Considered in Grand Committee
That the Grand Committee do consider the Financial Services Act 2021 (Prudential Regulation of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms) (Consequential Amendments and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2021.
My Lords, the Financial Services Act 2021 (Prudential Regulation of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms) (Consequential Amendments and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2021 among other things support the implementation of the remaining Basel III standards and the investment firms prudential regime, the IFPR.
As I am sure noble Lords will recall, the Government legislated, through the Financial Services Act 2021, to enable the Prudential Regulation Authority to update the UK’s capital requirements regime to implement the remaining Basel accords. These standards were developed following the 2008 financial crisis, which highlighted major deficiencies in international financial regulation.
Now that the UK has left the EU, we must implement many of these standards domestically for the first time. Parliament has approved the implementation of these standards by expert independent regulators, alongside an overarching accountability framework. In September, this House approved the Capital Requirements Regulation (Amendment) Regulations 2021, made under the Financial Services Act, which revoked the provisions in the UK capital requirements regulation, or UK CRR, necessary for the PRA to make these updates. The Financial Services Act 2021 also enabled the Financial Conduct Authority to introduce the investment firms prudential regime, or IFPR, which is the UK’s new tailored prudential regime for FCA investment firms. This regime carves FCA investment firms out of the UK CRR. The combination of these two prudential packages requires consequential changes to the statute book. This instrument ensures that these changes mesh appropriately and provide a complete, functioning legal regime for firms.
I now turn to the instrument in detail, first in respect to changes that implement the Basel standards. Many of the measures contained in this instrument update references in existing legislation to the UK CRR, so that they now relate to the new rules made by the PRA, known as the CRR rules. In addition, this instrument revokes the reporting and disclosure requirements for the leverage ratio. I remind noble Lords that the leverage ratio is a capital backstop that prevents banks from becoming excessively leveraged. I reassure noble Lords that the PRA was already able to set leverage-based capital requirements through PRA rules. The UK leverage ratio framework has been, and continues to be, set by the Financial Policy Committee, which has indeed reviewed it in its entirety recently.
This instrument also removes a legacy equivalence determination on Article 132 that was tied to an equivalence regime that was revoked as part of the Capital Requirements Regulation (Amendment) Regulations 2021 earlier this year. This is therefore a tidying up. This instrument ensures that firms do not have to reapply for permissions where the relevant article of the UK CRR is revoked and replaced with PRA rules.
I turn to the changes in relation to the implementation of IFPR. Some of these changes are straightforward—for example, removing now defunct terminology due to changes stemming from IFPR. Two others are more substantive. First, this instrument extends the Securitisation Regulation’s due diligence requirements to all FCA investment firms. This ensures that all FCA investment firms buying securitisations must conduct due diligence, thereby helping to safeguard the integrity of the UK securitisation market. The second removes FCA investment firms from the UK resolution regime. This reflects the Government’s view that the FCA’s existing toolkit, along with the measures the FCA will implement in future through IFPR and the investment bank special administration regime, are more appropriate ways of managing such firms’ failure. FCA investment firms currently use existing rules and go into insolvency proceedings anyway, rather than going into resolution. Therefore, keeping them within the resolution regime only serves to create administrative cost for these firms for no benefit.
This instrument contains a savings provision and a transitional provision for the IFPR. It enables the FCA to continue to modify, revoke or amend IFPR-relevant technical standards. It provides for transitional provisions that support the functioning of the UK securitisation market by extending the existing risk retention requirements for one year to allow time for firms to transition their approach. The risk retention requirement ensures that firms retain an economic interest in a portion of the risk that is being sold on to investors.
Finally, this instrument addresses a small number of deficiencies arising from the withdrawal of the UK from the EU which have been identified during the process of making these Basel and IFPR amendments.
In conclusion, the Treasury has worked closely with the Bank of England, the PRA, FCA, industry and, in relation to the resolution change, the Banking Liaison Panel in the drafting of this instrument.
I hope that noble Lords have found my explanation helpful. In short, this instrument plays an important functional part in preparing UK legislation for the important Basel III implementation and IFPR packages. I would like to inform noble Lords that a correction slip has been issued in relation to a typographical error in this draft instrument. There is an incorrect cross-reference in the title of Regulation 38. The operative provisions in that regulation are correct. As a result, the error has no legal effect, and noble Lords can be assured that this change is minor. I beg to move.
My Lords, I declare a possible interest as a trustee of the Parliamentary Contributory Pension Fund. I want to put this on the record, as we are getting wide briefings at the moment. I also have some experience of the friendly society movement as a former chairman of the Tunbridge Wells Equitable Friendly Society and two Invesco investment trusts.
I particularly draw attention to paragraph 7.8 of the Explanatory Memorandum, which is key. It says that
“the framework in its current form does not appropriately cater for the differences between credit institutions and investment firms and can be disproportionate”
and “burdensome”, et cetera. That seems crucial. It then goes on to mention the consultation that has been carried out. When my noble friend winds up, could he make it clear whether all parts of Part 9C rules have been produced and circulated to the interested parties, or not? Certainly, implementation on 1 January 2022 does not fill me with enthusiasm. It is after Christmas and less than a month away, so I hope he will say that they have been produced, and when.
I am sure that my noble friend and all noble Lords would feel that there are some deficiencies in UK-retained law. I seek reassurance that we are confident that those deficiencies have been removed.
The other dimension I raise relates to paragraph 12.3. It will not surprise my noble friends that, once again, I feel very strongly about impact assessments and statements from Her Majesty’s Treasury that it considers that the net impact will be less than £5 million and very limited. Paragraph 14.1 says that
“the number of small businesses in scope is low.”
They may be small businesses, but they are important businesses to whoever is running them—and we are talking about financial firms.
It is always helpful to have a review of any legislation, particularly legislation relating to our coming out of the EU. That may not be proportionate in the judgment of the Treasury, but I do not know how many firms we are talking about. If my noble friend has that information, that will be helpful. I suppose that if we are talking of only three or four, that may be right, but I do not believe that that is the number—from my experience in the City, from some of the presentations we have recently had and, indeed, from some of the publicity about what is happening in the financial sector at the moment.
Is my noble friend absolutely confident that those firms do not want the SI reviewed after a period? If they all say no—that they do not want a review and are comfortable—fine, but my judgment is that, in life, it is helpful to have a review at some point.
My Lords, obviously I will not oppose this statutory instrument, but it raises a number of issues which need to be explored, and I shall look forward to the Minister’s response to our concerns. We raised these concerns during the passage of the Financial Services Act 2021, but they have not been alleviated.
The Act and this SI transfer significant power to set the UK rules on Basel III standards to the financial regulators accompanied by minimal parliamentary oversight. It is a crucial process and has a fundamental impact on financial stability, as it sets the capital and risk management requirements for banks and other financial institutions. The PRA and the FCA are expected to consult on their decisions, and parliamentarians can contribute to those consultations, but as no more than ordinary consultees, despite their responsibilities to the public, and can at best hope for a few comments on their points as part of the general response.
Committees of Parliament can question the PRA and FCA and undertake reports but, in practice, on only a handful of issues each year, so they are likely to be visited exceedingly rarely and probably only at a time of crisis, which is rather too late. Even the SIs offer no meaningful accountability, because they cannot be amended. This SI, with the powers it gives the regulators, will mean that the issues of Basel III, so crucial to our financial structure, will probably never again come before either this House or the other place, except through that committee arrangement, which is, as I said, pretty minimal. Perhaps the Minister will confirm that.
When we were members of the EU—I know mentioning that is not popular with the Government—basic Basel standards were implemented through EU law, where the process was open and accountable and as different as day from night from our current circumstance. Before the EU Commission proposed draft legislation, it held many conferences and public meetings involving parliamentarians; parliamentarians were engaged in briefings, expert evidence sessions and discussions with a wide range of relevant regulators and supervisory authorities; and the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee would be involved in scrutinising the main directive and regulations by way of co-decision. With Brexit, the power has transferred from the EU, but the Government have chosen to do it in a way that essentially removes any meaningful democratic accountability. I should like to hear for the record why the Minister has chosen such a route.
I want to raise two narrow issues that are hanging loose. As part of setting Basel III standards, the PRA will determine MREL—the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities—and it will do so without any democratic oversight. MREL seeks to ensure that any bank failure can be resolved because the bank either has a very high level of capital or can bail in bonds to restore its capital position. Big banks can easily access the market for bail-in bonds, but mid-tier banks cannot, except at the most extortionate prices. The Bank of England has historically applied MREL to mid-tier banks, unlike its EU and US counterparts; that has been very much a UK decision. Late last year, the Bank of England started a review of MREL; I think it finally became aware that it was going to create major problems in the mid-tier market. Can the Minister please update us on what has happened with this review and where we now stand with MREL, particularly as regards mid-tier banks?
Lastly, during the passage of the Act that lies behind this SI, my noble friend Lord Oates and I moved amendments to get the PRA to seriously consider recognising the financial risk associated with stranded fossil fuel assets and to adjust capital requirements for the banks to reflect that risk. We were dismissed very casually. Now the PRA seems to be shifting its stance in its paper Climate-Related Financial Risk Management and the Role of Capital Requirements. Will the Minister please update us, as we have no other way of getting information? As I said, the effect of the Act and the SI is to remove any direct oversight of such issues from Parliament, except through the weak consultation and committee processes. As the one last opportunity, perhaps the Minister would inform us of where the status is today.
My Lords, I am grateful, as ever, to the Minister for introducing this latest set of Treasury regulations. These are not the first changes to arise from the Financial Services Act 2021, but this SI represents the biggest amendments to and revocation of the capital requirements regulation—the CRR—since that parent legislation passed. Many of the changes are to facilitate the implementation of certain Basel III standards from 1 January 2022. As the Minister and the Explanatory Memorandum noted, the UK played an active role in negotiating this reform package.
As we discussed at length during the passage of the parent Act, the Prudential Regulation Authority—the PRA—has taken responsibility for updating parts of the CRR through its regulatory rules. That such changes are being made at arm’s length might still rankle with some—the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, reinforced that point—but that was the Treasury’s determination and it is the framework that we must operate under.
Other changes made by the instrument are designed to facilitate the implementation of the investment firms prudential regime—the IFPR—by the Financial Conduct Authority. That new system will ensure tailored regulation of non-systemic investment firms outside the scope of the CRR. The Explanatory Memorandum notes that although the FCA has introduced most of its IFPR rules, some more are required before the regime goes live on 1 January 2022. Can the Minister confirm whether these additional rules have been finalised and published since the SI and EM were laid? If not, does the FCA have an estimate of when they will emerge?
Could the Minister also outline what parliamentary engagement has been undertaken on the CRR and the IFPR reforms? Given the highly technical nature of these regulations and the various regulatory rules that must be read alongside them, is the Minister confident that everything is present and correct? This might at first glance feel like a trivial question but, as a veteran of dozens of EU exit SIs, it is vital that we have confidence in this process.
Moving on, the Treasury has, in its Explanatory Memorandum, pointed to the existence of accountability frameworks for the PRA and the FCA. However, in doing so, it neglected to mention the unease that has been expressed about this by several colleagues across your Lordships’ House. At the time, it was suggested that concerned colleagues may find comfort in the ongoing future regulatory framework review process. Some has indeed been found in the proposals outlined in measures 6 and 7 of Command Paper 548 to introduce statutory requirements for the PRA and FCA to notify relevant parliamentary committees of their consultations and provide written responses to any representations made. If adopted, these steps would mirror several of the key asks in our previous amendments. Nevertheless, as always, the devil will be in the detail. While it may not be strictly relevant to this SI, can the Minister outline the anticipated timescale for the review? When is the Treasury likely to come forward with the resulting legislation?
Another concern around CRR and IFPR rule-making was the extent to which the regulators would have regard to the steps needed to tackle the climate crisis. The Government eventually conceded that the PRA and the FCA should have regard to the 2050 net-zero target, but this requirement takes effect only on 1 January —that is, after most of the rules have been published and at the same time as they enter into force. Can the Minister outline what steps, if any, have been taken by the regulators to ensure that green issues have been considered as part of the current exercise, in so far as it is possible within the Basel III framework? Can he also explain how he envisages the new duty operating in practice? What kinds of regulatory changes would he expect to see as a result of that concession having been made?
There is a perception—I have outlined my concerns before—that while the Chancellor likes to talk green, he is somewhat less keen on acting accordingly. Many firms in the financial sector are cognisant of the need to make their business practices more sustainable. Some have acted as outriders, setting ambitious targets and creating interesting schemes for change. However, more needs to be done. A voluntary approach to things such as investment in fossil fuels will get us only so far. Some will do the right thing but others may see opportunities to gain competitive advantage. If, by the time we get to the next financial services Bill, these kinds of issues have not been adequately addressed by the PRA and FCA, can the Minister commit the Treasury to taking action?
Implementing Basel III and IFPR is one thing, and we do not oppose these regulations’ small part in delivering those reforms. However, meeting the challenges of the future is another matter and it is not yet clear that we are on the right course.
I thank noble Lords for their contributions today. Some important points have been raised during the debate. I will attempt to answer them but there may be one or two where I will have to write.
To start, my noble friend Lord Naseby asked about impact assessments. A de minimis impact assessment has been published alongside the instrument. As the equivalent annual net direct cost is less than £5 million, the only direct costs to businesses in scope of the instrument will be approximately £900,000. This is for provisions relating to the securitisation regulation.
Regarding the amendment to Article 2(12)(g) of the securitisation regulation, including all the FCA investment firms in scope of due diligence requirements, the net impact to firms is expected to be £900,000 per annum, based on the relevant firms investing in 20 securitisation positions per year. This figure represents the aggregate compliant costs for firms that are being brought within the scope of the due diligence requirements. This figure has been calculated from information provided by the FCA and industry; the calculation is based on the type of investment firms on which the amendment has an impact, the estimated number of such firms and the estimated cost of complying with the due diligence requirements.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked about future regulatory reform and parliamentary oversight. The Government and the regulators are committed to ensuring that Parliament has the opportunities it needs to scrutinise the PRA’s rules and respond to anything raised. The Government consider that Parliament has a wide range of powers to request information and conduct effective scrutiny of the regulators, including through the Select Committee system. To support this work, the Government have proposed formalising through statute the mechanisms through which the regulators provide information to Parliament to ensure that it has the information it needs to undertake this scrutiny.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked me to outline what parliamentary engagement has been undertaken on both the CRR and IFPR reforms. Ultimately, it is Parliament that sets the regulators’ objectives. It is of course right that Parliament has an appropriate opportunity to scrutinise the work of the regulators and their effectiveness in delivering the objectives that Parliament has set them. The regulators committed to sending their consultations and draft rules on Basel and the IFPR to Parliament during the passage of the Financial Services Act earlier this year.
Consultation on these changes started in December 2020, so there has been plenty of time for Parliament to review and report on it, including through the Select Committee process. The PRA and the FCA also published their near-final rules over the summer to provide ample time for familiarisation well in advance of this debate. As part of the ongoing future regulatory reform, as I have mentioned, we have proposed formalising through statute the mechanism through which regulators provide information.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and my noble friend Lord Naseby asked whether the detail of this instrument and the accompanying rules set by the regulators are present and correct. The answer is yes. Treasury officials have worked extensively with their counterparts at the regulators to ensure that the changes mesh and make a cohesive whole. Where appropriate, both the Treasury and the regulators have consulted on the measures implemented through this statutory instrument. The noble Lord and my noble friend also asked whether the IFPR rules have been finalised and published since the SI and EM were laid. I can confirm that the FCA has now published all the IFPR rules, including the final outstanding set of rules, which were published on 26 November.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for his assertion that two of the measures in the recent financial future regulatory framework review consultation provided him with some comfort on the question of the regulators’ accountability to Parliament. He also asked about the timescales of the review. The Government published their consultation on 9 November, with a closing date for responses of 9 February next year. We will bring forward further detail on our approach to implementing the proposals in the review in due course.
The noble Lord asked me to outline what steps, if any, have been taken by regulators to ensure that green issues have been considered as part of their rule-making processes. He is of course correct to say that the Financial Services Bill 2021—now an Act—was amended to include
“have regard to the net-zero carbon target”,
which will apply after 1 January next year. This means that the PRA does not need to have regard to climate change considerations in making the Basel III rules, nor the FCA in making the IFPR rules, for 1 January. This was done to ensure that there is no delay in implementing the Basel III and IFPR reforms. It will be for regulators to determine how the new duty will operate in practice. The Government anticipate that it will function in much the same way as other similar obligations did during the PRA’s implementation of the Basel III standards, such as the need to have regard to the ability of firms
“to continue to provide finance to businesses and consumers in the UK”.
The PRA and the FCA are aware of the need to respond to the potential risks posed by climate change. For example, on 28 October, the PRA published its second climate change adaptation report, finding that under the existing regulatory capital framework there is scope to use capital requirements to address certain aspects of climate-related financial risks. This and future work will no doubt feed into how the PRA sets its rule from 1 January 2022.
I assure the Committee that the Government are prioritising tackling climate change. In October, we published Greening Finance: A Roadmap to Sustainable Investing, setting out our long-term ambition to green the financial system and align it with the UK’s world-leading net-zero commitment. Among other things, the road map outlines measures that we are taking to tackle greenwashing and to implement a new green taxonomy.
I remind noble Lords of this instrument’s key purpose. In short, it enables the implementation of the Basel III standards, regulation that is key to the UK’s international standing. It also updates the new IFPR definitions and takes FCA investment firms out of scope of the UK resolution regime. Finally, it irons out some of the wrinkles of existing EU regulation. I shall write to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, with a copy for the House, on some technical questions that she raised. Together, these measures will give UK firms certainty over the final elements of the Basel III standards and the IFPR regimes. I commend this instrument to the Committee.