Skip to main content

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Volume 776: debated on Monday 21 November 2016

Committee (1st Day) (Continued)

Clause 7: Fit and proper persons requirement

Amendment 13

Moved by

13: Clause 7, page 4, leave out line 39

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 14 and 15. I shall be brief. Clause 7 deals with the fit and proper persons regime and sets out which persons the Pensions Regulator must assess. It provides that regulation should set out matters which must be taken into account.

Clause 7(2)(e) identifies as one of the persons who must be assessed as fit and proper,

“a person who (alone or with others) has power to vary the scheme (where the scheme is not established under a trust)”.

By way of a probe, Amendment 13 would delete the reference to a scheme not established under trust. We ask the Government to spell out the type of arrangement they envisage would not be established under a trust and, where responsibilities are placed on trustees in the Bill—for example, in Clauses 14 and 15—by whom they would be discharged. Amendment 14 would ensure that the Pensions Regulator was subject to an ongoing requirement to ensure that specified persons remained fit and proper. Can the Minister advise whether and how such a requirement is envisaged to be met? Amendment 15 would change the nature of the resolution from negative to affirmative. I trust that the amendments will receive the same favourable response as those raised previously. I beg to move.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, for his introduction to the amendments. I hope to be able to respond almost as briefly—and as eloquently.

Amendment 13 would amend the description of one of the people whom the Pensions Regulator must assess as fit and proper. It would change the description of a person who,

“(alone or with others) has power to vary the scheme (where the scheme is not established under a trust)”,

by removing the words,

“where the scheme is not established under a trust”.

The preceding paragraph refers to a person who has the power to vary the terms of the trust under which the scheme is established, and the paragraph in question here is a counterparty to that provision. The two paragraphs work together to ensure that any person who has the power to vary the terms of the trust or the scheme is subject to the fit and proper person test. Clause 7(2)(d) describes the persons who have this function under a trust-based scheme and Clause 7(2)(e) describes an equivalent for schemes which are not set up under trust. Clause 7(2)(e) is therefore specifically to cater for those relatively rare exceptions where a master trust may be set up outside the trust-based structure and to ensure that we do not create an avoidance loop hole.

Incidentally, we have maintained the term “master trust”, as that is how such schemes are known in the industry, even where they may be set up outside the trust-based structure. Clause 1 defines what the term means for the purpose of this part of the Bill, to ensure that there is clarity about who is in scope of the new regime, but it is not necessarily the case that it would be possible only ever to set up the sort of scheme captured under trust. It would be relatively rare, but we need to cater for such circumstances. We would want the regime to bite where schemes were not set up under trust, and this is one place in the Bill where something separate is needed to provide such cover. The two paragraphs provide that anyone who has power to vary the terms of the master trust must be subject to the fit and proper test.

I welcome the sentiment expressed in Amendment 14, which would require the regulator to ensure that the authorisation criteria had been met continuously and that it should not be a “once and done” affair. I agree that it would not be sufficient to require the scheme to satisfy the regulator on these matters only once at the point of application for authorisation. The intent of the Bill is that the standards must be maintained continuously.

Clauses 3, 4 and 5 together ensure that a scheme cannot operate unless it is authorised—with various modifications for existing schemes in Schedule 2, which we will come to later—and provide for a clear application process and decision by the regulator. Clause 19 also allows for the Pensions Regulator to withdraw that authorisation at a point at which it stops being satisfied that the criteria are met. To be clear: this does not mean that the scheme will be asked to reapply for authorisation regularly and that, if it fails, this is the only way to change its status. Nor does it mean that, once the test is passed, the scheme will always remain authorised; the criteria must continue to be met. It does mean that the regulator can withdraw authorisation if it is no longer satisfied that the criteria are met. The scheme must be able to show to the regulator’s satisfaction that it is meeting the criteria on an ongoing basis.

I am grateful to the Minister for his comments, which have been very clear, but where I am struggling with his account of this part of the Bill is his saying that the regulator has almost an implied power to review, for example, whether a newly appointed trustee is a fit and proper person. There is nowhere in the Bill so far as I can see where that implied power is expressed. It is always better for such matters to be dealt with by giving the regulator an express power than to rely on some clever interpretation of words to get to the point where it is implied the regulator has a power to review when all it has is, in the words of the Minister, the power to withdraw authorisation, which is altogether different.

I take the point that the noble Lord has just made. I hope to be able to reassure him that other provisions in the Bill will satisfy him that the regulator will have the necessary information to withdraw authorisation if something happens that requires it. I will come to that shortly.

As a public body, the regulator must exercise its general functions reasonably and consistently with its duty to be satisfied that the scheme meets, and therefore continues to meet, the authorisation criteria. With respect, a specific regulation-making power to require the regulator to review fitness and propriety is not necessary.

I turn to other clauses, which I hope shed some light on the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton. Clause 14, requiring the submission of annual accounts, Clause 15, requiring the submission of a supervisory return and, crucially, Clause 16, which creates a duty to notify the regulator of significant events, all serve to ensure that the Pensions Regulator can take an ongoing view of risk in relation to whether it remains satisfied that the scheme continues to meet the criteria.

Additionally, the regulator also has its information-gathering powers to bring to bear, so it can ask schemes for information to assist in assessing whether it remains satisfied that a scheme continues to meet the criteria and inquire for more information about reported events or information provided. The duty to notify the regulator of significant events, which is provided for in Clause 16, will be supplemented by regulations which specify the events which must be reported. Although we intend to consult on the regulations, our current thinking is that such events will include a change in status of anyone subject to a fit and proper test and any change in the personnel who are subject to the fit and proper test. The use of the significant events regime in Clause 16 to achieve this end is not set out in express terms in the Bill because of the detail which will follow in regulations, but I hope that my outlining of the intent above has helped to clarify this. I have no doubt that later we will return to Clause 16 for further debate.

Amendment 15 would change the regulation-making procedure in Clause 7 from the negative procedure to the affirmative procedure. I note that in an otherwise critical report, the Delegated Powers Committee acknowledged that this clause was one where the negative procedure might be appropriate. None the less, I refer to what my noble friend said in earlier debates about wanting to stand back and look at the totality of procedures, affirmative and negative, and then come to a conclusion at the end on whether we strike the right balance. On that basis, I hope the amendment might be withdrawn.

I am grateful to the Minister for his response to those amendments, and am certainly grateful to my noble friend Lord Hutton for that important point about how, in the circumstances, it is better to have an express provision than an implied one. I will work through the record of what the Minister said to see how close we got to that express provision, or whether it is still essentially an implied power. I understand what the noble Lord said about the nature of the regulations. That will run through this Bill.

I return briefly to this question of when master trusts are set up but not under a trust. I think the noble Lord said that would be a rare or unusual occasion. I do not know whether he can say a bit more about that. Particularly, the raft of the Bill focuses on the obligations for the trustee or trustees who set up master trusts, but where it is not set up under trust, does it evolve into something that becomes a trust and therefore you get trustees in the normal way or does it continue with some other existence? If the latter, what is the nature of the person who would be a trustee were it set up under trust? That puzzled me a little. If the noble Lord felt it would be better to write to me, I would be happy with that, but if we could deal with it now that would be helpful.

The noble Lord is very generous in suggesting that this matter might be addressed better in a letter than in an exchange across the Dispatch Boxes. I made inquiries and it is indeed the case that some are established other than under trusts. Obviously, we do not want a loophole that people can use because they are not formally constituted as a trust. However, I accept the noble Lord’s generous offer and will write to him giving a more detailed response to the issues he raised.

I am grateful to the noble Lord. Just to be clear, in the follow-up I would like to try and see what the role or nature of that person would be who would be a trustee if set up under a trust. Are they something else under a regime that is not set up in that way? Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 13 withdrawn.

Amendments 14 and 15 not moved.

Clause 7 agreed.

Clause 8: Financial sustainability requirement

Amendments 16 and 17 not moved.

Clause 8 agreed.

Amendment 18

Moved by

18: After Clause 8, insert the following new Clause—

“Scheme funding: triggering events

Where—(a) a triggering event under section 21 occurs; and(b) the scheme has insufficient resources to meet the costs mentioned in section 8(3)(b); and(c) a prohibition under section 33 applies;the Secretary of State shall make provision for a compensation fund or for the funding to be provided by another source as a last resort.”

My Lords, Amendment 18 proposes a new clause that, put at its simplest, seeks a compensation fund or provider of last resort when a master trust fails and there are not enough resources to meet the costs of wind-up and transfer. It is the in extremis protection, ensuring a last line of defence for members’ funds if the capital buffer required under Clause 8 or the proposed continuity option provisions in Clause 24 fail.

Setting regulatory operational capital requirements for master trusts is important but does not guarantee the security of members’ benefits or rights. I am sure the Minister will reassure us that the Government intend to be robust. The trouble is that we are not sighted on the robustness of the capital adequacy or transfer-out regimes—indeed, neither is he at this point—because so much of it is still left to further policy decisions and regulations. Concepts such as “sustainable”, “sound” and “sufficient financial resources” are undefined in the financial sustainability requirement in Clause 8. There are no draft regulations for us to consider. There is no provision in the Bill for what happens if the regulatory regime fails to ensure that sufficient financial resources are available in the event of a master trust failure.

The Constitution Committee points out in its letter to the Government of 11 November that Clause 24, dealing with wind-ups and transfers-out, is an example of the Bill delegating the power to make regulations that will determine substantial policy issues when a draft of the regulations is not available and the Government have yet to determine their policy. This regulatory regime will be applied to an existing market that has developed in a variety of ways. The Government cannot guarantee that they will have time before its introduction to create and hold the benign behaviours needed to protect scheme members. The impact assessment acknowledged uncertainty about the Bill’s impact because substantive policy decisions will not be taken until the secondary legislation stage. Indeed, such is the amount of further work to be done that the authorisation regime will not come into effect until 2018. The Bill does not make clear what happens if no potential receiving scheme is able or willing to accept the benefits of the members on transfer. The scheme records may be in disarray. The actual costs of wind-up and transfer will not be known or knowable in advance.

Under Clause 33, there are prohibitions on the charges the master trust and the receiving scheme can impose on the members transferring, or on imposing any new charges to meet costs for which a receiving scheme is liable but which were originally incurred by the transferring scheme or as a result of the transfer. If the actual costs of wind-up are very high, the terms of the clause may deter other suitable master trusts from accepting a transfer in whole or in part.

The impact assessment explains that the prohibition on increasing member charges during wind-up and transfer will work because the money to pay for these costs will be met by the access to funding or capital reserves held in accordance with the new financial stability reserve requirements in Clause 8. Yet no regulator can guarantee that those will always be sufficient. Indeed, the impact assessment reasoning is restated by the noble Lord, Lord Freud, in his letter of 14 November. However, neither the Bill, the impact assessment nor the Minister’s letter inform us what would happen if, in a particular failing master trust, the capital reserve requirements proved insufficient for whatever reason. The Bill proposes no contingency plan for the failure of a master trust the records of which are in disarray, which has insufficient financial resources to comply with its duty when a triggering event occurs, and for which no master trust is willing to accept transfer of members’ benefits. What will happen in those circumstances? How will all the members’ funds be protected against increased charges? What liability for or immunity from the past provider’s mistakes will a receiving scheme have? What plans do the Government have for ensuring that bulk transfers between master trusts can legally proceed in an efficient and timely manner to ensure continuity of coverage for members of failed master trusts?

The suggested timetable in the Bill indicates that the new regime will come into full effect in 2018, after most remaining employees have auto-enrolled, so it will be some time before it is in place. However, the retrospective casting of the Bill—which I support—means that for existing unauthorised schemes, the scheme funder is liable for wind-up and transfer costs when a triggering event occurs on or after 20 October 2016. What if that funder has insufficient resources, is a limited liability company or is insolvent? Where would wind-up and transfer costs be recovered from?

In his letter of 14 November, the noble Lord, Lord Freud, comments that in such a situation,

“we would expect the normal considerations in terms of insolvency and court proceedings to apply to this financial debt as to any other”.

That prompts a series of questions for the Minister. What does that mean? Who would bring the proceedings and how would they be financed? If the members of such a master trust were transferred, would the receiving master trust be covered by the prohibition in Clause 33 on increasing charges? The noble Lord, Lord Freud, further comments in that letter:

“We do not expect the number of trusts who will find themselves in this position … without solutions for their members to be high. We anticipate that the market will wish to consolidate”.

That leads to a more general question: how exactly is it to be determined which is the appropriate master trust to be the receiving scheme in a wind-up under Clause 24? How will a potential receiving scheme be identified? Presumably, the regulator will not leave it to other schemes to do some self-organised divvying up. It could be problematic under competition law for a panel of providers to self-organise the divvying up of schemes. Will there be a formal regulatory allocation process, and if so, what will it be?

People need to be reassured that the Bill will provide them with protection in practice. At the moment, that ultimate reassurance is not there. The amendment does not prescribe the model but it fixes the principle of a last resort provision. I recognise that work needs to be done. There are matters to be considered—how to protect against moral hazard; how to ensure that market players do not game the process to cream off the best members; the need to look behind a triggering event to identify evidence of cherry-picking; and the funding underpin for a last resort provision—but there is a compelling need for a compensation or last resort provision, as proposed in the amendment. Without it, the Government cannot credibly assert that the Bill will do what is claimed in the opening line of the Explanatory Notes: protect all savers. I beg to move.

My Lords, it is actually extremely unlikely—in fact, virtually impossible—that members will suffer if the manager of a master trust gets into difficulties. The assets attributable to the pension fund members are segregated from the assets of the manager. How valuable or otherwise they are will depend upon how well they have been managed and, if there is more than one fund choice, which fund people have chosen.

Secondly, it is clear that the Pensions Regulator will and is intended to play the brokerage role. If it perceives that a master trust manager is in trouble, it will quickly sort out who is going to take over that business. It has value because fees are attached to managing the money, which other master trusts will happily pay. There is even some source of revenue coming back to the master trust in trouble as it is bailed out.

I am afraid that this sort of plaintive request for a compensation fund does not have my support. I thought we had collectively agreed that we did not want another compensation fund. Adding it at the end, almost out of principle, when the chances of it ever being used are virtually zero, is not particularly constructive.

My Lords, I support this amendment, to which my noble friend Lord Stoneham has put his name. The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, has set out the arguments in depth and there is very little left to say. Some means to guarantee the solvency of master trusts is needed, and will be fair. It is essential that it be fair.

If regulation is working well, it is to be hoped that the costs will be minimised and insured against. The regulator should have an incentive to merge schemes where resources look likely to be insufficient, and means to tide them over should be provided for. In other with benefit schemes, guarantees of last resort are provided and the liability risk is much greater. Confidence in pension schemes is essential. It would be very serious indeed if trusts became insolvent. As has already been said, protection as a last resort should be a rare occurrence. I support the amendment.

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. I am concerned that there are well-intentioned measures in the Bill designed to ensure that there is capital adequacy in these schemes. One hopes that they will work but how will any regulator know in advance what capital is actually adequate? The circumstances in which wind-up could take away people’s pensions, even if the assets are ring-fenced and protected for the members, are those in which there is no other mechanism for covering the wind-up costs. That is where the members’ pensions would be at risk.

Indeed, we saw this a number of years ago with defined benefit pension schemes, which is precisely why we ended up with the Pension Protection Fund. The Government put in well-meaning legislation that required minimum funding standards for defined benefit schemes which were supposed to ensure that members’ pensions were safe even if the scheme or the employer failed. Unfortunately, the situation with the schemes—due to lack of competent administration in some cases but not all; sometimes due to market movements as well—led to members losing their pensions, and the only real protection that ended up being available was this backstop insurance in the form of the Pension Protection Fund.

Yes, we need capital adequacy. Yes, the Bill is really important. But I would be really grateful if my noble friends the Ministers explained why the Government do not feel this is necessary, or how proper protection for members in extremis can be provided. For example, will NEST guarantee to take over these liabilities? Is there some other plan? I would be grateful for some reassurance from my noble friends.

Amendment 18 requires the Secretary of State to,

“make provision for a compensation fund or for the funding to be provided by another source as a last resort”,

in circumstances where the scheme has had a triggering event and has insufficient resources to pay the costs referred to in Clause 8(3)(b)—that is, the costs of complying with duties imposed under the Bill during a trigger event, and the costs of continuing to run the scheme for a period of six months to two years—and a prohibition on increasing charges during the trigger period applies.

The amendment speaks to the heart of what the Bill is about: protecting members. Along with a number of other amendments, it seeks to add further protections and, perhaps, test us a little on the extent of the measures the Government have provided for in the Bill as introduced. I welcome both the focus on member protection and the opportunity to explore the specific measures in the Bill which provide the members with security should the scheme decide to close or start to fail. The amendment would mean that if a scheme experienced a triggering event and had insufficient money to pay for the costs associated with the options the scheme may pursue following a triggering event, other funds must be provided. It also goes further to say that it is the Secretary of State who must provide a compensation fund or for the funding to be provided by another source.

In responding, I will touch on a few areas. I will outline, first, the measures which provide that sufficient funds must be held; secondly, some of the costs and complexities that would be introduced into the system should a compensation fund or other funding be required; and, thirdly, the compatibility with the regime provided for in the Bill.

I turn to the measures which provide that sufficient funds will be held. First, the main provisions in the Bill requiring schemes to hold certain funds are in Clause 8, which provides that for the scheme to be authorised it must satisfy the regulator that it has sufficient resources to meet certain costs. This includes the costs of complying with the requirements under the Bill once the scheme experiences a triggering event and those of running the scheme for a period of between six months to two years, in the event of a triggering event occurring. The Government believe that these measures are sufficient and that this is an appropriate regime for the types of funding in question here. Further, members’ savings are protected via the restrictions on using members’ pots to pay for these costs provided at Clause 33. We therefore consider that the amendment is unnecessary.

However, it would be helpful to explore the counterarguments or challenges as to whether this is adequate risk mitigation—in particular, to explore any suggestions that there is still some risk in relation to: the period before the authorisation regime is up and running; the calculation of those funds to ensure they are sufficient at the point of need; the availability of the funds at the point of need; and the funds diminishing over time. Finally, what happens if the lack of these funds leads to the regulator withdrawing authorisation and creating a triggering event? Let me set out how those risks are addressed within the regime.

In respect of the period before the regime is up and running, paragraph 7 of Schedule 2 provides that the scheme funder is liable for these costs. It places this liability on the scheme funder when a triggering event has occurred in an existing scheme and the liability for those costs does not lie elsewhere. The prohibition in relation to increasing members’ charges applies during this period, so members are protected. If the funder should be in financial difficulty, the matter should be pursued via the normal court channels or insolvency processes. It is not the members’ money which is at risk in these scenarios; it is the running costs of the scheme and payment for activities during the triggering event period.

We also know that other schemes may well rescue the failing scheme, as has happened before, to protect the reputation of the industry. This is a different dynamic from what would be the case in non-money purchase schemes, where the debt is about money needed to pay member benefits and where funding obligations to pay for the promised benefits would attach if another entity took over the scheme. The master trust industry can support the movement of members—some trusts are willing to do so—or take over failing master trusts, so government intervention is less warranted where an industry solution may be possible. This might be an appropriate point to deal with the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, about the identification of receiving schemes. They will be on a list kept by the Pensions Regulator, and some industry players may wish to step in and identify themselves.

On whether the funds available to the scheme will be sufficient, regulations will set out matters that the regulator must take into account when deciding whether it is satisfied that those funds are sufficient. We anticipate that these will include matters that will support the establishing of the assets needed to cover these specific costs, such as the business plan, the size of schemes, the costs of contracts and the value of assets, the nature and level of assumptions made in that business plan, the security of the scheme funder and the state of the scheme administration. Also covered will be the range of potential assumptions that may be used in arriving at the figure required.

Regulations may also specify the information that the regulator must take into account and requirements relating to the financing of the scheme or funder, such as requirements relating to assets, capital or liquidity. We anticipate that these will include matters such as how the funds are to be held to ensure that they may be accessed for specific purposes only, so that they are safe in the event of the funder becoming insolvent. In this way the Bill provides that to be authorised, a scheme must hold sufficient funds for those costs and that these funds must be held appropriately.

The supervision part of the regime focuses on ensuring that the funds remain sufficient and are not eroded over time, and that the Pensions Regulator can act swiftly should a drop occur in the funds held. There are measures in the Bill that work together to provide that this requirement to hold funds to cover the costs of the triggering period is an ongoing requirement, and one that the regulator will be able to supervise. Clause 19 states that if the regulator stops being satisfied that an authorised scheme meets the authorisation criteria, it may decide to withdraw the scheme’s authorisation.

Further, alongside the information-gathering powers that the regulator has under the Pensions Act 2004, Clause 14 requires the scheme and funder to submit annual accounts, while Clause 15 gives the regulator the power to require schemes to submit a “supervisory return” and Clause 16 places a requirement on certain persons to report “significant events”. We anticipate that these significant events will include matters in relation to the funds held under Clause 8. Through these means, the Pensions Regulator will have a stream of data in relation to which it can make further inquiries to ensure that it remains satisfied that the criteria continue to be met, and it can take action if that ceases to be so.

If the regulator becomes concerned that the assets are no longer sufficient to satisfy it that the criteria are met, it may issue a warning notice to withdraw authorisation, which is a triggering event, and will have access to the pause power and direction-making powers under the triggering-events part of the Bill. In this way, the Pensions Regulator can act quickly and decisively as soon as any risk arises, to diminish risk and prevent the situation deteriorating any further. On the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, about which liabilities the receiving scheme will have for debt in the existing scheme, the Bill imposes no liabilities on the receiving scheme for debt in the existing scheme.

This approach caters for a number of different structures under which the master trust schemes have been set up. It ensures that the regulator can make a scheme-specific assessment of the funds that must be held to cover the requirements. It helps ensure that the risk of the scheme not holding these funds, or of the funds being eroded, is minimised.

In addition to the consideration that this risk is already dealt with via the Bill’s provisions, I will turn to a second matter: the costs and complexity that this amendment could introduce into the regime. As soon as compensation is added to the regime—based on the concept that where the funds are insufficient, someone else will step in—an element of moral hazard creeps in, as the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, acknowledged. Master trusts are businesses set up to provide a service to a number of employers. Many are set up to make a profit; some are not-for-profit, but all are selling or marketing their services to employers and must take responsibility for providing protection to their members. I would also be concerned about the added cost of delivering a compensation fund. Noble Lords have left it for regulations to establish whether this fund or requirement would be a government-funded compensation scheme or a levy-funded compensation scheme, or on whom any additional sourcing requirement would be placed. So this would be a broad regulation-making power.

In terms of what type of compensation may be envisaged, if it was levy-based there would be additional administrative costs to consider, as well as additional costs to the schemes that would presumably need to contribute to it as well as holding funds for their own scheme for a very low risk, as my noble friend Lord Flight pointed out. These would be funds that the scheme could not use for its own risk mitigation. The type of risk we are looking at here does not warrant the introduction of a compensation scheme. Members’ pots or promised benefits are not at risk. Clause 33 provides protection when a trigger event occurs, as it prevents charges being increased or new ones being introduced. It is about the risk of the scheme being unable to meet costs related to paying for activities under the trigger events such as wind-up, bulk transfers, finding a new funder or suchlike. The cost and complexity of a new compensation fund is not warranted.

A third matter is that I am not convinced that the amendment is compatible with the wider regime provided for in the Bill. There would be some significant challenge in ensuring that this provision did not lead to unintended effects: if, for example, the other source of funding was to place a requirement on a specific person to provide the costs as a last resort. The regime has been specifically crafted to ensure that all types and structures of master trusts can comply with the requirement. This has been specifically designed to ensure sufficient flexibility in enabling schemes to comply with the obligation.

We place a funding obligation on a specific party in only one place in the Bill: for existing schemes during the period until they become authorised. At that point the scheme will hold the funds as part of meeting the authorisation criteria. Introducing ongoing funding accountability on a particular party external to the scheme would be an alternative rather than a complementary measure to the approach taken in the Bill. The Bill specifically focuses on identifying funds and requiring the scheme to hold such funds, so placing a funding responsibility on another party cuts across these measures.

I hope I have answered my noble friend’s questions. The Government’s view is that the measures during the period before existing schemes are authorised are appropriate and that the schemes, once authorised, will hold the funds. Clause 33 provides that members’ pots are protected by the restrictions imposed on increasing charges. The issue is simply not the same as for defined benefit schemes. The risks and the costs are different.

Will my noble friend write to me with some clarification on how costs would be covered? If a scheme fails and records are in disarray, how would the costs of wind-up be covered? I accept that they cannot come out of the members’ pots. If the company running the scheme or the employer has failed, where will the money come from to make sure that members’ current pension funds are transferred over and the costs of administering the transfer, executing the bulk transfer and clarifying the records are met? Currently it would seem that the members’ pots will be in limbo. The money cannot come out of their pots, but there is no one else to pay.

The money cannot come out of their pots, but the Pensions Regulator will be looking to transfer those pots to another master trust. The protection that this amendment and my noble friend are suggesting is almost conditioned by what we watch in the defined benefit market. This is a different situation, where there are protected pots. There may be costs in a catastrophic situation, but they will not fall on members, and it is not the job of government to protect non-members from getting into a mess.

Is it not very simple? The manager of the master trust would go bust just like any other business can go bust. It would go into liquidation and, to the extent that it owed debts to the suppliers of electricity or other such things, they would suffer.

My noble friend has put very bluntly what I was trying to say in a subtle and gentle way. If the landlord or another supplier to the scheme finds itself out of pocket, for instance, that is what will happen. It will go through the normal insolvency process, but it is not the job of the Pensions Regulator or the Government to be concerned about that. Our concern is purely with the members’ pots. Are they protected and is there a process to transfer them to someone who can look after them properly? I hope that is what I have been able to explain in an overlengthy reply. I hope it has enabled the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

I shall try to pick up some of the Minister’s points. There was a lot of detail in his reply. I am conscious of the time. I shall start with the risks that we are trying to mitigate; there seems to be a lot of confusion about them. The risk this Bill is trying to mitigate is that the costs associated with managing scheme failure and winding up the scheme fall on the members, so their pots are drained to pay for them. Their pots are not protected. We are talking not about the equivalent of a DB benefit provision or a Financial Services Compensation Scheme provision on an annuity, but about the specific risk that the Explanatory Notes and all the associated documents from the Government in support of the Bill identify that it is seeking to mitigate. Members’ pots should not be raided to pay for a master trust failure.

The Minister set out in great detail how the authorisation regime, the supervision regime and the scheme failure resolution regime will work very effectively to protect the members against that risk. That was very clearly laid out. I complimented the Explanatory Notes and other documents at Second Reading. It is possible to clearly follow the regime proposed. However, the regulatory regime cannot ensure that the capital adequacy and supervision regime will always ensure sufficient resources in the scheme to finance the cost of failure in respect of wind-up and transfer costs. That is the risk we are trying to deal with. It is not the function of a regulator, whether it is the PRA, the FCA or anything else, to eliminate all risk. It cannot possibly do so, unless there is an unlimited guarantee from the taxpayer always to remove risk in a regulated system.

This amendment seeks to address what happens when the regulatory system around capital adequacy or resolution through transfer of another scheme does not work. As the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, said, at the moment there is only one place to go, which is back to the members’ pots, which will be drained.

If I heard the Minister correctly, he said that there would be no liability for debt placed on the receiving scheme in a transfer situation, so he is saying that if there are insufficient resources in the failing master trust they cannot be offloaded on to the receiving scheme on transfer. They are still floating around to be paid for, so we cannot put them there and we cannot put them on the financial resources in the capital adequacy regime because that has failed, so we are still waiting for someone to pick up these costs because the only thing exposed at the moment is the members’ pots. In that situation, no regulator can guarantee whether there is a suitable master trust that will pick up all the members. It may want to cherry pick some and leave a rump behind. We do not know how this will play out. What has to be possible is that the capital adequacy and supervision regime does not always work and, if there is any one occasion when it does not work, the prohibition clause—Clause 33—cannot work because prohibition on increasing member charges when a failure takes place can operate only if someone provides the resources to fund that prohibition on increasing the charges.

There is no provision in the Bill or in any other policy document from the Government that states that, if a scheme fails in extremis and there are not the resources in place, there is no one to fund the prohibition order on increasing charges as a result of managing that failure other than the members’ pots.

I want to be very clear. There was a useful dialogue between me and my noble friend Lord Flight. I would like to repeat what I said. I am not saying that no one will lose money if something goes wrong; what I am saying is that it will not be the members because their pots are protected.

We have bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings for other people when they get into financial trouble, but that is a separate matter. The members are protected. What we are worried about in this Chamber is the position of the members, and Clause 33 provides that fundamental protection. It is not open to the failing scheme funder to raid those pots; that is prohibited, and we have a regime to prevent it happening.

Just because someone somewhere loses money around this process does not mean that we need a compensation regime. I want to make that utterly clear, because there seems to be a concern to see that nobody can lose money. If people mess things up, they may lose money—but members will not lose money.

I accept the clarification from the noble Lord. The amendment—which at this stage is partly probing, although underlying it is a principle that is a matter of substance—was not intended to prescribe the model. It does not say it has to be a compensation fund—it could be a provider of last resort—but there needs to be an explicit provision in the Bill that makes it clear what happens to protect the members’ pots when the supervisory and capital adequacy regime fail in a failing master trust. I do not believe that the Bill addresses that at the moment. I am not arguing for a particular model; I am arguing for a principle of absolute clarity as to how members’ protection against exposure to meeting the cost that I described—the risk that the Bill seeks to mitigate—will be addressed in an in extremis position.

It is not a plaintive request—I say to the noble Lord, Lord Flight, that I am not a plaintive request person. I am standing here quite firmly because potentially 7 million people are going to be affected and, over time, there will be trillions of pounds under management. This matter is worthy of interrogation, rather than us simply hoping.

The issue is an administrative one, in that you have people’s pension fund money, and the manager has got into trouble and, let us say, gone into liquidation. What administration would make sure that a new manager takes over and continues to investment-manage those pots of money? There have been suggestions that the Pensions Regulator himself should be empowered, or maybe required, to act as a broker with regard to such arrangements, but that problem has not yet been solved. That, surely, is the practical issue, not people losing money out of their pension pots.

The issue that we are dealing with is indeed an administrative issue, but saying members’ pots are protected does not protect members’ pots. In a scheme which has failed and is winding up, and whose administration is in disarray, it will take some time and money to decide and assess how much each member’s pot is actually worth, for example in the cases of a big master trust whose systems fail or of a smaller master trust whose systems simply were never up to scratch. We have 80 or so master trusts out there at the moment and have had no protection regime at all, no capital adequacy rules and no proper assessment of the quality of the trusts. We have so many members’ pension funds growing for them, and there is the possibility that more than one of these schemes will fail and need to wind up. There will be costs associated with assessing what the value of those members’ pots actually is. I do not hear anything at the moment that explains how the costs of administering and sorting out the records of that scheme, so that we know what each member’s pot is worth, are going to be funded. If the Pensions Regulator finds a way to pick up the cost, if NEST has to pick up the cost or if there is some insurance regime for industry-wide assessment of those costs, that is fine, but I just feel that we are assuming that this will be a wind-up of a scheme whose records are fine and it will be shipped off to another scheme, which will want to earn money for those members. That is not the case that is necessarily going to arise.

I thank noble Lords for the supportive argument on the point that I am trying to make. I should pull this to a close. It is not that the proposals in the Bill around authorisation, supervision and resolution on failure are, of themselves, something one would want to challenge—although there is the issue of how they and some of the policy will work in practice—it is what happens in the situation that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, set out, when one has a failure, costs are incurred in dealing with that failure and insufficient financial resources are available. How are the members’ pots protected in those situations? The reasoning in the impact assessment is that the prohibition in Clause 33 works because there will always be financial resources to fund it, but it is not clear, in the terms of the Bill, that there will always be financial resources outside of accessing the members’ pots. However, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 18 withdrawn.

Clause 9 agreed.

Clause 10: Scheme funder requirements

Amendment 19

Moved by

19: Clause 10, page 6, line 36, leave out “constituted as a seperate legal entity” and insert “approved by the Pensions Regulator”

My Lords, in moving Amendment 19, I will also speak to Amendment 20, which is grouped with it. Amendment 19 would remove the requirement that the scheme funder is constituted as a separate legal entity and, as an alternative proposition, would require it to be approved by the Pensions Regulator. Amendment 20 would remove the requirement that the scheme funder can carry out only activities that relate directly to the master trust scheme.

Taken together, it has been raised with us that, although it seems to be the intention that each scheme should have a scheme funder, the Bill does not actually require that. A variety of different structures are used for current master trusts, and the definition in the Bill does not fit easily with many of them. In particular, the requirement for a scheme funder to operate only a single master trust would require a number of existing schemes to move from being supported by an FCA-regulated entity with significant financial resources to being supported by a single-purpose vehicle set up just to run the master trust. The policy rationale for this is unclear, and perhaps the Minister would clarify whether that really is the intention.

Clause 10(3) would also prevent a single provider supporting more than one master trust, and it has again been put to us that this is likely to inhibit consolidation and the ability to rescue failing schemes, which we have just been discussing. It has been suggested by the ABI that, where the scheme funder is an FCA-authorised insurer, the requirements of Clause 10 should not apply. Alternatively, as our amendment suggests, that flexibility could be achieved by requiring the scheme funder to be approved by the Pensions Regulator. When it comes to submission of accounts, the insurer would not typically split out master-trust lines of business, and might have to rely on the PRA’s work to assess the strength of relevant firms. As suggested under Solvency II, firms must hold capital against pension scheme risks. These capital requirements are onerous and it does not seem reasonable to require the holding of additional capital on top of them.

If an existing body corporate conducts activities that relate directly to more than one master trust scheme, what do the Government actually want it to do? Splitting an existing operation into separate companies, even within a group structure, may not be without cost, including taxation. Further, how is this meant to work where a master trust provides money purchase benefits as well as other benefits? Clause 10 treats a scheme funder as a separate legal entity if, inter alia, it carries out activities only relating directly to the master trust scheme if it is a master trust scheme, as distinguished from a master trust, only to the extent that it provides money purchase benefits. So how can Clause 10 (3)(b) be satisfied where a master trust provides money purchase and other benefits? I beg to move.

My Lords, I believe this clause has aroused most concern in the industry, particularly the insurance industry. A number of organisations, particularly life offices, undertake a range of business activities in addition to simply sponsoring a master trust. The clause suggests that the scheme funder or sponsor must set itself up as a separate legal entity and undertake no other activity beyond sponsoring the master trust. Given that the whole purpose of the Bill is to ensure that funds are available to see through the orderly exit of the scheme’s sponsor, the provisions of Clause 10 as it stands are surely counterintuitive. One wants the sponsor to be as strong financially as possible, but the clause as it stands could well invoke the very thing that the Government are trying to avoid.

More specifically, as the noble Lord has pointed out, the insurance industry typically will have master trusts side by side with group personal pension schemes. As matters now stand, they are regulated by the FCA and PRA, and there would be a considerable duplication of regulation under the arrangements as proposed. I am sure the Government have focused on this, but I certainly feel that Amendments 19 and 20 are appropriate to address the problem that stands.

My Lords, I echo the comments made by my noble friend Lord Flight. Why do the draftsmen of the Bill think that having a separate legal entity is definitely a good thing? What are the risks that this approach tries to close down? Perhaps if we could understand those risks better, we might be able to address the issue in a slightly different way. Is the aim somehow to ring-fence the DC covenant of the scheme funder and prevent them from having other financial obligations that might take away from the support for this master trust, or to minimise the burden on checking accounts? Obviously, it is easier to review the accounts of a stand-alone entity than of a much broader group. Hopefully, if we could better understand what the rationale is, it might be possible to address some of the very important concerns that have been expressed by some of our major insurance companies.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, for his amendment. I gently point out that there is a spelling mistake in it, but there are other reasons for resisting it.

Amendments 19 and 20, tabled by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, deal with Clause 10, which sets out the requirements that a scheme funder must meet in order for a master trust to be authorised. I hope to explain to noble Lords, particularly my noble friend, the thinking behind insisting that there is a separate legal entity behind each scheme. A scheme funder by definition is key to the master trust’s financial sustainability. By “scheme funder” we mean a person who is liable to provide funds in relation to the scheme when the administration charges paid by and in respect of members are not sufficient to cover the scheme’s costs, or someone who is entitled to receive profits when the scheme’s charges exceed its costs.

Amendment 19 would remove the requirement for the scheme funder to be a separate legal entity that carries on business activities only directly related to the master trust, and would replace it with a requirement for the scheme funder to be approved by the Pensions Regulator. I listened with interest to the points that noble Lords made in respect of that amendment. Amendment 20 would similarly remove the requirement for a master trust’s scheme funder to be a separate legal entity that carries on only the master trust business. The effect of both amendments would be to allow the same legal entity that acts as scheme funder to engage in business activities not directly related to the master trust, making it more difficult for the Pensions Regulator to identify matters relevant to the master trust and therefore to assess the financial sustainability of the scheme.

To enable the regulator to assess the financial position of the scheme with certainty when deciding whether the master trust should be authorised or remain authorised, the scheme funder must be set up as a separate legal entity. This is defined in the Bill as meaning, in effect, a legal person whose only business activities are in relation to the master trust. Requiring scheme funders to be separate legal entities will make their financial position, and the financial arrangements between them and the master trust, more transparent to the regulator and provide greater clarity regarding the assets, liabilities, costs and income in relation to the master trust business. This will greatly assist the regulator in carrying out its assessment of schemes’ financial sustainability.

There will be greater transparency regarding any additional funding streams coming into the scheme funder entity, and the level of commitment of those funds for the purposes of running the master trust, should the scheme funder be in receipt of income generated from other lines of business carried on by connected entities. The amendments would remove that transparency by making it possible for the scheme funder to carry on business activities not related to the master trust under the same corporate entity. It would therefore be difficult for the regulator to identify the financial sustainability or otherwise of the master trust.

One of the other authorisation criteria of which the regulator needs to be satisfied is that the people involved in the master trust scheme are fit and proper. Clause 7 specifies people that the regulator must assess for this purpose, including the scheme funder. It is not clear to what extent Amendment 19, requiring the scheme funder to be approved by the regulator, would differ from the assessment that the regulator is already required to carry out under Clause 7. Requiring the regulator to approve the scheme funder in general terms, rather than setting out requirements in the primary legislation requiring the scheme funder to be set up as a separate legal entity, would not only potentially make the financial sustainability of the scheme less clear to the regulator but would also give master trusts and scheme funders less certainty about the conditions that must be met for authorisation.

To turn back to the requirement for the scheme funder to be set up as a separate legal entity, I am aware that a number of concerns have been raised about the impact that this will have on existing businesses, such as the removal of protection and cross-subsidy through diversified lines of business supporting the master trust, restrictions on the use of shared services and the disruption of existing business. I shall come to each of these in turn, but I reassure the House that this authorisation criterion is not designed to prevent funds from flowing from one business to another, nor is it our intention to disrupt existing arrangements unnecessarily. The overarching aim of the requirements is transparency in the cash flows to and from the master trust business, and the assets and liabilities related to it, so that the regulator can readily ascertain the financial position of the scheme funder and the financial arrangements between the funder and the scheme. I think that paragraph answers the question asked by my noble friend Lady Altmann.

The requirements in Clause 10 do not prevent the master trust benefiting from the support of other businesses. Support can be offered from the scheme funder’s wider group explicitly through the provision of a legally enforceable guarantee or other formal arrangement from another group company of sufficient financial strength. Where the scheme funder currently conducts other businesses, a degree of cross-subsidy may already take place, and there is no intention to prevent this.

However, we consider that it is in the interests of master trust operators and potential users to have a full understanding of the financial sustainability, or otherwise, of the master trust operation in isolation. If the operation is not financially sustainable and requires the support of the wider group to operate, we consider that the most appropriate way is for that support to be provided transparently and explicitly, rather than through the implied support offered as being one element of a company with multiple lines of business.

Requiring scheme funders to be set up as separate legal entities is not intended to require the unpicking of any shared service arrangements. Many financial services companies—indeed, many other companies—will use staff, systems and premises for multiple business lines, and usually allocate those costs as accurately as possible across the relevant activities. We expect any costs allocated to the master trust to be transparent to the regulator through the business plan, accounts and other related documents.

Groups of companies are used to restructuring their statutory accounting arrangements to reflect changes in focus, and master trust schemes in operation when the authorisation regime commences will be given a transitional period to comply with the requirements and apply for authorisation. If the scheme funder wants to pursue other business activities not related to the master trust, it may do so through another vehicle, or establish the master trust element as a separate entity.

I hope that that somewhat detailed explanation in relation to Amendments 19 and 20 reassures the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that the guiding principle behind requiring the scheme funder to be a separate legal entity whose business activities solely relate to the master trust is transparency. I also hope that I have set out why it would not be appropriate to substitute the requirements proposed in the Bill for a responsibility that would sit with the regulator to assess whether a safe and appropriate degree of separation between the master trust and the scheme funder’s other business has been achieved. That would provide an inferior level of protection to members. On that basis, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that detailed explanation. Again, we will need to read the record to make sure that we have fully understood the proposition. Incidentally, I should thank him for pointing out the spelling error, but offer even greater thanks to those who did not.

The nub of the issue is that this is to help the regulator establish financial sustainability and make it easier to interpret the data before it. One can readily see that there will be a range of circumstances where it will be quite appropriate for a separately constituted legal person to be the sole funder, but, as we have discussed, the issue is wider than that.

The Minister said that it is unnecessary to unpick shared service arrangements. I question how that is consistent with what is in the Bill. Clause 10(3)(b) states:

“the only activities carried out by the body corporate or partnership are activities that relate directly to the Master Trust scheme”.

Where a scheme funder provides, on a transparent basis, services to a group company and charges for them without affecting the master trust scheme, how is that possibly consistent with the requirement that the only activities carried out by the body corporate are those that relate directly to the master trust scheme? I really do not see that it is. Perhaps the Minister will reflect on that and write further in due course.

There is also an issue about how this is all consistent with arrangements for non-money purchase benefits. I think that the structure of the Bill is that you take them out of the picture—they are not considered in all this—but, again, if those are the arrangements in a single funder which is supporting both of those lines of business, it seems to me that you cannot simply ignore that for the purposes of interpreting Clause 10(3).

This requires a rethink. I understand the Minister to say that there will be some period upfront when existing arrangements will be unpicked and restructured, and that may help, but how is an FCA-regulated entity, which is stringent in its capital requirements but covers a range of group entities, to be restructured? Do they have to be moved out? Does the single entity left, which is dealing with the master trust, have to go through an equivalent FCA approval process to ensure an equivalent position at the end of the day? It does not make sense. We understand the benefits of transparency, and there may well be a range of circumstances where it is better to have a separate body corporate, a legal person with a clearly identified, separate funding stream. However, if that is to be the only way it can be done, that creates enormous problems, particularly for funds operational now.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Flight, we have continuing concerns which, with respect, have not been answered tonight. I do not know whether the Minister wants to have another go, but if he does not, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 19 withdrawn.

Amendment 20 not moved.

Clause 10 agreed.

Clause 11: Systems and processes requirements

Amendment 20A

Moved by

20A: Clause 11, page 7, line 19, leave out “must” and insert “may”

My Lords, there is an error in the Marshalled List. Amendment 20A should read: “page 7, line 19, leave out ‘may’ and insert ‘must’”.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord the Lord Speaker for putting the House right on that; the error was pointed out to me this morning. I shall speak briefly to the amendment.

All the information requirements relating to scheme processes as set out in Clause 11(4) are integral to a thorough assessment of a master trust’s capacity to run a scheme effectively. Therefore, it should be mandatory for regulations to include provision about the regulations. Master trusts must be effectively run so that members can be sure that their money and futures are secure. Security around master trusts is key to their success. It is much too important to be left to possible regulation; it needs to be enshrined in the Bill. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about the amendment, and I support all the other amendments in the group.

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 21 and other amendments in the group. Amendment 21 would make it a process requirement under Clause 11 on authorised master trusts when making investment decisions to consider,

“environmental, social and governance risks”,

Most investments in master trust schemes will be longer term and therefore exposed to longer-term risks. Consideration of those risks, which include such factors as climate change, unsustainable business practice and unsound corporate governance, is integral to the long-term sustainability of the investments held. The assessment of these risks should not be seen as an ethical extra but, rather, potential vulnerabilities to the sustainability of the scheme which should be properly understood.

The Pensions Regulator code of practice strengthened guidance for trustees on consideration of ESG risks, but it is not legally binding and there is no direct penalty for failing to comply. At a recent pensions conference, Andrew Warwick-Thompson, the executive director of the regulator, warned trustees against complacency when assessing ESG issues within portfolios. He commented that the regulator expects trustees to take ESG issues into account, saying,

“I would urge any trustee or asset manager out there who still thinks these things don’t matter to wake up and smell the coffee”.

He referred to research by Professional Pensions which showed that only 18% of responses from trustees, fee managers and pensions professionals thought trustees should be obliged to take ESG issues into account.

If many in the industry are reluctant to make an assessment of ESG risks, it is hardly an auspicious basis for optimism that a voluntary code will work. As the regulator himself commented:

“We need to guard against complacency here”.

There is increasing evidence showing that companies which perform well on ESG produce better returns for investors. Poor corporate practice has a real effect.

Master trusts have already grown exponentially against the background of a regulator having insufficient powers, relying instead on exhortations to trusts to embrace the voluntary master trust assurance framework. That did not work. With this Bill the Government are trying to put things right. The regulator expects ESG risk to be assessed. The amendment moves beyond expectation to a process requirement that trustees actually consider these risks. I ask the Minister: will the requirements under Clause 11(4)(d) include a specific requirement to assess ESG risks?

Amendment 22 requires an authorised master trust to have processes in place for the identification, reporting, managing and minimising of any conflict of interest. How to manage conflicts of interest in a master trust is an, as yet, unresolved problem. It is difficult to assess how this Bill will resolve it because of the policies still to be decided. In 2012 the Pensions Regulator, when investigating potential conflicts of interest in master trusts, commented:

“It is very hard to understand how and when they are acting as agents of the provider and when they are acting in the best interests of the member”.

In 2013 the then Office of Fair Trading raised concerns that some trustee boards were not sufficiently independent of the master trust provider to avoid conflicts of interest and always act in beneficiaries’ best interests. The Occupational Pension Schemes (Charges and Governance) Regulations 2015 introduced stricter requirements on master trusts and although welcome, they are not sufficient to address potential conflicts of interest. Trustees of occupational pension schemes are required to have a process in place to identify and manage any conflicts of interest and there is a regulatory DC code which recommends minimum controls. But they do not meet the conflict of interest challenges in a master trust.

Market pressure, combined with sound regulation, are important tools in the fight against conflicts of interest. The only trouble is that in the pensions market there is little pressure coming from the supply side, the scheme member—a proposition we have rehearsed so many times in debates in this Chamber and in the other place.

The Government’s impact assessment identifies the particular risks that master trusts pose, which compellingly support specific regulation for identifying, reporting and managing conflicts of interest. Master trusts develop new types of business structures which alter the relationships between members, employers, trustees and providers, on which occupational pension law and regulation is largely based. There is no requirement to include member or employer representatives on the board, and providers have a significant influence over who they appoint.

Many master trusts have been set up with a profit motive—something that existing occupational pensions’ regulation does not cater for. As the OFT observed, this is a concern and a complex area as these companies have obligations to their shareholders and other stakeholders and, as with any company, seek to make a profit. IFAs and fund managers may be part of the provider group that set up that master trust.

The trust deed in a master trust can inhibit the trustees from acting in the best interests of members if the rules fetter their powers. The master trust multi-employer characteristic can increase complexity and, with it, the potential for conflicts of interest. The products they provide are not covered by ECA regulation.

I ran through the list because, taken together, every one of those risks identified by the Government in the impact assessment compellingly supports a requirement for identifying, reporting and managing conflicts of interest in an authorised master trust. Given all the particular risks that the Government’s own impact assessment identifies, will the requirements under Clause 11 include a conflict management obligation? All of the requirements which master trusts meet under Clause 11 are important, so I ask the Minister whether there will be a set of minimum requirements that all master trusts must meet.

Finally, Amendment 27 in the group provides for regulations on systems and processes requirements—the key authorisation criteria in this Bill—to be subject to affirmative resolution. I accept that it is not unusual in pension legislation for detail to be delegated to regulation. I am not seeking to row against that. However, I believe the circumstances in this instance are different. These requirements go to the heart of how these master trusts are to be run. This is a new regime. There are no draft regulations before the House and policy matters are still to be resolved. This is a new regime of protection for what could be 6 or 7 million savers, or more. It is not a trivial matter. When the noble Lord is balancing whether they believe the Government have it right in terms of negative and affirmative resolution, I ask that the Minister focuses on these requirements and the regulations, certainly in the first instance.

My Lords, I am grateful to those who have spoken to this group of amendments to Clause 11, which sets out one of the authorisation criteria, namely,

“that the systems and processes used in running the scheme are sufficient to ensure that it is run effectively”.

Amendment 21, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord McKenzie and Lord Monks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, would amend Clause 11(4)(d) by making it clear that regulations on the matters that the regulator must take into account in deciding whether the schemes, systems and processes are sufficient to ensure that it is run effectively may include provisions about the processes that master trusts are required to follow in relation to environmental, social and governance risks. I think the intention behind the amendment is to do it in relation to the transactions and investment decisions of the scheme, rather than across the range of systems and processes that a scheme may operate on a day-to-day basis, such as staffing and travel. I see the noble Baroness nodding in assent.

Given that this amendment adds environmental, social and governance risks to subsection (4)(d), alongside processes relating to transactions and investment decisions, I am responding on the basis of that first interpretation. Clause 11 sets out specific areas that the Secretary of State may include in regulations and that the Pensions Regulator must take into account when deciding whether it is satisfied that the systems and processes adopted by schemes are sufficient to ensure that they are run effectively.

I have enormous sympathy with the case made by the noble Baroness that environmental, social and governance risks should feature in the way she described, but I remain to be persuaded that it needs to be included in the Bill. There are a number of reasons why. The current regulatory framework allows for ESG—environmental, social and governance—issues to be taken into account. TPR guidance makes it clear that trustees should take into account long-term financial sustainability in their investment strategies and new requirements can be inserted without primary legislation.

Environmental, social and governance issues are already, broadly, taken account of through the existing regulatory arrangements which apply to trustees of pension schemes with 100 or more members, including the statement of investment principles for their scheme, as set out in the investment regulations. The statement must include details of the extent to which the trustees take environmental, social and other factors into account in selecting, retaining and realising investments. These principles have been further supported by the Law Commission’s review of fiduciary duty, which confirmed that trustees should take these factors into account when they are financially material.

The Pensions Regulator has incorporated the Law Commission’s conclusions into its guidance for trustees and its code of practice on “Governance and administration of occupational trust-based schemes providing money purchase benefits”, which gives practical guidelines on how to comply with the legal requirements of pensions regulation. This guidance sets out the regulator’s expectation that when setting investment strategies, trustees will,

“take account of risks affecting the long-term financial sustainability of the investments”.

In addition, Regulation 4 of the investment regulations supplements trustees’ fiduciary duties under trust law by requiring that the assets of all pension schemes must be properly diversified in such a way as to avoid excessive reliance on any particular assets, and to avoid accumulations of risk in the portfolio as a whole. Should the Government subsequently decide to make regulations about the adequacy of the processes that master trusts are required to take into account in relation to environmental, social and governance risks in relation to investments, I can assure noble Lords and the noble Baroness that regulations would be able to cover this even if it was not specified in the Bill, as is done by the amendment. I hope I have said enough to explain why I am not of the view that the amendment should form part of the Bill.

Amendment 22 seeks to insert a new subsection into Clause 11 (4)(g) to make it clear that regulations about the processes used in running the scheme, which the regulator must judge are sufficient to ensure that the scheme is run effectively, may include provision about identifying, reporting, managing and minimising conflicts of interest relating to the work of trustees. The noble Baroness spoke about some of the risks involved here. The objective of Clause 11 is solely to ensure that the schemes are run effectively. It is not directly concerned about the conduct of the trustees undertaking their duties in relation to the pension scheme.

The Government recognised the potential for trustees’ conflicts of interest to arise in some multi-employer schemes and addressed this by introducing additional governance requirements for multi-employer schemes. These provisions were introduced in the Occupational Pension Scheme (Charges and Governance) Regulations 2015, which amended the Occupational Pension Schemes (Scheme Administration) Regulations 1996 to require, first, that there should be a minimum of three trustees, and that a majority of these three or more trustees, including the chair, must be independent of the scheme’s service providers. Furthermore, the trustees must be subject to fixed-term appointment and appointed via an open and transparent recruitment process. The trustees must make arrangements to encourage members to make their views known to trustees on matters concerning the scheme. When establishing whether a trustee is independent of the scheme’s service provider, various matters must be taken into account, which are set out at Regulation 28(3) of the scheme administration regulations 1996 as inserted by Regulation 22 of the charges and governance regulations. An example is whether the trustee is a director, partner, or employee of an undertaking which provides advisory, administration, investment or other services in respect of the scheme.

In addition to these requirements that are currently placed on trustees, Clause 7(2)(c) places a requirement on the Pensions Regulator to assess whether a trustee of a master trust scheme is a fit and proper person as part of the decision on the application to establish a master trust, as set out in Clause 5(3)(a). Clause 7(4)(b) provides for the Pensions Regulator to take into account any matters it considers appropriate that are not covered by regulation when assessing whether a person is a fit and proper person to act.

When the Pensions Regulator is no longer satisfied that an authorised master trust scheme meets the authorisation criteria, including whether a trustee of the scheme is a fit and proper person, Clause 19(1) allows for the authorisation to be withdrawn. Clause 19(2) and (3) provide the process that the Pensions Regulator must follow once a decision has been made to withdraw authorisation. So, in light of existing legislative requirements setting out the required propriety and conduct of trustees of pension funds, and the clear role of the Pensions Regulator set out in the Bill to ensure that trustees of master trust schemes are fit and proper persons, I believe that this amendment is not necessary.

Amendment 23 requires the Secretary of State to make regulations that set a minimum requirement for each of the processes listed in subsection (4)(a) to (g) of Clause 11. I agree in principle that the question of minimum standards is a key one, but I reassure noble Lords that the clause as drafted enables the Secretary of State to set out in regulations factors and standards to which the Pensions Regulator must have regard when deciding whether it is satisfied that a scheme’s systems and processes are sufficient. However, the key difference between the drafting of the Bill now, compared to how the amendment would alter its meaning, is that the amendment states that regulations “must” make minimum requirements.

There are two closely related reasons why I shall ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment. Both my points flow from the principle that the regime has been designed to ensure that we do not mistakenly apply a one-size-fits-all requirement to schemes. A minimum requirement, as something that necessarily has to be set out in regulations, may have some unintended consequences. First, were a minimum requirement to be applied, there is a risk that the one-size-fits-all approach could cause some schemes to fail to meet the criteria and therefore fail to achieve authorisation, despite having systems and processes which are sufficient to ensure that the scheme is run effectively.

Secondly, not all of the specified processes easily lend themselves to a minimum requirement. This brings a similar practical consequence to the point that I have just mentioned. Further, addition of the “must” in this amendment may result in finding the Secretary of State in a position where he cannot comply with his regulatory duties because there is no one-size-fits-all requirement in that case. An example for both these scenarios would be resource planning, where flexibility would be needed to cater for different scheme requirements. Another would be in relation to records management or administration, where flexibility would be needed to cater for different scheme requirements, sizes and structures.

For example, we would want to ensure that administrative systems must be adequate to support current operations; regularly monitored to ensure capacity; and adequate to support the anticipated growth of the scheme. This is more flexible than a minimum standard and tailored to a scheme’s own strategy for achieving sufficient scale. I hope that I have said enough for noble Lords to concur that the question of minimum standards is a key one, and that we will seek to use the regulation-making power in this way when appropriate, taking account of considerations to which I have just referred.

Finally, Amendment 20A stipulates that regulations about the processes must include provision about the areas listed under subsection (4) of the clause. As I have noted previously, we want to consult industry and other interested parties on the content of regulations made under Parts 1 and 2. The list provided at subsection (4) has been included in the Bill to provide clarity to industry now about the areas that the Government believe such regulations are likely to cover. However, the Government do not intend to stipulate the areas that must be included in the regulations made under this clause without consulting on those regulations. I hope that I have made the right assumption about what the amendment is aimed at and explained why the change would not be appropriate.

Finally, we have our old friends, negative and affirmative. I can only repeat what I have said on earlier occasions, and what my noble friend has said before—namely, that we would like to reflect on the balance of affirmative and negative in the Bill as a whole and come up with a balanced assessment of what we believe to be appropriate. On that basis, I hope that the amendments will not be pressed.

My Lords, I support the case that the noble Baroness made for Amendment 22. I am very worried about conflicts of interest. The Minister was very generous and set out a detailed explanation that will repay careful study by us all tomorrow. I will certainly do that. What happens to trust deeds in all this? My experience as a defined benefit trustee is that the trustees have control, responsibilities and duties and are able to effect measures through the trust deed. We seem to be leaving all that to one side in this legislation. There may well be a case for not including measures such as Amendment 22 in the Bill. However, fundamentally different conflicts of interest face trustees in a profit-making master trust situation when they have members on the one hand and providers on the other. I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, who knows a lot more about this than I do, makes an important point here. I am willing to discuss how we resolve this issue and whether we include the relevant measure in the Bill, but I will be following it very carefully as this legislation goes through.

I take the noble Lord’s point. Under the authorisation criteria, the Pensions Regulator has to assess,

“whether each of the following is a fit and proper person”,

and one of them is a trustee. However, I take on board what the noble Lord says, which echoes what he said in an earlier debate—namely, that we should not lose sight of the responsibilities of trustees when we focus on the Pensions Regulator and everybody else. I should like to reflect on the point he has made and, indeed, the other point made about potential conflicts of interest and master trusts.

I thank the Minister for his very full response on all the amendments in this group. I agree that long-term financial sustainability is very important. I noted that when he talked about the responsibilities of trustees, he said that they “must” do certain things, not “may”, yet the Bill says “may” and not “must”. I will look in detail at what the Minister has said and I will be looking for clarity in the Bill. However, given the hour, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 20A withdrawn.

Amendments 21 to 25 not moved.

Clause 11 agreed.

House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 8.32 pm.