Question for Short Debate
Asked by
To ask His Majesty’s Government what plans they have to review the powers and functions of police and crime commissioners.
My Lords, I have two objectives. The first is to draw together and reiterate a number of concerns which I have raised in speeches and in Oral Questions and Written Questions over the last four years. My concerns relate to misconduct in three of the areas where police and crime commissioners are elected under current arrangements—Wiltshire, Leicestershire and Cleveland.
My second objective is to take the Government to task for doing nothing to bear down on the cases of misconduct which have given rise to my long-standing concerns. Regarding the Government, I have tried hard to make some progress by seeking a discussion with the Home Secretary. In an Oral Question on 18 July, I asked for a meeting to be arranged which a small group, drawn from across the House, could attend. I got in touch with a few Members in the opposition parties and on the Cross Benches to see whether they could take part. Unsurprisingly, ministerial changes complicated and delayed matters over the summer, but towards the end of last month, I enlisted the help of my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom in finally fixing a date for the long-awaited meeting. On 26 September, he told me that he would pursue the matter, adding,
“I will come back to you as soon as I can.”
I have heard nothing further from him.
However, I have heard from his private office, which sent me the following email on 18 October:
“Thought I would provide an update now that we are post recess. I have reached out to the Home Secretary’s office again and due to her increasingly busy schedule she will be unable to commit to a meeting.”
The House will understand that my hopes of securing action by the Government have not been strengthened, rather it seems clearer than ever that the Government will continue to stand idly by in the face of my serious concerns. This debate is their opportunity to prove me wrong.
All this is very dispiriting, so let me make it plain that in using the limited time available to me to express worries and anxieties about specific issues, I cast no aspersions on the many police and crime commissioners, connected or unconnected with a political party, who are serving their communities with devotion and success. Since this year marks the 10th anniversary of the introduction of elected police and crime commissioners, it would be wrong not to pay tribute to what they have achieved, while at the same time expressing a little regret that they have not become better known and brought the system of which they are part widespread popularity. Opinion polls suggest that nearly half the country have never heard of them.
Here is another matter on which the Government could usefully exert themselves. If they took a sustained interest in the work of the commissioners, and made speeches about it, the public’s knowledge would increase. They have rejected other chances to show an interest in police and crime commissioners. If the noble Lord, Lord Bew, had been able to take part in this debate, he would have mentioned a report by his Committee on Standards in Public Life about police and crime commissioners. The report has been completely ignored by the Home Office.
The deep concerns that I mentioned at the outset are all connected with one person, Mike Veale. I have referred to him many times in the House over the years. He is at the centre of an issue of deep injustice. He is not a man lacking in regard for himself. In self-promoting publicity, he states, regarding his year as chief constable of Cleveland, a post from which he was forced to resign in 2019:
“I was responsible for the development and delivery of a compelling strategic vision … I am able to operate within my ethical and moral boundaries without compromising my values and integrity.”
His record tells a rather different story.
I first became aware of Mr Veale when, in 2015, as chief constable of Wiltshire and in charge of Operation Conifer, he sent officers to go through all Sir Edward Heath’s voluminous papers in the Bodleian Library, in the hope of finding evidence to show that the deceased statesman was guilty of the child sex crimes alleged by the notorious fantasist, Carl Beech, who is now serving a long prison sentence.
Veale said he was convinced that Sir Edward was “120 per cent guilty”. One of his senior officers stood outside Sir Edward’s house and appealed for witnesses against him. Veale destroyed his mobile telephone and so concealed its contents. Unable to substantiate any of the allegations against Sir Edward, he left seven of them open, neither proved nor disproved, in an obvious attempt to save face. Not a shred of evidence has been adduced to support any of these allegations against a public servant of immense distinction.
The then PCC for Wiltshire, Mr Angus Macpherson, said that he would establish an independent inquiry into Operation Conifer, but then changed his mind and called on the Government to set it up. The Government accepted that they had the power to intervene, the one exception to their normal Pontius Pilate stance, but then refused to use it. They say today that there is no need for them to do anything because Operation Conifer has now been carefully scrutinised. That was the line they took when writing in July to Lord MacGregor, a former Cabinet Minister who has now retired from the House, in reply to a letter from him sent to the Home Office one year—I repeat, one year—earlier.
That was no answer at all. Conifer has been scrutinised by the police themselves, not by an independent body. The Wiltshire PCC even allowed Veale to set up his own hand-picked scrutiny panel. Thanks to the Wiltshire PCC and a supine Home Office, Veale was left to transgress elsewhere. His brief stint as chief constable for Cleveland was investigated by the Independent Office for Police Conduct. After two years—things rarely move swiftly where police misconduct is concerned—the IOPC found in 2021 that Veale had
“breached standards of professional behaviour”.
On 2 August last year, the PCC for Cleveland announced that Veale would be referred “shortly” to an independent panel, where he would face gross misconduct proceedings. It is a legal requirement that such proceedings begin within 100 days, yet, by my rather shaky calculations, time ran out for Veale on 11 November last year. Very nearly 12 months later, proceedings have yet to begin.
During this period, Veale has been raking in an annual salary of some £100,000 as adviser to the so-called Conservative PCC for Leicestershire, one Rupert Matthews. He must have taken instruction in the Boris Johnson school of ethics. On 7 March, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked the then Minster, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford:
“Does she accept that, in many areas of public and private life, persons against whom serious allegations are made are suspended from their office, employment or other contributions to public life while an investigation is conducted? Why is that not happening here?”—[Official Report, 7/2/22; col. 1120.]
The answer he was given bore no relation to the question.
Answers, the Government say, must be sought not from them but from the relevant police and crime commissioners, so a public-spirited person, well known to me, has been doing just that. He has asked Mr Matthews several times to justify employing the discredited Veale. On 9 August last year, Matthews’s casework officer replied. Veale, she said, was being employed for six months. She added that
“it is important to note that he is currently not in breach of any misconduct regulations. The investigation is ongoing, and it would therefore be inappropriate to comment on anything in relation to that at this time”.
All further requests for a proper explanation were ignored until last month, when the same words were sent again, preceded by the following:
“This matter was discussed at the Police and Crime Panel for Leicestershire.”
Why was Veale still there long after the expiry of the six-month arrangement? To that, there was silence.
Is Cleveland more open and accountable? Not exactly. The PCC was asked in July why Veale’s misconduct hearing had not started. An executive assistant in his office replied:
“I have spoken to the Police & Crime Commissioner Steve Turner, and he has advised me this is currently being reviewed by our Chief Executive.”
In October, she was asked whether the review had been completed. The person who could supply an answer was on annual leave. She said:
“I will speak to her upon her return to the office and send you an update with regard to the review.”
At this rate, Veale will retire on a fat pension, and never answer for his misconduct.
What is needed is a Minister at the Home Office who will challenge the well-entrenched attitude in it that PCCs should be left entirely to their own devices, as if they constituted a separate estate of the realm. It is an attitude that makes effective accountability impossible. That accountability is not going to come from the small number of local electors who take an interest in the work of PCCs. Who but the elected Government is going to stop the offices of PCCs fobbing off inquirers with feeble and totally inadequate answers?
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, for securing this short debate. I agree with his every word. I want to stress that I still support the idea of police and crime commissioners representing the public of a police force area in their relationship with the police, holding chief constables to account and performing a vital community and partnership role. As the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, said, there are some superb examples of PCCs and their achievements. However, my support nowadays is sometimes sorely tested. The speech by the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, has added to my concerns.
As for the Veale case, this is a truly astonishing position. He was brought in to be my successor’s main adviser; got rid of all the others on day one, with a number of substantial contracts; and is facing a gross misconduct charge, still not decided, although it should have been decided in 100 days. Of course, he should have been suspended pending the tribunal decision, as normally happens in public life. This happened to a Minister from the other place just a few weeks ago during the Truss Government. He was immediately suspended from the Conservative Party, awaiting the result of an inquiry. That was the appropriate way to do it. I repeat the question: why has that not happened here, and why has the Home Office not insisted on it?
What has upset me as much has been what I describe as the masterful inactivity by my successor as police and crime commissioner for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland a couple of months ago, when there was much-publicised violence and trouble between minority communities in my city of Leicester. Surely it should be the priority of every police and crime commissioner to intervene and do what they can to prevent, stop and sort out community unrest of this nature by decreasing tensions, talking to the various leaders and bringing people together.
A prominent and senior Conservative asked me why I was staying silent on this. He said, “What is the point of police and crime commissioners anywhere if they do not act in such a situation as there was in Leicester a couple of months ago?” I agree with that senior Conservative. Given that, in my time, I had a deputy who understood the inner city, I believe that I and every other police and crime commissioner would have acted at once. Unfortunately, my successor did not, and a number of senior people of all kinds have confirmed what I am saying. Frankly, apart from a brief statement and a silent attendance at a post-troubles meeting with the city mayor, he kept out of it, finding displacement activities. Indeed, he was in London when the Home Secretary visited Leicester. That is just an example.
It pains me to say so, but this behaviour obviously gives police and crime commissioners a bad name. Being photographed endlessly enjoying tea and cake in beautiful Leicestershire villages is, frankly, no substitute for doing your job, and no excuse for not doing the hard grind, with the disappointments and the moments of success. That is what police and crime commissioners are elected to do, and most do it. If they choose not to do their job, particularly when it is difficult, who can blame the public for rejecting the system in place altogether?
I am sorry that I have had to say what I have said today, but I feel it strongly. I really think that it is time that the Home Office took an interest in this.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, for securing this debate and setting out for us with his habitual clarity the issues at hand. I am particularly saddened to hear that the good name of a distinguished former Prime Minister, Sir Edward Heath, has been traduced in the way that the noble Lord has described. However, I wish to approach this debate with a different focus.
Any hierarchy, any delivery of service, any public-facing organisation is fraught with multiple expectations and with the frailties and capacities of those who lead. For instance, diocesan bishops have wide discretion but are constrained by resource, custom, law, synodical structures and vocation.
The issues around effective delivery and of accountability in policing are very old. Historically, constables were at the direction of magistrates, who continued to sit on watch committees and police authorities until recent times. However, the growth in the size of forces and their operational complexity fuelled a sense of operational independence, away from political interference and amateur direction. It also allowed for co-operation at a national level where crime issues crossed county borders. Direct local accountability was seen to threaten professionalism, and it threatened the fight against crime nationally.
However, a police service insufficiently accountable fostered a culture apart from public concerns. In some places, it allowed corruption to be covered up and prejudices to become ingrained, and performance to become unchallenged. The alternatives, it seems, were national direction or local accountability, and the Government in 2011 opted for the latter by sweeping away local police authorities and replacing them, as we have heard, with directly elected police and crime commissioners.
Of the several commentaries on the progress of this innovation, the research commissioned by the National Police Chiefs’ Council in 2018 bordered on the excoriating. The more recent article by Simon Cooper in the journal Policing is more nuanced. It provides evidence for the sort of direct accountability and scrutiny the Government hoped for and for greater efficiency of action, but there is concern over idiosyncrasy of decisions, the increase in the removal of chief constables and the reluctance of suitable applicants to replace them.
This brings me to the special case of Dame Cressida Dick, who announced on 10 February this year that she would step aside as Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis in the midst of publicly expressed concerns about recent actions by the force. My thoughts on the matter are in no way related to the merits or otherwise of how the then commissioner carried out her role. Like others, however, I am concerned at the deficits in the process of removing her, identified by Sir Tom Winsor in his report of 24 August on her resignation, which was commissioned by the then Home Secretary—I have lost track of which one.
According to the former Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Dame Cressida was informed that morning that the mayor would publicly announce that same afternoon his lack of confidence and intention to begin the statutory process of removal. She had until then to act, and chose to go. The mayor, for whom I have a good deal of respect—in fact, a very great regard—has alluded to an “apparent degree of bias” in the report. There are questions about leadership and protection of the Metropolitan Police, but it remains the case that the process set down in Section 48 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 was not followed. The commissioner was not suspended. The commissioner was not formally informed of an intention that she should retire or resign and was given no opportunity to respond, and the Home Secretary’s consent was not obtained to remove her. Virtue lies in following agreed procedures when it is inconvenient to do so, not just when it is easy, especially when one is talking about a service which, in turn, is about ensuring law and order. I remain saddened and disappointed that this happened in this way.
There is some merit in examining a revision of the regulations applying to police and crime commissioners and mayors under the Act, or a code of practice on its operation, and I hope the Minister might indicate some willingness move in that direction.
My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, on obtaining this debate, and on his speech, and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Bach, on his. They clearly illustrated that there are serious problems with the current regime of the governance of the police, but there is nothing new in this. The governance of the police has always been difficult. In the middle of the last century the chief constable of Worcester was jailed for fraud. There were terrible problems with watch committees. We set up a royal commission on the police, and it pointed, in some very wise words, to the issues: that the police should be powerful but not oppressive; they should be efficient but not officious; and they should form an impartial force in the body politic, and yet be subject to a degree of control by persons who are not required to be impartial and who themselves are liable to police supervision. That encapsulates, as only royal commissions can do, the difficult issues.
However, since the police authorities regime was reformed under the guidance of that royal commission, two things have happened which transformed the position and necessitated change in the form of the introduction of police and crime commissioners. The first was the enormous growth in the power of the chief constable. This, like all changes that do not occur through legislation, occurred imperceptibly, and there is no doubt that by the early part of the current century chief constables were too powerful and needed a more effective body than the police authorities. Secondly, there had been a change in the power of the police. It used to be our view that the police ought to have just a little bit more power than the ordinary citizen. I am afraid that, with the Criminal Law Act 1967, we departed from that very long tradition of our constitution and gave the police enormous powers.
So, these two forces required reform. I do not want to criticise the change that was introduced by the introduction of police and crime commissioners. In the period where I dealt quite extensively with them, they did, on the whole, a very good job. But we have never really stood back, and this is why I so much welcome what the noble Lords, Lord Lexden and Lord Bach, have said.
There are now enough problems that we ought to have a proper review. I know that the Home Secretary has many other matters on her mind, but what about an independent review? I dare not suggest a royal commission—those are so wholly out of fashion; I just raise a number of points that require us to look at them again. First, is the way the office of police and crime commissioner is set up sensible? Not being a politician, I have always thought that the genius of our system was that politicians had a permanent office behind them that provided a degree of guidance: that there was some institution that could ensure continuity. Should not the police and crime commissioners have some sort of established office that supports them, and that has the protection of a permanent Civil Service?
Secondly—we have not thought about this enough—the police now have extensive powers to impose sanctions. They started with police cautions. Then, penalty notices were introduced, which were fine for things such as speeding, but no one has reflected properly on the extent of the problems of accountability. There was a public investigation by the police into very senior civil servants and Ministers, and yet the decision was made by the police, in an unreasoned way, as to what they did or did not do. It epitomises the growth in the use of the police as a punishing body—a body entitled to decide issues of justice—that we do not have a mechanism of accountability.
As I tried to point out during consideration of what I call the “police et cetera” Act—the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022—one of the defects is that there is nothing to provide a mechanism for supervising the penalty notices. Then, there is the problem of who holds the chief constable to account for operational matters, in so far as you can distinguish that from policy. Then, there is the whole question of the use of the police and crime commissioners in relation to criminal justice boards. I could go on and on. Of course, there is also the problem of Wales but I will not go into that tonight; that is too complicated an issue for police and crime commissioners.
All I am saying is that there is plenty of evidence that we need to look at this again, but we need to think of broader issues than these particular cases; they are the symptoms. We need to do everything with a proper regard to our constitutional rights, and acknowledge that the governance of the police is an intractable and difficult issue that has lived with us for a very long time.
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, on getting this debate. It is an interesting topic that we will keep coming back to, because we are facing legislation that will inevitably drag it to the fore.
In November 2011, the then Home Secretary Theresa May made the Policing Protocol Order, which stated:
“The establishment of PCCs has allowed the Home Office to withdraw from day-to-day policing matters, giving the police greater freedom to fight crime as they see fit, and allowing local communities to hold the police to account.”
The idea was that the public should have a direct say over policing in their area. I do not think that has happened. Although the old police authorities may not have been the ideal system, they were certainly more accessible by the average person. I was a councillor for four very long years and in my experience, people found it very easy to speak to me directly. They would stop me in the street, in the shops or in my front garden, and they were able to give me straight feedback on anything they were concerned about. When one has one person in a role of this kind, it is much harder to speak to them and to communicate. Police authorities probably worked much better and were probably more accountable.
I was on a police authority here in London for 12 years, from its start to its finish. It was a fascinating experience for somebody like me. I was possibly one of the rare types who went to protests and things like that, but not completely. We were an incredibly diverse bunch—a lot of elected people but also experts in various fields. It worked extremely well. We respected the successive police commissioners, but we also challenged them; we made them answer to us for their decisions. I think it worked extremely well.
At the moment PCCs can hire and fire police chief constables, who continue to manage things day to day. They also set the police budget and the police precept. They write the area’s policing plan and commission a range of crime-related services such as victim support. That is a very big job, and the PCCs I have spoken to need quite a lot of office help to make those things happen. Clearly, there have been many hiccups. One big problem that I have seen several times is that the chief constable resents the police and crime commissioner, and any breakdown in that relationship makes it incredibly difficult for the PCC to do their job properly.
In March this year the Home Office produced a report on a consultation it had done on giving PCCs greater powers of competence. The consultation had a staggering 84 responses—I am sure that all the groups that responded were very important—and the majority felt that PCCs should have more power. More scrutiny and accountability was also discussed. The police and crime commissioner review has considered options to strengthen the accountability and transparency of PCCs to ensure that the public can effectively hold them to account for the exercise of their functions. Given that the public find it difficult to hold them to account now, I guess that will be welcome.
Luckily, the end of the report states:
“We require primary legislation to provide PCCs with these wider powers. We will seek to implement the measures through the next appropriate legislative vehicle.”
So we lucky Peers will get the chance to debate this and suggest improvements. I rather think, given the nature of the debate today, that there might be a lot of amendments in the making.
My Lords, I too am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, for securing this debate. Liberal Democrats are in favour of greater police accountability but the system of police and crime commissioners appears to be broken, as the examples provided by other noble Lords have demonstrated.
Much criticism has been levelled at police leadership in recent years. We have seen justified criticism of the lack of Home Office involvement in the development and selection of the most senior police officers. Gone is the previous requirement that no chief constable be appointed without experience as an assistant chief constable or deputy in another force. Gone is the Home Office assessment of the suitability of candidates, including the grading of candidates for promotion. Instead, chief constables can appoint their own senior officers and PCCs can select their own chief constables—almost always the incumbent deputy.
Competition for chief officer posts in forces has all but evaporated, given the belief that the incumbent will always be selected, having developed a relationship with his or her police and crime commissioner. As we saw in the Wiltshire Constabulary case of the investigation of Sir Edward Heath, and as the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, has said, the PCC failed to launch an investigation into his own chief constable, and the Home Office then failed to hold either the chief constable or the PCC to account. Under the old tripartite system of Home Office, police authority and chief constable, the Home Secretary could and did overrule the police authority, but, because PCCs are allegedly democratically elected, they can be held to account only every four years by the electorate.
I say “allegedly” for a number of reasons. In places like Wiltshire there is an inbuilt Conservative Party majority. An Electoral Commission report in 2016 found that 72% of the electorate knew not very much or nothing at all about police and crime commissioners. With PCC elections costing £50 million a go, plus two by-elections so far—and on the last count only a 33% turnout, with voters clearly voting along party lines in most places—this is a very poor example of democracy. I understand that there are no independent police and crime commissioners left. The Home Office has abdicated responsibility for policing, placing it on police and crime commissioners who are dubiously elected on small turnouts, based on little or no public awareness, with voters voting along traditional party-political lines.
Placing too much power into the hands of one individual—in this case police and crime commissioners —creates the potential for other accountability issues. We saw this in Avon and Somerset, where inappropriate behaviour towards women was alleged against a chief constable. Vulnerable victims came forward and a case put to the police and crime commissioner, who then allegedly passed the details to the chief constable concerned, including details of the victims. While the chief constable was eventually forced to resign and has subsequently had his Queen’s Police Medal “cancelled and annulled” by the Queen, the police and crime commissioner remained in place.
The problem with the whole system of police and crime commissioners can be summed up by the current situation in the Metropolitan Police, which was placed into special measures by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, the subject of a damning report by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, with the Government blaming the de facto police and crime commissioner, and the police and crime commissioner blaming the Home Office, with the public confused as to where responsibility lies, and no one being held to account.
Liberal Democrats want police boards with similar powers to PCCs, composed primarily of local authority members, to replace police and crime commissioners. Representing a broad cross-section of constituencies and political parties, minority groups and ideas, and having responsibility for the overall funding and provision of local services, not just the police precept, most if not all of the problems with the existing system of police and crime commissioners could be overcome. At the very least, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, there are now so many problems with police and crime commissioners that a review is necessary, if not their removal and replacement.
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, on achieving this debate. His remarks were of concern to all of us. I have no doubt that, like him, we are waiting for the Minister’s response to that. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, raised similar concerns, and they deserve real answers and real steps to be taken to address them so that we are not here in six months debating the same thing. We are concerned to hear those remarks again: it undermines the whole PCC system. They might all be individual cases, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, but individual cases undermine the whole system if we are not careful, and they need to be addressed and dealt with.
The creation of PCCs was to increase public accountability, due to a belief that police authorities were not working well—although some police authorities worked really well; I heard the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones—and that a new structure of accountability was needed. There was a belief that the public were shut out of decisions with respect to the policing of their own communities and that something had to be done. Of course, the policy debate that then takes place is about what that is. How do you give the public a say without interfering with the operational independence of the police? That was the establishment of the police and crime commissioner reform that the Government took forward. The idea was a sort of compromise, and led to an individual accountable to a police and crime panel holding the chief constable to account. Various problems have emerged, and the Government themselves have recognised them and undertaken to conduct a part 1 and part 2 review. It would be helpful if the Minister could give us some idea of the Government’s thinking, following on from those reviews.
The creation of PCCs was to increase public accountability but there is still a complete lack of public understanding about the role. What is being done by the Government to increase understanding of the role—how PCCs interact with the chief constable, and how the police and crime panels work and hold police and crime commissioners to account? On democratic accountability, what is being done to increase the turnout for PCC elections? The average was 33.2% across all PCC elections in 2021, with turnout generally higher in Wales; I mention that to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. Why was that? In Durham, the turnout was 16.9%. What work have the Government done to try to understand the differences in electoral turnout between different areas, what can be done, and whether there are any lessons to be learned about that?
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, spoke about the complaints and misconduct processes. Earlier this month the review by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, found grave failings in the misconduct processes in the Metropolitan Police. We need urgent action, not only in the Met but to overhaul the whole police misconduct system. What are the Government doing in working with PCCs to look at a national reform of the misconduct process and see what can be done about that? If we do nothing, it leads to the sort of example that the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, spoke to us about.
How is best practice to be spread? Some PCCs, as noble Lords have said, have done brilliant and innovative work and made a huge difference in their area. Some police and crime panels work really well. What are the Government doing to spread that good practice? How are they trying to ensure that some of the worst-performing areas are brought up to the level of the best?
In every area, what we all seek to do is to make a police and crime commissioner system work. I agree with my noble friend Lord Bach that it was an attempt to do something about a lack of democratic accountability. Many people have had faith in police and crime commissioners but are concerned about the way that they have operated. The Government have been slow in responding to the criticism and in coming forward with their own ideas. What we seem to get is a review reviewing the review that took place, whereas what people are demanding is action and reform. The police and crime commissioners, and the police of this country, deserve that.
One of the greatest problems facing us, as we have said before to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, is the undermining of public confidence in the police. That is a huge concern to all of us across this Chamber. One way which could take us forward in dealing with it is to help police and crime commissioners work to provide the link they were supposed to provide between the public and the police. The system has not worked in the way that the Government would have expected or that all of us would have hoped but, by grasping the nettle of reform and listening to some of the criticisms and not simply objecting to them, the Government could and should find a way forward which would command support across the House.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions and very much congratulate my noble friend Lord Lexden as well on securing this important debate. I know that the topic has long been of interest to him, and a wide range of views have been expressed relating to the roles and responsibilities of police and crime commissioners this evening. I ought to remind the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the policy was introduced under the coalition Government. I do not believe that the model is broken, but I will come on to that in a second.
I also reassure my noble friend Lord Lexden that I am certainly not idle, but he may have noticed that I have had three bosses since he wrote his letter. I am still busily asking for the meeting that he requested. My predecessor asked for that meeting, which I am afraid was denied, but I will continue to persevere.
Before I get on to the bulk of the more general points, perhaps I may go into Operation Conifer to answer my noble friend Lord Lexden’s specific questions about that unfortunate case. Obviously I understand the strength of feeling on this matter. However, the Government have no plans to commission a review of either the conduct of the investigation into allegations made against Sir Edward Heath or the findings of that investigation. It is unfortunate, of course, that Operation Conifer was not able to resolve conclusively the position in respect of all the allegations made against Sir Edward Heath. I understand the desire of noble Lords to find a solution but the investigation has already been subject to considerable external scrutiny. I will go into that in a bit of detail.
There were three main bits of scrutiny. First, there was an independent scrutiny panel—I stress “independent”—to ensure proportionality. Secondly, there were two reviews by Operation Hydrant in September 2016 and May 2017, which concluded that the investigation was proportionate, legitimate and in accordance with national guidance. Thirdly, there was a review in January 2017 by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary as to whether resources assigned to the investigation by the Home Office were deployed in accordance with value-for-money principles; the review concluded that they were. Finally, the Wiltshire PCC then referred two matters regarding Mike Veale to the IOPC. That is a lot of external scrutiny, if we are being objective about this.
I am going to talk more generally about the police and crime commissioner model and try to answer all noble Lords’ specific points. We accept that policing is a unique public service, but like any public service—I think all noble Lords acknowledge this—it needs to be transparent and accountable to the public. The introduction of PCCs in 2012 has brought real local accountability to how chief constables and their forces perform, ensuring that the public have a stronger voice in policing.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, that I have no particular knowledge of his successor; I do not know him, and I do not know what he has been doing in Leicester. I would have thought that, given what the noble Lord has said about him tonight, he is very accountable to his public. If he has behaved as described, then he deserves what is coming to him. PCCs operate in the full gaze of the media and must justify their record via the ballot box. This is in stark contrast to the invisible and unaccountable police authorities that preceded them. I will go on a little bit until we get to the review, then I will talk a little about complaints.
We are approaching the 10-year anniversary of their introduction and we think it is important to recognise the vital role that PCCs play in the public safety landscape. They work with their communities to focus on local priorities, using their convening powers to drive crime-fighting efforts in their areas and advocate for victims across the criminal justice system. PCCs have a strong involvement in work to tackle some of the most significant issues facing our society, including county lines, anti-social behaviour and violence against women and girls. There are lots of examples of that. I will go back to one from my friend Katy Bourne, the PCC in Sussex. She points out that 10 years ago, for example, only 20% of police and crime plans referenced prevention and now it is included in all police and crime plans. That is a direct, positive feature of the introduction of police and crime commissioners.
I will go on to the review, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to. It is vital that PCCs continue to be strong and visible leaders in the fight against crime. That is why in July 2020 the Government announced a two-part review into PCCs to strengthen their role, to ensure that they are accountable to the public and that they have the tools and levers to carry out their role effectively. Recommendations from parts 1 and 2 were announced by Written Ministerial Statement in March 2021 and 2022 respectively.
These measures will sharpen local accountability and improve the consistency and quality of scrutiny by police and crime panels, as we were talking about earlier, and make it easier for the public to hold their PCC to account for their record on reducing crime. They will also ensure that PCCs have the necessary tools and levers to cut crime and will turn the dial on their involvement in the criminal justice system, giving PCCs a more defined role in relation to offender management and strengthening their role in key local partnerships. Of course, the proof will be in the pudding. That is why we have retained a relentless focus on delivery to realise the benefits of these important recommendations as quickly as possible. We have moved to multi-year violence reduction unit funding to facilitate long-term preventative strategies, better enabling PCCs to develop long-term strategies for reducing crime in their locality.
We have amended the specified information order to improve PCCs’ transparency by requiring them to provide a narrative on the Government’s crime outcomes, their force’s His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services performance reports and further complaint-handling information. We have also strengthened the scrutiny of PCCs by publishing new guidance for police and crime panels, including a variety of training tools such as videos, good-practice guides and sharing best practice, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. Also under discussion, and which I probably should have mentioned earlier in Questions, are regional panels. These are being looked at in terms of the police and crime panels as a way of ensuring that best practice is shared.
I take the point that publicity around the role of PCCs could be improved. I am going to get to the subject of the relationship between PCCs and chief constables. It would be important to answer the right reverend Prelate’s concerns and the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about the breakdown in communication and trust between those two roles. For a PCC to deliver to the community they serve, they need to have a strong working relationship with their chief constable. That has to recognise the operational independence of policing but also the local mandate of the PCC to deliver on local priorities.
The right reverend Prelate referred to the situation with Dame Cressida Dick. During the debate on the review of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, a week ago, I referred—at some length, I am afraid—to the mayor and MOPAC’s complex relationship with the Home Secretary in regard to this. I refer noble Lords to that in Hansard. On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I do not think that anyone is blaming anyone; it is a complex relationship, and the lines unfortunately crossed on a number of occasions.
Through the PCC review, we heard loud and clear the need for clarification of the working relationships between policing system partners. This is one of the primary reasons why we consulted on the Policing Protocol Order 2011—I note the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones—to ensure that we are able to support effective and constructive working relationships in the policing sector as well as possible. These responses are currently being considered, and we will update in due course.
We are also working with the sector to further develop the existing PCC and chief constable accountability guidance, which is designed to embed healthy working relationships between PCCs and chief constables, as well as outlining a framework for mediation for relationships that may be at risk of breaking down. We will also bring forward legislative amendments to make the chief constable suspension and dismissal process more rigorous and transparent, which in turn will make it fairer, ensuring that the chief constable has a voice.
I take the point about chief officer recruitment, which a number of noble Lords referred to. We want to ensure that there is a wide, well-rounded and diverse pool of candidates for appointment to chief officer ranks. We also want to ensure that there are consistent and high standards in selection processes. We welcome the College of Policing’s proposals for fundamental change to the current system, following a full independent review of progression and development to chief officer ranks. These measures will increase transparency and open up access to senior officer level development.
We continue to engage with local areas developing devolution deals to expand the mayoral PCC model, in line with the Government’s wider devolution and levelling-up agenda, and we have published our response to the consultation on giving PCCs greater powers of competence.
Time allows me to talk a little about the PCC complaints process, to which my noble friend Lord Lexden referred. Our announcement of the PCC review recommendations did not make specific recommendations on the PCC complaints system, and we are still committed to developing reforms in this area. This includes ensuring that there is clarity on what constitutes misconduct or a breach of expected standards by PCCs, deciding which body is best placed to handle certain types of complaints, ensuring that the system does not give rise to vexatious complaints and ensuring the effective handling of criminal allegations against PCCs.
What do the Government plan to do to prevent serious misconduct hearings being indefinitely delayed, as has happened in Cleveland? What will the Government do to get clear answers to public inquiries made to the offices of police and crime commissioners, instead of the hopeless and inadequate answers that I cited?
I am afraid I will disappoint my noble friend to some degree. As I said, we are committed to developing reforms in this area, and this will obviously need to look at the specific sets of circumstances to which he refers. I will make sure that my noble friend’s particular points are taken back and incorporated.
As I was saying, developing reforms include ensuring that there is clarity on what constitutes misconduct or a breach of expected standards by PCCs, deciding which body is best placed to handle certain types of complaints, ensuring that the system does not give rise to vexatious complaints and ensuring the effective handling of criminal allegations against PCCs. We acknowledge that we need a system that is open, transparent and fair for all parties when handling complaints. While we develop the reforms in this area, we have taken interim steps to assist. This includes publishing guidance to strengthen the quality and consistency of scrutiny by panels, more clearly explaining their roles and responsibilities—I note the point of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker—including in relation to their remit for handling PCC complaints.
The noble Lord, Lord Lexden, also asked what legal requirements exist to ensure that police and crime commissioners answer the inquiries made to them. The actions and decisions of PCCs are scrutinised by the panels, and the PCCs must provide information and answer questions raised by their PCP, where reasonable and appropriate, in line with their duties in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. Where necessary, PCCs must also respond to freedom of information requests from the public, in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
We intend to legislate to deliver those recommendations from the PCC review, which require primary legislation, as soon as parliamentary time allows. We are also fully committed to delivering the remainder of our non-legislative recommendations in conjunction with the sector by the end of this calendar year, where possible.
I am afraid I do not have any time left, but I close by saying that we seem to have debated the instances—very bad instances; no one is denying that—of one or two particularly bad apples. The fact remains that there are 39 PCCs and three mayors with PCC responsibilities and, as has been recognised, we should all acknowledge that they are, in the main, doing a very good job. I take this opportunity to thank all our sector partners for their continued support.