My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport (Ruth Kelly) has made the following Ministerial Statement.
Last December I commissioned an independent review of personnel security across the transport sector. This followed Lord West’s review last year which focused on physical infrastructure and confirmed that, although it is impossible to eliminate every risk, a robust transport security regime is in place. The review of personnel security was conducted by Stephen Boys Smith who has now delivered his report. It contains a detailed assessment of current security processes and recommendations of where changes might be needed. Because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter, it is not appropriate to publish it in full, but I have published a short summary of the report, and of its key recommendations.
The Government and the transport industries are committed to countering the threat from terrorism. The existing security regime encompasses a wide range of measures which seek to reduce the potential threat from insiders. These measures include both personnel security measures, such as background checks, and physical security measures, such as the searching and screening requirements. Many of these physical security measures apply to industry staff as well as passengers. For instance, the UK requires airports to screen 100 per cent of staff working in the restricted zone, and has played a leading role in ensuring that this approach has been incorporated into European regulations, as well as promoting it elsewhere.
Stephen Boys Smith's report acknowledges the effectiveness of the UK transport security regime, which overlaps multiple layers of security measures in this way. But the report also points out that the more effectively the security regime mitigates external threats, the more likely it becomes that terrorists will look for vulnerabilities elsewhere. I therefore agree with the key message of the report: that there should be an increased focus on personnel security and that this should be informed by systematic analysis of the risks. This is consistent with work already in hand within the Government’s counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST, where personnel security is one of the work streams.
The most important challenge will be to integrate fully a risk-based approach to personnel security into industry practices. This clearly cannot be delivered by the Government alone. Only the industry has the detailed knowledge of its operations and systems that is needed accurately to identify the specific personnel security risks that it faces and how they might be mitigated. But the Government have a vital role to play in raising awareness of personnel security issues within the industry, providing guidance and support to the industry, and ensuring that full and rigorous assessments are carried out and that appropriate action is taken where vulnerabilities are identified.
For this reason, I have asked my department to ensure with immediate effect that industry's attention is drawn to the advice which is already available (for example, that issued by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure), and to enhance the personnel security elements of our existing training programmes. Alongside this, my officials will urgently work up policy options over the summer for a cross-industry conference, to be held in the autumn. This conference will identify the most effective approaches to embedding risk assessment in the personnel security regime. The next phase will be for government and industry to work together, including through ongoing working groups such as the National Aviation Security Committee, to ensure that the necessary risk assessments are carried out and a clear programme of work delivered. This will require sustained effort by all.
I agree with the report’s view that identity is a key factor in personnel security regimes and note its conclusion that ID cards are a useful addition to identity assurance. This endorses the announcement by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary on 6 March that ID cards will be part of the identity assurance regime for airside workers, starting in 2009. Officials from the Home Office and my department are currently in discussion with the industry about how best to do this.
I also accept the report’s advice that, in the light of experience both in the Security Industry Association (SIA) and within some sectors of the transport industry, overseas criminal record checks are now a more viable option than they have been in the past.
While checks of this kind are primarily intended to reduce crime, they can also provide a useful additional check on an applicant's integrity as part of the overall personnel security regime. I have therefore asked my department to produce clear guidance, building on the approach taken by the SIA, to support those organisations whose risk assessments identify posts for which checks of this kind are necessary. Wherever such posts are identified, I expect the industry to take rapid action, and my department will be engaging closely with them over the coming months to ensure that this is the case.
Alongside this voluntary approach, which extends existing good practice in the industry, I believe there is also a case for introducing a mandatory requirement for those posts which present the highest risks, such as those with specific security responsibilities (and which are already subject to a counterterrorism check). However, before such a requirement can be put in place, there remain a number of legal and practical challenges to be overcome. These include identifying an effective means of dealing with the variability of international criminal records systems and documentation, and developing an approach which does not have undue implications for the ongoing efficiency and security of industry operations.
I have therefore asked my department to begin immediate discussions with employers and employees in the industry to agree a workable and effective approach to introducing such a requirement, with a view to implementation by the end of the year. In line with Stephen Boys Smith's recommendation, I expect this to apply to new applicants for these posts, as employers can assess the integrity of existing employees in other, more effective ways.
Over the longer term, as the exchange of information between countries becomes more efficient, it may be appropriate to extend this requirement to other posts. I note here also the Statement made on 16 July by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary about Sir Ian Magee’s review of criminality and the potential for overseas information to be more readily available to UK criminal record offices.
Finally, I agree with the view that while there should be some rebalancing of priorities between physical and personnel security activity, this should not result in a weakening of physical security programmes.
Copies of the report summary and recommendations have been laid in the Libraries of both Houses and will appear on the department’s website.