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Withdrawal Agreement: Attorney General’s legal opinion on the Joint Instrument and Unilateral Declaration

Volume 796: debated on Tuesday 12 March 2019


My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will repeat a Statement made in the other place by my right honourable and learned friend the Attorney-General:

“I would like to make a Statement about my legal opinion on the joint instrument and unilateral declaration concerning the withdrawal agreement published last night.

Last week, I confirmed I would publish my,

“legal opinion on any document that is produced and negotiated with the Union”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/3/19; col. 1112.]

This has now been laid before the House. This Statement summarises the instruments and my opinion of their legal effect.

Last night in Strasbourg, the Prime Minister secured legally binding changes that strengthen and improve the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration. The Government laid three new documents reflecting these changes in the House: a joint legally binding instrument on the withdrawal agreement and the protocol on Northern Ireland; a unilateral declaration by the United Kingdom in relation to the operation of the Northern Ireland protocol; and a joint statement to supplement the political declaration. The legal opinion I have provided to the House today focuses on the first two of these documents, which relate to the functioning of the backstop and the efforts of the parties that will be required to supersede it.

Let me first tell you what, in my opinion, these documents are not about. They are not about a situation where, despite the parties using good faith and their best endeavours, they cannot reach an agreement on a future relationship. In my opinion such a scenario is, in any case, highly unlikely to occur. It is in the interests of both the United Kingdom and the European Union to agree a future relationship as quickly as possible. Were such a situation to occur, however, the legal risk, as I set it out in my letter of 13 November, remains unchanged.

Let me now move on to what these documents do achieve. As I set out in my opinion, the joint instrument puts the commitments in the letter from Presidents Tusk and Juncker of 14 January 2019 into a legally binding form and provides, in addition, useful clarifications, amplifications of existing obligations and some new obligations. The joint instrument confirms that the European Union cannot pursue an objective of trying to trap the United Kingdom in the backstop indefinitely. The instrument makes explicit that this would constitute bad faith, which would be the basis of a formal dispute before an arbitrator. This means, ultimately, that the protocol could be suspended if the EU continued to breach its obligations.

The joint instrument also reflects the United Kingdom’s and European Union’s commitment to work to replace the backstop with alternative arrangements by December 2020, including as set out in the withdrawal agreement. These commitments include establishing,

“immediately following the ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement, a negotiating track for replacing the customs and regulatory alignment in goods elements of the Protocol with alternative arrangements”.

If an agreement has not been concluded within one year of the UK’s withdrawal, efforts must be redoubled. In my view, the provisions of the joint instrument extend beyond mere interpretation of the withdrawal agreement and represent materially new legal obligations and commitments which enhance its existing terms.

The unilateral declaration records the United Kingdom’s position that, if it were not possible to conclude a subsequent agreement to replace the protocol because of a breach by the European Union of its duty of good faith, it would be entitled to take measures to disapply the provisions of the protocol in accordance with the withdrawal agreement’s dispute resolution procedures and Article 20, to which I have referred.

There is no doubt, in my view, that the clarifications and amplified obligations contained in the joint statement and the unilateral declaration provide a substantive and binding reinforcement of the legal rights available to the United Kingdom in the event that the European Union were to fail in its duties of good faith and best endeavours.

I have in this Statement and in the letter I published today set out my view of the legal effect of the new instruments the Government have agreed with the European Union. However, the matters of law affecting withdrawal can only inform what is essentially a political decision that each of us must make. This is a question not of the lawfulness of the Government’s action but of the prudence, as a matter of policy and political judgment, of entering into an international agreement on the terms proposed. I commend this Statement to the House”.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for repeating the Statement made by the right honourable Attorney-General in another place. The purpose of the Statement was to provide the Attorney-General’s opinion on the implications of the three documents produced following the Prime Minister’s dash to Strasbourg yesterday. The purpose was, of course, what the Prime Minister had promised to negotiate, referring to,

“not a further exchange of letters, but a significant and legally binding change to the withdrawal agreement”.

According to the Mail on Sunday—not a newspaper that I necessarily follow in any respect—the Attorney-General is reported to have said:

“I will not change my opinion unless I’m sure there is no legal risk of us being indefinitely detained in the backstop. I am putting my hand on my heart. I will not change my opinion unless we have a text that shows the risk has been eliminated. I would not put my name to anything less”.

Before considering the merits of what the Prime Minister has obtained it is worth considering what has not been achieved. As I predicted in the debate yesterday—was it only yesterday?—there is no change to the withdrawal agreement. Its 597 pages remain unchanged. That is not entirely true, because they have been reduced to a smaller volume. The text, however, is completely unchanged. So too are the 26 pages—I think now 28 pages—of the political declaration.

The result is that the legal risk remains unchanged. As the Attorney-General states in paragraph 19 of his latest opinion:

“The legal risk remains unchanged that if through no such demonstrable failure of either party, but simply because of intractable differences, that situation does arise”—

that is, the situation in which no new agreement is reached—

“the United Kingdom would have, at least while the fundamental circumstances remained the same, no internationally lawful means of exiting the Protocol’s arrangements, save by agreement.”

I had the opportunity to hear the Attorney-General’s Statement in another place this morning, and I understood him to be reconfirming that position in his answers.

It is also worth restating that—despite rumours to the contrary—there are no changes to the arbitration provisions and no new system of arbitration: it will still be lawyers who make this decision. It also follows that the statement in paragraph 16 of the Attorney-General’s opinion of 13 November 2018 still stands. That statement was as follows:

“It is difficult to conclude otherwise than that the Protocol is intended to subsist even when negotiations have clearly broken down. The ordinary meaning of the provisions set out above and considered in their context allows no obvious room for the termination of the Protocol, save by the achievement of an agreement fulfilling the same objectives. Therefore, despite statements in the Protocol that it is not intended to be permanent, and the clear intention of the parties that it should be replaced by alternative, permanent arrangements, in international law the Protocol would endure indefinitely until a superseding agreement took its place, in whole or in part, as set out therein”.

I understand that still to be the position and invite the noble and learned Lord to confirm it.

In his Statement, the Attorney-General focused particularly on other available remedies in the event that the European Union can be proved guilty of bad faith in not reaching an agreement. He says—this is important, and the noble and learned Lord repeated these words earlier—that the new documents are,

“not about a situation where, despite the parties properly fulfilling the duties of good faith and their best endeavours, they cannot reach an agreement on a future relationship”.

Again, therefore, I ask the noble and learned Lord to confirm that the Government accept that if, while acting in good faith, both parties cannot reach an agreement, the backstop would endure with no predetermined end date. I underline the phrase “can be proved to be” acting in bad faith, because that would have to be demonstrated—would it not? —and it would be for the United Kingdom, if it was asserting that position, to prove it. Can the noble and learned Lord confirm that? The burden of proof, as we lawyers say, would be on us.

I also question the likelihood that that could be proved. I have made this point before in the House. It would be a very strong thing—a virtually impossible thing—for this arbitral panel to find on proof that senior statesmen and politicians were acting in bad faith, rather than simply being unable to agree on what are important matters for them—for their constituents, as for ours. As a practising lawyer —at least when he is not fulfilling governmental responsibilities—would the noble and learned Lord agree that the prospects of proving that, when the EU negotiators are saying, “No, we did not regard these proposals as being in the interests of the EU”, are vanishingly small? If he were advising a client, he would tell him so now.

In his previous advice, the Attorney-General referred to the difficulties of proof and the egregious nature of the conduct that would be required to establish a breach of those obligations by the EU. These are very strong things to have to prove. I respectfully suggest that, in reaching a view on how much comfort these arrangements give, that must be borne very much in mind.

The Attorney-General says that he believes the risks of an indefinite stay are reduced. He does not—it seems to me—explain in his advice why they are reduced. I understood that, in short, he sees a greater political will to reach an agreement. That is a political judgement. It is of course open to him and to others to take the same or a different view on the political will. I cannot, however, agree that anything in any of the three documents changes the legal reality.

In paragraph 4 of his opinion, the Attorney-General referred to a,

“systematic refusal to take into consideration adverse proposals or interests”.

A systematic, contumacious or deliberate refusal even to consider proposals would, I suppose, be evidence of bad faith—but that is as far as it goes. A sincere disagreement about the terms, however, is not bad faith.

As for the third document, the unilateral statement, it is that and nothing more. It is what the United Kingdom says that it thinks, but that does not make it so. I do not, therefore, share the view that there is anything in these legal documents that shifts the legal risk.

I am loath to go back to the codpiece that I referred to yesterday. However, I said then that I did not really understand how that soubriquet had come into being. From what I have read since, it is apparently code for figleaf. I regret to say that despite the energy and good faith of both the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General—which I respect—these are no more than a figleaf, and Members of the other place are left to make their political judgments on the basis of the Prime Minister’s deal.

My Lords, I do not propose to repeat the speech I made yesterday, in which I suggested that it was inappropriate for lawyers to determine an issue as important as whether the backstop had run its course. I am very pleased that in the conclusion to his Statement today, the Attorney-General emphasised that matters of law affecting withdrawal can only inform what is essentially a political decision that each of us must make. As it is a political decision, it is really not right to ask lawyers to determine whether a state is acting in bad faith, as the noble and learned Lord said a moment ago. I commend the Attorney-General for sticking firmly to the opinion that he first gave and not being shifted, despite the enormous pressure I have no doubt he is under.

An aggrieved party under this instrument would have to persuade the arbitrators to prove—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said—that the other party had failed the best endeavours test with the objective of applying the backstop indefinitely. Further, he would have to prove that there had been a persistent failure or a systematic refusal to consider the other side’s proposals. Only if the arbitrators found in the aggrieved party’s favour would they be able to use temporary measures to suspend the backstop—and I emphasise the word “temporary”. The other party could cure the problem at will at any time by taking the necessary measures to comply with the ruling.

My first question to the Minister, therefore, is this: what does he envisage to be temporary measures? What does that mean? Clearly, it would not be a permanent unilateral withdrawal from the backstop. What would happen at the Northern Ireland border to the free passage of goods if temporary measures were taken? Would it be a smuggler’s free for all or a clamping down?

The Attorney-General originally advised that it would be highly unlikely that the United Kingdom could take advantage of the remedies available to it for a breach of good faith and best endeavours because of the difficulties of proof and the egregious nature of the conduct, which would have to be established. I remind your Lordships that according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “egregious”, which the Attorney-General in typical fashion rolled off his tongue, means “shocking”. Is it now then all about timetables? That is all that the instrument appears to lay down. I listened to the Attorney-General talking in the other place about time being of the essence. To every lawyer, that phrase means that if the timetable is not adhered to, the whole agreement is defunct. The United Kingdom negotiators have not shown themselves to be particularly conscious of time over the past two and a half years. Will a breach of the timetable on either side now amount to egregious, shocking conduct, sufficient to trigger the dispute settlement arbitration procedures?

My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords for their contributions. Referring to the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, I will perhaps begin where he finished. If the noble and learned Lord was to revisit his study of early Italian Renaissance sculpture, he might be reminded that the fig leaf can cover some very important bits. Therefore, one must bear in mind that the use of analogies is not always entirely helpful.

In paragraph 19 of his opinion, the Attorney-General set out his view that the legal remains unchanged. But that was not the question that was being addressed. The issue that exercised people was one of an extreme nature, which one would, frankly, never anticipate arising where parties have entered into an international treaty in good faith and intend to discharge their obligations under that treaty in good faith. As I observed in a previous debate, if you simply do not trust the person with whom you are contracting or entering into a treaty, there is little point in doing so—you would not proceed in the belief that they would ever finally discharge their obligations. Here, however, we proceed in the confident belief that their obligations will be addressed and met.

It is therefore important that, in the context of the further agreement, the parties have fixed a date of December 2020 by which to use their best endeavours to arrive at an alternative to the backstop. It is in these circumstances that it is considered appropriate, as the Attorney-General observed in paragraph 7 of his opinion, to note that the provisions now represent materially new legal obligations and commitments which mean that unconscionable behaviour on the part of the EU, and failure to fulfil its obligation to seek suitable and alternative practical means of dealing with the backstop, would have to be properly addressed in the context of the arbitration provisions.

It is in that context that I come to address the questions posed by the noble and learned Lord, which touch upon each other. He began by asking how, if there is bad faith by the European Union, we would prove it. There are circumstances in which it would become apparent that the European Union was intent upon seeking to trap the United Kingdom in the backstop, notwithstanding the provision of alternative arrangements. But let us be clear: one does not anticipate or foresee that that would ever occur.

On that point, I note that the backstop has significant drawbacks for the European Union, just as it has significant drawbacks for the United Kingdom. If it were ever to emerge, the backstop would result in Great Britain enjoying the benefits of a customs union and paying nothing for that. The relevant payment in respect of the customs union would come from trade in Northern Ireland, not in Great Britain. Let us remember that there is very little in this that benefits the European Union, let alone the United Kingdom.

If we were, however, to find ourselves in a situation in which there was shocking or egregious conduct on the part of the European Union, the arbitration measure would be available. In finding that there was a breach, the arbitrators would be entitled to grant temporary measures. That would include a temporary suspension of the operation of the relevant backstop provisions with regard to the border.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, asked, quite rightly, what would happen at the border. One answer is that we would find ourselves in that situation only where the European Union had not been prepared to engage with coherent, sensible proposals put forward by the United Kingdom to deal with the border and ensure that it could remain entirely open. If a suspension was ordered by the arbitrators, it would then be open to the United Kingdom to implement those proposals unilaterally at the border in order to deal with the issue. If thereafter—in utterly extreme circumstances—the European Union was to persist in refusing to engage with the temporary suspension of the protocol, the arbitrators would eventually come to the conclusion, quite rightly, that the protocol was simply not required; that it was no longer “necessary” because the alternative arrangements during the suspension had clearly worked to the satisfaction of the European Union, which had done nothing in the meantime. Again, I stress that we are talking about the most extreme of circumstances. I do not contemplate that, politically, anyone will go there.

The noble and learned Lord has given us extreme examples such as unconscionable behaviour and all the rest of it, but does he not agree that the most likely circumstance in which we fail to agree is because we fail to agree? We have seen it over a period of time already, and know that it does not have to be unconscionable or as a result of bad faith. In those circumstances, none of these arguments would avail.

I do not accept the noble and learned Lord’s suggestion that that is the most likely or probable outcome. We have already seen circumstances in which parties have laid out the suitability of alternative arrangements for the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Work will go on with regard to that. There is going to be a track of work carried out as soon as the withdrawal agreement is concluded in order to bring that to fruition by December 2020. There is therefore no reason to suppose that such a thing is impossible. If we have a situation in which the EU simply refuses and turns its face away from a workable proposal, then there will be an issue of good faith and best endeavours to be addressed and disposed of. But the political reality is different. This is very much a situation in which we are dealing with an extreme. Equally extreme is the idea that somehow, over a period of almost two years, the parties would not be able to conceive of a means of dealing with the border except by means of the backstop.

My Lords, I have had the opportunity to study the earlier and most recent legal opinions of the Attorney-General. I agree with him that as a matter of law there is a risk. But I was a mathematician before I became a lawyer. One has to find out the size of the risk. Every one of us who crossed the street today to come here had to take a risk, did we not? I came yesterday by aeroplane, which also has a risk. The question is: what is the risk? A good deal of the discussion that has just taken place is about what happens in the event of extremes, but the most important way to annihilate the risk is by reaching an agreement that supersedes the protocol altogether. If we want to see how probable an agreement is, we have only to listen to Mr Johnson, who said: “They are keen to sell us their prosecco”. The European Union is as keen to have a free trade agreement with us as we are to have one with it. In fact, its trade is greater towards us than our trade is to the EU. Therefore, the chances are high, to be judged on the facts as they are now, that there will be an agreement to supersede the protocol. That is what one has to measure. So far as I am concerned, the risk is negligible—a very unlikely event. I would feel sorry if the future of our United Kingdom, in this connection, were determined by an appreciation of a so-called risk that is practically negligible.

I will welcome the noble Lord’s comments. His reference to Latin will no doubt enhance this debate. However, for the moment, I entirely concur with the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. It would be foolish in the extreme to make an important—indeed, significant—political decision on the basis of a risk that can genuinely be regarded as negligible.

My Lords, I apologise for my slip. The word “egregious” derives from the Latin “e grege”—outside the flock; in other words, it means abnormal, out of the ordinary. “Shocking” is the wrong translation.

The elaborate piece of theatre that the Government staged last night in Strasbourg and the opinion of the Attorney-General have been designed to ensure that we do not stay in the customs union. As the Minister himself acknowledged, staying in a customs union would be greatly in the national interest. The Government’s policy in this matter is 180 degrees in the wrong direction. Industry and commerce are crying out for the opportunity to stay in the customs union. If we did find that opportunity, I hope we would grasp it. It is much more likely to come to us not from bad faith on the part of the Commission or the Irish but simply because the whole idea of establishing a frontier that is not a frontier proves to be hocus-pocus, as my noble friend Lord Bassam has shown. No such technology is even under study at present. Anyone who knows anything about venture capital knows that the chance of a blue-sky idea becoming viable and generating money is, at best, one in 20.

I am obliged to the noble Lord for his address on “egregious”, and I do not disagree with the derivation of the term. It would be an abnormal situation to find ourselves in, and that is why I reiterate that it would be exceptional, unusual and unfortunate for us to proceed to make a political decision based on such an abnormality. The point I sought to make on the customs union is that in so far as we remain within it as a consequence of the backstop, if we ever did, it has clear deleterious impacts upon the European Union. We would, in a sense, be getting a free ride on the customs union so far as Great Britain is concerned, but not so far as Northern Ireland is concerned. But I do not anticipate that we are ever going to find ourselves within that backstop and, therefore, within that customs union.

My Lords, I have had the chance to study the Attorney-General’s comments and I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, that the Attorney-General is right. There will always be a legal risk and he would be wrong not to tell us that it remains. But that is the nature of risk. I am told that in Chinese the word “risk” is made up of two pictures—opportunity and danger. We have to look at the opportunities and then the danger, but not always concentrate on the danger.

For the likes of me, the pint is always half-full. For some, it is always half-empty. I thought that the worry about the backstop was that there was no timetable in which this matter might be resolved. December 2020 has been put into the agreement. There was also a worry that the United Kingdom might not be able to unilaterally withdraw from arrangements that did not help the rest of us. That has changed and is now reflected in the protocol. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, that it is not lawyers who will resolve this but political will, which is the way in which we should proceed.

Having read the legal opinion, I am of the view that although what has been achieved by the Prime Minister does not take away the legal risk, the issue is more about what will happen in terms of agreements. In the end, do we believe as a nation that we are capable of achieving the best agreement in our interests and those of Europe? We have been good at negotiating protocols that have helped democratic institutions all over the world. This is a time to start believing that we should create a good agreement by 2020 and show good faith. If others do not do so, then the arbitration would come into being.

I want us to take the Chinese view; there is always danger in risk but this is the time for me to say to everybody: let us seize the opportunity and be reconciled on an issue that looks difficult. A time may come, friends, when although lawyers talk and talk—I am one of them—this issue should not be resolved by them but by politicians.

I am obliged to the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York. I agree with his observation that ultimately we are concerned with a political, not legal, decision. We have to remind ourselves that the withdrawal agreement is the means to an end, not the end in itself. Either we leave on 29 March without any deal in place, because the law has already determined that that is our exit date, or we can leave sensibly, with a withdrawal agreement that takes us into the realms of further negotiation for our future relationship. There is no reason to suppose that as a consequence of that further move we are ever going to find ourselves in the backstop, let alone considering how to come out of it.

There are two other options. We could of course change the law and we could take an extension under Article 50. I think there are new elements in the new texts. I do not think they remedy what is, for me, a humiliatingly bad deal, but I see two new elements. First, there is a greater urgency—or an impression of urgency—in the treatment of the search for alternative arrangements to the backstop. The impression created is that the philosopher’s stone will be more actively sought. That does not guarantee that the philosopher’s stone will be found, and that is the risk that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, might want to bear in mind as well.

The second point is more legal than political. I see a change in the treatment of the risk of being trapped in the backstop because the European Union breaks the commitment in Article 5 of the withdrawal agreement to exercise good faith. As the Minister said, however, that is a vanishingly small risk. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said, the real risk is that the search for a mutually acceptable solution—a workable alternative arrangement—continues for some considerable time to prove fruitless. That is the real risk. Alchemy is like that. Does the Minister agree? Does he also agree with Mr Varadkar that the texts are perfectly acceptable because the withdrawal agreement has not been reopened and the backstop not been undermined?

My Lords, I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, on the matter of alchemy. Nevertheless, I agree with much of what he had to say. These further agreements inject a greater element of urgency into the whole process that is to be carried on and underline that this process will be carried on in good faith. That being so, there remains the outlier risk that a solution will not be found by December 2020. We remain confident that it will be. But in the event that it is not, the backstop will continue for a period. Wherein lies the disaster?

Does my noble and learned friend agree that, if at the end of this week the House of Commons discusses a delay to the Brexit date, a short delay would be entirely useless? Does he agree that what is required is a substantial delay of the kind advocated by the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Hannay, or the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong yesterday? As existing members of the European Union, we could discuss and negotiate our future relations with the European Union either within or without. Does he agree that that does not necessarily involve Brexit or, necessarily, a further referendum? Indeed, it might involve a Government of national unity to negotiate.

My Lords, my views on whether an extension should be short, long or anything in between are of no moment because, at the end of the day, any extension sought will have to be on the basis of consent with the European Union.

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that nobody would ever take any medicines if they read the leaflet in the packet in detail? That is the sort of risk we are talking about. Does he further agree that the deal on offer should be accepted tonight in another place and we should then move on?

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord emphasised the importance in the joint instrument of urgency. Indeed, paragraph 7 of the Attorney-General’s opinion today states:

“Therefore, provided the United Kingdom can clearly demonstrate in practice that it is effectively organised and prepared to maintain the urgent pace of negotiations that they imply, the EU could not fail to match it without being at risk of breaching the best endeavours obligation”.

As the Minister has emphasised that this is political, perhaps rather more than legal, I ask him a political question. Can he give the House three examples of when, since March 2017, the United Kingdom Government, in dealing with Brexit, have clearly demonstrated in practice that it is effectively organised?

My Lords, can we return to the legal advice, which is the subject of this Statement? Does the noble and learned Lord agree that the legal advice has not changed at all—yes or no?

Further, if we adopt his attractive metaphor about Italianate sculpture, does the Minister agree that if yesterday’s breathless Statement from the Prime Minister, anticipated in the House of Commons, is a fig leaf, if we lift that fig leaf, we will find that behind it are no parts whatever? To proceed towards an impossible, extreme scenario, as suggested by the noble and learned Lord himself, is something that a skilled lawyer in private practice, as the noble and learned Lord has been, would say to every client, “You can’t do it”.

My Lords, as regards the legal advice, I refer back to paragraph 7 of the Attorney-General’s letter, in which he said that the,

“Joint Instrument extend beyond mere interpretation of the Withdrawal Agreement and represent materially new legal obligations and commitments”.

To that extent, we have moved on. But of course, he also made absolutely clear that the legal risk that had been addressed in the context of whether there was a unilateral right to leave the backstop had not changed and that there was no internationally lawful means of exiting the protocol’s arrangements except by agreement. But context is everything.

On the second point, there appear ample grounds for supposing that, in taking this forward, we will arrive at a resolution of an issue that troubles lawyers but I suspect does not trouble politicians quite as much: whether or not the backstop is somehow a black or white outcome. It is not an outcome that is anticipated nor one that we believe we will have to address, and if we have to address it, we do not believe it will ever be permanent, and that for political reasons alone.

My Lords, I wanted to ask the noble and learned Lord to name an alchemist who ever succeeded in his determination to turn lead into gold, but perhaps that is for another occasion. Since we are talking about risk, it is important to remember that one risk that featured very strongly in noble Lords’ consideration of these matters is the possibility that anything that seemed to have the effect of recreating a border between the north and south of Ireland was a risk we were not willing to take. One reason for that was the fragility, albeit that it is still in existence, of the Belfast agreement. I say with due respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, that when one is considering risk, this is not crossing the road: it is a risk that could have the effect of bringing to an end many years of fragile peace. In those circumstances, it is hardly surprisingly that people want to be pretty certain, before that risk is taken, that to do so is not likely to lead to an adverse outcome.

With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, I must say that I entirely disagree with his analysis. The whole point of the present withdrawal agreement and the Northern Ireland protocol is to ensure that we adhere not only to the terms but to the spirit of the Belfast agreement. That is why the backstop has been formulated in the manner in which it has. We will leave the backstop only when, or if, there is a need to put in place alternative structures that do not require a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. I reiterate my belief that we will never actually enter the backstop in the first place. We have that period up to December 2020 in which to address this issue and it is not beyond the wit of man or alchemist to resolve such an issue.

My Lords, the Attorney-General stated:

“A unilateral declaration by one party to a bilateral agreement constitutes an authentic interpretation of the treaty if it is accepted by the other party”.

Does he not find that a little odd? It would not then be a unilateral statement at all but a joint statement. On what authority did the Attorney-General say that the EU has agreed to the UK unilateral but it will not object to the UK unilateral statement? I see no trace of that in any of the documents.

Secondly, the use of the arbitration procedure remains shrouded in mystery as a result of the provision in the withdrawal treaty that any dispute involving the interpretation of EU law has to go to the European Court of Justice and not the arbitration panel. It that likely to be the case in most of the disputes?

My Lords, with respect to the two points raised, a unilateral declaration by one party can have legal status as an interpretive document in the context of international law. In circumstances where the other party does not object to the unilateral statement, it will be seen to have legal status with regard to that party’s interpretation of the relevant treaty. In that context, I therefore see no difficulty with the opinion expressed by the Attorney-General on that point.

On the suggestion that the arbitration will be shrouded in mystery because of the need to refer a point of law to the European Court of Justice, I remind the noble Lord of my response to a question from him some time ago, when I pointed out that the real issue will be of fact, not law. It is therefore difficult to envisage the European Court of Justice having any material role in the context of a dispute over good faith or best endeavours.