Motion to Take Note
My Lords, we have a bucket filling up with water and this debate is all about turning the tide. I do not know whether it will also solve the leak problems here in Grand Committee.
It is not often that a committee looks at a subject comprehensively, as we did in 2010, and then decides to revisit it two years later because it feels it of sufficient importance that a number of lessons needed to be learnt and to see how an operation has moved forward. This is what we did with regard to Operation Atalanta and the other problems regarding Somalia.
I shall remind the Committee of the reasons for Operation Atalanta to begin with. It was not just about commercial shipping, which we most know it for. It was about protecting the World Food Programme, which was keeping vast numbers of people alive and away from starvation in Somalia itself, and getting that product to the port of Mogadishu was quite a challenge. It was also technically about protecting Somalia’s fisheries and has actually been pretty successful at that, but not of any great help to the Somalis. It was also about helping the commercial shipping side in terms of repulsing piracy on one of the world’s most important trade routes. Atalanta itself is one of three organised operations; Atalanta is the European Union one and there is NATO’s Ocean Shield, while Combined Task Force 151 is a coalition of other countries. There are also a number of independent operators as well, which we will come back to.
I shall set the scene by coming back to the 2010 report, in which we made a number of specific observations and recommendations. We had the World Food Programme leasing ships that were probably the slowest that ploughed the oceans anywhere on the globe. Why? Because they were the cheapest. However, that meant they were the most vulnerable and, because of the way that the charter agreement was, they did not allow military contingents on those vessels so they had to be shadowed by very expensive and scarce warships from the areas of issue right the way through to port. There was a lack of tanker refuelling, which meant that the best naval vessels had to go backwards and forwards to port in order to refuel, wasting a lot of time. If pirates were captured, there was often nowhere to send them or try them, because western navies were reluctant to bring those pirates back to their own shores. The insurance companies seemed to be oblivious to the problem or not to care about it. As far as they were concerned, it was a loss, they got their income and there was an occasional “hit” in terms of ransoms that had to be paid out, but there was no responsibility on the part of the insurance industry.
The Indian Ocean and the Gulf are a vast ocean, yet there is very little air surveillance. In fact, Luxembourg had to rent a private plane on behalf of Atalanta, which was used as surveillance out of the Seychelles, and that was about all there was to begin with. There was an undisciplined merchant fleet, which is still a problem to some degree, and many masters did not pay attention to the convoy systems or the various other ways of repulsing or at least putting off piracy attention. We also encountered the issue that the European Union and NATO seemed not to be managing to get on very well operationally, as always.
What was the result of that? In 2010 there were 174 attacks and 47 pirated ships. More than that, however, through this effort we managed to displace this problem from the Gulf right out to the Indian Ocean as a whole, so it became a far more difficult problem. Somali piracy, which is part of the private sector and private entrepreneurship to a large degree, found new ways of modifying the model through mother ships and all sorts of other ways, so that it could be more successful over that broader area. That brought major economic issues—we often forget this—to those littoral states in east Africa, whether it be Somalia itself, Tanzania, Kenya or the Seychelles. Because people feared to transit those waters or go to port in those areas, there were direct economic consequences. Tourism was also affected. The one area that did benefit, I am told, is the fisheries stocks. No one dared go there, so the fisheries did well. Unfortunately, the Somalis themselves probably did not benefit much from that.
What is the situation now? In 2012 the attacks decreased from 174—in 2010—to 36; instead of 47 pirated ships in 2010, we only had five. In 2013 so far—these are early days, admittedly—there have been only two attacks and no pirated vessels whatever. During that whole time, the World Food Programme has not suffered one loss. So, in some ways, the prime reason for Atalanta has been successful.
Why has this happened? My colleagues and fellow noble Lords will no doubt go through this. However, the reasons include very strong international co-operation, not just between those three forces but also between independent nations. This includes China, which for the first time has operated outside its regional area; India, Russia and even Iran—although that is one country where the co-operation has not been so great. The international effort has led to success. There has also been real practical working at sea, even at a practical level between the European Union and NATO, which must be a first. Merchant fleet behaviour has become much better through the work of Northwood. Surveillance and intelligence using the Seychelles as a base has worked well; air surveillance has been far more effective and consistent; and intelligence has been shared.
The committee also recognised that there has been a more robust approach. We are regularly reminded that this is a constabulary operation, not a military one, and that the use of force therefore has to be proportionate and used carefully. However, we generally regarded the raid on the coast as a successful instance of putting down a marker to show that the European Union force was serious in terms of its intent regarding pirate bases. Also, armed guards are now allowed on most of the merchant fleet. Our own committee was against this originally but we have changed our mind on that. However, I would be interested to hear the Government’s view on how the programme has worked. Perhaps most significant of all, in his evidence to us Alexander Rondos, the EU special representative, described Somalia and its cities as having bustle and growth, although he saw it as an economy without a state.
What are the lessons we learnt? The obvious ones are that there is disorder where there are weak states and where the rule of law does not go to the borders; and that regardless of whether that is due to religious militancy or, as here, private sector entrepreneurship, it is very bad for nationals and for the international community. We have seen a different sort of piracy in west Africa as well and we will need to tackle that over time, too. We also know that it is good to have a comprehensive policy. We now have a much more comprehensive one in terms of the European Union’s Horn of Africa policy in Atalanta, the EU trading mission for Somali troops and increasing the coastal capabilities of all those states through the EUCAP NESTOR operation. We felt that the Gulf states should be more involved, but we know that until we solve problems onshore in Somalia, those operations will have to remain.
I congratulate a number of actors on their work, the Seychelles in particular. The Foreign Ministry of the Seychelles came and gave us evidence. It worked strongly and very responsibly with the community. At Northwood, we saw a most professional operation which was hugely international in its scope. We felt great confidence in it and it has clearly been a major part of success. However, I commend perhaps most of all the international co-operation between all those forces; for example, between the UK and France—one of the French warships, FS “Surcouf”, has a UK Lynx helicopter on it. I also commend the Seychelles, Kenya and Mauritius on the trial and imprisonment of pirates. However, I remind my fellow Members of this House that four vessels are still being held; that is, 108 human beings are still being held as hostages in those conditions. We have a ready business model that can be used elsewhere in the world. I believe also that we have failed to see the needs and the hopes of the Somali people in judging this operation. Perhaps looking inland, as well as out to sea, is something that we need to learn from this otherwise successful operation. I beg to move.
My Lords, I want to begin with a complaint. I find it absolutely intolerable that a committee such as ours sits for a number of weeks or months, takes evidence and brings a lot of people kindly to give evidence before us; we produce a report in August; the Government respond shortly afterwards; but we cannot find time for the House to debate it until the following March. I find this quite intolerable. We have a government Whip who is kind enough to be with us—it is nothing to do with him—and I hope that he will pass on to the usual channels and those who organise our business that we really must treat Select Committee reports in a better way than this. I find it very unsatisfactory indeed. I say no more about it.
I should like, secondly, to express a number of thanks. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, who has been chairman of this sub-committee, ably supported by the staff who help us enormously—I thank all of them.
The next thing I want to do is to welcome the reduction in incidents of Somali piracy during the past year or so. This is a very significant fall and reflects great credit on the various military and naval forces which have helped to bring it about. I suppose that it has been helped particularly by the fact, referred to by the noble Lord, that a great number of merchant ships now have armed guards on them. We heard evidence that this has had a salutary effect on potential pirates, who find that there is a certain amount of fire directed towards them when they start attempting to board merchant ships.
As the chairman said, the committee changed its mind over this matter. In the earlier report, I think that a number of us were a little anxious lest we moved into a situation where oil tankers with a huge amount of inflammable material aboard started being attacked by rockets fired by pirates. There is a danger that, over months, as a response to armed guards on ships, the pirates might start using much more lethal weaponry which could lead to a major attack on a ship causing it to catch fire. So far, however, having armed guards has been a big success.
The chairman did briefly refer to another success—that 1,000,000 tonnes of food has been brought into Somalia under the World Food Programme. This is a wonderful record in an area where there is a great deal of belligerence. Many people would say that they did not deserve it, but of course starving people always deserve it and we should salute those who have taken in this 1,000,000 tonnes of food under considerable difficulty.
Another salutary episode which has helped to reduce the number of incidents was the single land attack on one of the harbours used by the pirates. I am glad that Admiral Potts said that we would do it again. There has been a certain amount of criticism about attacking a land target but it was quite right to do it and I think the committee agreed with that. When we went to Northwood I suggested that it would be a good idea to have another one just to show that it was not a one-off. I may sound rather belligerent but it did have an enormous salutary effect and another attack should not be ruled out.
When the Minister responds, I hope he will speak about the political progress that has been made in Somalia itself. From our committee’s report and from the comments of virtually everyone who has spoken about the crisis in Somalia and in the seas around it has been agreed that, on the ground, the long-term solution is a political one. This is very important and I hope the Minister will talk about it.
I am very disturbed indeed to hear that the newly elected president has decided to release 959 pirates by way of amnesty. Again, I hope the Minister will explain this because, from the brief I looked at which said that the president had given an amnesty to 959 pirates, I am not sure whether they were convicted, or that they were held and awaiting trial, or that they were known to be pirates to the civil authorities, such as they are in Somalia. I am interested to know quite what the basis of this amnesty is. We are told that the amnesty does not extend to what I would call the godfathers—the evil plotters who have been organising these attacks and who have been receiving vast amounts of money in ransoms. I am glad to know that the godfathers have not had amnesties but it would be helpful to know about it.
I turn now to the future. It seems to me that those 959 pirates who have received an amnesty are now free to get up to their monkey tricks again. The godfathers are presumably still there, ready to organise such things. Again, I hope the Minister will talk to us about the future. As the number of attacks has been so significantly reduced, there will be a temptation on the part of NATO, the Americans, the European Union and others who have been involved to say, “Oh well, it is much less now—we can relax our presence”. I am sure that there will be political pressure, particularly given the pressure on all the militaries around the world, to say that they are going to reduce the military and naval presence there. Having done so, however, there is a danger—because the pirates have received an amnesty and the godfathers are still there—that it will all start up again using the assets which have been used previously. I hope that the Minister will speak about this.
Another matter which I very much hope the Minister will speak about—I will try to fill in for a moment until the Minister has got his brief; I quite understand that one has to do that—is the fact that we said in our report that it was important to enthuse the Gulf states about attacking the pirates and causing the incidents to be reduced. Quite honestly, however, the Government’s response to our suggestion that the Gulf states should be encouraged to take a much more active part was pretty wishy-washy. I will not read aloud the Government’s response but they gave us four answers to that: we have a headquarters in Bahrain; there are port facilities in Oman; there is co-operation in Dubai; and a whole lot of countries came to a conference in London. With great respect, that is not at all what we meant. These Gulf countries are earning monumental amounts of money for their hydrocarbon exports. As far as I know, their physical assistance in all of this is not as great as it might be. I hope the Minister will look into this and say whether a much more positive approach can be made to our suggestion, in paragraph 87 of our report, to get those states much more actively involved.
Finally, I was concerned that we were told during the inquiry that quite a few convicted pirates were going to be returned to Somalia from Kenya, the Seychelles and other places. It seemed to some of us that to send them back to prisons in Somalia was not very clever because one could not be sure of the security around those prisons. We were told that the United Nations was building a prison and that it would be properly supervised. Given that 959 pirates have received an amnesty, does that mean that the United Nations prison will be redundant and not used? I do not know who these 959 pirates who have received an amnesty are, but it seems to me rather a strange decision that the prisons within Somalia are secure enough to hold convicted pirates. It would seem to me to need a great deal of expert outside supervision to ensure that those prisoners could not be freed. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, and I think I agree with everything that he said on this subject. I learnt from him—no doubt there is something wrong with the way that I get information on these kind of incidents but I had not heard about it—about the 950 pirates being amnestied by the Government of Somalia. I totally share his anxiety, indeed his horror, at that news and put it to the Government that it should have consequences. Unless there was consultation with the EU in advance of that decision being made by the Somali President then consequences really ought to flow, because it is quite inconsistent with the kind of collaboration and mutual confidence which one had understood had been developed over the past few months between the EU on the one side and the Somali Government on the other. The consequences should be in terms of aid or other forms of support which will be felt, in measured degree, by the Government of Somalia. If we just allow this incident to go uncommented on and unsanctioned, we shall be encouraging similarly bad behaviour in the future and shall lose that sense that we need to act as a team and keep in close co-operation with the Somali Government—we need to consult them about things but they need to consult us as well, and we expect their support. The cost of capturing these pirates is very considerable and the idea that they should be released in this way is quite horrific.
I will make three points, two of which will be approving—indeed congratulatory—points about the report and one of which will be more hortatory, or perhaps slightly critical. First, although there are other very good examples which I will not mention but which we all have had before our eyes, this seems to be an extraordinarily and particularly good example of the success of the European common foreign and security policy. We have managed to make considerable progress—the figures have already been mentioned—in dealing with this great threat and have managed to do so with tremendous leverage in the case of this country. We have almost not contributed any military units at all. We have contributed one of Her Majesty’s ships, a Royal Naval vessel, for a few months and of course contributed very importantly by providing command and control and logistical management of the exercise from PJHQ. We have obviously done an extremely good job there, and I add my own words to the words of congratulation that have already been spoken. I am of course very familiar with PJHQ—it is a wonderful body and a superb organisation, and it is not surprising to me that it has done such a good job. On top of that contribution, we have got all these vessels together. It would have been nice to have even more resources but we have contributed very considerable resources. It is an example of the leverage that can be generated by the common foreign and security policy and of the success that we can have.
Eurosceptics tend to say that we do not need an explicit EU policy and that we can just have a series of ad hoc coalitions where a lot of countries agree in their assessment of the problem and are prepared to do something about it. That is a very inadequate answer indeed. If you do not have a common foreign and security policy, you do not have the mechanisms and the tried and tested procedures there for, first, evaluating the threat, which is very important, and then for managing the response. You do not have the long-standing commitment and sense of solidarity; everybody just starts off saying, “Is it really in our national interest to do this? Do we really want to do it? How much will we be compensated by allies if we do it?”. You have to start afresh again, negotiating all these things from scratch, and every operation has the weaknesses and dangers of an experiment rather than being an ongoing, tried and tested policy where people have the confidence, know the procedures will work, and are familiar and happy with the decision-making process. This is a very good example of how we need a common foreign and security policy. I do not know that the Government are particularly interested in my contribution to their balance of competences review—they would probably dismiss me as a Europhile and anyway a member of the Labour Party, and so would not be interested in what I say—but I hope that the point gets included in the evaluation of the balance of competences review when it comes to the European common foreign and security policy. In fact, it would be monstrous if this was not taken into account as one of the examples of the success of that policy.
The second point I wanted to make, which is again very much approving, is to congratulate the committee on having been pragmatic enough to review its original position on two matters. One was the attack on the pirates’ land bases and the second was on having armed guards on ships passing through the pirate zone. The committee reviewed its original position in the light of evidence and experience and came up with absolutely the right policy solution. It strongly supports—as do I—the initiative taken to deal with some of the land bases. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, that it may be necessary to take further action. If it is, I hope that the authorities concerned will be encouraged to do so.
Equally, armed guards have proved their worth. It is not necessary to carry heavy armament for this purpose: a couple of general-purpose machine-guns, one on the port side and one on the starboard, will be enough effectively to deter the sort of pirates with whom we are dealing in the Indian Ocean. The committee was very good on that. It did not just come up with an initial response but looked carefully at the developing situation, and its report is the stronger for it.
On my third point, about ransom payments, I take issue with the committee. I have spoken on this in the Chamber, so noble Lords may be familiar with my views, which have not changed. The committee’s recommendation comes in paragraph 51 on page 18, which states:
“We reiterate our previous conclusion in our 2009 report that those involved in assembling ransoms in the United Kingdom have a duty to seek consent for its payment and that not to do so, if necessary by filing a Suspicious Activity Report, may result in the commission of a criminal offence. We request that the Government now respond substantively to this recommendation”.
This is woefully inadequate and thoroughly pusillanimous. It does not even begin to address the reality of the situation, which is that these are criminal payments. They are rewards to criminals for criminal activity that endangers life.
They are also very substantial—not that that makes a difference to the principle—and run into tens of millions of dollars on a regular basis. It has become something of an industry and is now a regular feature of the insurance market in London. Lloyd’s makes ransom payments that are transported by all sorts of dramatic means to the pirates in Somalia. This is simply not a situation about which we as legislators should be complacent. It is quite clear that these are criminal offences. They are payments to criminals for criminal purposes and they should be illegal. It should not be a question of reporting the matter through a suspicious activity report. The payments should be seized by the Serious Fraud Office or whichever arm of the police is responsible for monitoring illegal payments of this kind, and we should make sure, if the law is not robust enough to deal with the matter in this way and does not make it a criminal offence to make ransom payments to terrorists, pirates or any other form of criminal, that we change the law to make sure that it does exactly that.
I am very disappointed and very sorry that the committee did not come to that conclusion. It does not explain why it did not, and in its report did not even examine the suggestion that I am making—unless I missed it, and I hope I did not. I would be very interested during the rest of the debate to hear from Members of the Committee about why they feel that the present legal situation is adequate, and why a suspicious activity report is the furthest they envisage going in dealing with this matter—which after all, if it is not dealt with effectively both by the physical measures about which we have been talking and by measures controlling flows in the financial markets, will become a criminal industry affecting commerce throughout the world.
My Lords, I, too, greatly welcome the opportunity to discuss this report by Sub-Committee C. As I am about to be rotated—perhaps in this context I should say helicoptered—off the committee, perhaps I may also pay tribute to the stewardship of the committee by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson. I say “stewardship” because I am not sure that Liberal Democrats accept the concept of chairmanship. I also welcome the chance to comment—as did the noble Lord, Lord Davies—on a European Union activity that is working well, and to which the UK has made an important and perhaps even determining contribution. I will come back to that general point at the end of my speech.
I welcome, too, the way in which the effectiveness of Operation Atalanta today draws on the lessons from its own operations at the start. I think that there is a lesson here perhaps for other European Union operations and policies too—that there needs to be a constant rethinking in the light of experience. The first example which strikes me in particular is the stronger co-operation between Atalanta and NATO and others including India and China. I think that the way in which this has become a much more international anti-piracy operation is very impressive. The second example is the inclusion of security teams on board ships. The committee did indeed have reservations about this at first but, in the light of experience, it, too, changed its mind. It is clear that having security operations on board has proved itself in the past couple of years or so. Finally, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, pointed out, persuading the World Food Programme to provide larger and quicker ships to reduce their vulnerability to piracy, which has had a very marked effect on the ability of the programme to deliver food to populations in Somalia and elsewhere who really need it, is something which I greatly welcome, too. However, I welcome in particular the realisation that piracy is largely the result of chaos and instability within Somalia, which has effectively for the past 20 years or so, with a slight improvement recently, been a failed state.
We need to see Atalanta as part of a broader EU approach to the Horn of Africa, not just an operation in its own right. The Horn of Africa strategy adopted at the end of 2011, including the training mission in Uganda for Somali security sector training and the mission to strengthen coastal defence capabilities through the region—the horribly named EUCAP NESTOR—have not only been very worth while but add up to an overall approach by the EU to the Horn of Africa that is admirable. At the same time, it is encouraging that some economic and political stability is emerging at least in and around Mogadishu and that the influence of al-Shabaab is at least for now—and let us hope for longer than now—on the decline. Ensuring that that continues must be the main aim of EU and our own policy from now on. This should largely be an African task, not just an EU or western task, although it is very hard to see how EU and western help will not be necessary in the foreseeable future.
It seems to me that the African Union will have a key role to play here. It has huge challenges at present, and it has weaknesses, but it is far more effective than it has been in the past. I hope that the European Union and the UK will continue to do what they can to strengthen it. It would be very helpful if the Minister could say something about that.
At the same time the EU must focus its development on capacity building in Somalia. I declare an interest here as the chair of a medical aid charity, Merlin, which operates in Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia itself. Britain, like the EU, has an important role to play in helping with education and medical aid both through its own funds and through the help that it gives to non-governmental organisations.
I should like to branch out just slightly from Somalia and look at two other African issues that have arisen since our report was produced—as the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, said—some months ago. The first is Mali and the second is piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Sub-Committee C has expressed great concern about the destabilisation of Mali and the impact that that could have on Britain and on wider European interests since the break-up of the country two years ago. The attack on the oil refinery in southern Algeria and the recently—alas—proven murder of hostages, including a British hostage in northern Nigeria, show only too clearly how developments apparently remote from us can affect us and damage us directly.
I would not accept the argument that these attacks are the result of western action. We have a role to play in supporting west African countries in countering al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, but I do not underestimate the difficulties in doing it. I greatly welcome the help that we are giving the French in what could still be a long and unpredictable campaign in Mali. I believe that our contribution there really matters and is important.
More related perhaps to the debate on Somali piracy is the growth of piracy in west Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea. In some ways this seems to be of a different kind of piracy from that in Somalia, including attacks in port—for example, in Abidjan in the Ivory Coast—and it is centred more on stealing cargo for money than on kidnapping ships and crews for ransom. The effect of piracy in west Africa can be particularly dramatic on fragile economies, increasing insurance rates but, much more than that, reducing revenue—by up to 70% in the case of Cotonou, the only port in Benin. That has had a pretty dramatic impact on the state of a fragile economy.
From the recent Parliamentary Statement in another place by the Foreign Office Minister, Alistair Burt, I am glad to see that the Government are taking the growth of west African piracy seriously. I am also glad that the Royal Navy is deploying at least one ship in the Gulf of Guinea and is working closely there with the French. When the Minister responds could he say whether that deployment has been stepped up in the light of the growth of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea?
I would make one final point in drawing some of these threads together. We see a mixture of piracy, conflict and terrorism in Somalia, Mali and the Gulf of Guinea—all of these seem a long way off but this can affect our interests directly. As a nation with global interests and, as a member of the UN Security Council, of NATO and of the European Union, with global responsibilities too, we cannot stand aside from nor ignore instability of this sort. Nor, given budgetary pressures of which I am sure the Minister is only too aware, can we respond to them on our own. We also need to recognise that political influence, development and military intervention where necessary need to be looked at together—as has been the case in Somalia—and not as separate activities. As we have seen in Somalia, the European Union is uniquely able to do this, by bringing together actions through its defence policy and its common foreign and security policy. All those are important for the African countries themselves, for the EU and, I would argue, for Britain as well. None of those policies is perfect; all would be better with the full engagement of the United Kingdom, and British interests would be well served too. In the context of common foreign and security policy and of bringing together policies in Somalia, that argument is relevant to our policy towards the European Union in a wider sense where critical, constructive engagement can be in our interests and can make a real difference to the policies of the European Union itself.
I agree very much with what the noble Lord, Lord Jay, has just said. I would like to congratulate the chairman, my colleagues and the staff on what is an excellent report. It is a tribute to the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and I would like to pay him a general tribute as he is stepping down. He has been an excellent chairman of this committee and we have produced a number of very good reports in recent years.
I turn to the report. Operation Atalanta has been a success, as has the EU’s foreign policy—there is no question about that. This is due partly to the efficiency of the operation under UK leadership, which I hope people will focus on. We saw that leadership in operation at the command and control centre at Northwood, which we visited as a committee and very much admired. It is an amazing place and it was quite spectacular to see it in operation. Of course there has also been the co-operation with the other international organisations: the US-led combined maritime force; the NATO-led Operation Ocean Shield; and with other countries such as Russia, China and India. All that has obviously been very helpful, too.
Then, of course, we have the game-changer of putting armed guards on ships, which has been backed by a regulatory system that is becoming increasingly effective. As colleagues have noted, the committee changed its mind on this. The facts changed and so we changed our minds—that is a sensible thing for a committee to do. The truth is that having armed guards on ships has proved a highly effective deterrent. So far, no ships carrying armed guards have been successfully pirated. That in itself speaks for that idea.
I should also mention the building-up of a judicial system to deal with culprits. There are 101 in prison in the Seychelles and 147 in Kenya. I hope we are going to hear something from the Minister about this. I am not saying that he is responsible for what the Somali President has done, but it is important. It ostensibly drives a coach and four through the whole policy. If the Somali President comes along and gives amnesty to 959 pirates, what are we to say about the rest of them in prison elsewhere? This will clearly have to be looked at rather more carefully.
The most important point in the report is that the mandate of the operation should be extended beyond December 2014. That is an important signal that the EU and the international community are not going to walk away from their obligations to clear the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden of piracy. Interestingly, there was a meeting of the European Economic and Social Committee on 24 January, attended by the shipping industry and seafarers generally. They very much endorsed the position in our report. The noble Lord, Lord Jay, made strongly the point about the importance of attending to the political development in Somalia and of getting rid of the conditions in which piracy can flourish.
Our report also strongly supports the Horn of Africa strategy: the combination of diplomatic, financial and operational tools which provides some opportunity for a sensible and coherent response to all the awful crises facing the region. Alongside Atalanta, you now have NESTOR—the EU’s training mission for Somali security forces—as well as the appointment of the special representative for the Horn of Africa, which we welcome in our report.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Jay, I turn to the west African issue. The trouble with piracy, particularly if it is successful, is that it is very infectious. Although the background is different, Somali piracy is increasingly mirrored in what is happening in west Africa. Armed hijacking is on the rise in the Gulf of Guinea, the waters of Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ivory Coast. It is interesting that many of these incidents involve vessels transporting petroleum products. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime explains this by the booming black market for fuel in west Africa. Clearly, this is a rather sinister situation growing up here and it needs watching very carefully indeed. It is essential that there should be a response not only by the region’s Governments but by the international community so that west African seas do not become as dangerous as the Indian Ocean has been, but—fortunately—now is not.
I want to ask the Minister several questions. What are the UK Government and the EU doing to meet the threat? Can the Minister—I share the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jay, here—confirm that the Royal Navy is deploying units to west Africa and working in conjunction with France and the United States? Is there a case for applying some of the lessons that have been learnt in Somalia and the Indian Ocean in west African waters? Can the strategy and models that have been used successfully in this area be used also in west Africa? I know that it is a different situation but we ought to learn some lessons.
As a last point, we must not forget the cost of piracy. At the European Economic and Social Committee meeting which I was referring to, Dr Anna Bredima, who is vice-president of the Employers’ Group, said that piracy costs the global economy $12 billion a year. She went on to say:
“Piracy is not only a maritime problem. It is also a humanitarian, trade and global one, affecting consumers and taxpayers around the world”.
I also saw in a paper for Nautilus International, the seafarers’ organisation, a rather graphic description, drawn from the Times of India, of 23 crew members who were taken hostage from the cargo ship “Iceberg”—this is the human cost—and held for three years by Somali pirates. One died of malnutrition, and the Times of India told how the rest spent,
“four months next to a freezer with a body inside”,
and how officers were,
“hung upside down and tortured and the ears of a senior officer [were] … chopped off”,
for failing to move the ship. Pirates would beat or whip crew members if aircraft passed overhead. It is not surprising that these men are haunted by such memories. It serves as a reminder to us when we write our reports of why the pirates have to be fought, pursued and prosecuted.
My Lords, I joined Sub-Committee C, on external affairs, just in time to see the Turning the Tide report through to its conclusion, although I missed direct involvement in the original inquiry that preceded it. This was my first inquiry with Sub-Committee C and, along with other noble Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, for his chairmanship, and also note the expertise of the staff and the warm welcome offered by noble Lords who were already on the committee.
Before I joined Sub-Committee C I was, along with many others, all too aware of Somalia’s recent troubled history and in particular its notoriety as the launching pad for numerous acts of piracy in the Indian Ocean. I therefore welcome the opportunity today to address some of the issues raised by the report. I should say from the outset that I agree with many of the points that have already been made by other noble Lords on the committee but want to go into some other areas.
Naval patrols, armed personnel on vulnerable ships and the military operation on land-based criminals have all, as we have heard, contributed to diminishing the threat of piracy in the region. However, none of these activities represents a viable, or indeed a desirable, medium to long-term strategy. Political, economic and social stabilisation is the key to reducing piracy and other high-stakes criminal activity. If the root causes are not addressed, such crimes will continue to flourish.
As we reported, the EU has now formulated a strategy for the Horn of Africa and appointed a special representative, Alexander Rondos, who has already been referred to. It has also launched two missions: a training mission to Uganda—EUTM Somalia; and, crucially, the newish mission to strengthen the maritime capacity of the coastal states of east Africa—EUCAP NESTOR. As my noble friend Lord Jay said, that is not a very pleasant sounding title, but none the less we hope that it will be effective.
Alexander Rondos told us of the need to build up coastal communities if piracy was to be countered. He believed that extending stabilisation and investing in coastal areas was essential and absolutely key in offering an alternative incentive to those who feel that they need to tolerate piracy or allow it to operate from within their communities. The evidence from the Council of Somali Organisations supported this assertion and made the additional point that coastal communities had,
“persistently lobbied donors for small scale support to help them develop local mobile marine cadres”,
to patrol their coastline and provide a security presence that would disrupt and deter pirate groups and al-Shabaab activity.
To counter the argument that the EU presence represents yet another hostile foreign military force, as some see it, the EU needs to make a commitment to protect and monitor fishing in Somali waters. There has been a call for the mandates to be revised to protect Somali waters from illegal fishermen and those who transport toxic and other dangerous materials. When we received the evidence, we considered recommending that Operation Atalanta should undertake greater protection of Somali fishing grounds, but we concluded that a naval mission was not in a position to undertake this additional role as well as protecting shipping, and that the task should be taken up by another organisation.
To some extent, the newly established civilian mission EUCAP NESTOR goes part of the way towards addressing some of the concerns. The mission aims to train a coastal police force and judges with expert advice on legal, policy and operational matters concerning maritime security. Giving more resources and support to the countries of the region to build capacity would make further improvements and ultimately cost the EU less in the longer term. The FCO told us that the setting-up phase of EUCAP NESTOR was going well. I hope that the Minister will be able to tell us that the initiative is on track.
The focus on a military solution to Somalia-based piracy, and conventional approaches to aid and development, should not prevent the EU addressing real concerns about fishing and the historic dumping of toxic waste by multinational organisations. A recent Italian investigation concluded that around 35 million tonnes of waste had been exported to Somalia, leading to the assertion that its inland waste dumps were among the largest in the world.
The Somali people have been caught up in a dreadful vicious circle. With the likelihood that the country will achieve just one of the eight millennium development goals by 2015, weak governance structures at all levels, an underdeveloped civil society, the constant threat of armed conflict within and between clans and extensive corruption, it is no wonder that some companies feel able to take advantage of the situation and act with impunity, dumping nuclear and other hazardous waste in Somali coastal waters.
I emphasise that this is not put forward as an excuse for piracy—not in any way. However, the issue must be addressed if the EU is to maintain confidence in what it is doing. European multinationals, the Somali Government and local clan warlords have all been implicated in these activities. Arms have been traded for the right to dump hazardous materials. The ships bringing the cargo into Somalia then become trawlers when they leave the area, with their holds full of tuna fish. These illegal activities must be robustly monitored and the consequences addressed if there is to be a long-term solution to piracy in the region.
Recently, pirate gangs have turned to land-based criminal activity such as kidnapping aid workers, tourists and journalists in Somalia and Kenya and holding them for ransom. That is why military interventions need to take place alongside strategic local and regional political initiatives supported by international collaboration. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said, the involvement of organisations such as the African Union and ECOWAS is crucial to that operation.
In Somaliland, which is relatively stable, unemployment among young people stands at approximately 75%. One strategy to help keep young people from the grasp of criminal gangs would be to capitalise on the influx of foreign aid agencies and other NGOs into the area by ensuring that these organisations provide opportunities for local young people to learn skills, undertake internships and gain paid work. EU development aid should also be directed towards providing alternative livelihoods for the Somali people. Somehow, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, mentioned at the beginning, the vast majority of the Somali population are not involved in these criminal activities yet they seem to get punished whichever way things go.
As the Africa Research Institute points out, the EU needs to demonstrate its willingness to address the issue of European-owned companies that have been dumping toxic waste off the Somali coast for years. Robust action on this matter would help to underline the legitimacy of the EU endeavours in the region. I wonder if the Minister, or indeed the Government, has a view on this matter.
There are some positive signs emerging from Somalia, some of which have already been referred to. We heard from witnesses that there was less hostility from the Somali population to the African Union’s mission in Somalia, a greater spirit of optimism and more talk of nation building. The EUCAP NESTOR mission will be a significant development in combating piracy from the land.
What happens over the next few years will be crucial to the settled future of the Somalian peoples. I very much hope that the sub-committee will somehow find a way to revisit these issues and have another follow-up report at some point in the future.
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and the sub-committee on the report. I missed the debate of the noble Lord, Lord Luce, last year, so this is a valuable opportunity for me not just to speak today but to inform myself on an important area of foreign policy. This policy, as the Minister knows very well from his experience of Africa, ties defence priorities closely to those of international development. The unexpected release and safe return of the chemical tanker “Royal Grace” last week brought welcome relief to the operation as well as to those on board. I hope that we shall soon learn the fate of the other tanker MS “Smyrni”. These welcome facts further suggest that Atalanta, while not resting on her laurels, should already be rated as a major success of international co-operation alongside the remarkable military and political turnaround in Somalia itself.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe of Aberavon, said memorably in the last debate that the name Atalanta gave it a NATO benediction. It is true that, provided that there are no golden apples or false rewards, the name implies great rapidity from a defence point of view. It has been a spectacular demonstration of our own naval command and control over the past four years. I am personally enthusiastic about the Navy—perhaps not quite as gung-ho as the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, about a land operation but I think that we have done magnificently. For the EU, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has mentioned, it should mean a feather in the cap of the EEAS for its solid support of the operation. It should also get a mention in Sub-Committee C’s new report about to be published.
There are, of course, always dangers ahead. Last December, the Piracy Ransoms Task Force called for greater co-ordination among the countries and agencies involved. I am surprised that the committee has not pronounced more on the question of ransoms. There remains a widespread concern that while the incidence of piracy has come down, the amounts of ransoms are increasing. There are also fears that complacency may set in, armed guards will be reduced and the cycle may begin all over again. The trend of kidnapping in the region, notably in west Africa, has recently been upwards.
As for Somalia itself, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said in October that the priority should now be the re-establishment of stability and the rule of law. Nobody could disagree with that. He expressed the hope that the international community,
“will not allow that task to fail through lack of resources and lack of political will”.—[Official Report, 24/10/12; col.280.]
I agree with that aspiration: there is an upward trend of political will but no easy path ahead—as the noble Lord, Lord Jay, has expressed, and the noble Baroness, Lady Young, has already brought home to us.
“possibly the toughest place in the world to be a child”,
according to the CEO of Save the Children when he returned from that country. The number of people in urgent need of humanitarian aid is expected to exceed 2.1 million in the coming months. The figure is down from last year but it is still large. Again, success is relative. Recurrence of the 2011 famine has been largely averted in rural areas, but there is still an imperative to plant crops and avoid food dependency while encouraging the return of traders and small businesses to towns. Here, I strongly agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Young.
I am glad to say that one of the most effective programmes is the SEED employment programme, funded by the UK, which works alongside the FAO in Puntland and south-central Somalia. It generated 56,000 jobs and has trained nearly 4,000 women and young people in livestock and agriculture. This is exactly the kind of programme that must revive the economy. When extended to coastal areas, it will provide alternatives to piracy, which everyone knows is a side-product of the civil war and of anarchy over the past decades. Employment, small business support and trade should feature prominently at the London conference that will be held on 7 May. Somalia is making a rapid recovery. We in this country are host to many Somali refugees and should be well placed to encourage the return of business leaders and professionals who will help rebuild their communities.
On the rule of law, there are many gaps to be filled, as we all know. I hope that the Minister will bring us up to date with the work of EUCAP NESTOR, notably in Puntland and Somaliland, and tell us whether there has been any progress in setting up the new land-based coastal police force. The committee report states that,
“Nestor could and should be the gateway to a permanent solution”.
The name “Nestor” is familiar to me because it is the name of my grandson, whom I took to see HMS “Belfast” yesterday afternoon. I hope that everyone will see him as a figure of wisdom in the future.
I am not familiar with the intricacies of Somali politics. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, who came to the previous debate but who unfortunately is not here today, pointed out in October that until last summer the Puntland maritime police force had been very effective in closing bases and arresting pirates. Then it fell foul of other recognised authorities, including the UN, and even of its own South African trainers, one of whom was shot dead. Where food and commodities are scarce, clan loyalty and corruption easily turn into police connivance with the enemy—the pirates. Now that the new federal Government have greater confidence and are earning international recognition, will the Puntland police force be allowed to resume its former effectiveness? What will AMISOM and IGAD contribute to this exercise? Tributes are paid to them in the report. The government response to the committee mentioned training in Uganda but was silent on the calibre of the police forces in Somalia.
Finally, I hope that the Minister will congratulate Kenya and the Seychelles. They have expanded their courts and prisons over the years to accommodate hundreds of detained and convicted pirates. Perhaps he will update us on the attitudes there. In the context of what the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, said, will the Minister say to what extent and on what terms the pirates and prisoners are being returned either to civilian life or to face judgment in Hargeisa prison, which we have helped to rehabilitate, or elsewhere in Somalia?
We must be grateful that greater stability in Somalia will have valuable consequences over the border with Kenya, at a time of uncertainty following elections there. I hope that the world’s largest refugee camp will empty, that refugees will return home and that the acute conditions of poverty, malnutrition and ill health that we have seen so often on our TV screens over the past 20 years will disappear. Whether or not Atalanta is extended, the mission will have played a major role in this—largely, let us admit, for the benefit of the Gulf states and developed countries such as our own. Internal political stability can rarely be guaranteed by outsiders. Ultimately, it must depend on the Somali people themselves.
My Lords, I add my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and the European Union Committee for the report that we are considering today, which is a follow-up to the 2010 report on the European Union’s naval operation Atalanta. The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, gave us a comprehensive introduction on the present state of play, the key issues involved and progress made since the previous report. I do not, therefore, intend to refer to all the issues which he so ably addressed and which are referred to in the report.
The report indicates an improving situation as far as the levels of Somali piracy are concerned, with a significant reduction in the number of pirated vessels and hostages in June 2012 compared to June 2011, as well as much greater practical co-operation between organisations and nations. However, the report certainly does not suggest that the problem has been solved. The committee welcomed the EU Atalanta attack on the pirate land base and, in their response, the Government agreed with that. The committee also reported that it had changed its view on having armed guards on ships, in light of the fact that no ship carrying armed guards has been successfully pirated and violence has not apparently escalated.
Evidence was given to the committee, though, that those involved in piracy were increasing their activity on land, including kidnapping on shore, and that the smaller number of successful attacks had led to an increase in the level of ransom demands and greater violence. Indeed, the view appears to be that piracy will never be eliminated except, hopefully, in the longer term and that the realistic objective must be to make sure that it is contained. As a key part of that objective of containment, Operation Atalanta’s mandate was renewed in 2012 until the end of 2014.
I should like to raise a few points of relative detail about the report and the Government’s response. I note that, when the previous report was discussed in this House in November 2010, the response was given by the Foreign Office Minister. Today, the response to the European Union Committee’s follow-up report is being given by the Defence Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever. I am not sure whether the change in department responding to the debate represents any change in the Government’s priorities and approach to the issue of Somali piracy, Somalia and the EU’s Operation Atalanta, or whether it is simply an issue of the availability—or flexibility—of government Ministers. It would be helpful to have that small point clarified.
Paragraph 26 of the report states:
“We were, however, surprised to hear from the Minister that only one Royal Navy ship was allocated to Operation Atalanta for three months in a two year period”.
While the committee was surprised to hear this, it was not concerned, unlike the Chamber of Shipping, as the committee felt that there were financial constraints and considered that our command role from Northwood Headquarters was compensation for our limited contribution of vessels.
As the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, said, the committee’s report was completed last summer—over six months ago—and the government response was written last September, so could the Minister tell me whether our allocation of Royal Navy ships to Operation Atalanta remains as indicated in the report and the government response? I ask that also in the light of a recent article in the House magazine about HMS “Westminster” and her crew, which referred, among the other roles that they have, to the proud contribution made,
“to the international naval effort which has seen piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa reduce by 75% in the last 12 months”.
It may be that HMS “Westminster” has been involved in one of the other operations in the area, rather than in Operation Atalanta.
In its report, the committee expressed the view that any reduction in effort would quickly result in a renewed upsurge of pirate activity and that the mandate of Operation Atalanta should be extended beyond December 2014 to send a clear signal that the EU would not walk away from confronting piracy in the Indian Ocean. Rightly or wrongly, I rather took it from that that the committee may not wholeheartedly share the view that a decision on the renewal of the operation’s mandate should wait until the middle of next year, as appears to be the intention. The Government’s response to the report did not specifically address the issue of whether and when the mandate should be renewed, so it would be helpful if the Minister could say whether, on the basis of the situation on piracy as it is at the moment, the Government would or would not support renewal of Operation Atalanta’s mandate.
When the committee’s earlier report was discussed in 2010, there was general agreement that the long-term elimination of piracy would be secured only through addressing the underlying causes of instability affecting Somalia. That clearly remains the view. The committee’s report and the Government’s response set out the developments that have occurred and the steps that have been taken since the earlier report by the EU, the UN and the international community to help to improve the prospects of stability in Somalia. As the Government’s response says, fundamental to the EU’s efforts is the principle of encouraging greater African ownership, including by the African Union.
The committee is to be congratulated on the thoroughness of its work, including the follow-up report, which has highlighted the considerable progress that has been made and the reasons for it. Let us hope that that progress proves to be soundly based and that, despite some of the information that we have been given in the debate today about the release of those involved in piracy, it will ultimately lead not only to the eventual end of piracy but to a safer, more secure and more prosperous future for Somalia and its people in particular and for the region in general.
My Lords, I begin by acknowledging the quality of the contributions to this debate. Noble Lords have demonstrated a keen and impressive grasp of this very complicated issue. I praise in particular the excellent work of my noble friend Lord Teverson and the other committee members in compiling the report on Operation Atalanta.
Operation Atalanta has successfully contained, constrained and deterred acts of piracy. None the less, the UK’s longer-term aim is to eradicate the underlying causes of the instability that affects Somalia and gives rise to acts of piracy, and several noble Lords have made that point today. This can be achieved only by addressing the root causes of the problems in Somalia. EUTM Somalia and EUCAP NESTOR, launched as part of the EU’s contribution to an overall strategy for the Horn of Africa, aim to provide a comprehensive solution to Somalia’s problems. In time these missions, alongside AMISOM, will create a secure and stable Somalia, remove the incentives for piracy and develop the capacity of coastal states in the region to police their own coastlines.
The UK remains fully supportive of Operation Atalanta’s mandate and is committed to the continued command of Operation Atalanta from Northwood for the current mandate, which expires in December 2014. International pressure on the pirates must be maintained in order to prevent a significant resurgence of activity. While any formal decision to extend Operation Atalanta’s mandate beyond 2014 is unlikely to be taken in the immediate future, the EU has demonstrated a firm commitment to its counter-piracy efforts, including through enhancing the mandate with agreement on the use of autonomous vessel protection detachments and the disruption of pirate logistics dumps. Additionally, the launch of EUCAP NESTOR and a growing EU diplomatic role send further strong signals of increasing EU engagement.
The degree of maritime co-operation between the three core international counter-piracy forces—the EU’s Operation Atalanta, the US-led Combined Maritime Forces Combined Task Force 151 and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield—is among the best that we have ever seen. The three operations provide a variety of effective framework opportunities for third-state contributions to anti-piracy efforts to further enhance international co-operation, evidenced recently when Royal Thai naval forces commanded a Combined Maritime Forces task force from a UK vessel. The shared awareness and deconfliction mechanism has also helped to ensure that military efforts in the region are effectively co-ordinated between international partners.
The threat from piracy remains a serious problem, but results and trends suggest that Operation Atalanta, in conjunction with other measures to counter piracy, is proving effective. For example, as of 7 March this year, two vessels and 60 hostages were being held off the Somali coast, the lowest levels held by pirates since September 2009. I hate to correct my noble friend but two vessels and 48 hostages were released over the weekend, so the figures that I have quoted are the accurate ones. This compares favourably with May 2011, when 23 ships and 503 hostages were held. Attacks and pirating of vessels are down by over 75% during the past 12 months. However, I emphasise that these gains remain reversible and it is vital that we do not relieve any of the considerable pressure that is currently being brought to bear on the Somali pirates.
The ability to prosecute and detain convicted pirates is an important element of our strategy to combat piracy and is an effective deterrent. Over 1,200 suspects or convicted pirates are being held in 21 states across the world. The Seychelles currently holds 101, representing some 20% of its prison population, while Kenya holds 147. We continue to support regional partners in developing local prosecutorial capacity.
Capacity-building assistance is being provided to the Seychellois justice sector by the international community. For example, the UK has provided funding to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime for the work of its counter-piracy programme, which has included work with Montagne Posée prison in the Seychelles. A new 60-cell block was opened there in September 2011 to help with the detention of suspected and convicted pirates. The UK has provided assistance to the Attorney-General’s Office by seconding two prosecutors from the Crown Prosecution Service to assist with the prosecution of suspected pirates.
A longer-term solution to develop Somali capability and ownership of the piracy problem is being implemented by the UNODC’s post-trial transfer programme, which returns pirates convicted in regional jurisdictions to Somalia to serve out the balance of their sentences. The programme has so far transferred 59 convicted pirates from the Seychelles to Somaliland under the terms of a bilateral memorandum of understanding, the agreement of which was facilitated by the United Kingdom at the London conference on Somalia. Further transfers from the Seychelles are anticipated this year.
I turn to the specific questions asked by noble Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Jopling, asked what political progress had been made in Somalia. Real political progress has been made there in recent months. The transitional period concluded on 10 September with the election of a new president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. This was a significant moment in Somalia and an important step towards a renewed political process. The London Conference on Somalia in February 2012 brought the international community together to support this process and, for the first time in years, it was run in consultation with the Somali people through their elders. They led a process to draw up a new constitution and formed a new parliament which elected a new president.
It is clear that, after two decades of conflict and instability, the people of Somalia want to usher in a new era of peace, security and democracy. Recent political progress marks a new chapter in their history. The end of the transition is the best opportunity in years to make progress towards peace and stability. Already, people are rebuilding their properties and businesses; confidence is increasing; and the diaspora is returning.
My noble friend Lord Jopling and the noble Lord, Lord Radice, mentioned the 959 pirates who were released. They asked what was the basis of the amnesty and why did this not apply to the “godfathers”. This amnesty referred to the boys who had committed acts of piracy at sea but did not apply to the financial backers or the senior leaders of the pirate action groups. My noble friend Lord Jopling asked for the Government’s response to the committee’s recommendation for an increased contribution from the Gulf states. We are working closely with a number of the Gulf states, particularly the UAE, Bahrain and Oman, and organisations such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. The UAE has commanded the Combined Maritime Forces Combined Task Force 151 and Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and the UAE all provide bases for Royal Navy ships. They all share information with coalition forces.
My noble friend Lord Jopling also asked whether, as the number of attacks reduces, there is a temptation to relax our presence there. Military response must remain proportional to the threat until the root causes of piracy have been addressed ashore. This is now occurring via EUCAP NESTOR and other capacity-building initiatives. Meanwhile, Operation Atalanta, NATO and the CTF 151 continue their deterrent patrols which deliver the time and space to allow development activity to take place ashore.
My noble friend asked whether pirates would be returned to Somalia. The committee did not consider this to be sensible given the level of prison security. He asked would the UN prison remain unused. The UN has refurbished a prison in Somaliland which is currently housing convicted pirates returned from the Seychelles. Work is on the way to building additional penal facilities. This is crucial to Somalia’s ongoing development. Building justice and the rule of law is a priority for the new Somali president.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, pointed out that the example of success on Operation Atalanta should be included as part of the balance of competences review. Operation Atalanta will be part of a case study on common security and defence policy activities in the Horn of Africa. The noble Lord said that the committee’s conclusion in respect of ransom payments was wholly inadequate because these are criminal payments. Companies assembling ransoms in the UK must seek consent from the Serious Organised Crime Agency prior to payment. The Government do not make or facilitate substantive concessions to hostage-takers, including the payment of ransom. I would point out that it is not against UK law to pay piracy ransoms.
We agree with the noble Lord that it is not a satisfactory situation.
The noble Lord, Lord Jay, asked whether the United Kingdom continued to strengthen the African Union in Somalia. Support through the EU training mission will continue. The UK continues to support AMISOM in Mogadishu, which is the military arm of the AU in Somalia and was critical to the recent successful retaking of Kismayo that forced al-Shabaab out of one of its key strongholds and away from a key source of revenue. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, as a former ambassador to Paris, for his encouraging words on our support to the French over Mali.
The noble Lord also mentioned west African piracy. The situation there is much more maritime criminality than piracy—the theft of cargo, illegal bunkering et cetera—and should not be seen as similar to that in Somalia. As such, it is clearly the role of national police forces to deal with it. The Royal Navy is taking action where it can, predominantly in terms of training and capacity-building: HMS “Dauntless”, HMS “Edinburgh” and HMS “Argyll” have all recently worked in this area. The noble Lord asked what effect the destabilisation of Mali might have on wider UK interests. It would allow ungoverned space from which terrorists could operate, plan and launch attacks with impunity, and could also destabilise other parts of Africa such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
The noble Lord, Lord Radice, asked what the United Kingdom and the EU are doing to meet the threat in west Africa, whether the Royal Navy will deploy assets to west Africa and whether we will apply the lessons from Somalia to west Africa. Lessons are being learnt from Somalia and applied to west Africa. The UK is supporting the industry initiative to create a regional maritime trade information-sharing centre. The Royal Navy deployment has helped build capacity aboard vessels and it is helping to train maritime law enforcement officers and develop maritime legal frameworks to prosecute maritime crime. Corruption locally is the biggest threat.
The noble Baroness, Lady Young, and the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, asked how EUCAP NESTOR is progressing. The answer is: as well as can be expected. Building capacity where none has existed for 20 years is a great challenge. It involves preparing assessments of what is required, identifying key leaders who will have to drive forward development on behalf of the Somali Government and people, working in conjunction with various institution-building initiatives and prioritising where EU funds need to be spent.
The noble Baroness asked what the Government’s view is on dumping toxic waste off the coast of Somalia. Historical reports of toxic dumping in the early days of piracy cannot be denied, but it has reduced significantly owing to the naval presence in the area. Recent reports to the UN Security Council have failed to provide evidence of toxic dumping off the Somali coast. This Government remain committed to working with international partners to tackle all the reasons used to justify committing acts of piracy.
The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, asked me to congratulate Kenya and the Seychelles on their efforts and asked what the Government’s attitude was towards Operation Atalanta. Regional partners are an essential part of the UK’s counter-piracy strategy. The Seychelles are leading the effort, having recognised the threats from piracy to tourism and their fishing and maritime industries. We commend their continuing efforts and those of Kenya.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether there was a change in the department responsible, as I am responding to this debate, and whether it reflects a change in the Government’s approach to piracy. There is no change in the department. The Ministry of Defence led the written response to this committee, and it is therefore fitting that I attend this debate now. This Government remain committed to countering the threat of piracy in the Indian Ocean and to working with our international partners.
The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, asked whether the Puntland maritime police force would be allowed to resume its activities. The Puntland maritime police force is a local militia trained by a private security company and it received weapons in breach of the UN sanctions regime in force for Somalia. The decision to employ or allow the activities of the PMPF rests with the new Government of Somalia.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether the Government’s allocation of ships to Atalanta remains as per the report. The answer is yes. We allocate ships on a case-by-case basis, and it may not be the most effective use of ships to allocate them to Atalanta rather than to other coalitions. This is kept under constant review and plans made accordingly. A Royal Navy helicopter is currently assigned to Atalanta, working from a front ship. The noble Lord asked whether, given the current situation, the Government would support extension of Atalanta’s mandate. The EU is beginning a strategic review of Operation Atalanta, and we remain committed to supporting this mission.
The piracy threat cannot be dealt with through military means alone. It will require a sustained international effort that addresses not only the threat from pirates but institutional incapacity. The UK is ultimately seeking greater coherence between EUTM, Atalanta and Op NESTOR within the overall EU Horn of Africa strategy but also with other international and UK unilateral activity. All the symptoms—terrorism, piracy and migration—are a result of the causes of instability in Somalia. EUTM does not currently link directly to the other CSDP missions but rather to the wider EU strategy as part of the comprehensive approach to Somalia. Linking missions with diplomatic and developmental tools should enable the EU to take a lead internationally in seeking to bring stability and governance to the country and wider region.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister for his response and particularly for the good news—I am delighted to be corrected—that we are down to two vessels and 60 hostages. That has to be very good news for the families and the people who are involved. I hope that we can bring those figures down to zero before too long.
When I mentioned World Food Programme vessels coming into Mogadishu, I meant Djibouti. Clearly, they could not go into Mogadishu because it was not under any sensible control.
Perhaps I may respond briefly to what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, said about ransoms. We considered this in our first report but not in our second. I recognise that this is a hole in the report. In fact, the bit that was put in was really from another EU Committee report through the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. Perhaps we can look at this further.
Will the Minister ask his officials to do a broader note on pirate release? This is of concern to the committee and is an important context. It is not for further debate now, but if his department could give us more background, particularly on how it was done with the EU and contributing nations, we would find that very useful.
It is important that the pirate community, if we can call it that, knows that this operation will go on until the situation is resolved on land and the rule of law comes back right across Somalia.
I thank noble Lords for having participated today, particularly those who are not members of this committee. It has been a huge privilege and pleasure for me to be chair of the committee over four years—although all committee members have put me under great pressure most of the time, quite rightly—but this will probably be the last report that I present within this Committee Room. I thank the staff of the committee. I am trying to remember who was a part of the team back then, but I know that one of them was Kathryn Colvin. I thank her in particular for having put this report together and for having brought all those witnesses in front of us as well as she did. I commend the report to the Grand Committee.