trade union was more important to the person concerned than membership of the political party. Who would decide whether a member’s resignation was fair?

That was our concern. I appreciate that the Government have gone a considerable distance since we discussed the matter on Report, for which I am grateful. For that reason, I shall certainly not press our amendments. I look forward to the House accepting the Government’s amendment. I beg to move.

My Lords, having withdrawn Amendments Nos. 1 and 2, as ordained by the Public Bill Office, I was advised this morning by that office and others that I may speak to Amendment No. 3 with Amendments Nos. 8 to 10, which are supported, subject to a caveat, so that I am not speaking out of order. The caveat is that the intendment of Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 should be taken into account before these measures are implemented and that before these measures are implemented the reservations of the TUC should be recognised. I have referred to them in the past; this is a short speech and I shall not repeat myself, but they will be spoken about again today by the noble Baroness, Lady Turner of Camden.

Amendment No. 3 first came to my knowledge on a chance visit on 29 May to tidy up my desk. As I passed the Public Bill Office, I was handed the amendment. I called up the Department of Trade and Industry to inquire where the Minister was, as I wanted to talk to him about an arrangement that we had made. I was informed that he was in Mexico and had been there for quite some time and that I could not speak to him.

The scenario has changed. Having opposed, with the Government, the Lib Dem amendment to Clause 18 on Report and—because I am not a member of the Liberal Democrat Party—having no knowledge of the negotiations that resulted eventually in Amendment No. 3, this came as a great surprise. Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 had been withdrawn on Report on the assurance, made between myself and the Minister, that there would be further consideration and consultation, not as to the substance but as to the drafting, before Third Reading. Of course, I hoped that the noble Lord, Lord Jones, was a man of great honour and that if you made a deal with him he was the sort of man who would never rat on you. I rang up to ask him this morning if he could come and deal with this matter today, and deal with the arrangement that we made—because the noble Lord, Lord Bach, knows nothing about it. Very few other people know anything about it, although there is a reference to it at col. 1304 of the Official Report of 19 May. But I was told that the noble Lord, Lord Jones, could not come because he is in Azerbaijan. I do not even know where that is, but I am sure that it is a long way away. So there it is—noble Lords will have to take it from me, pending the noble Lord’s return to read the report. This morning I informed the Public Bill Office of that arrangement. The only other person who knew about it was my Chief Whip. I informed my Chief Whip. If I make an arrangement I inform my Chief Whip—she knew.

I said to the civil servant in the department on 29th May that there had been no consultation and no communication with the Minister. The civil servant arranged with two other civil servants to meet me on 30 May in the Royal Gallery. What was said was confidential and cannot be repeated. The Public Bill Office did not know then that there had been this arrangement and had sent the e-mail which ordained withdrawal of these amendments, which today, if they had not been withdrawn, would have been moved as complementary to Amendment No. 3. That is the straight position.

The scenario turned itself upside down in the Recess. I opened my e-mail. I am not very good with my e-mail. I leave it alone at weekends because I get very bored with it. Yesterday, at about six o'clock, I opened it up and then I knew that I could not move the amendments. There was then no time to draft an amendment or to do anything. I had a word, by chance, with the noble Baroness, Lady Turner. She did not realise until very late—I cannot remember why—that she could not put down an amendment. So one has been rushed towards the barrier. I am criticising no one because criticism is idle. I am just saying that we have been rushed towards the barrier, and here we are.

The grounds on which I would seek compatibility today if I had those amendments are strictly relevant for the consideration of government. I have tried to put them in a condensed form. First, these provisions as to conduct are ever subservient to the overarching authority of the ordained procedures as reflected in Amendments Nos. 1 and 2, to which there is no reference either in Amendment No. 3 or in Clause 18.

Secondly, the proper balance on adjudication is not just between, as it is put, the trades unions on one side, the rule book, the objectives, and the interests of those seeking membership or wanting to remain in membership, where notice is given and the other requirements of our tenets of natural justice are observed. That is not exactly the balance that must be struck, which is as stated in Amendments Nos. 1 and 2. No one has challenged that as being wrong at any stage; it is not wrong, it is entirely right. The balance must be struck between the competing convention rights on the facts and circumstances of each case.

The third issue—there is only one more after this and I will then sit down—is that without Amendments Nos. 1 and 2, or having regard to their intendment, there is no guidance or signpost to the trade union on adjudication or the employment tribunal on appeal. There is no guidance that the implementation of these provisions as to conduct must be in accordance with the mandatory effect of the ordained procedures.

The last matter affects the amendment of my noble friend Lord Henley, in that the interpretation of domestic law that distorts that balance would not be acceptable to the Strasbourg court. In other words, one must make it plain that the adjudication must be under the overarching authority of the Strasbourg court. This matter arose on Report. Objection was then made to this amendment on grounds totally wide of the intendment as expressed in the ordained procedures. You cannot amend domestic law to suit your own purpose; you must have implementation within the overarching authority. It is to be hoped that the Government heed the caveat and so reduce the risk of further application to the court. The door has been left ajar under these amendments.

There was no time to put down our amendments. I am not saying that it was the fault of the Government, but it was not our fault. If, as I have said and shall not repeat again, the Government had had regard to this, everything that should be achieved would have been achieved. It is better to leave it that way than divide the House.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, has referred to TUC reservations. There are indeed TUC reservations about the amendment, and I would not like this debate to pass without your Lordships realising what they are.

I had a letter from the TUC during the recess. The TUC believes that the proposed government amendment is unnecessary, would place unjustified restrictions on trade unions’ ability to determine their membership and is likely to act as an invitation to litigation. There are serious reservations with regard to the proposed amendment. First, under proposed new subsection (4C) it will be for the courts to determine whether membership of a political party is contrary to a rule or objective of a union. This could provide opportunities for the BNP or other similar bodies to grandstand courts and tribunals and to argue that they are not racist or fascist organisations. This issue is particularly likely to arise in the case of unions that oppose racism as part of their rules. The provision could also require unions to list in the rule books the names of any relevant political parties. Given the ease with which far-right parties can change their names, this is likely to cause major difficulties and to create opportunities for dissidents to argue that membership of a political party is not contrary to the rules of the union.

Secondly, the new procedural arrangements introduced in the proposed new subsection (4G)(a) and (b) will create a new statutory remedy for individuals for a breach of contract even though an individual can already complain to the certification officer and/or the High Court on the ground of expulsion in breach of the union’s rules. It is not clear how such double regulation complies with the Government’s better regulation standards.

Thirdly, there are serious concerns that under proposed new subsection (4G)(c) one of the conditions that must be satisfied before a union can exclude or expel on grounds of party political membership is that the individual would not,

“lose his livelihood or suffer other exceptional hardship by reason of not being, or ceasing to be, a member of the union”.

In the TUC’s view this condition is in no way required by the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights and could represent an unjustified restriction on trade unions’ rights to freedom of association enshrined in Article 11 of the European Convention.

The expression “exceptional hardship” is legally uncertain and furthermore no evidence has been provided of any abuse by trade unions to justify this provision or to establish why trade unions should be thus regulated. In the absence of closed-shop arrangements trade unions have no control over individuals’ access to employment. However, the provision would potentially make a union liable for decisions taken by an employer to dismiss an individual—decisions which are beyond any union’s control or influence. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that under Sections 146 and 152 of the 1992 Act individuals are already protected from any detriment or dismissal on the grounds of being, or not being, a union member. It will be recalled that I raised this issue in connection with the previous amendment, when I pointed out strongly that the wording might tie the union to being a party to a decision by an employer over which it had no control, and which had a subsequent deleterious effect on the rights of an individual who had been excluded. There is no reason why unions should be put in the position of having to bear that responsibility in connection with an employer’s action relative to an individual member, particularly now that they no longer have closed-shop agreements.

Fourthly, and perhaps most worryingly—this point was made to me by Thompsons, the legal firm which acts for a number of unions—if the amendment had been in place in the Lee case—that is, the ASLEF case—it is likely that Mr Lee could have successfully challenged the exclusion from the union even though subsequently ASLEF went on to win before the European Court. It is difficult to know how the amendment therefore gives proper effect to that court’s ruling.

Those are the TUC’s views on the amendment to Clause 18. It is only right and proper that noble Lords should know what they are before they reach a decision. I realise that the amendment has wide support in this House but it seems to me that if it becomes law we may very well find ourselves once again at the Strasbourg court, and nobody wants that to happen. There is considerable concern within the trade union movement, as expressed by the TUC, that the wording now before the House will not make things easier but rather a great deal worse, a great deal more complicated and a great deal more difficult for unions to comply with in situations such as the ASLEF case. That was not the original intention. The Government introduced the provision in the Bill because they were concerned to put into operation what was apparently required by the original decision in the ASLEF case before the ECHR.

Therefore, I am not happy about the amendment. It will undoubtedly be endorsed by the House, in which case it will be up to the TUC to take it further by whatever means are available to it, including perhaps lobbying Members in the other House when the matter gets to the Commons.

My Lords, I have no desire to unduly delay the House, but I wish to make one or two comments as briefly as they can be made. First, I thank the Minister for his contribution and work in seeking to secure broad support for the amendments, particularly Amendment No. 3, and—more than that—to have a change of strategic direction in respect of option B as opposed to option A. Also, I mention the work done by my noble friend Lord Lester. Although he is absent this afternoon, he attached his name to the amendment. The House will recall his contribution to the debate.

For my part, I think that the amendment has delivered on the three key principles which were a necessary precondition for supporting the Bill. The first was to ensure that Her Majesty’s Government met their obligation to the ECHR ruling. My view—it is the view of a lot of others who have read the judgment and followed the debate—is that recognition of compliance has been achieved as a result of the amendment.

The second principle of great importance was the maintenance and preservation of free, unfettered and democratic trade unions having the ability to govern, police and implement their own rules. I see nothing in the Bill that will undermine that fundamental principle. I know of the TUC’s concern, but I equally know of the briefing sent out by one or two solicitors. If one were unkind, one would begin to ask whose interests were served in the pursuance of suggesting that free and democratic trade unions would be undermined as a result of the Bill.

For me, the most fundamental principle in the debate, which the Bill has preserved, is the right of members of trade unions to natural justice in circumstances of either expulsion or exclusion from their trade union. No one in this House has argued against the principles of natural justice. What we have argued is that the Government’s starting point was to seek to provide mere remedies after the event. This amendment places a right and proper duty on the party that will be taking the principal decision to exclude or expel to comply with the principles of natural justice through procedures and ordinary rights of appeal enshrined in union rules. This Bill does not and will not write the union rules. Unions as free democratic organisations will have an opportunity to write those rules themselves. If members feel a sense of grievance about the way in which the rules are applied, they will have an opportunity to seek redress elsewhere.

Three key principles have been met: Britain will be able to comply with its statutory obligations, trade unions will have freedom and democratic rights in respect of their rule books, while the ability to discipline their members has been preserved, and members’ rights to natural justice will be safeguarded. On that basis, I support Amendment No. 3 in the name of my noble friend Lord Jones and I wish the Bill well on its way.

My Lords, the noble Lord is an experienced trade union leader and I have listened with great attention to everything that he said. Does he agree with what his noble friend Lady Turner of Camden said about the attitude and worries of the TUC?

My Lords, I assure the noble Lord that the TUC has expressed its concerns not just to my noble friend Lady Turner but to many others. However, I suspect that, when the TUC looks at the amendment and the principles that I expounded, not only will it begin to recognise that Britain’s ability to meet its obligations and the preservation of trade unions as free democratic organisations have been safeguarded, but it will, I am sure, be the first to accept that individual members’ rights to redress—not just to remedies, but to proper protection—have been ensured. Furthermore, if the Bill, when it reaches the statute book, is applied in the spirit in which it is intended, it can only strengthen the power and authority of the trade union movement. The TUC will be stronger and it will support the Bill.

My Lords, I suspect that most Members of this House will agree with many of the principles and details mentioned by my noble friend Lord Morris of Handsworth, not only in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, but in the main part of his speech. There is a great deal of agreement that the Government and the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, who is absent, should be congratulated on the amendment. However, to some extent I share the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, that undertakings made to him only a few days before the Recess by my noble friend Lord Jones of Birmingham, who is also absent, have not been carried forth. An amendment suddenly appeared during the parliamentary Recess. Like the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, and no doubt others, we first came across it only today. If this is to be the definitive amendment on this key provision in the Bill, it needs to be right. I am not sure that it is right; in other words, therefore, I agree with a great deal of what was said by my noble friend Lady Turner of Camden.

I am among those who have received briefing from the well known firm of trade union and employment lawyers, Thompsons, which has huge and lengthy experience. One point that it makes—and I think that my noble friend Lord Bach owes it to my noble friend Lady Turner of Camden to answer this—is that proposed new subsection (4C) seems to require a union to have either a rule or an objective that outlaws membership of “that political party”.

I want to develop the point made by my noble friend Lady Turner. As we are all interested in politics, we know that the extreme right—and in my younger days the extreme left as well—is always breaking up into splinter groups. Perhaps the “far- left” now has no particular meaning, but certainly trade unions do not wish to have to put up with membership that includes those of extreme right views. It would no doubt be the simplest thing in the world for the BNP to call itself “BNP 2008” and then, on 1 January, to change the name to “BNP 2009”; it would then be a different political party. It has changed its name in the past from the National Front to the BNP to something else—I cannot remember the various names that it has had. Thompsons pointed out to some of us in its briefing:

“A requirement that the relevant political party be named in the Rules or objects … would be an invitation to the far right parties liable to otherwise fall foul of trade union Rules and objects to regularly change their names”.

That is the trouble.

However, the crunch question is: “Does it matter?”. It matters from the point of view of the question with which we are all concerned: will the new Bill and the trade union rules made thereafter be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights? Here, perhaps I may again quote from the Thompsons briefing, which states that,

“the additional gloss contained in the redrafted (4C) requiring that a union has either a rule or an objective which outlaws membership of ‘that political party’ fails to understand the ECHR’s decision or properly amend the law in the light of the ECHR decision and will be open to further challenge either in the domestic courts or the ECHR in an appropriate case”.

The Minister must give an answer to that because this amendment is in his name and that of the well known human rights lawyer, the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill. I am sorry that the Minister is on his own and that he does not have the assistance of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, this afternoon, but does he really think that the amendment and the Bill that will be sent off to the other place will be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights?

My Lords, before my noble friend replies, I want to associate myself with the remarks of my two colleagues on this side. I fully support the TUC in this. My noble friend Lord Morris says that solicitors may have a vested interest, but surely the vested interest will be in more litigation, not less. This provision is likely to lead to more litigation and I put on the record the fact that Thompsons is totally opposed to that. In the end, it is not just the narrow membership issue that is at stake, but the freedom of trade unions to operate, to associate and, if necessary, to exclude justifiably from membership. What has been said is quite right. If we leave the issue where it is, a trade union will have to name in its rule book the organisation concerned, which, as has been said, could lead to a far-right organisation changing its name and continuing to change its name so that a particular member would never be expelled from the union. That is the truth of it.

I am afraid that I do not like many things about the amendment. It is far too narrow and I do not believe that it will fulfil the objectives that have been put forward. I think that more litigation will result from it. We hoped that the unions would not have to go to Strasbourg again on this matter but I think that this makes the situation worse. I say to my noble friend that complaints can be made to the certification officer, so why do they have to go back to the court? Is this a matter of bypassing? The certification officer is there to deal with such matters. I am sorry that it has come to this, but we need an explanation from my noble friend Lord Bach. It would have been more straightforward to take the first proposal rather than this amendment. I am sure that the TUC will not rest and that it will be very upset if this is carried through. The only objective open to it is to continue its lobbying in another place. I hope that my noble friend will pay attention to what we are saying.

My Lords, with some trepidation, I support the amendment to Clause 18, which stands in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Jones of Birmingham, and my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill. As I said at Second Reading, support for this has been reciprocated on all sides of the House. I am standing in for someone who is regarded as, if not one of the world’s experts on human rights, certainly one of the UK’s experts on human rights; he is very sorry that he cannot be in his place today. However, as a result of the negotiations that he and others had with the Government, he was delighted to put his name to the amendment. I know that if he were here he would also have liked to have thanked the noble Lord, Lord Morris of Handsworth, who he feels has been instrumental, with him, in producing the amendment before us today.

Before the Minister speaks, perhaps we should go back a little and remember what the amendment and the debate on this clause are about. I think that I am right in saying that it is common ground that we are under an obligation to implement in our legislation the ECHR decision in Aslef. I say that I think that it is common ground because I know that it is common ground on the other side of the House and it is certainly common ground on the Liberal Democrat Benches but, many weeks ago in the Moses Room, there was a moment when I thought that the Tory Opposition were flirting with the concept that we are under no obligation to legislate, in breach of the various treaties that the British Government have signed and which have been endorsed by every Tory Government of which I am aware. The noble Lord, Lord Henley, might have suggested that, but I do not think that he continued with the argument, so I suspect that we are on common ground on all sides of the House that we are under an obligation to implement or to put into our law the result of the Aslef case.

The noble Lord, Lord Morris of Handsworth, put it clearly when he said that, in taking the heat out of this, the Government went out to consultation on whether to go to solution A or solution B. The original clause had solution A, which I know that the TUC supported—it did not have to have its tanks on the Government’s lawn at that stage. The amendment before us is a form of option B, so we are really talking about a straight choice between option A and option B.

It will be of no surprise to noble Lords that from these Benches, as articulated until today by my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill, we have always been in favour of option B, for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Morris of Handsworth, gave. I ask Members opposite who have had their reservations about this: do they really not accept that proposed new subsection (4G) is not the way that any responsible trade union would conduct itself? Do they really accept that anyone can be expelled if,

“the decision to exclude or expel is taken otherwise than in accordance with the union rules”?

Do they really accept that someone can be expelled from a trade union if, under subsection (4G)(b),

“the decision to exclude or expel is taken unfairly”,

for all the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Morris of Handsworth?

I understand the argument about subsection (4G)(c), which is the exceptional hardship provision, because the TUC position ably articulated by the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, is: why should we include that when we no longer have the closed shop? I know that I speak for my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill and others on these Benches when I say that we cannot necessarily foresee circumstances under which,

“the individual could lose his livelihood or suffer other exceptional hardship by reason of not being ... a member of the union”.

That is a fail-safe provision, which it is prudent to have in the Bill.

Two objections came from the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, who reflected the views of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway. The first was that in some way, were we to adopt option A and have the original Clause 18, that would magically reduce the opportunity for litigation. I just do not see that. I do not see that if someone had been dismissed in ways not according to the union’s rules or if someone had been dismissed because the decision had been taken unfairly, that would mean that that person would put his hands up and say, “That’s fine, they went for option A, therefore I can do nothing about it”. I have read the briefings from other firms of solicitors. I do not see the argument that somehow going for the original Clause 18 would reduce the opportunity for litigation if the conditions under which the individual had been expelled were listed in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (4G). I do not accept that argument.

As for the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, about the definition of a political party in Clause 14, to take the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Morris of Handsworth, and speaking as an ex-lawyer, I do not think that it will take Thompsons or other firms long to draft a rule book that gets round the issue of the BNP changing its name. I can see how to do it. If anyone wants me to, I will go outside and spend five minutes drafting it, but I suggest that we leave that to Thompsons. In the mean time, I am happy to support the amendment.

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in what has been an absolutely fascinating debate on the government amendment. I will of course deal with the amendments spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Henley, who I thank for his remarks.

I feel obliged to make one or two comments in response to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway. First, I emphasise how grateful the Government, and particularly my noble friend Lord Jones, have been to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, for the interest that he has taken in this and his suggestions, but there seem to be some mistakes in memory. As I understand it, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, saw my officials last Friday. As a result of that meeting, it was suggested to him that he might like to speak to my noble friend Lord Jones over the weekend: that is, between my noble friend coming back from Mexico and going to Azerbaijan—in both cases to try to win exports for this country, let it be said. He had a brief window during the weekend when he was in the UK, and was willing—indeed, wanted—to talk to the noble Lord. However, as I understand it—I was not present—the noble Lord, in his usual generous spirit, commented that he did not want to interrupt my noble friend’s brief weekend. That discussion was possible, but it was not taken up.

My Lords, the noble Lord is quite right; I did not want to inconvenience his noble friend. However, I left my private telephone number at home. The arrangement was that if he felt like calling me up, I would be there.

My Lords, the very last thing that anyone on the government Front Bench would want to do is to offend the noble Lord in any way in these matters. That was certainly no one’s intention. The noble Lord also asked us to have regard to his amendments, although he has not moved them this afternoon. I assure him today that we certainly will.

My noble friend Lord Borrie suggested that the government amendment was tabled during the recess. Actually, it was not; it was tabled on Thursday 22 May, which is the day on which we went into recess. Noble Lords will remember that Report was on Monday 19 May. We worked very hard, or at least my officials did, to get the amendment into a workable form before the recess. The convention, if not the rule, suggests that Third Reading government amendments should be tabled well in advance, so we tabled it on Thursday 22 May. I wrote a letter to noble Lords with the amendment, and I can only apologise that it did not arrive sooner. I thought that I had made it quite clear that those letters should be got to noble Lords as soon as possible, and I can only regret that they were not. I particularly regret that today is the very first day on which noble Lords have had sight of this significant amendment. The amendment was forecast on Report, but of course looking at the amendment itself is what is important. As I said, it was laid down on 22 May. It could not have been tabled any quicker.

On the other amendments, I shall try to deal with the points that have been made in what has been an extensive debate. The noble Lord, Lord Henley, moved Amendments Nos. 4 to 6, which seek to prevent trade unions being able to exclude or expel on the basis of former membership of a political party. Our stance has not changed, I am afraid. We think that that would place a further limit on the freedom of trade unions to set and apply their rules, and therefore run contrary to the thrust of the ECHR judgment.

The noble Lord said on Report that he was opposed to trade unions being able to expel or exclude on this basis, even if an individual had only recently resigned his or her membership. This would provide scope for infiltration of trade unions by those who hold objectives and views which are incompatible with those of the union. It is easy to foresee a situation in which a BNP member resigns his membership on learning of a union’s intention to expel him only to rejoin once the threat of expulsion has passed. This cat-and-mouse cycle could continue indefinitely, imposing a significant administrative burden on the union and producing a loophole for vexatious action. This amendment would substantially frustrate the ability of trade unions to expel or exclude on the basis of political party membership and is, we think, contrary to the spirit of the ECHR judgment. It is interesting that the Joint Committee on Human Rights, in its consideration of how best to respond to the judgment, also included expulsion or exclusion on grounds of former membership.

We understand the argument that individuals change their political beliefs and accept that this can be done genuinely, wholeheartedly and with none of the malicious intent that I have just mentioned in my example. I am equally certain that trade unions accept this, too. Unions are in the business, as has been said, of recruiting members, and they will not seek to deny membership to those who have genuinely changed their views. Indeed, there are a number of well known examples of that happening. We have to remember that unions still need to follow fair procedures when expelling someone on the grounds of their former membership. The government amendment ensures that an individual has a fair opportunity to make representations and that those must be considered fairly by the trade union. This gives ample scope for that person to show that they no longer hold the same political beliefs.

Amendment No. 7, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Henley, is similar to an amendment that was tabled on Report. It seeks to define what type of organisation qualifies as a “political party”. We maintain our position at Report. We should be wary of introducing new wording to this legislation which is not strictly necessary. As I pointed out then, no definition of what constitutes a political party has existed in relation to these provisions, which were first introduced in 1993. As far as I am aware there have been no problems at all as a result. No problems were mentioned either in this debate or on the previous occasion.

The amendment would also create a serious problem. By defining a “political party” as only those that are registered within the UK, the amendment would exempt from this legislation the many members of British trade unions who are foreign nationals. I am delighted to be able to repeat that those numbers are increasing. Some of those individuals will be members of political parties in their own countries. While I am sure that the majority of those parties will have objectives that are entirely compatible with membership of a trade union, it is a fact of life that political extremism is found in all countries. Trade unions must be free to take action against such individuals while adhering to the general safeguards that our amendment provides. That is why the Government cannot support Amendment No. 7.

Perhaps I may turn to other comments made during this interesting debate. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, that the government amendment to Clause 18 strikes that balance between the competing Article 11 rights that the ECHR was so concerned about. Our amendment makes that clear.

I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Turner for her part in these debates. She spoke of breach of contract. There is no new ability for individuals to bring a claim for breach of contract as a result of our amendments. It has always been possible under option A—what Clause 18 looks like at the moment—for an expelled individual to bring a claim for breach of contract if a union breached its own rules in expelling him. However, an excluded individual never had a claim for breach of contract. This amendment provides additional safeguards for excluded individuals, which is absolutely in line with the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

My noble friends Lady Turner and Lord Borrie asked whether we felt that option B is compatible with the judgment of the European Court. We are confident that it is. As I have just said, the JCHR suggested a similar amendment to the one we have moved today. My noble friend Lady Turner argued that our amendment would make it harder for trade unions to expel or exclude on these grounds, but under current law trade unions cannot simply expel or exclude on the grounds of political party membership. Therefore Clause 18 as amended gives trade unions more freedom than they currently possess.

My noble friend Lord Hoyle talked about the role of the certification officer and raised the issue of using that officer as a remedy. The certification officer is a useful route for individuals who may have a complaint, but it is not available for exclusions, only for expulsions because the role of the officer is limited. My noble friend also said that he wanted to keep cases out of the courts. In fact the remedy for someone who is excluded would have to be through the employment tribunal.

Lastly, I turn to the point made by my noble friends Lord Borrie and Lady Turner about unions needing to identify and proscribe political parties in their own rules or objectives. We have thought about this and we do not think that it is necessary. We believe that general rules or objectives about the union’s political beliefs or attitudes, stating what it favours or what it dislikes, such as fascism or extreme xenophobic political parties, should suffice. Likewise, non-political rules relating to anti-racism or cultural pluralism may be used to show that membership of an extreme political party is contrary to the union’s rules or objectives. Membership need not be of that political party but of any political party whose values contravene the union’s rules or objectives.

We believe that trade unions in this country play a crucial part in protecting the rights of workers and we have put into effect, as we were bound to do, the ASLEF judgment. That judgment gives trade unions greater freedom than now to exclude or expel members whose political party membership is in opposition to the union’s political beliefs. So this is a sensible step forward in terms of giving trade unions the extra power which the court said that they should have. There is a genuine disagreement about which of the two options should be adopted, and that disagreement has been debated in this House from day one of the Bill. The Government have come to the view that our amendment is the right way to pursue this.

Since we are formally debating my Amendment No. 4, which seeks to amend Amendment No. 3, it falls to me to withdraw my amendment, as I promised to do. In doing so, I thank the Minister for introducing the amendment in the names of those who have been described as “the absent” noble Lord, Lord Jones of Birmingham, and “the absent” noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, and for bringing it forward in a spirit of compromise. I am sorry that he has not had what might be called unanimous support from his own side of the House. I thought that the Government needed all the friends they could get at the moment, but on this issue they seem to have lost the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, the noble Lords, Lord Borrie and Lord Hoyle, and, it seems, the entire TUC to boot. But no doubt the noble Lord will be building bridges in due course to try to re-establish links with those three eminent Peers and the Trades Union Congress.

I do not think that as a Government we have to build any links with my three noble friends. They are great supporters of the Government and we are absolutely delighted that, at least on these Benches, we can discuss these matters freely and openly.

My Lords, perhaps I may put it in the words of P G Wodehouse: they may not be exactly disgruntled but they seem far from being gruntled. I was making the point that the noble Lord may have to do a little building of bridges. We are grateful for what he gave us and no doubt the Liberals are as well. In that spirit of compromise, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 4.

[Amendment No. 4, as an amendment to Amendment No. 3, by leave, withdrawn.]

[Amendments Nos. 5 to 7, as amendments to Amendment No. 3, not moved.]

On Question, Amendment No. 3 agreed to.

8: Clause 18, page 16, leave out lines 38 and 39 and insert “in subsection (1D)(a), for “a member of the general public” substitute “a person working in the same trade, industry or profession as the complainant””

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 21 [Commencement]:

9: Clause 21, page 17, line 22, leave out “and Part 6 of the Schedule come” and insert “comes”

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The Schedule:

10: The Schedule, page 19, leave out lines 22 to 32

On Question, amendment agreed to.

An amendment (privilege) made.

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.